

Book Seven of the Republic by Plato

Introduction

For countless generations the image of a cave in Plato's **Republic** has been (and continues to be) a compelling image with regard to philosophical discourse. In addition to this it has strong religious associations because people saw it as an ideal representation of the world in which we live and the one to which we aspire. In other words, this image just seemed to have clicked, especially with Christian theology. The analogy speaks to a reality comprised of two parts: the cave and that which is outside it. While we might find it uncomfortably true to identify with the troglodytes, something mysterious and unidentifiable within us says that our true homeland is not there but in the light outside the cave or more properly, "a long way" up meaning this light is above the cave. Hence the unmistakable pull of this complex image.

The familiarity of the cave image has been commented upon so many times that it almost prevented me from jotting down what this document contains. I figured that already the Best and the Brightest had put forth their reflections; adding to them seemed like a waste of time, even an insult to their brilliant insights. At the same time the irresistible nature of the cave analogy just noted couldn't be ignored. I'd feel something were lacking if I hadn't put down these reflections. This has less to do with their worth and more a desire not to miss out on the experience of reading the text and jotting down reflections found there on my own.

Of course, everyone is invited to do this regardless of what others may think and certainly without fear of being criticized. The most important thing is *to enjoy the experience*, an overall theme I put forth with regard to other documents on this home page. This observation isn't intended to cover up inconsistencies in the document at hand as well as all the others. Rather it's to point to a long-lost fact about such ancient texts and those not so ancient: they are to be read with pleasure and incorporated into one's life as best as possible, that is, without strain. So after a few more necessary points, let's begin.


The Greek text is from **Platonis Opera**, Vol. IV edited by John Burnet (Oxford, 1902) whereas the English translation is from **Plato: Complete Works** edited by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, 1997). To better distinguish between the two, the former is in **dark red** and the latter in **dark blue**. For those with regular black and white printers, the English translation is in the font Tahoma whereas the notations are in the font Bodini BT, both 13 point. The intention is to make the two will stand out more clearly.

As for the nature of this document, it could be the first in a series of notations on Plato's **Dialogues**, more specifically, certain sections. Thus it may resemble the series of "notation"

documents relative to books of scripture already posted.

Please note that the text below is from 514a through 520d only, for the image of cave serves to introduce remarks on education within a *polis* or city-state.

This is a diagram lifted from a website.



The Text (514a-520d)

514 Next, I said, compare the effect of education and of the lack of it on our nature to an experience like this: imagine human beings living in an underground, cave-like dwelling, with an entrance a long way up which is both open to the light and as wide as the cave itself. They have been there since childhood, fixed in the same place with **b** their necks and legs fettered, able to see only in front of them because their bonds prevent them from turning their heads around. Light is provided by a fire burning far above and behind them. Also behind them but on higher ground there was a path stretching between them and the fire. Imagine that along this path a low wall has **c** been built like the screen in front of puppeteers above which they show their puppets.

“Next” (*meta tauta*: after these) is reference to a point of discussion which the speaker, that is, Socrates, sums at the end of Book Six consisting of “four such conditions in the soul or *psuche*.” They are understanding, thought, belief and imaging (*noesis*, *dianoia*,

pistis and *eikasia*, 514d). With this in mind, we could say that Book Seven concerns itself with *noesis* as tied in with the educative process and may be defined as intelligence in the sense of the thought process. It differs from the second (*dianoia*) which applies to thought as intention or purpose; note the preposition *dia-* suggests through-ness as well as thorough-ness. Both *noesis* and *dianoia* have as their root *nous*, mind.

Socrates puts forth a twofold theme, education and the lack of it. The first is *paideia* which involves the rearing of a child to adulthood, a fairly extended period of time when one's mind and character are formed chiefly by the example of the person(s) responsible, not just parents. He or she is presumed to be living a life of virtue or *arete* which implies excellency in all areas of life. Hence *paideia* and *arete* are pretty much interchangeable. The second is the same root with alpha privative (*apaideusia*) and in a word may be called stupidity, the mark of a malformed character. Socrates decides on making a comparison, *apeikazo* being the verb meaning to form from a model, to represent, the preposition *apo-* (from) prefaced to the root for *eikazo* (to represent by a likeness) and hence *eikon* or image. *Apo-* suggests from-ness, taking a picture, as it were, from something and putting it elsewhere...i.e., to make a comparison.

The distinction between *paideia* and *apaideusia* concerns human nature ('our nature' according to Jowett), *phusis* being the natural form or constitution of a person or a thing and implies its growth. The noun *pathos* translates here as effect relative to both *paideia* and *apaideusia*. It's a difficult word to translate meaning what one has experienced (suffered) in a basically passive manner and is applicable to the effects of *paideia* and *apaideusia* on a person. However, both involve active participation; even the latter concerns some form of rejection of the training offered.

Socrates invites the reader to envisage an image he's about to present using the common but important verb *eido* (here as to imagine) which means to perceive or behold and hence to know with emphasis upon seeing. And so we're bidden to conjure up an image of people living not on earth but under it, this being rendered by two adjectives, *katageios* and *spelaiodes* (under the earth and cavern-like), the latter suggestive of a fairly large assembly hall. The "like" part of *spelaiodes* means that the adjective doesn't quite mirror the reality of a cave which is representative of our current human existence. The image approaches which means that a lot is left to our imagination that we may figure out how the cave relates to our own lives.

Even though the cave conjures up dank, underground associations, it is a place where people live, *oikesis* being applicable to a house or dwelling. More disturbingly, as we go along, we find that this cave is our very existence. The entrance (*eisodos*: *eis-* or into) stretches upward, *anapetannumi* suggestive of flying or flapping upward (*ana-*) not unlike a bird which, in the case at hand, finds itself trapped and is desperately trying to escape.

In fact, it resembles a helpless fluttering where the bird attempts to fly upward; the more it tries, the harder it falls. The semi-dark atmosphere Socrates masterfully depicts contrasts with the *ana-* of the verb just mentioned relative to the preposition *pros*, that is, to or toward the light. Interestingly the entrance, despite being so far removed from this cavity in the earth, is as wide (*makros*) as the cave itself. That means one side is completely open to the *anapetannumi* while the other three sides consist of solid rock. Note that the size of this room isn't given; same with the number of prisoners. However, being representative of human living, it is larger than the physical world in the sense of including our thoughts and what springs from them. In light of this, size is irrelevant to this *oikesis* or where people abide permanently.

The inhabitants (again, no number is given but is indicative of virtually the entire human race) have been in this underground chamber with one side cut out which is as wide as the chamber. They've dwelt there since childhood (*pais*) implying that they may have not been born in the cave but placed in it after birth like abandoned children left on a doorstep. Since the cave isn't the native home of its inhabitants, some residual memory of the outside world remains but is almost fully clouded over. In fact, this cloud is not unlike the cave itself, representative of *lethe*, forgetfulness, the mortal enemy of *paideia* (education) which relies upon our recollective faculty. And so these people are chained (*desmos* applies to chains as well as fetters) as babes, really, before they've learned to walk which suggests that their limbs have withered away. Even if freed and they wanted to walk out, their limbs couldn't support them. Neither can they see (*horao* : to look out for, appear) left or right but only straight ahead (*prosthen*; the *pros-* here suggestive of forwardness only).

The verb *periago* means to lead or to draw around (*peri-*) which these fundamentally non-native troglodytes were prevented from doing. As just noted, only vision directed straight ahead (*prosthen*) is permitted, not one which is *peri*. In sum, we're dealing with vision which is *pros* vs. *peri* or forward vs. around. The verb *meno* which means to remain or to abide applies to being fixed permanently in one place. Since memory of what went before is dim yet essentially present, they take this as their natural condition. Actually the particular way Socrates is describing the cave is rather eerie. That is to say, not the physical part but the fact that it has been set in place with everything in order. Apparently someone wishes desperately to conceal from the human race that they have been born free and have a natural disposition for *paideia*. Perhaps this unease which Socrates doesn't mention forthrightly had provided the stimulus for one of the prisoners to free himself and escape the cave.

The cave's eeriness is enhanced with the presence of light (*phos*) in the form of a fire (*puros* can be a regular fire or a torch) meaning it's not natural but fueled by wood or charcoal and thus has to be kept going by someone. The size of the fire isn't given, but because the cave is dark, even a smallish one would suffice. So the real problem faced by

those in charge is to keep this fire going constantly. Three adverbs suggestive of distance describe the fire in relation to those who are bound: *anothen*, *porrothen* and *opisthen* (above, far off and behind). That makes the fire quite remote and dim. Nothing is said about any smoke produced which surely was, that contributing to the gloom within the cave by making it difficult for the prisoners to recognize each other, a symbol contributing to forgetfulness of how they got there in the first place.

On a higher level (*epano*: above) behind (*opisthen*) these unfortunates is a path (*hodos*) between them and the fire. Those so bound don't seem to consider themselves as such, knowing nothing better, nor would they called themselves prisoners. Keep in mind that this fire was just described as *anothen*, *porrothen* and *opisthen* (above, far off and behind). So the path extends between them, and this distant fire means they can hear footsteps of anyone walking to or from them. In other words, they have a keen sense of depth perception within this cave.

As for the wall or *teichion*, it pertains to that of a building compared with *teichos*, a wall more proper to a city as a defense. It extends along the path, the verb to describe its construction being *paroikodomeo* which means to build across or to pass. It consists of two roots, *oikos* and *demo* (house and to construct) prefaced with the preposition *para* which conveys the sense of being beside. This wall (again, proper to a building) resembles a screen or *paraphragma* defined as a breastwork on top of a wall or mound as well as screen or curtain. It consists of the root *phragma* (fence, screen) prefaced with another use of the preposition *para*, again, meaning beside. Furthermore, it lies between the prisoners and those on the path behind them, the verb being *prokeimai*, to set before (*pro*-). Perhaps the quasi-defensive image of this *paraphragma* is there for protection, in case those fettered break loose and attempt to escape. The element of fear, while not specified, is nevertheless present between the prisoners and those on the path.

So the wall just described is in front of the puppeteers or *thaumatapoiios* which derives from the verb meaning to do wonders, to play juggler's tricks (*thauma*: wonder, puppet show, toy theater and *poieo*, to make or to do). Even use of the term *thauma* implies that it captures the attention of those to whom it is shown. That means those fettered aren't bored but far from it. In many ways, they are too captivated by the *thauma* to even be aware of their chains.

