

The Phaedrus by Plato

Introduction

By no means is this document a scholarly tract on an important work by Plato. Instead, it is a series of brief observations on words and ideas from the **Phaedrus** in order to facilitate the reader's enjoyment of this dialogue. The basic format consists of transliterated words of the Greek text in italics along with brief notations. Such is one way the reader can get as close to the heart of the **Phaedrus** or to put it another way, get to a point where enjoyment and study of the text are indistinguishable. Key to this enjoyment is reading the text slowly as in the manner of *lectio divina*, the overall theme of this home page. Emphasis upon enjoying the text is important because it counters a common prejudice that one has to be very serious when it comes to things philosophical. We tend to think of the dialogues as objects of dissertations by scholars by people more in-the-know than the rest of us. Such a bias, if you will, is quite pervasive and needs to be remedied. The reader will discover this when actually taking up the dialogue itself and go along with the general flow of the text which, after all, is an interchange between two flesh and blood persons.

The **Phaedrus** doesn't get interesting under until Socrates gives his first speech in section 237a and continues through 257b. That part of the dialogue is expanded considerably and contains a brief Introduction as to the approach taken there. Such is real reason, if you will, for this document. The reader may want to jump there first to check it out and then come back to the beginning.

Another approach may be developed at a later time with regard to the **Phaedrus**. Early Christian authors, commonly known as the Church Fathers, were very familiar with Plato's works. They were seeking to make the new religion of Christianity appealing to the larger Mediterranean world while at the same time being faithful to its Hebrew origins. Of course, educated people of that world were familiar with Plato. By examining his writings the Christian authors sought ways to present their relatively new religion to a much larger audience. That means a dialogue as the **Phaedrus** can take on a whole new meaning in their endeavor to flesh out their understanding of Christian teaching and revelation. Of special importance are the Fathers who thought and wrote in Greek. The reason is obvious...they were able to reflection upon a text as the **Phaedrus** minus the filter of a translation as in the case of those Fathers who knew only Latin. If a reader follows in the footsteps of both Greek and Latin Church Fathers, perhaps after some time and experimentation he may replicate their experience today. Obviously philosophy continued to develop after Plato and Aristotle. However, what these two greats had laid down has had and continues to have profound ramifications. Thus these reflections upon the **Phaedrus**, unprofessional as they may be, are motivated in part as tending in that direction. That means another document taking into account how the **Phaedrus** affected Christian ideas on the *psuche* or soul is required, and hopefully it will come about.

The English translation is by Benjamin Jowett which can be found on the Internet. In some instances correspondences between that text and the Greek one are awkward, so some adaption is taken in order that the sense of the original may stand out more clearly. A more up to date translation is recommended, **Plato: Complete Works** edited by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, 1997). This text has made an occasional appearance on the Internet. That is to say, it has been posted in PDF format and later taken down...and then reappeared. When the correspondence between Jowett's translation and the Greek is more difficult, Cooper's is inserted as underlined right after the Jowett text. Because of the high value of the "insert" of 237a-257b, it is exclusively from Cooper. Also, most footnotes from this newer translation are included in the text. They are in the notations, the color **pink**, so as to distinguish them.

The Jowett translation is in **blue** whereas the notations are in **dark red**, simply for clarity. Some sentences in this translation are more difficult to make out. The traditional enumeration of Plato's dialogues is used and is in **bold orange** inserted as close as possible to correspond with the Greek text. Those reference with an asterisk (the color blue, *****) within the text of the **Phaedrus** mean that the particular word or phrase is used more than once and can be searched out for reference if needed. Any information as to how it's arranged or the like is indicated by words in **light green**.

Throughout special attention is given to prepositions whether "free standing" or part of a word. For example, even though the same preposition occurs frequently, it is noted and often defined because of the context which is different in each instance. The same importance is given to many words with alpha privative or the negative indicated by the letter alpha prefaced to these words.

The further a reader moves into the dialogue, the greater becomes the amount of recurring words. That means generally a lesser amount of notations except when called for. The first part of the dialogue isn't as interesting since it consists of Phaedrus recounting his experience of a speech he had heard that morning by a well known orator named Lysias who didn't know philosophy.

Postings will be put up until the job is finished.

The Phaedrus

227 Socrates (henceforth as Soc.). My dear Phaedrus, from where do you come and where are you going?

Socrates starts this dialogue on a comforting note with the adjective *philos*, "dear," that is, as an object of love regarding a person who is near and beloved.

Phaedrus (henceforth as Phaedr.). I come from Lysias the son of Cephalus, and I am going

to take a walk [*poreuo* with *peripaton*] outside the wall [*exo* with *teichos*], for I have been sitting with [*diatribo*] him the whole morning [*suchnos* & *ex heothinou*]; and our common friend [*hetairos*] Acumenus tells [*peitho*] me that it is much more refreshing to walk [*peripateo*] in the open air [*hodos* and *akopos*] than to be shut up in a cloister [*dromos*].

Cephalus is prominent in the opening section of Plato's **Republic** which is set in his home in Piraeus, the port of Athens. His sons Lysias, Polemarchus and Euthydemus were known for their democratic sympathies. / *poreuo*: to carry, to convey; used with *peripaton* or walking about (*peri-*, around) and for describing discourse in motion, if you will / *exo* with *teichos* or outside the fortifications / *diatribo*: to rub between or through (*dia-*), to employ oneself. The idea is consuming all one's time / *suchnos*: much or many; a long time inserted with *ex heothinou*, early in the morning / *hetairos*: comrade, associate, partisan / Acumenus was a doctor and a relative of the doctor Eryximachus who speaks in the **Symposium**. / *peitho*: to persuade, to prevail upon / *peritateo*: to walk around, *peri-* / *dromos*: course, race; compare with *hodos* or way, road which is used with *akopos* or alpha privative, without weariness or without *kopos* which is a striking or beating.

Soc. There he is right [*kalos*]. Lysias then, I suppose [*eoika*], was in the town [*astu*]?

Kalos: adverb, the literal meaning as beautifully. Compare with *kallos*, a noun pertaining to beauty. It's helpful to pay attention to this word throughout the dialogue with its varied shades of meaning, far broader than in any translation. / *eoika*: to be like, it is fitting / *astu*: town as well as civic body.

Phaedr. Yes, he was staying with Epicrates, here at the house [*oikos*] of Morychus; that house which is near the temple [*plesios*] of Olympian Zeus.

Oikos: abode, dwelling / Morychus is mentioned for his luxurious ways in a number of Aristophanes' plays / *plesios* near or in the vicinity of; 'temple' not in Greek text.

Soc. And how did he entertain [*diatribe*] you? Can I be wrong in supposing that Lysias gave you a feast [*heistia*] of discourse [*logos*]?

Diatribē pastime, amusement, a way of life / *heistia* also as the hearth of a house as well as a shrine / When an early Christian writer saw the association of a feast with *logos* (i.e., word as expression) it must have hit home in a special way, that is, intimating the *Logos*. This word occurs frequently throughout the **Phaedrus**.

Phaedr. You shall hear, if you can spare time [*scholia*] to accompany me.

Skokia: more specifically, leisure as enjoyed by the wealthy and educated classes, a rare opportunity in ancient times.

Soc. And should I not deem the conversation [*diatribē* *] of you and Lysias "a thing [*ascholia*] of higher import," as I may say in the words of Pindar, "than any business [*pragma*]?"

Diatribē / *ascholia*: alpha privative or a lack of leisure or *scholē* which is leisure for

pursuing more intellectual endeavors. It is more related to *pragma* or any type of commercial enterprise where emphasis is upon monetary gain. / **Isthmian I.2, adopted by Plato.**

Phaedr. Will you go on?

Soc. And will you go on with the narration?

Phaedr. My tale [*akoe*], Socrates, is one of your sort [*proseko*], for love [*erotikos*] was the theme [*logos* *] which occupied [*diatribo* *] us—love after a fashion [*tropos*] Lysias has been writing about a fair youth [*kalos*] who was being tempted, but not by a lover [*erastos*]; and this was the point he ingeniously proved that the non-lover [*ne eronti*] should be accepted [*charizo*] rather than the lover.

Akoe: a hearing, report / *proseko*: to have arrived, to be near at hand, *pros*-suggestive of direction towards-which / *erotikos* / *logos*: because as noted above this word occurs frequently throughout the **Phaedrus**, it must have stood out in a special way among educated Christian readers who were familiar with the presentation of Jesus Christ as *Logos*. / *diatribo* used for the verb and noun...here as the *logos* which literally has rubbed the *logos* through or *dia*- us. / *tropos*: a way or means / *kalos*: adjective which means beautiful / *ne eronti* or the negative with the verb *erao*, to love in a passionate way / *erotikos*: love, this being an adjective of *eros*, that passionate love or desire which is *tropos* or has a direction or way. / *charizo*: to say or to do something agreeable.

Soc. O that is noble [*gennaios*] of him! I wish that he would say the poor man rather than the rich, and the old man rather than the young one; then he would meet the case [*prosistemi*] of me and of many a man; his words [*logos*] would be quite refreshing [*asteios*], and he would be a public benefactor [*demopheles*]. For my part, I do so long [*epithumeo*] to hear his speech, that if you walk all the way to Megara, and when you have reached the wall come back, as Herodicus recommends, without going in, I will keep you company [*apoleipo*].

Gennaios: suitable to one's birth / *prosistemi*: literally, to stand near or *pros*-, in the direction towards-which / *asteios* literally as of the town and hence urbane / *demopheles*: one who gives *ophelia* or assistance to the *demos*, literally, the common people / *epithumeo*: to desire intensely *epi*- or upon indicative of this / **Herodicus was a medical expert whose regimen Socrates criticizes in Republic 406a-b.** / *apoleipo*: to leave off, *apo*- or from, this preposition indicative of a greater separation. It also means to bequeath.

Phaedr. What do you mean, my good Socrates? How can you imagine [*oiomai*] that my **228** unpracticed memory [*apomnaomai*] can do justice to an elaborate work, which Lysias, the greatest rhetorician of the age spent a long time [*chronos*] in composing. Indeed, I cannot; I would give a great deal if I could.

Oiomai: to suspect, to mean / *apomnaomai*: the root *mnaomai* meaning to remember or better, to be mindful of someone . Here it is lacking or *apo*-, literally as from the memory.

/ *chronos* as time with regard to *scholē* (in text) or leisure put at the service for a higher goal.

Soc. I believe that I know [*agnoeo*] Phaedrus about as well as I know [*epiletho*] myself, and I am very sure that the speech [*logos* *] of Lysias was repeated to him, not once only, but again and again [*epanalambano*];—he insisted on hearing it many times over and Lysias was very willing to gratify [*prothumos*, adverb & *peitho*] him; at last, when nothing else would do [*hikanos*], he got hold of [*paralambano*] the book, and looked at what he most wanted [*teleutao*] to see,—this occupied him during the whole morning; —and then when he was tired with sitting, he went out to take a walk, not until, by the dog [*ne ton kuna*], as I believe [*exepistamai*], he had simply learned by heart the entire discourse, unless it was unusually long, and he went to a place outside the wall that he might practice his lesson. There he saw a certain lover of discourse who had a similar weakness [*noseo*];—he saw and rejoiced; now thought he, "I shall have a partner in my revels [*sugkorubantiao*]." And he invited him to come and walk with him. But when the lover of discourse [*logos* *] begged that he would repeat the tale, he gave himself airs [*thrupto* and *epithumeo*] and said, "No I cannot," as if he were indisposed [*hekon*]; although, if the hearer had refused, he would sooner or later have been compelled by him to listen whether he would or no. Therefore, Phaedrus, bid him do at once what he will soon do whether bidden or not.

A contrast between the verbs *agnoeo* and *epiletho*, to perceive or to recognize and to cause to forget or lapse into forgetfulness, *epi-* or upon as prefaced to the verbal root. / *logos* / *epanalambano* means to repeat but with emphasis upon this again-ness. Note the two prepositions prefaced to *lambano* (to take, to receive): *epi* and *ana* or upon, both indicative of motion upwards and upon which are quite similar. The former suggests being there already whereas the latter is in the process of getting there. / *prothumos*: adverb; *thumos* or desire as the root with the preposition *pro* (signifies before-ness), direction towards which. / *peitho*: to persuade / *hikanos* or befitting, competent / *exepistamai*: to know thoroughly, *ex-* or from indicative of this, that is to say, a knowing-from / *noseo*: to be sick / *sugkorubantiao*: to join in (*sug-*) Corybantic revels which means sharing in a frenzy which leads to inspiration / *logos* / *thrupto* to break into small pieces with *epithumeo*, to set one's heart or *thumos* upon, *epi-*. Cf. *prothumos* just above. / *hekon*: willing.

Phaedr. I see that you will not let me off until I speak in some fashion or other; verily therefore my best plan is to speak as I best can.

Soc. A very true remark, that of yours [*dokeo*].

Dokeo: to expect.

Phaedr. I will do as I say; but believe me, Socrates, I did not learn [*exmanthano*] the very words [*rhema*]-O no; nevertheless I have a general [*shedos*] notion [*dianoia*] of what he said, and will give you a summary of the points in which the lover differed from the non-lover. Let me begin at the beginning.

Exmanthano or literally, to learn from (*ex-*), a more thorough type of acquiring knowledge, the object being *rhema* or that which is spoken, a subject matter; compare with the more common *logos* which seems to refer to a principle or matter at hand. / *schedos*: close at hand / *dianoia* the root *nous* (mind) prefaced with the preposition *dia-* (through) or through the mind.

Soc. Yes, my sweet one [*philotes*]; but you must first of all show what you have in your left hand under your cloak, for that roll, as I suspect, is the actual discourse [*logos*]. Now, much as I love [*phileo*] you, I would not have you suppose that I am going to have your memory exercised [*emmeletao*] at my expense, if you have Lysias himself here.

Philotes: from the verbal root *phileo*, to love with affection and in a kindly manner / *logos* / *phileo*: cf. *philotes* / *emmeletao* refers to exercise or practice.

Phaedr. Enough; I see that I have no hope [*ekkruo* & *elpis*] of practicing [*gumnazo*] my art upon you. But if I am to read [*anagnosko*], where would you please to sit?

Ekkruo: to knock out or *ek-* (from), or literally to knock out any hope or *elpis* / *gumnazo* to strip down naked in order to exercise / *anagnosko*: to recognize, *ana-* suggestive of motion upwards prefaced to the verbal root to know.

229 Soc. Let us turn aside and go by the Ilissus; we will sit down [*kathizo*] at some quiet spot [*hesuchia*].

Kathizo: also to encamp / *hesuchia* rest in the sense of taking one's ease.

Phaedr. I am fortunate [*eis kairon*] in not having my sandals, and as you never have any, I think that we may go along the brook and cool our feet in the water; this will be the easiest way [*rhadios*], and at midday and in the summer is far from being unpleasant [*aedes*].

Eis kairon: the preposition *eis* or into with *kairos*, opportunity, special occasion / *rhadios*: of a light matter *aedes* also as distasteful.

Soc. Lead on, and look out for [*skopeo*] a place in which we can sit down [*kathizo* *].

Skopeo to look after, behold / *kathizo*.

Phaedr. Do you see the tallest plane-tree in the distance?

Soc. Yes.

Phaedr. There are shade and gentle breezes, and grass on which we may either sit or lie down [*kataklino*].

Kataklino often used for reclining at table, the preposition *kata-* suggestive of downward-ness.

Soc. Move forward [*proago*].

Proago: to bring or carry on or forward, *pro-* meaning before.

Phaedr. I should like to know [*eipon*], Socrates, whether the place is not somewhere here at which Boreas is said to have carried off Orithyia from the banks of the Ilissus.

Eipon: to say, to speak / According to legend, Orithyia, daughter of the Athenian king Erechtheus, was abducted by Boreas while she was playing with Nymphs along the banks of the Ilissus River. Boreas personifies the north wind.

Soc. Such is the tradition [*lego*].

Lego to say or to speak.

Phaedr. And is this the exact spot? The little stream is delightfully clear and bright; I can fancy that there might be maidens playing near [*paizo & epitedeios*].

Paizo also as to make jest, often pertaining to a child and used with *epitedeios*, useful or expedient for an end.

Soc. I believe that the spot is not exactly here, but about a quarter of a mile lower down, where you cross [*diabaino*] to the temple of Artemis, and there is, I think, some sort of an altar [*bomos*] of Boreas at the place.

Diabaino:: literally as to go through or *dia-* / *bomos* a raised platform of any sort. Note the play on words, *bomos* and *Boreou*.

Phaedr. I have never noticed [*noeo*] it; but I beseech you to tell me, Socrates, do you believe this tale [*muthologema*]?

Noeo: to perceive by the mind / *muthologema*: or literally anything delivered by word of mouth; a tale or fable. It is prefaced to the root of *logos* or word.

Soc. The wise [*sophos*] are doubtful [*apisteo*], and I should not be singular [*atopos*] if, like them, I too doubted [*ouk an*]. I might have a rational explanation [*sophizo*] that Orithyia was playing [*paizo* *] with Pharmacia, when a northern gust carried her over the neighboring rocks; and this being the manner of her death [*teleutao*], she was said to have been carried away by Boreas. There is a discrepancy, however, about the locality; according to another version of the story she was taken from Areopagus, and not from this place. Now I quite acknowledge [*hegeomai*] that these allegories are very nice [*charizo* *], but he is not to be envied [*deinos*] who has to invent them; much labor and ingenuity [*epiponos & eutuches*] will be required of him; and when he has once begun, he must [*anagke*] go on and rehabilitate [*epanorthoo*] Hippocentaurs and chimeras dire. Gorgons and winged steeds flow in apace, and numberless other inconceivable and portentous [*amechanos & atopios*] natures [*phusis*]. And if he is skeptical [*apistos*] about them, and would fain reduce [*prosbibazo*] them one after another to the rules of probability, this sort of crude [*agroikos*] philosophy will take up a great deal of time [*chrao*]. Now I have [*deo*] no leisure [*schole* *] for such enquiries; shall I tell you why? I must first know myself [*gnonai emauton*], as the

230 Delphian inscription says; to be curious about [*skopeo* *] that which is not my concern [*allotrios*], while I am still in ignorance [*agnoeo*] of my own self, would be ridiculous [*geloios*]. And therefore I bid farewell to all this; the common opinion [*peitho* * & *nomizo*] is enough for me. For, as I was saying, I want to know [*skopeo* *] not about this, but about myself am I a monster [*therion*] more complicated [*poluploktos*] and swollen with passion [*epithumeo* *] than the serpent Typho, or a creature of a gentler [*hemeros*] and simpler [*haploos*] sort, to whom Nature [*Phusis*] has given a diviner [*theios*] and lowlier [*atuphos*] destiny [*moira*]? But let me ask you, friend have we not reached the plane-tree to which you were conducting us?

Sophos: wise; also as possessing skill and dexterity in an occupation. Compare with the verb *sophizo* in the text as rational explanation. / *apisteo*: alpha privative, not to believe or have faith / *atopos*: alpha privative as no-place / *ouk an*: not as would be / **According to legend, Orithuia, daughter of the Athenian king Erechtheus, was abducted by Boreas while she was playing with Nymphs along the banks of the Illisus River. Boreas personifies the north wind.** / *teleutao*: to come to an end / *charizo*: to do or say something agreeable / *hegeomai*: to go before, to lead / *deinos*: fearful, terrible / *epiponos*: literally as labor upon, *epi-* / *eutuches*: well off (*eu-* or well prefaced to the root *tugchano*: to hit upon. It also signifies to be in possession, to be at a place), successful. / *anagke*: necessity / *epanorthoo*: to set up again, to restore; the root *orthos*: (right) prefaced with two fairly similar prepositions, *epi* and *ana*, upon and upward / *amechanos*: alpha privative to *mechane*, an instrument or machine; without means or resources. / *atopios*: alpha privative; being out of the way (*topos*), absurd / *phusis* / *apistos*: literally, not worthy of belief / *prosbibazo*: *bibzo* or to lift up with the preposition *pros-* (direction towards-which prefaced to it); to liken, resemble, reduce / *agroikos*: of the country, rough. / *chrao*: to conceive or to need / *deo*: to need / *schole*: leisure for pursuits other physical or business related / *gignosko*: to know which involves distinguishing, recognizing and having concern / *skopeo*: to look after, to watch / *allotrios*: alien, foreign / *agnoeo*: to be ignorant / *geloios*: causing laughter, ridiculous. / *peitho*: to persuade / *nomizo* to hold as a custom, to practice. / *skopeo*: to look after, to watch / *therion*: wild animal or beast / *poluploktos*: *polus* (much or many) prefaced to the verbal root *pleko* (to plait, twist); much entangled, crafty, subtle / *epithumeo*: literally, to set one's heart or desire (*thumos*) upon, *epi-* / **Typhon is a fabulous multiform beast with a hundred heads resembling many different animal species.** / *hemeros*: tame, civilized / *haploos*: sincere, true / *phusis* / *theios* / *atuphos*: alpha privative; without pride or arrogance; *tuphos*: meaning smoke, vapor and hence pride because it rises / *moira*: portion, share, measure.

