

**The Meditations**  
**by Marcus Aurelius**  
(one of two)

**Introduction**

This document is a commentary of sorts on the Meditations by Marcus Aurelius which consists of twelve short books. The intent is to enable the reader to approach the text in the spirit of *lectio divina*. This phrase is usually reserved for reading the Bible and other Christian literature in a slow, meditative fashion, but it can be applied to an ancient philosophical text. The text at hand achieves this by inserting key transliterated Greek terms which includes cross references to the same word or similar words. Usually the last reference to a particular word or phrase is employed, working backwards. The Meditations is a late example of Stoic philosophy and can be used as an introduction to it.

The English text of George Long was downloaded from <http://classics.mit.edu>, The Internet Classics Archive. An updated version of the Long edition may be found in the Dover Thrift Edition (1997).

**BOOK ONE**

- 1.1. From [*para*: alongside, in the sense of being present to Verus. Each section of Book One begins with this preposition.] my grandfather Verus I learned [not in Greek text] good morals [*kaloethes*: *kallos* & *ethos*: beauty custom or disposition] and the government of my temper [*aorgeton*: lack of anger; *orge*: natural impulse or temperament].
- 1.2. From [*para*] the reputation [*doxa*: opinion, estimation] and remembrance [*mneme*: or mention, a living presence as opposed to mere memories] of my father, modesty [*aidemon*: bashfulness; can also pertain to a sense of shame] and a manly character [*arrenikon*: pertaining to the masculine gender and connotes robustness].
- 1.3. From [*para*] my mother, piety [*theosebēs*: fearing God in the sense of awe, dread] and beneficence [*metadotikon*: one disposed to give freely], and abstinence [*aphēktikon*: one who desists from], not only from evil deeds [*kakopoiein*: to do evil], but even from [*epi*: upon, in reference to] evil thoughts [*ennoia*: cognition, intention, better judgment. “Evil” is not in the Greek text.]; and further, simplicity [*litos*: inexpensive, plain, unadorned] in [*kata*: according to] my way of living [*diaita*: state, condition, dwelling], far removed from the habits [*diagoge*: a way or course of life] of the rich.
- 1.4. From [*para*] my great-grandfather, not to have frequented [*phoitaō*: to go to and fro, to resort constantly] public schools [*demosios* (common) & *diatribē* (a way of life, past time; literally, a wearing away)], and to have had good teachers at [*kata*: can suggest “according” to home or tied in with life at home, i.e., as opposed to public schools] home, and to know that on such things a man should spend [*analisko*: implies wasting or squandering one’s resources] liberally [*ektenos*: from a noun meaning extension].
- 1.5. From [*para*] my governor [*tropheus*: one who rears children; implies nourishing], to be neither of the green nor of the blue party at the games in the Circus, nor a partizan either of the Parmularius or the Scutarius at the gladiators’ fights; from him too I learned endurance of labor [*phereponos*: to carry labor], and to want little [*oligodeēs*], and to work with my own hands [*autourgikos*: or self-working], and not to meddle with other people’s affairs [*apolupragmos*: from a verb implying exertion or business], and not to be ready [*dusprosdektos*: hard & towards & acceptable] to listen to slander [*diabole*: from a verb meaning to set at variance; literally, to cast through].
- 1.6. From [*para*] Diognetus, not to busy myself about trifling things [*akenospoudos*: shunning vain pursuits; a + *kenos* + *spoude* or *no-vain-zeal*], and not to give credit [*apistetikos*: incredulous; a + *pistos* or *without faith*] to what was said by miracle-workers and jugglers about incantations and the driving away of daemons and such

things; and not to breed quails for fighting, nor to give myself up passionately [*ptoeo: to be passionately excited, with perz*] to such things; and to endure freedom of speech [*parresia: frankness, permission, to speak freely as a citizen*]; and to have become intimate [*oikeioo: to make one's own; related to oikos or house in the sense of a dwelling*] with philosophy; and to have been a hearer, first of Bacchius, then of Tandasis and Marcianus; and to have written dialogues in my youth; and to have desired [*epithumeo: to covert, yearn; epi (upon) intensifies the verbal root*] a plank bed and skin, and whatever else of the kind belongs to the Grecian discipline [*agoge: literally, a carrying away; observance, method*].

