

"This is the experience we humans call love, you beautiful boy (I mean the one to whom I am making this speech)." You are so young that what the gods call it is likely to strike you as funny. Some of the successors of Homer, I believe, report two lines from the less well known poems, of which the second is quite indecent and does not scan very well. They praise love this way:

Here Cooper's translation refers to 237b, 238d and 243e. *Pathos* or that which happens to someone which humans (*anthropos*) call (*onomazo*: to address by name) love or *eros*. By reason of your (that is, Phaedrus to whom Socrates is making a *logos* or expression) youth or *neotes* (connotes being impetuous) what the gods call (*kaleo*: to summon, invite) it will perhaps strike him (i.e., Phaedrus) as humorous (*gelao*: to laugh). The second line from one of the lesser poems by Homer is rather indecent (*hubristikos*: outrageous, insolent) and doesn't follow the expression of meter (*emmetros*, *em-* as *en-* or in) very well (*sophodra*: very much with the negative)

Yes, mortals call him powerful winged 'Love'; But because of his need to thrust out the wings, the gods call him 'Shove.'

Thnetos or mortals who call (*kaleo*: to summon, invite) Eros which is winged (*potanos*). On the other hand, the gods call (*anagke* is used here, necessity) him Shove or *Pteros*. The lines are probably Plato's invention, as the language is not consistently Homeric. The pun in the original is on *eros* and *pteros* ('the winged one').

You may believe this or not as you like. But, seriously, the cause of love is as I have said, and this is how lovers really feel.

This line is up to anyone to take as true or not (*peitho*: to prevail upon, persuade). However, Socrates says that such is the cause (*aitia*: occasion, opportunity as well as guilt or fault) of love and how the *pothos* of those who love (*erao*) happens or *tugchano* (to hit upon).

"If the man who is taken by love used to be an attendant on Zeus, he will be able to bear the burden of this feathered force with dignity. But if it is one of Ares troops who has fallen prisoner of love—if that is the god with whom he took the circuit—then if he has the slightest suspicion that the boy he loves has done him wrong, he turns murderous, and he is ready to make a sacrifice of himself as well as the boy.

The person taken (*lambano*) to be an attendant (*opadeo* being the verb; 'lover' isn't in the Greek text) upon Zeus or *Dios* (the adjective meaning god-like or noble), he will be enabled (*dunamai*: to be capable) to carry (*phero*) the weight or *achthos* of such a feathered force (*embrithes*: weighty, grave, dignified). On the other, if an attendant (*therapeutes*: also as one who serves a god, courtier) of Ares with whom has went about (*peripoleo*: the verb meaning the same but with emphasis by reason of the preposition *peri-*, around or about) has become a prisoner (*haliskomai*: to succumb to) of Eros, should he suspect (*oiomai*: to presage, forebode) to be treated badly (*adikeo*: not justly) by the lover (*erao*), he becomes murderous or *phonikos* and is prepared (*hetoimos*: carried into effect) to sacrifice (*kathieureo*: the verbal root meaning to make holy prefaced with *kata-* or according to) himself along with the boy or *pais*.

"So it is with each of the gods: everyone spends his life honoring the god in whose chorus he danced, and emulates that god in every way he can, so long as he remains undefiled and in his first life down

here. And that is how he behaves with everyone at every turn, not just with those he loves. Everyone chooses his love after his own fashion from among those who are beautiful, and then treats the boy like his very own god, building him up and adorning him as an image to honor and worship. Those who followed Zeus, for example, choose someone to love who is a Zeus himself in the nobility of his soul. So they make sure he has a talent for philosophy and the guidance of others, and once they have found him and are in love with him they do everything to develop that talent. If any lovers have not yet embarked on this practice, then they start to learn, using any source they can and also making progress on their own. They are well equipped to track down their god's true nature with their own **253** resources because of their driving need to gaze at the god, and as they are in touch with the god by memory they are inspired by him and adopt his customs and practices, so far as a human being can share a god's life. NB: This paragraph and the next two form one paragraph in the Cooper edition. Because of its length, the paragraph is divided into three sections for easier handling. This is the first section.

What had been described in the preceding paragraph applies to all the gods, for each person participated in the chorus (*choreutes*: choral dancer, devoted follower) giving honor (*timao*) and imitating (*mimeomai*) this god by how he lives (*zao*) as much as he can or literally into the capacity (*eis to dunaton*). He behaves thus without any tinge of corruption (*adiaphthoros*: alpha privative prefaced to the root *phthoros* or ruin and prefaced with the preposition *dia* or through) as well as the way he lives (*bioteuo*: also as to get food) in his first life (*genesis*: birth) which is *tade* (here or in this physical existence). Such is his behavior at every turn (*tropos*: direction, course) concerning people he loves (*erao*) as well as those with whom he associates (*homileo*: to be in the company with) and comes across (*prosphero*: literally to bear or carry towards-which or *pros*-).

From among beautiful persons (*kalos*), each person chooses (*eklego*: the preposition *ek*- or from intensifies this verb) in his own way (*tropos*, with *pros* or direction towards-which) and treats the youth as a god. He builds him up (*tektainomai*: to frame, do joiners' work) as well as adorns him (*katakosmeo*: the preposition *kata*- or in accord with, here implying the application of detail, *kosmeo* applicable to arranging, setting in order with an eye to what is decorous) as an image or *agalma* (glory, honor or statue in honor of a god) to be the object of honor and worship, *timao* and *orgiazo*, the latter often associated with the celebration of orgies and also applies to worship and honor. For example, persons who worship Zeus (*Dios*) seek (*zeteo*) a like-minded *psuche* to love (*erao*).

With this in mind, they look for (*skopeo*: to look at, examine or consider) someone like a philosopher (*philosophos*) and a nature which can govern (*hegemoneuo*: to lead the way, be governor). Having discovered (*heurisko*) such a person, they love (*erao*) him, doing everything to make it as such (*toioutos*). Should those who haven't started this (*embaino*: to go in or *en*-) endeavor (*epitedeuma*: pursuit or business practice; the preposition *epi*- or upon heightens the sense of this word), they put (*epicheireo*: literally, to put one's hand upon or *epi*-) themselves to learn (*manthano*) as best they can (*dunamai*) and seek after it (*meterchomai*: to go in quest of, *meta*- as with or after).

Such persons discover (*aneurisko*; the preposition *ana*- as prefaced to the verbal root suggestive of being throughout or continually) among or *para* themselves the nature (*phusis*) of their very own (*spheteros*) god. They find a means (*euporeo*: *eu*- or well) though eager application *suntonos* (*teino* or to extend with, *sun*-) and are compelled (*anagkazo*: to be necessary) to look at (*blepo* with *pros*, direction towards-which) the god. They manage to touch (*ephapto*: to bind upon or *epi*-) this god by means of their memory or *mneme* and are inspired (*enthousiazo*: to be possessed by a god or *daimon*), receiving (*lambano*) both customs and practices or *ethos* (habit, custom) and *epitedeuma*.

For all of this they know they have the boy to thank, and so they love him all the more; and if they draw their inspiration from Zeus, then, like the Bacchantes, they pour it into the soul of the one they love in order to help him take on as much of their own god's qualities as possible. Hera's followers look for a kingly character, and once they have found him they do all the same things for him. And so it is for followers of Apollo or any other god: They take their god's path and seek for their own a boy whose nature is like the god's; and when they have got him they emulate the god, convincing the boy they love and training him to follow their god's pattern and way of life, so far as is possible in each case. They show no envy, no mean-spirited lack of generosity, toward the boy, but make every possible effort to draw him into being totally like themselves and the god to whom they are devoted. This, then, is any true lover's heart's desire: if he follows that desire in the manner I described, this friend who has been driven mad by love will secure a consummation for the one he has befriended that is as beautiful and blissful as I said—if, of course, he captures him. Here, then, is how the captive is caught: This paragraph is part of the previous one as noted above. Because of the paragraph's length, it is divided into two sections, this being the second.

They attribute (*aiteo*: to ask, demand) such qualities to the one loved (*erao*) and love (*agapao*: to greet or regard with affection) him even more, getting inspiration (*aruo*: applies to drawing of water) from *Dios* or Zeus. Just like the Bacchantes (**Bacchantes were worshipers of Dionysus who gained miraculous abilities when possessed by the madness of their god.**), they pour (*epantleo*: to pump over or upon, *epi*-) it into the *psuche* of the one loved (*erao*). In this way they he can (*dunatos*: having capacity) to be like (*homoios*) their very own (*spheteros*) god.

Take two examples. First those with (*meta*) Hera look for (*zeteo*: to seek) a royal character (*basilikos*) and having discovered (*heurisko*: to find) it, they do (*drao*: to accomplish, usually something great) all (*pan*) the same thing for him. Secondly, we have those who follow Apollo as well as other gods. They go (*eimi*) in accord with (*kata*) their god and seek (*zeteo*) for their very own (*spheteros*) a youth (*pais*) whose nature they beget (*phuo*: to come into being). Once having obtained him (*ptaomai*: to procure for oneself), they imitate (*mimomai*) the god, persuading (*peitho*: to prevail upon) and educating (*ruthmizo*: to bring into measure or proportion, to arrange or define) him into (*eis*) the god's *epitedeuma* or practice. They lack jealousy (*phthonos*) and meanness (*aneleutheros*: not free) with regard to ill-will (*dusmeneia*: the adjective *dus-* for hard) concerning (*pros*: direction towards-which) the youth. Instead, they try (*peirao*) as much as possible (*pan* or all with *panτος*: adverb, altogether) to make (*ago*: to lead, carry) him as (*homoiotos*: likeness, with the preposition *eis* or into) themselves and the god whom they honor (*timaio*).

Such truly (*alethos*) is the desire (*prothumia*: *pro-* or before prefaced to *thumos* or desire, hence a desire before) and initiation (*telete*: involves mystical rites) of lovers (*erao*). That is to say, if he gets for himself (*diaprasso*: *prasso* or to effect prefaced with the preposition *dia-* or through, hence a thorough effecting) what, as I said, his desire (*prothumeo*: verb; cf. *prothumia* just above), this friend or *philos* (beloved, nearest and dearest) who has become mad (*mainomai*) through love (*erao*) will make real (*gignomai*: to bring into being) for him whom he has befriended (*phileo*: to love or regard with affection) that which is beautiful (*kalos*) and conducive to happiness (*eudaimonikos*: *eu-* or well prefaced to the root of this adjective, *daimon* which is a god or genius). It all depends if he can get (*haireo*: to take into one's power) him. In the follow way or *tropos* is how the one who is captured (*haireo* again) is seized (*haliskomai*: to be seized or detected).

"Remember how we divided each soul in three at the beginning of our story—two parts in the form of horses and the third in that of a charioteer? Let us continue with that. One of the horses, we said, is good, the other not; but we did not go into the details of the goodness of the good horse or the

badness of the bad. Let us do that now. The horse that is on the right, or nobler, side is upright in frame and well jointed, with a high neck and a regal nose; his coat is white, his eyes are black, and he is a lover of honor with modesty and self-control, companion to true glory, he needs no whip, and is guided by verbal commands alone. The other horse is a crooked great jumble of limbs with a short bull-neck, a pug nose, black skin, and bloodshot white eyes; companion to wild boasts and indecency, he is shaggy around the ears—deaf as a post—and just barely yields to horsewhip and goad combined. Now when the charioteer looks in the eye of love, his entire soul is suffused with a sense of warmth and starts to fill with tingles and the goading of desire. NB: This paragraph and the next two form one. They are divided into three sections for convenience.

As in the beginning (*arche*: first principle of anything) we took apart (*diaireo*: *haireo* or to take or grasp prefaced with the preposition *dia-* or through; to take through, as it were) here (*toude*) each soul in three parts: two in the *eidos* or form of horses and a third in the *eidos* of a charioteer. And so let us remain (*meno*) with that. Of the horses, one is good (*agathos*) whereas the other is not. Virtue (*arete*: the best of anything) is of the good and evil (*kakia*) of the bad (*kakos*), not going into details (*diepo*: to manage, conduct; the preposition *dia-* as through). The horse of a right form or an *eidos* which is *orthos* stands (*histemi*) as (*en* or *in*) the more beautiful (*kallos*) and is endowed with a number of qualities (not listed here). It is a lover of honor or *erastes* regarding *time* (also as an evaluation) along with *sophrosune* and *aidos*, moderation and reverence or respect. Furthermore, this horse is a true (*alethinos*) companion or *hetairos* (also friend) of glory (*doxa*: also as opinion) needing no whip but guided (*heniocheo*: to guide with reins) alone by a command (*keleusma*: behest) through speaking (*logos*: word as expression) only.

Among other things, the second horse is the companion (*hetairos*) of insolence and pride (*hubris* and *alazoneia* or false pretense). But when the charioteer sees (*eido*) the eyes of love (*erotikos*), all his *psuche* has a sense (*aisthesis*: perception) of being warmed through (*diathermaino*, *dia-* as through for thoroughness) and begins to fill (*hupopimplemi*: literally, to fill from underneath or *hupo-*) with pricks and tingles of desire (*pothos*: a longing after).

254 As for the horses, the one who is obedient to the charioteer is still controlled, then as always, by its sense of shame, and so prevents itself from jumping on the boy. The other one, however, no longer responds to the whip or the goad of the charioteer; it leaps violently forward and does everything to aggravate its yoke-mate and its charioteer, trying to make them go up to the boy and suggest to him the pleasures of sex. At first the other two resist, angry in their belief that they are being made to do things that are dreadfully wrong. At last, however, when they see no end to their trouble, they are led forward, reluctantly agreeing to do as they have been told. So they are close to him now, and they are struck by the boy's face as if by a bolt of lightning. When the charioteer sees that face, his memory is carried back to the real nature of Beauty, and he sees it again where it stands on the sacred pedestal next to Self-control. At the sight he is frightened, falls over backwards awestruck, and at the same time has to pull the reins back so fiercely that both horses are set on their haunches, one falling back voluntarily with no resistance, but the other insolent and quite unwilling. They pull back a little further; and while one horse drenches the whole soul with sweat out of shame and awe, the other—once it has recovered from the pain caused by the bit and its fall—bursts into a torrent of insults as soon as it has caught its breath, accusing its charioteer and yoke-mate of all sorts of cowardice and unmanliness for abandoning their position and their agreement. This paragraph is the second of three divided for the sake of convenience.

The horse obedient (*eupithes*: *eu-* or well implies willingness to obey) to the driver is

controlled (*biazo*: to constrain) always (*aei*: forever) by shame (*aidos*), thereby holding himself back (*katecho*: to hold down or *kata-*) from jumping upon (*epipedao*: to lead an assault upon or *epi-*) the beloved (*erao*). The other horse doesn't respond to (*entrepo*: literally, to turn in or *en-*) to the driver's urging, plunges (*skirtao*: to leap or bound) and runs away (*bia* and *phero* or violence, force and to carry), causing problems (*pragma*: thing, affair) to the one yoked with him (*suzux*) and the charioteer whom he compels (*anagkazo*: to be necessary) to approach (*eimi*) the youth or *paidikos* (adjective) and to recall (*mneia* with *poieo* or to make memory or recollection) the joys of love or its favors (*charis*) proper to *aphrodisios*., belonging to the goddess of love (Aphrodite). At first (*arche*: first principle of anything) they oppose (*antiteino*: *teino* or to stretch forward with *anti-* or against) in return along with *aganakteo* (to feel a violent irritation). They are fearful or *deinos* (also as terrible) of being wrong (*paranoma* or beside [*para-*] the law or custom, again the verb *agankteo* being used).

However, when they see no end (*peras*: limit, boundary) of fulfilling (*teleutao*, to accomplish or bring to and end) to their evil or *kakos*, they advance (*poreuo* or to make to go or convey with *ago*, to lead or carry off). They are likely (*eixante* or *eiko*), to agree (*homologeio*) to carry out the order (*keleuo*: to urge, exhort). Now that they are close to the boy (*pros* as direction towards-which), they see (*eido*) his face or *opsis* (also as sight), having been struck as by lightening (*astrapto*: to hurl lightning bolts). So when the charioteer sees (*eido*) this, his memory or *mneme* is carried back (*phero* with *phusis* or nature using the preposition *pros-* [direction towards-which] relative to *kallos* or beauty). He sees (*eido*) it firmly placed (*baino*: to go, walk) upon the sacred platform or *bathron* which is *hagnos*, pure or chaste right with (*meta*) *sophrosune* (moderation, temperance).

Seeing (*eido*) this causes fear (*deixo*), falling over backward and struck with awe (*sebeomai*: to worship) which makes one horse fall back willingly (*hekon*) whereas the other is insolent and not willing (*antiteino* with negative, not to stretch forward and *hubristes* (violent, wanton). Both horses draw back (*aperchomai*: *erchomai* prefaced with the preposition *apo-* or from) a bit. One drenches (*brecho*: to wet, moisten) the entire (*pas*) *psuche* with perspiration from (*hupo*) shame and awe or *aischune* and *thambos* (astonishment). The other, having (*lego*: to leave off, cease) recovered from pain or *odune*, comes off with abuse (*loidoreo*: to rebuke) scarcely (*mogis*) having caught its breath (*exanapneo*: two prepositions as prefixes, *ex-* and *ana-* or from and up or upon). It accuses (*kakizo*: to abuse; *kakos* being the adjective for evil or what is bad) the charioteer and yoke-mate (*homozugos*: linked together) of cowardice and unmanliness (*deilia* and *anandria*: *andreia* being a manly spirit) for having forsaken (*leipo*: to leave) their position and agreement or *taxis* (order) and *homologia* (literally, the same *logos* or mode of expression).