Phaedr. Yes, this is the tree.

Soc. By Hera, a fair resting-place [*katagoge*], full of summer sounds and scents. Here is this lofty and spreading plane-tree, and the chaste-tree cast us high and clustering, in the fullest blossom and the greatest fragrance; and the stream which flows beneath the plane-tree is deliciously cold to the feet. Judging from the ornaments [*agalma*] and images [*kore*], this

must be a spot sacred [*hieros*] to Achelous and the Nymphs. How delightful is the breeze-so very sweet; and there is a sound in the air shrill and summer-like which makes answer to the chorus of the cicadae. But the greatest charm [*kompso*] of all is the grass, like a pillow gently sloping to the head. My dear Phaedrus, you have been an admirable [*aristos*] guide [*xenageo*].

Katagoge: a bringing down, *kata-* / *agalma*: glory, gift, statue in honor of a god / *kore*: a maiden, puppet-doll / *hieros*: holy / **Achelous is a river god. The Nymphs are benevolent female deities associated with natural phenomena such as streams, woods and mountains.** / *kompso*: refined, clever, ingenious / *aristos*: the best or noblest of anything or anyone / *xenageo*: *xenos* or friend, stranger and *ago*, to lead, carry; to be a leader of mercenaries.

Phaedr. What an incomprehensible being [*thaumasios* & *atopotos*] you are [*phaino*], Socrates when you are in the country, as you say, you really are like [*eoika*] some stranger [*epichorios*] who is led about by a guide [*xenago*]. Do you ever cross the border? I rather think [*dokeo*] that you never venture even outside the gates.

Thaumasios: marvelous, wonderful / *atopotos*: alpha privative; out of the way or *topos*, unnatural / *phaino* to appear, to seem / *eoika* to seem. / *epichorios*: *epi-* or upon prefaced to *choros* (a piece of land), in or of the country / *xenago*: to lead as a stranger / *dokeo*: to suppose, imagine.

Soc. Very true [*suggignosko*], my good friend [*aristos* *]; and I hope that you will excuse me when you hear the reason, which is, that I am a lover of knowledge [*philomathes*], and the men who dwell in the city are my teachers [*didasko*], and not the trees or the country. Though I do indeed believe that you have found a spell [*pharmakon*] with which to draw me out of the city into the country, like a hungry cow before whom a bough or a bunch of fruit is waved. For only hold up before me in like manner a book, and you may lead me all round Attica, and over the wide world. And now having arrived, I intend to lie down, and do you choose any posture in which you can read [*anagignosko* *] best. Begin.

Suggignosko to know together (*sug-* or *sun-*). Compared with *anagignosko*, to read as well as to know again, both with the root *gignosko*, to know, *ana-* suggestive of motion upwards and prefaced to the verbal root to know / *philomathes* not *philosophos*, lover of wisdom. The root *phileo* connotes being a friend plus *mathesis*, learning, education. / *didasko*: to teach/ *pharmakon* medicine, potion / *anagignosko*: to recognize.

Phaedr. Listen. You know [*akoao*] how matters [*pragma*] stand with [*epistemi*] me; and how, as I conceive [*nomizo*], this affair may be arranged [*sumphero*] for the advantage of **231** both of us. And I maintain that I ought not to fail [*atucheo*] in my suit, because I am not your lover [*erastes*] for lovers repent [*metamelomai* of the kindnesses [*eu* with *poieo* *] which they have shown when their passion [*epithumia*] ceases [*pauo*], but to the non-lovers who are free and not under any compulsion, no time of repentance [*metagignosko*] ever comes; for they confer their benefits [*aristos* *] according to the measure of their ability

[*oikeios* *], in the way which is most conducive [*eu* and *poieo* cf. just above] to their own interest [*dunamis*]. Then again, lovers [*erao* *] consider [*skopeo* *] how by reason of their love [*erao*] they have neglected their own concerns [*diatithemi* & *ha* with *kakos* *] and rendered service to others [*poieo* with *eu*] and when to these benefits conferred they add on the troubles [*ponos*] which they have endured, they think [*hegeomai* *] that they have long ago made to the beloved a very ample [*axios*] return [*apodidomai* & *charis*]. But the non-lover has no such tormenting [*ponos*] recollections [*hupologizomai*]; he has never neglected his affairs or quarreled [*diaphora*] with his relations; he has no troubles to add up or excuse to invent; and being well rid of [*periaireo*] all these evils [*kakos*], why should he not freely [*prothumos*] do what will gratify [*charizo*] the beloved?

Akoo: to hear, to listen to / *pragma*: thing, business affair / *epistemi* to set, to place upon, *epi-* / *nomizo* to hold as a custom or usage / *sumphero*: literally, to carry or bring with, *sum-* / *atucheo*: alpha privative to *tugchano*, to happen upon, hit upon; to be unfortunate, to miscarry / *erastes* / *metamelomai*: to repent, change one's behavior; *meta-* or after prefaced to *melo*, to be an object of care / *eu* or the adverb for well with *poieo* to do / *epithumia*: intense desire; literally as desire upon (*epi-*) / *pauo* to cease, come to a rest / *metagignosko*: *meta-* or after prefaced to *gignosko* or to know; to change one's mind, to repent / *aristos*: the best of anything / *oikeios*: of the house, domestic / *dunamis*: power or strength in the sense of having capacity to exercise it / *erao*: to love / *skopeo*: to look after, to watch / *erao* / *diatithemi*: literally as to place or stand through, *dia-*; with *ha kakos*, translated literally as something like those which are done wickedly (adverb) / *ponos*: work, suffering / *hegeomai*: also as to go before, to lead / *axios*: worthy, noble / *charis*: grace, favor with *apodidomai*, to give back or return, the preposition *apo-* or from / *ponos* / *hupologizomai*: the verbal root meaning to reckon, to calculate with the preposition *hupo-*, from under / *diaphora*: the preposition *dia-* or through prefaced to the verbal root *phero*, to bear or to carry; difference, variance / *periaireo*: *peri-* or around prefaced to *haireo*, to take or grasp; to take away something / *prothumos*: *pro-* or before prefaced to *thumos* or desire, hence a desire-before; ready, willing (adverb) / *charizo*: to perform a benefit.

If you say that the lover [*eros*] is more to be esteemed [*axios*], because his love [*phileo* cf. paragraph above] is thought to be greater [*malista*]; for he is willing [*charizo*] to say and do [*ek ton logon & ek ton ergon* *] what is hateful [*apechthanomai* *] to other men, in order to please [*charizo* *] his beloved [*erao*];-that, if true, is only a proof that he will prefer [*poieo* & *pleionos* to make more or greater] any future love to his present, and will injure [*kakos* (adverb) * & *poieo*] his old love at the pleasure of the new. And how, in a matter [*pragma*] of such infinite importance [*sumphora*], can a man be right in trusting [*epicheiro*] himself to one who is afflicted with a malady which no experienced person [*empeiros*] would attempt to cure [*apotrepo*], for the patient himself admits [*homologeio*] that he is not in his right mind [*noseo* *], and acknowledges [*eido*] that he is wrong [*kakos* *, adverb] in his mind [*phroneo*], but says that he is unable to control [*krateo*] himself? And if he came to his right mind [*eu* & *phroneo*], would he ever imagine that the desires were good which he conceived when in his wrong mind? Once more, there are many more non-lovers than lovers; and if

you choose the best [*beltistos*] of the lovers, you will not have many to choose [*eklexis*] from; but if from the non-lovers, the choice will be larger, and you will be far more likely [*epitedeios* *] to find [*tugchano*] among them a person who is worthy of your friendship [*philia*].

Axios: worthy / *eros* & *phileo*: two words for love used together, the latter often associated with friendship, affection and approval / *malista*: exceedingly / *charizo*: to show a favor, be willing to do so / *ek ton logon* & *ek ton ergon*: literally, from words & from deeds / *apechthanomai*: to incur hatred or irritation / *poieo* & *pleionos*: to make more or greater / *pragma*: thing, usually a matter pertaining to business / *sumphora* (*sum-* or with & *phero*): to bear, to carry mishap, misfortune, event / *epicheiro*: to put one's hands to or upon, *epi-* / *empeiros*: practiced / *apotrepo*: to turn away from, *apo-* / *homologeo*: *homos-* or one and the same, common; to confess, to admit / *noseo*: to be ill / *eido*: to know / *phroneo*: to have understanding, to be wise / *beltistos*: most excellent / *eklexis*: choice / *epidedeios*: made for an end, purpose; the preposition *epi-* or upon intensifies the meaning of this word / *tugchano*: to hit upon. It also signifies to be in possession, to be at a place.

If public opinion [*nomos*] be your dread [*deido*], and you would avoid [*punthanomai*] 232 reproach [*oneidos*], in all probability [*eikos*] the lover, who is always thinking [*oiomai* *] that other men are as emulous [*zeloo*] of him as he is of them, will boast [*epairo*] to some one of his successes, and make a show of them openly [*epideiknumi*] in the pride of his heart [*philotimeomai*];-he wants others to know that his labor has not been lost [*ouk allos*]; but the non-lover is more his own master [*kreittous hauton ontos*], and is desirous [*haireo*] of solid good [*beltistos* *], and not of the opinion [*doxa*] of mankind. Again, the lover may be generally noted or seen following [*akoloutheo*] the beloved (this is his regular occupation [*ergon* *]), and whenever they are observed to exchange two words [*punthanomai*] they are supposed to meet about some affair [*ergon*] of love either past or in contemplation [*horao*]; but when non-lovers meet, no one asks the reason why, because people know [*eido* *] that talking [*dialego*] to another is natural, whether friendship [*philia* *] or mere pleasure [*hedone*] be the motive.

Nomos custom, usage / *deido* to fear / *punthanomai* to learn, to inquire / *oneidos* shame / *oiomai* to suppose, to think / *zeloo* to be zealous / *epairo*: *epi-* or upon prefaced to *airo*, to take or lift up; to lift and set upon / *philotimeomai*: *phileo*: to love in the sense of cherish prefaced to *timaos*, to honor or revere: to love or seek after honor, to be jealous / *ouk allos* not otherwise / *haireo* to take with the hand / *ergon* / *doxa*: alternately as glory / *akoloutheo* suggestive of a sequence / *punthanomai* to inquire, hear, learn about / *horao* to see, to look / *eido*: to know / *dialego*: the preposition *dia-* or through prefaced to *lego*, to pick out, count, tell; to argue / *hedone*: enjoyment, delight, pleasure.

Once more, if you fear [*deos* & *summeno*] the fickleness [*chalepos* & *paristemi*] of friendship [*philia* *], consider that in any other case [*tropos* *] a quarrel might be a mutual calamity [*diaphora* *]; but now, when you have given up what is most precious to you, you will be the greater loser, and therefore, you will have more reason in being afraid of the

lover, for his vexations [*blabe*] are many, and he is always fancying [*nomizo*] that every one is leagued against [*phobeo*] him. Wherefore also he debars [*apotrepo*] his beloved from society [*pros tous allous*]; he will not have [*ktaomai*] you intimate [*ousia*] with the wealthy, lest they should exceed him in wealth, or with men of education [*paideuo*], lest they should be his superiors in understanding; and he is equally afraid of [*phulasso*] anybody's influence [*dunamis* *] who has any other advantage [*agathos*] over himself. If he can persuade [*peitho* *] you to break with [*apechthanomai*] them, you are left without [*eis eremian*] friend in the world; or if, out of a regard to your own interest [*skopeo* *], you have more sense [*phroneo* *] than to comply with his desire, you will have to quarrel with him [*diaphora*].

Deos: fear / *summeno*: to remain with, *sum-* / *chalepos*: difficult to deal with, irksome / *paristemi*: to stand around (*peri-*) / *blabe*: hurt, damage / *nomizo*: to hold as a custom (cf. *nomos*) / *phobeo*: to fear / *apotrepo*: to turn away from, *apo-* / *pros tous allous*: literally, toward the others. The preposition *pros* is noted frequently throughout as indicative of direct speech or action. / *ktaomai*: to possess / *ousia*: being, substance / *dunamis*: power in the sense of having capacity / *agathos*: good, capable. This adjective is a key concept which has hints of transcendence and permanence. / *apechthanomai*: to incur hatred / *diaphora*, with *eis* or into, signifying intense disagreement / *eis eremian*: literally, into the desert.

But those who are [*tugchano* *] non-lovers, and whose success in love is the reward [*prasso*] of their merit [*arete*], will not be jealous of [*phthoneo*] the companions of their beloved, and will rather hate those who refuse to be his associates, thinking that their favorite is slighted [*huperorao*] by the latter and benefitted by the former; for more love than hatred [*echthra*] may be expected to come to [*elpis*] him out of his friendship [*philia* *] with others.

Tugchano: i.e., those who “hit upon” being non-lovers / *prasso*: to effect, accomplish / *arete*: the best in anyone or in anything, often translated as virtue / *huperorao*: to look down upon or over (*huper-*) prefaced to *horao*, to see, look / *echthra*: enemy / *elpis*: hope.

Many lovers [*erao* *] too have loved [*epithumeo* *] the person of a youth before they knew [*gignosko* *] his character [*tropos* *] or his belongings [*oikeios* *]; so that when their **233** passion [*epithumia* *] has passed away [*pauo*], there is no knowing [*adelos*] whether they will continue to be his friends [*philia* *]; whereas, in the case of non-lovers who were always friends, the friendship [*philia* *] is not lessened by the favors granted; but the recollection [*mnemeia*] of these remains [*kataleipo*] with them, and is an earnest [*eimi*] of good things to come [*mello*].

Erao / *epithumeo*: to desire intensely, the preposition *epi* indicative of being upon desire or *thumos* as to urge it on / *oikeios*: of the house, domestic / *epithumia* / *pauo*: to cease / *adelos*: alpha privative; unknown, obscure, not clear or not *delos* / *mnemeia*: memory in the sense of recollection, of keeping in mind one's eternal destiny. Also it can infer being mindful of one's divine source. / *kataleipo*: to leave behind, *kata-* indicative of downwardness / *eimi*: to be. / *mello*: to be destined, to be likely.

Further, I say that you are likely to be improved [*proseko* * & *beltistos* *] by me, whereas the lover [*eraste*] will spoil [*peitho*] you. For they praise [*epaineo*] your words [*lego*] and actions [*prasso*] in a wrong way [*para to beltiston*]; partly, because they are afraid of offending [*apechthanomai* *] you, and also, their judgment is weakened by passion [*epithumia* * & *gignosko* * & *cheiron*]. Such are the feats which love [*eros* *] exhibits [*epideiknumi* *]. When a lover suffers a reverse [*dustucho*] that would cause [*parecho*] no pain [*lupe*] to anyone else he makes things painful to the disappointed which give no pain to others; , love makes him think [*nomizo* *] he's accursed [*aniaros*]! he compels [*anagkazo*] the successful lover to praise what ought not to give him pleasure [*hedone* *], and therefore the beloved is to be pitied [*eleeo*] rather than envied [*zeleo* *]. But if you listen [*peitho* *] to me, in the first place, I, in my intercourse with [*suneimi*] you, shall not merely regard present [*pariemi*] enjoyment [*hedone* *], but also future advantage [*ophelia* *], being not mastered [*hessaomai*] by love [*eros* *], but my own master [*krateo* *]; nor for small causes taking violent dislikes [*echthra* & *ischuros*], but even when the cause is great [*megalos*, with *dia*], slowly laying up little wrath [*orge*]-unintentional offences [*suggnome*] shall forgive, and intentional ones [*ekousios*] I shall try to prevent [*apotrepo* *]; and these are the marks [*tekmar*] of a friendship [*philia* *] which will last [*polun chronon*]. Do you think [*paristemi* *] that a lover [*erao* *] only can be a firm [*ischuros* *] friend [*philia* *]? reflect [*enthumeomai*]:-if this were true, we should set small value on sons, or fathers, or mothers; nor should we ever have [*ktaomai*] loyal friends, for our love of them arises not from passion [*epithumia* *], but from other associations [*epitedeuma* *].

Proseko: to be at hand, present: *pros-*, direction toward-which as applied somewhat ironically by Phaedrus to Socrates whereas it should be the other way around. / *beltistos*: most excellent / *peitho*: to persuade / *epaineo*: to commend publically; the preposition *epi* or upon prefaced to the verb / *lego*: to say, what you say / *prasso*: to do, to accomplish / *para to beltiston*: beside or alongside that which is excellent, *para* indicating to be under its influence but not exactly touching it / *epithumia*: intense desire or *thumos* upon, *epi-* / *cheiron*: inferior / *eros* / *epideiknumi*: literally, to show upon, *epi-* / *dustucho*: *dus-* or essentially applied to destroying the good sense of anything, much like *mis-* in English. It is prefaced to *tugchano*, to hit upon; to be unhappy, unfortunate / *parecho*: to hand over, to supply, *para-* or beside as prefaced to the verb *echo*, to have / *lupe*: grief / *nomizo*: to estimate, to hold as a custom or *nomos* / *aniaros*: troublesome, annoying / *anagkazo*: also to carry through by force / *hedone* / *eleeo*: to show mercy / *zeleo*: to be eager, zealous / *peitho* / *suneimi*: literally, to be with, *sun-* / *pariemi*: to be near or present, *para-*. Compare with *suneimi*. / *hedone* / *ophelia* / *hessaomai*: to be defeated, to give way / *eros* / *krateo*: to be strong, to prevail / *echtra*: hatred, enmity / *megalos*: great, with *dia* or through / *orge*: a natural impulse or temperament / *suggnome*: acknowledgment, confession; the preposition *sug-* or with and suggestive of accompaniment / *ekousios*: voluntary, of one's own free will / *apotrepo*: to turn away from, *apo-* / *tekmar*: fixed mark, boundary / *philia* / *polun chronon* or *chronos*: much time / *paristemi*: to be near or present, *para-* suggestive of beside / *erao* / *ischuros* / *philia* / *enthumeomai*: to form a plan, think deeply, formulate; to have *thumos* or with all one's heart as *en-*, in / *ktaomai*: to procure, acquire / *epithumia* / *epitedeuma*:

pursuit, business, practice, *studium* being the Latin equivalent.

Further, if we ought to shower favors [*charizomai*] on those who are the most eager suitors, on that principle, we ought [*proseko* *] always to do good, not to the most virtuous [*beltistos* *], but to the most needy [*aporos*]; for they are the persons who will be most relieved [*apallasso*], and will therefore be the most grateful [*charis* *]; and when you make a feast you should invite [*parakaleo*] not your friend [*philos* *], but the beggar and the empty soul [*deo & plesmone*]; for they will love [*agapao*] you, and attend [*akoloutheo* *] you, and come about your doors, and will be the best pleased [*hedomai*], and the most grateful, and will invoke many a blessing on your head. Yet surely you ought not to be granting favors **234** [*charizomai* *] to those who besiege you with prayer, but to those who are best able to reward [*apodidomai* with *charis* *] you; nor to the lover [*prosaiteo*] only, but to those who are worthy of love [*pragma* *]; nor to those who will enjoy [*apolauo*] the bloom of your youth, but to those who will share their possessions [*agathos* *] with you in age; nor to those who, having succeeded [*diaprasso*], will glory in [*philotimao*] their success to others, but to those who will be modest [*aischuno*] and tell no tales; nor to those who care about [*spoudazo*] you for a moment only, but to those who will continue your friends [*philos* *] through life; nor to those who, when their passion [*epithumia* *] is over [*pauo* *], will pick a quarrel [*echthra* *] with you, but rather to those who, when the charm of youth has left you, will show [*epideiknumi* *] their own virtue [*arete* *]. Remember [*mimnesko*] what I have said; and consider [*enthumeomai*] yet this further point: friends admonish [*noutheteo*] the lover under the idea that his way of life [*epitedeuma* *] is bad, but no one of his kindred ever yet censured [*memphomai*] the non-lover, or thought that he was ill-advised [*kakos* (adverb) * & *boulomai*] about his own interests [*peri heauton*].