Above the wall these tricksters, if you will, show their puppets, *deiknumi*, which also means to inform or set before. They seem to be in charge of what goes on within the cave which is is an easy job as far as the prisoners go because they're set in place permanently and require basic human needs. On occasion the prisoners may get an idea of what their caretakers are saying from behind. They have nothing threatening to say, really, because the cave is a ready-made prison, the sole purpose of which is to keep the inmates occupied.

At one time the puppeteers may have been chained as well but gradually earned their role as being in charge provided they agreed to keep the cave environment going, never allowing anyone to come it with the reality laying above. Perhaps a few even may have escaped from the cave but unlike the escapee about to be discussed, they preferred darkness over light. For their reward, they were set in charge, ultimately just as chained as their prisoners.

I'm imagining it.

Glaucon apparently is the person with whom Socrates is speaking, understandably enthralled with this example. *Horao* is the verb used which means to look out for, to appear and can suggest that Glaucon is familiar with the image presented, uncomfortably so, because it rings true in his own life. Clearly he wishes Socrates to continue in order to resolve this issue and eventually climb out of the cave of his personal ignorance in which he had lived but didn't realized until now.

Then also imagine that there are people along the wall carrying all kinds of artifacts **c** that project above it—statutes of people and other animals made out of stone, wood **515** and every material. And as you would expect, some of the carriers are talking and some are silent.

Horao is the verb for imagine which, as noted above, fundamentally means to see. Socrates invites Glaucon to continue entertaining this unusual image which turns out to be a description of how people comport themselves in the world which supposedly is above ground but in actuality is below it. The amount of people along (*para* connotes being beside) the wall (*teichion*) isn't specified, presumably the puppeteers, and are carrying (the common verb *phero*) numerous artifacts or *skeue* which translates variously as a vessel, equipment and even attire. Not only are these anonymous, unnumbered persons carrying them, they are holding them up high in order to project above the wall, *huperecho* being the verb which suggests making them prominent (*hyper-* or beyond).

The artifacts comprise images or better, things which have been wrought (*ergazomai*) and are divided into two different types, belonging to people or other living things and *zoon*, applicable to a living being or a figure. Both are made not just of stone or wood but of every kind (*pantoios*) of material.

Eikos means probably or in all likelihood and pertains to someone like Glaucon and others at a point when the image Socrates is presenting comes into clearer focus. The verb *paraphero* is used for the bearers of these images which have been wrought or *ergazomai*. It consists of the root *phero* prefaced with the preposition *para-* intimating a bringing forward as well as a turning away. In other words, they are busy manipulating these

objects as quickly as they can. The prisoners may recognize some objects presented earlier and are inserted within their memory but have no power over them.

The two groups are either talking or not, *phtheggomai* meaning to utter a sound or to speak loudly and clearly. This could indicate a division of workers: those issuing orders as how and where to place the images and those carrying out the orders. All the while both groups have their attention on those who are fettered just below them knowing that they are bound there while the two groups carry on without interference. The presentation of images goes on uninterrupted, for the cave knows no distinction between night and day, the fire being the only source of light. Therefore the prisoners have no conception of the passage of time, just the passage of images.

It's a strange image you're describing and strange prisoners.

The adjective *atopos* is used twice meaning having no *topos* or no place with respect to what Socrates is conveying through both an image and the prisoners, *eikon* and *desmotes*. The first can apply to something which is alive, a representation, and the latter is the first time this noun is used though *desmos* applied to the people who are chained in the cave. While Glaucon is giving this response, he must be thinking to when he said above when he's imaging two examples which are *atopos*. In fact, the cave itself is *atopos* with respect to the light outside it.

They are like us. Do you suppose, first of all that these prisoners see anything of themselves and one another besides the shadows that the fire casts on the wall and front of them?

Homoios or like applies to that which is in common. Socrates makes a distinction between the troglodytes and “us,” a gesture of humility so that anyone considering their plight may not feel superior.

Oimai is the verb meaning to think or to suppose concerning the possibility of the prisoners being able to see (*horaō*). More specifically, this seeing applies to themselves as looking in a mirror whether individually or collectively. It doesn't matter, really, for all look the same. This stands in contrast to shadows (*skia*), namely, the statues of people and animals mentioned above. Glaucon's question intimates that the prisoners are stuck looking one way. While having the ability to hear (it's not mentioned specifically), we can assume they have this facility and they are aware of conversations transpiring behind them. In fact, that is their most developed sense. The question about the prisoners being able to see themselves is in addition to the shadows the fire throws on the wall before them. *Katantikru* is a preposition meaning over against, right opposite, and has the preposition *eis* which reads literally “into that which is right opposite.” As for the casting of light,

prospipto is the verb consisting of the root *pipto* meaning to fall prefaced with the preposition *pros* which signifies direction toward-which and hence a more direct casting.

b How could they, if they have to keep their heads motionless throughout life?

Socrates' response is direct and to the point, Glaucon apparently having missed his words about “their bonds prevent them from turning their heads around.” He says that while the troglodytes may not have been born in the cave, nevertheless it's their home, and they know no other. Apparently they have some kind of restraints to keep their heads in one place which sounds like something right out of a horror movie. This device like a quasi-mask or the like keeps the heads from turning, that is, they are *akinetos*, and this *akinetos* seems like it's pretty severe. Even worse, it lasts for life. Supposedly when a prisoner dies, he is removed and another takes his place. Despite the unpleasant prospect of never being able to move your head, let alone fettered, it goes unquestioned throughout life, a real tragedy which shows the gripping force these *thauma* or image must have over the persons so bound.

What about the things being carried along the wall? Isn't the same true of them?

Paraphero or literally to carry beside (*para-*) is the verb for carried which here is passive whereas its earlier use is active as “carriers.”

Of course.

And if they could talk to one another, don't you think they'd suppose that the names they used applied to the things they see passing before them?

Perhaps these things—the statues of people and animals—could come alive and speak with each other, *dialego* applicable to having a discussion (*dia-* or through suggestive of thoroughness). Obviously the inability to *dia-lego* applies to things which have been fabricated, not unlike idols. They imply that the troglodytes are in a similar condition even though they're packed together closely. But if the statues of people and animals were endowed with the capacity to speak, chances are they would name what they see before them, *horao* being used for this seeing. The verb *nomizo* applies to the giving of names which essentially means to hold as a custom, to make common use of. Apparently the prisoners can't give names, but that isn't for certain. If it is, those bearing the statues are only slightly better off than their captives.

They'd have to.

Anagke is a noun meaning force or restraint in response to the question about the relation

between names (*nomizo*) and what is *paraphero* or passing by.

And what if their prison also had an echo from the wall facing them? Don't you think they would believe that the shadows passing in front of them were talking whenever one of the carriers passing along the wall was doing so?

For the first time the cave is called for what it truly is, a prison or *desmoterion*, a place where people are chained (cf. *desmos* above), the idea being that they are not only in one huge cell but but chained within it, the chains being an extra measure of security and fear on the part of those in charge. It is a place of illusions which Socrates now begins to flesh out more clearly. *Oiomai* is the verb meaning to think which pertains to Socrates asking more or less rhetorically Glaucon's opinion on this “strange image and strange prisoners” and offered his opinion as above. He proposes the possibility of an echo bouncing off the opposite wall, *katantikru* them. Despite being muffled, echos within a confined space have greater impact because no external noises are interfering. Although this wall is *katantikru*, there are two other two walls minus the entrance which is “open to the light and as wise as the cave itself.”

This acoustical arrangement, if you will, would lead those so bound facing forward to conclude one fact—*hegeomai* also meaning to lead or to have dominance—that the shadows (*skia*) passing before them are engaged in conversation. This could lead further that the shadows are living beings, perhaps some kind of deities. The verb for passing before is *pariemi* containing the preposition *para-* or beside which apparently are engaged in talking, *phtheggomai* where emphasis is upon the utterance of words or some kind of exclamation. This seems to occur intermittently or when one of the persons behind the prisoners bearing an artifact or *skeue* passes by (*pariemi*). Although no details are given as to their conversations, they can vary from a normal tone to an extended one, either in loud or soft utterances. So the ones who are chained would have their attention divided between what they may consider deities (on the wall) and unknown voices from behind. The latter ones in chains similarly may lay claim to divinity, for they see a connection between the two. After all, their vision is restricted to right in front of them while their hearing isn't. Surely they must have questioned why this is so but by reason of their fetters, never could take steps to fix it, that is, until one prisoner makes good his escape.

I certainly do.

Ma Di': a strong affirmation invoking a divinity whose name usually is suppressed, most likely referring to Zeus.

c Then the prisoners would in every way believe that the truth is nothing other than the shadows of those artifacts.

Pantapasi: an adverb for in every way which is comprised of two forms of *pan*, all and used with the verb *nomizo* which as noted above applies to the giving of names, that is, names given to the shadows which is not unlike attributing divinity to them. Here, however, *nomizo* is used with respect to the truth or *to alethes*, what is true (adjective). It intimates that the prisoners accept the reality of the *skia /skeue* or shadows/artifacts, take them as given. After all, what else is there in the cave? Although they hear voices from behind, they're not certain about them...semi-real, if we can put it like that.

They must surely believe that.

The noun *anagke* or necessity is with the adjective *polus*, much or many...much necessity to put it literally and not unlike *Ma Di'* above.

Consider, then what being released from their bonds and cured of their ignorance would naturally be like if something like this came to pass. When one of them was freed and suddenly compelled to stand up, turned his head, walk and look up toward the light, he would be pained and dazzled and unable to see the things who shadows **d** he had seen before. What do you think he would say if we told him that what he had seen before was inconsequential, but that now because he is a bit closer to the things that are and is turned towards things that are more he sees more correctly? Or to put it another way, if we pointed to each of the things passing by, asked him what each of them is and compelled him to answer, don't you think he would be at a loss and that he would believe that the things he sought earlier were truer than the ones he was now being shown?

