

## Notations on the Making of Man by Gregory of Nyssa (one of two)

### Introduction

1. This document contains the English translation On the Making of Man (henceforth referred to as Hom Op, an abbreviation of the Latin Title, De Opificio Hominis, commonly used by scholars) along with notations. That is to say, the Hom Op document itself is in bold. Set off in brackets are transliterated Greek terms (underlined definitions) and notations which are in bold. Sentences which are parenthesis belong to the original English translation

As the reader will see, Gregory makes subtle use of prepositions: not just in and by themselves but as prefaced to nouns and verbs, sometimes up to three prepositions at once. This seems to be Gregory's way of attempting to describe that which is indescribable, namely, our relationship with God through Jesus Christ. Furthermore, this can be a way Gregory expresses the intricate workings of our minds and spirits. This isn't evident at first but emerges gradually as he reflects upon human nature. I urge the reader to keep in mind the diagram at the end of this document (it's posted elsewhere on this home page as well as the Lectio Divina home page) which outlines how prepositions are used. Keep them in mind either as free-standing or prefaced to nouns and verbs with respect to that circle which can represent our minds or reality in general.

This documents represents one phase of a larger project. Now that the basic notations are inserted, chances are that they will be expanded. Updates will be posted from time to time until the entire document is completed.

The English translation has been downloaded from Christian Classics Ethereal Library([www.ccel.org](http://www.ccel.org)). An especially fine version with contains the Greek and English side by side may be found at [www.ellopos.net/elpenor/physics/nyssa-man/1.asp](http://www.ellopos.net/elpenor/physics/nyssa-man/1.asp). The Migne text is taken from Patrologiae Graecae, 44.124-256. I have omitted notations in the Preface just below and begin with Part I. References to the Migne text are in brackets, {}.

### The Text

{126}Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa, to his brother Peter, the servant of God.

If we had to honor with rewards of money those who excel [dia + phero: to bear-through, to differ] in virtue [kata + arete: according to virtue], the whole world of money, as Solomon says, would seem but small to be made equal to your virtue in the balance. Since, however, the debt [charis: graciousness, kindness] of gratitude due to your Reverence is greater than can be valued in money, and the holy Eastertide [Pascha] demands the accustomed [sunethe: sun + ethos] gift of love [agape], we offer to your greatness of mind, O man of God, a gift too small indeed to be worthy of presentation to you, yet not falling short of the extent of our power. The gift is a discourse [logos], like a mean garment, woven not without toil from our poor wit [dia + noia or noos: intelligence, purpose; cf. 5.2 as understanding Dia or through suggests thorough understanding], and the subject of the discourse, while it will perhaps be generally thought audacious, yet seemed not unfitting. For he alone has worthily considered the creation [ktisis: founding, foundation] of God who truly was created after [kata: according to] God, and whose soul was fashioned [morphoo: morphe, form, shape] in the image [eikon] of Him Who created him, -Basil, our common father and teacher, -who by his own speculation [theoria] made the sublime ordering of the universe [dia + kosmesis: setting in order, regulation] generally intelligible [gnorimos: well-known, distinguished], making the world [kosmos: order, decoration] as established by [para: from the side of, beside..genitive] God in the true Wisdom [sophia] known to those who by means of his understanding [sunesis: sun + eimi: a coming]

together, union, sagacity are led to such contemplation [theoria]: but we, who fall short even of worthily admiring him, yet intend to add to the great writer's speculations that which is lacking in them, not so as to interpolate his work by insertion [hupo + boule: suggestion, substitution] (for it is not to be thought of that that lofty mouth should suffer the insult of being given as authority for our discourses), but so that the glory of the teacher may not seem to be failing among [en: in] his disciples.

For if, the consideration [theoria] of man being lacking in his Hexaemeron [translation posted on the Gregory of Nyssa website], none of those who had been his disciples contributed any earnest effort to supply the defect, the scoffer would perhaps have had a handle against his great fame, on the ground that he had not cared to produce in his hearers any habit of intelligence [kata + noetikos: observant, intelligent]. But now that we venture according to our powers upon the exposition [exegesis: statement, narrative] of what was lacking, if anything should be found in our work such as to be not unworthy of his teaching, it will surely be referred to our teacher: while if our discourse [logos] does not reach the height of his sublime speculation [theoria], he will be free from this charge and escape the blame of seeming not to wish that his disciples should have any skill [dexios: adjective, right, fortunate; as opposed to sinister] at all, though we perhaps may be answerable to our censurers as being unable to contain in the littleness [mikrophues: of low growth, short] of our hearts the wisdom [sophia] of our instructor [kathetyetes: guide].

The scope [skopos: one that watches] of our proposed enquiry {128} [eis or into theoria] is not small: it is second to none of the wonders of the world [kosmos],-perhaps even greater than any of those known to us, because no other existing thing, save the human creation [kata or according to; anthropos ktisis], has been made like [homoioo] to God: thus we shall readily find that allowance [sug or sun + gnome: mind, thought, mark, token] will be made for what we say by kindly readers [eugnomonon: gnome, means of knowing], even if our discourse is far behind the merits of the subject. For it is our business, I suppose, to leave nothing unexamined of all that concerns man,-of what we believe to have taken place previously, of what we now see, and of the results which are expected afterwards [eisusteron: in time to come, later]. Only other reference is PG18.137c] to appear (for surely our effort would be convicted of failing of its promise, if, when man is proposed for contemplation, any of the questions which bear upon the subject were to be omitted [anexetastos: not inquired into]); and, moreover, we must fit together [sun + artao: to knit, combine], according to the explanation of Scripture and to that derived from reasoning [logismos: counting, reckoning consideration], those statements concerning him which seem, by a kind of necessary sequence [taxis: arrangement, rank, order], to be opposed, so that our whole subject may be consistent in train of thought and in order, as the statements that seem to be contrary are brought (if the Divine power [dunamis] so discovers a hope for what is beyond hope, and a way for what is inextricable, [amechanos: without means, difficult] to one and the same end: and for clearness' [sapheneia: perspicuity] sake I think it well to set forth to you the discourse [logos] by chapters, that you may be able briefly to know the force [hupo + thesis: foundation] of the several arguments of the whole work.

*The following is an outline of each of the thirty chapters found in the English translation but not in the Greek text:*

1. Wherein is a partial inquiry into the nature of the world, and a more minute exposition of the things which preceded the genesis of man.

2. Why man appeared last, after the creation.
3. That the nature of man is more precious than all the visible creation.
4. That the construction of man throughout signifies his ruling power.
5. That man is a likeness of the Divine sovereignty.
6. An examination of the kindred of mind to nature: wherein by way of digression is refuted the doctrine of the Anomoeans.
7. Why man is destitute of natural weapons and covering.
8. Why man's form is upright, and that hands were given him because of reason; wherein also is a speculation on the difference of souls.
9. That the form of man was framed to serve as an instrument for the use of reason.
10. That the mind works by means of the senses.
11. That the nature of mind is invisible.
12. An examination of the question where the ruling principle is to be considered to reside; wherein also is a discussion of tears and laughter, and a physiological speculation as to the interrelation of matter, nature, and mind.
13. A rationale of sleep, of yawning, and of dreams.
14. That the mind is not in a part of the body; wherein also is a distinction of the movements of the body and of the soul.
15. That the soul proper, in fact and name, is the rational soul, while the others are called so equivocally: wherein also is this statement, that the power of the mind extends throughout the whole body in fitting contact with every part.
16. A contemplation of the Divine utterance which said,—"Let us make man after our image and likeness;" wherein is examined what is the definition of the image, and how the passible and mortal is like to the Blessed and Impassible, and how in the image there are male and female, seeing these are not in the Prototype.
17. What we must answer to those who raise the question—"If procreation is after sin, how would souls have come into being if the first of mankind had remained sinless?"
18. That our irrational passions have their rise from kindred with irrational nature.
19. To those who say that the enjoyment of the good things we look for will again consist in meat and drink, because it is written that by these means man at first lived in Paradise.
20. What was the life in Paradise, and what was the forbidden tree.
21. That the resurrection is looked for as a consequence, not so much from the declaration of Scripture as from the very necessity of things.
22. To those who say, "If the resurrection is a thing excellent and good, how is it that it has not happened already, but is hoped for in some periods of time?"
23. That he who confesses the beginning of the world's existence must necessarily agree also as to its

end.

24. An argument against those who say that matter is co-eternal with God.

25. How one even of those who are without may be brought to believe the Scripture when teaching of the resurrection.

26. That the resurrection is not beyond probability.

27. That it is possible, when the human body is dissolved into the elements of the universe, that each should have his own body restored from the common source.

28. To those who say that souls existed before bodies, or that bodies were formed before souls: wherein there is also a refutation of the fables concerning transmigrations of souls.

29. An establishment of the doctrine that the cause of existence of soul and body is one and the same.

30. A brief consideration of the construction of our bodies from a medical point of view.

I. Wherein is a Partial Inquiry into the Nature [phusiologia: phusis + logos. Literally, nature-word. Logos generally means the inward thought that is expressed. Cf. 30.4, natural substance. It can mean the study of natural phenomena.] of the World [kosmos], and a more minute exposition [diegesis: statement] of the things which preceded the Genesis of man.

1. "This is the book of the generation of heaven and earth," says Scripture, when all that is seen [phaino: to bring to light, to appear; cf. #2 as are seen. Implied is that what is unseen is not included] was finished [sun + teleo: to accomplish; cf. #5. The preposition sun means with implying a contribution and thus forming a unity], and each of the things that are betook itself to its own separate [pros...oikeios or domestic. I.e., in the direction-towards-which with respect to that which is proper in the sense of being "domestic." This noun shows that what God had created is not impersonal but has a "home" where cosmic realities are ordered as in a home] place [thesis: arrangement; connotes a position or arrangement], when the body of heaven compassed all things round [peri + echo: to embrace, comprehend; cf. 16.1 as compasses. A term suggesting intimacy, i.e., as with regard to that which is "domestic," oikeios], and those bodies which are heavy and of downward tendency [kato + pheres: adjective; bearing downward. It can have a negative connotation, re. moral matters], the earth and the water, holding [dia + krateo: to support, hold up. The preposition dia pertains to a thorough type of holding (through), again within the context of that which is pertinent to a household. The verb is used with the preposition en or in] each other in, took the middle place of the universe [mesen tou pantos. "Universe" literally means "all." Compare it with kosmos which the New Testament applies to the world.]; while, as a sort of bond and stability [sun + desmos: a fastening and bebaiotes or firmness. The former can apply to sinews or ligaments, giving an idea of a living body. The latter can mean security.] for the things that were made, the Divine power [dunamis. This word is used frequently in Hom Op and can apply either to God or to human faculties as in 6.1 with respect to mind, noos.n] and skill [techne: craft, cunning; cf. 13.9 as art] was implanted [en + phuteuo. I.e., divine dunamis and techne are embedded in "things that were made." First they come into existence after which these two are added.] in the growth [phusis: nature. This term is found often in Hom Op and can apply to an origin, the outward form of things.] of things, guiding [heniocheo: to control a horse as with reins] all things with the reins of a double operation [energeia: activity, operation. Another term frequently found in Hom Op. Compare with dunamis which applies to strength and power; cf. #2] (for it was by rest and motion [stasis kai kinesis or stability and movement, two opposites; cf. #2] that it devised [mechanomai: to make by art, contrive. Reference is to the divine dunamis and techne which here reveal a certain cunning] the genesis of the things that were not [ne ousin , i.e., which had no being], and the continuance [dia + mone: resting place. It also means continuance and can tie in with the notion of oikos as house above] of the things that are), driving

around [peri + elauno, to ride, march. *It can apply to rounding up cattle as well as harassing. Compare with heniocheo above*], about the heavy and changeless element [phusis: nature] contributed by the creation that does not move, as about some fixed path, the exceedingly rapid motion of the sphere, like a wheel, and preserving [sun+ tereo: to guard; cf. 29.11] the indissolubility [a + dia+ lusus: that which cannot be loosened-through; cf. 11.3 as solution, without prepositions] of both by their mutual action, as the circling substance by its rapid motion [kinesis] compresses the compact body [nastos: well-kneaded cheesecake] of the earth round about, while that which is firm and unyielding, by reason of its unchanging fixedness, continually [a + dia + leiptos: not through leaving behind (leipto, the verb) augments n [epi + teino: to extend, stretch. Cf. 16.10 as transcending. This is a key concept for Gregory for the soul's continuous growth, the noun being epektasis]] the whirling motion of those things which revolve round it, and intensity [huper + bole: overshooting, excess] is produced in equal measure in each of the natures which thus differ in their operation, in the stationary nature, I mean, and in the mobile revolution; for neither is the earth shifted from its own base, nor does the heaven ever relax in its vehemence, or slacken its motion.