Charizomai: to do or say something agreeable / *prosecho*: to be at hand, present: *pros-*, direction toward-which / *beltistos* / *aporos*: alpha privative and *poreuo*, to go, carry; having no way out, without means or resources / *apallasso*: to put away, to remove *apo-* or from / *charis* / *parakaleo*: to call or summon beside, *para-* / *philos* / *deo & plesmone*: to be lacking & a being filled or satisfied / *agapao*: to treat with affection, to be well pleased / *akoloutheo*: to follow as in a sequence of events / With reference to doors: **This is classic behavior in ancient Greek literature of a lovesick man pursuing his prey.** / *hedomai*: to take one's pleasure / *charizomai* / *apodidomai* with *charis*: to give or return (*apo-* or from) with the noun for grace, favor / *prosaiteo*: to as besides, *pros-* or towards which / *pragma*: thing, business matter / *apolauo*: to have the benefit of / *agathos*: adjective for good / *diaprasso*: to complete; *dia-* signifying through-ness and hence thoroughness / *philotimao*: literally, to love as well as to honor / *aischuno*: to shame / *spoudazo*: to be eager / *philos* / *epithumia* / *pauo*: to cease, come to an end / *echthra*: enemy / *epideiknumi*: literally, to show upon, *epi-* / *arete* / *mimnesko* / *enthumeomai*: literally, to desire intensely *en-* or in / *noutheteo*: to put to mind, *nous & tithemi* / *epitedeuma* / *memphomai*: to blame, find fault with / *kakos* / *boulomai*: to wish, to be willing / *peri heauton*: concerning those of oneself.

"Perhaps you will ask me whether I propose [*paraineo*] that you should indulge [*charizomai*

*] every non-lover. To which I reply that not even the lover [*erao* *] would advise [*keleuo*] you to indulge [*echo & dianoia* *] all lovers, for the indiscriminate [*oute & lambano*] favor [*charis* *] is less esteemed [*axios*] by the rational recipient, and less easily hidden by him who would escape the censure [*oute soi boulomeno or boulomai* *] of the world. Now love ought to be for the advantage [*ophelia* *] of both parties, and for the injury [*blabe* *] of neither. I believe [*nomizo* *] that I have said enough; but if there is anything more which you desire [*potheo*] or which in your opinion needs to be supplied, ask and I will answer."

Paraineo: to exhort, recommend, *para-*, beside, near / *charizomai / erao / keleuo*: to urge, drive on / *echo*: to have & *dianoia* or *nous* (mind) which is *dia-* or through the mind / *oute & lambano*: literally, neither & to receive, to take / *charis / axios*: worthy / *oute soi boulomeno*: neither having wished to oneself; *boulomai / ophelia / blabe / nomizo / potheo*: to long for, to yearn.

Now, Socrates, what do you think [*phaino* *]? Is not the discourse [*logos* *] excellent [*huperphuos*], more especially in the matter of the language?

Phaino: to appear / *huperphuos* (adverb): extraordinarily, marvelously, the preposition *huper* suggestive of being above or beyond.

Soc. Yes, quite admirable [*daimonios*]; the effect on me was ravishing [*ekplasso*]. And this I owe [to happen, to have something happen] to you, Phaedrus, for I observed [*apoblepo*] you while reading to be in an ecstasy [*ganumai*], and thinking [*hegeomai* *] that you are more experienced [*hepomai*] in these matters than I am, I followed your example, and, like you, my divine darling, I became inspired with a frenzy [*bakcheuo*].

Daimonios: heaven sent, marvelous; also as an address such as good sir / *ekplasso*: to strike out, drive away from, *ek-* / *apoblepo*: literally, to look away from, *apo-* / *ganumai*: to brighten up, to be happy / *hegeomai / hepomai*: to be busy / *bakcheuo*: to celebrate the mysteries of Bacchus.

Phaedr. Indeed, you are pleased to be merry [*paizo* *].

Soc. Do you mean that I am not in earnest [*spoudazo* *]?

Phaedr. Now don't talk in that way, Socrates, but let me have your real [*alethos*] opinion; I adjure you, by Zeus [*pros Dios*], the god of friendship [*philios*], to tell me whether you think that any Hellene could have said more or spoken better on the same subject [*pragma* *].

Alethos (adverb): truly / *pros Dios*: toward the God / *philios* (adjective): friendly / *pragma*: thing, business transaction.

Soc. Well, but are you and I expected to praise [*epaineo* *] the sentiments [*logos* *] of the author, or only the clearness, and roundness, and finish, and turn of the language? As to the first I willingly submit [*sugchoreteos*] to your better judgment [*charis* *], for I am not **235** worthy to form an opinion [*elauno*], having only attended [*prosecho* *] to the rhetorical

manner; and I was doubting [*oiomai* *] whether this could have been defended [*hikanos*] even by Lysias himself; I thought [*doxazo*], though I speak under correction, that he repeated himself two or three times, either from want [*euporeo*] of words or from want of pains; and also, he appeared to me ostentatiously [*neanieuomai*] to exult in showing [*epideiknumi* *] how well he could say the same thing in two or three ways.

Epaineo: literally, to praise upon, *epi-* / *logos*: word as expression / *sugchoreteos*: *sug-* or with prefaced to *choreo*, to give place, yield/ *charis*: grace, favor / *elauno*: to set in motion / *prosecho*: *echo* or to have prefaced with *pros-*, direction towards-which / *oiomai*: to suppose, think / *hikanos*: worthy of / *doxazo*: *doxa* meaning opinion / *euporeo*: the adverbial form *eu-* meaning well prefaced to the root *poreuo*: to go, carry; to supply, find a means or way / *neanieuomai*: to act like a hot-headed youth / *epideiknumi*: literally, to show upon, *epi-*.

Phaedr. Nonsense, Socrates; what you call repetition was the especial merit [*malista* *] of the speech [*logos* *]; for he omitted [*paraleipo*] no topic of which the subject [*pragma* *] rightly [*axios*] allowed, and I do not think that any one could have spoken better [*axios* *] or more exhaustively.

Malista / *logos* / *paraleipo*: to leave to one side (*para-*), to omit / *pragma* / *axios* (adverb): worthily; compare with *axios*, adjective.

Soc. There I cannot go along with [*peitho* *] you. Ancient sages [*sophos*], men and women, who have spoken and written of these things, would rise up in judgment against [*exelegcho*] me, if out of complaisance [*charizo* *] I assented [*sugchoro*] to you.

Peitho: to persuade / *sophos*: wise, skilled / *exelegcho*: to refute, all the stronger by reason of the preposition *ex-* or from / *charizo*: to show a favor, be willing to do something / *sugchoro*: to make room, with the preposition *sug-* or with.

Phaedr. Who are they, and where did you hear anything better than this?

Soc. I am sure that I must have heard; but at this moment I do not remember from whom; perhaps [*delos*] from Sappho the fair [*kalos* *], or Anacreon the wise [*sophos* *]; or, possibly, from a prose writer. Why do I say [*tekmairomai*] so? Why [*daimonios* *], because I perceive that my bosom is full, and that I could make another speech as good as that of Lysias, and different. Now I am certain [*ennoeo*] that this is not an invention of my own, who am well aware [*eu & eido* *] that I know nothing [*sunoida & amathia*], and therefore I can only infer [*oiomai* *] that I have been filled through the ears, like a pitcher, from the waters of another, though I have actually forgotten [*epiletho*] in my stupidity [*notheia*] who was my informant.

Delos (*delonti*): clear / *kalos* / *sophos* / *tekmairomai*: to assign, estimate / *daimonios*: here as friend or good acquaintance / *ennoeo*: literally, to think, consider, reflect; literally, *noeo* prefaced with the preposition *en* or *in* / *eu & eido*: literally, to know well / *aisthomai*: to feel, to perceive / *epiletho*: to cause to forget; *epi-* as upon intimates a more thorough

forgetfulness / *sunoida*: to know about, to testify; *sun-* or with being the preposition / *amathia*: ignorance; alpha privative, the adjective being *amathes*, stupid, with little learning / *epiletho*: the verbal root (to forget) intensified with the preposition *epi-*, upon / *notheia*: sluggishness.

Phaedr. That is grand [*kalos **]:—but never mind [*keleuo **] where you heard the discourse or from whom; let that be a mystery not to be divulged even at my earnest desire. Only, as you say, promise to make another and better oration, equal in length and entirely new, on the same subject Don't bother telling me when and from whom you've heard this, even if I ask you—do exactly what you said.; and I, like the nine Archons will promise [*hupischneomai*] to set up a golden image at Delphi, not only of myself, but of you, and as large as life.

Kalos / keleuo: to bid, to ask / **The archons were magistrates chosen by lot in classical Athens. On take in office they swore an oath to set up a golden statue if they violated the laws.** *hupischneomai*: to take upon oneself, profess that, *hupo-* suggestive of from under.

Soc. You are a dear [*philtatos*] golden ass [*chrussos*] if you suppose me to mean that Lysias has altogether missed the mark [*hamarteo*], and that I can make a speech from which all his arguments are to be excluded. The worst of authors will say [*pascho*] something which is to the point. Who, for example, could speak on this thesis [*logos **] of yours without praising [*egkomiazō & charizomai **] the discretion of the non-lover and blaming [*psego*] the **236** indiscretion [*aphros*] of the lover [*erao **]? These are the commonplaces of the subject which must come in (for what else is there to be said?) and must be allowed [*eateos*] and excused [*suggnosteos*]; the only merit [*heuresis*] is in the arrangement [*diathesis*] of them, for there can be none in the invention [*diathesis **]; but when you leave the commonplaces, then there may be some originality [*heuresis **].

Philtatos: superlative of *philos* / *chrussos*: golden; “ass” not in the text / *hamarteo*: also as to sin / *pascho*: to suffer, to be ill of, happen to be / *logos* / *egkomiazō*: to sing a song of praise / *charizomai*: to do something agreeable (*charis*, grace or favor) / *psego*: to censure / *aphros*: senseless, foolish; alpha privative, lacking *phronis* or wisdom with prudence / *erao* / *eateos*: suffered / *suggnosteos*: pardonable, allowable, *sug-* suggestive of with / *heuresis*: a finding, discovery / *diathesis*: literally, a placing-through, *dia-*.

Phaedr. I admit [*sugchoro **] that there is reason in what you say, and I too will be reasonable [*metrios*], and will allow you to start with the premiss [*hupotithemi*] that the lover [*erao **] is more disordered [*noseo **] in his wits than the non-lover; if in what remains you make a longer and better speech than Lysias, and use other arguments, then I say again, that a statue you shall have of beaten gold, and take your place by the colossal offerings of the Cypselids at Olympia.

Sugchoro: to make room with or *sug-* / *metrios* (adverb): moderately, tolerably / *hupotithemi*: literally, to place under, *hupo-* / *erao* / *noseo*: to be ill / **The Cypselids were rulers of Corinth in the seventh century B.C.; an ornate chest in which Cypselus was said to**

have been hidden as an infant was on display at Olympia, perhaps along with other offerings of theirs.

Soc. How profoundly in earnest [*spoudazo* *] is the lover, because to tease [*paidikos*] him I lay a finger upon his love! And so, Phaedrus, you really imagine [*oiomai* *] that I am going to improve upon [*epicheireo*] the ingenuity [*sophia*] of Lysias?

Spoudazo: to be eager, earnest / *paidikos*: puerile, sportive / *epicheireo*: to put one hands upon, *epi-* / *sophia*: wisdom, skill in a craft.

Phaedr. There I have you as you had me, and you must just speak "as you best can." Do not let us exchange "tu quoque" as in a farce, otherwise you will force us into trading vulgar [*phortikos*:] jibes the way they do in comedy or compel me to say to you as you said to me, "I know [*agnoeo* *] Socrates as well as I know myself, and he was wanting to, speak [*epiletheo*], but he gave himself airs [*thrupto*]." Rather I would have you consider that from this place we stir not until you have unbosomed [*en to stethei*] yourself of the speech; for here are we all alone, and I am stronger, remember, and younger than you-Wherefore perpend, "take my meaning" (A line of Pindar's, Snell 105) [*suniami*] and don't make me force you to speak when you can do so willingly and do not compel me to use violence [*bia*].

Phortikos: literally, fit for carrying; vulgar, arrogant / *agnoeo*: alpha privative; to be without *gignosko* or to know; not to perceive / *epiletheo*: to cause to forget, *epi-* or upon intensifying this *lethe* or forgetfulness / *thrupto*: to break into pieces / *en to stethei*: in the breast / *suniami*: to bring together, *sun-* as with / *bia*: bodily strength, force; used with *pros*, direction towards-which.

Soc. But, my sweet [*makarios*] Phaedrus, how ridiculous [*geloios* *] it would be of me to compete with Lysias in an extempore speech! He is a master in his art [*par' agathon poietai idiotas*] and I am an untaught man [*autoschediazō*].

Makarios: happily, blessed / *geloios*: causing laughter / *poiesis*: maker, inventor / *autoschediazō*: *autos* or oneself prefaced to *sxedon* (*sxedios*: on the spur of the moment) or the adverb for close, at hand; to speak off hand, unadvisedly.

Phaedr. You see how matters stand; and therefore let there be no more [*pauo* *] pretenses [*kallopizo*]; for, indeed, I know the word that is irresistible [*schedon*].

Pauo: to cease, come to and end / *kallopizo*: to make *kallos* or to beautify, give a fair appearance / *schedon*: near, at hand.

Soc. Then don't say it.

Phaedr. Yes, but I will; and my word [*logos* *] shall be an oath [*horkos*]. "I say, or rather swear [*omnumi*]"-but what god will be witness of my oath?-"By this plane-tree I swear, that unless you repeat the discourse here in the face of this very plane-tree, I will never tell [*epideiknumi* *] you another; never let you have word [*exaggello*] of another!"

Logos: word as expression / *horkos*: the object by which one swears / *omnumi*: to swear, confirm an oath / *epideiknumi*: to show upon, *epi-* / *exaggello*: to send out (*ex-*) tidings.

Soc. Villain [*babai & miaros*] I am conquered [*aneurisko*]; the poor lover of discourse [*philologos*] has no more to say.

Babai: an exclamation / *miaros*: stained with blood, an expression as “you rogue” / *aneurisko*: to find out, to discover / *philologos*: fond of (*philos* or friend) speaking, literary.

Phaedr. Then why are you still at your tricks [*strephe*]?

Strephe: to cause to rotate, to turn.

Soc. I am not going to play tricks now that you have taken the oath [*omnumi* *], for I cannot allow myself to be starved.

Omnumi.

237 Phaedr. Proceed.

Soc. Shall I tell you what I will do?

Phaedr. What?

Beginning (237a) of expanded text which ends at 257b

As noted in this document’s Introduction, the section at hand takes a more detailed examination of the very heart of the **Phaedrus** where Socrates speaks about the *psuche* or soul. Because this is a topic of perennial interest, it might be worthwhile to see in greater detail what such an ancient document has to offer on the matter. The English translation of 237a through 257b is from **Plato: Complete Works** edited by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, 1997). It’s choice is deliberate, namely, to avoid the cumbersome style of Jowett’s translation.

Three chief observations about this section are in order:

- 1) The same color identifying scheme is used with regard to the text’s presentation.
- 2) The English translation comes first.
- 3) Immediately after each paragraph comes a series of notations on the text which includes transliterated Greek words, some of which are expanded more, including those all-important prepositions.

And so this sub-document, if you will, is more a running commentary which some readers may find cumbersome. Even though a given word may repeat itself (for example: *eido*, to know and *psuche* or soul), the definition is given because the context is different. Thus the word “expansion” may be more appropriate to describe the approach taken. The reason? “Expansion” applies to a number of texts related to several books of the Bible posted on this Lectio home page where a given word, phrase or the like is fleshed out, hence expanded.

The approach adopted here is new with regard to a philosophical text posted on the Lectio page and hence is experimental. It contains personal observations while at the same time conforming to the text. Such is the source of some awkwardness of presentation. While this may be a problem, going through this particular section of the **Phaedrus** was a delight which is what this whole enterprise is about.

The Text

SOCRATES: I'll cover my head while I'm speaking. In that way, as I'm going through the speech as fast as I can, I won't get embarrassed by having to look at you and lose the thread of my argument.

By way of preparing for his discourse or *logos* (word as expression), Socrates adopts what is akin to a religious gesture, the veiling of his face, *egkalupto*. This verb is also suggestive of wrapping oneself with the intention of hiding from view. *Eg-* as prefaced to the root *kalupto* is a variance of the preposition *ek-* or from, rendering the verb as an unveiling-from, if you will.

Once Socrates has hidden his face from Phaedrus so as not to be bothered by importune questions and the like (already he had enough as the earlier part of the dialogue recounts), he can now gallop through his *logos*, *diatrecho*. This verb means to run through, the preposition *dia-* being prefaced to the verbal root, which insinuates a thorough spreading, one which is done-through.

Socrates intends to do this running-through as quickly as possible, *tachus*. Without the self-imposed veil he makes the excuse, if you will, of being ashamed (*aischune*) before Phaedrus which is a polite way of making him not feel inferior. The verb *diaporeo* means to be at a loss, the preposition *dia-* or through serving to emphasize the sense of loss. And prefaced to the root *poreuo* meaning to make to go, carry or convey.

PHAEDRUS: Just give your speech! You can do anything else you like.

Phaedrus willingly obliges, *boulomai* meaning to wish or be willing.

SOCRATES: Come to me, O you clear-voiced Muses, whether you are called so because of the quality of your song or from the musical people of Liguria, "come, take up my burden" in telling the tale that this fine fellow forces upon me so that his companion may now seem to him even more clever than he did before:

Ago implies a leading or carrying with regard to the Muses—source of inspiration for music, art and poetry—and is more forceful than a simple invitation. The word Muses is a term also applicable to music and song, so we could say that Socrates is about to engage in a *logos* or expression with a song-like character about it. *Ligus* modifies Muses and means clear-voiced as well as being shrill which is the quality or form (*eidos*) of their song, *ode*. *Eidos* signifies that which is seen or is the particular form of a thing. And so Socrates, whose head is veiled completely, has an intensification, if you will, of the Muses and their clear-voiced song.

Socrates here suggests a far-fetched etymology for a common epithet of the Muses, as the "clear-voiced" ones on the basis of its resemblance to the Greek name for the Ligurians who lived in what is now known as the French Riviera.

Socrates takes into consideration the source of the Muses' name (as it pertains to music and singing), that is, *eponymia* which means a surname where the preposition *epi-* (upon) is prefaced to the root *onoma* or name; i.e., name-upon.

Muthos represents anything delivered by word of mouth and can apply to counsel and advice which is applicable to the Muses and therefore given to Socrates. Socrates is sensitive enough, even with his head completely veiled, to consider the welfare of his *beltistos* or friend, Phaedrus, the term meaning the best of anything, especially as pertaining to virtue or *arete*.

Socrates applies the verb *anagkazo* (to be necessary) more in a gentle or understanding manner to Phaedrus who, judging by the sentence before this, forces Socrates to seek inspiration from the Muses. Socrates interjects some irony, claiming to be wiser than before...*sophos*...which fundamentally means talented in a handicraft or skill.

Note that Socrates uses the verb *dokeo* with regard to *sophos*, seems to be wise. All this is transpiring with his head veiled and his words coming across to Phaedrus more or less muffled, pretty much intended not to confuse him but to prepare him for what is to come.

