

Speech of Diotima

Introduction

This except from the Symposium is more or less a running commentary on what Diotima communicates to Socrates. It follows the text, of course, but fleshes it out referring to important Greek words and expands upon them. A similar text related to the famous allegory of the cave in the Republic follows the same pattern and is posted on this website.

Such a project is in line with this website's title which goes by the phrase *lectio divina*. While that pertains more specifically to sacred scripture of the Judeo-Christian tradition, there doesn't seem to be any reason not to apply it to texts prominent in that same tradition. In essence, *lectio* is the slow, deliberate reading of a text. Obviously scripture has more a direct access to things divine and is not on the same level as the Symposium. Nevertheless, that doesn't mean the pattern of *lectio* is incompatible with it. Reading such an important author as Plato in the manner of *lectio divina* is beneficial insofar as once fundamental themes of his philosophy have been grasped, they allow a better appreciation of both Jewish and Christian texts. That's something the early Church Fathers discovered early on.

Since *lectio divina* is essentially bound up with the document at hand, any historical information is more or less secondary and can be garnered from other sources. Although these sources are important, they're not oriented toward the more transcendent practice of *lectio*. For example, anyone can find information about the identity of Diotima as well as Agathon and any proper name or place encountered in the Symposium. Hence whether or not Diotima is a real, fictional or a daemonic person is secondary. The third seems most plausible, at least for this modest text, as it ties in with Socrates' governing spirit, his *daemon*.

Part of the motive behind this document is to recover an essential element of Plato's philosophy through the mouthpiece of Socrates, that is, for application in one's daily life. Thus this orientation isn't alien to the overall Christian approach, if you will, of the *lectio divina* homepage. While this tradition has riches on end, they are accessed not as frequently as they should. In fact, they've ended up as being virtually forgotten, all this hav-

ing happened in a generation or two. But once a person is exposed to these riches, a fire is kindled within which makes him or her want to ask all sorts of life-related questions. Quickly, then, one discovers the love of philosophizing, usually more compelling than engaging in theological speculation. At the same time it ties in with the current interest in spirituality (i.e., applied theology). In fact, you find yourself better equipped to go at it. So to do philosophy in the original sense as Diotima's speech spells out is what this short document is about. Hopefully practice in it enables a person to adopt more readily to the Christian "stuff. It doesn't seem to work the other way around, though that observation may be contested.

Please note: once the *logos* of Diotima is finished, the same approach taken here is applied to a section on Socrates as midwife as taken from Theaetetus 149+. Then follows the myth of Er in the Republic (614-621). Technically all three are unrelated but have had great significance for countless generations.

Two points are to be noted. First, this document was written in Libre Office and subsequently transferred to Word Perfect. From there it became a PDF file. Because of transference, the way some of the words are spaced at the end of a given line aren't precisely accurate and appear a bit awkward. Second, the transference from Word Perfect to PDF doesn't allow for putting titles in bold text.

The Speech

201 d Now (*ede*) I'll let you go (*eao*: this, along with *ede*, implies a letting go for something better). That is to say (leaving the discussion that has taken place in exchange for what Diotima had passed on to Socrates in the past. In other words, Socrates is a bit dismissive in tone), I shall try to go through for you the speech (Throughout the discussion thus far Socrates had felt the presence of Diotima pressing in through recollection of her and can no longer repress it. He wishes to replicate as exactly as possible what she had communicated to him, that is, her speech or *logos* which is a word by which an inward thought is expressed.) about Love (*Eros*: love as desire) I once heard from a woman of Mantinea (Mantinea was the site of a major battle of the Peloponnesian War in 418 BC when Sparta defeated an army of Argos and Athens. As for the proper name Diotima, it means "Honored by Zeus."), Diotima—a woman who was wise about many things

(Diotima's *logos* concerns *Eros* which can be taken as passionate desire. She is qualified to give it by reason of being wise *orsophos* not only about *Eros* but many other things (*alla polla.*) besides this: once she even put off the plague for ten years by telling the Athenians what sacrifices to make (One such example is Diotima having warded off [*anabole*: a putting off; literally, a casting up, *ana-*] for some ten years a plague from Athens, informing its inhabitants what sacrifices to make, *thuo* [also to slaughter for sacrificial purposes]). She is the one who taught me the art of love, and I shall go through her speech as best I can on my own, using what Agathon and I have agreed to as a basis (Socrates says that Diotima is the only person who had taught [*didasko*] him *ta erotika* or those things pertaining to *eros*. Such is the motive for him to pick out [*lego*] her *logos* and attempt [*peirao*] to go through [*dierchomai*, *dia-* or through prefaced to the common verb to go, *erchomai*] it as best he can [*dunamai*: to be able, to be strong enough] with help obtained from Agathon, *homologeoo* being the verb which means literally to speak together).

Following your lead, Agathon, one should first describe who Love is and what he is like, and afterwards describe his works (Socrates gives way to Agathon insofar as he wishes to describe [*diegeomai*: to set out in detail, *dia-* meaning through; to be fond of narrating] the identity of *Eros*, what he is like [*poios*] and then his works, *ergon* [occupation, the result of work])—I think (*dokeo*: to suppose, imagine) it will be easiest (*rhadios* connotes adaptability) for me to proceed (*diemi*: *dia-* or through) the way Diotima did and tell you how she questioned me (*anakrino* meaning to inquire, *ana-* or upon prefaced to *krino*, to judge or decide. It is used with the adjective *xenos* which is applicable to a guest or stranger and suggestive of Socrates' speaking close to but not quite in the same manner as Diotima. Thus *xenos* intimates a kindredness between the two as well as their differences).

You see, I had told (The preposition *pros* [indicative of direction towards-which] is used with regard to “told me” or literally, “told to me.”) her almost the same things Agathon told me just now: that Love is a great god and that he belongs to beautiful things (Socrates says that both Diotima and Agathon concur on the same subject, namely, that *Eros* is a god [not in Greek text] who is great [*megas*] as well as [literally] of beautiful things, the adjective *kalos* having a broader context of being of good quality, noble and honorable). And she used the very same arguments against me

that I used against Agathon; she showed how, according to my very own speech, Love is neither beautiful nor good (However, Diotima refutes [*elegcho*: to cross examine, test, question] which here is used with *logos*. Socrates just had he done with Agathon or in accord with the latter's speech or *logos* which has the preposition *kata* intimating the following of a given order, *Eros* is neither *kalos* nor *agathos*, good which involves being valiant, of good purpose as well as capable).

So I said, "What do you mean, Diotima (Socrates is confused, hence the question)? Is Love ugly, then, and bad (*Aischros* and *kakos* are the two adjectives here, the former suggestive of causing shame or disgrace and the latter, the common adjective for evil as well as worthless.)?"

202 But she said, "Watch (*Euphemeo* is a verb meaning to avoid unlucky words, to speak well of and is comprised of the root *phemi* (to declare, make know) prefaced with *eu-*, an adverbial form meaning well) your tongue! Do you really think (*Oiomai* means to suspect, to intend with regard to an obvious question, that not-beauty = ugliness or the adjectives *kalos* and *aischros*.) that, if a thing is not beautiful, it has to be ugly (The adjective *anagkaios* applies to whatever is restraining and used for "has to be.")?"

"I certainly do."

"And if a thing's not wise, it's ignorant (*Sophos* is the adjective with the negative *me* and *amathes* for ignorant which can lean more towards being stupid)? Or haven't you found out yet that there's something in between wisdom and ignorance (The second question posed by Diotima to Socrates is his inability or lack of *aisthanomai* (to apprehend, especially by the senses) to discern something in between (*metaxu*: *meta-* or in the midst of, among and *xun-...sun-* or with) *sophia* and *amathia*, the two adjectives having just been noted)?"

"What's that?"

"It's judging things correctly without being able to give a reason. Surely you see that this is not the same as knowing—for how could knowledge be unreasoning? And it's not ignorance either—for how could what hits the truth be ignorance? Correct judgment, of course, has this character: it is *in between* understanding and ignorance (Diotima calls

the *metaxu*...the in-the-midst-of plus with...as a matter of judging correctly, *doxazo* which is more to think or imagine [*doxa* = opinion] in a correct fashion, *orthos* meaning straight as well as upstanding. The key, however, is not giving a reason or *logos*.)”

“True,” said I, “as you say.”

“Then don’t force (As his *daimon*, Diotima bids Socrates not to force [*anagkazo*] the exchange of two opposites under discussion here: *kalos* = *aischros*, *agathos* = *kakos*.) whatever is not beautiful to be ugly, or whatever is not good to be bad. It’s the same with Love: when you agree (She uses this as a means of preparing Socrates to view [*homologeio*: literally as to speak together, *homoios* as same] the nature of *Eros* as belonging to neither side of the two pairs she just presented.) he is neither good nor beautiful, you need not think he is ugly and bad; he could be something in between (Instead, Diotima offers the possibility of something not yet considered, namely, that which is in between or in the midst of, *ti metaxu* [*meta* as among and *xun* as a variant of *sum/sun*, with, hence among-with]),” she said.

“Yet everyone agrees (Another use of *homologeio* or everyone saying-together) a great god (*Eros* is a great god [*theos*], *para panton* meaning beside or with all),” I said.

“Only those who don’t know (Diotima challenges Socrates’ statement about including those who don’t know as well as those who do, *eido* being the verb for both instances which fundamentally means to see, behold or to mark)?” she said. “Is that how you mean ‘everyone’? Or do you include those who do know?”

“Oh, everyone together (*Sumpantos*: the preposition *sum-* or with prefaced to *pas*, literally as with all and implies the whole.)”

And she laughed (*Gelao* means to laugh and can have a hint of scorn [on Diotima’s part] with regard to what Socrates supposedly said). “Socrates, how could those who say (This laughter is with regard those persons claiming [*homologeio*] *Eros* is not a god and agreeing that he’s a great god [*para panton* again, besides or with all]) that he’s not a god at all agree that he’s a great god?”

“Who says that?” I asked.

“You, for one,” she said, “and I for another.”

“How can you say this!” I exclaimed.

“That’s easy,” said she. “Tell me, wouldn’t you say that all gods are beautiful and happy (Diotima seeks to move the conversation along about *Eros* by presuming Socrates to agree that all gods are *eudaimon* and *kalos* (the Greek has the two adjectives in this order), the former suggestive of being blessed with a good genius or fortunate (*daimon* or this genius prefaced with the adverbial form *eu-*, well). Socrates shows astonishment about not agreeing with Diotima on this). Surely you’d never say a god is not beautiful or happy?”

“Zeus! Not I,” I said.

“Well, by calling anyone ‘happy,’ don’t you mean they possess (*eudaimon* = *ptaomai*: possession or procuring) good and beautiful things (*agathos* and *kalos*)?”

“Certainly.”

“What about Love? You agreed (Diotima shifts the conversation...the *logos*...to having Socrates agree [*homologeō*] that *Eros* has a need) he needs good and beautiful things (*agathos* and *kalos*, *endeia* being a noun meaning want, lack or deficiency and hence something defective), and that’s why he desires them—because he needs them (Here is the take-off point of this *logos* within the Symposium, of moving to a discussion about need or want, another term being used which will be mentioned shortly. In sum, *Eros* desires that which is *agathos* and *kalos*, *epithumeō* being the verb which has to do with setting one’s heart upon something: *epi-* or upon and *thumos* or principle of life, feeling combined with thought. In other words, *epithumeō* is impossible to translate accurately. Such *epithumeō*...desiring-upon by *Eros* = *Eros* needing *agathos* and *kalos*, *endees* being the adjective of *endeia* and suggestive of un-equality, of not having that which one wants to have).”

“I certainly did.”

“Then how could he be a god if he has no share in good and beautiful things?”

Amoiros is the adjective for no share, alpha privative and *moiros*, part or portion.

“There’s no way he could, apparently.”

Eioken implies being like or opportune, something like methinks and suggests doubt as to the question Diotima just posed.