2. These, moreover, were first framed [pro + kata + skeuazo: to prepare beforehand. Cf. 4.1 as make. The verb, often prefixed with the preposition kata, is frequent in Hom Op] before other things, {129} according to the Divine wisdom [sophia: can apply to skill, acquaintance with a thing which bestows sound judgment; cf. #4], to be as it were a beginning [arche: the first principle of a thing and can apply to a royal rule as in 2.1, dominion] of the whole machine [mechanama: engine as used in sieges], the great Moses indicating, I suppose, where he says that the heaven and the earth were made by [para] God “in the beginning” that all things that are seen [phaino: to appear. Frequently used in Hom Op and can refer to a manifestation; cf. #4 as see] in the creation are the offspring of rest and motion [stasis kai kinesis: cf. #1 just above], brought into being by [kata: according to] the Divine will [boule: determination, design. Compare with thelema as in 4.1]. Now the heaven and the earth being diametrically opposed [diistemi: to separate, be at variance. Next found at end of this section, “distinct.” It is followed by the preposition pros, direction-towards-which] to each other in their operations [energeia; also in #2], the creation which lies between the opposites, and has in part a share in what is adjacent to it [para + keimai: to lie beside & meta + echo: to have with. For the former, cf. 28.4, “adjacent stage” & for the latter, cf. #3 as partakes], itself acts as a mean [mesiteuo: to act as a mediator. Cf. #3, “to act as a mediator] between the extremes, so that there is manifestly a mutual contact [sun + apheia: connection, union, junction; cf. 15.3] of the opposites through the mean; for air in a manner imitates the perpetual motion [aei + kinetos] and subtlety of the fiery substance, both in the lightness of its nature, and in its suitability [epi + tedeios; cf. 29.9, “concerned”] for motion; yet it is not such as to be alienated [sug + geneia: kinship; not in Greek text] from the solid substance, for it is no more in a state of continual flux [dia + pantos or through-all; rheo: to flow] and dispersion [skedannemi: to disperse] than in a permanent state of immobility [aei menon akinetos: always remaining unmoved], but becomes, in its affinity [oikeiotes: relationship; cf. 23.3 as “likeness.” This noun is related to oikos, “house”] to each, a kind of borderland [methorion] of the opposition between operations [energeia], at once uniting [mignumi: to mix] in itself and dividing [dia + aireo: to divide, cleave. Dia intimates through, full penetration; cf. 8.5 as make a division] things which are naturally distinct [diistemi].

3. In the same way, liquid substance also is attached [harmozo: to fit together, regulate; cf. 24.7, adapted to, with preposition en] by double qualities to each of the opposites; for in so far as it is heavy and of downward tendency it is closely akin [sug + geneia; cf. 5.6 as kindred] to the earthy; but in so far as it partakes [meta + echo: to have with; cf. #5 as share] of a certain fluid and mobile energy it is not altogether alien from the nature which is in motion; and by

means of this also there is effected a kind of mixture and concurrence [mixis kai sun + hodos: way, path; *for hodos, cf. 25.9*] of the opposites, weight being transferred to motion, and motion finding no hindrance in weight, so that things most extremely opposite in nature combine [sum + baino: to go with; *cf. 6.3, agree with*] with one another, and are mutually joined by those which act as means [mesiteuo: to act as a mediator] between them.

4. But to speak strictly, one should rather say that the very nature of the contraries [phusis ton anti + keimenon: to lay opposite] themselves is not entirely without mixture of properties, each with [pros: direction towards-which, signifying dynamic action] the other, so that, as I think, all that we see [phaino: to appear ; *cf. 2.1 as appear before, with ana*] in [kata: according to which indicates a specific way of seeing or manifesting phaino] the world [kosmos: frequently mentioned in *Hom Op* which intimates a decoration or something ordered, and so the “contraries” are put within a certain order] mutually agree [neuo: to nod. A human gesture signifying the living nature of this kosmos], and the creation, though discovered in properties of contrary natures, is yet at union [sum + pneo: to breathe together. Another indicator of the living reality of kosmos] with [pros or towards-which with respect to the kosmos, a dynamic \pard cs3 “breathing-together” not turned in upon itself but to adorn (kosmeo) the kosmos] itself. For as motion is not conceived merely as [kata or according to] local shifting [topike: something which pertains to a given place. Meta + stasis. A standing-after or removal; *cf. 22.2, as change*], but is also contemplated [theoreo. *Cf. 5.1 as contemplated. In the case at hand, theoreo is used both re. “local shifting” and re. “change and alteration”*] in change and alteration [trope or a turning; *cf. 14.2 as mutation. Alloiosis: differs from trope in the sense of becoming something different; cf. 14.2*], and on the other hand the immovable [a + meta + titheimi. Literally, “not placed after.” Minus the negation the verb means “to place among to transpose”] [pros + iemi: to send towards] motion by way of alteration, the wisdom [sophia] of God has transposed [en + allasso: to divert, exchange] these properties [idiotes: peculiar nature], and wrought unchangeableness [a + treptos] in that which is ever moving, and change [trope: mutation, 14.2] in that which is immovable; doing this, it may be, by a providential dispensation [pro + metheia: foresight & oikonomeo], so that that property of nature [to tes phuseos idion: that which is peculiar or private of nature] which constitutes its immutability [a + trepton] and immobility [a + meta + theton: *cf. 21.1 as immutability*] might not, when viewed in any created object, cause the creature to be accounted [nomizo: to practice, be the custom. *The sense is to hold something as normative and thus accepted by everyone, also in #4 as considered*] as God; for that which may happen to move or change would cease to admit of the conception of Godhead [hupolepsin theotetes. *Implied is an assumption based upon a certain confidence bordering upon arrogance*]. Hence the earth is stable without being immutable, while the heaven, on the contrary, as it has no mutability, so has not stability either, that the Divine power [dunamis; *cf. 2.1*], by interweaving [sum + pleko: implies an entangling involvement in mutual relations] change in the stable nature and motion with that which is not subject to change, might, by the interchange [en + allasso: *cf. 6.2, with the preposition ex*] of attributes [idiotes: peculiar nature, property; *cf. 16.12*], at once join [pros + oikeo: to associate with. *The preposition implies full affiliation which is dynamic, towards-which, cf. 4.1 as swayed, with dia*] them both closely to each other, and make them alien from [peri: here, in the sense of concerning] the conception [hupo + lepsis; *cf. 12.13 as opinion*] of Deity [theios, adjective; *cf. 22.8: Greek text has theios, divine*]; {132} for as has been said, neither of these (neither that which is unstable, nor that which is mutable) can be considered [nomizo, *i.e., be normative and therefore a decisive factor; cf. 2.1 as reckoned*] to belong to the more Divine nature [theiotes; *cf. 5.2 as Godhead*].

5. Now all things were already arrived at their own end [telos: fulfillment, completion; *cf. 16.6*] “the heaven and the earth,” as Moses says, “were finished [sun + teleo: compare the two instances of telos & teleo. *The preposition sun or with intimates all elements were brought together successfully, cf. 30.4 as contribute*],” and all things that lie between them, and the particular things were adorned [dia +

komizo: to carry, convey thoroughly, dia or through] with their appropriate beauty [kallon; cf. 3.1]; the heaven with the rays of the stars, the sea and air with the living creatures that swim and fly, and the earth with all varieties of plants and animals, to all which, empowered by the Divine will [boule; cf. 3.1 as counsel], it gave birth together; the earth was full, too, of her produce, bringing forth fruits at the same time with flowers; the meadows were full of all that grows therein, and all the mountain ridges, and summits, and every hillside, and slope, and hollow, were crowned with young grass, and with the varied produce of the trees, just risen from the ground, yet shot up at once into their perfect beauty; and all the beasts that had come into life at God's command were rejoicing, we may suppose, and skipping about, running to and for in the thickets in herds according to their kind, while every sheltered and shady spot was ringing with the chants of the songbirds. And at sea, we may suppose, the sight to be seen was of the like kind, as it had just settled to quiet and calm in the gathering together of its depths, where havens and harbors spontaneously hollowed out on the coasts made the sea reconciled with the land; and the gentle motion of the waves vied in beauty with the meadows, rippling delicately with light and harmless breezes that skimmed the surface; and all the wealth of creation by land and sea was ready, and none was there to share [meta + echo; cf. 8.4 as partakes] it.

II. Why Man Appeared Last [teleutaios: in the sense of summing up or completing], After the Creation.

1. For not as yet had that great and precious [timios: held in honor] thing, man, come into [epi + choreo: to give way. *The sense is to be in accord with, to take possession of*] the world of being [ton onton, plural; used here with *kosmos* implying a kind of ornament decorated by these beings]; it was not to be looked for that the ruler [archo: verb, the one who begins or leads the way] should appear before [ana + phaino; cf. 29.4] the subjects of his rule; but when his dominion [arche: that which belongs to one who engages in *archo* just noted; cf. 5.1 as sovereignty] was prepared, the next step was that the king should be manifested [ana + deiknumi: to to lift up and show. *Implied is a public proclamation; also in #1*]. When, then the Maker [poietes: implies one who composes a poem] of all had prepared beforehand [pro + eu + trepizo: to adjust], as it were, a royal lodging in [kata + goge: an inn or halting place; literally, a bringing-down] for the future king (and this was the land, and islands, and sea, and the heaven arching like a roof over them), and when all kinds of wealth had been stored in this palace (and by wealth I mean the whole creation, all that is in plants and trees, and all that has sense, and breath, and life; {133} and-if we are to account materials also as wealth-all that for their beauty are reckoned [nomizo: cf. 16.1 as accounted] precious in the eyes of men, as gold and silver, and the substances of your jewels which men delight in-having concealed, I say, abundance of all these also in the bosom of the earth as in a royal treasure-house), he thus manifests [ana + deiknumi: c. 16.17, with *sun* added] man in the world, to be the beholder [theates: spectator; from *theomai*, one who beholds] of some of the wonders therein, and the lord of others; that by his enjoyment he might have knowledge [sun + esis: a coming together, quick comprehension. *Man thus brings together by his beholding that which is created*] of the Giver, and by the beauty and majesty of the things he saw might trace out [ana + ichneuo: to trace back. *I.e., follow back to the source*] that power [dunamis (3.1); used with arrhetos: unspoken; cf. 17.2 as unspeakable] of the Maker which is beyond speech and language.

2. For this reason man was brought into the world last [teleutaios; cf. 16.18] after the creation, not being rejected to the last as worthless [apo + bletos: that which is thrown away], but as one whom it behooved to be king over his subjects at his very birth. And as a good host [hestiator: one who gives a banquet] does not bring his guest to his house [leis + oikizo; cf. 10.6 as being introduced] before the preparation of his feast, but, when he has made all due preparation

[para + skeuazo; cf. 4.1 as make, with kata. The verb is prefaced by various prepositions], and decked with their proper adornments [kosmos] his house, his couches, his table, brings his guest home when things suitable for his refreshment are in readiness, rain the same manner the rich and munificent Entertainer [hestiator] of our nature [phusis], when He had decked [kata + kosmeo: to set in order, arrange; cf. 12.9, adorned] the habitation with beauties of every kind, and prepared this great and varied banquet, then introduced [eis + ago: to lead into] man, assigning to him as his task not the acquiring of what was not there, but the enjoyment of the things which were there; and for this reason He gives [kata + ballo: to bring down, deposit; cf. 23.9, was laid] him as foundations the instincts [kata + skeue: preparation, furnishings; cf. 3.1, the making] of a twofold organization [aphorme: starting point, origin], blending [eg + kata + mignumi: implies a mixing but one according to or kata the organization just noted] the Divine with the earthy, that by means of both he may be naturally and properly [sug + genos kai oikeios: the latter, next in 8.5] disposed to each enjoyment, enjoying God by means of his more divine nature, and the good things of earth by the sense [aisthesis: perception] that is akin [dia with homogenes, of the same family or race] to them.

### III. That the Nature of Man is More Precious Than All the Visible [phaino] Creation.

<sup>1.</sup> 1. But it is right that we should not leave this point without consideration [a + theoretos: i.e., that which is not subject to theoría], that while the world, great as it is, and its parts, are laid as an elemental [stoicheiodos: adverb, pertaining to the elements of creation. It can also apply to that which introductory and the order of letters; cf. 30.5 as elements] foundation for the formation of the universe [sus + stasis: a standing together, constitution & pan or all. Compare pan or all things with kosmos. Here kosmos precedes pan and acts as a pattern for it; cf. #2 as formation], the creation is, so to say, made offhand [apo + schediazō: connotes something done on the spur of the moment or done at random] by the Divine power [dunamis: compare with the more deliberate act of tracing out the Maker's dunamis in 3.1], existing [hupo + istemi: to stand under as support. Implied is an abiding presence with regard to the divine command or pros + tagne where pros directs this presence; cf. 16.12 as being] at once on His command, while counsel [boule: used for creation in 1.2 which intimates that God had consulted someone; cf. #2] precedes the making [kata + skeue; cf. 6.3 as formation] of man; and that which is to be is fore-shown [pro + tupoo: to mold beforehand: as a result of boule, counsel. The image here is that an image of man is made before his body] by the Maker [technites: artificer, craftsman; cf. 4.1 as artificers and connotes one skilled in a given art] in verbal description [dia tes tou logou graphes: by description of the word; i.e., verbally where the image of man is conceived], and of what kind it is fitting that it should be, and to what archetype [archetupos: first formed. The preposition pros is used, direction towards-which. Here several archetypes are intimated which requires that boule already noted; cf. #2 as archetypal] it is fitting that it should bear a likeness [homoiotes; cf. 4.1], and for what it shall be made, and what its operation [energeia: can mean energy in the sense of action; cf. 6.1] shall be when it is made, and of what it shall be the ruler, all these things the saying examines beforehand, so that he has a rank [axia: worthiness] assigned him before his genesis, and possesses rule over the things that are before his coming [para + erchomai: literally, to go by or beside. It connotes a presence to things yet to be made which is important but secondary to man being made in the divine image; cf. 16.1 as pass away, with sun] into being; for it says, "God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and the beasts of the earth, and the fowls of the heaven, and the cattle, and all the earth."

2. O marvelous! a sun is made, and no counsel [boule: not required as in #1 above regarding man; cf. 17.2 as determined by] precedes; a heaven likewise; and to these no single thing in creation is equal. So great a wonder is formed by a {135} word [rhema: cf. 23.1, the subject of speech. Compare

with *logos* in next sentence] alone, and the saying indicates neither when, nor how, nor any such detail. So too in all particular cases, the aether, the stars, the intermediate air, the sea, the earth, the animals, the plants, -all are brought into being with a word [logos], while only to the making of man does the Maker of all draw near [pros + iemi: cf. 26.6, to be at one's disposal. Such drawing near is present in the words of Genesis, "Let us make," etc. I.e., it implies a pros or towards-which] with circumspection [perieskemmenos: adverb. Verb is peri + skeptomai, to look all around. God seems to be cautious as to anyone else watching what he is about to do], so as to prepare beforehand [pro + etoimazo: indicates preparation for one's special use] for him material for his formation [sus + stasis: literally, a standing together (of elements going into the creation of man in the divine image and likeness; cf. 24.1 as existence], and to liken his form [morphe: frequently used in Hom Op and connotes a shape or appearance; cf. 4.1] to an archetypal [archetupos; cf. 4.1] beauty, and, setting before him a mark [skopos: goal: from root skeptomai just noted. Cf. 33.2] for which he is to come into being, to make [demiourgeo: to fabricate, practice a trade. The object is human nature or phusis] for him a nature appropriate and allied to [pros: direct attention to is inferred] the operations, and suitable for [pros, again] the object in hand.