Skopeo is the verb beginning this paragraph which means to behold, consider or examine, something Socrates invites Glaucon to do although in essence it's virtually impossible after the gloom and doom of this cave. It pertains to two wild possibilities, the first being a release or *luisis*, an apt words considering the fetters binding the prisoners. Fundamentally it means a loosing and even ransom...as if there might be someone willing to offer a thing of value for their release. The second possibility consists of something more inward, if you will, that being a cure of ignorance. Keep in mind, however, that the prisoners seem to have been placed in their sorry state, not being born there. So if a cure is to be offered, it is one pertinent to recollection of their native-born condition outside the cave but where that might be is anybody's guess.

The condition in which the prisoners find themselves is one of *aphrosune* which alternately means folly and thoughtlessness. It's the alpha privative of *phren* amounting to having no heart, spirit and essentially being gutless. Socrates describes this unheard of possibility by using the two terms *phusis* and *sumbaino*, nature and to come or go together

(*sum-* or with). In other words, if the proposed release and cure of ignorance were to harmonize with regard to the prisoners' inherent nature, not their being in the cave which is a case of mistaken identity.

Socrates has one of the prisoners experiencing this loosening or *luo*, that is to say, only one from an indefinite number of inmates. How, when and why this comes about is not given and left up to our imagination or better, left up to each of us if we have what it takes to make this momentous decision. Action is passive...“was freed” or not on his own which implies some kind of agent is at work whether external or internal to him. If we could locate that, then the whole issue of the cave analogy is solved. As for the prisoner's decision, it's momentous and indeed the turning point in this unusual saga. Note, that this unique prisoner is compelled to stand up (*anagkazo* and *anistemi*; the latter connotes restoring) meaning he isn't doing it on his own but by someone or something else, that source again left up to our imagination. Would it be one of the puppeteers sympathetic to his plight? The person in charge of the cave, whoever that might be? Again, questions best left unanswered but are allowed to percolate in the back of our minds. So whoever compels him comes over and raises him his feet. However, his feet had been chained since childhood or even babyhood, so he doesn't have the ability to walk because his legs are almost withered away. In other words, the potential for exiting the cave is conditioned on the ability to walk. Note that this along with standing up is done suddenly or *exaiphnes*, the preposition *ex-* (from) intimating quickness.

Obviously legs which are practically useless aren't able to bear the body's weight as just noted, but the prisoner with whom we're concerned manages literally to crawl toward the entrance. He knows this must be done *exaiphnes*, not gradually, else he might balk and refuse to take the risk. Also *exaiphnes* connotes a sense of urgency, that he has to exit the cave before anyone else notices. As for the other prisoners, they're too preoccupied with the images being flashed on the screen. Perhaps one of the puppeteers was sympathetic to this prisoner's plight, he wanting to make good his escape as well. If this fellow could make it, he'd have some help on the outside for an escape. In that case he may have asked his fellows to increase the intensity of images so as to keep everyone else occupied.

The act of painfully standing up takes place at the same time the prisoner is forced (*anagkazo*) to turn his head, *periago* being the verb where the preposition *peri-* means around or about. This too the prisoner had never experienced, his head being forced to be *akinetos* or unmoved and compelled to look straight ahead. Such is the second of three instance of *exaiphnes*, of sudden movement. The third comprises two parts, walking and looking up toward the light. You'd expect someone in this condition to barely shuffle along which is what the verb *badizo* connotes, doing this under his own power. At the same time he raises his head (*anablepo*, *ana-* meaning above) in the direction of the light. The preposition *pros* pertains to forward movement guided by, if you will, the *ana-* of

anablepo. Thus we have two prepositions relative to forward and/or upward movement. Obviously the prisoner has to pass the puppeteers who interestingly don't hassle his progress. This could be from indifference. In effect, they're just as much fettered as the prisoners over whom they have been appointed to keep in check.

Despite having been fettered for so long, Socrates is more interested in the effect of light from outside the cave on this escapee, that is, sunlight compared with the weak light provided by a fire. For this reason the light toward which (*pros*) he walks ever so slowly but surely and to which he raises his eyes (*anablepo*) both pains and dazzles his vision. This is rendered by the verb *kathorao*, literally to look down upon (*kata-*) or to regard. And as already noted, he does this on withered legs. *Alego* is the verb for pain (usually of the bodily kind) along with being dazzled, the latter rendered by *adunatos* or being rendered unable with the noun *marmaruge* which means a flashing or gleaming with the preposition *dia* or through. In other words, his sight is blinded by or through flashes rendering him incapable of seeing. In a sense, the fire inside the cave had such *marmaruge* (the leaping of its flames) but was considerably dimmer.

The prisoner is unable to distinguish objects clearly by reason of this *marmaruge*, the realm which had cast shadows (*skia*) down into the cave and onto the wall mediated by the puppeteers. So this *marmaruge* seems to be where real objects are, that is, compared with shadows in the cave. Socrates doesn't specify what these real objects are, just that they are present or more accurately, are present within each prisoner who hadn't been born inside the cave but outside and then fettered there for life.

At this juncture Socrates poses a question more or less rhetorical that's on the mind of everyone reading this analogy of the cave. everyone's attention, of course, is focused upon one prisoner who makes good his escape. Escape as we conceive it may not be the right word, for nothing suggests a break-out let alone collaboration with fellow prisoners who remain fettered as usual. Concerning our prisoner, he "was freed (*luo*...the passive *lutheie*)," where the means is suggested more than said in outright fashion. Obviously being freed is key immediately after which our prisoner hasn't yet a clue as to what is going on. We're to step in at this point and inform him that what he had witnessed (*horao*) most of his life not only consisted of a display of puppets but of puppeteers within a cave in comparison to the light. Socrates calls these artifacts or *skeue* inconsequential which here is the noun *phluaria* meaning silly talk or nonsense.

Note that "we"—Plato and Glaucon—are to tell the ex-prisoner about the artifacts he and the others were compelled to watch, not knowing his response but eagerly awaiting it now that he is closer to things as they really are. This is rendered by *eggutero* (*eggus* meaning near) with the genitive *tou ontos*, literally "of being." The comparative of *eggus* doesn't mean the prisoner is close to being (*eimi*) but in comparison to his previous condition, is in

a far better space to give an assessment of the two. Presumably at this stage he has managed to climb if not crawl up that entrance which is “a long way up” as noted in the opening paragraph. And so Socrates and Glaucon are standing at the cave's entrance waiting to greet this special person and guide him from there.

In addition to greater proximity to being—and what that means remains to be spelled out—the attention of the now former prisoner is turned toward “things that are more.” This object, if you will, is rendered by the preposition *pros*. As noted above, this preposition signifies direction towards-which and used with *mallon onta*, literally as more being. The verb *blepo* means to look in the sense of being possessed with sight; compare with *horao* or to see, that is, more with the eyes. Although the prisoner was capable of one-way sight as *blepo* towards the wall, now this same *blepo* is amplified far more than he could have imagined.

Socrates re-phrases the question ('to put it another way') by again putting himself in company with the ex-prisoner and asking him to compare what he sees (*horao*) now with what he had seen earlier in the cave. Note that Socrates compels (*anagkazo*) the man to answer...he doesn't force him...which is in line with his customary approach to elicit a response from within and not imposed from without. After all, the prisoner got out on his own accord and can't adjust to his new environment on his own, a place with more being compared to one with less being. However, he's certain about one thing: that he can see more correctly, the verb *blepo* being used with the comparative *orthos* which also means straight...seeing straight ahead, if you will.

While we have Socrates, Glaucon and the ex-prisoner standing, if you will, outside the cave, they're beholding things passing by or *ekaston ton parionton* (each passing in their vicinity or *para-* them) which is the same as the *mallon onta* of the last paragraph, things with more being. If this “stuff” outside the cave is endowed with more being, it implies that what is within the cave has less being. Furthermore, we're dealing with the capacity of seeing, again the verb *horao* with regard to stuff outside the cave or perceiving what has less being compared with what has more being. Right away the ex-prisoner is trying to determine exactly where he actually is. At least he has Socrates by his side in his well-known role as midwife which at this point is playing a critical role to bring something to birth within the former prisoner. The chief means of performing this duty of midwifery is by showing, the verb *deiknumi* suggests the making of an offer which can be either accepted or rejected. Regardless, Socrates is looking for an answer, *apokrino* meaning to mark by a distinction, *apo-* being the preposition for from.

Because of his inability to adjust to this “place” of more being, the ex-prisoner is at a loss to give an answer as to what is passing by him, these objects not yet being clarified. However, it's put this way in order to draw us into further inquiry and not sink back into

our personal caves. Without a doubt, he's in a state of perplexity which might include a temptation to return to his fettered existence. The verb *aporeo* describes this man's situation perfectly, to be at a loss or to have no resources as to his position, the spot Socrates wants to get not just him but everyone else who deal with him. Being so confused yet simultaneously in a strange state of calm makes one more docile to the truth which here is put as more being vs. less being. One still has an option to go either way despite the desirability of the former. Socrates does say that the ex-prisoner would opt for the latter...less being...by reason of the security it supposedly had offered. In other words, the cave is a place he remembers, and remembrance as *anamnesis* is knowledge of one's origins. Without it one can't even distinguish being the two modes of being.

So the ex-prisoner is in a state of suspension brought on by *aporeo*. He has to decide all on his own without help from anyone else whether this sight of things passing by with more being is truer (*alethes*) than what he's being shown (*deiknumi*) now. "Being shown" is not effected by anyone with him though we could for convenience sake posit Socrates and Glaucon there with him. It's the seeing...the *horao*...of what has more being which is occurring right now compared with memory of the past, things with less being. This could be a way of saying that memory can be strong (more being) or weak (less being). Although we might be intrigued by the unidentified stuff passing by, that's not the point. It's more a question of opting for sharpening our faculty of memory or allowing it sink back into the cave of forgetfulness.

Much truer.

And if someone compels him to look at the light itself, wouldn't his eyes hurt and wouldn't he turn around and flee towards the things he's able to see, believing that they are really clearer than the ones he is being shown?

For the sake of clarifying the text, we could take these words as someone in the company of the ex-prisoner who is familiar with the realm of more being, perhaps a person who may have preceded him from the cave below and has become more adjusted to the new brightness. The verb *anagkazo* is used, that is, this other person compels the man to look (*blepo*), actually shaking him from his stupor because he remains dull and sluggish before the light (*phos*) which is far brighter than the fire within the cave. If he weren't pushed so hard, he'd just stand there pretty much not knowing what to do, no better than having been fettered down below. Naturally his eyes would hurt, *algeo* also connoting distress. This would prevent him from turning around (*apostrepho*: *strepho* or to turn prefaced with the preposition *apo*- or from; to turn back) and hastening to return to his former environment. The preposition *pros* is indicative of direction towards-which and refers, of course, to the far dimmer fire in the cave. Bound up with this *pros* is the familiarity with the cave environment expressed by the verb *dunamai*, to have the capacity, to do

something, and is connected with the verb *kathorao*, literally to look down upon with regard to the prison of the cave.