Now once more it tries to make its unwilling partners advance, and gives in grudgingly only when they beg it to wait till later. Then, when the promised time arrives, and they are pretending to have forgotten, it reminds them; it struggles, it neighs, it pulls them forward and forces them to approach the boy again with the same proposition; and as soon as they are near, it drops its head, straightens its tail, bites the bit, and pulls without any shame at all. The charioteer is now struck with the same feelings as before, only worse, and he's falling back as he would from a starting gate; and he violently yanks the bit back out of the teeth of the insolent horse, only harder this time, so that he bloodies its foul-speaking tongue and jaws, sets its legs and haunches firmly on the ground, and 'gives it over to pain.' When the bad horse has suffered this same thing time after time, it stops being so insolent; now it is humble enough to follow the charioteer's warnings, and when it sees the beautiful boy it dies of fright, with the result that now at last the lover's soul follows its boy in reverence and awe. This paragraph and the previous two form one. They are divided into three sections for convenience.

One horse attempts (*anagkazo*: to force, compel) its unwilling (*ethelo*: to propose) partner to

advance or *prosiemi* (to let come to, admit; *pros-* as direction towards-which) and concedes (*deo*: to be fit, proper) when they agree (*sugchoreo*: to get out of the way, to separate; *sug-* or with prefaced to *choreo*, to give way) to wait (*hupoballo*: literally, to case beyond or *huper-*) until a later time. So once the agreed upon (*suntithemi*: to place with or *sun-*) time arrives and they are pretending (*prospoieo*: literally, to make towards-which or *pros-*) to have forgotten (*amnemoneo*: to be unmindful), it reminds (*anamimnesko*: *ana-* or upon, again) them. The horse goes through various struggles and makes its unwilling partners approach (*proserchomai*: *pros-* or direction towards which prefaced to *erchomai*, to come or to go) the boy with the same words (*logos*, with *epi* or upon). When near (*eggus*) him, the horse draws (*helko*) without shame or *anaideia* (also impudence, effrontery).

Now the charioteer experiences the same passion as earlier (expressed by the noun *pathos* and the verb *patheo*) but worse, as if he were starting over again at the gate. He pulls with force (*bia*: bodily strength) the bit back out of the teeth belonging to the insolent (*hubristos*) horse but harder, giving the horse pain (*odune*; cf. *Iliad* v.397 and *Odyssey* xvii.567. When the bad (*poneros*: painful, grievous) horse has experienced (*pascho*: to suffer) this often enough (*pollakis*: many times), it stops (*lego*) being insolent (*hubris*: wanton violence). Now it is sufficiently humble (*tapeinoo*: to abase) to follow (*hepomai*: also as to be busy about) warnings (*pronoia*: foresight, purpose; *pro-* or before prefaced to *nous* or mind) from the charioteer. Seeing (*eido*) the boy (here as *kalos* or beautiful), it perishes (*diollumi*: to perish utterly) by reason of fear (*phobos*). The result? The *psuche* of the lover (*erastos*) goes with or literally as *sum-baino*, with the youth in both reverence and awe (*aideomai*: also to show respect and *deixo*: to be alarmed or anxious).

255 "And because he is served with all the attentions due a god by a lover who is not pretending otherwise but is truly in the throes of love, and because he is by nature disposed to be a friend of the man who is serving him (even if he has already been set against love by school friends or others who say that it is shameful to associate with a lover, and initially rejects the lover in consequence), as time goes forward he is brought by his ripening age and a sense of what must be to a point where he lets the man spend time with him. It is a decree of fate, you see, that bad is never friends with bad, while good cannot fail to be friends with good. Now that he allows his lover to talk and spend time with him, and the man's good will is close at hand, the boy is amazed by it as he realizes that all the friendship he has from his other friends and relatives put together is nothing compared to that of this friend who is inspired by a god.

Because the horse gets the attention (*therapeuo*: to do service with the noun *therapeia* or service done to gain favor) belonging to a god (*isotheos*: literally on the same plane or like a god) by a lover (*erao*) who isn't pretending (*schematizo*: to assume a form or figure, with *ouk* or the negative), truly he is in love (*pascho*: to be passive to something) and by nature (*phusis*) disposed to be a *philos* or friend of the person who is serving (*therapeuo*) him. This is true even if he is set against (*diaballo*: literally as to throw or cast through, *dia-*) by school friends (*sumphoitaio*: the verb to stalk or roam about prefaced with the preposition *sum-* or with) or by certain others who claim it is shameful (*aschros*) to associate with (*plesiazo*: to draw near) a lover (*eros*) and rejects (*apotho*: to thrust back) him.

As time (*chronos*) advances (*proeimi*: *pro-* or before) he is brought (*ago*) by his age (*hekika*: usually applies to a time of life, regardless) and sense of debt (*chreos*: also as obligation) to (*eis* or into) where he allows (*prosiemi*: *pros-* or direction towards-which) the man to associate with (*homilia*: converse, with *eis* or into) him. It is decreed (*meiromai*: to obtain one's share) that the bad (*kakos*: evil) isn't friends (*philos*) with the bad while the good (*agathos*) can't help but be friends with (*philos*)

the good. Now that he allows (*prosiemi*: *pros-* or direction towards which) his lover (*erao*) to speak with (*logos*: word as expression) him as well as to be with (*homilia*: converse) him, for the good intention (*eunoia*: *eu-* as well prefaced to *nous* or mind) is near (*egguaio*), the one loved (*erao*) is struck (*ekplesso*: to drive away or *ek-*). He realizes (*diaisthanomai*: literally to perceive or feel through, *dia-*), for all the friendship or *philia* from other friends (*philos*) and those of his household (literally, *oikeios*) cannot compare (*parecho*: to hand over, to furnish; *para-* as beside or along with) the *philos* at hand who is inspired by a god (*entheos*: literally, *en-* or in god).

"After the lover has spent some time doing this, staying near the boy (and even touching him during sports and on other occasions), then the spring that feeds the stream Zeus named Desire when he was in love with Ganymede begins to flow mightily in the lover and is partly absorbed by him, and when he is filled it overflows and runs away outside him. Think how a breeze or an echo bounces back from a smooth solid object to its source; that is how the stream of beauty goes back to the beautiful boy and sets him aflutter. It enters through his eyes, which are its natural route to the soul; there it waters the passages for the wings, starts the wings growing, and fills the soul of the loved one with love in return. Then the boy is in love, but has no idea what he loves. He does not understand, and cannot explain, what has happened to him. It is as if he had caught an eye disease from someone else, but could not identify the cause; he does not realize that he is seeing himself in the lover as in a mirror. So when the lover is near, the boy's pain is relieved just as the lover's is, and when they are apart he yearns as much as he is yearned for, because he has a mirror image of love in him—back-love—though he neither speaks nor thinks of it as love, but as friendship. Still, his desire is nearly the same as the lover's, though weaker: he wants to see, touch, kiss, and lie down with him; and of course, as you might expect, he acts on these desires soon after they occur.

Once the lover has spent time (*chronizo*: to tarry, linger) doing (*drao*) this as being near (*plesiazoo*: to approach) the boy, even touching him (*hapto*: to fasten, lay hold of) as in gymnastics and other occasions (*homilia*), the spring flowing into the stream which Zeus names (*onomazo*: to address by name) *Himeros* (a yearning after) when he was in love with or *erao* Ganymede carries (*phero*: to bear) itself greatly (*polus*) in the lover or *erao* and is absorbed (*duo*: to sink into or down) into (*eis*) him. Once filled (*apomestoomai*: to be filled to the brim, as far as one can go), the stream overflows (*aporreo*: *apo-* or from as with *apomestoomai*) outside (*echo*). For example, *pneuma* (wind, breath) or an echo bounces back (*hallomai*: to spring, leap with *palin* or once again) from an object which is smooth and solid (*leios* or without hair and stereos: firm, stark), being carried or *phero* from when it came (*hormao*: to set in motion). Thus the stream of beauty returns once more into the beautiful youth entering through the eyes, the natural route (*phuo*: to beget, come into being with the preposition *epi* or upon) belonging to the *psuche* which reaches there (*aphikneomai*) and causes the youth to raise his feathers (*anaptereoo*: *ana-* or above or upon). It waters (*ardo*: to give drink) the passages (*diodos*: *hodos* or way prefaced with the preposition *dia-* or through), allows (*hormao*: to rush headlong, compel) and the wings to grow and in turn (*au*: anew, afresh) fills (*enpleroo*: the preposition *en-* or in, to fill-in) the *psuche* of him who is loved, *erao*.

The boy loves (*erao*) but is at a loss (*aporreo*: to flow or run off from, *apo-*; also as fade from remembrance) as how to explain (*phrazo*: to show forth, declare) his own condition (*peitho*: to be passive to events) and knows (*eido*) nothing from whence it came. It is similar to having caught an eye infection from another person, yet one can't discover its cause (*prophasis*: also as pretext, the preposition *pro-* as before). He is forgetful (*lanthano*) of seeing (*horao*) himself in the lover (*erao*) as in a mirror. Thus when the lover is near (*pariemi*: to be beside or *para-*) both the pain or *odune* of the youth and lover ceases (*lego*). When apart, (*apiemi*: *apo-* or from) he desires just as much as he is

desired, *potheo* being used here. The reason? He has a mirror (*eidolon*: also as phantom) or an image of love (*anteros*: *anti-* or against, opposite prefaced to *eros*) within him. However, he doesn't call (*kaleo*: to summon, invite) nor think (*oiomai*: also as to presage, forebode) it to be friendship or *philia*. Nevertheless, his desire (*epithumeo*: *epi-* as upon with respect to *thumia*, the seat of anger and desire as with *epithumia*), while weaker (*asthenes*: alpha privative with *sthenos* which also can be force), is close (*paraplesios*: coming alongside or near, *para-*) to the one who loves him. He wants to have contact with him, especially to lay down with him (*sugkatakeimai*: the verbal root prefaced with two prepositions, *sug-* or with and *kata-* or down). As in all likelihood (*eikos*), he does (*poieo*) these things immediately (*tachu*) after they occur.

"When they are in bed, the lover's undisciplined horse has a word to say to the charioteer—that **256** after all its sufferings it is entitled to a little fun. Meanwhile, the boy's bad horse has nothing to say, but swelling with desire, confused, it hugs the lover and kisses him in delight at his great good will. And whenever they are lying together it is completely unable, for its own part, to deny the lover any favor he might beg to have. Its yoke-mate, however, along with its charioteer, resists such requests with modesty and reason. Now if the victory goes to the better elements in both their minds, which lead them to follow the assigned regimen of philosophy, their life here below is one of bliss and shared understanding. They are modest and fully in control of themselves now that they have enslaved the part that brought trouble into the soul and set free the part that gave it virtue. After death, when they have grown wings and become weightless, they have won the first of three rounds in these, the true Olympic Contests. This and the next paragraph form one but are divided for the sake of convenience.

When both are laying down (*sugkoimaomai*: *sug-* or with prefaced to the verb *koimazo* meaning to sleep), the undisciplined (*akolastos*: alpha privative with *kolazo*, to curtail or keep within bounds) horse has a word for (*pros*: direction towards-which) the charioteer, namely, that having suffered (*ponos*: labor that results from pain or in pain) much, it deserves (*axios*) some enjoyment or *apolauno* (to have the benefit of). On the other hand, the horse belonging to the youth (*paidikos*: adjective) is swelling with passion (*spargao*: to be bursting) and is at a loss (*aporreo*: to flow or run off from, *apo-*; also as fade from remembrance) to speak. It casts itself upon (*periballo*: literally, to cast around or about, *peri-*) the beloved or *erastes* (eager for), greeting (*aspazomai*) him eagerly (*sphodra*: adverb meaning very much) because of his good disposition (*eunoos*: *eu-* or the adverb well prefaced to *nous* or mind).

When laying down (*sugkatakeimai*: to have sexual intercourse with, *sug-*), for its own part (*meros*: portion), this wonton steed is completely unable to deny (*aparneomai*: to deny utterly) the lover any favor (*charizo*: to show kindness) toward the lover (*erao*) which he happens (*tugchano*: to hit upon) to need (*deo*). However, the yoke-mate (*homozux*: literally, the same yoke) and charioteer resist (*antiteino*: the verb to extend prefaced with the preposition *anti-* or against) such requests with modesty and reason or *aidos* (also shame) and *logos* (word as expression).

If that which is better (*beltion*: comparative of *agathos*) achieves victory (*nikao*: to prevail) in both their minds (*dianoia*: literally, through or *dia-* the *nous* or mind) which compels (*ago*: to lead) them to follow the assigned (*tasso*: to arrange, marshal, draw up) manner of life (*daitia*: state, condition) and philosophy (*philosophia*: love or friendship with wisdom), their life (*bios*: a manner of living) here (*enthade*: in this world) is blessed (*makarios*: happy) and endowed with like-mindedness (*homonoeitikos*: *homoios* or like prefaced to the adjective *noetikos* or intelligent) conducing to agreement, harmonious). They are in control (*egkrates*: holding firm) and *kosmios* (regular, discreet), having brought into subjection (*douloo*: to enslave) that which introduced (*engignomai*: to be bred in or *en-*) evil (*kakios*) to the *psuche* and set free (*eleutheroo*) the part which gave it *arete* (the best or

noblest of anything) or virtue. Having died (*teleutao*: to bring to pass, to accomplish) and having grown wings and are light (*elaphros*: bouyant), they have won (*nikao*: to be victorious) the first of three rounds in the true Olympic Contests (*Palaisma*: wrestling bout).

There is no greater good than this that either human self-control or divine madness can offer a man. If, on the other hand, they adopt a lower way of living, with ambition in place of philosophy, then pretty soon when they are careless because they have been drinking or for some other reason, the pair's undisciplined horses will catch their souls off guard and together bring them to commit that act which ordinary people would take to be the happiest choice of all; and when they have consummated it once, they go on doing this for the rest of their lives, but sparingly, since they have not approved of what they are doing with their whole minds. So these two also live in mutual friendship (though weaker than that of the philosophical pair), both while they are in love and after they have passed beyond it, because they realize they have exchanged such firm vows that it would be forbidden for them ever to break them and become enemies. In death they are wingless when they leave the body, but their wings are bursting to sprout, so the prize they have won from the madness of love is considerable, because those who have begun the sacred journey in lower heaven may not by law be sent into darkness for the journey under the earth; their lives are bright and happy as they travel together, and thanks to their love they will grow wings together when the time comes. This and the last paragraph form one but are divided for the sake of convenience.

There is no greater good (*agathos*) than either human (*anthropinos*) moderation (*sophrosune*) or divine madness (*mania*: connotes enthusiasm as well as frenzy) which can be given (*porizo*: to furnish, equip) to a man. However, should they take on (*chrao*: to furnish as well as to proclaim) a life style (*diaitia*: mode of living) which is ambitious (*philotimos*: loving or *philos*- honor) and both *phortikos* and *aphilosophos* (fit for carrying, wearisome and disinclined to philosophy), shortly when careless (*ameleia*: indifference) due to drinking or the like, the horses belonging to those yoked together (*hupozugios*) which are undisciplined (*akolastos*: licentious) will take (*lambano*: to receive) their *psuche* as *aphrouros* (alpha privative with *phroura* or guard; off guard as with military duty). These same horses will bring them together (*sunago*: *sun-* or with) to (*eis*, into) this act (*diaprasso*: to bring about or accomplish, the preposition *dia-* or through indicative of thorough accomplishment) which people (*pollus*: many) consider to be the happiest (*makarios*: blessed) choice (*hairesis*) of them all (*haireo*: to take by the hand, choose).

Having accomplished (*diaprasso* a second time) it once, they continue (*chrao*: to furnish as well as to proclaim) with it for the rest (*loipos*: remaining) of their lives although sparingly (*spanios*: rare, scarce) because they haven't approved (*dokeo*: to think, determine, seem have an opinion) of their deeds (*prasso*: to achieve, effect) with their minds (*dianoia*: *dia-* or through the *nous* or mind). Thus they live in friendship (*philos*) despite being lesser than those joined through the pursuit of philosophy) while being in love (*erao*) and having passed (*diago*: *dia-* or through) beyond (*exo*: outside) it. Because they have given each other great faith (*pistis*) and have take vows (*themitos*: allowed by the laws of the gods and men), they couldn't loosen (*luo*) them and become enemies (prefaced with *eis* or into).

In death (*teleute*: completion) they are without wings when leaving (*exbaino*: *ex-* or outside, from) the body although their wings are bursting (*hormao*: to set in motion, rush headlong) to sprout. Thus the prize (*althlon*) from the madness (*mania*: frenzy) of love (*erotikos*: adjective) is not small because the journey (*poreia*: walking, mode of walking) in the lower heaven (*hupouranios*) may not by law or *nomos* (custom, usage) be sent into darkness (*skotos*: gloom) for the journey or *poreia* under the earth. As they travel together (*poreuo*: to carry, convey; used along with *diago* or literally to go

through, *dia-*) their lives (*bios*: mode of living) are bright and happy or *phanos* and *eudaimoneo* (to be prosperous, well off; *eu-* or well with a good *daimon* or guiding spirit). At the appropriate time they will grow wings together, thanks (*charis*: grace, favor) to their love or *eros*.