There once was a boy, a youth rather, and he was very beautiful, and had very many lovers. One of them was wily and had persuaded him that he was not in love, though he loved the lad no less than the others. And once in pressing his suit to him, he tried to persuade him that he ought to give his favors to a man who did not love him rather than to one who did. And this is what he said:

Socrates begins his *logos*—his expression—with mention of a *pais* or *meirakiskos*, the former being a child, generally speaking, and the latter referring more to a boy in the sense of a lad. The identity of this child isn't given which is incidental although he is *kalos* or literally beautiful which connotes being honorable, not just fair in appearance. This young man has a multitude of lovers or *erastes*, those moved by *eros* or love loaded with a strong sense of desire. Among them is someone who is *haimulos*, wheedling or cunning, a trait which becomes especially evident in his ability to persuade, *peitho*, which involves a prevailing upon. Because the boy is young, such *peitho* must be done in accord with his age. Thus the boy can be an easy prey for someone who is cunning. In other words, *peitho* can go either way, good or bad. So this person, marked by deceit, not only attempts to *peitho* the boy but to *epipeitho* him. That is to say, the same verb used twice with the preposition *epi-* prefaced to it, indicative of an intensification of *peitho* which can go forcefully or gently though with persistence.

The end of such *epipeitho*? That the boy accept someone older who does not love him rather than one who does, *erao* being used. *Charizomai* means to accept or to show favor or to be agreeable.

"If you wish to reach a good decision on any topic, my boy, there is only one way to begin: You must know what the decision is about, or else you are bound to miss your target altogether. Ordinary people cannot see that they do not know the true nature of a particular subject, so they proceed as if they did; and because they do not work out an agreement at the start of the inquiry, they wind up as you would expect—in conflict with themselves and each other. Now you and I had better not let this happen to us, since we criticize it in others. Because you and I are about to discuss whether a boy should make friends with a man who loves him rather than with one who does not, we should agree on defining what love is and what effects it has. Then we can look back and refer to that as we try to find out whether to expect benefit or harm from

love. Now, as everyone plainly knows, love is some kind of desire; but we also know that even men who are not in love have a desire for what is beautiful. So how shall we distinguish between a man who is in love and one who is not? We must realize that each of us is ruled by two principles which we follow wherever they lead: one is our inborn desire for pleasures, the other is our acquired judgment that pursues what is best. Sometimes these two are in agreement; but there are times when they quarrel inside us, and then sometimes one of them gains control, sometimes the other. Now when judgment is in control and leads us by reasoning toward what is best, that sort of self-control is called 'being in your right mind'; but when desire **238** takes command in us and drags us without reasoning toward pleasure, then its command is known as 'outrageousness'. Because this is a lengthy paragraph, it is divided into two sections.

The older man who is *haimulos*—wheedling as well as cunning—now begins his speech which, after all, is the person of Socrates with his wrapped head after invoking the Muses and before Phaedrus whom he calls a *pais* or boy, that term already being used in the context of the dialogue at hand. Socrates speaks of not so much of reaching a decision, the verb *boulomai* suggestive of willing, but more precisely how to begin, the noun *arche* which means more than the start of something but more the first principle (of counsel) as well as its foundation. Such *arche* here pertains to gaining good insight or knowledge into counsel which will carry it through to its completion. It is used with *mello*, a verb rather difficult to nail down and pertains to intending to carry through with something.

The verb *eido* implies a seeing as well as appearing to be and suggestive of imperfect or unsure counsel or *boule*. Should the boy fail to achieve a correct decision concerning this *boule*, he will have missed the mark, *hamartano* applicable to target practice (from which is derived the New Testament noun for sin). *Anagke* or necessity is used with *hamartano*.

Most people fail to grasp their ignorance—the verb *lanthano* meaning to forget or to escape notice—of specific things, (*eido*, again with emphasis upon seeing) the very nature of things, *ousia* being the noun for substance or essence. Actually, *lanthano* as forgetting is quite serious in the sense of losing contact with one's faculty of *anamnesis* or recollection, very important for Socrates and to be discussed later on.

Arche or beginning is used with *skepsis* the beginning of inquiry and involves perception through the senses where information is processed before reaching a decision. However, those with whom Socrates is concerned fail to agree, *diomologeō* consisting of the root *homologeō* (literally to speak together) prefaced with the preposition *dia-* or through. And so failure in this regard results in (*proerchomai*: to go on or proceed; *pro-* or before) a lack of *homologeō* or again, speaking with each other or the inability to see eye to eye. *Apodidomai* is the verb for expect and intimates a giving up or delivering over, *apo-* suggestive of away from.

Socrates is careful with his companion Phaedrus not to fall into the trap of misunderstanding just noted. *Peitho* is the verb which means to persuade or make an agreement with each other not to allow it, *epitimaō* literally meaning to lay a value upon, *epi-*.

Logos as word or expression applies to the matter about to be discussed between Socrates and Phaedrus with regard to the love for a boy by a man who loves (*erao*) him or by one who doesn't, that is, to make friends with him, *philia* connoting affection and used with the preposition *eis*, literally "into affectionate friendship." Also involved with this *philia* is its *dunamis*, power or capacity.

Apoblepo means to look back or look away from (*apo-*) used with *anaphero*, to bring up (*ana-*) with regard to a *skepsis* or examination of the subject matter at hand. That is to say,

whether to expect benefit or harm, the verb *parecho* meaning to have beside (*para-*) with regard to either *ophelia* or *blabe*, assistance or service, hurt or damage.

It is clear (*delos*: evident) that *eros* is a desire or *epithumia*, a word which sexual connotations and implying lust. Note that this word consists of *thumos* or mind, temper, with the preposition *epi-* (upon) prefaced to it. A person not in love has this *epithumia* (the verb *epithumeo*) for what is *kalos* or beautiful which intimates whatever is virtuous or admirable. Thus it's necessary to distinguish between or *krino* (also to decide) between a man in love and not in love.

Each person is governed (*archo*: to make a beginning as with *arche*) and led (*ago*) by two principles guiding us, *hepo* meaning to follow or escort in the sense of accompanying us. One consists in an *epithumai* with regard to *hedone* (delight or pleasure) which is literally implanted (*emphutos*; *em-* or *en-*, in) within us. The other an opinion (*doxa*: also as judgment) which has been acquired or gained (*epiktetos*: *ptaomai* or to procure prefaced with the preposition *epi-* or upon, acquired-upon) and goes after the best, the verb *aphikneomai* suggesting a reaching (*apo-* or from) that which is *aristos*, the very best of anything. Both can go two ways: in agreement or at issue with each other, *homonoieo* which means to be of one or the same (*homos*) with regard to thinking or better perceiving. The other is when the two quarrel within us, *stasiazo* meaning to be at variance or to form a political party. Practically speaking one dominates now and the other later, *krateo* suggestive of conquering or laying hold of.

Sophrosune as self-control is difficult to control and usually refers to the moderation of desires, neither favoring their excess nor diminishment, and the balance resulting in soundness of mind. Diametrically opposed to *sophrosune* is *epithumia*, that intense desiring-upon (*epi-*) which is *alogos*., lacking *logos* and more proper to a beast-like existence. Once in command, *epithumia* drags us down (*helko*), literally. in the direction of *hedone* or pleasure which is prefaced with the preposition *epi*, something like “upon pleasure.” Thus the dragging down of *epithumia* results in *hedone*. The result? A change of names, if you will, or to *hubris* or wanton violence which takes control of us, *archo* (to begin) being used with the noun *arche* which suggests that *hubris* becomes our first principle for doing everything else. As for this change of names, the verb is *eponomazo* meaning to apply a word as a name. It consists of the root *nomizo* (to be customary) prefaced with the preposition *epi-* or upon.

I.e, *hubris*, which ranges from arrogance to the sort of crimes to which arrogance gives rise, sexual assault in particular.

A continuation of the previous paragraph which, as noted above, is divided for the sake of presenting the notation in a easier manner. Now outrageousness has as many names as the forms it can take, and these are quite diverse. Whichever form stands out in a particular case gives its name to the person who has it—and that is not a pretty name to be called, not worth earning at all. If it is desire for food that overpowers a person's reasoning about what is best and suppresses his other desires, it is called gluttony and it gives him the name of a glutton, while if it is desire for drink that plays the tyrant and leads the man in that direction, we all know what name we'll call him then! And now it should be clear how to describe someone appropriately in the other cases: call the man by that name—sister to these others—that derives from the sister of these desires that controls him at the time. As for the desire that has led us to say all this, it should be obvious already, but I suppose things said are always better understood than things unsaid: The unreasoning desire that overpowers a person's considered

impulse to do right and is driven to take pleasure in beauty, its force reinforced by its kindred desires for beauty in human bodies—this desire, all-conquering in its forceful drive, takes its name from the word for force (*rhome*) and is called *eros*."

Hubris designates excess and can assume many forms, not just outright violence, the term being *poluonumos* (*polus* + *onoma*). Two other words with the adjective *polus* prefaced to them are used: *polumeles* and *polumeres* (many members and many parts).

Whichever form (*idea*: semblance, outward appearance) happens (*tugchano* meaning this and applies to hitting a mark) to stand out (*ekprepes*: *prepo* or to be clear or conspicuous made all the more so by the preposition *ek-* or from) in a given instance, it bestows its name (*onomazo*: to address by name) to whomever has it, the noun *eponumia* being used. As noted above it refers to a surname where the preposition *epi-* (upon) is prefaced to the root *onoma* or name; i.e., a name-upon. A person having such an unfortunate (*kalos* or beautiful with the negative) name (that is, the verb *parecho* is the root *echo* or to have prefaced with *para-* which indicates beside or nearby) is not deserving (*exaxios*: *axios* or worthy with the preposition *ex-* or from...not...*axios*) of having (*ktaomai*: to get or procure, not simply already in one's possession) it.

The desire for food (and *epithumia* can apply to our appetite) can overwhelm our *logos* or expression with regard to what is *aristos*, or best both visibly and morally. The verb for this almost uncontrollable urge is *krateo* and suggestive of being dominant. The name of the force at hand is *gastrimargia* or gluttony. The same applies to drinking in excess or when alcohol or *methe* (strong drink) becomes a tyrant, *turanneuo* referring to an absolute monarch who has the capacity to get anything he wants and *ktaomai* as the verb which means to procure, acquire and just noted at the end of the last paragraph.

With this example before us, it's easy—*prosdelos*: clear in a focused way, if you will, with *pros-* indicative of place-toward which movement—to describe other examples following the same pattern with regard to our *epithumia* in control of us. *Dunasteuo* is the verb which connotes something like lordship in an absolute sort of way (compare with *krateo* and *turanneuo* already mentioned).

A desire or *epithumia* which lacks reasoning (as often the case), that is, *logos* or expression, takes over (*krateo*) one's impulse as expressed by the verb *hormao*, to set in motion with a certain urgency. Here it is rendered as considered or by the phrase *epi to orthon*, literally upon what is right in the sense of being correct. This impulse is directed not so much to (*ago* as to lead) beauty or that which is *kallos* but is an improper desire (*hedone*) for it, the preposition *pros* or direction toward-which concerning *hedone*. Such *epithumia* are strengthened (*rhonnumi* implies eagerness; *rhome* or force being derived from this verb) by kindred desires or those *epithumia* which are *suggenes*, literally as born-with (*sug-*) concerning beauty (*kallos*) as found in human bodies. The preposition *epi* or upon is used with regard to *soma* or body...literally, desire-upon. Such desire is all-conquering (*nikao*: often refers to battle, to prevail) by reason of its impulse, *agoge* meaning a carrying away. And so we have two instances of the verb *rhonnumi*, the second as forceful and the noun derived from it, *rhome* which is the equivalent of *eros*.

There, Phaedrus my friend, don't you think, as I do, that I'm in the grip of something divine?

After his introductory words Socrates whether or nor Phaedrus thinks (*dokeo*, to

suppose) that he is gripped by some divine impulse. The verb here is *pascho* which suggests being passive or in possession by something along with the noun *pathos*, similarly as anything that befalls one, that *pathos* being divine (*theios*).

PHAEDRUS: This is certainly an unusual flow of words for you, Socrates.

Euroia means flow prefaced with *eu-* meaning good or better, well. To Phaedrus, Socrates' words are literally beside what is accustomed, the preposition *para* with *etho*, to be accustomed or what is usual.

SOCRATES: Then be quiet and listen. There's something really divine about this place, so don't be surprised if I'm quite taken by the Nymphs' madness as I go on with the speech. I'm on the edge of speaking in dithyrambs as it is.

Socrates bids Phaedrus to be quiet, that is *sigao* which also can apply to speaking in hushed tones. *Eikoka* connotes being opportune, here in reference to the natural beauty of the place or *topos* where both men found themselves (*topos* can also apply to an opportunity). It seems to be a spot where inhabited by Nymphs, thereby subjecting Socrates to their madness, *numpholeptos* or literally caught by the Nymphs. Nevertheless, Socrates will continue with his *logos* or speech. This *logos* will take the form of dithyrambs, a choral poem originally connected with the worship of Dionysus. In classical times it became associated with an artificial style dominated by music. *Phtheggomai* is the verb for speaking which implies uttering words clearly and distinctly., this thanks to the Nymphs' inspiration.

PHAEDRUS: Very true!

SOCRATES: Yes, and you're the cause of it. But hear me out; the attack may yet be prevented. That, however, is up to the god; what we must do is face the boy again in the speech:

Aitios is an adjective meaning responsible as well as culpable. *To epion* means attack or *epeimi* as literally to be upon, *epi-* and refers to being possessed or being set upon by the Nymphs. Still, it might not happen, *apotrepo* meaning to turn away from (*apo-*). *Epimeleomai* means that the god is in charge, that he has care of the outcome, another use of the preposition *epi-* as upon. Socrates continues with the necessity of facing the boy (*pros*, direction towards-which) the boy in his *logos*.

"All right then, my brave friend, now we have a definition for the subject of our decision; now we have said what it really is; so let us keep that in view as we complete our discussion. What benefit or harm is likely to come from the lover or the non-lover to the boy who gives him favors? It is surely necessary that a man who is ruled by desire and is a slave to pleasure will turn his boy into whatever is most pleasing to himself. Now a sick man takes pleasure in 239 anything that does not resist him, but sees anyone who is equal or superior to him as an enemy. That is why a lover will not willingly put up with a boyfriend who is his equal or superior, but is always working to make the boy he loves weaker and inferior to himself. Now, the ignorant man is inferior to the wise one, the coward to the brave, the ineffective speaker to the trained orator, the slow-witted to the quick. By necessity, a lover will be delighted to find all

these mental defects and more, whether acquired or innate in his boy; and if he does not, he will have to supply them or else lose the pleasure of the moment. The necessary consequence is that he will be jealous and keep the boy away from the good company of anyone who would make a better man of him; and that will cause him a great deal of harm, especially if he keeps him away from what would most improve his mind—and that is, in fact, divine philosophy, from which it is necessary for a lover to keep his boy a great distance away, out of fear the boy will eventually come to look down on him. He will have to invent other ways, too, of keeping the boy in total ignorance and so in total dependence on himself. That way the boy will give his lover the most pleasure, though the harm to himself will be severe. So it will not be of any use to your intellectual development to have as your mentor and companion a man who is in love.

Socrates calls Phaedrus his brave friend, *pheristos* which implies being quick in action. *Tugchano* is the verb for have and implies a hitting upon or meeting by chance with regard to *beouleuteon* which translates literally as one must take counsel. This word is used with *horizo* which applies to defining the subject at hand and also means to divide or to separate. *Blepo* or keep in view pertains to having the power of sight.

Benefit or harm, *ophelia* or *blabe*; the former applies to help or assistance and the latter to anything that causes damage. Both apply to the lover or non-lover, the verb *erao* being used.

A danger exists from a person who is ruled by desire, *archo* as being the first principle of something here as connected with *epithumia*. In other words, Socrates doesn't wish this intense, lustful desire-upon to be the first principle governing one's life. Not only that, the lover is a slave (*douloo*) to *hedone*, pleasure which gives the ability to turn the boy into what is most pleasant (*hedus*) for himself, the verb being *paraskeuazo*, to provide or prepare. A more intimate tone to what is going on is intimated by the fact that the boy is *para-* the lover, beside him. On the other hand, someone who is sick (*noseo* also can apply to suffering from a plague) can't face up to some superior to him but preys upon a boy who doesn't resist him, *antiteino* or to stretch (*teino* suggests exertion) out against (*anti-*). Because of this a lover doesn't want (*anecho*: to lift up or maintain, *ano-* being above prefaced to *echo*, to have) someone equal to him. Instead, he wants a boy who is weaker and inferior, *hesson* and *hupodees*, the latter suggestive of some deficiency. To this end the lover is working, *apergazomai* meaning to finish off (*apo-*) or to complete.

Socrates gives four examples of how the lover keeps his boy subordinate to himself, demonstrating his point by showing how a lover delights in finding deficiencies (*kakos* usually means evil or bad) according to (*kata*) the mind or following its rules and methods, *dianoia* being comprised of *nous* (mind) and prefaced with the preposition *dia-* (through), thereby connoting thought, intention and purpose. Such evils, if you will, can be acquired or innate, *gignomai* and *phusis* or to come into being and origin, nature. If these defects aren't pleasant, the lover will have to furnish them, *paraskeuazo*, this verb meaning to prepare, provide; the preposition *para-* as preface to the verb suggests being prepared by one's side or in one's close vicinity. If he fails, then he must supply them or lose (*steromai*) that which is momentarily pleasant (*hedus*), the adverb *parautika* suggestive of that which is immediate or straightaway.

The consequence of this, *anagke* being used as fundamental necessity, is that the lover will be jealous (*phthoneros*) and keep the boy away from (*apeirgo*; *apo-* or from) associating with good company, *sunousia* meaning literally a being or *ousia* with, *sun-* and *ophelimos*, an adjective translated as profitable or advantageous. Great (*megas* intimates something that has become full-blown; used with *aitios*, an adjective meaning instrumental) harm or *blabe* will

result to the boy if kept from anything that would improve him, *phronimos*, meaning to be in one's right mind, being prudent. The real harm, of course, is not just *philosophia* (love of wisdom or to have a regard with affection for *sophia*) but one which is divine. The verb *heirgo* used here literally means to fence in...to fence in the boy from such divine philosophy. However, if the boy follows this *philosophia*, he will look down on the lover who is trying to keep him for himself alone, the verb *kataphroneo* being used, literally as to think or to be prudent (*phroneo*) down upon (*kata-*).

The lover will attempt to invent ways to keep the boy away from divine philosophy, (*mechanaomai* or to contrive or devise, to construct) or keeping him in ignorance. The verb *agnoeo* connotes a failure to understand and thus dependent on himself which is rendered by the verb *apoblepo*, to look away from or *apo-* all other objects with the intent of focusing upon just one; the preposition *eis* is also used, literally as into the lover. The result? The boy will suffer harm (*blaperos* in the superlative; akin to *blabe*) while giving his lover pleasure, *hedus* being an adjective. Socrates comes to the conclusion that having a man in love (*erao*) as a mentor and companion, *epitropos* and *koinonos* (something like a governor, *epi-* as upon and someone with whom you have things in common with) will hinder one's intellectual development. This is rendered by *dianoia* or through (*dia-*) the mind (*nous*) with the adjective *lusiteles* (advantageous; used with the negative here).

"Now let's turn to your physical development. If a man is bound by necessity to chase pleasure at the expense of the good, what sort of shape will he want you to be in? How will he train you, if he is in charge? You will see that what he wants is someone who is soft, not muscular, and not trained in full sunlight but in dappled shade—someone who has never worked out like a man, never touched hard, sweaty exercise. Instead, he goes for a boy who has known only a soft unmanly style of life, who makes himself pretty with cosmetics because he has no natural color at all. There is no point in going on with this description: it is perfectly obvious what other sorts of behavior follow from this. We can take up our next topic after drawing all this to a head: the sort of body a lover wants in his boy is one that will give confidence to the enemy in a war or other great crisis while causing alarm to friends and even to his lovers. Enough of that; the point is obvious.

Hexis as development connotes habit of both body and mind. Socrates puts the contrast between the good (*agathos*) and pleasure (*hedus*) in terms of this *hexis*, not unlike gymnastic training. *Therapeuo* is the verb here which means to do service with the connotation of giving honor, that is, concerning chasing (*dioko* has a certain intensity about it, to persecute) pleasure, not the good.

The trainer, if you will, desires a person who is soft, *malthakos*, which also means faint-hearted, cowardly or yielding. In contrast is the adjective *apeiros* which reads literally as without (alpha privative) trial or experience. Although Socrates gives a further description of such a person, he claims it's not necessary to continue, *probaino* meaning to go forward (*pro-*) since there is one essential point bound up by all these, the adjective *kephalaios* referring to the head of what is important with the verb *horizo*, to set a boundary.