So what the ex-prisoner remembers of the cave rushes in upon him and tempts him sorely. After all, he had been out of there just a short time compared with having been raised in the cave from childhood. He believes the artifacts shown on the wall are clearer than what he is beholding right now, *nomizo* being derived from *nomos* (custom, usage) and thus suggestive of maintaining an opinion. Hence he believes that the cave's images are clearer (*saphes* also means distinct) than what is shown, *deiknumi* again in the passive which suggests something larger at work not quite made clear to us.

He would.

Outos or thus is Glaucon's natural response, he concurring from experience of his own personal cave, if you will.

And if someone dragged him away from them by force, up the rough, steep path and didn't let him go until he had dragged him into the sunlight, wouldn't he be pained and irritated at being treated that way? And when he came into the light with the sun **516** filling his eyes, wouldn't he be unable to see a single one of the things now said to be true?

Socrates now returns to the image of the cave, wanting to give an alternate picture of the situation. Someone familiar with the environment outside it has decided to come down and drag out the prisoner, *helko* meaning that he's brought by force (*bia*: often refers to bodily strength) or against his will compared with the earlier situation of him leaving voluntarily. He describes the entrance with a path as rough and steep. The word for this path is *anabasis*, more accurately an ascent which keeps in line with its earlier description as “a long way up.” However, this slope is both rough and steep, *trachus* and *anantes*, the former suggestive of being jagged and the latter as uphill. Along this difficult route not trodden very often this person has a firm grip (*aniemi*: to set on or urge as well as to free) on the prisoner, the verb *exelko* being used for dragged which is *helko* prefaced with the preposition *ex-* or from, which is more forceful. The distance up to the light isn't given but inferred by this foreboding entrance.

So why is this extraction put in such harsh terms? Compared with the prisoner's earlier free will ascent, Socrates' second description shows another side of life within the cave compared with life outside it. Both are true, showing two complementary sides of the transition for in real life we alternate between them. Finally he comes into the sun's full light (*phos*), angry after having been maltreated which is expressed by the two verbs *odunao* and *aganakteo* (to suffer pain and to be irritated or vexed). That, however, is the

beginning of the ex-prisoner's pains. Now he must deal with the full force of the sun's light. Actually he felt it growing stronger as he and the fellow leading him made their way up the path, approaching it with a certain anxiety. Now that he's fully exposed (*pros* or direction towards-which regarding the light), he can't behold anything it illumines, all of which are claimed to be true (*alethes*). Naturally speaking he does have a point. Bright light does away with distinctions and can cause a partial blindness. In the case at hand, the sun is the greater reality compared to the things it illumines. Might there happen to be some puppeteers like those in the cave controlled by the sun? Does that mean one must do away with the sun as well?

He would be unable to see them, at least at first.

Exaiphnes or suddenly, the preposition *ex-* or from prefaced to *aphno* meaning unawares and thereby intensifying it.

I suppose, then, that he had need time to get adjusted before he could see things in the world above. At first he had see shadows most easily, then images of men and other things in water, then the things themselves. Of these he would be able to study the things in the sky and the sky itself more easily at night, looking at the light of the **b** stars and the moon then during the day, looking at the sun and the light of the sun.

The verb *oimai* or to think in the sense of supposing is used here, but it's pretty obvious what the ex-prisoner must do to acclimatize himself after being unceremoniously dragged from the cave below into the sun's full light. *Sunetheia* is a noun meaning habitual intercourse or acquaintance...*ethos* meaning custom, usage...prefaced with the preposition *sun-* or with and has the verb *deo*, to be in want. Obviously it takes time to adjust one's eyes (*horao* again) to the full light of the sun which, of course, belongs to the world above the cave rendered as *ta ano* or the things above. *Ta ano* settles the matter definitively that the cave is beneath the ground, not cut into a mountainside as commonly thought. Nothing more is said of the fellow who dragged him out forcibly; he does this and leaves the scene at once, for the ex-prisoner is on his own now.

So after having become acclimatized to the brilliance of sunlight which isn't filtered, he sees (*kathorao*) things in a given order, the preposition *kata-* prefaced to the verb suggestive of this. This *kata-*, if you will, is threefold. First come shadows (*skia*) in ready fashion, *rhadios* meaning easy, because they are reminiscent of the shadows in the cave. I.e., like follows like but obviously of two completely different orders. Second are images or *eidolon*, this noun also meaning an unsubstantiated form, in essence, a phantom. Compare this *eidolon* with shadows of the cave; the former are more substantial than the latter yet still are shadows. They're comprised not only of men but apparently everything else existing on the ground above the cave. Here the shadows are in water, not on a cave

wall, leading the ex-prisoner that he hasn't exchanged one cave for another even if the latter is a kind of super-cave. Third and finally we have these things in and by themselves, (*auta*).

Once his vision has adjusted itself, he begins to engage in study, *theaomai* meaning to see clearly or having shifted to this from his customary *horao*, that is, to look out for, to appear. Hence it's indicative of appearance, the *skia* or shadows to which his vision had grown accustomed. Note that what he perceives more clearly now are located not in the cave nor upon the earth but in the sky as well as the sky itself, this being represented by the noun *ouranos*, the physical sky or heaven where the (heavenly) planets and hence divinities reside though he doesn't know this yet. The ex-prisoner is able to view the sky more easily at night than the day which must make him wonder about the relationship between the sun and the stars as well as planets. As for the night vision, it's called the *kosmos* (not mentioned here) which more fundamentally and appropriately applies to a decoration as in a woman's dress, flowing like the Milky way.

The verb *probleo* (*blepo* meaning to be possessed with sight) is used where the preposition *pros-* prefaced to it means a directed vision, one which as noted several times earlier with regard to this preposition, a direction towards-which. It's used both with regard to the sun (the only object, really) during the day and the stars plus moon by night. Surely our ex-prisoner is fascinated by twilight, morning and evening, when the reality of one shifts to another leading him to wonder what the stars are doing blotted out by the night. Sometimes, however, he can see the moon by day, leading him to believe that during this time they are present but invisible. The same doesn't apply to the sun, for it moves from east to west and mysteriously re-appears in the east to start the passage over again. Such an alternation was never visible in the cave, this being enough motive never to return there again. All this is simply expressed by exchanging that *horao* for this new, wondrous *problepo*.

Of course.

Finally, I suppose he'd be able to see the sun, not images of it in water or some alien place but the sun itself in its own place and be able to study it.

Finally is rendered such by the adjective *teleutaios* which connotes coming to an end or conclusion with the verb *oiomai* suggestive here of coming to a conclusion with the possibility, even remote, of an action that won't come to pass. At first it seems an understatement because the sun is blatantly obvious, especially for one who had spent his entire life in the cave. However, the ex-prisoner had been placed in the cave, not born there. Although he enjoys the novelty of beholding the sun, memory of the past images projected on the cave's wall have a surprising grasp over him. Here the sun's presence is

compared with images or appearances of it, that is, *phantasma* (also refers to a dream compared with *eikon*). When in water, such a *phantasma* shimmers and can be distorted by the light. The same type of distortion is worse in an alien place, *hedra* applicable to sitting and modified by *allogrios* which also means something forced or unnatural.

Compared with this sitting which is unnatural (to put it in another way) is the sun which has its own (*kath' auton* or according to its own) place, *chora* meaning position or station as in life. Because this infers something more permanent, the ex-prisoner is able to study the sun. This is rendered by two verbs pertinent to sight, *kateidon* (*eido* or to perceive, behold, prefaced with *kata-* which here means down) and *theaomai*, to see clearly as well as to see as a spectator. And so the studying at hand involves a looking-down (in the sense of catching a glimpse) and to see with clarity though in the quasi-detached fashion of a spectator.

Necessarily so.

And at this point he would infer and conclude that the sun provides the seasons and **c** the years, governs everything in the visible world and is in some way the cause of all things that he used to see.

“At this point” refers to when the ex-prisoner makes a distinction between images and the reality reflected in them which hitherto was confusing, that is, after the manner of the fire and images projected by it within the cave. A similar dynamic, at least superficially, is going on outside the cave with regard to the sun and images of it.

Sullogizomai is the verb which implies making an inference or to conclude from a premise and as used here suggests probability containing an element of uncertainty. The root is *logizomai* (usually to reckon) prefaced with the preposition *sun-* or with...to reckon with. It also includes the coming to a conclusion. Hence *sullogizomai* results in three conclusions. The sun is the means by which time is kept throughout the different seasons, the verb being *parecho*, literally a having beside or in the vicinity (*para-*). Secondly the sun governs everything we can see, *epitrepo* meaning to turn over to, to entrust with the preposition *epi-* or upon prefaced to the verbal root. Its field of operation, if you will, is the world (*topos* is used, place) which we can see, *horao*. Third and finally the sun is the cause (*aitios*) of everything visible, *horao* used for the second time in a row but here with regard to *tropos* which also means a turn, way, habit or custom. However, this sets the stage for a comparison between this new discovery and memory of the cave's existence. Soon it will be a matter of choosing between them.

It's clear that would be his next step.

Glaucon acknowledges this conclusion as coming (*erchomai*) next, for what the ex-prisoner beholds is so obvious but as said just above, is bound to conflict with memory of the cave's shadows.

What about when he reminds himself of his first dwelling place, his fellow prisoners and what passed for wisdom there? Don't you think that he'd count himself happy for the change and pity the others?

Glaucon asks *ti oun*, literally as “what then?” regarding this comparison which by its very description is bound to cause problems. *Anamimnesko* is the verb to remember, reflexive, if you will, the ex-prisoner going back (*ana-* as up to or along) to memories of the cave. Involved here are memories of having been deluded when he was in the cave. Note that they don't pertain to himself but to those still in there. Like him, they're endowed with this faculty of recollection but are too captivated by the images dancing on the wall to access it.