"These are the rewards you will have from a lover's friendship, my boy, and they are as great as divine gifts should be. A non-lover's companionship, on the other hand, is diluted by human self-control; all it pays are cheap, human dividends, and though the slavish attitude it engenders in a friend's soul is **257** widely praised as virtue, it tosses the soul around for nine thousand years on the earth and leads it, mindless, beneath it.

Such are the rewards from the friendship or *philia* of a lover (*erastes* with *para*, beside, close by) which are as divine gifts (*doreo*: to give, present) should be. On the other hand, the companionship (*oikeotes*: *oikos* means house implying someone who lives under the same roof) from a non-lover (*me* or negative with *erao*) is diluted (*kerannumi*) by human (*thnetos*: mortal) moderation (*sophrosune*). It dispenses (*oikonomeo*: *oikos* or house and *nemo* or to distribute) that which is human and miserly (again, *thnetos* and *pheidolos*: sparing, thrifty) though the servility (*aneleutheria*: alpha privative or without freedom) it begets (*entikto*: to give birth) in the *psuche* of a friend (*philos*) is praised as virtue (*arete*: the best of anything), it tosses (*kulindao*: to roll along) the soul around for nine thousand years on the earth after which it leads this soul as mindless (anous: without a *nous*) beneath.

"So now, dear Love, this is the best and most beautiful palinode we could offer as payment for our debt, especially in view of the rather poetical choice of words Phaedrus made me use." Forgive us our earlier speeches in return for this one; be kind and gracious toward my expertise at love, which is your own gift to me: do not, out of anger, take it away or disable it; and grant that I may be held in higher esteem than ever by those who are beautiful. If Phaedrus and I said anything that shocked you in our earlier speech, blame it on Lysias, who was its father, and put a stop to his making speeches of this sort; convert him to philosophy like his brother Polemarchus so that his lover here may no longer play both sides as he does now, but simply devote his life to Love through philosophical discussions."

Dear Love or *Eros* which is *philos* is the best and most beautiful (*arete*: the best of anything along with *kallos*) *palinode* (recantation or literally, a singing again) given as payment (*ektino*: the preposition *ek-* or from intensifies the sense of this verb) in light of the poetical (*poietikos*: capable of making, creative) words (*onoma*: name) which Phaedrus made (*anagkazo*: to compel) me use. But please show forbearance (*suggnome*: acknowledgment, confession; *sug-* or with) and favor (*charis*: grace), being gracious and kind or *eumenes*: *eu-* or well and *hilaos* concerning my art (*techne*: skill) of love (*erotikes*, adjective) which you have bestowed upon me. Do not take it away (*aphaireo*) nor harm it (*peroo*: to mutilate, maim) due to anger or *orge* (natural impulse or propensity). Allow that I be honored (*timios*) by (*para*) those who are beautiful (*kalos*).

If I or Phaedrus said (*logos*: word as expression) anything offensive (*apecho*: to keep away from or *apo-*) earlier, blame (*aitiaomai*: *aitia* being the noun for cause) Lysias who was its father and stop (*pauo*: to cease) him from such words (*logos*). Turn (*trepo*) him to (*eis* or into) *philosophia* as his brother Polemarchus so that his love (*erastes*) doesn't halt between two opinions (*epamphoterizo*: to play a double game) but simply (*haplos*, adverb) make his life (*bios*: mode of living) to Love (*Eros* with *pros*, direction towards-which) by means of (*meta*) words which are philosophical (*logos* and *philisophos*).

End (257b) of expanded text begun in 237a

Phaedr. I join in the prayer [*suneuchomai*], Socrates, and say with you, if this be for my good [*ameinon*], may your words come to pass. But why did you make your second oration [*logos* *] so much finer [*apergazomai* *] than the first? I wonder [*thaumazo* *] why. And I begin to be afraid [*okneo*] that I shall lose conceit of Lysias, and that he will appear tame [*tapeinos*] in comparison [*antiparateino*], even if he be willing to put another as fine and as long as yours into the field, which I doubt. For quite lately one of your politicians was abusing [*loidoreo* *] him on this very account; and called him a "speech writer" again and again. So that a feeling of pride [*philotimia*] may probably induce him to give up writing speeches.

Suneuchomai: to give thanks with or *sun-* / *ameinon*: stronger, better / *logos* / *apergazomai*: to finish off, produce / *thaumazo*: to be amazed / *okneo*: to hesitate, shrink back / *tapeinos*: humble / *antiparateino*: the root *teino* (to stretch out) prefaced with two prepositions, *anti* and *para* or against and beside / *loidoreo* / *philotimia*: love (*philos*) of distinction, ambition; *time* means honor and implies ambition.

Soc. What a very amusing notion [*geloios* *]! But I think, my young man, that you are much mistaken [*diamartano*] in your friend if you imagine that he is frightened at a little noise [*psophodees*]; and possibly, you think [*oiomai*] that his assailant was in earnest [*oneidizo*]?

Geloios: literally as causing laughter / *diamartano*: to go quite astray, *dia-* or through) from / *psophodees*: shy, timid / *oiomai* / *oneidizo*: to reproach.

Phaedr. I thought [*phaino* *], Socrates, that he was. And you are aware [*sunoida* *] that the greatest and most influential statesmen are ashamed [*aischuno* *] of writing speeches and leaving them in a written form [*suggramma*], lest they should be called Sophists by posterity.

Phaino: literally, to appear / *sunoida*: literally, to know with or *sun-* / *aischuno* / *suggramma*.

Soc. You seem to be unconscious [*lanthano* *], Phaedrus, that the "sweet elbow" of the proverb is really the long arm of the Nile. And you appear to be equally unaware of the fact that this sweet elbow of theirs is also a long arm. For there is nothing of which our great politicians are so fond [*phroneo* *] as of writing speeches and bequeathing them to posterity. And they add their admirers' names at the top of the writing, out of gratitude [*epaineo* *] to them.

Lanthano: to forget / "sweet elbow:" Apparently this was a familiar example of something named by language that means the opposite—through called "pleasant" it was really a long, nasty bend. / *phroneo*: to have sense, understanding / *epaineo*: to praise.

Phaedr. What do you mean? I do not understand [*manthano* *].

Manthano: to learn.

258 Soc. Why, do you not know [*manthano* *] that when a politician writes, he begins with the names of his approvers [*epainetes*]?

Manthano / *epainetes*: one who praises or commends.

Phaedr. How so?

Soc. Why, he begins in this manner: "Be it enacted by the senate [*boule* *], the people, or both, on the motion of a certain person," (This is the standard form for decisions, including legislation, made by the assembly of Athens, though it is not the standard beginning for even the most political of speeches.) who is our author; and so putting on a serious face [*egkomiazo* *], he proceeds to display [*epideiknumi* *] his own wisdom [*sophia* *] to his admirers in what is often a long and tedious composition. Now what is that sort of thing but a regular piece of authorship?

Boule: counsel / *egkomiazo*: to sing a song of praise / *epideiknumi*: literally, to show upon or *epi-* / *sophia*.

Phaedr. True.

Soc. And if the law is finally approved [*emmeno*], then the author leaves the theater in high delight [*getheo* *]; but if the law is rejected and he is done out of his speech-making, and not thought good enough [*axios* *] to write, then he and his party are in mourning [*pentheo*].

Emmeno: to abide by, to be true / *getheo*: to rejoice / *axios*: worthy, honorable / *pentheo*.

Phaedr. Very true.

Soc. So far are they from despising [*huperphroneo*], or rather so highly do they value [*thaumazo* *] the practice of writing.

Huperphroneo: to be proud, *huper-* meaning above or over / *thaumazo*: to be amazed.

Phaedr. No doubt.

Soc. And when the king or orator has the power [*hikanos* *], as Lycurgus or Solon or Darius (Lycurgus was the legendary lawgiver of Sparta. Solon reformed the constitution of Athens in the early sixth century BC and was revered by both democrats and their opponents. Darius was king of Persia (521-486 BC). None of these was famous as a speech writer.) had, of attaining an immortality [*athanatos* *] or authorship in a state, is he not thought [*hegeomai* *] by posterity, when they see [*theaomai* *] his compositions, and does he not think [*nomizo* *] himself, while he is yet alive, to be a god [*isotheos* *]?

Hikanos: to be worthy / *athanatos*: adjective / *hegeomai* / *theaomai* / *nomizo*: to hold as a custom or *nomos* / *isotheos*.

Phaedr. Very true.

Soc. Then do you think [*oiomai* *] that any one of this class, however ill-disposed, would reproach [*oneidizo* *] Lysias with being an author?

Oiomai / *oneidizo*.

Phaedr. Not upon your view [*eikos* *]; for according to you he would be casting a slur [*aischros* *] upon his own favorite pursuit [*logos* *].

Eikos: likely / *aischros*: shame / *logos*: word as expression.

Soc. Any one may see [*delos* *] that there is no disgrace [*aischros* *] in the mere fact of writing.
Delos: clear / *aischros*.

Phaedr. Certainly not.

Soc. The disgrace begins when a man writes not well [*kalos* *], but badly [*kakos* *].
Kalos and *kakos*: adverbs.

Phaedr. Clearly.

Soc. And what is well [*kalos* *] and what is badly-need [*me & tropos* *] we ask Lysias, or any other poet or orator, who ever wrote or will write either a political or any other work, in metre or out of metre, poet or prose writer, to teach [*exetazo*] us this?

Tropos: manner, shape or form / *kalos*: adverb / *me*: negative with *tropos* or manner, shape, form / *kalos* / *exetazo*: to examine, estimate, *ex-* or from.

Phaedr. Need we? For what should a man live if not for the pleasures [*hedone* *] of discourse? Surely not for the sake of bodily pleasures, which almost always have previous pain [*aisthanomai* * & *prolupeomai*] as a condition of them, and therefore are rightly called slavish [*andrapododes*].

Hedone / *aisthanomai*: to feel, perceive / *prolupeomai*: to feel pain or distress; *pro-* or before with *lupe*, grief / *andrapododes*.

Soc. There is time enough [*schole* *]. And I believe [*dokeo* *] that the grasshoppers chirruping **259** after their manner in the heat of the sun over our heads are talking to one another [*dialego* *] and looking down at [*kathorao*] us. What would they say if they saw that we, like the many, are not conversing [*dialego* *], but slumbering [*nustazo*] at mid-day, lulled [*keleo*] by their voices, too indolent to think [*argia & dianoia* *]? Would they not have a right [*dikaios* *] to laugh at [*katagelao*] us? They might imagine [*hegeomai* *] that we were slaves, who, coming to rest at a place of resort of theirs, like sheep lie asleep at noon around the well. But if they see [*horao* *] us discoursing [*dialego* *], and like Odysseus sailing past them, deaf [*akeletos*] to their siren voices, they may perhaps, out of respect [*agaomai*], give us of the gifts which they receive from the gods that they may impart them to men.

Schole: leisure, especially for nobler pursuits / *dokeo*: to think, determine, seem / *dialego*: *dia-* or through / *kathorao*: *kata-* or to see down prefaced to *horao* / *dialego* / *nustazo*: to be half asleep / *keleo*: to charm, beguile / *argia*: idleness, laziness / *dianoia*: *dia-* or through the *nous* or mind / *dikaios*: adverb / *katagelao*: the preposition *kata-* (down) implies mocking or literally, to laugh-down / *hegeomai* / *horao* / *dialego* / *akeletos*: proof against enchantment / *agaomai*: to admire, wonder.

Phaedr. What gifts do you mean? I never heard of any [*tugchano* *].

Tugchano: to hit upon, meet.

Soc. A lover of music [*philomousos*] like yourself ought surely [*prepo*] to have heard the story of the grasshoppers, who are said to have been human beings in an age before the Muses. And when the Muses came and song appeared they were ravished with [*explesso*] delight [*hedone* *]; and singing always, never thought of [*ameleo* *] eating and drinking, until at last in their forgetfulness [*lanthano* *] they died [*teleutao* *]. And now they live again in the grasshoppers; and this is the return which the Muses make to them-they neither hunger, nor thirst, but from the hour of their birth are always singing, and never eating or drinking; and when they die they go and inform [*apaggello* with *para*] the Muses in heaven who honors [*timao* *] them on earth. They win the love [*prospihiles*] of Terpsichore for the dancers by their report [*apaggello* *] of them; of Erato for the lovers [*erotikos* *], and of the other Muses for those who do them honor [*time* *], according to the several ways [*eidos* *] of honoring them of Calliope the eldest Muse and of Urania who is next to her, for the philosophers, of whose music the grasshoppers make report [*apaggello* *] to them; for these are the Muses who are chiefly concerned with heaven [*houranos*] and thought [*logos* *], divine as well as human, and they have the sweetest [*kallos* *] utterance [*phone*]. For many reasons, then, we ought always to talk and not to sleep at mid-day.

Phileo: to love or regard with affection / *prepo*: to be conspicuous, to resemble / *explesso*: to drive out of (*ek*-) one's senses / *hedone* / *ameleo*: alpha privative; to have no care for / *lanthano* / *teleutao*: to bring to completion / *apaggello* with *para* (beside) / *timao* / *prospihiles*: dearly beloved; the root *philos* or friend with the preposition *pros*, direction towards-which / *apaggello* / *erotikos* / *time* / *eidos* / *apaggello* / *houranos* / *logos* / *kallos* / *phone*: voice.

Phaedr. Let us talk.

Soc. Shall we discuss [*skeptomai*] the rules of writing and speech as we were proposing [*protithemi*]?

Skeptomai: to look about closely / *protithemi*: to set before, *pro*-.

Phaedr. Very good.

Soc. In good speaking [*ero* * & *huparcho* *] should not the mind [*dianoia* *] of the speaker know [*eido* *] the truth [*alethos* *] of the matter about which he is going to speak?

Ero: the common verb to speak with *hupoarcho*, to begin to speak, *hupo*- meaning under / *dianoia*: *dia*- with *nous* or through the mind / *eido* / *alethos*.

Phaedr. And yet, Socrates, I have heard that he who would be an orator has nothing to do with **260** [*anagke* * & *manthano* *] true justice [*dikaios* *], but only with that which is likely to be approved by the many who sit in judgment [*dikaiosune* *]; nor with the truly [*ontos* *] good [*agathos* *] or honorable [*kalos* *], but only with opinion [*dokeo* *] about them, and that from opinion comes persuasion [*peitho* *], and not from the truth [*aletheia* *].

Anagke / *manthano*: to learn / *dikaios* / *dikaiosune* / *agathos* / *kalos* / *dokeo*: to seem, appear / *peitho* / *aletheia*.

Soc. The words of the wise [*sophos* *] are not to be set aside [*apoballo*]; for there is probably something [*skopeo* *] in them; and therefore the meaning of this saying is not hastily to be dismissed [*lego* * & *aphiemi*].

Sophos / apoballo: to cast from (*apo-*) / *Illiad ii 361 / skopeo*: to examine / *lego* with *aphiemi*: (not) to be let loose, *apo-* or from.

Phaedr. Very true.

Soc. Let us put the matter thus:-Suppose that I persuaded [*peitho* *] you to buy a horse and go to the wars. Neither of us knew [*agnoeo* *] what a horse was like, but I knew [*eido* *] that you believed [*hegeomai* *] a horse to be of tame animals the one which has the longest ears.

Peitho / agnoeo / eido / hegeomai.

Phaedr. That would be ridiculous [*geloios* *].

Geloios: causing laughter.

Soc. There is something more ridiculous coming:-Suppose, further, that in sober earnest [*spoude* *] I, having persuaded [*peitho* *] you of this, went and composed [*suntithemi* *] a speech [*epainos*] in honor of an ass, whom I entitled a horse beginning: "A noble animal and a most useful possession [*chresimos*], especially in war, and you may get on his back and fight, and he will carry baggage or anything."

Spoude: connotes speed / *peitho / suntithemi*: sun- or with / *epainos*: praise, commendation / *chresimos*: useful, of service.

Phaedr. How ridiculous [*paggeloios*]!

Paggeloios: pan or all prefaced to the root adjective *geloios*.

Soc. Ridiculous! Yes; but is not even a ridiculous [*geloios* *] friend better than a cunning [*deinos* *] enemy [*echthros* *]?

Geloios / deinos: fearful, terrible / *echthros*.

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. And when the orator [*rhetorikos* *] instead of putting an ass in the place of a horse puts good [*agathos* *] for evil [*kakos* *] being himself as ignorant [*agnoeo* *] of their true nature as the city on which he imposes [*lambano* * & *peitho* *] is ignorant; and having studied [*meletao*] the notions [*doxa* *] of the multitude, falsely persuades [*peitho* *] them not about "the shadow of an ass," which he confounds with a horse, but about good which he confounds with evil-what will be the harvest which rhetoric will be likely to gather after the sowing of that seed?

Rhetorikos / agathos / kakos / agnoeo / lambano: to take, receive / *peitho / melatao*: to exercise, practice / *doxa*: opinion / *peitho*.

Phaedr. The reverse of good [*epieikes*].

Epieikes: fitting, meet: literally as "not wholly fitting."