IV. That the Construction [kata + skeuel] of Man Throughout Signifies [epi + semaino: to set a mark upon] His Ruling Power [archiken exousian].

1. For as in our own life [literally, in this life] artificers [technites: skilled workman. Compare with demiourgos as in 5.1, a framer or one who works for other people] fashion [schematizo: to form, figure. The noun is schema, a form or figure. Cf. 20.3; connotes making an arrangement] a tool [organon: organ; cf. 6.1 as organ] in the way suitable to its use, so the best Artificer [aristos + technes. The adjective connote nobility, excellence] made our nature as it were a formation [skeuos: an instrument. Compare with organon, from skeuzo as in 6.3 (with kata), forms] fit for the exercise [energeia; cf. 6.1 as operation] of royalty, preparing [demiourgeo: to practice a trade; also in #1 as was created] it at once by superior advantages [proterema: victory] of soul, and by the very form [schema: figure; cf. 23.3 as figurān . Compare with morphe as in 3.2 just above, whereas the former connotes the character of something] of the body, to be such as to be adapted for [pros: as towards-which, an immediate realization of this royalty] royalty: for the soul immediately shows its royal and exalted [epermenon] character, far removed as it is from the lowliness [tapeinotes: humility] of private station [idiotikos: adverb; cf. 1.4, peculiar nature] in that it owns no lord [a + despotes; cf. 22.27 as Lord, without a], and is self-governed [autos + exousios: self-realized authority], swayed [dia + oikeo: to govern; cf. 8.4 as ordered. Dia or through suggests thorough penetration by the will or thelema.] autocratically by its own will; for to whom else does this belong than to a king? And further, besides these facts, the fact that it is the image [eikon; cf. 5.1] of that Nature [phusis; cf. 5.1] which rules over [dunasteuo: exercising dunamis] all means nothing else than this, that our nature was created [demiourgeo; cf. 29.2 as made] to be royal from the first [euthus: directly, immediately]. For as, in men's ordinary use [sun + etheia: habitual intercourse, intimacy, habit, custom. Prefaced by the adverb kata, according to], those who make [kata + skeuazo; i.e., in accord with princes; also in #1] images of princes both mold [ana + masso: to receive an impression, wipe off] the figure [charakter: a mark engraved or impressed; cf. 5.2 as stamp] of their form [morphe; cf. 5.1], and represent along with [sum + para+ grapho: to write alongside, express at the same time. Two prepositions: sun or with and para or alongside in the sense of in addition. Cf. 17.3 as describe, with dia] this the royal rank by the vesture of purple, and even the likeness is commonly [pard ul sun + etheia; cf. 20.1 as use. Connotes habituation, custom] spoken of as "a king," so the human nature also, as it was made [kata + skeuazo] to rule the rest, was, by its likeness to [homoiotes pros: direct relation with or pros the King cf. 3.1 above. For noun, cf. 5.2 as image] the King of all, made as it were a living [empsuchos: cf. 8.7, animate or having a psuche] image, partaking [to koinoneo: have dealings with; to have koinonia] with the archetype [archetupos; cf. 6.3] both in rank

and in name, not vested in purple, nor giving indication [epi + semaino: literally, to sign-upon; cf. 8.1 as to show] of its rank by scepter and diadem (for the archetype itself is not arrayed with [en or in; not identified with that which is exterior] these), but instead of the purple robe, clothed in virtue, which is in truth the most royal of all raiment, and in place of the scepter, leaning on [ereido: to prop, support] the bliss [makariotes: happiness; cf. 5.1 as bliss] of immortality [athanasia], and instead of the royal diadem, decked [kosmeo; cf. 12.9 as adorned, with kata] with the crown of righteousness; so that it is shown to be perfectly [dia & akribeia: literally, through accuracy, cf. 5.2. Implied is minute observance] like to [pros: direct relationship with beauty] the beauty [kallon; cf. 5.1] of its archetype in all that belongs to the dignity [axioma: honor, reputation] of royalty. {137} V. That Man is a Likeness [homoioima] of the Divine Sovereignty [basileia].

1. It is true, indeed, that the Divine beauty [kallon] is not adorned [aglaizo: to make bright, take delight in. This verb signifies honor; compare with the more common kosmeo as in 12.9 which connotes order] with any shape [skema; cf. 7.1, figure] or endowment of form [eumoiria: happy possession of something. It is used here with morphe, similar to skema, which seems more external or even superficial than morphe], by any beauty of color [euchroia: can apply to complexion], but is contemplated [theoreo; cf. 8.4 as considered] as excellence [kata & arete or according to excellence. Compare the visibleness of kallon, skema & morphe with the less visible nature of arete or in accord with arete. Arete also in #1.] in unspeakable bliss [makariotes; cf. 16.4 as blessedness]. As then painters transfer [meta + phero; also in #1] human forms [morphe; also in #1] to their pictures by the means of certain colors, laying on their copy the proper and corresponding tints, so that the beauty of the original [archetupon: literally, beginning figure in the sense of an outline] may be accurately transferred to [meta + phero pros; cf. 18.2, without pros] the likeness [homoioima: a lesser used word derived from homoioo], so I would have you understand [noeo: to observe, notice; cf. 11.3 as perceive. Frequently this verb has prepositions prefixed to it] that our Maker [plastēs: molder. Next found in #2 as fashioner. Implied is that the person so making has material to work with] also, painting the portrait to resemble His own beauty [pros to idion kallos; i.e., in the direction of his own beauty], by the addition [epi + bole: casting upon. This follows the active nature of pros. Bole is used often with the prepositions meta & ana as 13.1 & 21 respectively] of virtues [ain arete as excellency in this same section], as it were with colors, shows in us His own sovereignty [arche: the divine “beginning” or dominion present in us; cf. 7.1]; and manifold [polos + eidos; cf. 6.1 as diverse] and varied are the tints, so to say, by which His true form [morphe; compare with the human one in this section; cf. 6.3] is portrayed [ana + zoos + grapheo: to paint completely, delineate; literally upon-life-to write]: not red, or white, or the blending of these, whatever it may be called, nor a touch of black that paints the eyebrow and the eye, and shades, by some combination, the depressions in the figure, and all such arts which the hands of painters contrive [epi + technaomai; cf. 17.4. The verb without preposition means to execute skillfully], but instead of these, purity, freedom from passion [a + patheia. Implies lack of sin; cf. 12.1, the noun with sum], blessedness [makariotes; cf. 16.4], alienation [allotriosis: estrangement] from all evil, and all those attributes of the like kind [genos: race, family] which help to form [morpheo; cf. 17.1 as fashioned] in men the likeness [homoiosis; used here with pros or towards the likeness of God; cf. 18.4] of God: with such hues as these did the Maker [demiourgos; cf. 23.4 as creator] of His own image [eikon; cf. #2 as likeness] mark [dia + charasso: to sever, divide, give shape. It connotes a sharpening as from the verb minus the preposition] our nature [phusis].

2. And if you were to examine [sun + ex + tazo: to search out and examine together; cf. 10.4 with dia & ex] the other points also by which the Divine beauty [kallon; cf. 18.5] is expressed [charaterizo: to designate by a characteristic mark. The verbal root is charasso as in #1 above. Implied is that God bestows a personal character], you will find that to [pros: i.e., the “other points” have this dynamic pros relationship] them too the likeness [eikon; also in #2] in the image [homoiotēs. Here eikon is situated within the homoiotēs; cf. 9.1 as likeness] which we present is perfectly [dia & akribeia; as in 4.1]

preserved [sozo: to save, keep]. The Godhead [theiotes; cf. 6.1] is mind [noos; cf. 9.1. Often spelled as *noos* as in 6.1] and word [logos]: for “in the beginning was the Word” and the followers of Paul “have the mind of Christ” which “speaks” in them: humanity too is not far removed [porro] from these: you see in yourself word and understanding [dia + noia: intelligence, purpose; cf. 6.3, with *exo*], an imitation [mimema: copy] of the very Mind [noos] and Word. Again, God is love [agape], and the fount of love: for this the great John declares, that “love is of God,” and “God is love”: the Fashioner [plastēs: molder; cf. #1] of our nature has made this to be our feature [prosopon: face, outward appearance] too: for “hereby,” He says, “shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you love one another”:-thus, if this be absent [*i.e.*, *not present*: para + eimi: to be near, present; cf. 8.5], the whole stamp [charakter; cf. 6.2 as *character*] of the likeness [eikon] is transformed [meta + poieo: to alter the mark; *connotes remodeling*]. The Deity beholds [epi + blepo: to look upon; for *blepo*, cf. 10.5] and hears all things, and searches [dierneunao: to examine closely; *prefaced with dia implying thoroughness; also in #2*] all things out: you too have the power of apprehension [anti + lepsis: a receiving in turn; cf. 8.4 as *activity, with anti*] of things by means of sight and hearing, and the understanding [dia + noia; cf. 10.5] that inquires into things and searches [dierneunao] them out.

VI. An Examination [exetasis: review] of the Kindred [sug + geneia] of Mind [noos pros] to Nature: Wherein, by Way of Digression, is Refuted the Doctrine [dogma] of the Anomoeans

1. And let no one suppose [oiomai: to hold an opinion] me to say that the Deity [to theion; cf. 12.9] is in touch [epi + apto: to bind on; cf. 12.8 as *touching with pros*] with existing things in a manner resembling human operation [energeia; cf. 13.6], by means of different faculties [dunamis: alternately as power, also in #1]. For it is impossible to conceive [kata + noeo: to observe well. *Literally as to know according to; cf. 8.3 as to consider*] in the simplicity [haplotes: singleness, frankness] of the Godhead [theiotes; cf. 5.2] the varied and diverse [polos + eidos; cf. 5.1] nature of the apprehensive operation [anti + leptikos: susceptible; *from anti + lambano, to receive instead of*] not even in our own case are the faculties which apprehend things numerous, although we are in touch with those things which affect our life in many ways by means of our senses [aisthesis; cf. #2 as *perception*]; {140} for there is one faculty [dunamis; cf. 7.1 as *powers*], the implanted mind [noos; cf. 8.4] itself, which passes through [diexeimai: to recount in full] each of the organs of sense and grasps [epi + drassomai; cf. 10.3 as *apprehends*] the things beyond: this it is that, by means of the eyes, beholds what is seen; this it is that, by means of hearing, understands what is said; that is content with what is to our taste, and turns from what is unpleasant; that uses the hand for whatever it wills, taking hold or rejecting by its means, using the help [sun + ergia: cooperation; cf. 17.3, *assistance*] of the organ [organon; cf. 9.3 as *instrument*] for this purpose precisely as it thinks expedient.

2. If in men, then, even though the organs formed [kata + skeuazo; cf. 4.4] by nature for [pros; *in the direction towards which*] purposes of perception [aisthesis; cf. 8.4] may be different, that which operates and moves by means of all, and uses each appropriately for the object before it, is one and the same, not changing [sun + ex + allasso: to change with; *ex suggests a coming from this change*] its nature by the differences of operations, how could any one suspect [katopteuo: to spy out, observe] multiplicity of essence [ousia; cf. 8.5] in [epi: upon] God on the ground of His varied [polumeres: consisting of many parts] powers? For “He that made the eye,” as the prophet says, and “that planted the ear,” stamped on [en + semaino: to give signs; cf. 8.1 as *show with preposition epilain*] human nature these operations to be as it were significant characters [charakter; cf. 5.2 as *stamp*], with reference to their models [para + deigma: pattern; cf. 10.5 as *illustration with preposition hupo*] in Himself: for He says, “Let us make man in our image.”

3. But what, I would ask, becomes of the heresy [haireisis: a taking and choosing] of the Anomoeans? what will they say to this utterance? how will they defend [dia + sozo: to save] the vanity of their dogma in view of the words cited? Will they say that it is possible that one image [eikon; cf. 9.1] should be made like [homoioo; cf. 16.3 as likened] to different forms [morphe; cf. 28.3 as shapes]? if the Son is in nature [kata ten phusin; according to nature] unlike [anoimoios: dissimilar] the Father, how comes it that the likeness He forms [kata + skeuazo; cf. 8.8 as suitable] of the different natures is one? for He Who said, "Let us make after our image," and by the plural signification revealed the Holy Trinity, would not, if the archetypes [archetupos] were unlike one another, have mentioned the image in the singular: for it would be impossible that there should be one likeness displayed of things which do not agree with [sum + baino: to go with; cf. 27.7 as happens] one another: if the natures were different he would assuredly have begun their images also differently, making the appropriate image for each: but since the image is one, while the archetype is not one, who is so far beyond the range of understanding [exo dia + noia: outside understanding; cf. 8.2 as thought] as not to know that the things which are like the same thing, surely resemble one another? Therefore He says (the word, it may be, cutting short this wickedness at the very formation [kata + skeue; cf. 8.1] of human life), "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness."