“Now do you see (*Horao* is the common verb for see implying the possession of sight)? You don’t believe (*Nomizo* means to have in common as well as to be customary, *nomos* meaning custom or usage. Diotima uses this verb in an exclamatory sentence, that Socrates agrees with her) Love is a god either!”

“Then, what could Love be?” I asked. “A mortal (*thnetos* = mortal, subject to death)?”

“Certainly not.”

“Then, what is he?”

“He’s like what we mentioned before,” she said. “He is in between mortal and immortal (Another mention of *metaxu* [*meta* as among and *xun* as a variant of *sum/sun*, with, hence among-with] with regard to *Eros* being this way concerning mortal and immortal, *thnetos* and *athanatos*, the latter being alpha privative).”

“What do you mean, Diotima?”

“He’s a great spirit (*daimon* and *to daimonion* or spirit) Socrates.

Everything spiritual, you see, is in between god and mortal (that which is of a *daimon* = *metaxu* or in between *theos* and *thetos*. To Socrates as with most people, Diotima’s emphasis on in-between-ness is disconcerting because we can’t wrap our minds around it. Perhaps we’re unaccustomed to see in between things, if you will, and focus more upon this object vs. that object or the like).”

“What is their function (*Dunamis* also means power or better, the capacity to do something which means it can refrain from doing it as well)?” I asked.

“They are messengers (The third person plural is used here though reference seems to concern *ta daimonion* [“What is their function?” as noted just above]; neuter singular though it can infer that which is plural) who shuttle back and forth between the two (The verb is *diaporeuo*, literally as to carry over or set across, *dia-* suggestive of doing this through), conveying prayer and sacrifice from men to gods (messengers or engage in *hermeneuo*, to interpret or explain as well as being intermediaries between gods and men (*para* often means beside, in the presence of or close by), while to men they bring commands from the gods and gifts in return for sacrifices. Being in the middle of the two, they round out the whole and bind fast the all to all. Through them all divination passes (The verb is *diaporeuo*, literally as to carry over or set across, *dia-* suggestive of doing this through. This task works two ways, that is, involved *to daimonion*: prayer [*deesis*: entreaty in the form of asking] and *thusia* [sacrifice as well as sacred rites] from man to gods; *epitaxis* [the verb *tasso* or to arrange prefaced with the preposition *epi-* or upon, literally as to arrange upon and *amoibe* [requittal, recompense]), through them the art of priests in sacrifice and The person who is *sophos* (also, skilled) or wise here is a man who is *daimonios* or possessed by his *daimon* while the person *sophos* in ways other than this subjection to his *daimon* such as in a profession or in manual work (*techne* and *cheirurgia*) is 203 simply a mechanic or *banausos*, this word suggestive of being vulgar or having bad taste ritual, in enchantment, prophecy, and sorcery (*Mantike* or divinization can also pertain to prophecy as it inspires a person which makes room [*choreo* intimates giving way] with respect to the following four, this verb meaning that it permeates them all, giving way: 1) *techne* [skill, craft] of priests which takes two forms, sacrifice and ritual [*telete*: rite performed at an initiation] , 2) enchantment [*epode*: literally, a song sung to or over], 3) prophecy [*manteia*] which is more along the lines of the mode or style of divinization and 4) sorcery [*goeteia*: witchcraft or magic]). Gods do not mix with men; they mingle and converse with us through spirits instead, whether we are awake or asleep (Instead of mixing with men [*meignumi*: to bring together, make acquainted with], gods prefer to mingle and hold conversation: the first is *homilia* [a being

together, company] and the second is *dialektos*, literally, a speaking through or *dia-* or through prefaced to *lego*. Both are used with the preposition *pros* relative to *anthropos* or men, to or in the direction towards men, this indicative of that which is ongoing. The gods do this twofold action whether men are awake or sleeping [*egeiro*]; also as to arouse, stir up and *katheudo* which can also apply to being idle.). He who is wise in any of these ways is a man of the spirit, but he who is wise in any other way, in a profession or any manual work, is merely a mechanic (The person who is *sophos*[also, skilled] or wise here is a man who is *daimonios* or possessed by his *daimon* while the person *sophos* in ways other than this subjection to his *daimon* such as in a profession or in manual work [*techne* and *cheirourgia*] is simply a mechanic or *banausos*, this word suggestive of being vulgar or having bad taste). These spirits are many and various, then, and one of them is Love.”

“Who are his father and mother?” I asked (Socrates’ question is with regard to *Eros*.)

“That’s rather a long story (*Makros* is the adjective for long but despite this, Diotima decides to recount it to Socrates, *diegeomai* meaning to set out in detail [*dia-* or through and *ergazomai* or to work, labor...through the work]),” she said. “I’ll tell it to you, all the same.” “When Aphrodite was born, the gods held a celebration (It begins with the birth of Aphrodite when the gods held a birthday celebration, *estiao* literally meaning to receive into one’s own hearth or *estia* which applies to one’s home. In other words, the celebration was quite intimate in Aphrodite’s honor.). Poros, the son of Metis (One of the guests was *Poros* which fundamentally means a means of passing a river or ford, even a ferry and more commonly is taken as a way or path. He is the son of *Metis* which translates as cunning as well as wisdom, counsel and craft), was there among them. When they had feasted, Penia came begging (During the feast or the verb *deipneuo* which usually refers to dinner *Penia* [poverty or need] can begging, *prosaiteuo* consisting of the root *aiteo* prefaced with the preposition *pros-*, direction towards-which. In other words, *prosaiteuo*, combined with this verb, represents a request border upon a demand. It is used with the verb *aphikneomai*, to come up to, approach), as poverty does when there’s a party (This is typical for *Penia* during a party, *euochai* [good cheer, the adverbial form *eu-*]), and stayed by the gates. Now Poros got drunk on nectar (there was no wine yet, you see) and,

feeling drowsy, went into the garden of Zeus, where he fell asleep (*Poros* or want got drunk [*metheusko*: also to be filled with food] on nectar because wine hadn't been invented which made him drowsy or *bareo* which means literally to weigh down. Thus he entered Zeus' garden and fell asleep [*eudo*: also to be at ease]). Then *Penia* schemed up a plan to relieve her lack of resources (*Penia* got wind of this and hatched a plan, *epibouleuo* [the root *bouleuo* or to take counsel prefaced with the preposition *epi-* or upon...to take counsel or resolve-upon; to lay snares] in order to alleviate her *aporia* which means literally her difficulty of passing): she would get a child from *Poros* (The*epibouleuo*? To get pregnant by *Poros* or *poros* in order to relieve her *aporia*). So she lay beside him and got pregnant with Love (And so *Penia* lay beside *Poros* [that is to say, need beside means], *kataklyno* consisting of the root *klino* [to bend, slope] prefaced with the preposition *kata-* which here means a downward motion. The result? She became pregnant with *Eros*). That is why Love was born to follow Aphrodite and serve her (For this reason *Eros* followed [*akolouthos*: following, attendant upon and intimating the following of a sequence] Aphrodite and served her (*therapon*: comrade-in-arms, one devoted)): because he was conceived on the day of her birth. And that's why he is also by nature a lover of beauty, because Aphrodite herself is especially beautiful (Thus *Eros* was conceived on the day of the birth [*genethlios*: belonging to one's birth] of *Penia*. Because of this, *Eros* is by nature [*physis*: indicative of a natural bent] an *erastes* or lover of beauty, *kalos* here with the preposition *peri* or around, about, for Aphrodite is especially beautiful, *kalos*).

“As the son of *Poros* and *Penia*, his lot in life is set to be like theirs (Diotima continues with *Eros* as offspring of “Way” and “Need” saying that his life will be set to be like theirs, the verb being *kathistemi* [the root *histemi* or to stand prefaced with the preposition *kata-* or in accord with; to set in order or arrange] along with the other verb *tugchano*: to light upon, hit a mark). In the first place, he is always poor, and he's far from being delicate and beautiful (as ordinary people think he is) (*Eros* is always [*aei*: also as forever] *penes* [i.e., adjective of *Penia*] an far from being delicate and beautiful [*apalos* and *kalos*, the former implying softness] as most people consider [*oiomai*: to suspect, to intend with regard to an obvious question] him); instead, he is tough and shriveled and shoeless and homeless, always lying on the dirt without a bed, sleeping at people's doorsteps and in roadsides under the sky, having his mother's

nature, always living with Need (Instead *Eros* is a kind of vagabond...*skleros* and *dauchmeros* [hard and squalid] being among his traits...with his mother's *phusis* or nature and always living [*sunoikos*, literally as dwelling in the same or *sun-*, that is, with] need which here is not *Peni* but *endeia*, which connotes more deficiency). But on his father's side he is a schemer after the beautiful and the good (His father's side is quite different, plotting against [*epiboulos*: *boule* or counsel, advice prefaced with the preposition *epi-* or upon] concerning what is both *kalos* and *agathos*); he is brave, impetuous, and intense (Several among his traits are the following six: impetuous (*itos* or *itamos*: headlong, eager), intense [*suntonos*: the verbal root *teino* or to extend prefaced with the preposition *sun-* or with *to* to intensify its meaning]), an awesome hunter, always weaving snares, resourceful in his pursuit of intelligence, a lover of wisdom through all his life, a genius with enchantments, potions, and clever pleadings (Also he is resourceful in pursuing [*epithumetes*: the root *thumos* or principle of life prefaced with the preposition *epi-* or upon; feeling combined with thought literally as one who longs for or desires] intelligence [*phronesis*: purpose, intention, prudence], lover of wisdom [*philosophos*] throughout his life, a brilliant [*deinos*: fearful, marvelous, clever] with enchantments along with potions [*goes*: sorcerer, wizard and *pharmakeus*: also as one who poisons] and clever pleadings [*sophistes*: master of one's craft, adept, skilled]).

“He is by nature neither immortal nor mortal (The verb *phuo* [to bring forth, produce] is used with respect to the adjectives *athanatos* and *thnetos*, that is, concerning *Eros*). But now he springs to life when he gets his way; now he dies—all in the very same day (Also he is flourishing and alive [*thallo*: to be luxuriant and *zao*] whenever he prospers [*euporeo*: *eu-* or the adverbial form for well] while, by reason of having the nature or *phusis* of his father, he returns to life, *anabioskomai* [*bios*: life in the sense of course of life] after having been dead [*apothnesko*: to be ready to die]). Because he is his father's son, however, he keeps coming back to life (*Apothesko* is with *tote* or then whereas *anabioskomai* is with *palin* or again), but then anything he finds his way to always slips away, and for this reason Love is never completely without resources, nor is he ever rich (However, that which is always coming about [*porizo*: to carry, furnish] flows out [*hupokreo*: *hupo-* or under and *ek-* or from; to pass away gradually]. Because of this *Eros* never lacks resources [*aporeo*: to be at a loss] nor is ever rich [*plouteo*]).

204 “He is in between wisdom and ignorance as well (Eros is mesos [middle the preposition *en* or in the middle] of *sophia* and *amathia* or wisdom [perhaps most likely as skill, implying cunning] and lack of knowledge [*amathia*: the verbal root *manthano* with alpha privative]). In fact, you see, none of the gods loves wisdom or wants to become wise—for they are wise (Compared with *Eros*, the gods don’t love wisdom or want to become wise [*phiosopheo* and *epithumeo* being the verbs, the latter a *thumos* or what involves the heart and mind which is upon or *epi*-])—and no one else who is wise already loves wisdom; on the other hand, no one who is ignorant will love wisdom either or want to become wise (On the other hand, an ignorant person won’t love wisdom [*philosopheo*] or want [*epithumeo*; i.e., have his *thumos* upon] to become wise [*sophos*]). The difficulty [*chalepos*: grievous, painful] with *amathia* or lack of knowledge is being content [*hikanos*: sufficient, adequate. This adjective is used with the verb *dokeo*, to suppose, imagine] with oneself even though you’re neither *kalos* nor *agathos*, beautiful nor good, let alone intelligent [*phronimos*: in one’s right mind and senses]). For what’s especially difficult about being ignorant is that you are content with yourself, even though you’re neither beautiful and good nor intelligent. If you don’t think you need anything, of course you won’t want what you don’t think you need (If you don’t think [*oiomai*: also as to suppose or imagine] to be needing anything [*endeos*: connotes deficiency] you won’t want what you don’t think [*oiomai*] you need [*epideo*: the preposition *epi*- or upon prefaced to the verb *deo*, to want; literally to want upon]).”