Soc. But perhaps rhetoric [*techne* *] has been getting too roughly handled [*agroikos*] by us, and she might answer: What amazing nonsense you are talking! As if I forced [*anagkazo* *] any man to learn [*manthano* *] to speak in ignorance [*agnoeo* *] of the truth [*alethes* *]! Whatever my advice [*sumboule*] may be worth, I should have told him to arrive at [*ptaomai* *] the truth first, and then come to [*lambano* *] me. At the same time I boldly assert [*lego* *] that mere knowledge [*eido* *] of the truth [*ta onta* *] will not give you the art [*techne* *] of persuasion [*peitho* *].

Techne: the art (of rhetoric) / *agroikos*: literally, dwelling in the fields and hence rustic / *anagkazo* / *manthano* / *agnoeo* / *alethes* / *sumboule*: literally, to cast with or sun- / *ptaomai*: to possess / *lambano* / *lego* / *eido* / *ta onta*: true being / *techne* / *peitho*.

Phaedr. There is reason in the lady's defense of herself. Well, is that a fair [*dikaios* *] reply?

Dikaios: just.

Soc. Quite true; if only the other arguments [*epeimi* *] which remain to be brought up bear her witness [*martureo*] that she is an art [*techne* *] at all. But I seem to hear them arraying [*proseimi* * & *diamartureo*] themselves on the opposite side, declaring that she speaks falsely [*pseudo*], and that rhetoric is a mere routine [*tribe*] and trick [*atechnos*], not an art [*techne* *]. Lo! a Spartan appears, and says that there never is nor ever will be a real [*etumos* *] art of speaking which is divorced from [*hapto* * with *aneu*] the truth [*aletheia* *].

Epeimi: to be upon (*epi*-), at hand / *martureo* / *techne* / *proseimi*: to be present, *pros*- or direction towards-which / *diamartureo*: *dia*- or through suggests a more intense witness / *pseudo* / *tribe* / *atechnos*: alpha privative; lacking skill or *techne* / *techne* / *etumos* / *hapto*: to join or fasten with *aneu* or without / *aletheia*.

261 Phaedr. And what are these arguments [*logos* *], Socrates? Bring them out that we may examine [*exetazo* *] them.

Logos / *exetazo*: *ex*- or from.

Soc. Come out, fair children [*thremmata*], and convince Phaedrus, who is the father of similar beauties [*kallipais*], that he will never be able to [*peitho* *] speak about anything as he ought [*hikanos* *] to speak unless he have a knowledge of philosophy [*philosopheo* *]. And let Phaedrus answer you.

Thremmata: nursling, creature which usually applies to animals / *kallipais*: with beautiful children / *peitho* / *hikanos*: adverb; same spelling as the adjective / *philosopheo*.

Phaedr. Put the question.

Soc. Is not rhetoric [*rhatorike*], taken generally, a universal art [*techne* *] of enchanting the mind [*psuchagogia*] by arguments [*logos* *]; which is practised not only in courts and public assemblies, but in private houses also, having to do with all matters, great as well as small, good and bad alike, and is in all equally right [*orthos* *], and equally to be esteemed [*entimos*]-that is what you have heard?

Rhatorike: adjective taken as a noun / *psuchagogia*: evocation (*ago* being the verbal root,

to lead) of souls (*psuche*) from the underworld / *orthos* / *entimos*: honored.

Phaedr. Nay, not exactly that; I should say rather that I have heard the art [*techne* *] confined to speaking and writing in lawsuits, and to speaking in public assemblies-not extended farther.

Techne.

Soc. Then I suppose that you have only heard of the rhetoric [*techne** & *logos* *] of Nestor and Odysseus, which they composed in their leisure hours [*scholazo*] when at Troy, and never of the rhetoric of Palamedes?

Techne with the preposition *peri* (around, concerning) and *logos* / *scholazo*: to be at rest or to have leisure / Nestor and Odysseus are Homeric heroes known for their speaking ability. Palamedes, who does not figure in Homer, was proverbial for his cunning.

Phaedr. No more than of Nestor and Odysseus, unless Gorgias is your Nestor, and Thrasymachus or Theodorus your Odysseus.

Gorgias of Leontini was the most famous teacher of rhetoric to visit Athens. About Thrasymachus of Chalcedon (cf. 267c) we know little beyond what we can infer from his appearance in Book One of the **Republic** On Theodorus of Byzantium (not to be confused with the geometer who appears in the **Theaetetus**), see 266e and Aristotle **Rhetoric** 3.13.

Soc. Perhaps that is my meaning. But let us leave them. And do you tell me, instead, what are plaintiff and defendant doing in a law court-are they not contending?

Phaedr. Exactly so.

Soc. About the just and unjust-that is the matter in dispute?

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. And a professor of the art [*techne* *] will make the same thing appear [*phaino* *] to the same persons to be at one time just, at another time, if he is so inclined [*boulomai* *], to be unjust [*adikaios* *]?

Techne / *phaino* / *boulomai*: to will, be willing / *adikaios*.

Phaedr. Exactly.

Soc. And when he speaks in the assembly, he will make the same things seem good [*agathos* *] to the city at one time, and at another time the reverse of good [*tanantios*]?

Agathos / *tanantios*: or *enantios*, the opposite.

Phaedr. That is true.

Soc. Have we not heard of the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno), who has an art [*techne* *] of speaking by which he makes the same things appear to his hearers like and unlike, one and many, at rest [*meno* *] and in motion [*phero* *]?

Techne / meno: to remain / *phero*: to bear, carry / The Eleatic Palamedes is presumably Zeno of Elea, the author of the famous paradoxes about motion.

Phaedr. Very true.

Soc. The art of disputation [*antilogike*], then, is not confined to the courts and the assembly, but is one and the same in every use of language; this is the art [*techne* *], if there be such an art, which is able to find a likeness [*homoioo*] of everything to which a likeness can be found, and draws into the light of day the likenesses and disguises [*apokrupto*] which are used by others?

Antilogike: adjective, *anti-* meaning against, opposite / *techne / homoioo*: to be like, resemble / *apokrupto*: to hide, conceal, *apo-* or from indicative of deeper concealment.

Phaedr. How do you mean?

Soc. Let me put the matter [*phaino* *] thus: When will there be more chance of deception [*diaphero*]-when the difference is large or small?

Phaino / diaphero: literally, to bear or carry through (*dia-*).

262 Phaedr. When the difference is small.

Soc. And you will be less likely to be discovered [*lanthano* *] in passing by degrees [*metabaino*] into the other extreme than when you go all at once?

Lanthano: to forget / *metabaino*: to pass over from one place to another *meta-* indicative of after.

Phaedr. Of course.

Soc. He, then, who would deceive [*apatano*] others, and not be deceived, must exactly [*akribos*] know [*diaeido*] the real likenesses [*homoioites* *] and differences [*anomoites*] of things?

Apatano / akribos: adverb / *diaeido*: literally, to know through (*dia-*) / *homoioites / anomoites*.

Phaedr. He must.

Soc. And if he is ignorant [*agnoeo* *] of the true nature [*aletheia* *] of any subject, how can he detect [*diagignosko*] the greater or less degree of likeness [*homoioites* *] in other things to that of which by the hypothesis he is ignorant [*agnoeo* *]?

Agnoeo / aletheia / diagignosko: literally, to know through or *dia-* / *homoioites / agnoeo*.

Phaedr. He cannot.

Soc. And when men are deceived [*apatano* *] and their notions [*doxazo* *] are at variance with [*para*] realities [*ta onta* *], it is clear [*delos* *] that the error [*pathos* *] slips in through [*eisreo*] resemblances [*homoiotēs* *]?

Apatano / *doxazo*: to hold an opinion / *ta onta* / *delos* / *pathos* / *eisreo*: to flow into, *eis-* / *homoiotēs*.

Phaedr. Yes, that is the way.

Soc. Then he who would be a master of the art must understand the real nature of everything; or he will never know either how to make the gradual departure from truth into the opposite of truth which is effected by the help of resemblances, or how to avoid it? Could someone, then, who doesn't know [*gnorizo*] what each thing is ever have the art [*technikos*] to lead others little by little [*metabibazo*] through similarities [*homoiotēs* *] away from what is the case [*apo tou ontos*] on each occasion to its opposite? Or could he escape [*diapheugo*] this being done to himself?

Gnorizo: to make known, point out / *technikos*: from *techne* or art / *metabibazo*: to carry over (*meta-*), transfer / *apo tou ontos*: from reality / *homoiotēs* / *diapheugo*: to flee; the preposition *dia-* or through suggests completeness.

Phaedr. He will not.

Soc. He then, who being ignorant [*eido* *] of the truth [*aletheia* *] at appearances [*doxa* *], will only attain [*thereuo*] an art of rhetoric which is ridiculous [*geloios* *] and is not an art [*atechnos*] at all?

Eido: to know with *me* (negative) / *aletheia* / *doxa*: opinion / *thereuo*: to hunt, chase down / *geloios* / *atechnos*: lacking art or *techne*.

Phaedr. That may be expected [*kinduneuo*].

Kinduneuo: to make a venture.

Soc. Shall I propose [*boulomai* *] that we look [*eido* *] for examples of art [*entechnos*] and want of art [*atechnos* *], according to our notion of them, in the speech of Lysias which you have in your hand, and in my own speech?

Boulomai: to wish, be willing / *eido*: to know / *entechnos*: the preposition *en-* or *in* / *atechnos*: alpha privative of *techne*.

Phaedr. Nothing could be better; and indeed I think that our previous argument has been too abstract [*psilos*] and wanting [*hikanos* *] in illustrations [*paradeigma*].

Psilos: bear / *hikanos*: last reference adverb / *paradeigma*: example.

Soc. Yes; and the two speeches happen to afford a very good example [*paradeigma* *] of the way in which the speaker who knows [*eido* *] the truth [*alethos* *] may, without any serious purpose [*prospaizo*], steal away [*parago*] the hearts of his hearers. This piece of good-fortune I attribute [*aitiaomai*] to the local [*entopios*] deities [*theos* *]; and perhaps, the prophets [*prophetes*] of the

Muses who are singing over our heads may have imparted their inspiration [*epipneuo*] to me. For I do not imagine that I have [*metochos*] any rhetorical art [*techne* *] of my own.

Paradeigma / *eido* / *alethos* / *prospaizo*: to play sport with, *pros-* indicative of direction towards which / *parago*: to lead beside (*para-*) / *aitiaomai*: to bring a charge, accuse / *entopios*: in (*en-*) the place / *theos* / *prophetes* / *epipneuo*: literally, to breathe upon (*epi-*) / *metochos*: verbal root meaning to have, *meta-* or with / *techne*.

Phaedr. Granted; if you will only please to get on.

Soc. Suppose that you read [*anagignosko* *] me the first [*arche* *] words of Lysias' speech.

Anagignosko: also as to know again (*ana-*) / *arche*.

Phaedr. "You know how matters [*pragma* *] stand with [*epistemi* *] me, and how, as I conceive [*nomizo* *], they might be arranged [*sumphero* *] for our common interest; and I maintain that I ought not to fail [*atucheo* *] in my suit, because I am [*tugchano* *] not your lover [*erastes* *]. For lovers repent [*metamelomai* *]."

Pragma / *epistemi*: to stand upon or *epi-* / *nomizo*: to hold as a custom, consider / *sumphero*: to carry with, *sum-* / *atucheo*: to be misfortunate, unlucky / *tugchano*: to hit upon, meet / *erastes* / *metamelomai*.

Soc. Enough:-Now, shall I point out the rhetorical error [*hamartano* * & *atechnos* *] of those words?

Hamartano: to miss the mark / *atechnos*: lacking art or *techne*.

263 Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. Every one is aware that about some things we are agreed [*homoetikos*], whereas about other things we differ [*stasiotikos*].

Homoetikos: adverb; literally, of the same mind or *nous* / *stasiotikos*: adverb; inclined to faction, sedition.

Phaedr. I think that I understand [*manthano* *] you; but will you explain [*saphes* *] yourself?

Manthano: to learn / *saphes*: clear, distinct.

Soc. When any one speaks of iron and silver, is not the same thing present in the minds of all [*dianoeo*]?

Dianoeo: to have in mind; the preposition *dia* or through suggests thoroughness.

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. But when any one speaks of justice [*dikaios* *] and goodness [*agathos* *] we part company and are at odds with one another [*amphisbeteuo*] and with ourselves?

Dikaios / *agathos* / *amphisbeteuo*: to disagree, *amphi-* both, around.

Phaedr. Precisely.

Soc. Then in some things we agree [*sumphoneo*], but not in others?

Sumphoneo: literally, to sound together, *sum-*.

Phaedr. That is true.

Soc. In which are we more likely to be deceived [*euapatetos*], and in which has rhetoric [*rhetorikos* *] the greater power [*dunamai* *]?

Euapatetos: easy to cheat, *eu-* easy or well / *rhetorikos* / *dunamai*: to have the capacity for something.

Phaedr. Clearly, in the uncertain class [*planao*].

Planao: to mislead, wander.

Soc. Then the rhetorician [*techne* * & *rhetorikos* *] ought [*meteimi*] to make a regular division [*diaireo*], and acquire [*lambano* *] a distinct notion [*charakter*] of both classes [*eidos* *], as well of that in which the many err [*planao* *], as of that in which they do not err?

Techne with *rhetorikos*: the rhetorical art / *meteimi*: to go after (*meta-*), follow / *diaireo*: the preposition *dia-* or through suggestive of thoroughness / *lambano* / *charakter*: a mark which is engraved or impressed / *eidos* / *planao*: to wander.

Phaedr. He who made such a distinction [*katanoeo*] would have an excellent [*kalos* *] principle [*eidos* *].

Katanoeo: to observe, perceive; *noeo* with the preposition *kata* (in accord with) prefaced to it / *kalos* / *eidos*.

Soc. Yes; and in the next place he must have a keen eye for the observation of particulars in speaking, and not make a mistake about the class to which they are to be referred. Second, I think, [*oiomai* *] he must not be mistaken [*lanthano* *] about his subject; he must have a sharp eye [*oxus* * & *aisthanomai* *] for the class to which whatever he is about to discuss [*ero* *] belongs [*tugchano* *].

Oiomai / *lanthano*: to escape notice / *oxus*: piercing / *aisthanomai*: to feel, perceive / *ero* / *tugchano*: to hit upon, meet.

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. Now to which class does love [*eros* *] belong-to the debatable [*amphibeteuo* *] or to the undisputed class?

Eros / *amphibeteuo*: to disagree, *amphi-* both, around.

Phaedr. To the debatable [*amphibeteuo* *], clearly; for if not, do you think that love would have allowed [*egchoreo*] you to say as you did, that he is [*tugchano* *] an evil [*blabe* *] both to the lover [*erao* *] and the beloved [*erao* *], and also the greatest possible good [*agathos* *]?

Amphisbeteuo / egchoreo: to give room / *tugchano / blabe*: harm / *erao* (used twice) / *agathos*.

Soc. Capital [*aristos* *]. But will you tell me whether I defined [*horizo* *] love [*eros* *] at the beginning of my speech? for, having been in an ecstasy [*enthusiastikos*], I cannot well remember [*mimnesko* *].

Aristos / horizo: to set a boundary / *eros / enthusiastikos*: inspired / *mimnesko*.

Phaedr. Yes, indeed; that you did, and no mistake [*amechanos & sphodros*].

Amechanos: adverb; without means or resources / *sphodros*: excessive, violent.

Soc. Then I perceive that the Nymphs of Achelous and Pan the son of Hermes, who inspired me, were far better rhetoricians than Lysias the son of Cephalus. How much artful [*technikos* *] with speeches Alas! how inferior to them he is! But perhaps I am mistaken; and Lysias at the commencement [*archo* *] of his lover's [*erotikos* *] speech did insist on [*anagkazo* *] our supposing [*hupolambano*] love [*eros* *] to be something or other which he fancied him [*boulomai* *] to be, and according to this model he fashioned [*suntasso*] and framed the remainder [*diaperaino*] of his discourse [*logos* *]. Suppose we read [*anagignosko* *] his beginning [*arche* *] over again:

Technikos / archo: to begin in the sense of being the first principle of anything / *erotikos / anagkazo / hupolambano*: literally, to take or receive from under (*hupo-*) / *eros / boulomai*: to will, be willing / *suntasso*: literally, to set or place with, *sun-* / *diaperaino*: to make a full end of, *dia-* or through / *logos / anagignosko*: also as to know again, *ana-* / *arche*.

Phaedr. If you please; but you will not find what you want.

Soc. Read [*lego* *], that I may have his exact words.

Lego: also as to pick.

Phaedr. "You know how matters [*pragma* *] stand with [*epistemi* *] and how, as I conceive, they might be arranged [*sumphero* *] for our common interest; and I maintain I ought not to fail **264** [*atucheo* *] in my suit because I am not your lover [*erastes* *], for lovers repent [*metamelomai* *] of the kindnesses which they have shown, when their love [*epithumia* *] is over [*pauo* *]."

Pragma: thing, matter / *epistemi*: to set or place upon, *epi-* / *sumphero*: to bear or carry with, *sum-* / *atucheo*: to be unfortunate / *erastes / metamelomai*: to change one's purpose; *meta-* as after / *epithumia*: a *thumos* or mind, spirit which is upon, *epi-* / *pauo*: to cease.

Soc. Here he appears to have done just the reverse of what he ought [*zeteo* *]; for he has begun [*aparche* *] at the end [*teleute*], and is swimming on his back through the flood to the place of starting [*archo* *]. His address [*lego* *] to the fair youth begins where the lover [*erastes* *] would have ended [*pauo* *]. Am I not right, sweet Phaedrus?