Socrates speaks of three aspects of this memory. First the cave as the ex-prisoner's second dwelling, *oikesis* involving management of a household, not just the physical place but concern for all who live in it. In actuality the cave isn't his proper *oikesis*, having “been there since childhood” meaning, as pointed out at the beginning of this excerpt, the prisoners were born outside the cave and inserted at an early age. This is why the allegory ties in with *paideia*, education from one's youth. *Paideia* is directed for life outside the cave..

Secondly we have fellow prisoners (*sundesmotēs*) or those who were fettered with (*sun-*) him. Finally the prisoner reminds himself, *ana-* as reflexive, concerning not so much wisdom in and by itself (*sophia*) but given the prisoner's situation, as limited to what they hear in addition to the images on the wall. The cave's environment offers very little wiggle room...literally...so the *sophia* involved consists in speaking about what the images projected as well as what is heard as coming from behind, the prisoners' heads prevented from turning left or right. We don't know if the prisoners were able to share with each other what their masters were discussing; perhaps they kept it to themselves. Such wisdom builds up over time, giving a vague idea of what life outside the cave just might be. However, it isn't sufficient to motivate them to seek escape. And so the *sophia* at hand is passed off as being held at a rather low level of understanding as Socrates is about to say.

Now Socrates asks Glaucon a question with regard to how the ex-prisoner considered (*oiomai*) his troglodyte experience. Judging by his strong reaction to the world outside the cave he feels his former home (*oikesis* as above) as simply dreadful even though earlier he may have wished to return there. That is to say, he believes himself as happy, *eudaimonizo*. This verb consists of the root *daimon* which means a guiding principle or spirit and is prefaced with the adverbial form (well) for good, *eu-*. The new orientation of the ex-

prisoner's *daimon* is called a *metabole* or change, literally a casting-after (*meta-*) from where one is at the present into the future. However, memory of his fellow prisoners, those with whom he had been fettered (*sundesmotēs*), causes pity (*eleeo*) to well up from within him,

Certainly.

Mala also means very much, exceedingly.

And if there had been any honors, praises or prizes among them for the one who is sharpest at identifying the shadows as they passed by and who best remembered which usually came earlier, which later and which simultaneously, and who could **d** thus best divine the future, do you think that our man would desire these rewards or envy those among the prisoners who were honored and held power? Instead, wouldn't he feel with Homer that he would much prefer to "work the earth as a surf to another, one without possessions" (**Odyssey** XI 489-90) and go through any sufferings rather than share their opinions and live as they do?

Socrates puts into the mind of the ex-prisoner any benefits that may have made him long to be back in the cave, especially jealous of any fellow prisoner who made out better than the others even though he's still unable to move. He mentions three things they may have won: honors (*time* connoting a prerogative), *epainos* (also as approval) and *geras* (a gift of honor). In sum, these are gifts for what the prisoners have accomplished which, given their fettered condition, are extremely limited. There comes to mind the handing out of token gifts as for schoolchildren, given the circumstances of the cave. The criterion for getting all three prizes? The prisoner with the sharpest sight, the adjective *oxus* meaning keen or piercing as to seeing (*kathorao*) the passing (*pariemi*: *para-* as nearby or by) shadows on the cave's wall in front of them, "shadows" not being mentioned explicitly. And, of course, we can't forget bribing one of the puppeteers.

Grasping the shadows...*kathorao* (to see in accord with something, *kata-*)...is one thing, remembering or to call to mind (*mnemoneuo*) the sequence of these shadows is another: first, second and all together, the verb *etho* applies to this order, that is, to be accustomed. This is serious business for those inside the cave and may dazzle the uninitiated as they are to the light outside. While it's going on, the puppeteers must be exchanging cynical remarks among each other, calling their subjects outright fools. So while attention is on the sequence of shadows...their *pariemi* ...the real issue isn't even brought up, namely, the nature of these shadows, let alone who's controlling them. To do so is possible only by someone who has escaped the cave and has come back but at the risk of being subject to fierce persecution by the puppeteers, those in charge.

Instead of what these shadows may consist of and so forth, focus is upon divining the future in the best (*dunatos*: strong, mighty) possible way. The verb is *apomanteuomai* with the preposition *apo-* (from) being a more intense form or auguring and used with another verb, *heko*, to reach a point or to intend, this more relative to the best prisoner at it. This, of course, is the most significant event for the troglodytes as well as their captives. For the latter it meant they wouldn't complain at being fettered so severely and focus with renewed energy on the shadows in preparation for the next contest. For the former, they wouldn't have to be as careful guarding their charges.

Amid this celebratory atmosphere Socrates singles out the prisoner who has managed to escape. Early on he had seen the futility of this contest and preferred not to participate. He had to be careful, however, for if the puppeteers got wind of his true intent, he'd be thrown into double shackles. Being so fettered would be worse because unlike his fellows, he knows the true situation and can't escape it.

Socrates poses the question about this prisoner who theoretically at this point has returned as whether he'd enjoy the rewards offered to the winner, that is, the honors, approval and gift already outlined. This is expressed by the adverb *epithumhtikos* with the verb *echo*, to have. The adverb consists of the root *thumos*, difficult to translate adequately, meaning not just the soul as *psuche* but as something more gutsy, the heart as seat of anger or wrath. Here the preposition *epi-* (upon) is used for intensification of an already intense word. Along with this misdirected desire the prisoner at hand avoids, thanks to having been outside the cave, freedom from being envious (*zeloo*) over those upon whom honor (*timao*) had been bestowed and who have gained a modicum of respect both among their fellow prisoners and his captives. This control is expressed by the verb *endunasteuo* meaning to exercise *dunamis* or power in...*en*...the cave's environment. Though not mentioned specifically, this could be over the puppeteers or becoming one of them.

Instead of grasping after this petty form of glory and control, Socrates applies to the person under discussion an observation by the greatest Greek poet, Homer. This connection is expressed through the verb *pascho*, generally as to have something done to oneself. It's connected with making a preference, that is, the verb *bouleuo* (to take counsel) with *sphodra*, an adverb meaning that which is in excess or very much. That is to say, he'd go along with the quote from the **Odyssey** which has to do with living as a bondsman while possessing nothing, that is, *eparouros* or attached to the soil with the verb *manthano* meaning to learn or to learn this way of life as someone who is *akleros*, poor or literally, someone without a lot. In addition, he'd prefer to endure all types of suffering (*pascho*) over sharing the opinions of the troglodytes, they being based of the shadows, *doxazo* being the verb. And from these shadows they get an idea of how to live which, of course, is very confined due to being fettered and their heads forced to look one way or at the shadows

projected upon the cave's wall opposite them.

e I suppose he would rather suffer anything and then live like that.

Oiomai is the verb for to suppose which seems rather tepid on Glaucon's part, given the gloomy assessment Socrates just presented. Also *doxazo* is used, to form an opinion, here with regard to living in the cave where the inhabitants strive for petty goals in life.

Consider this too. If this man went down into the cave again and sat down in his same seat, wouldn't his eyes—coming suddenly out of the sun like that—be filled with darkness?

This is a big “if” (*ei*) Socrates wishes us to consider, *ennoeo* consisting of the root for mind or *nous* prefaced with the preposition *en-* (in)...to consider-in. From what we've learned about the cave, of how the puppeteers keep the prisoners fettered for life (they too being condemned to live there), who'd want to descent there again, *katabaino*? Anyway, the ex-prisoner would consent to do this—the reason not given but left to the reader to decipher—he'd take his same place or *thakon* meaning a chair as well as meaning sitting in council. Socrates says that he does this coming from the sunlight into the darkness or *skotos*, also meaning gloom which is more like it because the cave would be illumined by the fire. The ex-prisoner goes there suddenly or *exaiphnes*, the preposition *ex-* or from prefaced to *aphno* meaning unawares and thereby intensifying it. However, the introductory remarks of the text says that the entrance is “a long way up” which if taken literally, would allow for gradual adjustment from full sunlight to the *skotos*.

They certainly would.

Mala is an adverb meaning very much, exceedingly.

And before his eyes had recovered—and the adjustment would not be quick—while his **517** vision was still dim, if he had to compete again with the perpetual prisoners and recognizing the shadows, wouldn't he invite ridicule? Wouldn't it be said of him that he had returned from his upward journey with his eyesight ruined and that it isn't worthwhile even to try to travel upward? And, as for anyone who tried to free them and leave them upward, if they could somehow get their hands on him, wouldn't they kill him?

Obviously the shadows (*skia*) which constituted the ex-prisoner's former environment would prevent him from adjusting immediately compared to the full sunlight to which he had been exposed recently. Once at his former place of imprisonment which he used to call home—and the thought of it was both embarrassing and terrifying as he glanced at the

same old prisoners in their same old places—he faced the prospect of competing with them, the verb *diamillomai* being used which means not so much to contend but to do with some violence. The puppeteers must have been astonished equally, this being the first time ever a former prisoner had returned to them. In fact, it boosted their moral; being inside the cave was more real than being outside it.

The competition consists in discriminating (*gnomateuo*) between the various shadows (*skia*) which, as the ex-prisoner knows so well, goes on forever (*aei*). If he doesn't join in (and that means being fettered once again and his head locked into a forward-only position), his fellows which are called *paraschoi* (from *parecho* meaning to hand over-beside, *para-*) would ridicule him, *gelos* meaning laughter but here in a mocking fashion. To some he is a traitor coming into their home and trying to disrupt it. Part of this comes from the ex-prisoner's eyes still being dim, *ambluno* meaning to blunt, of hitting all at once the cave's forbidding surrounding. The prisoners' advantage is that their eyes are adjusted...always they have been...while the newcomer's still need time (*chronos*) to do so, *kathistemi* meaning to set in order as well as to bring down. Also the noun *sunetheia* means acquaintance or intimacy (*sun-* or with prefaced to *ethos*). Given this context, the preposition *kata-* can be taken in two ways, that is, as according to and as down, for the ex-prisoner must sit down with his former colleagues (if one may call them that).

They certainly would.