1.7. From [*para*] Rusticus I received the impression [*phantasia: appearance, imagination*] that my character [*ethos: as in good morals, above in #1*] required improvement [*diorthosis: a making straight, restoration, reform*] and discipline [*therapeia: service, treatment*]; and from him I learned not to be led astray [*ektrepo: to turn (off the road)*] to sophistic emulation [*eis zelon sophistikon: into zealous sophistic*], nor to writing on speculative matters [*peri ton theorematon: concerning a sight or spectacle (theoremata)*], nor to delivering [*protrepo: to impel, persuade*] little hortatory orations [*logarion: petty speech*], nor to showing myself off [*phantasioplektos, adverb: struck by phantasia or appearances as in #7*] as a man who practices much discipline [*asketikos: pertains to training, as an athlete*], or does benevolent acts in order to make a display [*epideiknumi: to exhibit, point out*]; and to abstain [*aphistemi: to put away, stand aloof from*] from rhetoric, and poetry, and fine writing [*asteiologia: literally, writing of the town in the sense of being refined*]; and not to walk about in the house in my outdoor dress, nor to do other things of the kind; and to write my letters with simplicity [*aphelos, adverb: the adjective means literally without a stone, smooth; connotes bluntness*], like the letter which Rusticus wrote from Sinuessa to my mother; and with respect to those who have offended me [*chalepairo: to display anger*] by words, or done me wrong [*plemmeleo: literally, to make a false note in music*], to be easily disposed [*euanakletos, adverb: literally as easy to call out (as with the names of dogs)*] to be pacified and reconciled [*eudiallaktos, adverb for both English terms. Diallage: interchange, friendship*], as soon as they have shown a readiness [*diaeimai: to be in a certain state; dia suggests thoroughness*] to be reconciled [*epanerchomai: epi + ana, upon + onto*]; and to read carefully, and not to be satisfied with a superficial [*oloscheros, adverb: entirely, utterly*] understanding [*perinoeo: to contrive cunningly, to consider on all sides (peri)*] of a book; nor hastily to give my assent [*sugkatatithemi: to deposit together, to agree with: sug or sum + kata (according)*] to those who talk overmuch [*perilaleo: to chatter exceedingly, to gossip; literally, to speak around*]; and I am indebted to him for being acquainted with [*hupomimnesko: to bring to mind*] the discourses of Epiktetus, which he communicated [*metadidomi: to give a share*] to me out of his own collection [*oikothen, adverb: from one's house*].

1.8. From [*para*] Apollonius I learned freedom of will [*eleutheron*] and undeviating [*anamphibolos, adverb: unambiguous*] steadiness of purpose [*akubentos: risking nothing upon a die; cautious*]; and to look to [*apoblepo: connotes intense gazing, with pros or in the direction towards which*] nothing else, not even for a moment, except to reason [*logos: word, with pros*]; and to be always the same, in sharp pains, on the occasion of the loss of a child, and in long illness; and to see clearly [*enargos: in bodily shape, of gods appearing in their own forms*] in a living example [*paradeigma: pattern, model*] that the same man can be both most resolute [*sphodros: vehement, robust*] and yielding [*aneimenos: released from labor, slack*], and not peevish [*duscherantikos: to bear with an ill grace*] in giving his instruction [*exegeisis: statement, narrative*]; and to have had before my eyes a man who clearly considered his experience [*empeiria: acquaintance with*] and his skill [*entrecheia: aptitude, instinct*] in expounding [*paradidomai: to transmit*] philosophical principles [*theoremata: spectacle, that which is looked at*] as the smallest of his merits [*kalos, adjective: beautiful, noble*]; and from him I learned how to receive from friends what are esteemed favors [*charis: grace, kindness*], without being either humbled [*hettaomai: to be discomfited, prove inferior*] by them or letting them pass unnoticed [*anaisthetos, adverb: in an unfeeling way, senseless*].