Zeteo: to seek / *aparche*: first fruits / *teleute*: end in the sense of being complete / *archo*: to begin as first principle of something / *lego / erastes / pauo*: to cease.

Phaedr. Yes, indeed, Socrates; he does begin at the end [*teleute* *].

Soc. Then as to the other topics-are they not thrown [*ballo*] down [*chuden*] anyhow? Is there any principle [*logos* *] in them? Why should [*anagke* *] the next topic follow next in order, or any other topic? I cannot help [*dokeo* *] fancying in my ignorance [*eido* * with *meden*] that he wrote off boldly [*agennes*] just what came into his head, but I dare say that you would recognize a rhetorical necessity [*anagke* *] in the succession [*ephexes* *] of the several parts of the composition *logographikos*]?

Ballo / chuden (adverb): without order, indiscriminately / *logos / anagke / dokeo*: to think, suppose / *eido* with *meden* or negative / *agennes*: sordid, low-born / *anagke / ephexes / logographikos*: *logos* & *graphe*, writing.

Phaedr. You have too good [*chrestos*] an opinion [*hegeomai* *] of me if you think that I have any such insight [*dieidon* & *akribos* *] into his principles of composition.

Chrestos: useful, serviceable / *hegeomai / dieidon*: seen through (*dia-*) thoroughly / *akribos* (adverb): sharply, accurately.

Soc. At any rate, you will allow [*phaino* *] that every discourse [*logos* *] ought to be a living creature [*zoon* *], having a body of its own and a head and feet; there should be a middle, beginning, and end, adapted to [*prepo* *] one another and to the whole?

Phaino: to shine / *logos / zoon / prepo*: to be fitting.

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. Can this be said of [*skeptomai* *] the discourse [*logos* *] of Lysias? See whether you can find any more connection [*diaphero* *] in his words than in the epitaph [*epigramma*] which is said by some to have been inscribed on the grave of Midas the Phrygian.

Skeptomai: to look about closely / *logos / diaphero*: literally, to carry through, *dia-* / *epigramma*: writing upon, *epi-*.

Phaedr. What is there remarkable in the epitaph?

Soc. It is as follows:-

I am a maiden of bronze and lie on the tomb of Midas;
So long as water flows and tall trees grow,
So long here on this spot by his sad tomb abiding,
I shall declare to passers-by that Midas sleeps below.

Now in this rhyme whether a line comes first or comes last, as you will perceive, makes no difference.

Phaedr. You are making fun of [*skopto*] that oration of ours.

Skopto: to jeer.

Soc. Well, I will say no more about your friend's speech lest I should give offence to you; although I think that it might furnish many other examples of what a man ought rather to avoid. But I will proceed to the other speech, which, as I think is also suggestive to students of rhetoric. Well, then, if that upsets [*achthomai*] you, let's leave that speech aside—even though I think it has plenty of very useful examples [*paradeigma* *], provided one tries [*blepo* *] to emulate [*mimeomai* *] them as little as possible—and turn to [*epichereo*] the others. I think [*dokeo* *] it is important [*proseko* *] for students of speech making [*logos* *] to pay attention to [*skopeo* * & *boulomai* *] one of their features.

Achthomai: to be vexed, grieved / *paradeigma*: *deigma* or sample, pattern prefaced with *para-*, beside / *blepo* / *mimeomai*: to imitate, portray / *epichereo*: to put one's hand to or upon, *epi-* / *dokeo* / *proseko*: to be seeming, *pros-* or direction towards-which / *logos*, with *peri* or concerning / *skopeo*: to examine / *boulomai*: to will, be willing.

265 Phaedr. In what way?

Soc. The two speeches, as you may remember, were unlike-I the one argued that the lover [*erao* *] and the other that the non-lover ought to be [*charizomai* *] accepted [*lego* *].

Erao / *charizomai*: to say or do something agreeable / *lego*.

Phaedr. And right manfully [*andrikos*].

Soc. You should rather say [*oiomai* *] "madly" [*manikos* *]; and madness was the argument of [*zeteo* *] them, for, as I said, "love [*erao* *] is a madness [*mania* *]."

Oiomai: to think, suppose / *manikos* / *zeteo*: to seek / *erao* / *mania*.

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. And of madness [*mania* *] there were two kinds; one produced by human infirmity [*nosema*], the other was a divine [*theios* *] release [*exallage*] of the soul from the yoke of custom [*etho* *] and convention [*nomimos*].

Mania / *nosema*: disease, plague / *theios* / *exallage*: alteration / *etho* / *nomimos*: conformable to custom.

Phaedr. True.

Soc. The divine madness was subdivided into four kinds [*meros*], prophetic [*mantikos* *], initiatory [*telestikos*], poetic [*poietikos*], erotic [*erotikos* *], having four gods presiding over [*diaireo* *] them; the first was the inspiration [*epipnoia*] of Apollo, the second that of Dionysus, the third that of the Muses, the fourth that of Aphrodite and Eros. In the description of the last kind of madness, which was also said to be the best [*aristos* *] we spoke of the affection [*pathos* *] of love [*eroktikos* *] in a figure [*apeikazo*], into which we introduced [*ephapto* *] a tolerably credible and possibly true though partly erring [*paraphero*] myth, which was also a hymn in honor of Love, who is your lord and also mine, Phaedrus, and the guardian of fair children, and to

him we sung the hymn in measured and solemn strain. And having whipped up [*kerannumi* *] a not altogether implausible [*apithanos*] speech [*logos* *], we sang [*prospaizo* *] playfully [*euphemos*] but also appropriately and respectfully [*metrios* *], a story-like hymn to my master and yours, Phaedrus—to Love [*eros* *] who watches over [*ephoros*] beautiful boys.

Meros; part / *mantikos* / *telestikos*: connected with mystic rites / *poietikos* / *erotikos* / *diaireo*: to distinguish, determine; *dia-* or through / *epipnoia*: literally, a breathing upon, *epi-* / *aristos* / *pathos*: suffering, misfortune / *erotikos* / *apeikazo*: to model, represent, copy / *ephapto*: to bind on or into, *epi-* or upon / *paraphero*: literally, to carry beside, *para-* / *kerannumi*: to mix, mingle / *apithanos*: incredible, unlikely / *logos* / *prospiazo*: *pros-* indicative of towards-which / *euphemos* (adverb): of good (*eu-*) omen / *metrios* (adverb) / *eros* / *ephoros*: guardian, *epi-* indicative of being upon.

Phaedr. I know that I had great pleasure [*aedos*] in listening to you.

Aedos: nauseous, with *ouk* or negative.

Soc. Let us take this instance and note how the transition [*metabaino* *] was made from blame [*psego* *] to praise [*epaineo* *].

Metabaino: literally, to go with or after, *meta-* / *psego*: to censure / *epaineo*.

Phaedr. What do you mean?

Soc. I mean [*phaino* *] to say that the composition was mostly playful [*paio* & *paidia*]. Yet in these chance fancies of the hour were involved two principles of which we should be too glad to have a clearer description if art could give us one. But part [*eidos* *] of it was given with Fortune's [*tuche* *] guidance [*proereo*], and there were in it two kinds of things the nature of which it would be quite wonderful to grasp [*lambano* *] by means of a systematic [*dunamis* *] art [*techne* *].

Phaino: to appear, shine / *paio*: to strike / *paidia*: play / *eidos* / *tuche* / *proereo*: to set beforehand, *pro-* / *lambano* / *dunamis* / *techne*.

Phaedr. What are they?

Soc. First, the comprehension [*sunorao*] of scattered particulars [*diaspeiro*] in one idea [*idea* *]; as in our definition [*horizo* *] of love [*eros* *], which whether true [*eu* *] or false [*kakos* *] certainly gave clearness [*saphes* *] and consistency [*homologeio* *] to the discourse [*logos* *], the speaker should define [*horizo* *] his several notions [*didasko* *] and so make his meaning clear.

Sunorao: literally, to see with, *sun-* / *diaspeiro*: to scatter through, *dia-* / *idea*: form, appearance / *horizo*: to define, make a border / *eros* / *eu*: adverb / *kakos*: adverb / *saphes* / *homologeio* / *logos* / *horizo* / *didasko*.

Phaedr. What is the other principle [*eidos* *], Socrates?

Soc. The second principle is that of division [*diatemno*] into species according to the natural formation [*eidos* *], where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might. Just as our **266** two discourses, alike assumed, first of all, a single form of unreason [*aphron*]; and then, as the

body which from being one becomes double and may be divided into a left side and right side, each having parts right and left of the same name [*homonumos*]-after this manner the speaker proceeded to divide the parts of the left side and did not desist until he found in them an evil or left-handed love [*agapao* * & *eidōs* *] which he justly reviled; and the other discourse leading us to the madness [*paranoia*] which lay on the right side, found another love [*erao* *], also having the same name, but divine [*theios* *], which the speaker held up before [*proteino*] us and applauded and affirmed [*epaino*] to be the author [*aitios* *] of the greatest benefits [*agathos* *].

Diatemno: to cut through, *dia-* / *eidōs*, with *kata* or according to / *aphron*: alpha privative; without reason or *phren*, literally as midriff / *homonumos* / *agapao* / *eidōs* / *paranoia*: literally, beside, *para-* the *nous* or mind / *erao* / *theios* / *proteino*: to extend before, *pro-* / *epaino*: literally, to sing upon, *epi-* / *aitios*: cause / *agathos*.

Phaedr. Most true.

Soc. I am myself a great lover [*erastes* *] of these processes of division [*diarexis*] and generalization [*sunagoge*]; they help me to speak and to think [*phroneo* *]. And if I find [*hegeomai* *] any man who is able to see "a One and Many [*pephukos*]" in nature, him I follow, and "walk in his footsteps as if he were a god". And those who have this art [*dunamai* * & *drao*], I have hitherto been in the habit of calling [*prosagoreuo*] dialecticians; but God knows [*eido* *] whether the name is right or not. And I should like to know what name you would give to your or to Lysias' disciples, and whether this may not be that famous art of rhetoric which Thrasymachus and others teach and practice [*chrao* *]? Skillful [*sophos* *] speakers they are, and impart their skill to any who is willing to make kings of them and to bring gifts to them.

Erastes / *diarexis*: the verbal root *haireo* or to choose prefaced with the preposition *dia-* or through / *sunagoge*: literally, a bringing (*ago*) together, *sun-* or with / *phroneo* / *hegeomai* / *pephukos*: from *phuo*, to put forth, produce / **Odyssey ii.406** / *dunamai*: to be able, have the power or capacity / *drao*: to do, effect / *prosagoreuo*: to address; *agoreuo*: to speak in the assembly prefaced with *sun-* or with / *eido* / *chrao*: to furnish / *sophos*.

Phaedr. Yes, they are royal men; but their art is not the same [*epistemon*] with the art of those whom you call, and rightly [*orthos* *], in my opinion, dialecticians:-Still we are in the dark about [*diapheugo* *] rhetoric.

Epistemon: knowing, wise, prudent; *epi-* or upon intensifies the sense of this word / *orthos* (adverb) / *diapheugo*: to flee prefaced with *dia-* or through.

Soc. What do you mean? The remains [*apoleipto*] of it, if there be anything remaining which can be brought under [*lambano* *] rules of art [*techne* *], must be a fine thing; and, at any rate, is not to be despised [*atimasteos*] by you and me. But how much is left?

Apoleipto: *leipo* or to leave prefaced with *apo-* or from / *lambano* / *techne* / *atimasteos*.

Phaedr. There is a great deal surely to be found in books of rhetoric?

Soc. Yes; thank you for reminding [*suchnos*] me:-There is the exordium, showing how the speech [*logos* *] should begin [*arche* *], if I remember [*oiomai* *] rightly; that is what you mean-the niceties [*kompsos*] of the art [*techne* *]?

Suchnos: much, great / *kompsos*: refined, gentlemanly / *logos* / *arche* / *oiomai* / *kompsos* / *techne*.

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. Then follows the statement of facts [*diegesis* *], and upon that witnesses [*marturion*]; thirdly, proofs [*tekmerion*]; fourthly, probabilities [*pistosis*] are to come; the great Byzantian word-maker [*logodaidalos*] also speaks, if I am not mistaken [*oiomai* *], of confirmation [*epipistosis*] and further confirmation.

Diegesis: narrative, statement; *dia-* or through / *marturion* / *tekmerion*: sure sign / *pistosis*: assurance, confirmation / *logodaidalos*: skilled in tricking out a speech or *logos* / *epipistosis*: *pistosis* with *epi-* (upon) prefaced to it.

Phaedr. You mean the excellent Theodorus.

267 Soc. Yes; and he tells how refutation [*elegchos*] or further refutation is to be managed [*poietos*], whether in accusation [*kategoria*] or defense [*apologia*]. I ought also to mention [*ago* *] the illustrious [*kallos* *] Parian, Evenus, who first invented [*heurisko* *] insinuations [*hupodelosis*] and indirect praises [*parapainos*]; and also indirect censures [*parapsugos*], which according to some he put into verse to help [*charis* *] the memory [*mneme* *]. But shall I "to dumb forgetfulness [*heudo*] consign" Tisias and Gorgias, who realized that what is likely [*eoika* *] must be held in higher honor [*timeteos*] than what is true [*alethos* *] who are not ignorant [*eido* *] that probability is superior to truth, and who by: force [*rhome* *] of argument [*logos* *] make the little appear [*phaino* *] great and the great little, disguise the new in old fashions and the old in new fashions, and have discovered [*aneurisko* *] forms for everything, either short [*suntomia*] or going on to infinity [*apeiros* *]. I remember Prodicus [Prodicus of Ceos, who lived from about 470 until after 400 BC, is frequently mentioned by Plato in connection with his ability to make fine verbal distinctions] laughing [*gelao* *] when I told him of this; he said that he had himself discovered the true rule of art [*techne* *], which was to be neither long nor short, but of a convenient length [*metrios* *].

Elegchos: argument, proof / *poietos*: to be made or done / *kategoria*: *kata-* in accord with or against / *apologia* / *ago*: to do, with *es meson ouk* or literally not in the midst / *kallos* / **Evenus of Paros was active as a sophist toward the end of the 5th century BC. Only a few tiny fragments of his work survive.** / *heurisko*: to find out / *hupodelosis*: *deloo* or to make clear prefaced with *hupo-* or under, the verb meaning to show privately / *parapainos*: *para-* or beside prefaced to *epaineo*, to approve, commend / *parapsugos*: *para-* or beside prefaced to *psogos*, a blamable fault, flaw / *charis*: grace, favor / *mneme* / *heudo*: to slumber / **Tisias of Syracuse, with Corax, is credited with the founding of the Sicilian school or rhetoric represented by Gorgias and Polus.** / *eoika* / *timeteos* / *alethos* / *eido* / *rhome*: bodily strength / *logos* / *phaino* / *aneurisko*: *ana-* or up to, along / *suntomia*: conciseness; *sun-* or with prefaced to *temno* meaning to cut / *apeiros*: alpha privative; also as inexperienced prefaced to *peirao*, to attempt, make a trial of / *gelao* / *techne* / *metrios*.

Phaedr. Well done, Prodicus!

Soc. Then there is Hippias the Elean stranger, who probably agrees [*sumpshphos*] with him.

Hippias of Elis was born in the mid 5th century and traveled widely teaching a variety of subjects, including mathematics, astronomy, harmony, mnemonics, ethics and history as well as public speaking. / *sumpshphos*: *psephos* with *sum-*; literally as a small stone or vote.

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. And there is also Polus, who has treasuries of diplasiology, and gnomology, and eikonology reduplication, speaking in maxims, speaking in images, and who teaches in them the names of which Licymnius made him a present; they were to give a polish.

A pupil of Gorgias; Plato represents him in the **Gorgias**. He was said to have composed an **Art of Rhetoric**.

Phaedr. Had not Protagoras something of the same sort?

Protagoras of Abdera, whose life spanned most of the fifth century BC, was the most famous of the early sophists. We have a vivid portrayal of him in Plato's **Protagoras** and an intriguing reconstruction of his epistemology in the **Theaetetus**.

Soc. Yes, rules of correct diction and many other fine precepts [*kalos* *]; for the "sorrows of a poor old man," or any other pathetic case, no one is better than the Chalcedonian giant; he can put a whole company of people into a passion [*orgizo*] and out of one again by his mighty magic [*orgizo* *], and is first-rate at inventing or disposing of any sort of calumny [*diabole*] on any grounds or none. All of them agree [*sundokeo*] in asserting that a speech should end [*telos* *] in a recapitulation [*koinos* *], though they do not all agree to use the same word [*onoma* *].

Kalos / Literally, "the might of the Chalcedonian:" a Homeric figure referring to Thrasymachus who came from Chalcedon. Cf. 261c. / *orgizo* (used twice): to provoke to anger / *diabole*: slander; from *diaballo*, to cast through, *dia-* / *sundokeo*: to seem good to one another, *sun-* or with / *telos* / *koinos*: common / *onoma*: name.

Phaedr. You mean that there should be a summing up [*kephalaios* & *teleute* *] of the arguments in order to remind [*hupomimnesko* *] the hearers of them.

Kephalaios: belonging to the head / *teleute* / *hupomimnesko*: the verbal root regarding memory prefaced with the preposition *hupo*, under...a memory which is under or supportive.

Soc. I have now said all that I have to say of the art [*techne* *] of rhetoric: have you anything to add?