VII. Why Man is Destitute [gumnos: naked] of Natural Weapons and Covering.

1. But what means the uprightness of his figure [skema; cf. 5.1]? and why is it that those powers [dunamis; cf. 8.4] which aid [sum + phuo: to grow together, with pros; connotes mutual assistance with a given purpose. Cf. 27.5 as is allied, with pros] life do not naturally belong to his body? But man is brought [para + ago: to mislead, lead by] into [epi; as descending upon life] life bare of natural covering, an unarmed and poor being, destitute of all things useful, worthy, according [kata] to appearances [to phainomenon; cf. 20.4 as glamour], of pity rather than of admiration, not armed with prominent horns or sharp claws, nor with hoofs nor with teeth, nor possessing by nature any deadly venom in a sting, -things such as {141} most animals have in their own power for defense against those who do them harm: his body is not protected with a covering of hair: and yet possibly it was to be expected that he who was promoted [pro + tasso: to protect, appoint beforehand; cf. 10.2 as appointed, without pro] into rule over [eis & arche; literally, into the rule or beginning. Also in #1] the rest of the creatures should be defended by nature with arms of his own so that he might not need assistance from others for his own security. Now, however, the lion, the boar, the tiger, the leopard, and all the like have natural power sufficient for their safety: and the bull has his horn, the hare his speed, the deer his leap and the certainty of his sight, and another beast has bulk, others a proboscis, the birds have their wings, and the bee her sting, and generally in all there is some protective power implanted by nature: but man alone of all is slower than the beasts that are swift of foot, smaller than those that are of great bulk, more defenseless than those that are protected by natural arms; and how, one will say, has such a being obtained the sovereignty [arche; cf. 14.1 as beginnings] over [kata; according to; can intimate arche in accord with the nature of all things] all things?

2. Well, I think it would not be at all hard to show that what seems to be a deficiency [epi + dees] of our nature is a means [aphorme: starting point, origin; cf. 27.9 as beginning] for [pros] our obtaining dominion over the subject [hupo + cheir: to be under hand] creatures. For if man had had such power as to be able to outrun the horse in swiftness, and to have a foot that, from its solidity, could not be worn out, but was strengthened by hoofs or claws of some

kind, and to carry upon him horns and stings and claws, he would be, to begin with, a wild looking and formidable creature, if such things grew with his body: and moreover he would have neglected his rule over the other creatures if he had no need of the co-operation of his subjects; whereas now, the needful services of our life are divided among the individual animals that are under our sway, for this reason-to make our dominion over them necessary.

3. It was the slowness and difficult motion of our body that brought the horse to supply our need, and tamed him: it was the nakedness of our body that made necessary our management of sheep, which supplies the deficiency of our nature by its yearly produce of wool: it was the fact that we import from others the supplies for our living which subjected beasts of burden to such service: furthermore, it was the fact that we cannot eat grass like cattle which brought the ox to render service to our life, who makes our living easy for us by his own labor; and because we needed teeth and biting power to subdue some of the other animals by grip of teeth, the dog gave, together with his swiftness, his own jaw to supply our need, becoming like a live sword for man; and there has been discovered by men iron, stronger and more penetrating than prominent horns or sharp claws, not, as those things do with the beasts, always growing naturally with us, but entering into alliance with us for the time, and for the rest abiding by itself: and to compensate for the crocodile's scaly hide, one may make that very hide serve as armor, by putting it on his skin upon occasion: or, failing that, art fashions iron for this purpose too, which, when it has served him for a time for war, leaves the man-at-arms once more free from the burden in time of peace: and the wing of the birds, too, ministers to our life, so that by aid of contrivance {144} we are not left behind even by the speed of wings: for some of them become tame and are of service to those who catch birds, and by their means others are by contrivance subdued to serve our needs: moreover art contrives to make our arrows feathered, and by means of the bow gives us for our needs the speed of wings: while the fact that our feet are easily hurt and worn in traveling makes necessary the aid which is given by the subject animals: for hence it comes that we fit shoes to our feet.

VIII. Why Man's Form [schema] is Upright; And that Hands Were Given Him Because of Reason [logos]; Wherein Also is a Speculation [philosophia] on the Difference of Souls.

1. But man's form is upright, and extends [ana + teino; cf. 13.2 as exerting with the preposition sun] aloft towards [pros; in the direction towards which] heaven, and looks upwards: and these are marks [archikos: adjective, from arche; signifies being fit to rule] of sovereignty which show [epi + semaino; cf. #2 as signify, with the preposition en] his royal dignity. For the fact that man alone among [en; presence in existing things] existing things is such as this, while all others bow their bodies downwards, clearly points to the difference [dia + phora: distinction; cf. 14.2 as varieties] of dignity between those which stoop beneath his sway and that power which rises above them: for all the rest have the foremost limbs of their bodies in the form of feet, because that which stoops needs something to support it: but in the formation [kata + skeue; cf. #8 as organization] of man these limbs were made hands, for the upright body found one base, supporting its position securely on two feet, sufficient for its needs.

2. Especially do these ministering hands adapt [sun + ergos: i.e., work together] themselves to the requirements [hupo + ergia] of the reason [logos]: indeed if one were to say that the ministration [huperesia; cf. 10.1 as service] of hands is a special property of the rational [logikos; can pertain to speech, logos; cf. #1] nature, he would not be entirely wrong; and that not only because his thought [dia + noia; cf. #5 as mind] turns to the common and obvious fact that we signify [en + semaino; cf. 22.4 as indicates with the preposition para] our reasoning [logos] by means of

the natural employment of our hands in written characters. It is true that this fact, that we speak by writing, and, in a certain way, converse by the aid of our hands, preserving sounds by the forms of the alphabet, is not unconnected with the endowment of reason [logikos; cf. #4 as *rational*]; but I am referring to something else when neI say that the hands co-operate [sun + ergo; cf. 13.5 as *co-operating*] with the bidding of reason [logos].

3. Let us, however, before discussing this point, consider [kata + noeo: to observe well; cf. 11.2 as *understood*] the matter we passed over (for the subject of the order [taxis: arrangement, rank, order; cf. #7. Compare with *akolouthia* in #5 with *implies sequence*. The idea of sequence fits well with the *kata katanoeo*] of created things almost escaped our notice), why the growth of things that spring from the earth takes precedence, and the irrational animals come next, and then, after the making of these, comes man: for it may be that we learn [manthano: to perceive by the senses, comprehend; cf. 12.4 as *aware*] from these facts not only the obvious thought, that grass appeared to the Creator useful for the sake of the animals, while the animals were made because of man, and that for this reason, before the animals there was made their food, and before man that which was to minister [hupereteo: to do service on board ship, to serve; verbal root to *huperesia* in #2] to human life.

4. But it seems to me that by these facts Moses reveals [para + deloo: to intimate. The preposition implies an indirect manifestation] a hidden doctrine [kekrummenon dogma; cf. 12.9], and secretly [dia & aporetos: ineffable, not to be spoken; with *dia*, through this ineffability; cf. 17.2 as *mysteries*] delivers [para + didomai; cf. 16.9 as *conveys*. Implies a handing-beside, present yet not fully so] that wisdom [philosophia; cf. #7 as *doctrine*] concerning the soul, of which the learning [paideusis: culture, instruction; often applied to rearing children] that is without [exothēn: cf. 16.1 as *heathen or those who are not Christian*] had indeed some imagination [phantazo: to appear, imagine; cf. 13.7 as *beguile*], but no clear comprehension [kata + noeo (verb); cf. #8 as *devised with the preposition epi*]. His discourse ne[logos] then hereby teaches us that the power [dunamis; cf. #5 as *faculty*] of life and soul may be considered [theoreo; also in #4 as *is to be seen*] in three divisions. For one is only a power of growth and nutrition supplying what is suitable for the support of the bodies that are nourished, which is called the vegetative soul, and is to be seen [theoreo; cf. 7.7 as *conceived: object is vegetative soul; compare with object of katanoeo*] in plants; for we may perceive [kata + noeo: cf. 11.2 as *understood*] in growing plants a certain vital power [dunamis: object of *katanoeo* (compare with object of *theoreo*)] destitute of sense [aisthesis; cf. #5]; {145} and there is another form [eidōs: that which is seen; cf. #5 as *kind*] of life besides this, which, while it includes the form above mentioned, is also possessed in addition of the power of management [oikonomeo: to regulate; cf. 12.9 as *govern*] [a + logos; cf. #5] animals: for they are not only the subjects of nourishment and growth, but also have the activity [anti + lepsis: support, exchange; cf. 10.7 as *perception*] of sense and perception. But perfect [teleios; cf. #5 as *last*] bodily life is seen in the rational [logikos] (I mean the human) nature, which both is nourished and endowed with sense, and also partakes [meta + echo: to be with or meta reason; cf. 12.8] of reason and is ordered [dia + oikeo: to manage; cf. #5 as *regulated*. I.e., *noos order through or dia*] by mind [noos; cf. 6.1].

5. We might make a division [dia + airesis; cf. 1.2 as *dividing verb*] of our subject [logos] in some such way as this. Of things existing, part are intellectual [noetos; cf. 11.1 as *intelligible*], part corporeal [somatikos]. Let us leave alone for the present the division [tome; connotes what is left over after cutting] of the intellectual according to its properties [oikeios: belonging to the house, related; used with *pros*; cf. 10.5 as *being on close terms*], for our argument [logos] is not concerned with these. Of the corporeal, part is entirely devoid of life, and part shares [meta + echo; cf. 12.8 as *partakes*] in vital energy [zotikes energeias]. Of a living body, again, part has sense [aisthesis; as in 14.1] conjoined [suzao: to live with one another] with life, and part is without sense: lastly,

that which has sense is again divided into rational [logikos; cf. #8] and irrational [a + logos; cf. 15.2 as animal]. For this reason the lawgiver says that after inanimate [a + psuchos or without a psuche or soul; cf. 29.5] matter (as a sort of foundation for the form of animate things), this vegetative life was made, and had earlier existence in the growth of plants: then he proceeds to introduce the genesis of those creatures which are regulated [dia + oikeo: to administer, manage a house; cf. 12.13 as governed] by sense: and since, following the same order [akolouthia: sequence, succession, here with kata; cf. #7 as sequence], of those things which have obtained life; in the flesh, those which have sense can exist by themselves even apart from the intellectual [noeros: related to noos; also in #5] nature, while the rational principle could not be embodied save as blended [suy + kerannumi: to unite closely] with the sensitive, -for this reason man was made last [teleutaios; s24 cf. 16.18] after the animals, as nature advanced [proiemi: to govern, manage; cf. 29.4 as concurrently, with sum] an orderly course [akolouthos, adverb] to perfection [pros to teleion; cf. teleutaios just noted]. For this rational animal [logikon zoon], man, is blended [kata + kirnao: to mix, fuse; kata implies according to a sequence, order as with akolouthia] of every form [idea: outward appearance cf. 12.10] of soul; he is nourished by the vegetative kind [eidos; cf. #8. Compare with idea, form just noted] of soul, and to the faculty [dunamis; also in #5] of growth was added that of sense, which stands midway, if we regard its peculiar nature, between the intellectual [noeros; also in #5] and the more material essence [ousia] being as much coarser than the one as it is more refined than the other: then takes place a certain alliance and commixture of the intellectual essence with the subtle [leptos: peeled, husked] and enlightened element [photos + eides: like light] of the sensitive nature: so that man consists of these three: as we are taught the like thing by the apostle in what he says to the Ephesians praying for them that the complete grace of their “body and soul and spirit [suma, psuche, pneuma]” may be preserved at the coming of the Lord; using, the word “body” for the nutritive part, and denoting the sensitive by the word “soul,” and the intellectual by “spirit.” Likewise too the Lord instructs the scribe in the Gospel that he should set before every commandment that love to God which is exercised with all the heart and soul and mind [dia + noia; cf. 9.2, understanding]: for here also it seems to me that the phrase indicates the same difference, naming the more corporeal existence [kata + stasis; cf. 12.14 as condition] “heart,” the intermediate “soul,” and the higher nature, the intellectual [dia + noia; cf. 10.6 as understanding] and mental faculty [poietike dunamis; adjective as something made & can apply to poetry], {148} “mind” [noeros; cf. 9.1, intelligible].

6. Hence also the apostle recognizes three divisions [dia + phora: difference; cf. 15.1 as definition] of dispositions [pro + airesis: a choosing before, plan; cf. 16.14, tendency], calling one “carnal,” which is busied with the belly and the pleasures connected with it, another “natural,” which holds a middle position with regard to virtue and vice, rising above the one, but without pure participation [meta + echo; cf. 12.9 as partakes] in the other; and another “spiritual,” which perceives [en + thereo: to see in] the perfection [to teleion; cf. #7 as last] of godly life [politeia or citizenship which here is kata or according to God; cf. 22.8 as conversation]: wherefore he says to the Corinthians, reproaching their indulgence in pleasure and passion, “You are carnal,n ” and incapable of receiving the more perfect doctrine; while elsewhere, making a comparison of the middle kind with the perfect, he says, “but the natural man receives not the things of the Spirit: for they are foolishness unto him: but he who is spiritual judges all things, yet he himself is judged of no man.” As, then, the natural man [psuchikos: concerning with this life only; cf. 14.2 as animating] is higher than the carnal, by the same measure [ana + logia: proportion] also the spiritual man [pneumatikos; cf. 20.1] rises above [huper + ana + istemai: connotes a beyond followed by up to] the natural.

7. If, therefore, Scripture tells us that man was made last [teleutao: to complete, finish], after every animate thing [empuschos; cf. 9.2 as animated], the lawgiver is doing nothing else than declaring to us the doctrine [philosophia kata] of the soul, considering that what is perfect comes last [to teleion en teleutaiois], according [epi: upon] to a certain necessary sequence [akolouthia] in the order of things [taxis; cf. 18.8 with sun, as arrangement]: for in the rational are included the others also, while in the sensitive there also surely exists the vegetative form, and that again is conceived [theoreo; cf. 11.3 as contemplate] only in connection with what is material: thus we may suppose that nature makes an ascent as it were by steps [bathmos: degree]-I mean the various properties of life-from the lower to the perfect form [epi to teleion; epi as upon suggests full completion; cf. 15.2 as perfection].