Sphodra is an adverb meaning excessively.

b This whole image, Glaucon, must be fitted together with what we said before. The visible realm should be likened to the prison dwelling, and the light of the fire inside it to the power of the sun. And if you interpret the upward journey and the study of things above as the upward journey of the soul to the intelligible realm, you'll grasp what I hope to convey, since that is what you wanted to hear about. Whether it's true or not, only the gods know. But this is how I see it: in the knowable realm, the form of the good is the last thing to be seen, and it is reached only with difficulty. Once one has seen it, however, one must conclude that it is the cause of all that is correct and **c** beautiful in anything, that it produces both light and its source in the visible realm, and that in the intelligible realm it controls and provides truth and understanding, so that anyone who is to act sensibly in private or public must see it.

Socrates continues to address Glaucon whom he calls a friend or *philos*, first recapping and then expanding what he had said thus far. He calls this story about the cave an image or *eikon* which also means a similitude or semblance which he wishes to fit in with his earlier (*emprosthēn*: also as in front) remarks, *prosapto* being the verb suggesting each point of the narrative connecting to (*pros-*) what corresponds to real life. Note the two uses

of the preposition *pros-* signifying direction towards-which, here indicating the need for an immediate connection. As for *emprosthen*, it has the added preposition *em-* or in.

Here the prison or *desmoterion* (place of binding) is likened to an *oikesis* or household, the verb *aphomoioo* (*apo-* or from prefaced to the root *homoioo*). In actuality this is true for the prisoners since they've been there since infancy. Its illumination is by a fire only and at first seems an unlikely image...*eikon* ...of the visible world presented as *phaino* (to bring to light, disclose) with the noun *opsis* (appearance, sight) and the preposition *dia-* or through. Also this fire has the place of the sun, a poor comparison by reason of its weak power, *dunamis*, but the prisoners have no means to appreciate this.

Next Socrates switches to the ascent (*anabasis*: *ana-* or up to, along, not simply up) from the cave which was accomplished earlier by one of the prisoners though the actual impetus for it isn't given. For him it's more important to interpret two things. First is the prisoner's escape, if you will, his going up *anodos* which is similar to *anabasis* (both prefaced with *ana-* or above), the former a way (*hodos*) up and latter apparently more an ascent. Here *anodos* is in reference to the soul or *psuche* which Socrates has been presenting as a prisoner. Secondly comes the study of what lies above (*ano*) the cave, the *thea* or literally the seeing of what is there, this noun suggestive of contemplation, related to *theoria*. Such seeing/contemplation belongs literally *eis* or into the place or *topos* which is *noetos* or as belonging to the *nous* (mind).

So if we follow Socrates' recommended interpretation of what is above vs. what is in the cave, hopefully we won't err (*hamartano*: to miss the mark), for it's something he hopes to convey to Glaucon that he may grasp. After all, like the rest of his readers, he has a great desire to hear about it, *epithumeo* or to set his *thumos* or heart-upon (*epi-*). At the same time Socrates confesses that the cave analogy may be (*tugchano*: to hit upon) true (*alethes*) or not, this adjective implying that which is unconcealed. Anyway, he leaves it up to the god or *theos*. As for this god (Zeus, perhaps), it doesn't play a significant role in the cave allegory which gives it broader acceptance without watering down the role of religion.

After this admission Socrates puts forth his own view, *phaino* being used which means to appear, or this is how the analogy appears to him who interprets it. He begins to speak of the form of the good or *idea* (refers to the outward appearance) of that which is *agathos* or good and does so with an initially negative tone. That is to say, this idea is difficult to attain, *teleutaios* meaning the extreme or end with respect to knowing, *gnostos* as well as hardly being able to be seen (*horao*). the adverb *mogis* is used here meaning scarcely or with toil and pain. However, it's in the realm of possibility to be seen though Socrates doesn't give details as how to go about achieving this, for he prefers to leave the reader find his own way.

But once the form of the good is seen (*horao*), the conclusion (*sullogisteos*, adjective; *sulloge*: a gathering or collecting, *sul-* or *sun-* as with) is that it's the cause (*aitia*) of everything both right and beautiful or *orthos* and *kalos* in everything, the latter applicable to anything of fine quality or noble. So this *horao* is to be transferred from the knowable realm to everything (*pan*). Furthermore, it's the origin (*tikto*: to bring into the world, to engender with *kurios* or appointed, ordained) of light within what we can see (*horatos*; from *horao*).

Within that which is intelligible (again, *noetos* with *kurios*, that which is proper to the intelligible) the form of the good also offers two things, *parecho* being the verb (to hand over-beside, *para-*), truth and understanding or *aletheia* (with *kurios*) and *nous* (also as mind). Thus anyone who is to act in a sensible fashion whether privately or publicly (*prasso* with *emphronos*: to do or achieve and in a rational, intelligent fashion along with *demousios*: belonging to the people) needs to see (*eido*; compare with *horao* above) it.

I have the same thought, at least as far as I'm able.

Sunoiomai: *oiomai* or to suppose with the preposition *sun-* (with) prefaced to it. Glaucon concurs with Socrates' concluding remarks above concerning a person who acts sensibly. In other words, he supposes-with to the best of his ability, *dunamai* meaning to have the capacity to do something with *tropos* or way, habit.

Come, then, share with me this thought also: it isn't surprising that the ones who get to this point are unwilling to occupy themselves with human affairs and that their souls are always pressing upwards, eager to spend their time above, for, after all, this **d** is surely what we would expect if indeed things fit the image I described before.

Socrates invites Glaucon to come along with him (*sunoiomai* again) in a friendly, personable fashion which is typical of him, that is, to see if he is of the same mind. As for Glaucon, he is disposed by reason of his brief remark in the sentence just above. Socrates maintains that we should not be surprised (*thaumazo*) at a way of viewing life unfamiliar to most people. The reason? The majority of the human race is occupied with human affairs which is rendered as doing (*prasso*) things proper to men, *anthropos*, so it's highly unusual to meet someone not of this persuasion, *ethelo*. On the other hand, some souls (*psuche*) are endowed with an unnatural propensity to urge themselves upwards at all times (*aei*: also, forever). Note two verbs at work here, *epeigo* and *diatribo*. The former has the preposition *ana-*, intensified, if you will, by the preposition *epi-* or upon prefaced to the verb...a pressing upon→above. The other verb is *diatribo* which literally means to rub hard, *tribo* with the preposition *dia-* or through...to rub-through.

What we come away with this paragraph is that such souls are caught midway between the

cave's depths and the sunlight or somewhere on that path which is a “long way up and as wide as the cave itself.” On it they are wearing themselves out...*diatribo*, if you will...but not necessarily in a negative fashion. They are eager to escape the gloom of the prison. Socrates says in a rather matter-of-fact way that we should expect this (*eikos*: in all likelihood) if it agrees with the image or *eikon* put forth earlier (*proereo*), this being a participle prefaced with the preposition *kata* or in accord with.

It is.

What about what happens when someone turns from divine study to the evils of human life? Do you think it's surprising since his sight is still dim, and he hasn't yet become accustomed to the darkness around him, that he behaves awkwardly and appears completely ridiculous if he's compelled either in the courts or elsewhere to contend about the shadows of justice or the statues or which they are the shadows and to dispute about the way these things are understood by people who have never seen justice itself?

The verb *thaumazo* opens this paragraph, expressing surprise with regard to turning from one manner of life to another; a degradation in life is more like it, of opting from what is above the cave to what is inside it. The verb *erchomai* (to come, to go) is used here along with two prepositions, *apo* and *epi* or from and upon. *Apo* is with respect to things divine (*theios*) and *epi* to things which are human (*anthropeios*: that which is suited to anything human). To both belong *theirion*, an adjective applicable to a viewing or beholding. So it's a matter of giving up one manner of seeing for another. The reason for this turning, however, isn't stated but left to the reader to see if it mirrors any movement in his heart.

It seems that Socrates has in mind the newly released prisoner not yet acclimatized to the light outside the cave, having been reared by the dim fire which had been used for projecting images on the wall. Such a person opts for the evils or *kakos* belonging to human life, again, *anthropeios* suggesting that an opposite mode of life exists intimated by the adjective *theios* or divine as in divine study. This person behaves in a disgraceful fashion as meant by the verb *aschemoneo* and intensified by the adjective *geloios*, ridiculous, also applicable to laughter. If this weren't enough, *geloios* is modified by the adverb *sphodra* ...ridiculous in an exceeding fashion. Such is the way by which he manifests himself, *phaino*), that is, prior to becoming acclimatized. The adjective *sunethes* means being habituated and is comprised of the root *ethos* (custom, usage) with the preposition *sun-* or with prefaced to it and found with the adverb *hikanos* or sufficiently. This is with respect to the darkness (*skotos*) surrounding him, the verb being *pareimi*, to be about or beside (*para-*) which here suggests envelopment.

Socrates speaks thus with respect to this ex-prisoner should he be compelled (*anagkazo*)

either in court (*dikastrion*) or similar places of legal contention (*agonizomai*: also to win by a contest) concerning not so much justice (*dikaios* or just things) but shadows and of it, *skia* which are the same as statutes (*agalma*: glory, gift). A *skia* is more transitory whereas an *agalma* is permanent and can represent, if you will, a *skia*.

Then there's the matter of disputing (*diamillaomai*: to contend hotly) how people understand (*hupolambano*: the root *lambano* or to take, to receive prefaced with the preposition *hupo-* or under...to take-under) all this, that is, by those who never have seen justice in and by itself (*dikaiosune*), such people being inferred as inhabitants of the cave.

That's not surprising at all.

Thaumastos as wonderful or marvelous.

518 No it isn't. But anyone with any understanding would remember that the eyes may be confused in two ways and from two causes, namely, when they've come from the light into the darkness and when they have come from the darkness into the light. Realizing that the same applies to the soul when someone sees a soul disturbed and unable to see something, he won't live mindlessly, but he'll take into consideration whether it has come from a brighter life and is dimmed through not having yet become accustomed to the dark or whether it has come from greater ignorance into greater light and is dazzled by the increased brilliance. Then he will declare the first soul happy and its experience and life, and he'll pity the latter—but even if he choose **b** to make fun of it at least he'll be less ridiculous than if he laughed at a soul that has come from the light above.

Socrates comes back with an immediate refutation of Glaucon, again accessing the two types of seeing discussed throughout this section: those in the cave (by firelight) and those outside (exposed to the sun). He posits the necessity for understanding phrased literally as “if anyone has mind” or *nous*. Bound up with this *nous* which involves one's mind and heart is remembrance or *mimnesko*, to put in mind (*nous* implied), and that pertains not directly to seeing but to the physical eyes. These means of sight are subject to being confused (*epitarasso*: to stir up with the preposition *epi-* or upon for emphasis) in two ways: having been in the light and having gone into (*eis*) the darkness and visa versa (that is, *phos* → *skotos* and *skotos* → *phos*).