“In that case, Diotima, who are the people who love wisdom (*philosopheo* as loving wisdom) if they are neither wise nor ignorant (*sophos* or *amathes*)?”

“That’s obvious,” she said. “A child could tell you (The obviousness [*delos*: visible, conspicuous] of which Diotima speaks is related to a child or *pais*). Those who love wisdom fall in between those two extremes (*Eros* is in between [*metaxu*: *meta* as among and *xun* as a variant of *sum/sun*, with, hence among-with] the extreme of *sophos* and *amathes*). And Love is one of them, because he is in love with what is beautiful, and wisdom is extremely beautiful (*Sophia* is extremely beautiful, *kallos* being the adjective which can apply to beauty as for show). It follows that Love must be a lover of wisdom and, as such, is in between being wise and being

ignorant (It follows [*anagkaios*: necessary] that *Eros* is a *philosophos* and thus in between [*metaxu*] being wise and being ignorant, *sophos* and *amathos*). This, too, comes to him from his parentage, from a father who is wise and resourceful and a mother who is not wise and lacks resource (The cause [*aitia*] of this? His pedigree: a father who is *sophos* and *euporos* [*eu-* or the adverbial form for well prefaced to the noun *poros*, a means of passing...i.e., *Poros*] and a mother who lacks wisdom [*sophos* with negative] and has no resources or *aporos*: *poros* with alpha privative). “My dear Socrates, that, then, is the nature of the Spirit called Love (Such is the *phusis* or nature of *Eros*, *daimon* being used or its guiding spirit which is neither divine nor human but *metaxu* or in between both). Considering what you thought about Love (With regard to what Socrates thought [*oiomai*] of *Eros*, it isn’t surprising [*thaumastos*: wonderful, marvelous] that he maintained the position he did, *pascho* meaning to suffer, to be in a passive state of mind), it’s no surprise that you were led into thinking of Love as you did. On the basis of what you say, I conclude that you thought Love was being loved, rather than being a lover (From what Socrates said [*tekmairomai*: to judge from signs or token, *tekmar* being such a noun], Diotima thought [*dokeo* as to seem appear with *emoi* or to me] he maintained [*oiomai*] *Eros* was being *erao* or *eromenon* loved instead of being a lover, *erao:eron*). I think that’s why Love struck you as beautiful in every way: because it is what is really beautiful and graceful that deserves to be loved, and this is perfect and highly blessed (And so Diotima though [*oiomai*] that is why *Eros* appeared [*phaino*: to bring to light] to Socrates as wholly beautiful [*pagkalos*: *pan-* or all prefaced to *kalos*]. What is truly [*to onti*] *kalos* and *abros* [delicate, graceful, dainty] deserves being loved or *erao* and is both perfect and most blessed, *teleos* (or *teleios*): having reached an end and *makarios*: also as happy); but being a lover takes a different form, which I have just described (On the other hand, being a lover [*erao* or one who does *erao*] assumes another form or *idea* [form, outward appearance] which Diotima had described earlier, the verb being *dierchomai* literally as to go through, *dia-*).”

So I said, “All right then, my friend (Socrates calls Diotima his friend or *xenos* which can be a stranger as well including a guest). What you say about Love is beautiful, but if you’re right, what use is Love to human beings (What she says about love is beautiful or *kalos* [adverbial form], but if correct, she asks what use [*chreia*: advantage, service] is *Eros* to

people)?” “I’ll try to teach you that, Socrates, after I finish this (Diotima claims she’ll attempt [*peirao*: to make trial of] to teach [*didasko*] this to Socrates after she finishes). So far I’ve been explaining the character and the parentage of Love. Now, according to you, he is love for beautiful things (Thus far Diotima has been the origin of *Eros*, the verb *gignomai*[to come into existence] being used, and to Socrates this is of beautiful things, *kalos*). But suppose someone asks us, ‘Socrates and Diotima, what is the point of loving beautiful things?’

“It’s clearer this way (*Saphes* is the adjective for clearer, also as pain, manifest, unerring *anderao* is the verb here for desire): ‘The lover of beautiful things has a desire; what does he desire?’ ”

“That they become (*Gignomai* is the verb, usually as to be born or come into existence) his own,” I said.

“But that answer calls for still another question, that is, ‘What will this man have, when the beautiful things (*Potheo* is the verb for calling for and involves longing, yearning as well as regret, being used with respect to *apokrisis* which literally means a separating [*krino*: to judge with the preposition *apo-* or from prefaced to it]) he wants have become his own (The question at hand deals with what will be in one’s possession once the *kalos* he wants are his)?’

I said there was no way I could give a ready answer (*apokrino* for to answer [*apokrisis* just above] and the adverb *procheiros* or at hand [literally: *pro-* or before prefaced to *cheir* or hand] or ready) to that question. Then she said, “Suppose someone changes the question, putting ‘good’ in place of ‘beautiful,’ and asks you this: ‘Tell me, Socrates, a lover of good things has a desire; what does he desire?’” *Metaballo* is the verb here, literally as to cast (*ballo*) after (*meta-*) with regard to changing the question, that is, *agathos* instead of (*anti*) *kalos*. *Chraomai* means to proclaim or declare along with *punthanomai* (to inquire). The verb *erao* is used here for both lover and desire.

“That they become his own,” I said.

“And what will he have, when the good things he wants have become his own?”

“This time it’s easier to come up with the answer (*Euporos* is the adjective here which means literally good or *eu-* [adverbial form] passage or *poros* and used with the verb *apokino: krino* or to judge prefaced with the preposition *apo-*, from),” I said. “He’ll have happiness (*Eudaimon* is the other word here prefaced with *eu-* referring to having a good *daimon* or governing spirit or genius).”

205 “That’s what makes happy people happy (Another use of *eudaimon* with respect to not possessing good things or thing which are *agathos, ktaomai* being the verb which also pertains to acquisition), isn’t it—possessing good things. There’s no need to ask further (Diotima is firm on this point, the possession of material things, hence she says there’s no need to inquire further, *prosdeo* meaning to need besides or *deo* with the preposition *pros-* [direction towards- which] prefaced to it), ‘What’s the point of wanting happiness (*boulomai* means to be willing or preferring with respect to being *eudaimos*)’ The answer you gave seems to be final (*Telos* is Socrates’ answer [*apokrisis*], final or complete with nothing further to add)?”

“True,” I said.

“Now this desire for happiness, this kind of love—do you think it is common to all human beings and that everyone wants to have good things forever and ever (Diotima asks Socrates about the kind [*boulesis*: willing, intention or purposes] of love under discussion, whether it’s something *agathos*, common [*koinos*] to everyone, and wanted forever, *aei*)? What would you say?”

“Just that,” I said. “It is common to all.”

“Then, Socrates, why don’t we say that everyone is in love (The verb *erao* with *pas* or all, this verb being applied to things),” she asked, “since everyone always loves the same things? Instead, we say some people are in love and others not; why is that (Instead, we [Diotima uses the first person plural, a kind of solidarity, if you will] say that some are in *erao* while others are not *inerao*, a quandary Diotima poses to Socrates)?”

“I wonder (Socrates can’t respond properly but expresses wonder, *thaumazo* also connoting honor as well as worship) about that myself,” I said.

“It’s nothing to wonder about,” she said. “It’s because we divide out a special kind of love (Diotima says there’s no need for this *thaumazo* because we divide *eros* up, the verb being *aphaireo* [literally as to take or *haireo* with the preposition *apo-* or from prefaced to it] with regard to a certain [*ti*] *eidos* [that which is seen; from *eido*] or form of love), and we refer to it by the word that means the whole—‘love’; and for the other kinds of love we use (Thus we address it by name, *onomazo*, which means the *holos* or whole. That is to say, we give [*epitithemi*: literally to place upon or *epi-*] it’s the name or *onoma* which is *erao*; for other types of *erao* we use other words, *katachraomai* being the verb with the root meaning to use and here prefaced with the preposition *kata-* which is suggestive of using in a certain order) other words.”

“What do you mean?” I asked.

“Well, you know, for example, that ‘poetry’ (Diotima offers the example of poetry, *poiesis* meaning a fabrication or creation as from the verbal root *poieo*, to make) has a very wide range (It is *ti polu* or literally a certain much, a way of stating its range or capacity). After all, everything that is responsible for creating something out of nothing is a kind of poetry (Poetry is an *aitia* or cause of creating something [*eis to on*; into being] from nothing, *me ontos*); and so all the creations of every craft and profession are themselves a kind of poetry, and everyone who practices a craft is a poet (Note the other three words relative to making in addition *topoiesis*: *techne* [craft, skill], *ergasia* [manufacture] and *demiourgos* [literally as work for the people, practitioner]).”

“True.”

“Nevertheless,” she said, “as you also know (*oiomai*: to think, suppose, imagine), these craftsmen are not called (*kaleo*: to summon) poets. We have other words (*onoma*: name) for them, and out of the whole of poetry we have marked off (*aporizo*: *apo-* or from prefaced to the root *horizo*, to set a boundary) one part (*moiros*), the part the Muses give us with melody and rhythm (*mousikos* and *metron* [skilled in music or belonging to the

Muses and that by which anything is measured, limit, proportion]), and we refer to this by the word that means the whole. For this alone is called (*kaleo*) ‘poetry (*poiesis*),’ and those who practice (*poieo*: to do) this part of poetry are called poets (*poietos*).”

“True.”

“That’s also how it is with love (*eros*). The main point (*kephalaioi*: literally as belonging to the head) is this: every (*pas*: all) desire (*epithumia*: literally, desire [*thumos*] which is *epi*- or upon) for good things (*agathos*) or for happiness (*eudaimoneo* [the verb for *eudaimon* meaning to be truly happy or prosperous) is ‘the supreme (*meegas*: large) and treacherous (*doleros*: deceitful) love (*eros*)’ in everyone (*pas*). But those who pursue (*trepo*: to turn or direct towards) this along any of its many other ways (*pollache*: also as often)—through making money, or through the love (*eros*: note *erao* and *erastes* which follow) of sports, or through philosophy(*philosophia*)—we don’t say (*kaleo*: to call) that these people are in love (*erao*), and we don’t call them lovers (*erastes*). It’s only when people are devoted (*spoudazo*: to be busy with, zealous) exclusively to one special kind (*eidosis*: form) of love (*eros*) that we use these words that really belong to (*ischo*: to restrain, with *onoma* or name) the whole (*holos*) of it: ‘love’ and ‘in love’ and ‘lovers(*eros, erao* and *erastes*).”

“I am beginning to see your point (*kinduneuo* is the verb which means to be daring, to be risked, very likely.),” I said.