8. Now since man is a rational animal [logikos; cf. 10.1], the instrument [organon; cf. 9.3] of his body must be made suitable [kata + skeuazo; cf. 16.18] for the use of reason [logos]; as you may see musicians producing their music according to the form [eidōs; cf. 13.6 as part] of their instruments, and not piping with harps nor harping upon flutes, so it must needs be that the organization [kata + skeue; cf. 9.1] of these instruments of ours should be adapted [katalasso: to change] for reason, that when struck by the vocal organs it might be able to sound properly for the use of words. For this reason the hands were attached to the body; for though we can count up very many uses in daily life for which these skillfully contrived and helpful instruments, our hands, that easily follow every art and every operation, alike in war and peace, are serviceable, yet nature added them to our body pre-eminently for the sake of reason. For if man were destitute of hands, the various parts of his face would certainly have been arranged like those of the quadrupeds, to suit the purpose of his feeding: so that its form would have been lengthened out and pointed towards the nostrils, and his lips would have projected from his mouth, lumpy, and stiff, and thick, fitted for taking up the grass, and his tongue would either have lain between his teeth, of a kind to match his lips, fleshy, and hard, and rough, assisting his teeth to deal with what came under his grinder, or it would have been moist {149} and hanging out at the side like that of dogs and other carnivorous beasts, projecting through the gaps in his jagged row of teeth. If, then, our body had no hands, how could articulate sound have been implanted in it, seeing that the form of the parts of the mouth would not have had the configuration proper for the use of speech, so that man must of necessity have either bleated, or `baaed,` or barked, or neighed, or bellowed like oxen or asses, or uttered some bestial sound? but now, as the hand is made part of the body, the mouth is at leisure for the service of the reason. Thus the hands are shown to be the property of the rational nature [logike phusis], the Creator having thus devised [epi + noeo: to intend, purpose; cf. 23.4 as conceived with sun] by their means a special advantage for reason.

1. Now since our Maker [poieo; verb] has bestowed upon our formation [plasma: anything molded; cf. 16.18 as work. The verb implies malleability] a certain Godlike grace [theoeide charis; i.e. charis which is "eidōs" God], by implanting in His image [eikon; cf. 12.9] the likeness [homoiotes; noted next in 9.3] of His own excellences [agathos, adjective], for this reason He gave, of His bounty [philotimia: ambition, display; literally as love of honor], His other good gifts to human nature; but mind [nous] and reason [phronesis: purpose, intention. It connotes prudence in daily life] we cannot strictly say that He *gave* [italics in English text], but that He imparted [meta + didomai] them, adding [epi + ballo: casting upon; cf. 23.4 as implant] to the image the proper adornment [kosmos; cf. 23.1 as universe] of His own nature. Now since the mind is a thing

intelligible [noeros; cf. 12.2 as *intelligent*] and incorporeal [a + somatos; cf. 12.3], its grace would

have been incommunicable and isolated, if its motion [kinesis; cf. 13.1] were not manifested [phaneroo; cf. 29.3] by some contrivance [epi + noia: *conception, reflection; i.e., a nous which is epi or upon. Compare with dia + noia or through-ness as in #2*]. For this cause there was still need of this instrumental organization [kata + skeue; cf. 12.6], that it might, like a plectrum, touch the vocal organs and indicate by the quality of the notes struck, the motion within.

2. And as some skilled [empeiros: *experienced; implies acquaintance*] musician, who may have been deprived by some affection of his own voice, and yet wish to make his skill [epi + isteme: *acquaintance, science*] known, might make melody with voices of others, and publish his art by the aid of flutes or of the lyre, so also the human mind [nous; cf. 10.3] being a discoverer of all sorts of conceptions [noema: *that which is perceived, purpose, design*; cf. 10.2], seeing that it is unable, by the mere soul, to reveal to those who hear by bodily senses the motions of its understanding [dia + noia; cf. 15.2 as *intellect*], touches, like some skillful composer, these animated [empsychos; cf. 30.33] instruments, and makes known its hidden thoughts by means of the sound produced upon them.

3. Now the music of the human instrument [organon; cf. 4.1] is a sort of compound [sum + miktos] of flute and lyre, sounding together in combination as in a concerted piece of music. For the breath, as it is forced up from the air-receiving vessels through the windpipe, when the speaker's impulse to utterance attunes the harmony to sound, and as it strikes against the internal protuberances which divide this flute-like passage in a circular arrangement, imitates in a way the sound uttered through a flute, being driven round and round by the membranous projections. But the palate receives the sound from below in its own concavity, and dividing the sound by the two passages that extend to the nostrils, and by the cartilages about the perforated bone, as it were by some scaly protuberance, makes its resonance louder; while the cheek, the tongue, the mechanism of the pharynx by which the chin is relaxed when drawn in, and tightened when extended to a point-{152} all these in many different ways answer to the motion of the plectrum upon the strings, varying very quickly, as occasion requires, the arrangement of the tones; and the opening and closing of the lips has the same effect as players produce when they check the breath of the flute with their fingers according to the measure of the tune.

X. That the Mind [noos] Works [en + ergeo] by Means of the Senses.

1. As the mind then produces the music of reason by means of [dia or through] our instrumental construction [kata + skeue: *that is, through or dia along with kata or according to*], we are born rational [logikos; next noted in 14.2], while, as I think, we should not have had the gift of reason [logos] if we had had to employ our lips to supply the need of the body-the heavy and toilsome part of the task of providing food. As things are, however, our hands appropriate this ministration to themselves, and leave the mouth available for the service [huperesia: *body of rowers*; cf. 8.3] of reason.

2. The operation [en + ergeia; cf. #7] of the instrument, however, is twofold; one for [pros] the production of sound, the other for the reception of concepts [noema: perception, thought; cf. #3] from without; and the one faculty does not blend [epi + mignumi; cf. 9.3, *miktos re compound*] with [pros] the other, but abides [para + meno: to be at hand; i.e., remains nearby] in the operation for which it was appointed [tasso: to fall into order] by nature, not interfering with its neighbor either by the sense of hearing undertaking to speak, or by the speech undertaking to hear; for the latter is always uttering something, while the ear, as Solomon somewhere says, is not filled with continual hearing.

3. That point as to our internal faculties [ton en hemin or literally, those in us] which seems to me to be even in a special degree matter for wonder, is this:-what is the extent [platos: breadth, width] of that inner receptacle [endothern chormema: room] into which flows everything that is poured in by our hearing? Who are the recorders [hupo + mnematographos: or one who commits to memory by writing] of the sayings that are brought in by it? What sort of storehouses are there for the concepts [noema; cf. 16.9 as subject] that are being put in by our hearing? And how is it, that when many of them, of varied kinds, are pressing one upon another, there arises no confusion and error in the relative position of the things that are laid up there? And one may have the like feeling of wonder also with regard to the operation of sight; for by it also in like manner the mind [nous; cf. #4] apprehends [epi + drassomai: to lay hold of; cf. 21.2 as apprehended, without epi] those things which are external to the body, and draws to itself the images [eidolon: phantom; cf. 12.2 as representation] of phenomena, marking in itself the impressions [charakter; cf. 12.9 as figure] of the things which are seen.

4. And just as if there were some extensive city receiving all comers by different entrances, all will not congregate at any particular place, but some will go to the market, some to the houses, others to the churches, or the streets, or lanes, or the theaters, each according to his own inclination [gnome: means of knowing, mind; cf. 16.11 as decision], -some such city of our mind [nous; cf. #5] I seem to discern established [sun + oikizo: to live together; cf. #6, with eis as being introduced] in us, which the different entrances through the senses keep filling, while the mind, distinguishing [philo + krineo: literally, to love to distinguish] and examining [dia + ex + tazo: to scrutinize thoroughly; cf. 12.13 as discussed, minus dia] each of the things that enters, ranks [enapotithemai: to store up] them in their proper departments [topos: place; cf. 12.3 as place] of knowledge [gnosis; cf. #5].

5. And as, to follow the illustration [hupo + deigma: token, mark; cf. #6] of the city, it may often be that those who are of the same family and kindred do not enter by the same gate, coming in by different entrances, as it may happen, but are none the less, when they come within the circuit of the wall, brought together again, {153} being on close terms with each other [pros allelous oikeios: or having familiarity pros or towards each other] (and one may find the contrary happen; for those who are strangers and mutually unknown often take one entrance to the city, yet their community [koinonia; cf. 12.10 as communication] of entrance does not bind them together; for even when they are within they can be separated to join their own kindred); something of the same kind I seem to discern [blepo: to see; cf. 18.7 as behold] in the spacious territory [euruchoria: broadness, capacity for containing] of our mind [nous; cf. 11.1]; for often the knowledge [gnosis; cf. #7] which we gather [sun + ageiro: to assemble] from the different organs of sense is one, as the same object is divided into several parts in relation to the senses; and

again, on the contrary, we may learn from some one sense many and varied things which have no affinity [sun + baino: to go with; used with kata ten phusin, according to nature] one with another.

6. For instance-for it is better to make our argument [logos] clear [dia + saphenizo] by illustration [hupo + deigma; cf. 16.2 as examples]-let us suppose that we are making some inquiry into [peri: or concerning] the property of tastes-what is sweet to the sense, and what is to be avoided by tasters. We find, then, by experience [peira: trial, experiment; cf. 20.3], both the bitterness of gall and the pleasant character of the quality of honey; but when these facts are known, the knowledge is one which is given to us (the same thing being introduced [eis + oikizo: to bring in as a dweller] to our understanding [dia + noia; cf. 12.2] in several ways) by taste, smell, hearing, and often by touch and sight. For when one sees honey, and hears its name, and receives it by taste, and recognizes [epi + gignosko: to have full knowledge; cf. 11.2 as know] its odor by smell, and tests it by touch, he recognizes [gignosko: to know] the same thing by means of each of his senses.

7. On the other hand we get [didasko: to learn] varied and multiform [polueideos] information by some one sense, for as hearing receives all sorts of sounds, and our visual perception [anti + lepsis: receiving in turn, support; cf. 5.2 as apprehension] exercises its operation [en + ergeia] by beholding [theoria: noun; cf. 12.13 as speculation] things of different kinds-for it lights alike on black and white, and all things that are distinguished by contrariety of color,-so with taste, with smell, with perception [kata + noesis: observation; cf. 24.2] by touch; each implants in us by means of its own perceptive power [dia tes oikeias antilepseos] the knowledge [gnosis] of things of every kind.

XI. That the Nature of Mind [no word in Greek text] is Invisible [a + theoretos; cf. 3.1].

1. What then is, in its own nature, this mind [nous; used with kata, according to its own nature] that distributes [epi + merizo: to impart; cf. 21.9, divided (without epi)] itself into faculties [dunamis] of sensation, and duly receives [ana + lambano: to engage in, to take up; cf. 16.1 as resume with epi], by means of each, the knowledge [gnosis; cf. #4] of things? That it is something else besides the senses, I suppose no reasonable man [emphron: shrewd, sensible; cf. 13.5, conscious] doubts; for if it were identical with sense, it would reduce the proper character [oikeiotes: relationship, intimacy. Cf. 11.1, character. It is related to the verbal root oikos already noted, house] of the operations carried on by [kata: in the sense of according to] sense to one, on the ground that it is itself simple, and that in what is simple no diversity [poikilos: literally, many colored] is to be found. Now however, as all agree that touch is one thing and smell another, and as the rest of the senses are in like manner so situated with regard to each other as to exclude intercommunion [a + koinonetos: excommunication. Related to koinonia, fellowship] or mixture, we must surely suppose, since the mind is duly present [para + istemi. Cf. 22.5. The preposition para, often used, intimates a being-besides and just within reach though not fully] in each case, that it is something else besides the sensitive nature, so that no variation may attach to a thing intelligible [noetos; cf. #2].

2. "Who has known the mind of the Lord?" the apostle asks; and I ask further, who has

understood [kata + noeo: to observe well; cf. 16.13 as consider. Kata intimates setting in order, mentally] his own mind? Let those tell us who consider the nature of God to be within {156} their comprehension [kata + lepsis: a seizing, taking possession; cf. #4], whether they understand [kata + noeo; cf. 16.13, consider. Note two uses of kata in close succession or according to] themselves-if they know [epi + gignosko: to know-upon. Cf. 23.3 as known, without epi] the nature of their own mind. "It is manifold and much compounded [polus + sunthetos: of many elements]." How then can that which is intelligible [noetos; cf. 12.1] be composite? Or what is the mode [tropos: direction, way; cf. 17.2] of mixture of things that differ in kind? Or, "It is simple [aplous] and incomposite [a + sunthetos]." How then is it dispersed [dia + speiro: to scatter abroad] into the manifold divisions of the senses? how is there diversity [to poikilon: many-colored] in unity [monotes]? how is unity maintained in diversity?

3. But I find the solution [luisis: a setting free; cf. 17.1] of these difficulties by recourse [ana + trecho: to jump up and run] to the very utterance [phone: voice; cf. 16.1, word] of God; for He says, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." The image is properly an image so long as it fails in none of those attributes which we perceive [noeo: to observe, think; cf. 15.1, conceive] in the archetype [archetupos; cf. 16.3]; but where it falls from its resemblance [homoiotes; cf. 16.3] to the prototype [prototupos; cf. 12.9, archetypal] it ceases in that respect to be an image; therefore, since one of the attributes we contemplate [theoreo] in [peri: around] the Divine nature is incomprehensibility [to a + kata + lepton: that which is unable to be grasped; implies inability of kata not to make according to. Cf. #4] of essence [ousia; cf. 14.3, substance], it is clearly necessary that in this point the image should be able to show its imitation [mimesis; cf. 16.3] of the archetype.