This physical example of the eyes pertains to the soul or *psuche*, the verb *nomizo* being used as to have an understanding...a beholding...of it. *Nomizo* applies to a soul which is both disturbed and unable to see. The verb *thorubeo* means to make a noise or uproar and *adunateo* or not to have the capacity for something is used with *kathorao*, to see (*kata-* or in accord with a plan or the like). This offers the opportunity not to live mindlessly

rendered by the adverb *alogistos* or in a heedless fashion coupled with the verb *gelao*, to laugh, usually with scorn.

When you see such a soul, you'll take into consideration (*episkopos*: one who watches over, *epi*-) whether it has come from a more radiant life, a life which is *ek* (from) *phanoterou* or *phaienos*, shining or radiant and has become darkened (*skoteo*: to stupefy, to blind) by *aetheia* or by not being accustomed or whether it has come into that which is more radiant (*phaeinous*) from greater ignorance (*amathia*: stupidity) and hence is astounded (*emplesso*: the root to strike, to smite prefaced with the preposition *em*- or *en*- meaning in; to strike-in) by greater brilliance. This phrase consists of the noun *marmaruge* or brilliance modified by the adjective *lampros* (bright, limpid). The result? One will call the soul happy (*eudaimoneo*: to be prosperous, blessed, *eu*- signifying wellness) along with its experience and life or *pathos* and *bios* (anything that befalls one and a course of life). On the other hand, one will have pity on (*eleeo*) the other soul. Should, however, one wish (*boulomai*: to be willing) to ridicule (*gelao*: to laugh at) it, he will be less scorned (*katagelastos*: mocked or laughed at, *kata*- as down) than having laughed (*gelao*) at a soul which has come from the light (*phos*, with *ek*) above (*anothen*, the sense of which is reenforced by the preposition *epi* or upon).

What you say is very reasonable.

Metrios: moderately.

If that's true, then here's what we must think about these matters: education isn't what some people declare it to be, namely, putting knowledge into souls that lack **c** it, like putting sight into blind eyes.

Socrates now offers for consideration what he had just presented, *nomizo* being the verb meaning to hold as a custom which involves more than just consideration but assuming as one's own. Education as *paideia* (that difficult word to translate since it covers the bulk of one's life and is marked by *arete* or virtue) differs radically from the opinions of people, *epaggello* meaning to proclaim or to announce (literally, to announce upon or *epi*-). If we take this literal definition, people may be said to be obsessed with propounding their point of view and closed to external input. They call *paideia* the putting (*entithemi*: to put in or *en*-) of knowledge (*episteme*: acquaintance with a matter, skill; *epi*- or upon) into souls (*psuche*) just as one would put sight into eyes which are blind or *tuphos* (dark, obscure). Perhaps the puppeteers fall into this category.

They do say that.

But our present discussion, on the other hand, shows that the power to learn is

present in everyone soul and that the instrument with which each learns is like an eye that cannot be turned around from darkness to light without turning the whole body. This instrument cannot be turned around from that which is coming into being without turning the whole soul until it is able to study that which is and the brightest thing **d** that is, namely, the one we call the good. Isn't that right?

Logos is the noun for discussion and has wide application, for example, word as expression laying at its root meaning. Socrates comes out with quite a revolutionary idea regarding *paideia* for his time, namely, that everyone's soul (*psuche*) has the capacity to learn...has the *dunamis* for it or the might or strength. Yet it requires an instrument or means (*organon*: a tool for making or doing) for learning which is rendered by the verb *katamanthano* or literally to learn in accord with or *kata-* a given plan or program. This instrument resembles an eye unable to be turned around (*strepho*) from darkness to light, that is, *ek* → *pros*, the former being with *phaino* (to appear) and the latter with *skotodes* (obscure). Such turning requires one's entire body (*soma*).

The tool (*organon*) at hand can't be turned around (*periakteon*: *periago*, the preposition *peri-* or around) from what's coming into being or *gignomai* (to become) without turning the soul (*psuche*) in its entirety (*holos*: whole, entire) until it has the capacity (*dunatos*: strong, mighty) to study (*anecho*: literally, to hold up or *ana-* or to sustain along with *theomai*: to see clearly or as a spectator) that which exists (*eis to on*: literally as into what is) as well as the brightest thing that exists (*tou ontos*: of being with *phaeinon* or radiant) which we call the good (*agathos*). Correct?

Yes.

Then education is the craft concerned with doing this very thing, this turning around and with how the soul can most easily and effectively be made to do it. It isn't the craft of putting sight into the soul. Education takes for granted that sight is there but that it isn't turned the right way or looking where it ought to look, and it tries to redirect it appropriately.

The topic of discussion is *paideia* or education founded upon virtue (*arete*) which Socrates presents as a craft or *techne*, this word applicable to a skill or artifice thereby implying an element of cunning which can't be taught but picked up by experience. Such craftiness, if you will, is ideally suited for the turning around under discussion, *periagoge* (*peri-* or around) as well as for how the soul may effectively do this which is called *metastrepho*, another very for turning around, the preposition *meta-* suggesting after-ness, if you will. Both are to be done easily and effectively, *rhadios* and *anusimos* (capable of accomplishment). This doesn't involve installing (*empoioeo*: to make in or *em-*) the faculty of sight or *horao*; rather, *paideia* involves the presence of (*echo*: to have) sight yet not

turned in the right way (*orthos*, adverb with the verb *trepo*, to turn) or looking (*blepo*: to look in the sense of being possessed with sight) where it should. Thus the task of *paideia* is to redirect it in the appropriate fashion (*diamechanaomai*: to contrive, to bring about where *dia-* or through as prefaced to the verb suggests a certain thoroughness).

So it seems.

Now it looks as though the other so-called virtues of the soul are akin to those of the body, for they really aren't there beforehand but added later by habit and practice. **e** However, the virtue of reason seems to belong above all to something more divine which never loses its power but is either useful and beneficial or useless and harmful, **519** depending on the way it is turned. Or have you never noticed this about people who are said to be vicious but clever, how keen the vision of their little souls is and how sharply it distinguishes the things it is turned towards? This shows that its sight isn't inferior but rather is forced to serve evil ends so that the sharper it sees, the more evil it accomplishes.

Other virtues belong to the soul... the *arete* of the *psuche*...seem to resemble (*kinduneuo*: to be daring, to make a venture) the ones of the body (*soma*) because in essence (*to onti*: literally, in being) they are added (*empoieo*: to make in or -em) later both by habit and practice or *ethos* and *askesis* (exercise, training).

On the other hand we have reason or *phroneo* (to have understanding along with prudence) which happens to be (*tugchano*) more divine (*theios*). And to be *theios* seems to be attributable to the sun compared to the fire within the cave. Never does it lose its power, that is, *dunamis* or the capacity to do something. Never is it destroyed (*apollumi*); instead, it's either useful and beneficial or not so and harmful (*chresimos* and *ophelimos*→*achrestos* and *blaberos*). This depends on the way it's turned, *periagoge* (*peri-* meaning around).

Socrates ask a rhetorical question (*ennoeo*: to consider, to reflect) about clever people who also are vicious, *sophos* and *poneros* or wise in the sense of being skilled and toilsome, painful. He attributes to them little souls or *psucharion*, a diminutive of *psuche* and have keen vision or can see (*blepo*) but are bitter or pungent (*drimus*: also as sharp) which connotes the sense of smell and taste. Such vision enables them to distinguish sharply (*diorao*: *horao* with *dia-* or through prefaced to it and the adverb *oxeos*) what they turn to (*trepo*). Such a capacity reveals that the sight or *opsis* at hand isn't inferior (*phaulos*: easy, slight) but is compelled (*anagkazo*: to force) to be at the service of (*hupereto*: the preposition *huper-* or on behalf of) evil ends (*kakia*: badness). I.e., the sharper it sees the more evil it is able to accomplish.

Absolutely.

However, if the nature of this sort had been hammered at from childhood and freed from the bonds of kinship with becoming which have been fastened to it by feasting, **b** greed and other such pleasures and which, like leaden weights, pulls its vision downwards—if being rid of these, it turned to look at true things, then I say that the same soul of the same person would see these most sharply just as it now does the things it presently turned towards.

For example, let's say that the nature of those with little souls (*psuche – psucharion*) as noted above is driven home (*kopto*: to strike or to smite) right from (*euthus*: straight, direct) childhood (*pais*: related to *paideia*) and set free from the fetters (*perikope*: related to *kopto*; a cutting around or *peri-*) of becoming (*suggenes*: congenital; *sug-* or with and *genesis* or origin, source, cause), these having been fixed to (*prosphuo*: *phuo* or to bring forth with the preposition *pros-* signifying direction towards-which) it by feasting, greed and other such pleasures (*edode*: food, victuals, *lichneia*: daintiness and *hedone*). They are not unlike leaden weights (*molubdis*) which pull down (*strepho*: to turn with the preposition *kata*, down) one's vision (*opsis*). However, should such a little soul gets rids of them, turns to look at what is true, then I maintain that the soul of such a person would see these hindrances very keenly just as it does now with regard to things it is turned towards.

Should freedom (*apallage*: deliverance, release) be gained by a turning to (*peristrepho*: *strepho* with *peri-* or around prefaced to it) what is true (*alethos* with the preposition *eis* or into...into what is true), Socrates says that the same soul of the same person would see them most sharply (*oxus* with *horao*) just like now with regard to things (the preposition *epi* or upon) it is turned towards (*trepo*).

Probably so.

Eikos: in all likelihood.

And what about the uneducated with no experience of truth? Isn't it likely—indeed, doesn't it follow necessarily from what was said before—that they will never adequately govern a city? But neither would those who have been allowed to spend **c** their whole lives being educated. The former would fail because they don't have a single goal at which all their actions, public and private, inevitably aim; the latter would fail because they would refuse to act, thinking that they had settled while still alive in the faraway Isles of the Blessed.