"Our next topic is the benefit or harm to your possessions that will come from a lover's care and company. Everyone knows the answer, especially a lover: His first wish will be for a boy who has lost his dearest, kindest and godliest possessions—his mother and father and other

close

relatives. He would be happy to see the boy deprived of them, since he would expect them **240** either to block him from the sweet pleasure of the boy's company or to criticize him severely for taking it. What is more, a lover would think any money or other wealth the boy owns would only make him harder to snare and, once snared, harder to handle. It follows by absolute necessity that wealth in a boyfriend will cause his lover to envy him, while his poverty will be a delight. Furthermore, he will wish for the boy to stay wifeless, childless, and homeless for as long as possible, since that's how long he desires to go on plucking his sweet fruit.

Again Socrates mentions benefit and harm or *ophelia* and *blabe* resulting (*parecho*: literally, to hold beside, *para*-) from the care and company of a lover, that is, his *homilia* and *epitropeia*. The former implies converse and the latter guardianship, the preposition *epi*- or upon implying this care. *Saphes* and *malista* or clear and exceedingly is a way of saying that the lover will be on the lookout for a boy who has lost his parents and is in need for protection. Another pair of adjectives to describe the boy's parents is *eunous* and *theios*, literally as well-disposed (*eu*- or an adverbial preface, well) and divine. The lover would like the boy to be an *orphanos* or orphan with respect to them.

All in all the lover wishes the boy to be deprived of life's normal relationships in order that he may enjoy the fruit (*karpoo*) of what he has set his heart upon, *epithumeo*, where *epi*- means upon with respect to *thumia*, the seat of anger and desire as with *epithumia*.

"There are other troubles in life, of course, but some divinity has mixed most of them with a dash of immediate pleasure. A flatterer, for example, may be an awful beast and a dreadful nuisance, but nature makes flattery rather pleasant by mixing in a little culture with its words. So it is with a mistress—for all the harm we accuse her of causing—and with many other creatures of that character, and their callings: at least they are delightful company for a day. But besides being harmful to his boyfriend, a lover is simply disgusting to spend the day with. 'Youth delights youth,' as the old proverb runs—because, I suppose, friendship grows from similarity, as boys of the same age go after the same pleasures. But you can even have too much of people your own age. Besides, as they say, it is miserable for anyone to be forced into anything by necessity—and this (to say nothing of the age difference) is most true for a boy with his lover. The older man clings to the younger day and night, never willing to leave him, driven by necessity and goaded on by the sting that gives him pleasure every time he sees, hears, touches, or perceives his boy in any way at all, so that he follows him around like a servant, with pleasure.

Kakos or evil is more forceful to describe the troubles that befall us in life but are balanced out by some *hedone* or pleasure which is *parautika*, an adverb suggestive of what is passing. Note that Socrates identifies the agent as a *daimon*, difficult to render into English, something like a power that controls the destiny of human beings. Also note *ti* which makes the identity of this *daimon* all the more indistinct and hence mysterious, i.e., "some divinity." Socrates knows what this *daimon* is but doesn't let on because he would be misunderstood.

One such *kakos* or negative influence is a person who likes to flatter others, *kolax*, which can also apply to someone prone to fawning. This flatterer is described as a beast which is awful and a nuisance which is dreadful, the two adjectives being *deinos* and *megalos* (fearful and the common word for great or large).

Amousos is an adjective which means literally not inspired (i.e., alpha privative) by the Muses, another way of referring to the flatterer.

The lover is harmful (*blaberos* with the preposition *pros*, direction towards-which) as well as disgusting (*aedes*: distasteful, obnoxious) to his boyfriend which is rendered by the verb *sunemereuo*, literally, to pass the day together (*sun-*) and prefaced with the preposition *eis*, literally as into.

The verb *suneimi* or to be with (*sun-*) is used to describe the older man clinging to the boy, driven (*elauno*: to drive a chariot) both by a sting/pleasure, *oistros/hedone*, the former being anything that drives a person mad and can refer to passion. As a result, the older man becomes a servant or *hupereteo*, fundamentally as to do service on board a ship, to be an under-rower, *hupo-* (under).

"As for the boy, however, what comfort or pleasure will the lover give to him during all the time they spend together? Won't it be disgusting in the extreme to see the face of that older man who's lost his looks? And everything that goes with that face—why, it is a misery even to hear them mentioned, let alone actually handle them, as you would constantly be forced to do! To be watched and guarded suspiciously all the time, with everyone! To hear praise of yourself that is out of place and excessive! And then to be falsely accused—which is unbearable when the man is sober and not only unbearable but positively shameful when he is drunk and lays into you with a pack of wild barefaced insults!

The verb *suniemi* means to be with, *sun-*. *Aedia* is the word to describe the disgustingness of the older man which connotes being nauseous as well as odious. It sums up all that follows. The verb *anapetannumi* sums up the older man's attitude just described, that is to say, to spread out or unfold with regard to his insults which he does when *katakores*, literally, sated or gluttoned.

"While he is still in love he is harmful and disgusting, but after his love fades he breaks his trust with you for the future, in spite of all the promises he has made with all those oaths and 241 entreaties which just barely kept you in a relationship that was troublesome at the time, in hope of future benefits. So, then, by the time he should pay up, he has made a change and installed a new ruling government in himself: right-minded reason in place of the madness of love. The boy does not even realize that his lover is a different man. He insists on his reward for past favors and reminds him of what they had done and said before—as if he were still talking to the same man! The lover, however, is so ashamed that he does not dare tell the boy how much he has changed or that there is no way, now that he is in his right mind and under control again, that he can stand by the promises he had sworn to uphold when he was under that old mindless regime. He is afraid that if he acted as he had before he would turn out the same and revert to his old self. So now he is a refugee, fleeing from those old promises on which he must default by necessity; he, the former lover, has to switch roles and flee, since the coin has fallen the other way, while the boy must chase after him, angry and cursing. All along he has been completely unaware that he should never have given his favors to a man who was in love—and who therefore had by necessity lost his mind. He should much rather have done it for a man who was not in love and had his wits about him. Otherwise it follows necessarily that he'd be giving himself to a man who is deceitful, irritable, jealous, disgusting, harmful to his property, harmful to his physical fitness, and absolutely devastating to the cultivation of his soul,

which truly is, and will always be, the most valuable thing to gods and men.

Again the words *blaberos* and *aedes* or harmful and disgusting or nauseous. *Lego* means to leave off or to cease with respect to *eros* which is more or less equivalent to *apistos* or unfaithful with regard to promises made, the verb *hupischneomai* meaning to promise or take upon oneself (*hupo-* or under).

The older man has repented, if you will, *metaballo* and *archo* being two verbs to show this. The former means literally to cast after (*meta-*) and pertains to a change. The latter is the verbal root for *arche*, first principle of anything. To replace the *mania* or madness (connotes enthusiasm as well as frenzy) of *eros* this man inserts within his *nous* or mind *sophrosune* which generally translates as self-control. Nevertheless, the young man doesn't realize this, perhaps due to his immaturity, considering the old man to be his former self or not having changed. Now the older man has to flee and the boy pursue him, angry that he had given himself over to a man who was in love (*erao*), that is, someone who has lost his mind or *nous*. And so the lesson learned is that the young man realizes not to give himself to a older person who is not truthful and especially harmful or *blaberos* concerning his *psuche* or soul, the preposition *pros* (direction towards-which) being used. Such cultivation is a *paideusis* which applies to the rearing and education of a child. It remains most valuable or *timios*, honorable and worthy to men and gods.

"These are the points you should bear in mind, my boy. You should know that the friendship of a lover arises without any good will at all. No, like food, its purpose is to sate hunger. 'Do wolves love lambs? That's how lovers befriend a boy!'"

Sunnoeo or literally to consider with (*sun-*): to know (*eido*, with emphasis upon seeing) that a lover's friendship or *philia* lacks *eunoia* or lacks a *nous* which is set up, if you will, as well (*eu-*). The verb befriends (*phileo*) is the root for *philia* (friendship). Compare with *agapao* (to treat with affection, be well pleased) used with regard to wolves and lambs.

That's it, Phaedrus. You won't hear another word from me, and you'll have to accept this as the end of the speech.

Telos or end as completion with regard to Socrates' *logos*.

PHAEDRUS: But I thought you were right in the middle—I thought you were about to speak at the same length about the non-lover, to list his good points and argue that it's better to give one's favors to him. So why are you stopping now, Socrates?

Oiomai is used frequently to express the idea of thinking yet intimates a certain foreboding. Here the verb pertains to speaking well about the non-lover, *charizomai* pertaining to something favorable. *Apopauo* means to stop but is a more intense form (*pauo*: to cease) indicated by the preposition *apo-*, from.

SOCRATES: Didn't you notice, my friend, that even though I am criticizing the lover, I have passed beyond lyric into epic poetry? What do you suppose will happen to me if I begin to praise his opposite? Don't you realize that the Nymphs to whom you so cleverly exposed me will

take complete possession of me? So I say instead, in a word, that every shortcoming for which we blamed the lover has its contrary advantage, and the non-lover possesses it. Why make a **242** long speech of it? That's enough about them both. This way my story will meet the end it deserves, and I will cross the river and leave before you make me do something even worse.

The overheated choral poems known as dithyrambs (see 238d) were written in lyric meters. The meter of the last line of Socrates' speech, however, was epic, and it is the tradition in epic poetry to glorify a hero, not to attack him.

Aisthanomai as notice means more properly to perceive by the senses with regard to Socrates criticizing the lover, *phtheggomai* as uttering a sound or voice in a clear fashion. To the self-asked question about praising the lover's opposite, Socrates responds by saying that the Nymphs will possess him completely, *enthusiazō* meaning to be inspired by a god or to go into ecstasy. Phaedrus had put this forward, *proballo* meaning literally to cast before (*pro-*) with foresight, *pronoia*, a second word with the preposition *pro-* prefaced to it (*nous* or mind).

Loidoreo means to rail or revile as applied to the lover, but it has a contrary advantage (*agathos* or good) which the non-lover has, *proseimi* meaning to be added to (*pros-*).

PHAEDRUS: Not yet, Socrates, not until this heat is over. Don't you see that it is almost exactly noon, "straight-up" as they say? Let's wait and discuss the speeches, and go as soon as it turns cooler.

Remain is *perimeno* or literally to remain around (*peri-*), and *dialego* means to discuss, or literally to pick through (*dia-*).

SOCRATES: You're really superhuman when it comes to speeches, Phaedrus; you're truly amazing. I'm sure you've brought into being more of the speeches that have been given during your lifetime than anyone else, whether you composed them yourself or in one way or another forced others to make them; with the single exception of Simmias the Theban, you are far ahead of the rest. Even as we speak, I think, you're managing to cause me to produce yet another one.

Simmias, a companion of Socrates, was evidently a lover of discussion (cf. **Phaedo** 85c). *Theios* or divine translates here as superhuman.

PHAEDRUS: Oh, how wonderful! But what do you mean? What speech?

SOCRATES: My friend, just as I was about to cross the river, the familiar divine sign came to me which, whenever it occurs, holds me back from something I am about to do. I thought I heard a voice coming from this very spot, forbidding me to leave until I made atonement for some offense against the gods. In effect, you see, I am a seer, and though I am not particularly good at it, still—like people who are just barely able to read and write—I am good enough for my own purposes. I recognize my offense clearly now. In fact, the soul too, my friend, is itself a sort of seer; that's why, almost from the beginning of my speech, I was disturbed by a very uneasy feeling, as Ibycus puts it, that "for offending the gods I am honored by men." But now I understand exactly what my offense has been.

Daimon or divine agent which was familiar (*etho*: to be wont) to Socrates and came to

him as he was about to cross the river and whose approach is unpredictable. Usually it serves to restrain Socrates, *epischeo* literally as to hold upon, *epi-*. Socrates believes he has heard a voice, possible from this *daimon*, to remain where he was until he atones for (*aphosioo*: to purify from guilt) an offense (*hamartano*: to miss the mark, to do wrong) against (*eis* or literally into) the gods.

Socrates claims to be a seer or *mantis* but adds that he isn't good at it, *spoudaios* suggesting earnestness as well as a certain haste, comparing his mediocrity as being barely literate. Nevertheless, Socrates recognizes (*manthano*: more as to learn) his offenses or *harmatia* which fundamentally means to miss the mark as in target practice. He adds that in addition to himself as a person there exists the soul (*psuche*) which resembles a *mantis*, the adjective *mantikos* being used.

Socrates expresses his dismay or *dusopeo* which means to put out of countenance (*dus-* meaning hard) by a quote from Ibycus, *amplakein* meaning to miss or fall short of and *ameibo*, to give or get in exchange. **Ibycus was a sixth century poet famous for his love poetry.** The verb for offending is *amplakein* which means to miss or fall short of and *ameibo* the verb for honored which fundamentally means to exchange. This quote helps Socrates understand (*aisthanomai*, to perceive by the mind) his offense or *hamartia* which also means sin or failure.

PHAEDRUS: Tell me, what is it?

SOCRATES: Phaedrus, that speech you carried with you here—it was horrible, as horrible as the speech you made me give.

Deinos is the adjective for horrible and connotes a sense of dread and fear.

PHAEDRUS: How could that be?

SOCRATES: It was foolish, and close to being impious. What could be more horrible than that?

Euethes means simple minded (*eu-* or well prefaced to *ethos*, custom or usage) and *asebes* meaning ungodly or unholy, alpha privative. Again, Socrates criticizes Phaedrus's speech as *deinos*.

PHAEDRUS: Nothing—if, of course, what you say is right.

SOCRATES: Well, then? Don't you believe that Love is the son of Aphrodite? Isn't he one of the gods?

Eros or Love as a god. *Hegeomai* here is rendered as believe and means to lead, conduct or to regard.

PHAEDRUS: This is certainly what people say.

SOCRATES: Well, Lysias certainly doesn't and neither does your speech, which you charmed me through your potion into delivering myself. But if Love is a god or something divine—which he is—he can't be bad in any way; and yet our speeches just now spoke of him as if he were. That is their offense against Love. And they've compounded it with their utter foolishness in parading **243** their dangerous falsehoods and preening themselves over perhaps deceiving a few silly

people and coming to be admired by them.

Socrates equates Phaedrus' speech or *logos* with a potion, the verb *katapharmakeuo* meaning to fill with drugs or charms. The root *pharmakon* means drug or a cure, the verb here being prefaced with the preposition *kata-*, in accord with. Socrates uses the verb *lego* or to pick as well as recount for handing himself over to (*hupo*, under) Phaedrus.

Eros = *theios* or is divine and therefore not *kakos* (bad) although Socrates claims he and Phaedrus had been putting this god in an offensive light, the verb being *hamartano* or to miss the mark. People act thus, compounding their offense with foolishness which is *euetheia*, fundamentally as goodness (*eu-* the adverbial form for well) of heart but also as silliness which here is *asteios*, literally as of the city and hence witty or clever.

Falsehoods or those things which aren't true (*alethos*) lead to deceiving (*exapatao*, the preposition *ex-* or from intensifying the verb's meaning) as well as putting on airs unnecessarily. The verb is *semnuo* which pertains to affecting a grave and solemn air with the result of being admired, *eudokimeo* as to be thought of well (*eu-*).

And so, my friend, I must purify myself. Now for those whose offense lies in telling false stories about matters divine, there is an ancient rite of purification—Homer did not know it, but Stesichorus did. When he lost his sight for speaking ill of Helen, he did not, like Homer, remain in the dark about the reason why. On the contrary, true follower of the Muses that he was, he understood it and immediately composed these lines:

There's no truth to that story: You never sailed that lovely ship,
You never reached the tower of Troy.

Kathareuo is the verb for purify which brings to Socrates' mind persons who offend...miss the mark or *hamartano*...when they engage in telling false stories about divine matters, the noun being *nuthologia*. This noun consists of *muthos* plus *logos*, literally a word or expression about a legend. There exists a rite of purification (*katharmos*) which is *archaios* which means literally from the beginning and was unknown to Homer though Stesichorus knew of it.

Etumos is the adjective for truth in the fragment given here and means that which is real or actual. The passage is Frg 18 (Edmonds).

And as soon as he completed the poem we call the Palinode, he immediately regained his sight. Now I will prove to be wiser than Homer and Stesichorus to this small extent: I will try to offer my Palinode to Love before I am punished for speaking ill of him—with my head bare, no longer covered in shame.

Parachrema is the adverb for as soon as meaning on the spot or right away.

Socrates claims to be wiser or *sophos* than the two men mentioned, this adjective suggestive of being skilled or trained although by just a bit. Nevertheless, Socrates will proceed even if he speaks ill of Love or *Eros*. Now he will lack shame or *aischune* by removing that veil with which he had covered his head.

PHAEDRUS: No words could be sweeter to my ears, Socrates.

SOCRATES: You see, my dear Phaedrus, you understand how shameless the speeches were, my own as well as the one in your book. Suppose a noble and gentle man, who was (or had once been) in love with a boy of similar character, were to hear us say that lovers start serious quarrels for trivial reasons and that, jealous of their beloved, they do him harm—don't you think that man would think we had been brought up among the most vulgar of sailors, totally ignorant of love among the freeborn? Wouldn't he most certainly refuse to acknowledge the flaws we attributed to Love?

Socrates puts words in the mouth of Phaedrus, that is, he understands (*ennoeo*: *en-* or in prefaced to *noeo*, to think; to have in one's mind or *nous*) the shamelessness of the speeches just mentioned, *anaidos* being an adverb and suggesting both ruthlessness and recklessness (alpha privative, no *aidos* or reverence as well as shame).

Ethos is the noun for character, also as custom or usage, and modified by the adjective *praos* which suggests being mild. If such a person heard we (presumably Socrates and Phaedrus) saying that lovers instigate (*anaireo*: to take up, *ana-*) quarrels, *exthros* being an adjective meaning hateful for small reasons, *smikros* also being an adjective. Jealously (*phthoneros*, adverb) results in causing the boy harm, *blaberos*, also an adverb.

If such a noble man thought Socrates and Phaedrus behaved as such, he would consider (*hegeomai* also means to lead, conduct) them as vulgar sailors who have no knowledge of *eros* existing among those who have been born free and not slaves. In the end, this person would not acknowledge (*homologeō*) the flaws (*psego*: to blame, censure) the two have attributed to *Eros*.

PHAEDRUS: Most probably, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Well, that man makes me feel ashamed, and as I'm also afraid of Love himself, I want to wash out the bitterness of what we've heard with a more tasteful speech. And my advice to Lysias, too, is to write as soon as possible a speech urging one to give similar favors to a lover rather than to a non-lover.

Aischauno is the verb for to be ashamed by the man who is *praos* or mild mentioned just above and *deido* the verb which connotes being alarmed as well as fearful with regard to *Eros*. Because of this, Socrates wishes to (*epithumeo*: to set one's *thumos* or desire upon, *epi-*) the composition of a speech (*logos*, expression) which lacks *halmuros*, literally as being salty. Socrates advises Lysias to grant similar favors (*charizomai*: to grant *charis*, grace or favor) to a lover instead of a non-lover.

PHAEDRUS: You can be sure he will. For once you have spoken in praise of the lover, I will most definitely make Lysias write a speech on the same topic.

SOCRATES: I do believe you will, so long as you are who you are.

PHAEDRUS: Speak on, then, in full confidence.

Tharseo means to have courage or boldness.

SOCRATES: Where, then, is the boy to whom I was speaking? Let him hear this speech, too. Otherwise he may be too quick to give his favors to the non-lover.

PHAEDRUS: He is here, always right by your side, whenever you want him.

244 SOCRATES: You'll have to understand, beautiful boy, that the previous speech was by Phaedrus, Pythocles' son, from Myrrhinus, while the one I am about to deliver is by Stesichorus, Euphemus son, from Himera.' And here is how the speech should go:

Socrates addresses directly the unidentified boy who is beautiful or *kalos* even though most likely he wouldn't understand what he is about to say. At this point, however, we are at the heart of dialogue. Etymologically, "Stesichorus, son of Good Speaker, from the Land of Desire." Myrrhinus was one of the demes of ancient Athens.

"There's no truth to that story—that when a lover is available you should give your favors to a man who doesn't love you instead, because he is in control of himself while the lover has lost his head. That would have been fine to say if madness were bad, pure and simple; but in fact the best things we have come from madness, when it is given as a gift of the god.