“Now there is a certain story ,” she said, “according to which lovers are those people who seek their other halves (*Logos* or word, expression and *lego* [also to count, gather[concerning those filled with *erao* seek [*zeteo*: also to investigate] the other halves [*hemisus*] of themselves). But according to my story, a lover does not seek the half or the whole, unless, my friend, it turns out to be good as well (However, Diotima has a different *logos*, that is, one in love [*erao*] seeks neither the half or whole [*holos*] unless it happens to turn out [*tugchano*: to light upon, hit upon] good or *agathos*). I say this because people are even willing to cut off their own arms and legs if they think they are diseased (She says this because people are willing to amputate one of their limbs if they deem [*dokeo*: to seem, appear] it diseased [*poneros*: toilsome, painful]). I don’t think an individual takes joy in what belongs to him personally unless by
206 ‘belonging to me’ he means ‘good’ and by ‘belonging to another’ he

means 'bad.' That's because what everyone loves (*erao*) is really nothing other than the good (*agathos*). Diotima doesn't think [*oiomai*] a person welcomes [*aspazo*: to embrace, cling to] what belongs to [*oikeios*: belonging to the house or one's own] him unless by that he means the good or *agathos* and what belongs to another [*allotrios*: also as strange, alien] as being bad, *kakos* which also means evil). Do you disagree (Diotima ends her remains but posing the question to Socrates whether or not he agrees, *dokeo* [to think, suppose])?"

"Zeus! Not I," I said.

"Now, then," she said. "Can we simply (*Aploos* is the adjective for simply and also means to be straightforward) say that people love the good (*erao* and *agathos*)?"

"Yes," I said.

"But shouldn't we add that, in loving it, they want the good to be theirs?"

"We should."

"And not only that," she said. "They want the good to be theirs forever (*Aei* or forever with regard to possession of the good which isn't mentioned here), don't they?"

"We should add that too."

"In a word (*sullebden* is an adverb also meaning collectively, in short), then, love is wanting to possess the good forever."

"That's very true," I said.

"This, then, is the object of love," she said. "In view of that, how do people pursue it if they are truly in love (*Aei* is mentioned here in the beginning as to what is this *eros* being such, that is, as eternal)? What do they do with the eagerness and zeal we call love (Diotima asks how [*troposor* course, direction] people pursue [*dioko*: to cause to run, set in a quick motion] *eros*, what they do [*prasso*: achieve, effect, accomplish] with the *spoude* and *suntasis* [haste or speed and tension, rigidity: *sun-* or with prefaced to

the verbal root *teino*, to extend] called [*kaleo*] *eros*?)? What is the real purpose of love? Can you say (Also Diotima asks simply what's the purpose *oregon* (occupation, result of work) of love or *eros* is, *tugchano* meaning to hit upon)"

"If I could," I said, "I wouldn't be your student (*phoitaō*: to go to and fro, resort to) filled with admiration for your wisdom (*sophia* or wisdom; also involves skill), and trying to learn (*manthano*: involves practice and experience) these very things (*para* suggestive of being beside Diotima)." "Well, I'll tell you," she said. "It is giving birth (*Tokos* is a noun for bring to birth and also refers to the produce of money, interest) in beauty, whether in body or in soul (Here *kalos* or beauty applies to both *soma* and *psuche*, physical body and soul)."

"It would take divination to figure out what you mean (Socrates claims that *manteia* or divinization (also means prophecy) is required to figure out (*manthano*: to learn) what Diotima means). I can't."

"Well, I'll tell you more clearly (Diotima now resolves to assist Socrates by being clearer, *saphes*, also as plain, manifest)," she said. "All of us are pregnant (Each of us is pregnant [*kuo*] both in body and soul, *soma* and *psuche* (the two nouns have the preposition *kata*, suggestive of being in accord with), Socrates, both in body and in soul, and, as soon as we come to a certain age, we naturally desire to give birth (Upon reaching a given age [*helikia*: time of life, prime of life] naturally [*phusis* or nature] we desire [*epithumeo*: to have *thumos* or desire upon, *epi*-] to give birth, *gignomai*). Now no one can possibly give birth in anything ugly; only in something beautiful. That's because when a man and a woman come together in order to give birth, this is a godly affair (It's impossible [*dunamai*: to be able or capable] to beget [*tikto*: to beget, bring forth. Compare with *gignomai*, more as coming into being] that which is ugly or *aischros* [also shameful] instead of what's beautiful or *kalos*. The reason? The union [*sunousia*: literally, a being with or *sun*-] for giving birth [*tokos*: cf. *tikto*] is a *pragma* [deed, matter, affair] which belongs to the gods). Pregnancy, reproduction—this is an immortal thing for a mortal animal to do, and it cannot occur in anything that is out of harmony, but ugliness is out of harmony with all that is godly (Conception and generation or *kuesis* and *genesis* are an immortal thing [*athanatos*] for an animal [*zoon*: a living being]. It's impossible for what lacks [*adunatos*:

having lack of strength] with regard to anything not in harmony [*anrmostos*: alpha privative to *harmozō*, to fit together, join] whereas that which is *aischros* [as shameful, just noted] is such with everything divine). Beauty, however, is in harmony with the divine (On the other hand, that which is beautiful or *kalos* is in harmony with it, *harmozō*). Therefore the goddess who presides at childbirth—she’s called Moira or Eilithuia—is really Beauty (Thus Moira [portion, fate] and Eilithuia [the goddess of childbirth] is Kallone or that which is most beautiful). That’s why, whenever pregnant animals or persons draw near to beauty, they become gentle and joyfully disposed and give birth and reproduce (For this reason when pregnant animals or persons approach [*prospelazo*: *pelazo* or to come near intensified by the preposition *pros-*, direction towards-which] beauty [*kalos*], they become gentle [*hilaos*: gracious, kindly] and are inclined [*diacheo*: literally, to pour in different ways, *cheo* prefaced with the preposition *dia-* or through] with a good disposition [*euphraino*: *eu-* or well as associated with *phren*, one’s heart or spirit; to cheer, delight] and thus give birth. The verb *tikto* is used with *gennaō*, to bring into the world or engender with to beget or produce); but near ugliness they are foul-faced and draw back in pain; they turn away and shrink back and do not reproduce, and because they hold on to what they carry inside them, the labor is painful (However, when near ugliness [*aischros*] it’s a different story which can be summed up in not reproducing [*gignomai*], turning away [*apotrepo*: the preposition *apo-* or from] and shrinking back [*aneillo*], a fact which makes anything conceived [*kuema*] difficult to bear, the verb *phero* [to carry] with the adjective *chalepos*). This is the source of the great excitement about beauty that comes to anyone who is pregnant and already teeming with life (Diotima sums up her remarks by saying that such is the great [*polus*: many] emotion [*ptoiesis*: excitement] about beauty or *kalos* which comes to anyone who is pregnant or teeming with life [*spargo*: swell with passion, to be ripe]): beauty releases them from their great pain. You see, Socrates,” she said, “what Love wants is not beauty, as you think it is (*Kalos* sets them free [*apoluo*: *luo* or to loosen prefaced with the preposition *apo-* or from] from great pain [*odis*: pains of childbirth]. Finally Diotima addresses Socrates directly by saying that what *eros* wants isn’t *kalos* as he thinks [*oiomai*: to suspect, to intend with regard to an obvious question]).”

“Well, what is it, then?”

“Reproduction and birth (*genesis* and *tokos*) in beauty (*kalos*).”

“Maybe,” I said.

“Certainly,” she said. “Now, why reproduction? It’s because reproduction goes on forever; it is what mortals have in place of immortality 207 forever; it is what mortals have in place of immortality (Diotima brings up reproduction or *genesis* because it is *aeigenes* or eternal [*aei-* plus verbal root for *genesis*, *gennaō*] and is a substitute of immortality [*athanatos*: adjective] for mortals, *thnetos*: liable to death). A lover must desire immortality along with the good, if what we agreed earlier was right, that Love wants to possess the good forever (A lover [*eros*] must desire [*epithumeō*: to have *thumos* or desire upon, *epi-* with *anagkaios*: necessary] immortality with the good [*agathos*] from what we agreed upon or *homologeō*: literally as to speak together, *homoios* as same). It follows from our argument that Love must desire immortality (It is used with *logos* or discourse, namely, that *eros* must desire *athanasia*).”

All this she taught (*didasko*) me, on those occasions when she spoke on (*peri*: around, concerning) the art of love (*erotikos*: caused by love). And once she asked, “What do you think (*oiomai*) causes (*aitios*: responsible, culpable) love and desire (*eros* and *epithumia*, desire-upon or *thumos* which is *epi*), Socrates? Don’t you see what an awful state a wild animal (*therion*) is in (*diatithemi* or literally to set or place through [*dia-*] with the adjective *deinos*, fearful, marvelous, clever) when it wants to reproduce (*gennaō*)? Footed and winged animals alike, all are plagued by the disease (*noseō*: connotes suffering from plague) of Love (*erotikos*). First they are sick (*diatithemi*: the root meaning to set or place prefaced with the preposition *dia-* or through; literally, to set-through) for intercourse (*summignumi*, the preposition *sum-* or with) with each other, then for nurturing (*trophe*: nourishment) their young—for their sake the weakest animals stand ready to do battle against the strongest and even to die for them, and they may be racked with famine in order to feed their young. They would do anything for their sake. Human beings, you’d think, would do this because they understand the reason (*logismos*: reckoning, calculating, consideration) for it; but what causes (*aitia*: noun) wild animals (*therion*) to be in such a state of (*diatithemi*) love (*erotikos*)? Can you say?”

And I said again that I didn't know (*eido* (fundamentally means to see, behold or to mark)).

So she said, "How do you think (*dianoeomai*: the root for *nous* or mind prefaced with *dia-* or through; to think-through) you'll ever master (the adjective *deinos* usually as fearful, terrible but here as something like able, clever) the art of love (that which is *erotikos*), if you don't know (*ennoeo* or to think, reflect and similar to to *dianoeomai*) that?"

"But that's why I came to you (The preposition *para* is used with regard to "you"), Diotima, as I just said. I knew I needed (*deo*) a teacher (*didaskalos*, also as master). So tell me what causes (*aitia*: noun) this, and everything else that belongs to (*peri*: around, about) the art of love (*erotikos*)."

"If you really believe (*pisteuo*: also as to trust) that Love (*Eros*) by its nature (*phusis*: that which is indicative of a natural bent) aims at what we have often (*pollakis*: many times) agreed (*homologeio*: literally to speak together) it does, then don't be surprised (*thaumazo*: to show amazement) at the answer," she said. "For among animals (*entaucha*: here, in this state of things or in this position) the principle (*logos* or word as expression) is the same as with us, and mortal nature (a *phusis* which is *isthnetos*) seeks (*zeteo*) so far as possible (*dunamis* or the capacity to do something with the preposition *kata*, in accord with) to live forever (the verb *eimi* or to be with *aei* and be immortal, *athanatos*). And this is possible (*dunamai*: to be able, capable) in one way only (*monos*, adjective): by reproduction (*genesis*: origin, source), because it always (*aei*) leaves behind (*kataleipo*) a new young one (*neos*) in place of the old (*palaios*). Even while each living thing (*zoon*) is said to be alive (*zao*) and to be the same—as a person is said to be the same (*oios*: such as, what sort of) from childhood (*paidarion*: diminutive of *pais*, child) till he turns into an old man (*presbutos*: elder) —even then he never consists of the same things (*oudepote ta auta echon*: or never having the things), though he is called the same, but he is always (*aei*) being renewed (*gignomai*: to come into being) and in other respects passing away (*apollumi*: to destroy utterly), in (the preposition *kata* is used, in accord with) his hair and flesh and bones and blood and his entire body (*soma*). And it's not just in (*kata*: in accord with) his body, but in (*kata*: in accord with) his soul (*psuche*), too, for none of his manners (*tropos*: course, direction), customs (*ethos*: usage, disposition, character),