4. For if, while the archetype transcends comprehension [kata + lepsis; used with huper for transcends, or beyond], the nature of the image were comprehended [kata + lambano; cf. 16.4, apprehended], the contrary character of the attributes we behold [epi + theoreo: to see upon; cf. 156.13, contemplated] in them would prove the defect of the image; but since the nature of our mind, which is the likeness of the Creator evades [dia + pheugo: to escape-through] our knowledge [gnosis], it has an accurate resemblance [akribos or sharp; used with homoiotes & preposition pros, direction towards-which] to the superior nature [to huper + keimenon: that which lies above], figuring by its own unknowableness [a + gnostos] the incomprehensible [a + kata + lepton] Nature.

XII. An Examination [ex + etasis] of the Question Where the Ruling Principle is to Be Considered [nomizo] to Reside; Wherein Also is a Discussion of Tears and Laughter, and a Physiological [pusiologia: study of natural phenomenon] Speculation as to the Inter-Relation [koinonia] of Matter, Nature, and Minds.

1. Let there be an end [sigao: to be silent], then, of all the vain and conjectural [stochastikos: able to guess] discussion of those who confine the intelligible [noetos; cf. 15.3 as inconceivable with ana & epi] energy to certain bodily organs; of whom some lay it down that the ruling principle [to hegemonikon: ready to lead, guide; cf. #2] is in the heart, while others say that the mind [nous] resides in the brain, strengthening such opinions [epi + noia: notion, purposea; cf. 17.4 as contrivance] by some plausible superficialities. For he who ascribes [pros + tithemi] the

principal authority to the heart makes its local position evidence of his argument (because it seems that it somehow occupies the middle position in the body, on the ground that the motion of the will is easily distributed from the center to the whole body, and so proceeds to operation; and he makes the troublesome and passionate disposition [dia + thesis: arrangement; cf. 13.17 as disposition] of man a testimony for his argument [logos], because such affections seem to move this part sympathetically [pros ten sum + patheia]. Those, on the other hand, who consecrate the brain to reasoning [logismos: counting, reckoning, consideration; cf. 13.5], say that the head has been built by nature as a kind of citadel of the whole body, and that in it the mind dwells like a king, with a bodyguard of senses surrounding it like messengers and shield-bearers. And these find a sign [semeion; cf. 17.2 as marks] of their opinion [hupo + noia: a hidden thought, conjecture; cf. 16.5 as inferences] in the fact that the reasoning of those who have suffered some injury to the membrane of the brain is abnormally distorted, and that those whose heads are heavy with intoxication ignore {157} what is seemly.

2. Each of those who uphold these views puts forward some reasons of a more physical character [aitia: charge; cf. 23.4 as existence] on behalf of his opinion [doxa] concerning the ruling principle [to hegemonikon]. One declares that the motion which proceeds from the understanding [dia + noia; cf. 12.13 as reason] is in some way akin to [pros] the nature of fire, because fire and the understanding are alike in perpetual motion; and since heat is allowed to have its source in the region of the heart, he says on this ground that the motion of mind [nous] is compounded with the mobility of heat, and asserts that the heart, in which heat is enclosed, is the receptacle of the intelligent [noeros; cf. 9.1] nature. The other declares that the cerebral membrane (for so they call the tissue that surrounds the brain) is as it were a foundation or root of all the senses, and hereby makes good his own argument [logos], on the ground that the intellectual [noetikos] energy cannot have its seat save in that part where the ear, connected with it, comes into concussion with the sounds that fall upon it, and the sight (which naturally belongs to the hollow of the place where the eyes are situated) makes its internal representation [eidolon; cf. 13.10 as shadows] by means of the images that fall upon the pupils, while the qualities of scents are discerned in it by being drawn in through the nose, and the sense of taste is tried by the test of the cerebral membrane, which sends down from itself, by the vertebrae of the neck, sensitive nerve-processes to the isthmoidal passage, and unite them with the muscles there.

3. I admit it to be true that the intellectual part [to dia + noetikon: that which is through the intellect; cf. #4] of the soul is often disturbed [epi + tarasso: troubled upon] by prevalence [epi + kratesis: a conquest upon] of passions [pathema: suffering; implies a calamity, misfortune]; and that the reason [to logismon: argument, counting; cf. 18.3] is blunted by some bodily accident so as to hinder its natural operation [en + ergeia; cf. #13]; and that the heart is a sort of source of the fiery element in the body, and is moved [sug + kineo: in the sense of being stirred up (with)] in correspondence with the impulses of passion [thumodes: adjective; as substantive, the active, non-rational principle in the soul; used with pros] and moreover, in addition to this, I do not reject (as I hear very much the same account from those who spend their time on anatomical researches) the statement that the cerebral membrane (according to the theory of those who take such a physiological view), enfolding in itself the brain, and steeped in the vapors that issue from it, forms a foundation for the senses; yet I do not hold this for a proof [apo +

dexis] that the incorporeal [a + somatos; cf. 16.3] nature is bounded [em + peri + erchomai: to encompass or in-concerning-to] by any limits of place [topos with peri + grapho, to draw a line around].

4. Certainly we are aware [manthano: to perceive by the senses, comprehend; cf. 17.9 as learn] that mental aberrations [para + phora: a going aside] do not arise from heaviness of head alone, but skilled physicians declare [epi + istamai: to know, be assured; implies acquaintance with] that our intellect [to dia + noetikon; cf. #3 above] is also weakened by the membranes that underlie the sides being affected by disease, when they call the disease frenzy, since the name given to those membranes is frenes [Greek word in the English text; singular is phren, midriff, heart, mind]. And the sensation resulting from sorrow is mistakenly supposed to arise at the heart; for while it is not the heart, but the entrance of the belly that is pained, people ignorantly refer the affection to the heart. Those, however, who have carefully studied [epi + skopeo: to examine, regard, a beholding upon; cf. 18.2 as survey] the affections in question give some such account as follows:-by a compression and closing of the pores, which naturally takes place over the whole body in a condition of grief, everything that meets a hindrance in its passage is driven to the cavities in the interior {160} of the body, and hence also (as the respiratory organs too are pressed by what surrounds them), the drawing of breath often becomes more violent under the influence of nature endeavoring to widen what has been contracted, so as to open out the compressed passages; and such breathing we consider a symptom of grief and call it a groan or a shriek. That, moreover, which appears to oppress the region of the heart is a painful affection, not of the heart, but of the entrance of the stomach, and occurs from the same cause (I mean, that of the compression of the pores), as the vessel that contains the bile, contracting, pours that bitter and pungent juice upon the entrance of the stomach; and a proof of this is that the complexion of those in grief becomes sallow and jaundiced, as the bile pours its own juice into the veins by reason of excessive pressure.

5. Furthermore, the opposite affection, that, I mean, of mirth and laughter, contributes to establish the argument; for the pores of the body, in the case of those who are dissolved in mirth by hearing something pleasant, are also somehow dissolved and relaxed. Just as in the former case the slight and insensible exhalations of the pores are checked by grief, and, as they compress the internal arrangement of the higher viscera, drive up towards the head and the cerebral membrane the humid vapor which, being retained in excess by the cavities of the brain, is driven out by the pores at its base, while the closing of the eyelids expels the moisture in the form of drops (and the drop is called a tear), so I would have you think that when the pores, as a result of the contrary condition, are unusually widened, some air is drawn in through them into the interior, and thence again expelled by nature through the passage of the mouth, while all the viscera (and especially, as they say, the liver) join in expelling this air by a certain agitation and throbbing motion; whence it comes that nature, contriving to give facility for the exit of the air, widens the passage of the mouth, extending the cheeks on either side round about the breath; and the result is called laughter.

6. We must not, then, on this account ascribe the ruling principle [to hegemonikon; cf. 18.6 as ruling element] any more to the liver than we must think, because of the heated state of the blood about the heart in wrathful dispositions, that the seat of the mind [nous] is in the heart [kardia]; but we must refer these matters to the character of our bodily organization [kata + skeue; cf. 16.6 as creation], and consider that the mind is equally in contact with each of the

parts according to a kind of combination [anakrasis: a mixing with others] which is [kata ton aphraston: according-to-which-cannot-be-spoken] indescribable.

7. Even if any should allege to us on this point the Scripture which claims the ruling principle for the heart, we shall not receive the statement without examination [anex + tasis]; for he who makes mention of the heart speaks also of the reins [nephros: kidneys], when he says, “God tries the hearts and reins”; so that they must either confine the intellectual principle [to noeron; cf. 16.9 as intellectual element] to the two combined or to neither.

8. And although I am aware that the intellectual [noetikos; cf. 16.9 as intelligent, with dia] energies are blunted, or even made altogether ineffective in a certain condition [dia + thesis: disposition, arrangement; cf. 18.7}{161}] of the body, I do not hold this a sufficient evidence [tekmerion: also as sign, proof; cf. 18.1] for limiting the faculty [dunamis] of the mind [nous] by any particular place, so that it should be forced out of its proper amount of free space by any inflammations that may arise in the neighboring parts of the body (for such an opinion is a corporeal one, that when the receptacle is already occupied by something placed in it, nothing else can find place there); for the intelligible nature neither dwells in the empty spaces of bodies, nor is extruded by encroachments of the flesh; but since the whole body is made like some musical instrument [organon; last noted 9.3], just as it often happens in the case of those who know how to play, but are unable, because the unfitness of the instrument does not admit of their art, to show their skill (for that which is destroyed by time, or broken by a fall, or rendered useless by rust or decay, is mute and inefficient, even if it be breathed upon by one who may be an excellent artist in flute-playing); so too the mind, passing over [dieko: to extend, reach] the whole instrument, and touching [pros + apto: to fasten, attach] each of the parts in a mode corresponding to its intellectual activities, according to its nature, produces its proper effect on those parts which are in a natural condition, but remains inoperative and ineffective upon those which are unable to admit the movement of its art; for the mind is somehow naturally adapted to be in close relation with [pros] that which is in a natural condition [kata phusin dia + keimenon oikeios: literally as with all the following according to nature disposed properly], but to be alien from that which is removed from nature.

9. And here, I think there is a view [theorema: sight, principle; cf. 12.13 as thought] of the matter more close to nature, by which we may learn something [kata to meros] of the more refined [asteios: of the town, refined] doctrines [dogma; cf. 12.14 as opinion]. For since the most beautiful [kalliston] and supreme [exochos: standing out] good of all is the Divinity [to theion; cf. 16.4 as Deity] Itself, to [pros] which incline [neuo: to bend, assent] all things that have a tendency [epheisis: a throwing at, appeal] towards what is beautiful and good, we therefore say that the mind [nous], as being in [kata: i.e., according to the image or eikon intimating following in its train] the image of the most beautiful, itself also remains [dia + meno: in the sense of remaining through; used with preposition en or in] in beauty and goodness so long as it partakes [meta + echo; cf. 12.13 as share] as far as is possible in its likeness to [pros or in the direction of this archetype] the archetype; but if it were at all to depart from this it is deprived [gumnazo: to train naked, wear out; cf. 24.1 as divested] of that beauty in which it was. And as we said that the mind was adorned [kata + kosmeo; cf. 2.2 as decked according to] by the likeness of the archetypal [prototupos] beauty, being formed [morphao; cf. 16.13 as fashioned] as though it were a mirror to receive the figure [charakter; cf. #10] of that which it expresses [emphanizo], we consider that the nature which is

governed [oikonomeo: cf. #11; *implies ordered as a household*] by it is attached to the mind [nous] in the same relation [analogia: cf. 19.1 *as analogy*], and that it too is adorned by the beauty that the mind gives, being, so to say, a mirror of the mirror; and that by it is swayed and sustained [sun + echo: cf. #11] the material element of that existence [hupo + stasis: cf. 15.3 *as being*] in [peri] which the nature is contemplated [theoreo].

10. Thus so long as one keeps in touch with the other [*literally, has the other of other*], the communication [koinonia: cf. 15.3 *as connection*] of the true [ontos: adverb] beauty extends [diexeimi: to go through] proportionally [analogos] through the whole series, beautifying [kallopizo: to embellish; cf. #12] by the superior nature [dia tou huper + keimemenou] that which comes next [to proseches] to it; but when there is any interruption [dia + spasmos: gap] of this beneficent connection [sum + phuia: affinity; cf. #11], or when, on the contrary, the superior comes to follow [anti + koloutheo: to be reciprocally implied, corresponding; *for verb, cf. 30.30 as follows upon, with epi*] the inferior, then is displayed the misshapen character of matter, when it is isolated from nature (for in itself matter is a thing without form [a + morphos] or structure [a + kata + skeuos: unwrought, chaotic]), and by its shapelessness is also destroyed [sun + dia + pheiro: the 2 prepositions imply a thorough destruction, with & through] that beauty of nature with which it is adorned [kallopizo or makes kallos; cf. 12.12] through the mind [nous]; and so the transmission of the ugliness {164} [aischos: shame] of matter reaches through the nature to [epi: upon the mind or nous] the mind itself, so that the image [eikon] of God is no longer seen in the figure [charakter] expressed by that which was molded according to it; for the mind, setting the idea [idea: form, kind, sort; cf. 16.11 *as principle*] of good like a mirror behind the back, turns off the incident rays of the effulgence [em + phasis: image, reflection] of the good, and it receives [ana + masso: to take upon oneself] into itself the impress of the shapelessness [a + morphia: cf. just above *as without form, adjective*] of matter.