Phaedr. Not much; nothing very important [*axios* *].

268 Soc. Leave the unimportant and let us bring [*eidō* *] the really important question into the light of day [*auge* *], which is: What power [*dunamis* *] has this art [*techne* *] of rhetoric, and when?

Eidō: the familiar verb to know / *auge* / *dunamis*: capacity to do or exercise / *techne*.

Phaedr. A very great power [*rhonnumi* *] in public meetings [*sunodos*].

Rhonnumi: to be strong, enthusiastic / *sunodos*: literally, a road (*hodos*) with, *sun-*.

Soc. It has. But I should like to know [*daimonios* *] whether you have the same feeling [*phaino* *] as I have about the rhetoricians? To me there seem to be a great many holes [*diistemi*] in their web.

Daimonios: of the gods (not in the English text), marvelous / *diistemi*: to stand apart, distinguish; *dia-* or through.

Phaedr. Give an example.

Soc. I will. Suppose a person to come to your friend Eryximachus, or to his father Acumenus, and to say to him: "I know [*epistemi* *] how to apply [*prosphero* *] drugs which shall have either a heating or a cooling effect, and I can give a vomit and also a purge, and all that sort of thing; and knowing [*epistemi* *] all this, as I do, I claim to be a physician and to make physicians by imparting [*paradidomai* *] this knowledge [*episteme* *] to others,"-what do you suppose that they would say?

Epistemi: to know upon, *epi-* / *prosphero*: to bear or carry towards-which, *pros-* / *epistemi* / *paradidomai*: to give beside or alongside of, *para-* / *episteme*.

Phaedr. They would be sure to ask him whether he knew [*prosepistamai*] "to whom" he would give his medicines, and "when," and "how much."

Prosepistamai: two prepositions, *pros* and *epi*, towards which and upon.

Soc. And suppose that he were to reply: "No; I know nothing of all that; I expect the patient who consults [*manthano* *] me to be able to do these things for himself?"

Manthano: to learn.

Phaedr. They would say in reply that he is a madman [*mainomai* *] or pedant who fancies that he is a physician because he has read something in a book, or has stumbled on [*paratugchano*] a prescription [*pharmakion*] or two, although he has no real understanding [*epaio*] of the art [*techne* *] of medicine.

Mainomai: to rage / *paratugchano*: the root *tugchano* (to hit upon) prefaced with the preposition *para* or beside / *pharmakion*: remedy / *epaio*: to perceive, feel / *techne*.

Soc. And suppose a person were to come to Sophocles or Euripides and say that he knows [*ephistemi* *] how to make a very long speech [*rhesis*] about a small matter, and a short speech about a great matter, and also a sorrowful speech, or a terrible, or threatening speech, or any

other kind of speech, and in teaching [*didasko* *] this fancies [*oiomai* *] that he is teaching [*paradidomai* *] the art [*poiesis* *] of tragedy?

Ephistemi: literally, to set upon or *epi*-, to place, understand / *rhexis*: resolution / *didasko* / *oiomai*: to think, believe / *paradidomai*: to hand over or beside, *para*- / *poiesis*: a making, fabrication.

Phaedr. They too would surely laugh at [*katagelao* *] him if he fancies [*oiomai* *] that tragedy is anything but the arranging [*sustasis*] of these elements in a manner which will be suitable [*prepo* * & *sunistemi*] to one another and to the whole.

Katagelao: *kata*- or down; to laugh-down / *oiomai* / *sustasis*: literally, a standing with, *sun*- / *prepo* / *sunistemi* (cf. *sustasis*).

Soc. But I do not suppose [*oimai* *] that they would be rude [*agroikos* *] or abusive [*loidoreseia*] to him: Would they not treat him as a musician would a man who thinks [*oiomai* *] that he is a harmonist because he knows how to pitch the highest and lowest notes; happening [*tugchano* *] to meet [*ephistemi*] such an one he would not say to him savagely [*oxus* * & *barus* * & *agrius*], "Fool [*mochtheros*], you are mad [*melagchoao*]!" But like a musician, in a gentle [*praos* *] and harmonious tone of voice, he would answer: "My good friend [*aristos* *], he who would be a harmonist must [*anagke* *] certainly know [*epistemi* *] this, and yet he may understand nothing of harmony [*harmonia*] if he has not got beyond your stage of knowledge [*epaio* *], for you only know [*epistemi* *] the preliminaries [*mathema*] of harmony and not harmony itself."

Oimai / *agroikos*: literally, dwelling in the fields, rustic *loidoreseia*: rebuke, reproach / *tugchano* / *ephistemi*: to set, place upon (*epi*-) / *oxus* / *barus* / *agrius* (adverb): of the country, rudely / *mochtheros*: miserable, wretched / *melagchoao*: to be melancholic / *praos* / *aristos* / *anagke* / *epistemi*: to know upon, *epi*- / *harmonia* / *epaio* / *epistemi* / *mathema*: lesson.

Phaedr. Very true.

269 Soc. And will not Sophocles say to the display [*epideiknumi* *] of the would-be tragedian, that this is not tragedy but the preliminaries of tragedy? And will not Acumenus say the same of medicine to the would-be physician?

Epideiknumi: literally, to show upon, *epi*-.

Phaedr. Quite true.

Soc. And if Adrastus the mellifluous or Pericles heard of these wonderful arts, brachylogies and eikonologies and all the hard names which we have been endeavoring to draw into [*diemi*] the light of day [*skepteos*], what would they say? Instead of losing temper [*chalepos* *] and applying uncomplimentary epithets [*apaideutos*], as you and I have been doing, to the authors of such an imaginary art, their superior wisdom [*sophos* *] would rather censure [*epiplessos*] us, as well as them. "Have a little patience, Phaedrus and Socrates, they would say; you should not be in such a passion [*chalepains* & *suggignosko*] with those who from some want [*epistemi* *] of dialectical skill are unable to define [*horizo* *] the nature of rhetoric, and consequently suppose [*oiomai* *] that they have found the art [*techne* *] in the preliminary conditions [*mathema* *] of it, and when these have been taught [*didasko*] by them to others, fancy [*pithanos*] that the whole art of

rhetoric has been taught [*sunistemi* *] by them; but as to using the several instruments [*ergon* *] of the art effectively, or making the composition a whole,-an application of it such as this is they regard as an easy thing which their disciples may make for [*porizo*] themselves."

Pericles, who dominated Athens from the 450s until his death in 429 BC, was famous as the most successful orator-politician of his time. The quotation is from the earthy Spartan poet Tyrtaeus, fragment 12.8 (Edmonds). Adrastus is a legendary warrior hero of Agros, one of the main characters in Euripides' **Suppliants**. / *diemi*: to pass through, *dia-* / *skepteos*: from the verb *skeptomai*, to look about closely / *chalepos* (adverb): difficult to deal with / *apaideutos*: alpha privative; uneducated, rude, not having *paideia* / *sophos* / *epiplesso*: to punish, chastize, the preposition *epi-* or upon giving a certain intensity to the verb / *chalepairo*: to be severe / *suggnosko*: to consent, agree, *sug-* or with / *epistemi* with *me* or the negative / *horizo* / *oiomai* / *techne* / *mathema*: lesson / *didasko* / *pithanos*: persuasive / *sunistemi* / *ergon* / *porizo*: to furnish.

Phaedr. I quite admit [*kinduneuo* *], Socrates, that the art [*techne* *] of rhetoric which these men teach [*didasko* *] and of which they write is such as you describe -there I agree with [*dokeo* * & *alethos* *] you. But I still want to know where and how the true [*to onti*] art [*techne* *] of rhetoric and persuasion [*pithanos* *] is to be acquired [*porizo* *].

Kinduneuo: to be daring, to run the risk of / *techne* / *didasko* / *dokeo* & *alethos*: to suppose and the adjective for true / *to onti* / *pithanos* / *porizo*.

Soc. The perfection [*teleos* * & *dunamai* *] which is required of the finished orator [*agonistes*] is, or rather must [*anagkaios* *] be, like the perfection of anything else; partly given [*huparcho* *] by nature [*phusis* *], but may also be assisted by art. If you have the natural power and add to it knowledge [*episteme* *] and practice [*melete*], you will be a distinguished speaker; if you fall short in either of these, you will be to that extent defective [*ateles* *]. But the art, as far as there is an art [*techne* *], of rhetoric does not lie [*phaino* *] in the direction [*poreuo* * & *methodos*] of Lysias or Thrasymachus.

Dunamai: to be able to bring to an end or *teleos* (adjective) / *agonistes*: competitor; *agon* being a contest for a prize / *anagkaios* / *huparcho*: literally, to begin under, *hupo-* / *phusis* / *episteme* / *melete*: care, attention / *ateles*: alpha privative; not complete nor perfect / *techne* / *phaino* / *poreuo*: to go, carry / *methodos*: a following after (*meta-*), pursuit.

Phaedr. In what direction then?

Soc. I conceive [*kinduneuo* * & *aristos* *] Pericles to have been the most accomplished [*teleos* *] of rhetoricians.

Kinduneuo / *aristos* / *teleos*.

Phaedr. What of that?

Soc. All the great arts [*techne* *] require [*prosdeomai*] discussion and high speculation **270** [*adoleschia* & *meteorologia*] about the truths of nature [*phusis* *]; hence comes loftiness of thought [*hupselonoos*] and completeness of execution [*telesiourgos*]. And this, as I conceive [*oiomai* *], was the quality which, in addition to his natural gifts, Pericles acquired [*ptaomai* *]

from his intercourse [*prospiptno*] with Anaxagoras whom he happened to know. He was thus imbued with [*empiplemi*] the higher philosophy *meteorologia* *], and attained [*aphikneomai* *] the knowledge of Mind [*noos* * with *epi phusin*] and the negative of Mind [*dianoia* *] which were favorite themes of Anaxagoras, and applied what suited his purpose [*prosphoros*] to the art [*techne* *] of speaking.

Techne / prosdeomai: to need besides (*para*-), to be deficient / *adoleschia*: idle talk / *meteorologia*: discussion of heavenly bodies / *phusis / hupselonoos*: *nous* or mind with the adjective for high / *teseiourgos*: *telos* and *ergon* or work / *oiomai / ktaomai / prospiptno*: to fall upon, supplicate; *pros*- or direction towards-which / *empiplemi*: to be filled with, *em*- or in / *meteorologia / aphikneomai / nous & epi phusin* or literally upon nature / *dianoia* which also uses *epi phusin / prosphoros*: the verbal root *phero* (to bear, carry) prefaced with the preposition *pros*, towards-which / *techne*.

Phaedr. Explain.

Soc. Rhetoric is like medicine [*techne* * & *iatrikos*].

Techne / iatrikos: healing.

Phaedr. How so?

Soc. Why, because medicine has to define [*diaireo* *] the nature [*phusis* *] of the body and rhetoric of the soul [*psuche* *]-if we would proceed, not empirically [*empeiria*] but scientifically [*tribe* *], in the one case to impart health and strength by giving medicine and food in the other to implant the conviction or virtue which you desire, by the right application of words and training or a soul with the reasons [*logos* *] and customary rules [*nomimos* *] for conduct [*epitedeusis*], that will impart [*peitho* *] to it the convictions [*boule* *] and virtues [*arete* *] we want [*paradidomi*].

Diaireo: to distinguish, determine; *dia*- or through / *phusis / psuche / empeiria*: experience / *tribe*: routine / *logos / nomimos / epitedeusis*: devotion, attention; *epi*- or upon / *peitho / boule / arete / paradidomi*: to hand down or over (*para*-).

Phaedr. There, Socrates, I suspect that you are right.

Soc. And do you think that you can know [*katanoeo* *] the nature [*phusis* *] of the soul [*psuche* *] intelligently [*axios* *] without knowing the nature of the whole?

Katanoeo: *kata*- suggestive of according to / *phusis / psuche / axios* (adverb): or worthily.

Phaedr. Hippocrates the descendant of Asclepius says [*peitho* *] that the nature even of the body can only be understood [*methodos* *] as a whole.

Peitho / Hippocrates, a contemporary of Socrates, is the famous doctor whose name is given to the Hippocratic Oath. None of the written works that have come down to us under his names express the view attributed to him in what follows. All doctors were said to be descendants of Asclepius, hero and god of healing. / *methodos*: a following after (*meta*-), pursuit.

Soc. Yes, friend, and he was right [*kalos* *]:-still, we ought not to be content with the name of Hippocrates, but to examine [*exetazo* *] and see whether his argument agrees with [*sumphoneo* *] his conception [*logos* * & *skopeo* *] of nature.

Kalos (adverb) / *exetazo* / *sumphoneo*: literally, to sound together or *sum-* / *logos* / *skopeo*.

Phaedr. I agree.

Soc. Then consider [*skopeo* *] what truth [*alethes* *] as well as Hippocrates says about this or about any other nature [*phusis* *]. Ought we not to consider [*dianoeo* *] first whether that which we wish to learn [*boulomai* *] and to teach is a simple [*haploos* *] or multiform [*polueides*] thing, and if simple, then [*technikos* *] to enquire what power [*dunamis* *] it has of acting or being acted upon [*pascho* *] in relation to other things, and if multiform, then to number [*arithmeo*] the forms [*eidōs* *]; and see first in the case of one of them, and then in. case of all of them, what is that power of acting [*phuo* *] or being acted upon [*pascho* *] which makes each and all of them to be what they are?

Skopeo / *alethes* / *phusis* / *dianoeo*: to perceive through or *dia-* / *boulomai*: to will, be willing / *haploos* / *polueides* / *technikos*: expert or here, we as experts / *dunamis*: the capacity to do anything / *pascho*: connotes being in a certain state of mind / *arithmeo* / *eidōs* / *phuo*: to put forth, produce / *pascho*.

Phaedr. You may very likely be right [*kinduneuo* *], Socrates.

Kinduneuo.

Soc. The method [*methodos* *] which proceeds without analysis is like the groping [*poreia* *] of a blind man. Yet, surely, he who is an artist ought not to admit of a comparison [*apeikasteon*] with the blind, or deaf. The rhetorician, who teaches [*didomai* *] his pupil to speak [*logos* *] scientifically [*techne* *], will particularly [*akribos* *] set forth [*deiknumi* *] the nature of that being to which he addresses [*prosphero* *] his speeches [*logos* *]; and this, I conceive, to be the soul [*psuche* *].

Methodos / *poreia*: mode of walking / *apeikasteon*: one must represent as like / *didomai*: to give / *logos* / *techne* / *akribos* (adverb) / *deiknumi*: to show / *prosphero*: to bring towards-which or *pros-* / *logos* / *psuche*.

Phaedr. Certainly.

271 Soc. His whole effort [*hamilla*] is directed [*tithemi* * with *pros*] to the soul; for in that he seeks [*epicheireo* *] to produce conviction [*peitho* *].

Hamilla: contest / *tithemi* with *pros*, literally, to put toward / *epicheireo*: to put one's hand upon (*epi-*) / *peitho*.

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. Then clearly [*delos* *], Thrasymachus or any one else who teaches [*didomai* * & *techne* *] rhetoric in earnest [*spoude* *] will give [*grapho*] an exact description [*akribeia*] of the nature of the soul [*eido* * & *psuche* *]; which will enable us to see whether she be single [*hen* *] and same

[*homoios* *], or, like [*morphe*] the body, multiform [*polueides* *]. That is what we should call showing [*deiknumi* *] the nature [*phusis* *] of the soul.

Delos / didomai with *techne* or to impart a technique / *spoude / grapho*: to draw, write / *akribeia*: exactness / *eido / psuche / hen*: one / *homoios / morphe*: form / *polueides / deiknumi / phusis*.

Phaedr. Exactly.

Soc. He will explain, secondly, the mode in which she acts [*pascho* *] or is acted upon [*phuo* *].
Pascho / phuo.

Phaedr. True.

Soc. Thirdly, having classified [*diatasso*] men and speeches [*logos* *], and their kinds [*psuche* * & *genos* *] and affections [*pathema* *], and adapted [*prosarmozo*] them to one another, he will tell the reasons of his arrangement, and show why one soul is persuaded by a particular form of argument, and another not. And he will give instructions [*didasko* *] concerning the reasons [*logos*] why one kind of soul is necessarily convinced by one kind of speech while another necessarily [*anagke* *] remains unconvinced [*peitho* *].

Diatasso: literally, to arrange through, *dia-* / *logos / psuche / genos / pathema / prosarmozo*: to attach to or towards-which, *pros-* / *didasko / logos / anagke / peitho*, with *me* or negative.

Phaedr. You have hit upon a very good [*kallos* *] way.

Soc. Yes, that is the true and only way in which any subject can be set forth [*endeiknumi*] or treated by rules of art [*techne* *], whether in speaking or writing. But the writers of the present day, at whose feet you have sat, craftily, conceal [*apokrupto* * & *techne* *] the nature of the soul [*psuche* *] which they know [*eido* *] quite well [*pagkalos*]. Nor, until they adopt our method [*tropos* *] of reading and writing, can we admit [*peitho* *] that they write by rules of art [*techne* *]?

Endeiknumi: literally, to show in, *en-* / *techne / apokrupto / techne / psuche / eido / pagkalos*: literally, all & beautiful / *tropos / peitho / techne*.

Phaedr. What is our method?

Soc. I cannot give you the exact [*eupetes*] details [*rhema* *]; but I should like to tell you generally, as far as is in my power, how a man ought to proceed [*endechomai*] according to rules of art [*technikos*].