opinions (*doxa*), desires (*epithumia*: desire or yearning; *thumos* prefaced with *epi-* or upon), pleasures (*hedone*), pains (*lupe*: distress), or fears (*phobos*) ever remains (*pareimi*: literally, to be by the side or near, para-) the same, but some are coming to be (*gignomai*) in him while others are passing 208 away (*apollumi*: to destroy utterly). And what is still far stranger (*atopos*: alpha privative, no *tropos* or no place) than that is that not only does one branch of knowledge (*episteme*: literally, a standing upon or *epi-*; acquaintance, skill) come to be (*gignomai*) in us while another passes away (*apollumi*) and that we are never the same (*oudepote hoi autoi*: literally, never the these) even in respect of our knowledge (*episteme* with the preposition *kata*, in accord with), but that each single piece (*hekastos*) of knowledge has the same fate (*pascho*: the sense of this verb is to receive an impression from without). For what we call (*kaleo*: to summon) studying (*melete*: care, attention) exists because knowledge (*episteme*) is leaving (*exeimi*: *eimiprefaced* with the preposition *ex-* or from) us, because forgetting (*lethe*: oblivion) is the departure (*exodos*: *hodos* or way prefaced with the preposition *ex-* or from) of knowledge, while studying (*melete*) puts back a fresh (*kainos*: new) memory (*mneme*) in place of what went away (*apeimi*: *eimiprefaced* with *apo-* or from), thereby preserving (*sozo*: to save) a piece of knowledge, so that it seems (*dokeo*: to appear) to be the same. And in that way (*tropos*: course, direction) everything mortal (*thnetos*) is preserved (*sozo*), not, like the divine (*theios*: belonging to a god), by always being the same in every way (*pantapasi*: the adjective *pas* or all used twice), but because what is departing (*apios*: far away, distant) and aging (*palaioo*) leaves behind (*egkatalaipo*: the root *leipo* prefaced with *kata*, in accord with) something new (*neos*), something such as it had been. By this device (*mechane*: instrument, contrivance), Socrates,” she said, “what is mortal (*thnetos*) shares in (*metecho*: the root *techo* or to have prefaced with the preposition *meta-*, here as with) immortality (*athanasia*), whether it is a body (*soma*) or anything else, while the immortal (*athanatos*) has another way. So don’t be surprised (*thaumazo*) if everything naturally values (*timao*: to hold in honor) its own offspring (*apoblastema*: literally, a shoot with *phusis* or nature), because it is for the sake of (*charis*: grace, favor, for what reason) immortality (*athanasia*) that everything shows this zeal (*spoude*: also as haste), which is Love (*eros*).”

Yet when I heard her speech (*logos*: word as expression) I was amazed (*thaumazo*), and spoke: “Well,” said I, “Most wise (*sophos*: also as skilled)

Diotima, is this really (*alethos*: adverb; truly) the way it is (*houtos echei*: has thus)?”

And in the manner of a perfect (*teleos* or *teleios*: pertains to having reached an end) sophist (*sophistes*: master of one’s craft, wise, prudent; the adjective *sophos* or wise being derived from it) she said, “Be sure of it (*eu* or the adverbial form indicative of well-ness and the verb *eimi*, to be), Socrates. Look, if you will (*ethelo*: to wish, to purpose), at how human beings seek (*blepo*: to have the power of sight) honor (*philotimia*: *phileo* or to love prefaced to *time* or honor). You’d be amazed at (*thaumazo*) their irrationality (*alogia*: alpha privative; having no *logos* or capacity for expression, lack of reason or accountability), if you didn’t have in mind (*ennoeo*: the preposition *en-* or in prefaced to *noeo*, to perceive, understand) what I spoke about and if you hadn’t pondered (*enthumeomai*: the preposition *en-* or in prefaced to the verbal root of *thumos* or principle of life, to lay to heart) the awful state (*diakeimai*: the preposition *dia-* or through prefaced to *keimai* [to be outstretched, to be laid up], to be in a certain state or so affected) of love (*eros*) they’re in (*deinos*: fearful, terrible), wanting to become famous (*onomastos* [the noun *onoma*]: wanting to be named) and ‘to lay up glory (*kleos*: also as rumor, report) immortal forever (*aei*, with the preposition *eis* or into along with *chronos* or chronological time),’ and how they’re ready to brave any danger (*kindunos* with the verb *kinduneuo*: to be daring, make a venture) for the sake of this, much more than they are for their children; and they are prepared to spend (*analisko*: to lavish, squander) money, suffer through (*poneo*: the verbal root of *ponos*) all sorts of ordeals (*ponos*: work as well as distress), and even die for (*huperapothnesko*: the two prepositions *huper-* and *apo-* [on behalf of and from] prefaced to the verbal root *thnesko*, to die) the sake of glory (*hostis*: anything whatsoever, glory not mentioned). Do you really think (*oiomai*: means to suspect, to intend with regard to an obvious question) that Alcestis would have died for (*apothnesko*) Admetus,” she asked, “or that Achilles would have died after Patroclus, or that your Codrus would have died (*proapothnesko*: the preposition *pro-* or on behalf of, for) so as to preserve (*huper*: like *pro-*, on behalf of) the throne for his sons, if they hadn’t expected (*oiomai*) the memory (*mneme*) of their virtue (*arete*: the best quality of anyone or anything)—which we still hold in honor (‘in honor’ not in the Greek text)—to be immortal (*athanatos*)? Far from it,” she said. “I believe that anyone will do anything for the sake of immortal (*athanatos*) virtue (*arete*)

and the glorious fame (*euklees*: the root *kleos* [fame, glory] prefaced with the adverbial *eu-* or well) that follows; and the better (*ameinon*) the people, the more they will do, for they are all in love with (*erao*) immortality (*athanatos*).

“Now, some people are pregnant (*egkmon*) in body (*soma*, with the preposition *kata*, in accord with), and for this reason turn more to (*pros*: direction towards-which) women and pursue (*trepo*: to turn one’s steps, show) love (*erotikos*: adjective) in that way, providing (*porizo*: to carry, furnish) themselves through childbirth with immortality (*athanasia*) and remembrance (*mneme*) and happiness (*eudaimonia*: having a good [*eu-*, 209 adverbial form of well] *daimon* or governing spirit), as they think (*oiomai*), for all time to come (*epeita*: thereupon); while others are pregnant (*koueo*) soul (*psuche* with *kata* or according to)—because there surely are those who are even more pregnant (*kuo*) in their souls than in their bodies, and these are pregnant with what is fitting (*proseko*: *pros-* or direction towards-which prefaced to *heko*, to be present, to have come, be near, be proper) for a soul to bear (*kuo*) and bring to birth (*tikto*). And what is fitting (*proseko*)? Wisdom (*phronesis*: purpose, intention, prudence) and the rest of virtue (*arete*), which all poets beget (*genetes*: begetter, ancestor), as well as all the craftsmen who are said to be creative (*heuretikos*: from the verbal root *heurisko* [to find, discover], inventive). But by far the greatest and most beautiful part (*kallos*) of wisdom (*phronesis*) deals with the proper ordering (*diakosmesis*: the verbal root *kosmeo*[to decorate, order] prefaced with the preposition *dia-* or through; i.e., a thorough ordering) of cities and households, and that is called (*onoma*: name) moderation (*sophrosune*: soundness of mind, prudence, discretion) and justice (*dikaiosune*). When someone has been pregnant (*egkumon*) with these in his soul (*psuche*) from early youth (*neos*: also as new), while he is still a virgin (*eitheos*: an unmarried youth), and, having arrived (*heko*: to have come, be present) at the proper age (*helikia*: time of life, prime of life), desires (*epithumeo*: to have *thumos* or desire upon, *epi-*) to beget (*tikto*) and give birth (*gennao*), he too will certainly go about seeking (*zeteo* with *oimai* or to think) the beauty (*kalos*: with the preposition *en* or in, being present within beauty from which, it seems, the person at hand would give birth) in which he would beget (*gennao*); for he will never beget in anything ugly (*aischros*: also as shameful). Since he is pregnant, then, he is much more drawn to (*aspazo*: to embrace, cling to) bodies that are beautiful (*kalos*) than to

those that are ugly (*aischros*); and if he also has the luck to find (*entugchano*: the verbal root with the preposition *en-* or *in* prefaced to it, to fall upon, to meet) a soul (*psuche*) that is beautiful (*kalos*) and noble (*gennaios*: suitable to one's birth or descent) and well-formed (*euphues*: the verbal root *phuo* [to bring forth] prefaced with the adverbial form for well, *eu-*; well-grown, shapely), he is even more drawn to (*aspazo*) this combination (*sunamphoterai*: both together, *sun-* meaning with); (*pros touton*: literally as towards this) such a man makes him instantly (*euthus*) teem with (*euporeo*: *eu-* as well; to prosper, thrive) ideas and arguments (*logos*: word as expression for both ideas and arguments) about virtue (*arete*, with the preposition *peri*, also as around)—the qualities a virtuous man should have (*chre*: it must, it needs) and the customary activities (*agathos*: good) in which he should engage (*epitedeuo*: the preposition *epi-* or *upon* prefaced to the verb; to make a practice of, pursue, study); and so he tries (*epicheireo*: literally, to put one's hand upon, *epi-*) to educate (*paideuo*: to bring up or rear a child) him. In my view (*oimai*), you see, when he makes contact with (*hapto*: to touch, fasten, bind) someone beautiful (*kalos*) and keeps company with (*homileo*: to be friends) him, he conceives (*kueo*) and gives birth to (*tikto*) what he has been carrying inside (*gennao*) him for ages (*palai*: long ago). And whether they are together or apart (*pareimi* and *apeimi*: the prepositions *para-* or *beside* and *apo-* or *from*), he remembers (*mimnesko*: to remind) that beauty. And in common with him he nurtures (*sunektrepho*: the root *trepho* prefaced with two prepositions, *sun-* and *ek-*, with and from) the newborn (*gennao* and *kainos* or *new*); such people, therefore, have much more to share (*koinonia*: fellowship) than do the parents of human children, and have a firmer bond (*ischo*: to hold fast, keep back, restrain with *bebaios*, also as steady) of friendship (*philia*), because the children in whom they have a share (*koinoo*: to make common) are more beautiful (*kallos*) and more immortal (*athanatos*).

Everyone would rather have (*dechomai*: to take, receive) such children than human ones (*anthropinos*), and would look up to (*apoblepo*: the preposition *apo-* or *from*; also as to look away from) Homer, Hesiod, and the other good poets with envy and admiration (*zeloo*: to be eager or zealous [for both nouns]) for the offspring (*ekgonos*: born of, sprung of) they have left behind (*kataleipo*: the preposition *kata* intimating that which is down)—offspring, which, because they are immortal (*athanatos*) themselves, provide their parents with immortal glory (*kleos*: also as fame)

and remembrance (*mneme*: memory). For example,” she said, “those are the sort of children Lycurgus left behind (*kataleipo*) in Sparta as the saviors (*soter*: also as guardian) of Sparta and virtually all of Greece. Among you the honor (*timios*: adjective) goes to Solon for his creation (*genesis*) of your laws (*nomos*: custom, usage). Other men in other places everywhere, Greek or barbarian (*barbaros*: i.e., non-Greek), have brought a host of beautiful deeds (*ergon*: occupation, the result of work) into the light (*apophaino*: the preposition *apo-* or from; to show forth, make known) and begotten (*gennao*) every kind of virtue (*arete*). Already many shrines (*hieros*: filled with or manifesting divine power) have sprung up to honor them for their immortal (*toioutos*: such as this) children, which hasn’t happened yet to anyone for human offspring (*anthropinos*). “Even you, Socrates, could 210 probably come to be initiated (*mueo*: that is, into 210 mysteries) into these rites of love (*erotikos*: adjective). But as for the purpose of these rites—when they are done (*meteimi*: the preposition *meta-* or after prefaced to *eimi*) correctly (*orthos*: adverb)—that is the final (*teleos*: perfect, complete) and highest mystery (*epoptikos*: the noun is *epopteia* which refers to Eleusinian mysteries in honor of Demeter and Persephone), and I don’t know (*eido*: to see, behold, mark) if you are capable (*oios*: alone, single in its kind) of it. I myself will tell you,” she said, “and I won’t stint (*apoleipo*: *apo-* or from prefaced to the root *leipo*; to leave behind or literally, to leave from) any effort (*prothumia*: *pro-* or on behalf of prefaced to *thumos* or desire; readiness, willingness, eagerness). And you must try (*peirao*: to attempt, endeavor) to follow (*epomai* or *epo*) if you can.