11. And in this way is brought about the genesis of evil, arising [para + phistemi: to bring into existence by the side of] through the withdrawal [huex + airesis: taking away from below; *implies a gradual withdrawal*] of that which is beautiful and good. Now all is beautiful and good that is closely [oikeos: cf. 17.2] related to [pros] the First Good; but that which departs from [echo: or outside of] its relation [schesis: state, condition; cf. 17.2 *as to cling to*] and likeness to [pros] this is certainly devoid [a + moiros: without share] of beauty and goodness. If, then, according to the statement we have been considering [theoreo], that which is truly [ontos] good is one, and the mind [nous] itself also has its power of being beautiful and good, in so far as it is in [kata: according to] the image of the good and beautiful, and the nature, which is sustained [sun + echo: cf. 30.6 *as holds together*] by the mind, has the like power, in so far as it is an image of the image, it is hereby shown that our material part holds together [sun + istemi: cf. #14], and is upheld [peri + krato: to prevail] when it is controlled [oikonomeo: cf. 22.1 *as governed, as in managing a household*] by nature; and on the other hand is dissolved [luo: cf. 14.1 *with telos*] and disorganized [dia + pipto: to fall away; cf. 17.4 *as declension, used with apo*] when it is separated from that which upholds and sustains it, and is dissevered [dia + spao: to tear asunder; *dia as through implies thoroughness*] from its conjunction [sum + phuia: affinity] with [pros: compared with dia as in *diaspao, a complete sundering*] beauty and goodness.

12. Now such a condition as this does not arise except when there takes place an overturning [epi + strophe; *implies a twisting wheeling about*] of nature to the opposite state, in which the desire [epi + thumia: yearning, longing] has no inclination [neuo: to nod; *cf. 1.4*] for beauty and goodness, but for that which is in need of the adorning element [kallopizo: to embellish; *cf. #10*]; for it must needs be that that which is made like to matter, destitute [ptucheuo: to go begging] as matter is of form of its own, should be assimilated [sum + meta + morphoo: to transform completely] to it in respect of [kata] the absence alike of form [a + schemos: unseemly] and of beauty.

13. We have, however, discussed [para + ex + tazo: to examine by comparing; *cf. 16.7, minus para*] these points in passing, as following [ex akolouthia; *also in #13*] on our argument, since they were introduced [epi + eis + erchomai; *cf. 18.2 as entered, with sun*] by our speculation [theoria; *cf. 15.3*] on [eis] the point before us; for the subject of enquiry was, whether the intellectual faculty [he noera dunamis] has its seat in any of the parts of us, or extends [dieko; *cf. 12.8 as passing over*] equally [kata to ison] over [dia: through] them all; for as for those who shut up [peri + ergo: to inclose all round] the mind locally in parts of the body, and who advance [pros + phero] for the establishment [sun + tasis] of this opinion [hupo + lepsis] of theirs the fact that the reason [dia + noia] has not free course [euodoo: to help on the way, prosper] in the case of those whose cerebral membranes are in an unnatural condition, our argument [logos] showed that in respect of every part of the compound nature [suy + krima: body formed by combination of elements] of man, whereby every man has some natural operation, the power [dunamis] of the soul remains equally ineffective [anenergetos] if the part does not continue [dia + meno] in its natural condition. And thus there came into our argument, following [akolouthia] out this line of thought [theorema: sight, principle], the view we have just stated, by which we learn that in the compound nature of man the mind is governed [dia + oikeo: to manage; *cf. 13.5 as guided*] by God, and that by it is governed our material life, provided the latter remains in its natural state [en phusei], but if it is perverted [para + trepo: to turn aside] from nature it is alienated also from that operation [en + ergeia; *cf. #14*] which is carried on by [kata or according to] the mind.

14. Let us return [epi + ana + erchomai] however once more to the point from which we started—that in those who are not perverted [para + trepo] from their natural condition [kata + stasis; *cf. 13.17 as state*] by some affection [pathe: a passive state; *cf. 14.1 as passion*], the mind exercises its own power [ten oikeian dunamin], and is established firmly in those who are in sound health [sun + istemi; *cf. 16.1 as composed*], but on the contrary is powerless in those who do not admit its operation [en + ergeia]; for we may confirm our opinion [dogma] on these matters by yet other arguments: and if it is not tedious for those to hear who are already wearied with our discourse [logos], we shall discuss these matters also, so far as we are able, in a few words.

{165} XIII. A Rationale [aitio + logia: inquiry into causes] of sleep, of yawning, and of dreams.

1. This life of our bodies, material and subject to flux [rhooes: with a strong stream], always advancing [pro + iemi: to send before] by way of [dia] motion, finds the power [dunamis] of its being in this, that it never rests from its motion: and as some river, flowing on by its own

impulse [horme; cf. 14.1], keeps the channel in which it runs well filled, yet is not seen in the same water always at the same place, but part of it glides away while part comes flowing on, so, too, the material element of our life here suffers change in [dia] the continuity [sun + exeia] of its succession [dia + doche] of opposites by way of motion and flux, so that it never can desist [histemi: to stand, set in array] from change [meta + bole; cf. 22.5 as reformation], but in its inability to rest keeps up unceasingly its motion [kinesis] alternating [enameibo] by like ways: and if it should ever cease moving it will assuredly have cessation [paule: rest] also of its being.

2. For instance, emptying succeeds [dia + dechomai: to receive from another] fulness, and on the other hand after emptiness comes in turn a process of filling: sleep relaxes the strain of waking, and, again, awakening braces up what had become slack: and neither of these abides [sum + meno: to remain with] continually [dienekes: unbroken; cf. 14.2 as co-extensive], but both give way, each at the other's coming; nature thus by their interchange [hupallage: exchange] so renewing [ana + kainizo] herself as, while partaking [meta + lagchano: to have a share in what is allotted] of each in turn, to pass [meta + baino; cf. 28.5 as transfer] from the one to the other without break [a + dia + pastos; incessant]. For that the living creature should always be exerting [sun + teino: cf. 16.10 with epi as transcending] itself in its operations [en + ergeia] produces a certain rupture and severance of the over strained part; and continual quiescence [anesis: relaxation] of the body brings about a certain dissolution and laxity in its frame: but to be in touch with each of these at the proper times [kata kairon; cf. #3] in a moderate degree [metrios] is a staying-power [dunamis pros dia + monen or a power remaining towards-through] of nature, which, by continual transference [meta + basis: change] to the opposed states, gives herself in each of them rest from the other. Thus she finds the body on the strain through wakefulness [egregorsis; cf. #5 as waking state], and devises relaxation for the strain by means of sleep, giving the perceptive faculties [aisthetikos, adjective; cf. 15.1] rest for the time from their operations, losing them like horses from the chariots after the race.

3. Further, rest at proper times [eu + kairos] is necessary for the framework of the body, that the nutriment may be diffused over the whole body through the passages which it contains, without any strain to hinder its progress. For just as certain misty vapors are drawn up from the recesses of the earth when it is soaked with rain, whenever the sun heats it with rays of any considerable warmth, so a similar result happens in the earth that is in us [kath' hemas: according to us], when the nutriment within is heated up by natural warmth; and the vapors, being naturally of upward tendency and airy nature, and aspiring to that which is above them, come to be in the region of the head like smoke penetrating the joints of a wall: then they are dispersed thence by exhalation to the passages of the organs of sense, and by them the senses are of course rendered inactive, giving way to the transit of these vapors. For the eyes are pressed upon by the eyelids when some leaden instrument, as it were (I mean such a weight as that I have spoken of), lets down the eyelid upon the eyes; and the hearing, being dulled by these same vapors, as though a door were placed upon the acoustic organs, rests from its natural operation: and such a condition is sleep, when the {168} sense is at rest in the body, and altogether ceases from the operation of its natural motion, so that the digestive processes of nutriment may have free course for transmission by the vapors through each of the passages.

4. And for this reason, if the apparatus of the organs of sense should be closed and sleep hindered by some occupation, the nervous system, becoming filled with the vapors, is naturally and spontaneously extended so that the part which has had its density increased by the vapors is rarefied by the process of extension, just as those do who squeeze the water out of clothes by vehement wringing; and, seeing that the parts about the pharynx are somewhat circular, and nervous tissue abounds there, whenever there is need for the expulsion from that part of the density of the vapors-since it is impossible that the part which is circular in shape should be separated directly, but only by being distended in the outline of its circumference-for this reason, by checking the breath a yawn the chin is moved downwards so as to leave a hollow to the uvula, and all the interior parts being arranged in the figure of a circle, that smoky denseness which had been detained in the neighboring parts is emitted together with the exit of the breath. And often the like may happen even after sleep when any portion of those vapors remains in the region spoken of undigested and unexhaled.

5. Hence the mind [nous] of man clearly proves its claim to connection [sun + estosis] with his nature, itself also co-operating [sun + ergo; *cf. 8.2*] and moving with the nature in its sound and waking state [egregorsis], but remaining unmoved when it is abandoned to sleep, unless any one supposes that the imagery [phantasia: imagination; *cf. #12*] of dreams is a motion of the mind [kinesis nou] exercised in [kata] sleep. We for our part say that it is only the conscious [emphron: alive, rational] and sound action [sun + estosis] of the intellect [dia + noia; *cf. #17*] which we ought to refer to mind [nous]; and as to the fantastic nonsense which occurs to us in sleep, we suppose that some appearances of the operations [kata] of the mind are accidentally molded [dia + plasso] in [kata] the less rational part of the soul; for the soul, being by sleep dissociated from the senses, is also of necessity outside the range of the operations of [kata] the mind; for it is through the senses that the union [sun + ana + krasis: commingling; *cf. 20.3 as disposition with ana*] of mind with man takes place; therefore when the senses are at rest, the intellect also must needs be inactive; and an evidence of this is the fact that the dreamer often seems to be in absurd and impossible situations, which would not happen if the soul were then guided [dia + oikeo: to manage; *cf. #12 as guided*] by reason [logismos: counting, reckoning; *cf. 18.5*] and intellect [dia + noia].

6. It seems to me, however, that when the soul is at rest [eremizo: connotes being civilized, tame and cultivated] so far as concerns its more excellent [pro + timeteros; connotes preference, honor] faculties [dunamis] (so far, I mean, as concerns [kata] the operations of mind and sense [nous & aisthesis with energeia], the nutritive part of it alone is operative during sleep, and that some shadows and echoes of those things which happen in our waking moments-of the operations both of [kata] sense and of intellect-which are impressed upon it by that part [eidos: form, shape] of the soul which is capable of memory, that these, I say, are pictured [ana + zographo: to paint completely, delineate] as chance will have it, some echo of memory still lingering [para + meno: cf. 13.14, a remaining-beside] in this division [eidos] of the soul.

7. With these, then, the man is beguiled [phantazo: to create an illusion; cf. #10 as imaged], not led to [kata] acquaintance [homilia; cf. #12 as communication] with the things that present themselves [phaino: to appear; cf. 22.2 as appearing] by any train of thought, but wandering

among confused and inconsequent [anacolouthos] delusions [apate: trick, fraud]. But just as in his bodily operations, {169} while each of the parts individually acts in some way according [kata] to the power which naturally [phusikos] resides in it, there arises also in the limb that is at rest a state sympathetic [sun + dia + thesis: disposition to, affection; cf. 20.3] with [pros] that which is in motion, similarly [analogos] in the case of the soul, even if one part is at rest and another in motion, the whole is affected in sympathy [sun + dia + tithemi: i.e., with & through] with the part; for it is not possible that the [kata] natural unity should be in any way severed [sun + dia + spao: to part forcibly at the same time], though [en] one of the faculties included in it is in turn supreme in virtue [dia] of its active operation [en + ergeia]. But as, when men are awake and busy, the mind is supreme [epi + krateo], and sense ministers [hupereteo: to do service on board ship, to serve; cf. 8.3] to it, yet the faculty [dunamis] which regulates [dioiketikos] the body is not dissociated from them (for the mind furnishes the food for its wants, the sense receives what is furnished, and the nutritive faculty of the body appropriates to itself that which is given to it), so in sleep the supremacy of these faculties is in some way reversed in us, and while the less rational becomes supreme, the operation of the other ceases indeed, yet is not absolutely extinguished; but while the nutritive faculty is then busied with digestion during sleep, and keeps all our nature occupied with itself [a + scholeo: to be without leisure], the faculty of sense is neither entirely severed from it (for that cannot be separated [dia + temno: to cut thoroughly] which has once been naturally joined), nor yet can its activity revive, as it is hindered by the inaction during sleep of the organs of sense; and by the same reasoning [logos] (the mind also being united to [pros] the sensitive part [to aisthetikon eidos] of the soul) it would follow that we should say that the mind moves with [sug + kineo] the latter when it is in motion, and rests [sug + kata + pauo: with & according to] with it when it is quiescent.

8. As naturally happens with fire when it is heaped over with chaff, and no breath fans the flame-it neither consumes what lies beside it, nor is entirely quenched, but instead of flame it rises to the air through the chaff in the form of smoke; yet if it should obtain any breath of air, it turns the smoke to flame-in the same way the mind when hidden by the inaction of the senses in sleep is neither able to shine out through them, nor yet is quite extinguished, but has, so to say, a smouldering activity, operating to a certain extent, but unable to operate farther.

9. Again, as a musician, when he touches with the plectrum the slackened strings of a lyre, brings out no orderly melody (for that which is not stretched will not sound) but his hand frequently moves skillfully, bringing the plectrum to the position of the notes so far as place is concerned, yet there is no sound, except that he produces by the vibration of the strings a sort of uncertain and indistinct hum; so in sleep the mechanism of the senses being relaxed, the artist is either quite inactive, if the instrument is completely relaxed by satiety or heaviness; or will act slackly and faintly, if the instrument of the senses does not fully admit of the exercise of its art [techne; cf. 30.30].

10. For this cause memory [mneme] is confused, and foreknowledge [pro + gnosis; cf. #12], though rendered doubtful [epi + nustazo: to drop asleep over] by uncertain veils, is imaged [phantazo: to create an illusion; cf. #7 as to create and illusion] in shadows [eidolon: image, phantom; cf. #11] of our waking pursuits [hupar: state of waking, real appearance; cf. #11], and often indicates to us something of what is going to happen [ex + baino: to go out]: for by its subtlety [leptos: light, adjective] of nature the mind has some advantage, in ability to behold [kathorao: to look down upon, to perceive] things, over [para] mere corporeal grossness; yet it cannot make {172} its meaning clear [dia + sapheo] by direct [euthus: immediate] methods, so that the information of the matter in hand should be plain and evident [pro + delos], but its declaration of the future is ambiguous and doubtful, -what those who interpret [hupo + krinomai: to represent] such things call an “enigma” [ainigma: dark saying, riddle].