Etumos is the adjective for truth which connotes being genuine and *charizomai* the verb to give favors. *Sophroneo* means to be of sound mind, temperate or modest and refers to being in control of oneself. This moderation/control stands in contrast to the lover having lost his head, *mainomai* meaning to rage or be furious and is the root for *mania* madness as already mentioned. Generally it means enthusiasm and is applicable to being inspired. Socrates says that such *mania* is best (*agathos*) when it comes from the gods.

"The prophetess of Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona are out of their minds when they perform that fine work of theirs for all of Greece, either for an individual person or for a whole city, but they accomplish little or nothing when they are in control of themselves. We will not mention the Sybil or the others who foretell many things by means of god-inspired prophetic trances and give sound guidance to many people—that would take too much time for a point that's obvious to everyone. But here's some evidence worth adding to our case: The people who designed our language in the old days never thought of madness as something to be ashamed of or worthy of blame; otherwise they would not have used the word 'manic' for the finest experts of all—the ones who tell the future—thereby weaving insanity into prophecy. They thought it was wonderful when it came as a gift of the god, and that's why they gave its name to prophecy; but nowadays people don't know the fine points, so they stick in a 't' and call it 'mantic.' Similarly, the clear-headed study of the future, which uses birds and other signs, was originally called oionistic, since it uses reasoning to bring intelligence (*nous*) and learning (*historia*) into human thought; but now modern speakers call it oinnistic, putting on airs with their long 'o.' To the extent, then, that prophecy, mantic, is more perfect and more admirable than sign-based prediction, oionistic, in both name and achievement, madness (*mania*) from a god is finer than self-control of human origin, according to the testimony of the ancient language givers.

Mainomai or to be out of one's mind is equivalent to performing good deeds (*kalos*) on

behalf of Greece, *ergazomai* suggestive of more of accomplishment than actually doing though certainly including both. However, when exerting self-control or *soprhonizo* (to learn as well as knowing how to exercise moderation), they accomplish little (*braxus* is suggestive of being short as well). Thus while *mainomai* and *soprhonizo* seem to be opposites, both can work hand in hand.

Socrates speaks of some evidence for his position, *epimarturomai* meaning literally to give witness upon or *epi-*, to adduce as evidence. And that evidence comes from of old (*palaios* suggestive of being ancient) when people held *mania* or madness in high esteem (*aischros*: or alpha privative, not as ashamed and *oneidos*, reproach, censure). They used (*techne*: skill which involves a certain amount of cunning with the superlative of *kallos*, beautiful) or wove (*empleko*: also as to plait or entwine) this word (*onoma*: name) into that which is *manikos* into prophecy. In other words, these men of old thought it wonderful or *kalos* (beautiful) when such *mania* was taken as a divine (*theios*) gift, *moira* also meaning part, portion or destiny. Hence the name they bestowed upon it, *nomizo* meaning to be the custom, to deem or hold. However, today people are *apeirokalos*, ignorant (*apeiros*: alpha privative; literally, without trial) of the beautiful (*kalos*) and thus insert (*epiballo*: to cast upon, *epi-*) the letter “t” and call it “mantic.”

Then there is what is called “oionistic” which is called *emphronon* or sensible, intelligent (*em-* or in one’s mind) and divines by using birds and signs (*semeion*: also a mark, token or proof). Thus they thought (*oiomai* connotes an element of suspecting, of intuiting) both *nous* (mind) and giving an account (*historia*: also as systematic observation) when it comes to thought or *dianoia*, literally through (*dia-*) the *nous* which was just mentioned. However, at the present the letter (long ‘o’) was inserted, rendering the word as “oionistic.”

Socrates claims that *mania* is better (*teleios*: perfect as well as valid) and more worthy of respect (*entimios*: the preposition *en-* being a more intensive form) than any prediction (oionistic, that is concerning birds) both in *onoma* and *ergon* or name and work as that which has been wrought. Because *mania* comes from a god, it supercedes *sophrosune* (self-control, moderation, discretion) which is human, the preposition *para* (beside) with *anthropos* (man). Ancient (*palaios*) language has testified (*martureo*: to give witness) to this.

"Next, madness can provide relief from the greatest plagues of trouble that beset certain families because of their guilt for ancient crimes: it turns up among those who need a way out; it gives prophecies and takes refuge in prayers to the gods and in worship, discovering mystic rites and purifications that bring the man it touches through to safety for this and all time to come. So it is that the right sort of madness finds relief from present hardships for a man it has possessed.

Mania can relieve sickness and pain or literally, hard work (*nosos* and *ponos*) stemming (*egginomai*: to spring up, come into being) from crimes of old (*palaios*), *menima* meaning a cause of wrath or guilt. *Mania* takes the form of religious expressions in order to deliver a person, *apallage* signifying release and a going away (*apo-*) as well as a refuge, *katapheugo*, the preposition *kata-* (in accord with) being prefaced to the verbal root which here applies to that which is down, suggestive of hiding. *Lusis* as relief means literally a loosening with regard to evils (*kakos*) in the present, *pariemi* (literally, to go alongside, *para-*) which had possessed a man. The verb is *katecho* meaning to hold back, *kata-* often with regard to motion from above to downward. And so we have a *mania* which is of the right sort (*orthos* connotes straightness).

245 "Third comes the kind of madness that is possession by the Muses, which takes a tender virgin soul and awakens it to a Bacchic frenzy of songs and poetry that glorifies the achievements of the past and teaches them to future generations. If anyone comes to the gates of poetry and expects to become an adequate poet by acquiring expert knowledge of the subject without the Muses' madness, he will fail, and his self-controlled verses will be eclipsed by the poetry of men who have been driven out of their minds.

Katokoche or possession (cf. *katecho* in the paragraph above) proper to *mania* pertains to the Muses which take a *psuche* as *hapalos* (connotes softness) and *abatos* (alpha privative; literally as not trodden) and wakes it (*egeiro* suggestive of arousing). That is, it creates a madness or *ekbacheuo* associated with Bacchus through songs and poetry, the preposition *ek-* or from-which intensifies the verb meaning to go. I.e., note the similarity between *egeiro* and *ekbacheuo* which glorifies or *kosmeo* (pertains to adorning) what is *palaios* or ancient as well as the education (*paideuo* with regard to the rearing of a child) with regard to *epigignosko* or literally to know upon, *epi-*.

Aphikneomai means to reach or attain with regard to the gates (*epi* or upon them) of poetry. Should a person be persuaded (*peitho* connotes prevailing upon) that he is worthy (*hikanos*: sufficient, adequate) of being a poet by a certain *techne* (skill or technique, it won't work (*ateles*: imperfect, incomplete or not *a-* & *telos*). Similarly, his verses which are full of *sophrosune* or moderation and self-control (verb used here) will be surpassed (*aphanizo*: to do away with, remove) by the poetry of those who have become mad, *mainomai*.

"There you have some of the fine achievements—and I could tell you even more—that are due to god-sent madness. We must not have any fear on this particular point, then, and we must not let anyone disturb us or frighten us with the claim that you should prefer a friend who is in control of himself to one who is disturbed. Besides proving that point, if he is to win his case, our opponent must show that love is not sent by the gods as a benefit to a lover and his boy. And we, for our part, must prove the opposite, that this sort of madness is given us by the gods to ensure our greatest good fortune. It will be a proof that convinces the wise if not the clever.

Kalos or beautiful is the adjective for fine (achievements) attributable to a *mania* which is *apo* or from the gods. This should make us confident—three verbs related to fear are present here, *phobeo*, *thorubeo* and *deidissomai*—in our claim to have (*proaireo*: to bring forth, *pro-* or before) a friend (*philos*) in control of himself or *sophroneo* instead of someone who is not (*kineo*: to put into motion). This contrast between *sophrosune* (the noun) and *kineo* intimates that to be in motion is mistakenly preferable to remaining still which can fall under the domain of *sophrosune*. Someone who expects to be victorious (*niketerios*) against this position must demonstrate (*deiknumi*: to bring to light, point out) that *eros* isn't sent or *epipempto* (to send upon or *epi-*) as a benefit or *opheilia* (with the preposition *epi*, upon; i.e., two uses of this *epi* together) by the gods to the lover or one loved, the verb *erao* being used in both instances.

Instead of this position, Socrates says he requires a burden of proof or *apodeikteon* (*apo-* or from prefaced to the verbal root being *deiknumi*, to show-from, an adjective pertaining to the affording of proof. That is to say, it is given by (*para*) the gods that people may be assured of their greatest (*megistos*) good fortune or *eutuchia*. The verbal root of this noun is *tugchano* which means to succeed, and the noun itself is prefaced by *eu-* which connotes well-being. In sum, Socrates' alternative will be a proof or *apodexis* or a setting for (*apo-* or from as in

apodeikteon) concerning the *mania* or madness under discussion. This it is to convince (*pistos*: faithful) those who are wise or *sophos*) and hopefully those who are clever or *deinos*, an adjective which fundamentally means fearful. Also included are those who are *apistos* or lack faith.

"Now we must first understand the truth about the nature of the soul, divine or human, by examining what it does and what is done to it. Here begins the proof:

Noeo is the verb to understand meaning to perceive by the mind or *nous*, to consider or reflect with regard to the truth (*alethes*: literally, as unconcealed) about the *phusis* of the *psuche* whether it be divine or human (*anthropinos*). The noun *pathe* is a passive state concerning that which is done to someone or something and *ergon* the noun for work or that which is wrought. Now Socrates presents the *apodeixis* or proof, rather the *arche* or beginning as first principle of this exposition.

"Every soul is immortal. That is because whatever is always in motion is immortal, while what moves, and is moved by, something else stops living when it stops moving. So it is only what moves itself that never desists from motion, since it does not leave off being itself. In fact, this self-mover is also the source and spring of motion in everything else that moves; and a source has no beginning. That is because anything that has a beginning comes from some source, but there is no source for this, since a source that got its start from something else would no longer be the source. And since it cannot have a beginning, then necessarily it cannot be destroyed. That is because if a source were destroyed it could never get started again from anything else and nothing else could get started from it—that is, if everything gets started from a source. This then is why a self-mover is a source of motion. And that is incapable of being destroyed or starting up; otherwise all heaven and everything that has been started up would collapse, come to a stop, and never have cause to start moving again. But since we have found that a self-mover is immortal, we should have no qualms about declaring that this is the very essence and principle of a soul, for every bodily object that is moved from outside has no soul, while a body whose motion comes from within, from itself, does have a soul, that being the nature of a soul; and if this is so—that whatever moves itself is essentially a soul—then it follows necessarily that soul should have neither birth nor death.

Athanatos or immortal, alpha privative as applicable to every (*pan*) *psuche*. The reason: that which is in motion at all times or *aeikinetos* (*aei* or forever prefaced to the verbal root *kineo*, to set in motion). In contrast, whatever moves or is moved (*kineo* in both instances; compare this verb with *sophrosune* two paragraphs above) by (*hupo*) something else ceases to be alive (*zoe*: life as existence) when it stops (*pausa* being a noun meaning rest or pause) moving. That (i.e., the *psuche*) which moves itself (*to hautō*) never ceases or *apoleipo* (to leave behind, the preposition *apo-* suggestive of from-ness) movement, *kineo* again which is used throughout. Another verb is similar to *apoleipo* here, *lego* which is a ceasing or coming to an end and is used with *kineo*.

Source and spring or *pege* and *arche*: the former pertains to running water and the latter to the first principle of anything. Both are used with respect to *kineo*, and *arche* has no end, *agenetos* means to be uncreated or un-originated. Anything with an *arche* must (*anagke*: necessity) be attributed to a source (*gignomai*) else it would be this *arche*. In other words,

having no *arche* means no destruction, *adiaphthoros* being an adjective with alpha privative to the root *phthoros* (ruin) prefaced with the preposition *dia* or through.

If a beginning or *arche* suffered destruction (*apollumi*: ruin in the utter sense), it would be impossible to get started again from something else. Hence a self-mover or *to auto hautou kinoun* is a source of *kinesis*. Keeping in mind the contrast drawn between *kineo* and *sophrosune* earlier, this self-mover may be said to be endowed with *sophrosune* which is free from *kinesis*. If this weren't so, heaven and everything would fall apart and cease, *sumpipto* and *histemi* or to fall together (*sum-*) and literally, to stand.

Hence a self-mover is *athanatos* or immortal, the verb being *phaino* which means to appear or to disclose, this immortality being the very essence (*ousia*: substance) and reason (*logos* as expression) of the *psuche*. This stands in contrast to any exterior (*exothern*: from outside) movement which pertains to something that lacks a soul or is *apsuchos* which is a more direct way of putting it. On the other hand, motion belonging to a body or *soma* is *endothern* or from within and this is *empsuchos* or having life...*psuche*...which is *em-* (i.e., *en-*) or in. And so Socrates concludes this section by saying that by necessity (*anagke*) the *psuche* lacks both birth and death (*agenetos* and *athanatos*, two adjectives being alpha privative).

246 That, then, is enough about the soul's immortality. Now here is what we must say about its structure. To describe what the soul actually is would require a very long account, altogether a task for a god in every way; but to say what it is like is humanly possible and takes less time. So let us do the second in our speech. Let us then liken the soul to the natural union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer. The gods have horses and charioteers that are themselves all good and come from good stock besides, while everyone else has a mixture. To begin with, our driver is in charge of a pair of horses; second, one of his horses is beautiful and good and from stock of the same sort, while the other is the opposite and has the opposite sort of bloodline. This means that chariot-driving in our case is inevitably a painfully difficult business.

Hikanos means satisfactory and pertains to what Socrates had just defined about the soul's immortality (*athanasia*), so now it's time to consider its structure or *peri tes ideas autes*: concerning (*peri* also as around, indicative of looking at a matter from all view points) its own self-ness. He opts for a human presentation, *diegesis* (*dia-* connoting through-ness) which means narrative, not a divine one which would take too long.

Socrates decides to liken (*eikoa*: cf. *eikon* or image) the *psuche* to a natural union of winged horses. This union is expressed by the noun *dunamis* which means power as natural capacity or property with the adjective *sumphutos* which means congenital or kindred (*sum-* as with). The gods have such horses which are all good (*agathos*) and derive from good stock, the second use of the adjective. In comparison, every else has a mixture, *meignumi* being a verb. This *meignumi* implies the opposite of *agathos*, *enantios*, which is inferred, not stated. Driving this pair (*agathos/enantios*) is by necessity (*anagke*) both *chalepos* and *duskolos* or painful, hard to bear and hard (*dus-*) to satisfy, discontented.

"And now I should try to tell you why living things are said to include both mortal and immortal beings. All soul looks after all that lacks a soul, and patrols all of heaven, taking different shapes at different times. So long as its wings are in perfect condition it flies high, and the entire universe is its dominion; but a soul that sheds its wings wanders until it lights on something solid, where it settles and takes on an earthly body, which then, owing to the power

of this soul, seems to move itself. The whole combination of soul and body is called a living thing, or animal, and has the designation 'mortal' as well. Such a combination cannot be immortal, not on any reasonable account. In fact it is pure fiction, based neither on observation nor on adequate reasoning, that a god is an immortal living thing which has a body and a soul, and that these are bound together by nature for all time—but of course we must let this be as it may please the gods, and speak accordingly.

Zoon or that which is living in the sense of having existence and includes beings both mortal and immortal, *thnetos* and *athanatos*. Socrates uses the phrase all soul (*psuche pasa*) which cares for (*epimeleomai*: the preposition *epi-* or upon intensifies the meaning) that which is *apsuchos*, without (alpha privative) a *psuche*. It patrols or *peripoleo* (*peri-* or around prefaced to *poleo*, to range) all of heaven (the same adjective concerning all soul) while assuming different shapes (*eidosis*: signifies that which is seen or is the particular form of a thing) at different times.

The soul's wings must be in perfect condition (*teleos*: relative toward and end or goal) in order to fly on high or *meteoroporeo* which means to fly through the air (*meteoros*: raised from off the ground prefaced to *poreuo* which implies carrying) enabling it to have the universe (*kosmos*: also as decoration) under itself, *dioikeo* meaning to administer and consists of *oikeo* (to dwell) prefaced with the preposition *dia-*, through. On the other hand, a *psuche* which sheds its wings and assumes (*lambano*: to take, receive) a body or *soma* comprised of the earth (*geinos*) wanders or *antilambano* (literally, to receive instead, *anti-* suggestive of against) until it lands on something solid, *stereos* also meaning that which is harsh. The verb *katoikizo* means to settle or bring home, *kata-* suggestive of in accord with this home. The verb *kineo* or to move is used in conjunction with the noun *dunamis* meaning to have capacity, the ability as to move on one's own.

The adjective *sumpan* (*sum* = with and *pan* = all) as everything refers to *psuche* and *soma* as *pegnumi*, to stick or to fix. Furthermore, the designation or *eponumia* (surname where the preposition *epi-* (upon) is prefaced to the root *onoma* or name; i.e., name-upon) of mortal (*thnetos*) applies here. And so this *sumpan* is something devised, *logizomai* meaning to calculate, reckon and often with negative connotations. In other words, it not based upon observation nor reasoning (*eido* and *noeo*, the former applies to knowing and the latter to understanding), that a god is an immortal (*athanatos*) living being (*zoon*) with a *soma* and *psuche* and that both are connected (*sumphuo*: literally to grow together, *sum-*) for all time, *aei* (eternity) plus *chronos* (implies space as well). Anyway, such things are as the god wills or *philos* which means beloved or dear.

"Let us turn to what causes the shedding of the wings, what makes them fall away from a soul. It is something of this sort: By their nature wings have the power to lift up heavy things and raise them aloft where the gods all dwell, and so, more than anything that pertains to the body, they are akin to the divine, which has beauty, wisdom, goodness, and everything of that sort. These nourish the soul's wings, which grow best in their presence; but foulness and ugliness make the wings shrink and disappear.

Socrates is now concerned with the cause (*aitia*) of the wings being shed, *apobole* (literally, a casting from, *apo-*) and what makes them fall away (*apporeo*: literally, to flow from, *apo-*) from a *psuche*. Because wings have the capacity (*dunamis*, also as power, might as well as

property) to lift up things which are heavy and thus situate them in places where the gods dwell (*oikeo*), they are akin to the divine, the verb being *koinoneo* or to be in common (*koinos*, adjective) with. And so this realm which is *theios* is also *kalos*, *sophos*, *agathos* and the like, all nourishing (*trepho*: to increase, rear) the wings of a *psuche*. On the other hand, that which is *aischros* (literally, not ashamed) and ugly (*kakos* fundamentally means evil) cause the wings to shrink and disappear, *phthino* (connotes decaying) and *diollumi* (to destroy utterly, *dia-* or through suggestive of thoroughness).

"Now Zeus, the great commander in heaven, drives his winged chariot first in the procession, looking after everything and putting all things in order. Following him is an army of gods and 247 spirits arranged in eleven sections. Hestia is the only one who remains at the home of the gods; all the rest of the twelve are lined up in formation, each god in command of the unit to which he is assigned. Inside heaven are many wonderful places from which to look and many aisles which the blessed gods take up and back, each seeing to his own work, while anyone who is able and wishes to do so follows along, since jealousy has no place in the gods' chorus. When they go to feast at the banquet they have a steep climb to the high tier at the rim of heaven; on this slope the gods' chariots move easily, since they are balanced and well under control, but the other chariots barely make it. The heaviness of the bad horse drags its charioteer toward the earth and weighs him down if he has failed to train it well, and this causes the most extreme toil and struggle that a soul will face. But when the souls we call immortals reach the top, they move outward and take their stand on the high ridge of heaven, where its circular motion carries them around as they stand while they gaze upon what is outside heaven.

Zeus is a commander or *hegemon*, one who is in a position of authority to others and is in heaven (*ouranos*) who drives (*elauno* also applies to riding) his winged chariot first in procession, the verb *poreuo* being used here which can apply to carrying or conveying. While doing this, Zeus looks after everything as well as putting them in order, the two verbs being *diakosmeo* and *epimeleomai*. The first pertains to decoration and has the preface *dia-* or through prefaced to it, indicative of a thorough arrangement and care. The second has the preface *epi-* or upon prefaced to the verbal root for care. Like the just mentioned *dia-*, *epi-* is indicative of thoroughness though the accent is upon rather than through.