“A lover who goes about this matter correctly (*orthos*: adverb) must begin (*archo*: to make preparations, to lead the way) in his youth (*neos*: also as new) to devote (*eimi*: to be) himself to beautiful (*kalos* with the preposition *epi* or upon) bodies (*soma*). First, if the leader (*hegoumenos*) leads (*hegeomai*: also as to suppose, believe) aright (*orthos*), he should love (*erao*) one body (*soma*) and beget (*gennao*) beautiful (*kalos*) ideas (*logos*: word as expression) there; then he should realize (*katanoeo*: to know [*noeo*] in accord with [*kata-*] a given plan or pattern) that the beauty (*kallos*) of any one body (*soma*) is brother (*adelphos*: being a brother means being of the same mother) to the beauty of any other (*heteros*: here not as a brother nor as of the same mother but a more comprehensive recognition) and that if he is to pursue (*dioko*: more to chase or hunt and used with *dei*, it is necessary) beauty (*kalos*) of form

(*eidos*: originally, that which is seen and with the preposition *epi* or upon, upon form) he'd be very foolish (*anoiōs*: alpha privative; to lack *nous* or the capacity for perception) not to think (*hegeomai*: to suppose, believe) that the beauty (*kallos*) of all bodies (*soma*: with the preposition *epi* or literally 'upon all bodies') is one and the same (*he te kai*). When he grasps (*ennoeo*: the preposition *en-* or in prefaced to *noeo*; to have in one's thoughts. It is used with (*kathistemi*: the verb *histemi* [to stand] prefaced with the preposition *kata-*, in accord with; to set in order) this, he must become a lover (*erastes*) of all beautiful (*kalos*) bodies (*soma*), and he must think (*kataphroneo*: the root *phroneo* [to think, be sage or prudent] prefaced with the preposition *kata-*, in accord with) that this wild gaping (*sphodra*: adverb; very much, exceedingly) after just one body is a small thing (*smikros*: variant of *mikros*) and despise (*hegeomai*: to lead, go before with *chalaō*: to slacken, loosen) it.

“After this he must think that the beauty (*kallos*) of people's souls (*psuche*) is more valuable (*timios*: also as honorable) than the beauty of their bodies (*soma*: with the preposition *en* or in), so that if someone is decent (*eieikes*: *eikos* or probable, likely prefaced with the preposition *epi-* or upon; fitting, meet, suitable) in his soul (*psuche*), even though he is scarcely (*smikros*: variant of *mikros* or small) blooming (*anthos*: flower; with the verb *echo*, to have) in his body, our lover must be content (*exarkeo*: *arkeo*: to ward off, be sufficient prefaced with the preposition *ex-* or from; to suffice) to love (*erao*) and care for (*kedo*: to trouble, be concerned) him and to seek (*zeteo*) to give birth (*tikto*) to such ideas (*logos*: word as expression) as will make young men better (*belteros*: comparative of *agathos*, good). The result is (*hina*: also as 'in order that') that our lover will be forced (*anagkazo*: to be necessary) to gaze at (*theaomai*: to contemplate, behold) the beauty (*kalos*) of activities (*epitedeuma*: the preposition *epi-* or upon suggests a more lively or intense activity; pursuit, business) and laws (*nomos*: also as custom) and to see (*eido*: to behold, mark) that all this is akin to (*suggenes*: the preposition *sug-* or *sun-* as with) itself, with the result that he will think (*hegeomai*: also as to lead, go before) that the beauty (*kalos*) of bodies (*soma*: with the preposition *peri* or around, concerning) is a thing of no importance (*smikros*: variant of *mikros*, small). After customs (*epitedeuma*: as just noted, the preposition *epi-* or upon suggests a more lively or intense activity; pursuit, business) he must move on (*ago*: to lead, carry, fetch, bring) to various kinds of knowledge (*episteme*: the preposition *epi-* as

indicative of knowledge-upon). The result is that he will see (*blepo*: to have the power of sight) the beauty (*kallos*) of knowledge (*epistemos*: adjective of *episteme*) and be looking mainly not at beauty (*kalos*, with the preposition *pros*, direction towards-which) in a single example (*par' heni*: by or literally beside one)—as a servant (*oiketēs*: literally, of the household and not as demeaning as, for example, *doulos*) would who favored (*agapao*: to greet with affection) the beauty (*kallos*) of a little boy (*paidarion*: also can apply to a girl) or a man or a single custom (*epitedeuma*) ((double, underlined parentheses indicate that parentheses are used in the English translation being a slave (*douleuo*: the verbal root of *doulos*, in comparison with *oiketēs* just above), of course, he's low and small-minded(*phaulos* [easy, careless] and *smikrologos* [*smikros* and *logos*]))—but the lover is turned (*trepo*: to direct) to the great (*polus*: also as many; used with *epi* or upon) sea of beauty (*kalos*), and, gazing upon (*theoreo*: to contemplate, observe) this, he gives birth to (*tikto*) many gloriously beautiful (*kalos* and *megaloprepes*: the preposition *mega* or great or big and *prepo*, to be distinguished) ideas and theories (*logos* and *dianoia*, the latter as the root *nous* [mind] prefaced with the preposition *dia-* or through], in unstinting (*aphthonos*: alpha privative; free from envy) love of wisdom (*philosophia*), until, having grown and been strengthened (*auxano*: to increase in power and *rhunnumi*: to be eager, enthusiastic) there, he catches sight of (*kateidon*: *eido* or to see, know with the preposition *kata-* or down; literally, to look down upon) such knowledge (*episteme*: knowing-upon or *epi-*, and it is the knowledge of such beauty, *kalos*)...

“Try to pay attention to me (*peirao*: to attempt, endeavor along with *prosecho* and *nous*: the verbal root *echo* [to have] prefaced with the preposition *pros-*, direction towards-which and the noun meaning mind),” she said, “as best you can (*mala*: very, exceeding). You see, the man who has been thus far guided (*paidagogo*: *pais* or child and *ago*, to lead or guide) in matters of Love (*erotikos* with the preposition *pros*, direction towards-which), who has beheld (*theoreo*: to contemplate, observe) beautiful things (*kalos*) in the right order and correctly (*ephexes*: in succession and *orthos*: rightly), is coming now to the goal (*telos*: end, perfection, with the preposition *pros* or direction towards-which) of Loving (*erotikos*): all of a sudden (*exaiphnes*: *aphno* with the preposition *ex-* or from) he will catch sight of (*kathorao*: the root *hora* prefaced with the preposition *kata-*, down; to look down upon) something wonderfully

(*thaumastos*) beautiful (*kalos*) in its nature (*phusis*); that, Socrates, is the reason for all his earlier labors (*ponos*: distress).

211 “First, it always (*aei*) is and neither comes to be nor passes away (*gignomai* and *apollumi*, the latter suggestive of complete destruction), neither waxes nor wanes (*auxano* and *phthio*: to increase and to come to an end). Second, it is not beautiful (*kalos*) this way and ugly (*aischros*: shameful) that way, nor beautiful at one time and ugly at another, nor beautiful in relation to one thing and ugly in relation to another (the preposition *pros* or direction towards- which being used with the same two adjectives); nor is it beautiful here but ugly there, as it would be if it were beautiful for some people and ugly for others. Nor will the beautiful appear (*phantazomai*: to become visible, show oneself) to him in the guise of a face or hands or anything else that belongs to the body (*soma* with *metecho*, the root *echo* [to have] prefaced with the preposition *meta-*, with]). It will not appear to him as one idea (*logos*: word as expression) or one kind of knowledge (*episteme*: literally, a standing upon or *epi-*, acquaintance, skill). It is not anywhere in another thing, as in an animal, or in earth, or in heaven, or in anything else, but itself by itself with itself (*kath’ hauto* and *meth’ hauto*), it is always one in form (*monoeides*, *eidos* being the root noun for form or that which is seen); and all the other beautiful things (*kalos*) share in (*metecho* or have-with) that, in such a way (*tropos*: course, direction) that when those others come to be or pass away (*gignomai* and *apollumi*: this pair noted just above), this does not become the least bit smaller or greater nor suffer any change (*pascho*: to suffer, to be in a passive state of mind). So when someone rises (*epaneimi*: *eimi* or to be prefaced with *epi-* and *ana-*, upward and to; to go back up, return) by these stages (*hode*: what is present, what is before), through loving boys (*paiderasteo*: *pais* or child prefaced to the root *erao*) correctly (*orthos*: rightly), and begins (*archo*: also as to make preparations, to lead the way) to see (*kathorao*: the verbal root *horao* prefaced with the preposition *kata-*, in accord with) this beauty (*kalos*), he has almost (*schedon*: close) grasped (*hapto*: to touch) his goal (*telos*: perfect, complete). This is what it is to go (*eimi*) aright (*orthos*), or be led (*ago*) by another, into the mystery of Love (*erotikos* with the preposition *epi* or upon): one goes always (*aei*) upwards (*epaneimi*: *eimi* or to be prefaced with *epi-* and *ana-*, upward and to; to go back up, return) for the sake of this Beauty (*kalos*), starting out from (*archo* with *apo* or from) beautiful things and using (*chrao*: to furnish, proclaim) them like rising

stairs: from one body to two and from two to all beautiful bodies, then from beautiful bodies to beautiful customs (*epitedeuma*: the preposition *epi-* or upon suggests a more lively or intense activity; pursuit, business), and from customs to learning (*mathema*: lesson, science) beautiful things, and from these lessons he arrives in the end at (*teleutao*: to complete, finish) this lesson, which is learning of this very Beauty (*kalos*), so that in the end (*teleutao*) he comes to know (*gignosko*) just what it is to be beautiful.

“And there in life (*bios*: life in the sense of course of life), Socrates, my friend (*philos*),” said the woman from Mantinea, “there if anywhere should a person live his life (*biotos*: to be worth living), beholding (*theoreo*) that Beauty (*kalos*). If you once see (*eido*: to behold, mark) that, it won’t occur (*dokeo*: to seem, appear) to you to measure (*kata* or in accord with) beauty by gold or clothing or beautiful boys and youths—who, if you see (*horao*: to observe, appear; compare with *eido*) them now, strike you out of your senses (*ekplesso*: the preposition *ek-* or from prefaced to the verbal root), and make you, you and many others, eager to be with (*suneimi*) the boys you love and look at (*horao*; the verb ‘love’ not in the text) them forever (*aei*), if there were any way to do that, forgetting food and drink, everything but looking at (*theoreo*) them and being with (*suneimi*) them. But how would it be, in our view (*oiomai*: to suspect, to intend),” she said, “if someone got to see (*eido*) the Beautiful (*kalos*) itself, absolute (*eilikrines*: pure, absolute), pure (*katharos*), unmixed (*ameiktos*), not polluted (*anapleos*: quite full) by human flesh or colors or any other great nonsense (*pluaris*: silly talk) of mortality (*thnetos*), but if he could (*dunamai*: to have the capacity) see (*kateidon*: the preposition *kata-* prefaced to the verb reading literally to look down upon) the divine (*theios*) Beauty (*kalos*) itself in its one form (*monoeides*: *eidos*, that which is seen, form or shape)? Do you think (*oiomai*) it would be a poor life (*abios* which is *phaulos* or easy, careless) for a human being 212 to look (*blepo*: to have the power of sight) there and to behold (*theoreo*) it by that which he ought (*dei*: it is necessary), and to be with (*sunieimi*) it? Or haven’t you remembered (*enthumeomai*: the preposition *en-* or in prefaced to the verbal root for the noun *thumos* [heart, soul, spirit]; literally, to lay to or in the heart),” she said, “that in that life alone (*monochos*: single, unique), when he looks at (*horao*) Beauty (*kalos*) in the only way that Beauty can be seen—only then will it become possible for him to give birth (*tikto*) not to images of virtue (*eidolon*: also as phantom

or something unsubstantial; with *arete*) ([[double underlined parentheses to show that the parentheses are in the English translation] because he's in touch with (*hapto*) no images]), but to true virtue ([[double underlined parentheses to show that the parentheses are in the English translation] because he is in touch with the true Beauty (*alethos* without 'beauty' in the Greek)). The love of the gods (*theophiles*: the verbal root *phileo*, to regard with affection; highly favored) belongs to anyone who has given birth to (*huparcho*: *hupo-* or under prefaced to the verbal root for *arche* [beginning]; to begin to be) true virtue (*alethos* with *arete*) and nourished it (*trephe*: to bring up, rear), and if any human being could become immortal (*athanatos*), it would be he."