11. So the butler presses the cluster for Pharaoh's cup: so the baker seemed to carry his baskets; each supposing himself in sleep to be engaged in those services with which he was busied when awake [hupar]: for the images [eidolon; cf. #10] of their customary occupations imprinted [en + tupoo: to cut into, engrave] on the prescient element [pro + gnostokos] of their soul, gave them for a time [epi & kairos; cf. 16.3 as temporal with pros] the power of foretelling [kata + manteuomai: to divine, surmise], by this sort of prophecy on the part of the mind [nous], what should come to pass.

12. But if Daniel and Joseph and others like [kata: according to them] them were instructed [pro + paideuo: to bring up a child; cf. 15.2 as to teach] by Divine power [dunamis], without any confusion [epi + tholoo: to become turbid] of perception [aisthesis; cf. 14.1 as sense], in the knowledge [gnosis; cf. #13] of things to come, this is nothing to the present statement; for no one would ascribe [logizomai: to calculate; cf. 17.2 as to judge] this to the power of dreams, since he will be constrained as a consequence [ek & akolouthos] to suppose that those Divine appearances [theo + phaneia; cf. 16.17 with epi, superficies] also which took place in wakefulness [hupar; cf. #11 as awake] were not a miraculous vision [optasia] but a result [akolouthia; cf. 15.3 as course] of nature brought about spontaneously [kata to automaton]. As then, while all men are guided [dia + oikeo; cf. 15.1 as regulated] by [kata] their own minds [nous], there are some few who are deemed worthy of evident Divine communication [homilia; cf. #7 as acquaintance]; so, while the imagination [phantasia; cf. #13 as dreams] of sleep naturally occurs in a like and equivalent manner for all, some, not all, share [meta + echo; cf. 14.2 as partake] by means of their dreams in some more Divine manifestation [emphaneia] but to all the rest even if a foreknowledge [pro + gnosis; cf. 16.16] of anything does occur as a result of dreams, it occurs in the way [kata] we have spoken of.

13. And again, if the Egyptian and the Assyrian king were guided by God [theothen: adverb, with the help of the gods] to the knowledge [gnosis; cf. 16.16 as foreknowledge with pro] of the future, the dispensation [to oikonomoumenon; i.e., related to management of a household] wrought by their means is a different thing; for it was necessary that the hidden wisdom [sophia; cf. 22.1] of the holy men should be made known, that each of them might not pass [para + trecho] his life without profit to the state. For how could Daniel have been known for what he was, if the soothsayers [epodos: a singing over] and magicians [magos: an enchanter] had not been unequal to the task of discovering the dream? And how could Egypt have been preserved while Joseph was shut up in prison, if his interpretation [krisis: judgment; cf. 20.1 with dia as discernment]

of the dream had not brought him to notice? Thus we must reckon these cases as exceptional, and not class them with common dreams [phantasia; *cf.* #14].

14. But this ordinary seeing of dreams is common [sun + ethes: living together] to all men, and arises in our fancies [phantasia; *cf.* #17 as *semblances*] in different modes and forms: for either there remain [para + meno; *cf.* 17.2], as we have said, in the reminiscent [mnemonikos] part of the soul, the echoes of daily occupations; or, as often happens, the constitution of dreams is framed with regard to such and such a condition [dia + theseis] of the body: for thus the thirsty man seems to be among springs, the man who is in need of food to be at a feast, and the young man in the heat of youthful vigor is beset by fancies corresponding to his passion.

15. I also knew another cause of the fancies of sleep, when attending one of my relations attacked by frenzy; who being annoyed by food being given him in too great quantity for his strength, kept crying out and finding fault with those who were about him for filling intestines with dung and putting them upon him: and when his body was rapidly tending to perspire he blamed those who were with him for having water ready to wet him with as he lay: and he did not cease calling out till the result showed the meaning of these complaints: {173} for all at once a copious sweat broke out over his body, and a relaxation of the bowels explained the weight in the intestines. The same condition then which, while his sober judgment was dulled by disease, his nature underwent, being sympathetically affected by the condition of the body-not being without perception of what was amiss, but being unable clearly to express its pain, by reason of the distraction resulting from the disease-this, probably, if the intelligent principle of the soul were lulled to rest, not from infirmity but by natural sleep, might appear as a dream to one similarly situated, the breaking out of perspiration being expressed by water, and the pain occasioned by the food, by the weight of intestines.

16. This view also is taken by those skilled in medicine, that according to the differences of complaints the visions of dreams appear differently to the patients: that the visions of those of weak stomach are of one kind, those of persons suffering from injury to the cerebral membrane of another, those of persons in fevers of yet another; that those of patients suffering from bilious and from phlegmatic affections are diverse, and those again of plethoric patients, and of patients in wasting disease, are different; whence we may see that the nutritive and vegetative faculty of the soul has in it by commixture some seed of the intelligent element, which is in some sense brought into likeness to the particular state of the body, being adapted in its fancies according to the complaint which has seized upon it.

17. Moreover, most men's dreams are conformed [tupoo: to form, mold; *cf.* 3.1 with *pro* as *fore-show*] to the state [kata + stasis] of their character [ethos: custom; *cf.* 18.5]: the brave man's fancies are of one kind, the coward's of another; the wanton man's dreams of one kind, the continent man's of another; the liberal man and the avaricious man are subject to different fancies; while these fancies are nowhere framed by the intellect [dia + noia; *cf.* 20.1 as *sense*], but

by the less rational disposition [dia + thesis; *cf. 18.3*] of the soul, which forms even in dreams the semblances [phantasia; *cf. 22.2 as phantom*] of those things to which each is accustomed by the practice of his waking hours.

XIV. That the Mind [nous] is Not in a Part of the Body; Wherein Also is a Distinction [dia + krisis] of the Movements of the Body and of the Soul.

1. But we have wandered [apo + planaō; *can connote deception*] far from our subject [ton pro + keimon: what set before], for the purpose of our argument [logos] was to show that the mind is not restricted [en + deo: to bind on, in] to any part of the body, but is equally in touch [ephapto: to lay hold of] with the whole, producing its motion according to the nature of the part which is under its influence [hupo + keimon: what lies under]. There are cases, however, in which the mind even follows [epi + akoloutheo; *cf. 16.14 as following out*] the bodily impulses [horme; *cf. 17.1 as desire*], and becomes, as it were, their servant; for often the bodily nature takes the lead by introducing [en + tithemi] either the sense [aisthesis; *cf. 22.1*] of that which gives pain or the desire for that which gives pleasure, so that it may be said to furnish [para + echo] the first beginnings [arche; *cf. 17.1*], by producing in us the desire for food, or, generally, the impulse towards some pleasant thing; while the mind, receiving [ex + dechomai: to succeed, await] such an impulse, furnishes the body by its own intelligence [tais oikeias peri + noias] with the proper means towards [pros] the desired {176} object [to pothoumenon; *i.e., pathē*]. Such a condition, indeed, does not occur in all, save in those of a somewhat slavish disposition [dia + keimai; *cf. 17.2 as disposed*], who bring the reason [logos] into bondage to the impulses of their nature and pay servile homage to the pleasures of sense by allowing them the alliance [sum + machia: an auxiliary force; *cf. 18.4*] of their mind; but in the case of more perfect men [teleios; *cf. #2*] this does not happen; for the mind takes the lead [kathegeomai: to go before], and chooses the expedient course [to lusitelos or luo + telos] by reason and not by passion [pathe; *cf. 12.14 as affection*], while their nature follows in the tracks of its leader [pro + kathegeomai: to be a guide].

2. But since our argument [logos] discovered in our vital faculty three different varieties [dia + phora: distinction; *cf. 16.8*] -one which receives nourishment without perception, another which at once receives nourishment and is capable of perception, but is without the reasoning activity, and a third rational [logikos; *cf. 15.2*], perfect [teleios], and co-extensive [dienekes: unbroken] with the whole faculty [dunamis]-so that among these varieties the advantage belongs to the intellectual [noeras; *cf. 15.1*],-let no one suppose [hupo + noeō: to think secretly; *cf. 29.4*] on this account that in the compound nature [sug + krīma: body formed by combination; *cf. 16.9*] of man there are three souls welded together [sug + kroteō: to strike together], contemplated [theoreō; *cf. 15.2 as found*] each in its own limits, so that one should think man's nature to be a sort of conglomeration [sug + krotēma or kroteō] of several souls. The true and perfect [teleios] soul is naturally one, the intellectual [noeras] and immaterial [aulos: lacking materiality], which mingles [kata + mignumi: to mix up; *cf. 22.4*] with our material nature by the agency of the senses; but all that is of material nature to [hulodes], being subject to mutation [tropē: change] and alteration [alloiosis: change; *cf. 16.12*], will, if it should partake [meta + echo] of the animating [psuchikos; *cf. 15.2 as spiritual*] power, move by way of growth: if, on the contrary, it should fall away from the vital [zotikos] energy, it will reduce its

motion to [eis] destruction.

3. Thus, neither is there perception without material substance [ousia], nor does the act of perception take place without the intellectual [noeras] faculty [dunamis].

XV. That the Soul Proper, in Fact and Name, is the Rational [logikos] Soul, While the Others are Called So Equivocally; Wherein Also is This Statement, that the Power of the Mind Extends [dieko] Throughout the Whole Body in Fitting Contact [pros + apto] with Every Part.

1. Now, if some things in creation possess the nutritive [threptikos: capable of rearing] faculty, and others again are regulated [dia + oikeo; cf. 8.4 as ordered with regard to a household] by the perceptive [aisthetikos; cf. #2] faculty, while the former have no share [meta + echo; cf. #2 as to partake] of perception nor the latter of the intellectual [noeras; cf. #2] nature, and if for this reason any one is inclined to the opinion of a plurality of souls, such a man will be positing [dogmatizo: to declare; cf. #28.3 as to assert] a variety of souls in a way not in accordance [kata] with their distinguishing definition [dia + phora; cf. 8.6 as divisions]. For everything which we conceive [noeo; cf. 16.3] among existing things, if it be perfectly [teleios: adverb] that which it is, is also properly called by the name it bears: but of that which is not every respect what it is called, the appellation [pros + agoria] also is vain. For instance:-if one were to show us true bread, we say that he properly applies the name to the subject: but if one were to show us instead [anti + para + deiknumi: to exhibit side by side or in opposition] that which had been made of stone to resemble the natural bread, which had the same shape, and equal size, and similarity of color, so as in most points to be the same with its prototype [prototupos; cf. 16.7], but which yet lacks the power of being food, on this account we say that the stone receives the name of "bread," not properly, but by a misnomer, and all things which fall under the same description, which are not absolutely what they are called, have their name from a misuse [kata + kresis: misapplication, full use] of terms.

2. Thus, as the soul finds its perfection [to teleion; cf. 16.10]{177} in that which is intellectual [noeras; cf. 24.2] and rational [logikos; cf. 16.9], everything that is not so may indeed share the name [homonumos] of "soul," but is not really soul, but a certain vital energy associated [sug + krino: to compound; cf. 16.4 as to compare] with the appellation of "soul." And for this reason also He Who gave laws on every matter, gave the animal [a + logos; cf. 16.9 as irrational or that which lacks logos] nature likewise, as not far removed from this vegetative life, for the use of man, to be for those who partake [meta + echo; cf. 16.9] of it instead of herbs:-for He says, "You shall eat all kinds of flesh even as the green herb;" for the perceptive [aisthetikos; cf. 13.2 as perceptive faculties] energy seems to have but a slight advantage over that which is nourished and grows without it. Let this teach [paideuo: to bring up a child; cf. 17.2 as to instruct] carnal men not to bind [pros + trecho: to run towards] their intellect [dia + noia; cf. #3] closely to the phenomena of sense, but rather to busy [pros + ascholeo: to compel attention] themselves with

their spiritual [psuchikos; *cf. 8.6 as natural man*] advantages [pro + terema: victory], as the true soul is found [theoreo; *cf. #3 as regarded*] in these, while sense has equal power also among the brute [a + logos] creation.

3. The course [akolouthia; *cf. 16.12 as train*] of our argument [logos], however, has diverged to another point: for the subject of our speculation [theoria; *cf. 20.1*] was not the fact that the energy of [kata] mind [nous] is of more dignity among the attributes we conceive in man than the material element of his being [hupo + stasis; *cf. 16.17 as existence*], but the fact that the mind

is not confined [peri + echo; *cf.* ] to any one part of us, but is equally in all and through all, neither surrounding [peri + lambano; *cf. 22.4 as comprehending*] anything without, nor being enclosed within anything: for these phrases are properly applied to casks or other bodies that are placed one inside the other; but the union [sun + apheia: conjunction, contact] of the mental [nous] with the bodily presents a connection [koinonia; *cf. 16.9 as community*] unspeakable and inconceivable [an + epi + noetos], -not being within it (for the incorporeal is not enclosed [egkrateo] in a body), nor yet surrounding it without (for that which is incorporeal does not include [peri + lambano] anything), but the mind approaching [eggizo] our nature in some inexplicable [a + machanos: without means] and incomprehensible [a + kata + noetos] way, and coming into contact with [pros + apto: to touch; *cf. 12.8*] it, is to be regarded [theoreo] as both in it and around it, neither implanted in it nor enfolded with it, but in a way which we cannot speak or think, except so far as this, that while the nature prospers according to its own order [heirmos: series, chain, sequence; *cf. 22.5 as sequence*], the mind [nous] is also operative [energos]; but if any misfortune befalls [peri] the former, the movement of the intellect [dia + noia; *cf. 18.3 as mind*] halts [skazo: to limp] correspondingly.