In Zeus' train is an army (*stratia*) of both gods and spirits comprised of eleven sections, this verb being *kosmeo* or implies adornment of these sections. The word for spirits is *daimon* or a divine agent, a word awkward to translate into English. Of all the gods, Hestia alone remains at their home or *oikos* while the others are in formation, *tasso* meaning to be drawn up as an army for battle. Each god has a command over the unit assigned (*taxis*: a drawing up, with *kata* or in accord with) to him.

Heaven contains many places which are wonderful (*makarios*: happy, blessed) where the those gods which are *eudaimonos* or blessed (*eu-* or well) with a good genius or fortunate take up and back. That is to say, *epistrepho* which means to turn around (*epi-* or upon) or to go back and forth. Each god is involved with his own work (*prasso*: to accomplish, manage) while anyone else may do the same because there is no jealousy involved. More accurately, *phthonos* is outside (*exo*) the divine chorus.

When the gods feast (*thoino*: meal, with *epi* or upon) at a banquet (*daite*, with *pros* or direction towards-which), they make their way or *poreuo* (with *pros*, direction towards-which) on high (*ano*: above) to what is called an *apsis*, a disk or orbit in the realm called *hupouranios*

or literally above (*hupo-*) the heavenly realm, this by a steep climb (*akra:* summit). En route the chariots of the gods move easily (*rhadios*) due to being balanced and under control, *isorropos* (literally, equally balanced, *rhope* being an inclination).

However, other chariots can hardly (*mogis* or scarcely) make (*metecho:* literally, to have with, *meta-*) the ascent because the bad (*kakos:* also as evil) horse is heavy (*baruno:* connotes being oppressed) drags (*rhepo:* connotes sinking) the charioteer to the earth and weighs him down (*britho*) if he hasn't trained (*trepo:* suggestive of nourishing and cherishing) the horse properly (*me kalos:* literally as not beautifully). As a result the *psuche* will experience extreme (*eschatos:* last in a series) toil or *ponos* (labor that results in pain or is pain). On the other hand, there are souls which are immortal (*athanatos*) who attain the summit or *akros* with *pros*, direction towards-which. From here they move (*poreuo*) outward or *exo*, standing (*histemi*) on heaven's high ridge (*notos:* the back or rear of a ridge). Their circular motion or *periphora* (a carrying around or *peri-*) carries them around (*periago* or *peri-* again) while gazing (*theoreo:* to look at in the sense of beholding or inspecting) that which is *exo* or outside heaven.

"The place beyond heaven—none of our earthly poets has ever sung or ever will sing its praises enough! Still, this is the way it is—risky as it may be, you see, I must attempt to speak the truth, especially since the truth is my subject. What is in this place is without color and without shape and without solidity, a being that really is what it is, the subject of all true knowledge, visible only to intelligence, the soul's steersman. Now a god's mind is nourished by intelligence and pure knowledge, as is the mind of any soul that is concerned to take in what is appropriate to it, and so it is delighted at last to be seeing what is real and watching what is true, feeding on all this and feeling wonderful, until the circular motion brings it around to where it started. On the way around it has a view of Justice as it is; it has a view of Self-control; it has a view of Knowledge—not the knowledge that is close to change, that becomes different as it knows the different things which we consider real down here. No, it is the knowledge of what really is what it is. And when the soul has seen all the things that are as they are and feasted on them, it sinks back inside heaven and goes home. On its arrival, the charioteer stables the horses by the manger, throws in ambrosia, and gives them nectar to drink besides.

The *topos* or place (also means occasion) beyond heaven (*huperouranios:* *huper-* as above or beyond) has praises which cannot be sung (*humneo:* also as to celebrate or commemorate) adequately (*axia:* worthiness with the preposition *kata* or in accord with) by poets. Nevertheless, Socrates feels compelled to take the risk (*tolmeteon:* connotes boldness) and speak the truth, *alethes* (literally, that which is not concealed), *aletheia* (noun, with *peri* or around) being his subject matter.

Socrates asks somewhat rhetorically about this place or *topos* lacking color, shape and solidity or that which is *achromatos*, *aschematisos* and *anaphes*, all alpha privative. The second lacks *schema* (form, shape or figure) and the third literally means not to be touched and hence impalpable. It seems that the three negative qualities contribute to making this *topos* beyond heaven a being or *ousia* that really is, these words being expressed by two forms of this noun: *ontos ousa*. Despite its triple capacity for not being perceived, this *ousia* is what all knowledge is about, *episteme* (literally, knowledge upon or *epi-*). In other words, this being visible or *theatos* (*theomai:* to gaze, behold) is contrary to whatever lacks color, shape and solidity and proper to the governing principle or *kubernetes* (literally, a helmsman) of one's intelligence or *nous*.

Socrates now moves to considering the mind or *dianoia* of a god (*theos*). Compare with the just mentioned *nous* only with *dia-* or through prefaced to it; i.e., through-the-mind. It is fed or *trepho* (suggestive of growth as well) by two things: intelligence or *nous* and *episteme* or knowledge upon or *epi-*, both of which had just been noted. With this divine exemplar in mind which hopefully Phaedrus is familiar with, Socrates applies it to the mind of any (*apas* suggests whole, all together) soul or *psuche* which has the intent (*melo*: to be the object of care or thought) of taking in (*dechomai*: also as to receive) that which is appropriate to it. The verb *proseko* means to have come, be at hand which is suggested by the preposition *pros-*, direction towards which).

If this is so, the soul will be delighted (*agapao*: to greet or regard with affection) in seeing and watching, *eido* (to see, perceive or behold) as well as *theoreo* (to gaze or behold and seems more uninterrupted than *eido*). The former is with respect to what is real which is rendered literally as the being (*to on*) through time or *chronos*. The second is with regard to what is true or *alethes*. There are two results flowing from this double type of beholding, if you will, feeding and feeling wonderful or *trepho* (cf. last paragraph) and *eupatheo* (*eu-* suggestive of well-ness and adverbial in form prefaced to *patheo* which means to be passive or receptive to influences). This continues for a limited time and doesn't seem un-extended, if you will. That is, circular motion (*kuklos*) brings the soul around (*periphero*: *peri-* or around) to (*eis*: into) its starting point, the noun *periphora*: (a carrying around, *peri-*) also being used.

Periodos is another word with the preposition *peri-* or around prefaced to it, here regarding *hodos* or road which suggests a rotation which we could say is founded upon awareness without an object. More accurately, this *peri-* motion is important and suggests objects, etc., moving around the soul which doesn't move.

Such movement offers a threefold view (*kathorao*: *horao* with the preposition *kata-* or in accord with): 1) not simply of justice (*dikaioisune*) but as it is, *auten* or *autos* suggestive of self. 2) Self-control or *sophrosune* which connotes being moderate in all things and 3) knowledge, that is, *episteme* which is knowledge-upon (*epi-*).

Episteme has two types: 1) that which is close to change, the former being the verb *prosistemi* (*histemi*: to stand, to place prefaced with the preposition *pros-*, suggestive of direction towards-which) and the latter being *genesis* or the coming into birth or existence. Such *episteme* becomes different (*heteros*: one of two, second) when knowing different things which we take for real (*ousa on*), and the location of this real (*onton*) is down here, *nun* or now. 2) Instead, it is, somewhat awkwardly said, the *episteme* of what really is (*on ontos*) what it is (*ousia*).

Once the soul or *psuche* (not mentioned here) has both seen things as they are (*ta onta ontos*) and has feasted (*estiao*: to receive at one's hearth or house) upon them it goes to the inmost part (*to eiso*: within, *to* as specific, 'the' within) of heaven or returns (*erchomai*) home (*oikade*: adverb, as it were, for *oikos* or house). Now the charioteer puts the horses away, giving them ambrosia and nectar to drink, the drink of the gods. While all good and fine, what do the horses do next? Horses just stand there, for they don't lay down to sleep.

248 "Now that is the life of the gods. As for the other souls, one that follows a god most closely, making itself most like that god, raises the head of its charioteer up to the place outside and is carried around in the circular motion with the others. Although distracted by the horses, this soul does have a view of Reality, just barely. Another soul rises at one time and falls at another, and because its horses pull it violently in different directions, it sees some real things and misses

others. The remaining souls are all eagerly straining to keep up, but are unable to rise; they are carried around below the surface, trampling and striking one another as each tries to get ahead of the others. The result is terribly noisy, very sweaty, and disorderly. Many souls are crippled by the incompetence of the drivers, and many wings break much of their plumage. After so much trouble, they all leave the sight of reality unsatisfied, and when they have gone they will depend on what they think is nourishment—their own opinions.

Such is the *bios* or life of the gods, this word meaning not animal life but a course or manner of living. Socrates now speaks of so-called other (*allos*) souls, using *allos* in a positive sense concerning those which follow (*hepo*: also as to be busy about) a god. This divinity is not specified but is followed very closely, *aristos* usually applied to that which is best and often concerns virtue. Perhaps he has in mind god as *daimon*. Such a soul makes itself like that god, *eikazo* being the verb from which *eikon* or image is derived. It has a charioteer or driver of horses meaning that it is a passenger going along for the ride. The soul raises this driver's head, *huperairo* which consists of the root *airo* (to raise) prefaced with the preposition *huper-* or above. Implied is that the charioteer has had its head down, let alone looking straight ahead. The place (*topos*) to which its gaze is to be directed is upward or *eis* with the preposition *exo* (re. *topos*) or literally into outside. Next the soul is borne around, *sumperiphero* or to carry with-around (*sum-* and *peri-* joined together) with other similar souls. It is used with the noun *periphora* noted above, a carrying around (*peri-*).

Despite other horses (and by implication, other souls) causing distraction (*thorubeo*: to make a noise, to cheer aloud), the soul at hand barely (*mogis*: *mogos* is a noun for toil or trouble) sees Reality, the verb being *kathorao* (above as *horao* with the preposition *kata-* or in accord with) and the noun as *ta onta* (the beings).

Socrates speaks of another *psuche* which rises and falls, *airo* and *duo* (to sink down), both with regard to *tote* or at this time/at another time. The pulling (*hepomai*: *hepo* or to be busy about, to follow after; noted above) of the horses is violent, *glixomai* (connotes striving after, to be eager) in different directions which makes the soul see (*eido*: to perceive, behold) some things which are real (*ta*, the [things] or presuming *onta* as just above) while missing (*adanuteo*: alpha privative, to be lacking strength) others. The reason for this? The horses are pulling the soul violently, *biazo*, to overpower by force.

Those souls which remain attempt (*peirao*: also to make a trial of) to keep up with the one just mentioned but cannot rise, that is, *ano* or above. Instead, they are submerged (*hupobrujos*: under or *hupo-* the water) all the while trampling and striking each other, *pateo* and *epiballo* (to tread upon and to cast upon, *epi-*) in their desire to be first. The result: *thorubos* (noise, uproar), *hamilla* (contest for superiority) and *hidros* (perspiration) as well as being crippled (*choleuo*: to become lame) by the *kakia* (essentially evil and implies coward-ness) of the charioteers who cause the plumage of souls' wings to break (*thrauo*: also as to shatter). This unfortunate experience (*ponos*: labor that results in pain) causes the souls to leave the sight (*thea*: seeing, looking) unsatisfied or *ateles* (alpha privative; without end or not accomplishing one's purpose). Such souls will substitute (*chrao*: to fall upon, conceive a desire) personal opinions (*doxastos*: matter of opinion, conjectural) as their nourishment or *trophe* (also pertains to livelihood).

"The reason there is so much eagerness to see the plain where truth stands is that this pasture has the grass that is the right food for the best part of the soul, and it is the nature of the

wings that lift up the soul to be nourished by it. Besides, the law of Destiny is this: if any soul becomes a companion to a god and catches sight of any true thing, it will be unharmed until the next circuit; and if it is able to do this every time, it will always be safe. If, on the other hand, it does not see anything true because it could not keep up, and by some accident takes on a burden of forgetfulness and wrongdoing, then it is weighed down, sheds its wings and falls to earth. At that point, according to the law, the soul is not born into a wild animal in its first incarnation; but a soul that has seen the most will be planted in the seed of a man who will become a lover of wisdom or of beauty, or who will be cultivated in the arts and prone to erotic love. The second sort of soul will be put into someone who will be a lawful king or warlike commander; the third, a statesman, a manager of a household, or a financier; the fourth will be a trainer who loves exercise or a doctor who cures the body; the fifth will lead the life of a prophet or priest of the mysteries. To the sixth the life of a poet or some other representational artist is properly assigned; to the seventh the life of a manual laborer or farmer; to the eighth the career of a sophist or demagogue, and to the ninth a tyrant.

The plain or *pedion* is where truth (*aletheia*) is to be found and is desired greatly to be seen, the verb *eido* (connotes perceiving) with *spoude* meaning haste or speed. This *pedion* is a *nome* (pasture; connotes distribution or spreading out) which has grass as the proper nourishment for (*tugchano*: connotes coming or hitting upon as well as meeting by chance) the soul's best part (*aristos*: connotes virtue as well). The wings' nature (*phusis*) raise (*kouphzo*: to be light, to lighten) the *psuche* to be nourished (*trepho*) by it.

Destiny or law has the title Adrasteia, literally as inescapable, the formal name of Nemesis or the goddess who takes vengeance and has a law (*thesmos*: that which is laid down) which Socrates now describes. Should a *psuche* become a companion to a god or *sunopados* (literally, following along or accompanying with, *sun-*) and happens to see (*kateidon*: *eido* or to perceive with the preposition *kata-* in accord with) any true thing (*alethos*), it will not be harmed (*ablabe*: connotes security) until it takes the next circuit or *periodos* (*peri-* or around prefixed to *hodos*, way or path). Yet the *psuche* can (*dunamai*: to be capable, strong enough) do this every time (*aei*: forever, always), always (*aei*: i.e., two uses of the same word) it will be safe (*ablabe*: connotes security).

On the other hand, if a *psuche* doesn't see (*eido*) anything true because it couldn't keep up (*ephepo*: to come upon, *epi-* or follow, attend) and by accident (*suntuxia*: occurrence, happening; the verb *tugchano* with the preface *sug-* or with and the verb *chrao*: to furnish with, proclaim or consult an oracle) assumes a burden (*baruno*: to weigh down, oppress with the other verb *pimplemi* or to full) of forgetfulness (the noun *lethe* from which derives *aletheia* or truth, fundamentally as not forgetful) and wrongdoing (*kakia*: evil). This makes the *psuche* weighed down (*baruno* again), shed its wings and fall to earth, the preposition *epi* being used, upon the earth, suggestive of crashing.

Now (*tote*: or at this time/at another time) in accord with the law (*nomos*: also as that which is customary) the soul doesn't become a wild (*thereion*) animal (*phusis*: nature) in its first incarnation (*genesis*). Instead, a *psuche* which has seen the (*eido*) most will be planted (*gignomai*: to come into being) in a man's seed (*gone*: offspring). This man, in turn, will become a lover of wisdom or lover of beauty (*philosophos* and *philokalos*) or even take to the arts (*mousikos*: skilled in music and skilled in liberal arts) and be prone to erotic love (*erotikos*).

Socrates concludes this paragraph by speaking of several more types of souls, nine in total. As for the sixth or poet, some other representational artist (*minesis*: imitation) is properly

assigned (*harmozo*: to fit together, arrange according to the laws of harmony).

"Of all these, any who have led their lives with justice will change to a better fate, and any who have led theirs with injustice, to a worse one. In fact, no soul returns to the place from which it **249** came for ten thousand years, since its wings will not grow before then, except for the soul of a man who practices philosophy without guile or who loves boys philosophically. If, after the third cycle of one thousand years, the last-mentioned souls have chosen such a life three times in a row, they grow their wings back, and they depart in the three-thousandth year. As for the rest, once their first life is over, they come to judgment; and, once judged, some are condemned to go to places of punishment beneath the earth and pay the full penalty for their injustice, while the others are lifted up by justice to a place in heaven where they live in the manner the life they led in human form has earned them. In the thousandth year both groups arrive at a choice and allotment of second lives, and each soul chooses the life it wants. From there, a human soul can enter a wild animal, and a soul that was once human can move from an animal to a human being again. But a soul that never saw the truth cannot take a human shape, since a human being must understand speech in terms of general forms, proceeding to bring many perceptions together into a reasoned unity." That process is the recollection of the things our soul saw when it was traveling with god, when it disregarded the things we now call real and lifted up its head to what is truly real instead.

Regardless of the kinds of souls, there are two general types. One lives (*diago*: literally, to carry across or through, *dia-*) with justice (*dikaios*) will change to a fate (*moira*: also meaning part, portion or destiny) which is better, *metalambano* meaning to take or receive with (*meta-*). The other type of *psuche* concerns that which is unjust or *adikos*. All souls do not return (*aphikneomai*) the place from which they came, the preposition *eis* or into being used with *hothen* (whence). The time span here is ten thousand years.

Socrates claims one exception to this lengthy period of time, the *psuche* which practices philosophy (*philosopho*), does so without guile (*adolos*: unadulterated, genuine) and loves boys (*paiderasteo*: *pais* or child with the verbal root *erao*) in a philosophical manner (*philosophia* with the preposition *meta*, with). Socrates continues in some detail along some mythological line about the other souls which come to judgment (*krisis*: literally, a separating power) after their lives are over, *teleutao* meaning to fulfil, accomplish or bring to an end. Some go beneath the earth (*hupo ges*) whereas justice or *Dike* (also custom, usage, penalty) herself lifts (*kouphizo*: to make light, soar) other up into (*eis*) a place (*topos*) in heaven. Thus the latter live in accord with the life they had in human form or *eidos* (signifies that which is seen or is the particular form of a thing).

After a period of a thousand years both groups of souls arrive (*aphikneomai*) at a choice or *hairesis* (a taking for oneself) and allotment (*klerosis*: a choosing by lot) of second lives from which each *psuche* chooses the life it wants (*ethelo*: to wish. NB three words relative to choice are used here). Now a *psuche* can choose to enter (*aphikneomai*) an animal or *eis* (into) to a human being again (*bios* or a course or manner of living with the adjective *anthropinos*, human). However, a *psuche* which never saw (*eido*) the truth or *aletheia* is unable to take (*heko*: to have come, be present) human shape or *schema* (figure, fashion or manner of a thing). The reason? A person must understand (*sunimi*: to go together or *sun-*, to perceive, hear or be aware) speech as general forms. It is expressed as *kata* (in accord with) with *eidos*, in accord with form and thus bringing together (*sunairo*: *haireo* or to choose with the preposition *sun-*,

with...to choose with) a number of perceptions (*aisthesis*: primary sense is upon feeling) into or *eis* a single *logismos* (counting, calculation or reasoning). This is called the recollection of things, *anamnesis* (a calling to or *ana-* mind or memory, *ana-* being more direct and dynamic) what our soul (note the singular *psuche* and plural first person) saw (*eido*) when traveling with the god, *sumporeuomai* (to go on a journey with or *sum-*). At that time or with the god the *psuche* disregarded (*hupereido* or *eido* with the preposition *huper-*, above) what we call real (*einai*: to be) and instead raised its head (*anakupto*: *ana-* or above) to (*eis* or into) what is truly real or *to on ontos* (literally as really the being).

"For just this reason it is fair that only a philosopher's mind grows wings, since its memory always keeps it as close as possible to those realities by being close to which the gods are divine. A man who uses reminders of these things correctly is always at the highest, most perfect level of initiation, and he is the only one who is perfect as perfect can be. He stands outside human concerns and draws close to the divine; ordinary people think he is disturbed and rebuke him for this, unaware that he is possessed by god. Now this takes me to the whole point of my discussion of the fourth kind of madness—that which someone shows when he sees the beauty we have down here and is reminded of true beauty; then he takes wing and flutters in his eagerness to rise up, but is unable to do so; and he gazes aloft, like a bird, paying no attention to what is down below—and that is what brings on him the charge that he has gone mad. This is the best and noblest of all the forms that possession by god can take for anyone who has it or is connected to it, and when someone who loves beautiful boys is touched by this madness he is called a lover. As I said, nature requires that the soul of every human being has seen reality; **250** otherwise, no soul could have entered this sort of living thing. But not every soul is easily reminded of the reality there by what it finds here—not souls that got only a brief glance at the reality there, not souls who had such bad luck when they fell down here that they were twisted by bad company into lives of injustice so that they forgot the sacred objects they had seen before. Only a few remain whose memory is good enough; and they are startled when they see an image of what they saw up there. Then they are beside themselves, and their experience is beyond their comprehension because they cannot fully grasp what it is that they are seeing.