This, Phaedrus and the rest of you, was what Diotima told me. I was persuaded (*peitho*). And once persuaded, I try to persuade others too that human nature (*phusis*) can find no better workmate (*sunergon*: the preposition *sun-* or with prefaced to *ergon* [occupation, the result of work]) for acquiring (*ktema*: possession) this than Love (*eros*). That's why I say that every man must honor (*chre*: it is necessary with *timao*) Love (*eros*), why I honor (*timao*) the rites of Love (*ta erotica*) myself and practice (*askeo*: to form by art, exercise, train) them with special diligence (*diapherontos*: adverb consisting of the preposition *dia-* or through and the verbal root *phero*, to bear or carry; also as differently from, in varying ways), and why I commend (*parakeleumai*: the preposition *para-* or beside prefaced to *keleuo* or to urge, drive on; to order one to do a thing, advise) them to others. Now and always (*aei*) I praise (*egkomiazō*: to be said in panegyric) the power and courage (*dunamis* or capacity and *andreia* or manliness) of Love (*eros*) so far as (*kath' hoson* or according to such) I am able. Consider (*nomizō*: to practice, make common use) this speech (*logos* or expression), then, Phaedrus, if you wish, a speech in praise of (*egkomios*: adjective) Love (*eros* with the preposition *eis* on literally into love). Or if not, call (*onomazō*: to name) it whatever and however you please (*chairo*: to rejoice, be glad) to call it.

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Socrates as Midwife (Theaetetus 148c-168e)

Please note: this text had been converted from a PDF format. Hence the e notations as inserted we unable to convert to the color brown as with the Diotima speech.

148c Socrates: But do you think the discovery [*exeurisko*: the verbal root *heurisko* prefaced with the preposition *ex-* or from, literally as to know-from] of what knowledge [*episteme*: literally, a standing upon or *epi-*; acquaintance, skill] is really what I was saying just now—a small thing [*smikros*: a variant of *mikros*]? Don't you think [*oiomai*: to suspect, to intend with] that's a problem for the people at the top [*akros*: highest, at the most extreme. Just before the beginning of this excerpt was mention of an example of runners who seem to fall into this category or extended to those who are such]?

Theaetetus: Yes, rather, I do; and the very topmost [*mala* as very much & superlative of *akros*] of them.

Socrates: Then do have confidence [*tharseo*: to be bold, audacious] in [*peri*: also as around, concerning] yourself and try to believe that Theodorus knew what he was talking about [*hoios*: such as, what sort or manner of nature]. You must put your whole heart [*prothumeomai*: the root *thumos* or principle of life, feeling combined with thought prefaced with the preposition *pro-* or before; to be ready, eager] into what we are doing—in particular into this matter of getting (*tugchano*: to light upon, hit a mark) a statement [*logos*: word as expression] of what knowledge [*episteme*] really is.

Theaetetus: If putting one's heart [*prothumia*: cf. verbal root just above] into it is all that is required, Socrates, the answer will come to light [*phaino*: to appear, reveal].

Socrates: Go on, then. You gave us a good lead [*huphegeomai*: the preposition *hupo-* or under prefaced to the verbal root *hegeomai*, also as to suppose, believe; to go just before, lead] just now. Try [*peirao*: connotes making acquaintance] to imitate [*mimeomai*: to mimic, represent] your answer [*apokrisis*] about the powers [*dunamis*: the capacity to do something]. There you brought together (*perilambano*: the root *lambano* (to take, receive) prefaced with the preposition *peri-* or around; literally, to take-around] the many powers within a single form [*eidosis*: i.e., that which is seen]; now I want you in the same way to give [*proseipon*: the

preposition *pros-* as direction towards-which] one single account [*logos*] of the many branches of knowledge [*episteme*: the preposition *epi-* suggests a more comprehensive form of knowledge but as acquaintance, skill].

Theaetetus: But I assure [*eimi* or to be with *eu*, the adverb for well] you, Socrates, I have often [*pollakis*: many times] tried [*epicheireo*: the preposition *epi-* or upon prefaced to the root *cheir* or hand; literally as to put one's hand upon] to think this out [*skeptomai*: to look about carefully], when I have heard reports of the questions [*apophero*: *apo-* or from prefaced to *phero* (to bear, carry), to carry off] you [*para* or about, nearby] ask [*erotao*]. But I can never persuade [*peitho*] myself that anything I say will really do [*dunamai*: to have the capacity with *hikanos* or worthily, sufficiently]; and I never hear anyone else state the matter in the way that you require. And yet, again, you know [*diakeleuomai*: the root *keleuo* or to urge prefaced with the preposition *dia-* or through (literally as to urge-through); to exhort, encourage], I can't even stop worrying [*apallasso*: to set free, release, deliver] about [*melo*: to be an object of care or interest] it.

Socrates: Yes; those are the pains of labor [*odino*: to be in travail], dear Theaetetus. It is because you are not barren [*kenos*: empty, vain] but pregnant [*egkumon*].

Theaetetus: I don't know [*eido*: to perceive, behold] about that, Socrates. I'm only telling you what's happened [*pascho*: to be passive to something] to me.

149 Socrates: Then do you mean to say you've never heard about my being the son of a good hefty [*blosuros*: grim, fierce, bluff] midwife [*maia*: foster mother, female doctor], Phaenarete [the name means 'She who brings virtue to light']?

Theaetetus: Oh, yes, I've heard that before.

Socrates: And haven't you ever been told that I practice [*epitedeuo*: the preposition *epi-* or upon prefaced to the verb; to make a practice of, pursue, study] the same art [*techne*: skill, craft] myself?

Theaetetus: No, I certainly haven't.

Socrates: But I do, believe me [*eimi* or to be with *eu*, the adverb for well]. Only don't give me away [*kateipon*: the preposition *kata-* or down prefaced to *eipon*; to denounce, speak against] to the rest of the world [*allos*: other], will you? You see, my friend, it is a secret [*lanthano*: to forget or to escape notice] that I have this art [*techne*: skill]. That is not one of the things you hear people saying about me, because they don't know [*eido*: to perceive, behold]; but they do say that I am a very odd sort of person [*atopos*: alpha privative; out of place or *topos*], always causing people to get into difficulties [*aporeo*: to be at a loss]. You must have heard that, surely?

Theaetetus: Yes, I have.

Socrates: And shall I tell you what is the explanation [*aitios*: responsible, culpable] of that?

Theaetetus: Yes, please do.

Socrates: Well, if you will just think of [*ennoeo*: the preposition *en-* or in prefaced to *noeo*; to have in one's thoughts] the general facts [*apas*: all possible] about the business of midwifery [*maia*: foster mother, female doctor], you will see [*manthano*: to learn] more easily [*rhadios*: connotes adaptability] what I mean [*boulomai*: connotes to be willing]. You know [*eido*], I suppose [*pou*: in any way possible, perhaps], that women never practice [*adunatos*: having lack of strength] as midwives [*maieuomai*] while they are still conceiving [*kuiskomai*] and bearing children [*tikto*] themselves. It is only those who are past child-bearing who take this up.

Theaetetus: Oh, yes.

Socrates: They say it was Artemis who was responsible [*aitia*: cause] for this custom; it was because she, who undertook the patronage of childbirth [*loxeia*], was herself childless [*alochos*]. She didn't, it's true, entrust [*didomai*: to give] the duties of midwifery [*maieuomai*] to barren women [*steriphos*: also as firm solid], because human nature [*phusis*] is too weak [*asthenes*: alpha privative; *sthenos*: strength, might] to acquire [*lambano*: to take, receive] skill [*techne*: also as craft] where it has no experience

[*apeiros*: alpha privative; without trial (*peira*), unacquainted]. But she assigned [*prostasso*: the preposition *pros-* or direction towards- which prefaced to *tasso*, to arrange, put in order] the task to those who have become incapable of child-bearing [*atokos*: alpha privative; without tokos or bringing forth] through age [*helikia*: time of life, prime of life]—honoring [*timaos*] their likeness [*homoiotos*: resemblance] to herself.

Theaetetus: Yes, naturally.

Socrates: And this too is very natural [*eikos*: likely, probably], isn't it?—or perhaps necessary [*anagkaios*]? I mean that it is the midwives who can tell [*gignosko*: to know] better than anyone else whether women are pregnant [*maion*] or not.

Theaetetus: Yes, of course.

Socrates: And then it is the midwives [*maia*] who have the power [*dunamai*: to have the capacity] to bring on [*egeiro*: to awaken, arouse] the pains [*odis*], and also, if they think fit [*boulomai*: to wish, desire], to relieve [*malthakos*: soft, gentle, mild] them; they do it by the use of simple drugs [*pharmakon*: medicine, enchanted potion], and by singing incantations [*epaeido*: to soothe by charms]. In difficult cases [*dustokeo*: the adjective *dus-* as unlucky and used as the English mis- prefaced to words; *tikto* is the root, to give birth], too, they can bring about the birth [*tikto*]; or, if they consider [*dokeo*: to suppose, imagine] it advisable [*neos*: new, afresh], they can promote a miscarriage [*amblisko*].

Theaetetus: Yes, that is so.

Socrates: There's another thing too. Have you noticed [*aisthanomai*: to apprehend by the senses] this about them, that they are the cleverest [*deinos*: also as fearful, terrible] of match-makers [*promnesteria*], because they are marvelously [*passophos*: *pas* or all prefaced to *sophos*, wise or skilled] knowing [*gignosko*] about the kind of couples whose marriage [*suneimi*: *sun-* or with prefaced to *eimi*; to be joined with] will produce [*tikto*: to give birth] the best [*aristos*: connotes virtuous as well] children?

Theaetetus: No, that is not at all familiar [*eido*] to me.

Socrates: But they are far prouder [*phroneo*: to think, be wise, prudent; with *meizon* or comparative] of this, believe me, than of cutting the umbilical cord. Think [*ennoeo*: the preposition *en-* or in prefaced to *noeo*; to have in one's thoughts] now. There's an art [*techne*: skill] which is concerned [*therapeia*: a waiting on, service] with the cultivation and harvesting of the crops. Now is it the same art which prescribes [*gignosko*: to know] the best soil for planting or sowing a given crop? Or is it a different one?

Theaetetus: No, it is all the same art.

Socrates: Then applying this to women, will there be one art of the sowing and another of the harvesting?

Theaetetus: That doesn't seem likely [*eikos*], certainly.

150 Socrates: No, it doesn't. But there is also an unlawful and unscientific practice [*adikos* and *atechnos*: two adjectives, alpha privative; unjust and without art or technique] of bringing men and women together [*sunagoge*: the preposition *sun-* or with prefaced to the verb *ago*: to lead, carry, convey] which we call [*onoma*: name] procuring [*proagogia*: the preposition *pro-* or before prefaced to the verbal root *ago* just noted]; and because of that the midwives [*maia*]¹—almost august body of [*semnos*: revered, holy] women—are very reluctant [*pheugo*: to flee] to undertake even lawful matchmaking. [*promnestikos*: from a verbal root meaning to endeavor, solicit]. They are afraid [*phobeo*] that if they practice this [*aitia*: cause; with the preposition *eisor* into], they may be suspected of [*empipto*: the preposition *em-* or in prefaced to the verbal root meaning to fall] the other. And yet, I suppose, reliable matchmaking [*promnaomai*: to woo or court] is a matter for [*proseko*: to be fitting] no one but the true [*orthos*: straight, right] midwife [*maia*].