Eupetes: favorable, fortunate / *rhema / endechomai*: admit, allow / *technikos* (adverb).

Phaedr. Let me hear.

Soc. Oratory is [*tugchano* *] the art [*dunamis* *] of enchanting the soul [*psuchagogia*], and therefore he who would be an orator has to learn [*eido* *] the differences [*eidōs* *] of human souls [*psuche* *]-they are so many and of such a nature, and from them come the differences between man and man. Having proceeded thus far in his analysis [*diaireo* *], he will next divide speeches into their different classes [*eidōs* *]:-"Such and such persons," he will say, are affected [*eupeitho* & *duspeitho*] by this or that kind of speech in this or that way," and he will tell you why. The pupil must have a good [*hikanos* *] theoretical notion [*noeo* *] of them first, and then he must have experience [*praxis* or *praxis* with *theaomai* *] of them in actual life, and be able to follow [*epakoloutheo*] them with all his senses about [*aisthesis* * & *oxeos* *] him, or he will never get beyond the precepts [*suneimi* * & *logos* *] of his masters. But when he understands what persons are persuaded [*hikanos* * & *peitho* *] by what arguments, and sees the person about whom he was speaking in the abstract actually before him, and knows [*diaisthanomai* *] that it is he, and can 272 say [*endeiknumi* *] to himself, "This is the man or this is the character who ought to have a certain argument applied to [*prosoisetos*] him in order to convince [*peitho* *] him of a certain opinion"; -he who knows all this, and knows also when [*kairos* *] he should speak and when he should refrain [*epischeteon*], and when he should use pithy sayings [*brachulogia*], pathetic appeals [*eleinologia*], sensational effects [*deinosis*], and all the other modes [*eidōs* *] of speech which he has learned [*manthano* *];-when, I say, he knows the times [*akairia*] and seasons [*eukairia*] of all these things, then, and not till then, he is a perfect master [*teleios*] of his art [*techne* * & *apergazomai* *]; but if he fail [*elleipo*] in any of these points, whether in speaking or teaching [*didasko* *] or writing them, and yet declares that he speaks by rules of art [*techne* *], he who says "I don't believe [*peitho* *] you" has the better [*krateo* *] of him. Well, the teacher will say, is this, and Socrates, your account [*apodektos*] of the so-called art [*techne* *] of rhetoric, or am I to look for another?

Tugchano: to hit upon / *dunamis* / *psuchagogia*: literally, the leading of souls / *eido* / *eidōs* / *psuche* / *diaireo*: to distinguish, determine; *dia-* or through / *eidōs* / *eupeitho* & *duspeitho*: *eu-* as favorable & *dus-* as not favorable / *hikanos* (adverb) / *noeo*: to perceive or use one's *nous* / *praxis* or *praxis* / *theaomai*: to see in the sense of beholding / *epakoloutheo*: to follow upon or *epi-* / *aisthesis* / *oxeos* (adverb): sharply / *suneimi*: literally, to be with, *sun-* / *logos* / *hikanos* (adverb) / *peitho* / *diaisthanomai*: to perceive through, *dia-* / *endeiknumi*: to show in or *en-* / *prosoisetos*: to be added to, *prosphero* / *peitho* / *kairos*: special time or event not bound by chronological time / *epischeteon*: *epecho* / *brachulogia* (*brachus*: short) & *logos* / *eleinologia*: *eleinos* or finding pity & *logos* / *deinosis*: exaggeration / *eidōs* / *manthano* / *akairia*: unfitnes of times or *kairos* / *eukairia*: special (*eu-*, well) fitness of times / *teleios* / *techne* / *apergazomai*: to finish off, produce / *elleipo* / *didasko* / *techne* / *peitho* / *krateo*: to be strong, prevail / *apodektos*: one must receive from others / *techne*.

Phaedr. He must take this, Socrates for there is no possibility [*adunatos*] of another, and yet the creation of such an art [*ergon* *] is [*phaino* *] not easy [*smikros*].

Adunatos / *ergon* / *phaino*: to appear / *smikros*: small.

Soc. Very true; and therefore let us consider [*metastrepho*] this matter in every light, and see whether we cannot find [*episkopeo*] a shorter and easier road; there is [*phaino* *] no use in taking a long rough round-about way if there be a shorter and easier one. And I wish that you would try

and remember [*anamimnesko* *] whether you have heard [*epakouo*] from Lysias or any one else anything which might be of service [*boetheia*] to us.

Metastrepho: to turn about / *episkopeo*: to look upon, *epi-* / *phaino*: to appear / *anamimnesko*: to recall (again, *ana-*); an intensive form of recollection / *epakouo*: literally, to hear upon, *epi-* / *boetheia*.

Phaedr. If trying would avail, then I might; but at the moment I can think of nothing.

Soc. Suppose I tell you something which somebody who knows told me.

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. May not "the wolf," as the proverb says, claim a hearing"?

Phaedr. Do you say what can be said for him.

Soc. He will argue that is no use in putting [*anago*] a solemn face [*semnuo*] on these matters, or in going round and round [*periballo*], until you arrive at first principles; for, as I said at first, when the question is of justice [*dikaios* *] and good [*agathos* *], or is a question in which men are concerned [*mello* *] who are just and good, either by nature or habit, he who would be a skillful [*hikanos* *] rhetorician has no need of [*metecho* *] truth [*aletheia* *]-for that in courts of law men literally care nothing about truth [*aletheia* *], but only about conviction [*pithanos* *]: and this is based on probability [*eikos* *], to which who would be a skillful orator should therefore give his whole attention [*prosecho* *]. And they say also that there are cases in which the actual facts [*prasso* *], if they are improbable [*eoika*], ought to be withheld, and only the probabilities should be told either in accusation [*kategoria* *] or defense [*apologia* *], and that always in speaking, the orator should keep probability [*eikos* *] in view [*diokteos*], and say good-bye [*chairo*] to the truth 273 [*aletheia* *]. And the observance, of this principle [*logos* *] throughout a speech furnishes [*porizo* *] the whole art [*techne* *].

Anago: to lead to, *ana-* / *semnuo*: to be solemn / *periballo*: to cast around or about, *peri-* / *dikaios* / *agathos* / *mello*: to be about to do / *hikanos* (adverb) / *metecho*: literally, to have with, *meta-* / *aletheia* (twice) / *pithanos*: persuasive / *eikos*: likely / *prosecho*: *pros-* suggestive of direction towards-which / *prasso*: to do, accomplish / *eoika* / *kategoria* / *apologia* / *eikos* / *diokteos*: from *dioko*, to pursue / *chairo*: to rejoice / *aletheia* / *logos* / *porizo* / *techne*.

Phaedr. That is what the professors [*technikos* *] of rhetoric do actually say [*dierchomai* & *prospoieo*], Socrates. I have not forgotten [*anamimnesko* *] that we have quite briefly touched upon [*ephapto*] this matter already [*bracheos*]; with them the point is all-important [*pammegas*].

Technikos: one who has *techne* or skill / *dierchomai*: to pass through, *dia-* / *prospoieo*: to pretend, to make as if; *pros-* suggestive of direction towards-which / *prospoieo*: literally, to make before, *pro-* / *anamimnesko*: *ana-* or above or back; a more intensive form of recalling / *ephapto*: *epi-* or upon / *bracheos* (adverb): shortly / *pammegas*: literally, all great.

Soc. I dare say that you are familiar [*pateo* & *akribos* *] with Tisias. Does he not define probability [*eikos* *] to be that which the many think [*dokeo* *]?

Pateo: to tread / *akribos* (adverb): accurately / *eikos* / *dokeo*.

Phaedr. Certainly, he does.

Soc. I believe that he has [*heurisko* *] a clever [*sophos* *] and ingenious case [*technikos* *] of this sort:-He supposes a feeble [*asthenes* *] and valiant man [*andrikos* *] to have assaulted [*sugkopto*] a strong [*ischuros* *] and cowardly one [*deilos* *], and to have robbed him of his coat or of something or other; he is brought into court, and then Tisias says that both parties should tell lies: [*alethes* *] the coward [*deilos* *] should say that he was assaulted by more men than one; the other should prove [*elegcho*] that they were alone, and should argue thus: "How could a weak man like me have assaulted a strong man like him?" The complainant will not like to confess his own cowardice, and will therefore invent [*epicheireo* *] some other lie [*pseudo* *] which his adversary will thus gain an opportunity of refuting [*elegcho* *]. And there are other devices [*techne* *] of the same kind which have a place in the system. Am I not right, Phaedrus?

Heurisko: to find out / *sophos*: wise, skilled / *asthenes* / *andrikos* / *sugkopto*: literally, to strike with, *sug-* / *ischuros* / *deilos* / *alethes*, with negative / *deilos* / *elegcho* / *epicheireo*: to put one's hand upon, *epi-* / *pseudo* / *elegcho* / *techne*.

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. Bless me, what a wonderfully mysterious [*apokrupto* *] art [*techne* *] is this which Tisias or some other gentleman, in whatever name or country he rejoices [*tugchano* *], has discovered [*aneurisko* *]. Shall we say a word to him or not?

Apokrupto: to hide, conceal / *techne* / *tugchano*: to hit upon / *aneurisko*.

Phaedr. What shall we say to him?

Soc. Let us tell him that, before he appeared, you and I were saying that the probability [*tugchano* * & *eikos* *] of which he speaks was engendered [*gignomai* *] in the minds of the many by the likeness [*homoiotes* *] of the truth [*alethos* *], and we had just been affirming that he who knew [*epistamai* *] the truth [*aletheia* *] would always know best [*kallos* *] how to discover [*heurisko* *] the resemblances [*eidosis* *] of the truth. If he has anything else to say about the art [*techne* *] of speaking we should like to hear him; but if not, we are satisfied [*dierchomai* * & *peitho* *] with our own view, that unless a man estimates [*diarithmeo*] the various characters [*phusis* *] of his hearers and is able [*dunamai* *] to divide [*diaireo* *] all things into classes [*eidosis* *] and to comprehend [*perilambano*] them under single ideas he will never be a skillful [*technikos* *] rhetorician even within the limits of human power [*dunatos* *]. And this skill he will not attain [*ptaomai* *] without a great deal of trouble [*pragmateia*], which a good man ought to undergo, not for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but in order that he may be able to say what is acceptable [*diaponeo* & *sophron*] to God [*theos* *] and always to act acceptably [*charizo* *] to Him as far as in him lies [*dunamis* *]; for there is a saying of wiser men [*sophos* *] than ourselves, that a man of sense [*melete* * & *nous* *] should not try to please [*charizo* *] his fellow servants (at least

274 this should not be his first object [*parergon*] but his good and noble masters; and therefore if the way is long and circuitous, marvel [*thaumazo*] not at this, for, where the end is great, there we may take the longer road, but not for lesser ends such as yours [*dokeo* *]. Truly, the argument may say, Tisias, that if you do not mind going so far, rhetoric has a fair [*kallos* *] beginning [*gignomai* *] here.

Tugchano / eikos: in all likelihood / *gignomai / homoiotes / alethos / epistamai*: to know upon, *epi-* / *aletheia / kallos / heurisko / eidos / techne / dierchomai*: to go through, *dia-* / *peitho*: to persuade / *diarithmeo*: to reckon, enumerate, *dia-* or through / *phusis / dunamai / diaireo*: to distinguish, determine; *dia-* or through / *eidos / perilambano*: literally, to receive around, *peri-* / *technikos / dunatos / ktaomai / pragmateia*: diligent study / *diaponeo*: to work out, *dia-* or through with labor / *sophron*: discreet, prudent / *theos*: here it is plural / *charizo / dunamis*, with *eis* or into / *sophos / melete*: care or attention / *nous / charizo / parergon*: literally, beside (*para-*) the work / *dokeo / kallos / gignomai*: to beget, bring into being.

Phaedr. I think, Socrates, that this is admirable [*pagkalos* *], if only practicable.

Pagkalos (adverb); all beautiful.

Soc. But even to fail [*epicheireo* *] in an honorable [*kalos* *] object is honorable [*pascho* *].

Epicheireo: to put one's hand upon, *epi-* / *kalos / pascho*: to suffer, be disposed.

Phaedr. True.

Soc. Enough [*hikanos* *] appears to have been said by us of a true [*techne* *] and false art [*atechnia* *] of speaking.

Hikanos (adverb) / *techne / atechnia*: lacking art or *techne*.

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. But there is something yet to be said of propriety [*euprepeia*] and impropriety [*aprepeia*] of writing.

Euprepeia / aprepeia: *eu-* vs. *a-*.

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a manner which will be acceptable [*charizo* *] to God?

Phaedr. No, indeed. Do you?

Soc. I have heard a tradition of the ancients, whether true [*alethes* *] or not they only know; although if we had found [*heurisko* *] the truth ourselves, do you think that we should care [*melo* *] much about the opinions [*doxazo* *] of men?

Alethes / heurisko / melo / doxazo.

Phaedr. Your question needs no answer [*geloios* *]; but I wish that you would tell me what you say that you have heard.

Gelaïos: laughable.

Soc. At the Egyptian city of Naucratis, there was a famous old god, whose name was Theuth; the bird which is called the Ibis is sacred [*hieros* *] to him, and he was the inventor of many arts, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry and draughts and dice, but his great discovery [*heurisko* *] was the use of letters. Now in those days the god [*daimon* *] Thamus [The Egyptian god of writing, measuring and calculation. The Greeks identified Thoth with Hermes, perhaps because of his role in weighing the soul. Thoth figures in a related story about the alphabet at **Philebus** 18b] was the king of the whole country of Egypt; and he dwelt in that great city of Upper Egypt which the Hellenes call Egyptian Thebes, and the god himself is called by them Ammon [As king of the Egyptian gods, Ammon (Thamus) was identified by Egyptians with the sun god Ra and by the Greeks with Zeus]. To him came Theuth and showed [*epideiknumi* *] his inventions [*techne* *], desiring that the other Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of [*diadidomai*] them; he enumerated them, and Thamus enquired about [*diexeimi*] their several uses [*ophelia* *], and praised [*kalos* *] some of them and censured [*kalos* *] others, as he approved [*epaino* *] or disapproved [*psego* *] of them. It would take a long time to repeat all that Thamus said to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts. But when they came to letters, This, said Theuth, will make [*parecho* *] the Egyptians wiser [*sophos* *] and give them better memories [*mimnesko* *]; it is a specific both for the memory and for the wit. Thamus replied: O most ingenious [*technikostate*] Theuth, the parent or inventor of an art [*techne* *] is not always the best 275 judge [*krino* *] of the utility [*ophelia* *] or inutility [*blabe* *] of his own inventions to the users of them. And in this instance, you who are the father of letters, from a paternal love of your own children have been led to attribute [*eunoia*] to them a quality which they cannot have; for this discovery of yours will create forgetfulness [*lethe* *] in the learners' [*manthano* *] souls [*psuche* *], because they will not use their memories [*ameleteria*]; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember [*anamimnesko* *] of themselves. The specific which you have discovered [*heurisko* *] is an aid [*pharmakon* *] not to memory [*mneme* *], but to reminiscence [*hupomnesis*], and you give [*porizo* *] your disciples not truth [*aletheia* *], but only the semblance of truth [*doxa* *]; they will be hearers of many things [*polugnomon*] and will have learned nothing [*didache*]; they will appear to be omniscient [*doxosophos*] and will generally know nothing [*agnomon*]; they will be tiresome company [*chalepos* * & *suniami* *], having the show of wisdom [*doxosophos*] without the reality [*sophos* *].

A Greek trading colony in Egypt. The story that follows is probably an invention of Plato's (see 275b3) in which he reworks elements from Egyptian and Greek mythology. / *hieros* / *heurisko* / *daimon* / *epideiknumi*: to show upon, *epi-* / *techne* / *diadidomai*: literally, to give through, *dia-* / *diexeimi*: literally, to pass or go through, *dia-* / *ophelia* / *kalos* (adverb) / *kalos* (adverb), with negative / *epaino*: *epi-* or upon / *psego* / *parecho*: to have beside or *para-* / *sophos* / *mimnesko* / *technikostate* / *techne* / *krino* / *ophelia* / *blabe* / *eunoia*: good will, favor / *lethe* / *manthano* / *psuche* / *ameleteria*: want of practice / *anamimnesko* / *heurisko* / *pharmakon* / *mneme* / *hupomnesis*: a reminding, *hupo-* or under / *porizo*: to furnish / *aletheia* / *doxa*: opinion / *polugnomon*: very sagacious / *didache*: teaching with *aneu* or without / *agnomon*: senseless,

unfeeling / *chalepos* (adjective) / *suniami*: to be with, *sun-* / *doxosophos*: wise in one's conceit or wisdom (*sophia*) / *sophos*: wise, skilled.

Phaedr. Yes, Socrates, you can easily [*rhadios* *] invent [*poieo* *] tales [*logos* *] of Egypt, or of any other country.

Rhadios / *poieo* / *logos*.

Soc. There was a tradition in the temple of Dodona that oaks first gave prophetic [*mantikos* *] utterances. The men of old, unlike in their simplicity [*sophos* *] to young philosophy, deemed that if they heard the truth [*alethos* *] even from "oak or rock," it was enough for them; whereas you seem to consider [*skopeo* *] not whether a thing is or is not true [*diaphero* *], but who the speaker is and from what country the tale comes.