Dikaios is the adjective for fair (more as just) with regard to the mind (*dianoia*: *nous* with the preposition *dia-* or through) of a philosopher (again, one who loves or has friendship [*phileo*] for wisdom [*sophia*]) which alone grows wings. The reason? Its memory or *mneme* (also applies to a record or inscription) always (*aei*) keeps it close as possible which is rendered by the phrase *kata* (in accord with) and *dunamis* (power in the sense of capacity) to those realities (*ekeinos*, with the preposition *pros*, direction towards-which) the gods (*theos*) are divine (*theios*).

The person who makes correct (*orthos*: adverb, fundamentally as straight) use of (*chrao*: to furnish, proclaim) reminders or *hupomnemasis* (literally, a reminding from under or *hupo-*) of what has just been said (cf. *mneme* or remembrance just above in light of *hupo-mnemasis*) remains always (*aei*) at the highest (*teleios*) and most perfect level (*teleo*: to fulfill, accomplish) of initiation (*telete*) and thus is as perfect (*teleos*) as possible. Also he stands outside (*existemi*: *ex-* or from) human concerns or *spoudasma* (a thing or work done with zeal, a pursuit) and draws (*gignomai*: to come into being) close to (*pros*: direction towards-which) that which is divine (*theios*). The majority of people (*polus*: many) consider (*noutheteo*: to put in mind or *nous*, to warn) him as disturbed (*parakineo*: to move aside or *para-*) and therefore rebuke him

because they don't know (*lanthano*: to forget, suggesting that they people may have known earlier) he is inspired or *enthousiazō* (also to be in ecstasy).

This brings Socrates to his consideration (*logos*: word) about the fourth kind of madness or *mania* (connotes frenzy) which a person shows when seeing (*horao*) the beauty or *kallos* down here or *tede* (here, on the spot) and thus is reminded (*anamimnesko*: the preposition *ana-*, up, upon) of true beauty, *alethos* without the noun. Now he flies off (*anapteroo*: the preposition *ana-*, up, upon as in *anamimnesko* just noted), fluttering in the eagerness (*prothumeomai*: to be ready, willing; the preposition *pro-* meaning to be before) of his attempt but cannot (*adunatos*: lacking *dunamis* or capacity). Still, he gazes on high (*blepo* with *ana*, third recent occurrence of this preposition; to have the power of sight; compare with *horao* which implies giving heed) like a bird while not paying attention to (*ameleo*: alpha privative; to have no regard, to neglect) what lies below (*kato*). Because of this a charge or *aitia* (fault, accusation) is leveled (*diakeimai*: to be disposed, affected; the preposition *dia-* or through prefaced to the verb meaning to lay or to stretch) against him for having gone or *manikos* (unbalanced, extravagant).

However, such an accusation turns out to be the best (*aristos*: connotes virtue) and noblest (*aristos* with the preposition *ex* or from) of all types of possession (*enthousiazō*) for anyone who both has (*echo*) it and has it in common (*koinoneo*). A person partaking (*metecho*: *echo* prefaced with the preposition *meta-* or with, to have with) of such madness or *mania* and who loves (*erao*) beautiful (*kalos*) youths is called a lover or *erastes*.

Socrates has stated that every *psuche* has in its nature or *phusis* the seeing (*theomai*: to behold, usually with a sense of wonder) of reality, *ta onta* (the beings). If not, it was impossible for a *psuche* to enter (*eis tode* or into-to here) into something that is alive (*to zoon* or that which is alive in the animal sense compared with *bios*, a manner of living). However, not all souls are reminded (*anamimnesko*: *ana-* or up, upon) with ease (*rhadios*: ready) about what is there (*ek tonde*: from here) by what is here (*ekeinos*: that person there). This doesn't include souls which saw (*eido*) there or *takei* briefly (*bracheos*) the reality there (*hosos*: as much as possible) nor souls which ran into misfortune or *dustucho* (*dus-* or hard prefaced to *tugchano*, to hit upon) when they had fallen down here or to earthly existence (*deuro*: also as until now). They have turned (*trepo*) by associating with bad company or *homilia* (converse, being together) which leads to being *adikos* or unjust and thus have forgotten (*lanthano*) sacred objects (*hikanos*) seen (*eido*) earlier or *tote* (also at another time).

Socrates says that just a few souls remain (*leipo*: to leave behind with *pareimi*: to be close by, *para-*) with a good memory or a *mneme* which is *hikanos* (worthy) who are startled (*ekplesso*: to strike out or *ek-*) when they see (*eido*) an image or *homoion* of what was (*gignomai*: to come into being) there (*ekei*: in that place). They do not know (*agnoeo* or to lack *gnosis*) what had befallen them (*pathos*) because they lack the ability to grasp (*diaisthanomai*: to perceive through or *dia-*) sufficiently (*hikanos*).

"Justice and self-control do not shine out through their images down here, and neither do the other objects of the soul's admiration; the senses are so murky that only a few people are able to make out, with difficulty, the original of the likenesses they encounter here. But beauty was radiant to see at that time when the souls, along with the glorious chorus (we were with Zeus, while others followed other gods), saw that blessed and spectacular vision and were ushered into the mystery that we may rightly call the most blessed of all. And we who celebrated it were wholly perfect and free of all the troubles that awaited us in time to come, and we gazed in

rapture at sacred revealed objects that were perfect and simple and unshakeable and blissful. That was the ultimate vision, and we saw it in pure light because we were pure ourselves, not buried in this thing we are carrying around now, which we call a body, locked in it like an oyster in its shell.

Both justice and self-control or *dikaiosune* and *sophrosune* (moderation) do not give their light (*pheggos*: connotes splendor) through the images (*homoima*) *tade* (here or in this physical existence) let alone other which the *psuche* admires (*timios*: honorable). Due to the senses (*organon*: instrument, tool) murky condition (*amudros*: indistinct, barely legible) just a few people can see (*theaomai*: to see clearly or to view as a spectator) the *genos* or type of likenesses (*eikazo*: to like, compare).

However, beauty (*kallos*) was bright (*lampros*: radiant) to see (*eido*) when souls were with the glad (*eudaimonos*: blessed or *eu-* with a good genius) chorus and while we (Socrates uses the first person plural) were in Zeus' company (*hepomai*: to be busy about, to follow after). There we beheld a vision (*opsis*), a blessed sight or *thea* (seeing, looking) as *makarios* (happy), and we were initiated (*teleo*: to fulfil, accomplish) into that rite (*telete*: rite of initiation) rightly (*themis*: law, what is right) the most blessed of them all (*makarios*).

Socrates claims that those of us who have celebrated (*orgiazo*: honor or worship) the mystery...that *teleo*...just above were wholly perfect (*holokleros*: complete or *holos* in all parts) and free from all evils (*apathes*: alpha privative; literally, without feeling with regard to *kakos* or that which is wicked) that were waiting for (*hupomeno*: *meno* or to remain prefaced with *hupo*- or under) us in the time to come (*husteros*: latter, following which modifies *chronos*, conventional time). We were admitted into sacred objects, *mueo* being the verb (to initiate into sacred mysteries with the noun *phasma* or vision, portent) which were complete (*holokleros*: second use of this adjective), simple (*haploos*: single, sincere), unshakeable (*atremos*) and blissful (*eudaimon*: blessed with a good or *eu-* [well] genius or *daimon*). Such we behold (*epopteuo*: to overlook [*epi-* or upon] or to be admitted to the highest grade of the mysteries) in pure light (*auge*: sunlight which is *katharos*) because we are pure and not locked into (*asemantos*: without leader, unsealed; alpha privative with *semaino*, to sign) what we're bearing (*periphero*), that is, what we call (*onomazo*: to address by name) a body or *soma*, being locked into (*desmeuo*: to be fettered in chains) it as oyster within its shell.

"Well, all that was for love of a memory that made me stretch out my speech in longing for the past. Now beauty, as I said, was radiant among the other objects; and now that we have come down here we grasp it sparkling through the clearest of our senses. Vision, of course, is the sharpest of our bodily senses, although it does not see wisdom. It would awaken a terribly powerful love if an image of wisdom came through our sight as clearly as beauty does, and the same goes for the other objects of inspired love. But now beauty alone has this privilege, to be the most clearly visible and the most loved. Of course a man who was initiated long ago or who has become defiled is not to be moved abruptly from here to a vision of Beauty itself when he sees what we call beauty here; so instead of gazing at the latter reverently, he surrenders to pleasure and sets out in the manner of a four-footed beast, eager to make babies; and, **251** wallowing in vice, he goes after unnatural pleasure too, without a trace of fear or shame. A recent initiate, however, one who has seen much in heaven—when he sees a godlike face or bodily form that has captured Beauty well, first he shudders and a fear comes over him like those he felt at the earlier time; then he gazes at him with the reverence due a god, and if he

weren't afraid people would think him completely mad, he'd even sacrifice to his boy as if he were the image of a god. Once he has looked at him, his chill gives way to sweating and a high fever, because the stream of beauty that pours into him through his eyes warms him up and waters the growth of his wings. Meanwhile, the heat warms him and melts the places where the wings once grew, places that were long ago closed off with hard scabs to keep the sprouts from coming back; but as nourishment flows in, the feather shafts swell and rush to grow from their roots beneath every part of the soul (long ago, you see, the entire soul had wings). NB: This paragraph and the next two form one paragraph in the Cooper edition. Because of its length, the paragraph is divided into three sections for easier handling. This is the first section.

The words thus far made Socrates speak (*eromai*: to ask, question) longer (*makros*) than intended, having done so by reason of being favorable (*charizomai*: to say or do something agreeable) with regard to our recollective faculty or *mneme*. That is to say, he does this by reason of a desire (*pothos*: longing, yearning) of what had been. With regard to beautiful things (*kallos* with *peri*: literally as around), it was radiant or *lampo* (to be bright) with (*meta*) other things. However, having come here (*deuro*: up to this time, hitherto), we can grasp (*katalambano*: to take or to receive with *kata-*, in accord with) its shape gleaming (*stilbo* with *enarges*) through the clearest (*enarges* or second use of this word: visible, palpable, in bodily shape) of our senses or *aisthesis* (perception by senses).

Vision or *opsis* is the sharpest sense or *aisthesis* which comes through (*dia*) the body or *soma* despite the fact that it can't see (*horao*) wisdom (*phronesis*: more as purpose or intention). Vision would cause (*parecho*: echo or to have with *para-*, beside) a fearful (*deinos*) love or *eros* should an image (*eidolon*: also a phantom) of wisdom (not mentioned in the Greek text) come through (second use of *parecho*) our sight (*opsis* with *eis* or into) clearly (*enarges*) as beauty (not mentioned in the Greek text). Such applies to other things relative to love (*erastos*: that which is beloved). Only *kallos* or beauty has the lot (*moira*: part, portion) as being the most visible (*ekphanes*: showing itself, manifest; the preposition *ek-* or from highlights this visibility) and most loved (*erasmios*).

Someone who was not a novice (*neoteles*: *neos*: new or youthful prefaced to the root *telos*, end or completion) or had become defiled (*diaphtheiro*: the preposition *dia-* or through prefaced to the verbal root meaning to corrupt) is not to be carried (*phero*) abruptly or *oxeos* (sharply) from here or *enthende* (hence, from this quarter) to (*pros* or direction towards-which) seeing (*theaomai*: to see clearly or to view as a spectator) beauty or *kallos* in and by itself when he sees its namesake (*eponymia*: surname) here (*tede*). Instead of gazing at (*prosorao*: *horao* prefaced with *pros-*, direction towards-which) the latter with reverence (*sebomai*: to feel awe, revere), he gives in to (*paradidomai*: *para-* or beside; he puts himself beside) pleasure or *hedone*. Now he follows (*epicheireo*: to put one's hand upon or *epi-*) the custom (*nomos*) of four-footed beasts in his desire to produce children (*paidosporeo*). He also associated with (*proshomileo*: *pros-* or direction towards-which prefaced to *homileo*, to be in company with) vice or *hubris* (wanton arrogance) and pursues (*dioko*: to chase after, hunt) pleasure or *hedone* which isn't natural (*phusis* or nature with the preposition *para*, beside). While doing this, he doesn't have any shame, *aischuno*.

Artiteles (*arti*: just now and the verbal root *teleo*: to complete, finish) or someone newly initiated who has seen much (*polutheamon*: the verbal root *theaomai* or to see clearly prefaced by the adjective *polus* or much) *tote* or at one time, having beheld a divine-like face or a *prosopon* which is *theoeides*) or *idea* (form or outward appearance) belonging to a body (*soma*)

that has imitated beauty (*kallos* with *mimeomai*) well, first shudders (*phrisso*: to bristle) followed by fear (*deima*) which has taken hold of him (*hupolambano*: to take up, *hupo-* or from under) much as before (*tote*). Then he looks (*prosoraō*: to behold; *pros-* as direction towards-which) with reverence (*sebomai*: connotes piety or the Latin *pious*, dutiful towards one's country, gods and family) at him as a god. If he were not afraid (*deixo*: to be alarmed), he would be considered (*doxa*: opinion) mad or *mania* (connotes frenzy). In fact, he might go so far as to offer sacrifice (*thuo*: to offer by/ burning) to his boy (*paidikos*: of a child, here in the plural) as if to the image (*agalma*: glory, honor or statue in honor of a god) of a god.

Once he looks at him (the boy or *paidikos*), he breaks out in a sweat and high fever (*metabole* is used, a change) because the rush (*aporroē*: effluence; *apo-* or from) of beauty or *kallos* which he receives (*dechomai*) through the eyes warms him and waters the growth (*phusis*: nature) of his wings. Also the same heat defrosts places where the wing once had grown, allowing nourishment (*trophe*) to flow back in (*epirreo*: to flow upon or *epi-* the surface) to make the roots of the feathers grown back from even part (*eidōs*: that which is seen or is the particular form of a thing) of the *psuche*. The words in parentheses are a kind of brief reminder that once or *palai* (long ago) the *psuche* in its entirety (*pan*: all) had wings.

Now the whole soul seethes and throbs in this condition. Like a child whose teeth are just starting to grow in, and its gums are all aching and itching—that is exactly how the soul feels when it begins to grow wings. It swells up and aches and tingles as it grows them. But when it looks upon the beauty of the boy and takes in the stream of particles flowing into it from his beauty (that is why this is called 'desire'), when it is watered and warmed by this, then all its pain subsides and is replaced by joy. When, however, it is separated from the boy and runs dry, then the openings of the passages in which the feathers grow are dried shut and keep the wings from sprouting. Then the stump of each feather is blocked in its desire and it throbs like a pulsing artery while the feather pricks at its passageway, with the result that the whole soul is stung all around, and the pain simply drives it wild—but then, when it remembers the boy in his beauty, it recovers its joy. From the outlandish mix of these two feelings—pain and joy—comes anguish and helpless raving: in its madness the lover's soul cannot sleep at night or stay put by day; it rushes, yearning, wherever it expects to see the person who has that beauty. When it does see him, it opens the sluice-gates of desire and sets free the parts that were blocked up before. NB: This paragraph as well as the one above and the one below form one paragraph in the Cooper edition. Because of its length, the paragraph is divided into three sections for easier handling. This is the second section.

Thus the whole (*holos*: connotes completeness) *psuche* seethes and throbs, *zeo* and *anakekio* or to boil and to gush up, *ana-* (on, upon) in this condition. The *pusche* beginning (*archo*: to be the first principle of anything) to grow wings feels (*pascho*: to suffer, endure) like a child whose teeth are starting to grow, *pathos* or feeling used for this experience. But when the *psuche* looks upon (*blepo* or to have the power of sight with *pros*, direction towards-which) the *kallos* or beauty of the *pais* (child; can be either a boy or a girl but most likely the former here) and takes in (*epeimi*: to be or set upon, *epi-*) the stream of particles (*meros*: part) flowing in (*rheo*)—because of this it is called desire or *himeros* (desire or yearning; the derivation is from *mere* or 'particles.' *ienai* or 'go') when both watered and warmed (*ardo*: to refresh and *thermaino*: to grow hot), only then does pain (*odune*: also, grief or distress) lessen (*lophao*: to rest, recover) and joy comes in (*getheo*: to rejoice).

On the other hand, when the *psuche* is separated (*choris*: separately, apart) and becomes unclean (*auchmeo*: to be squalid or unwashed), the openings (*diexodos*: *hodos* or way with the preposition *dia-* or through) belonging to the passages (*stoma*: mouth) where the feather grow (*hormao*: connotes rushing headlong) are dried shut or *sunauaino* (the preposition *sun-* or with suggests a thorough drying up) and prevents (*apokleio*: to shut off from, *apo-*) the wings from sprouting (*blaste*: birth, growth). Then each feather's stump is blocked (*apokleio*: *apo-* or from; second use of this verb) in its desire or *himeros* (yearning), throbbing (*pedao*: to leap, spring) like a pulsing artery (*sphuzo*: to beat, be feverish) while the feather pricks (*egchrrio*: also as to anoint) at the passageway (*diexodos*: *dia-* and *ex-* or through and from as prepositions prefaced to *hodos*, way). The result? The *psuche* in its entirety (*pas*) is stung all around (*kuklos*: a ring, circle) and causes pain or *odununao*. However, upon remembering (*mneme*: memory) the boy having beauty (*kalos*: adjective), it becomes joyful (*getheo*).

The strange combination (*atopia*: alpha privative; literally as out of place with the verb *mignumi* (to join, mingle) from both, that is, *pathos* and *luttao* (to be mad) comes anguish and raving (*aphorao*: literally to look away from or *apo-* and *emmanes* or frantic raving) which makes sleep impossible as well as not being able to stay put (*meno*: to remain) during the day. Instead of this, the soul desires (*theo*: to run) and yearns (*potheo*: to long after, often with a sense of regret) to where it expects (*oiomaí*) to see (*horao*: to gaze, behold) him who has beauty or *kallos*. And so when it does see (*eido*: also as to know) him, it loosens (*luo*) the sluice gates of desire (*himeron*) and what had been closely packed together (*sumphrasso*: also as to close ranks together; *sum-* or with prefaced to *phrasso*, to fence or hedge in).

And now that the pain and the goading have stopped, it can catch its breath and once more **252** suck in, for the moment, this sweetest of all pleasures. This it is not at all willing to give up, and no one is more important to it than the beautiful boy. It forgets mother and brothers and friends entirely and doesn't care at all if it loses its wealth through neglect. And as for proper and decorous behavior, in which it used to take pride, the soul despises the whole business. Why, it is even willing to sleep like a slave, anywhere, as near to the object of its longing as it is allowed to get! That is because in addition to its reverence for one who has such beauty, the soul has discovered that the boy is the only doctor for all that terrible pain. NB: Because this paragraph and the previous two form one paragraph in the Cooper edition, it is divided into three sections for easier handling. This is the third and final section.

Because the pricks and pains (*kentron*: sharp point and *odis*: sometimes as anguish) have ceased (*lego*), the *psuche* can receive (*lambano*) its breath (*anapnoe*: *ana-* or signifying *motion* upwards) and once again (*au*: afresh) bear the fruit (*karpeo*) of the sweetest pleasure (*hedone*) in the present or *pareimi* (to be close by or beside, *para-*). The pleasure or *hedone* so garnered transcends (*lanthano*: to forget or put in *lethe*, oblivion as opposed to *anamnesis*) family or friends as well as wealth through neglect or *ameleia* (alpha privative with the verbal root *melo*, to be an object of care). The verb *apollumi* is used which means to perish utterly concerning these object of concern and love. Furthermore, the *psuche* formerly estimated (*kallopizo*: literally to make the face beautiful) that which it held as *nomimos* (conformable to custom or *nomos*) and *euschemon* (elegant in figure, *eu-* or well with *schema*) as something looked down upon (*kataphroneo*: *phroneo* or to be wise and prudent with *kata-* or below). In fact, the *psuche* is willing (*hetoimos*: prepared, carried into effect) to be a slave (*douleuo*) and sleep close as possible to (*eggus*: nearby) to the person or the boy it has *pothos* or *potheo* (to long after,

often with a sense of regret). The reason? In addition to the respect (*sebomai*: connotes awe) for one endowed with such beauty or *kallos*, the *psuche* has found that the boy is the only physician (*iatros*) for its great pain or *ponos* (also labor that results in pain).