Theaetetus: Apparently [*phaino*: to bring to light].

Socrates: So the work [*tosoutos*: so large, great, far] of the midwives [*maia*] is a highly important one; but it is not so important as my own performance [*drama*: deed, act]. And for this reason, that there

is [*proseimi*: the preposition *pros-* or direction towards-which prefaced to *eimi*] not in midwifery the further complication, that the patients are sometimes [*eniote*: at times] delivered of [*tikto*] phantoms and sometimes of realities [*eidolon* and *alethinos*: a phantom or something insubstantial plus that which is true], and that the two are hard [*rhadios*: easy] to distinguish [*diagignosko*: the preposition *dia-* or through prefaced to the verbal root to know; literally as to know-through]. If there were, then the midwife's greatest and noblest [*kallos*: fundamentally, as beautiful] function [*ergon*: occupation, the result of work] would be to distinguish [*krino*: to judge] the true from the false [*alethos* and *me*, the latter as not] offspring—don't you agree [*oiomai*]?

Theaetetus: Yes, I do.

Socrates: Now my art [*techne*: technique, practice] of midwifery [*maieusis*] is just like [*huparcho*: *hupo-* or under prefaced to the verbal root for *arche* [beginning]; to begin to be] theirs in most respects. The difference is [*diaphero*: the preposition *dia-* or through prefaced to the verb *phero*; literally as to bear or carry through] that I attend men and not women, and that I watch over [*episkopeo*: the preposition *epi-* or upon prefaced to the verbal root *skopeo*, to look at] the labor [*maieuomai*] of their souls [*psuche*], not of their bodies [*soma*]. And the most important thing about my art [*techne*] is the ability to apply all possible tests [*basanizo*: to make proof, examine] to the offspring, to determine whether the young mind [*dianoia*: the root *nous* [mind] prefaced with the preposition *dia-* or through] is being delivered [*apotikto*: *tikto* or to deliver prefaced with the preposition *apo-* or from] of a phantom [*eidolon*: also as phantom or something unsubstantial], that is, an error [*pseudos*: false], or a fertile [*gonimos*: genuine] truth [*alethes*: literally, as that which not concealed]. For one thing which I have [*huparcho*: *hupo-* or under prefaced to the verbal root for *arche* or beginning; to begin to be] in common with the ordinary midwives is that I myself am barren [*agonos*: alpha privative; not yet born] of wisdom [*sophia*: cleverness, skill]. The common reproach [*oneidizo*: to upbraid] against me is that I am always asking [*erotao*] questions of other people but never express my own views [*apophaino*: the preposition *apo-* or from prefaced to *phaino*, to appear, reveal; literally as to appear-from] about anything, because there is no wisdom [the adjective *sophos* with the verb *echo*, to have] in me; and that is true enough [*alethes* with the verb *oneidizo* again]. And the reason [*aitios*:

culpable, reasonable, instrumental in causing] of it is this, that God compels [*anagkazo*: to be necessary] me to attend the travail [*maieuomai*] of others, but has forbidden [*apokoluo*: the preposition *apo-* or from prefaced to the verbal root meaning to hinder or prevent] me to procreate [*gennao*]. So that I am not in any sense a wise man [*sophos*]; I cannot claim as the child [*ekyonos*: born of, sprung of] of my own soul [*psuche*] any discovery [*heurema*: discovered not by chance but by thought] worth the name of wisdom. But with those who associate with [*suggignomia*: the preposition *sug-* or with prefaced to the verb *gignomai* (to be) be with or hold converse with] me it is different. At first some of them may give the impression [*phaino*: to appear, reveal] of being ignorant and stupid [*amathes*: alpha privative; *manthano* or to learn; used with *panu* or altogether]; but as time goes on and our association [*sunousia*: literally, a being or *ousia* with, *sun-*] continues [*proeimi*: pro- or before; to go forward], all whom God permits [*pareiko*: the preposition *para-* or beside prefaced to *eiko* (to yield, give way)] are seen to make progress [*epididomai*: the preposition *epi-* or upon prefaced to *didomai* (to give); to increase, advance]—a progress which is [*dokeo*, to suppose, imagine] amazing [*thaumazo*] both to other people and to themselves. And yet it is clear [*enarges*: visible, palpable] that this is not due to anything they have learned [*manthano*] from me; it is that they discover [*heurisko*: to find] within themselves [*par' hauton*: para also as beside, accompanying] a multitude of beautiful things [*kalos*], which they bring forth into the light [*tikto*: to beget]. But it is I, with God's help [*theos* and *maieia*], who deliver of this offspring [*aitios*: used in the sense of Socrates being instrumental]. And a proof [*delos*: clear, manifest] of this may be seen in the many cases where people who did not realize [*agnoeo*: to be ignorant] this fact took all the credit [*aitiaomai*: to accuse, censure, give credit] to themselves and thought that I was no good [*kataphroneo*: the root *phroneo* (to think, be sage or prudent) prefaced with the preposition *kata-*, in accord with]. They have then proceeded [*peitho*: to persuade] to leave [*aperchomai*: *apo-* or from] me sooner [*proi*: early, as in the morning] than they should [*dei*: it is necessary, there is need of], either of their own accord or through the influence of [*hupo*: under] others. And after they have gone away from [*aperchomai*: *apo-* or from] me they have resorted to harmful company [*sunousia*: literally, a being-with or *sun-* and the adjective *poneros* or toilsome, painful], with the result that what remained [*loipos*: the rest] within them has miscarried [*exambloo*]; while they have neglected the children I helped them to bring forth [*kakos*: adverb

and *trepho*: to nourish], and lost [*apollumi*: to destroy completely] them, because they set more value upon [*poieo*: to make with *peri pleionos*, literally as concerning more] lies and phantoms [*pseude* and *eidolon*: also as false and phantom or that which is unsubstantial] than upon the truth [*alethos*: adjective]; finally they have been set down for [*teleutao*: to complete, finish] ignorant fools [*amathes*: not educated], both by **151** themselves and by everybody else. One of these people was Aristides the son of Lysimachus; and there have been very many others. Sometimes they come back, wanting my company [*sunousia*] again, and ready to move heaven and earth [rendered by the noun *thauma* or marvel and the verb *drao*, to do or accomplish] to get it. When that happens, in some cases the divine sign [*daimonios*: possessed by one's *daimon*] that visits me forbids me [*gignomai*: to come into existence and *apokoluo*: the preposition *apo-* or from] associate with [*suneimi*: *sun-* or with and *eimi*] them; in others, it permits me, and then they begin again to make progress [*epididomai*: *epi-* or upon and the verb *didomai*, to give; literally to give upon]. There is another point also in which those who associate with me [*suggignomai*: the preposition *sug-* or with are like women in child-birth [*tikto*]. They suffer the pains of labor [*odino*], and are filled [*empiplemi*: the preposition *em-* or in suggestive of filling in] day and night with distress [*aporia*: difficulty of passing, perplexity]; indeed they suffer far more than women. And this pain [*odis*: pain of childbirth] my art [*techne*: skill] is able to bring on [*egeiro*: awaken, to rise], and also to allay [*apopauo*: the preposition *apo-* or from]. Well, that's what happens to them; but at times, Theaetetus, I come across people who do not seem [*dokeo*] to me somehow to be pregnant [*egkumon*]. Then I realize that they have no need of [*deo*: to be in want] me, and with the best will in the world [*eumenos*: adverb; well disposed, kindly] I undertake the business of match-making [*promnaomai*: to woo, court]; and I think I am good good enough—God willing [*sun theo eipein*: literally, with god to speak]—at guessing [*topazo*: literally, to put in place, *topos*] with whom they might profitably [*hikakos*: adverb; worthily] keep company [*suggignomai*: *sug-* or with]. Many of them I have given away [*ekdidomai*: literally to give from; to surrender] to Prodicus; and a great number also to other wise [*sophos*] and inspired [*thespesios*: divinely sounding or sweet] persons. Well, my dear lad [*aristos*: the best or noblest of someone or something], this has been a long yarn [*mekuno*: to delay, put off]; but the reason was that I have a suspicion [*hupoteuo*: to be apprehensive] that you (as you think yourself) are pregnant [*odino*] and in labor [*kuo*]. So I want you to

come to [*prosphero*: the preposition *pros-* or direction towards- which and *phero* or to bear, carry with *pros* or ‘towards me’] me as to one who is both the son of a midwife [*maia*] and himself skilled in the art [*maieutikos*]; and try to answer [*apokrino*] the questions I shall ask you as well as you can [*prothueomai*: the preposition *pro-* or before and *thumos*, principle of life, feeling; to be willing, eager to do]. And when I examine [*skopeo*: to look at] what you say, I may perhaps think [*hegeomai*: to suppose, believe] it is a phantom [*eidolon*] and not truth [*alethes*: adjective], and proceed to take it quietly from [*hupexairo*: literally, to take away from beneath, *hupo-*] you and abandon [*apoballo*: the preposition *apo-* or from prefaced to *ballo*, to cast] it. Now if this happens, you mustn’t get savage with [*agriaino*: to be angered; *agrioi* literally as living in the fields, uncultivated] me, like a mother over her first-born child. Do you know, people have often before now got into such a state [*diatithemi*: the preposition *dia-* or through prefaced to *tithemi*, to set or place; to arrange, dispose of] with me as to be literally ready [*atechnos*: alpha privative; unskilled, without rules or art] to bite [*dakno*: often applied to dogs] when I take away [*aphaireo*: the preposition *apo-* or from] some nonsense [*leros*: silly] or other from them. They never believe [*oiomai*: to suspect, to intend with regard to an obvious question] that I am doing this in all goodwill [*eunoia*: *eu-* the adverbial form for well prefaced to the root *nous* or mind]; they are so far from [*porro*] realizing [*eido*: to know] that no god can wish evil [*dusnoos*: *dus-* as applicable to bad prefaced to *nous* or mind] to man, and that even I don’t do [*drao*: to do some great thing] this kind of thing out of malice [*dusnoia*: cf. *dusnoos*], but because it is not permitted [*sugchoreo*: the preposition *sug-* or with prefaced to *choreo*, to withdraw, make room] to me to accept [*themis*: that which is laid down] a lie [*psuedos*: false] and put away [*aphanizo*: alpha privative; literally, to make unseen, obliterate] truth [*alethes*: adjective].

So begin again [*arche*: first principle, here with *ex* or from], Theaetetus, and try [*peiro*: to attempt] to say what knowledge [*episteme*: literally, a standing upon or *epi-*; acquaintance, skill] is. And to say what knowledge don’t on any account [*medepote*: in no way] tell me that you can’t. For if God is willing [*thelo*], and you play the man [*andrizo*: to come to manhood], you can.

Theaetetus: Well, Socrates, after such encouragement [*parakeleuomai*: the preposition *para-* or beside, near prefaced to the verb *keleuo*, to urge,

exhort] from you, it would hardly be decent [*aischros*: shameful, with negative] for anyone not to try [*prothumeomai*: the preposition *pro-* or before prefaced to the verbal root *thumos* (principle of life, feeling combined with thought); to be eager] his hardest [*tropos*: place, with the adjective *pas* or all] to say what he has [*echo*: to have] in him. Very well then. It seems [*dokeo*] to me that a man who knows something perceives [*aisthanomai*: to apprehend by the senses] what he knows [*ephistemi*: literally, to set or place upon, *epi-*], and the way it appears [*phaino*: to reveal] at present [*nuni*: now], at any rate, is that knowledge [*episteme*] is simply [*allo ti*: anything but] perception [*aisthesis*: feeling with regard to the senses].

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Myth of Er (Republic 10.614–10.621)

This text has yet to be added. 6 October 2016.