Eikos or likely opens this paragraph with regard to those whom Socrates calls uneducated or *apaideutos*, lacking *paideia* which intimates lacking *arete* or virtue, the best of

anything. Such people have no contact (*apeiros*: unacquainted with) the truth or *aletheia*, this observation necessarily (*anagke*: necessity) coming on the heels of what he had mentioned earlier, that is, that such persons never will rule a city well (*hikanos*: sufficiently), *epitropeuo* meaning to be an administrator, the root *trepo* (to turn) with the preposition *epi-* or upon prefaced to it. The same is applicable to persons who haven't been allowed (*eao*: to concede, let alone) to spend their lives in *paideia*, this being rendered by the verb *diatribo* (literally, to rub through, *dia-*) along with the noun *telos* (consummation, end) with the preposition *dia* or through.

As for the first group, they're doomed to fail because they lack (the verb *echo* or to have with the negative) one goal (*skopos*) to which all their actions, both public and private (*idios* and *demosios*: one's own and belonging to the people) aim or *stochazomai*: to endeavor or conjecture. The second group are bound to fail because they'd refuse to take action (*prasso*), entertaining the idea (*hegeomai*: to go before, to believe) that they had settled (*apoikizo*: literally, to send from or *apo-* home, to colonize) while still alive (*zao*) in the distant Isles of the Blessed (*nesos* which are *makarios*, happy or fortunate), these being the final resting place for heroes and virtuous people.

That's true.

It is our task as founders, then, to compel the best natures to reach the study we said before is the most important, namely, to make the ascent and see the good. But when **d** they made it and looked sufficiently, we must not allow them to do what they are allowed to do today.

Here Socrates speaks of himself and Glaucon as founders of a city state, a *polis*, whose task (*ergon*: business, work) is to compel (*anagkazo*) the best natures (*phusis* which are *beltistos*, superlative of *agathos* or good) to attain (*aphikneomai*: to arrive, to reach) the most important study (*mathema*: that which is learned, a lesson and with the preposition *pros* signifying direction towards-which) as stated above. In other words, Socrates is speaking of the ascent from (the verb *anabaino* and the noun *anabasis*) the cave and to see the good (*eidon* with respect to *agathos*). Upon have accomplished it and looked sufficiently (*eido* with the adverb *hikanos* also as worthily), we as founders can't allow them to do (*epitrepo*: literally, to turn upon or *epi-*) what they are permitted (*epitrepo* again) to do today.

What is that?

To stay there and refuse to go down again to the prisoners in the cave and share their labors and honors whether they are of less worth or of greater.

Socrates says that the biggest error for the former prisoners is to stay (*katameno*: *meno* or to remain prefaced with the preposition *kata-*, in accord with; also *kata-* as down...down in the cave also applies) there (i.e., the light) and refuse (*ethelo*) to descend (*katabaino*: the preposition *kata-* as down) again into the cave to be with (*para*: beside, in the company of) the prisoners. The same applies in refusing to share their labors and honors (the noun *ponos* or hard work and the verb *timao*) whether or not they are of less or greater value (*phaulos* and *spoudaios*: hasty, worthy of serious attention).

Then are we to do them an injustice by making them live a worse life when they could live a better one?

Glaucon poses a rhetorical question about injustice (the verb *adikeo*) with regard to the uneducated or those lacking *paideia* and hence *arete*. The injustice proposed, if you will, is to make these persons live a worse form of life when they can live a better one, *cheiron* vs. *ameinon* or inferior vs. braver.

e You are forgetting again that it isn't the law's concern to make any one class in the city outstandingly happy but to contrive to spread happiness throughout the city by bringing the citizens into harmony with each other through persuasion or compulsion and by making them share with each other the benefits that each class can confer on **520** the community. The law produces such people in the city not in order to allow them to turn in whatever direction they want but to make use of them to bind the city together.

Socrates reminds Glaucon as a *philos* or friend that he is forgetting (*epiletho*: the preposition *epi-* or upon intensifies the verb, to forget-upon) about the law (*nomos*: custom, usage with the verb *melo*, to be an object of concern or care). That concern does not pertain to making (*prasso*) any class (*genos*: offspring, generation) within the *polis* especially happy (*diaphero*: to make a difference; literally, to carry through or *dia-*; used with the adverb *diapherontos* which is comprised of the root *phero*, to bear or to carry prefaced with the preposition *dia-*, to carry-through). Instead, the intent is to spread happiness (*eu*: the adverb for well) throughout the *polis* by bringing (*mechanomai*: to construct, to bring about with *eggignomai*: to spring up, to take place among) the citizens into harmony (*sunarmoizo*: the preposition *sun-* or with) through persuasion or compulsion (the verb *peitho* and the noun *anagke*).

Also the citizen are to share the benefits (*metadidomai*: to give with or *meta-*; to give a share and *ophelia* or help, assistance) proper to each class and their bestowal upon the community. At this point the English translation inserts references to 420b-421c, 462a-466a). The law produces these people in the city not to allow (*aphiemi*: to release) them to turn (*trepo*) in whatever direction they wish (*boulomai*) but to use (*katachraomai*: to use

up, to do what one likes; *chrao* or to furnish with the preposition *kata-* or according to) them to bind the city together (*sundesmos* with the preposition *epi* or upon; literally, a binding-with or *sun-*).

That's true, I had forgotten.

Epilanthano: to forget, the preposition *epi-* or upon intensifying the verb.

Observe, then, Glaucon, that we won't be doing an injustice to those who have become philosophers in our city and that what we will say to them when we compel them to guard and care for the others will be just. We will say "when people like you come to be in other cities, they are justified in not sharing in this city's labor for they **b** have grown there spontaneously against the will of the constitution. And what grows up of its own accord and owes no debt for its upbringing has justice on its side when it is not keen to pay anyone for that upbringing. But we have made few kings in our city and leaders of the swarm, as it were, both for yourselves and for the rest of the city. You are better and more completely educated than the others and are better **c** able to share in both types of life. Therefore each of you in turn must go down to live in the common dwelling place of the others and grow accustomed to see in the dark. When you are used to it, you will see vastly better than the people there. And because you have seen the truth about fine, just and good things, you will know each image for what it is and also that of which it is the image. Thus for you and for us the city will be governed not like the majority of cities nowadays by people who fight over shadows and struggle against one another in order to rule—as if that were a great good—but by people who are awake rather than dreaming, for the truth is surely this: **d** a city whose prospective rulers are least eager to rule must of necessity be more free from civil war whereas a city with the opposite kind of rulers is governed in the opposite way.

Socrates speaks with Glaucon, asking him to *skopeo* or to make an observation about persons who have become philosophers in our city, *philosophos par' hmin* or literally, philosophers beside us or in our company. That is to say, the first person plural is suggestive of doing something spontaneously (i.e., 'let us'); also it may include those philosophers associated with Socrates. The issue at hand is not doing an injustice which is rendered as a verb, *adikeo*. So this "we" will say to the philosophers—those who love or are friends of (*phileo*) wisdom (*sophia*)--or will oblige them (*prosanagazo*: the preposition *pros-* suggestive of taking direct action which here is compulsion). This is a just cause (*dikaios*), this adjective with the preposition *pros*, direction towards-which and consists of compelling to both take care of (*epimeleomai*: the preposition *epi-* or upon intensifying that nature of this care) other persons and to guard (*phulasso*: to keep watch) the city, "city" not mentioned but *par'hmin*.

The “we” as continued by Socrates will say to such lovers-of-wisdom that in other cities (*polis*) those like them in all likelihood (*eikotos*) aren’t compelled to share in (*metecho*: *meta-* or with prefaced to the verb *echo*, to have) the labors (*ponos*: hard work) belonging to the city. Such is to be expected since they grew up of their own accord (*automatos* and *emphuo*: acting of one’s accord and to implant; *em-* or in); furthermore, the ruling body or *politeia* (city state’s government) would prefer not having them, *akoues* meaning involuntary or not in accord with one’s will.

What grows up by itself (*autophues*: *autos* prefaced to *phuo*, to bring forth) and shows no debt (*opheile*) for this upbringing (*trophe*: fundamentally as nourishment but applicable to a way of life; compare with *paideia*) has justice (*dike*) on its side when not keen (*prothumeomai*: the verbal root for *thumos* or desire prefaced with the preposition *pro-* or before) to pay anyone for that upbringing. On the other hand we have begotten (*gennao*) you to become rulers of the hive, *hegeomon* being a noun which means to be first *with* regard to *smenos*, a swarm of bees which suggests that a queen is in charge to which the other bees or city’s inhabitants are blindly subservient.

Socrates continues by saying that those whom he’s addressing are better educated (*paideuo*) than others and can share (*metecho* or to have with or *meta-* along with *dunamai*, having the capacity to do something) in both types of life. Each of you must make the descent (*katabaino*: *kata-* or down) to the common dwelling (*sunoiakesis*: a living with or *sun-*) of other persons and get acclimatized to (*sunethisteon*: the root *ethos* or custom, usage with the preposition *sun-* or with) seeing (*theaomai*: to view as a spectator) in the dark. However, once you’ve become adjusted (*sunethizo*: the root *ethos* with *sun-* or with prefaced to it, you will see (*horao*) vastly (*murios*: numberless, countless) better than the inhabitants and will know (*gignosko*) what are the images (*eidolon*: an unsubstantiated form, phantom) and what they stand for (*atta*: something) because you’ve seen (*horao*) the beautiful, just and good (*kalos*, *dikaios* and *agathos*) in their truth (*alethos*: adjective).

Thus for both you and us the city will be governed (*oikeo*: to inhabit, manage, colonize) not like a dream (*onar*) as with most others where people fight over (*stasiazo*: to be at variance with) shadows (*skiamacheo*: the verbal root meaning to fight prefaced with *skia* or shadow) and struggle against (*skiazo*) each other in order to rule (*archo*: to begin, lead the way) as that were a great good (*agathos*) but by those for whom it will be a reality (*oikeo*) and not a dream (*onar*) because the truth is as follows. It is a city whose potential (*mello*: to think of doing, to intend) rulers (the verb *archo* with *prothumos*: the root *thumos* or desire prefaced with *pro-* or before) are not eager to rule (*archo*) and necessarily (*anagke* : necessity) are freer from civil strife (*astasiastos*: without *stasiazo* noted above) whereas a city with the opposite kind (*enantios*: adjective) is governed (*archo*) in the opposite fashion (*enantios* opposite; adverb).

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