Mantikos / *sophos* with *ouk*, negative / *alethos* / *skopeo* / *diaphero*: to bear or carry through, *dia-*.

Phaedr. I acknowledge the justice of your rebuke [*epiplesso* *]; and I think [*dokeo* *] that the Theban is right [*orthos* *] in his view about letters.

Epiplesso: to punish or chastize, *epi-* or upon / *dokeo* / *orthos*.

Soc. He would be a very simple person, and quite a stranger to the oracles of Thamus or Ammon, who should leave [*oiomai* *] in writing or receive in writing any art [*techne* *] under the idea that the written word would be intelligible [*bebaios*] or certain [*saphes* *]; or who deemed [*oiomai* *] that writing was at all better than knowledge [*eido* *] and recollection [*hupomimnesko* *] of the same matters?

Oiomai / *techne* / *bebaios*: firm, solid / *saphes*: clear / *oiomai* / *eido* / *hupomimnesko*: to remember under, *hupo-*.

Phaedr. That is most true.

Soc. I cannot help feeling [*deinos* *], Phaedrus, that writing is unfortunately like painting [*zographia*]; for the creations of the painter have the attitude [*histemi* *] of life, and yet if you ask them a question they preserve a solemn [*semnos*] silence [*sigao*]. And the same may be said of speeches. You would imagine [*doxa* *] that they had intelligence [*phroneo* *], but if you want [*boulomai* *] to know anything and put a question to one of them, the speaker always gives one unvarying answer [*semaino* *]. And when they have been once written down they are tumbled about [*kulindao*] anywhere among those who may or may not understand [*ephistemi* *] them, and know not to whom they should reply, to whom not: and, if they are maltreated [*plemmeleo*] or abused [*loidoreo* *], they have no parent to protect them; and they cannot protect [*amuno*] or defend [*boetheo*] themselves.

Deinos: fearful, terrible / *zographia*: painting from life / *histemi*: to stand / *semnos* / *sigao* / *doxa* / *phroneo*: to be prudent, to purpose / *boulomai* / *semaino*: to make signs / *kulindo*: to roll / *ephistemi*: to stand upon or *epi-* / *plemmeleo*: to offend against / *loidoreo* / *amuno*: to ward off / *boetheo*: to help.

Phaedr. That again is most true.

276 Soc. Is there not [*horao* *] another kind of word [*logos* *] or speech far better than this, and having far greater power [*dunatos* *]-a son of the same family, but lawfully begotten [*phuo* *]?

Horao: to see / logos / dunatos / phuo.

Phaedr. Whom do you mean, and what is his origin [*gignomai* *]?

Soc. I mean an intelligent word [*episteme* *] graven [*grapho* *] in the soul [*psuche* *] of the learner, which can [*dunatos* *] defend [*amuno* *] itself, and knows [*epistemon* *] when to speak and when to be silent [*sigao* *].

Episteme: knowledge upon or epi- / grapho: to write / psuche / dunatos / amuno / epistemon / sigao.

Phaedr. You mean [*eido* *] the living word [*logos* *] of knowledge which has a soul [*empsuchos* *], and of which written word is properly no more than an image [*eidolon* *]?

Eido / logos / empsuchos: em- or in / eidolon.

Soc. Yes, of course that is what I mean [*pantapasi*]. And now may I be allowed to ask you a question: Would a husbandman, who is a man of sense [*nous* *], take the seeds, which he values and which he wishes to bear fruit, and in sober seriousness [*spoude* *] plant them during the heat of summer, in some garden of Adonis, that he may rejoice [*chairo* *] when he sees them in eight days appearing in beauty? at least he would do so, if at all, only for the sake of amusement and pastime. But when he is in earnest he sows in fitting soil, and practices [*techne* *] husbandry, and is satisfied if in eight months the seeds which he has sown arrive at perfection [*telos* *]?

Pantapasi: literally all-all / nous / spoude: haste, zeal / chairo / techne / telos.

Phaedr. Yes, Socrates, that will be his way when he is in earnest [*spoude* *]; he will do the other, as you say, only in play. Quite differently from the others, as you say.

Soc. And can we suppose that he who knows the just [*dikaios* *] and good [*kalos* *] and honorable [*agathos* *] has less understanding [*episteme* *] than the husbandman, about his own seeds?

Dikaios / kalos / agathos / episteme: knowledge upon, epi-.

Phaedr. Certainly not.

Soc. Then he will not seriously [*spoude* *] incline to "write his thoughts in water with pen and ink, sowing words which can neither speak for themselves nor teach [*didasko* *] the truth [*alethos* *] adequately [*hikanos* *] to others?

Spoude / didasko / alethos / hikanos.

Phaedr. No, that is not likely.

Soc. No, that is not likely-in the garden of letters he will sow and plant, but only for the sake of recreation and amusement [*paidia* *]; he will write them down as memorials [*hupomnema*] to be treasured [*thesaurizo*] against the forgetfulness [*lethe* *] of old age, by himself, or by any other old man who is treading the same path. He will rejoice [*hedomai* *] in beholding their tender growth; and while others are refreshing their souls with banqueting and the like watering themselves with drinking parties and everything else that goes along with them, this will be the pastime in which his days are spent [*paizo* *].

Paidia: sport / *hupomnema*: reminder, *hupo-* or under / *thesaurizo* / *lethe* / *hedomai* / *paizo*: to play or make jest.

Phaedr. A pastime [*paidia* *], Socrates, as noble [*pagkalos* *] as the other is ignoble [*phaulos*], the pastime of a man who can be amused [*paizo* *] by serious [*dunamai* *] talk [*logos* *], and can discourse merrily [*muthologeio*] about justice and the like.

Paidia / *pagkalos*: all beautiful / *phaulos* / *paizo* / *dunamai* / *logos* / *muthologeio*: *muthos* or anything delivered by word of mouth and *logos*.

Soc. True, Phaedrus. But nobler far is the serious [*kallos* *] pursuit [*spoude* *] of the dialectician, who, finding [*lambano* *] a congenial [*prosakouo* *] soul [*psuche* *], by the help of science sows 277 and plants therein words which are able to help [*boetheo* *] themselves and him who planted them, and are not unfruitful, but have in them a seed which others brought up in different soils render [*parecho* *] immortal [*athanatos* *], making the possessors of it happy to the utmost extent [*dunatos* *] of human happiness [*mala*].

Kallos / *spoude* / *lambano*: to take, receive / *prosakouo*: to listen to, *pros-* as direction towards-which / *boetheo* / *parecho* / *athanatos* / *dunatos* / *mala*: exceedingly.

Phaedr. Far nobler [*kallos* *], certainly.

Kallos.

Soc. And now, Phaedrus, having agreed upon [*homologeio* *] the premises we decide about [*krino* *] the conclusion.

Homologeio / *krino*.

Phaedr. About what conclusion?

Soc. About Lysias, whom we censured [*aphikneomai* *, *exetasso* & *oneidos* *], and his art of writing, and his discourses, and the rhetorical skill [*techne* *] or want of skill which was shown in them-these are the questions which we sought to determine, and they brought us to this point. And I think [*dokeo* *] that we are now pretty well informed [*deloo*] about the nature of art [*entechnos*] and its opposite.

Aphikneomai: to arrive, reach / *exetasso*: to examine, question, *ex-* or from / *oneidos* / *dokeo* / *deloo*: to be clear / *entechnos*: furnished by art.

Phaedr. Yes, I think with you; but I wish that you would repeat [*hupomimnesko* *] what was said.

Hupomimnesko: to remind under or *hupo-*.

Soc. Until a man knows [*eido* *] the truth [*alethes* *] of the several particulars of which he is writing or speaking, and is able to define [*horizo* *] them as they are, and having defined them again to divide [*temno*] them until [*epistamai*] they can be no longer divided [*atmetos*], and until in like manner he is able to discern [*dieidon* *] the nature [*phusis* *] of the soul [*psuche* *], and discover [*aneurisko* *] the different modes [*eidōs* *] of discourse which are adapted [*prosarmozo*] to different natures [*panarmonios*], and to arrange [*tithemi* *] and dispose [*diakosmeo* *] them in such a way that the simple [*haplous* *] form of speech [*logos* *] may be addressed to the simpler nature, and the complex [*poikilos*] and composite to the more complex nature—until he has accomplished all this, he will be unable to handle [*metacherizo*] arguments according to rules of art, as far as their nature allows them to be subjected to art [*techne* *], either for the purpose of teaching [*didasko* *] or persuading [*peitho* *];—such is the view which is implied [*menuo*] in the whole preceding argument.

Eido / *alethes* / *horizo* / *temno* / *epistamai*: to know upon or *epi-* / *atmetos* / *dieidon*: to see through or *dia-* / *phusis* / *psuche* / *aneurisko* / *eidōs* / *prosarmozo*: *pros-* or direction towards—which / *panarmonios*: embracing all modes, *para-* or beside / *tithemi* / *diakosmeo*: to adorn thoroughly or *dia-*, through / *haplous* / *logos* / *poikilos* / *metacherizo*: *meta-* or with, after / *techne* / *didasko* / *peitho* / *menuo*: to disclose.

Phaedr. Yes, that was our view [*phaion* *], certainly.

Phaino: to become clear, distinct.

Soc. Secondly, as to the censure [*dike*] which was passed on the speaking or writing of discourses, and how they might be rightly [*kalos* *] or wrongly [*aischros* *] censured [*oneidos* *]—did not our previous argument show [*deloo* *]?

Dike / *kalos* / *aischros* / *oneidos* / *deloo*.

Phaedr. Show what?

Soc. That whether Lysias or any other writer that ever was or will be, whether private man or statesman, proposes [*tithemi* *] laws [*nomos* *] and so becomes the author of a political treatise, fancying [*hegeomai* *] that there is any great certainty [*bebaiotes*] and clearness [*sapheneia*] in his performance, the fact of his so writing is only a disgrace [*oneidos* *] to him, whatever men may say. For not to know [*agnoeo* *] the nature of justice [*dikaios* *] and injustice [*adikos* *], and good [*agathos* *] and evil [*kakos* *], and not to be able to distinguish [*ekpheugo*] the dream from the reality, cannot in truth [*aletheia* *] be otherwise than disgraceful [*eponeidistos*] to him, even though he have the applause [*epaineo* *] of the whole world.

Tithemi / *nomos* / *hegeomai* / *bebaiotes*: firm, secure / *sapheneia* / *oneidos* / *agnoeo* / *dikaios* / *adikos* / *agathos* / *kakos* / *ekpheugo*: literally, to flee from, *ek-* / *aletheia* / *eponeidistos*: to be reproached, *epi-* or upon / *epaineo*: *epi-* or upon.

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. But he who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily [*anagkaios* *] much which is not serious [*paidia* *], and that neither poetry nor prose, spoken or written, is of any great value [*axios* *], if, like the compositions of the rhapsodes, they are only recited in order to be believed 278 [*didake* * & *peitho* *], and not with any view to criticism or instruction; and who thinks that even the best of writings are but a reminiscence [*hupomnesis* *] of what we know [*eido* *], and that only in principles of justice [*dikaiois* *] and goodness [*kalos* *] and nobility [*agathos* *] taught [*didasko* *] and communicated [*mathesis* *] orally for the sake of instruction and graven [*grapho* *] in the soul [*psuche* *], which is the true way of writing, is there clearness [*enarges* *] and perfection [*teleos* *] and seriousness [*spoude* * & *axios* *], and that such principles are a man's own and his legitimate offspring;-being, in the first place, the word which he finds [*heurisko* *] in his own bosom [*en hauto*]; secondly, the brethren and descendants and relations of his others [*psuche* *];-and who cares for [*emphuo*] them and no others-this is the right sort of [*kinduneuo* * & *axia* *] man; and you and I, Phaedrus, would pray [*euchomai* *] that we may become like him.

Anagkaios / *paidia*: childish play, sport / *axios* / *didake* / *peitho* / *hupomnesis*: literally, memory under or *hupo*- / *eido* / *didaios* / *kalos* / *agathos* / *didasko* / *mathesis*: teaching, learning / *grapho* / *psuche* / *enarges* / *teleos* / *spoude* / *axios* / *heurisko* / *en hauto*: in himself for “bosom” / *psuche* / *emphuo*: to implant, grow in, *em*- / *kinduneuo*: to make a venture, take a risk / *axia*: with *kata* or according to / *euchomai*: *eu*- or well.

Phaedr. That is most assuredly my desire [*boulomai* *] and prayer [*euchomai* *].

Boulomai / *euchomai*.

Soc. And now the play is played out [*paizo* *]; and of rhetoric enough [*metrios* *]. Go and tell Lysias that to the fountain and school of the Nymphs we went down, and were bidden by them to convey a message to him and to other composers of speeches-to Homer and other writers of poems, whether set to [*suntithemi* *] music or not; and to Solon and others who have composed writings in the form of political discourses which they would term laws [*nomos* *]-to all of them we are to say that if their compositions are based on [*suntithemi* *] knowledge [*eidōs* *] of the truth [*alethes* *], and they can defend or prove them, when they are put to the test, by spoken arguments, which leave their writings poor in comparison of them, then they are to be called, not only poets, orators, legislators, but are worthy of a higher name, befitting the serious pursuit of their life. if you can defend [*elegcho* *] your writing when you are challenged and if you can yourself make the argument [*apodeiknumi*] that your writing is of little worth [*phaulos* *], then you must be called by a name [*eponumia* *] derived not from these writings but rather from those things that you are seriously pursuing [*spoudazo* *]

Paizo / *metrios* (adverb) / *suntithemi*: to set or place with, *sun*- (used twice) / *nomos* / *eidōs* / *alethes* / *elegcho* / *apodeiknumi*: to point away from, *apo*- / *phaulos* / *eponumia*: derived, significant name; *epi*- or upon / *spoudazo*: to be eager.

Phaedr. What name [*eponumia* *] would you assign [*nemo*] to them?

Eponumia / *nemo*: to dispense.

Soc. Wise [*sophos* *], I may not call [*kaleo* *] them; for that is a great name which belongs to [*dokeo* *] God [*theos* *] alone,-lovers of wisdom or philosophers [*philosophos* *] is their modest [*harmozo*] and befitting [*emmeles*] title.

Sophos / kaleo / dokeo / theos: a god / *philosophos / harmozo*: to adapt, harmonize / *emmeles*.: in tune, harmonious.

Phaedr. Very suitable [*tropos* *].

Tropos: method, way.

Soc. And he who cannot rise above [*timios* *] his own compilations [*suntithemi* *] and compositions [*grapho* *], which he has been long patching [*strepho* *], and piecing [*kollao*], adding some and taking away some, may be justly called poet or speech-maker or law-maker.

Timios: worthy / *suntithemi*: to set or place with, *sun-* / *grapho / strepho*: to turn / *kollao*: to glue.

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. Now go and tell this to your companion.

Phaedr. But there is also a friend of yours who ought not to be forgotten [*parerchomai*].

Parerchomai: to pass by, *para-*.

Soc. Who is he?

Phaedr. Isocrates the fair:-What message will you send to him, and how shall we describe him?

Soc. Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus; but I am willing to hazard a prophecy concerning him.

279 Phaedr. What would you prophesy [*manteuomai*]?

Manteuomai: to divinize.

Soc. I think [*dokeo* *] that he has a genius [*phusis* *] which soars above [*ameinon* *] the orations of Lysias, and that his character [*ethos* *] is cast [*kerannumi* *] in a finer mold. My impression of him is that he will marvelously [*thaumastos*] improve [*proeimi* *] as he grows older, and that all former rhetoricians will be as children in comparison [*diaphero* *] of him. And I believe that he will not be satisfied with rhetoric, but that there is in him a divine [*theios* *] inspiration [*horme*] which will lead him to things higher still. For he has [*dianoia* *] an element of philosophy [*philosophia* *] in his nature [*phusis* *]. This is the message of the gods dwelling in this place, and which I will myself deliver to Isocrates, who is my delight; and do you give the other to Lysias, who is yours.

Dokeo / phusis / ameinon: stronger, better / *kerannumi / thaumastos / proeimi*: to go forward, *pro-* / *diaphero*: literally, to carry or bear through, *dia-* / *theios / horme*: impulse / *dianoia*: literally, through or *dia-* the *nous* or mind / *philosophia / phusis*.

Phaedr. I will; and now as the heat is abated let us depart.

Soc. Should we [*prepo* *] not offer up a prayer [*euchomai* *] first of all to the local deities [*theios* *]? By all means.

Prepo: to be fitting / *euchomai*: eu- or well / *theios*.

Soc. Beloved [*philos* *] Pan, and all you other gods [*theos* *] who haunt this place, give me beauty [*kalos* *] in the inward soul [*endothen* *]; and may the outward [*exothern* *] and inward man be at one [*echo* * & *philos* *]. May I reckon [*nomizo* *] the wise [*sophos* *] to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as a temperate man [*sophron* *] and he only can bear and carry.- Anything more? The prayer [*euchomai* *], I think, is enough [*metrios* *] for me.

Philos / *theos* / *kalos* / *endothen* / *exothern* / *echo*: to have / *philos* / *nomizo* / *sophos* / *sophron* / *euchomai* / *metrios* (adverb).

Phaedr. Ask the same for me, for friends [*suneuchomai*] should have all things in common [*koinos* *].

Suneuchomai: literally, to join in (*sun-*) prayer or thanksgiving / *koinos*.

Soc. Let us go.

+ The End +