1.9. From [*para*] Sextus, a benevolent disposition [*eumenes: beneficial, kindly*], and the example [*paradeigma: cf. 1.8*] of a family [*oikos: household*] governed in a fatherly manner [*patronomizo: pater + nomizo, to use customarily*], and the idea [*ennoia: cf. 1.3*] of living conformably [*absent in Greek text*] to nature [*phusis: with kata, according to*]; and gravity [*semnos: revered, holy*] without affectation [*aplastos, adverb: literally as not molded; in a natural state*], and to look carefully after the interests [*kedemonikos, adverb: providential; verb as one who is in charge in the sense of*

being a guardian] of friends, and to tolerate [*anektos: from anechomai, to endure*] ignorant persons [*idiotes: a private person, common man, unskilled*], and those who form opinions [*oiomai: to suppose, mean*] without consideration [*atheoretos: lacking in theoreo (theoria)*]: he had the power of readily accommodating [*euarmostos: to be well harmonized (harmoizo)*] himself to [*pros: in the direction towards which*] all, so that intercourse [*homilia: association, converse*] with him was more agreeable [*prosenes: soft, gentle*] than any flattery; and at the same time [*kairos: occasion, opposed to kronos*] he was most highly venerated [*aidesimos: exciting shame; connotes fear and respect*] by those who associated with him: and he had the faculty [*lacking in Greek text*] both of discovering and ordering [*taktikos: pertains for ordering of soldiers*], in an intelligent and methodical [*katakeptos: adverb for both English adjectives; able to keep in check: from katalambano, to seize, apprehend*] way, the principles [*dogma: teaching*] necessary for [*eis: into*] life; and he never showed [*parecho: to exhibit, hold in readiness; with para, beside*] anger [*orge: cf. 1.1, aorgeton: lack of anger*] or any other passion [*pathe: emotion, affection, feeling*], but was entirely free from passion [*apathes: not to have pathe or unmoved*], and also most affectionate [*philostorgos: philos (dear) + orge (natural impulse, often associated with anger)*]; and he could express approbation [*euphemos: uttering sounds of good omen*] without noisy display [*apsopheti, adverb: without noise or sound*], and he possessed much knowledge [*polumathes*] without ostentation [*anepiphantos, adverb: without phaneros or making manifest or evident*].

1.10. From [*para*] Alexander the grammarian, to refrain [*epilambano: to lay hold of, with epi or upon*] from fault-finding [*anepiplektos: not open to attack*], and not in a reproachful way [*oneidistikos, adverb*] to chide [*prophero: to bring before*] those who uttered any barbarous or solecistic [*soloikos: incorrect use of language*] or strange-sounding expression [*apeches: discorant: apo + echos*]; but dexterously [*epidexios: tending towards the right, with epi or upon*] to introduce the very expression which ought to have been used, and in the way of answer or giving confirmation [*sunepimarturesis: joint testimony or sun + martureo*], or joining in an inquiry [*sundialepsis: sun + dia + lambano or with + through + receiving*] about the thing itself, not about the word, or by some other fit suggestion [*parapomnesis: reminding by the way or para + mneme*].

1.11. From [*para*] Fronto I learned to observe [*epistamai: to know how, to understand, with epi or upon*] what envy, and duplicity, and hypocrisy are in a tyrant, and that generally those among us who are called Patricians are rather deficient in paternal affection [*astorges: without attraction; stergo: to be fond of, acquiesce*].

1.12. From [*para*] Alexander the Platonic, not frequently nor without necessity to say to any one, or to write in a letter, that I have no leisure [*ascholos: no schole or that in which leisure is employed*]; nor continually to excuse [*paraiteomai: to beg, entreat, decline*] the neglect of duties required by our relation [*schesis: condition, quality*] to those with whom we live, by alleging [*proballo: to throw before*] urgent occupations [*pragma*].

1.13. From [*para*] Catulus, not to be indifferent [*oligoros, adverb: scornful; literally, little concern*] when a friend finds fault, even if he should find fault without reason [*alogos, adverb: a + logos, or word*], but to try to restore [*apokathistemi: apo + kata + istemi*] him to [*epi: upon*] his usual disposition [*sunethes: a dwelling together which connotes something habitual*]; and to be ready to speak well [*euthumos, adverb: in good spirits; thumos: heart or seat of anger*] of teachers, as it is reported [*anamimnesko: to remind, recall, with ana or upon, along*] of Domitius and Athenodotus; and to love [*agapetikos: to have agape*] my children truly.

1.14. From [*para*] my brother Severus, to love my kin [*philoikeios: philos + oikeios, that which is proper to a household*], and to love truth [*philaletes: philos + aletheia*], and to love justice [*philodikaaios: philos + dikaios*]; and through him I learned to know Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dion, Brutus; and from him I received the idea [*phantasia: cf. 1.7 as impression*] of a polity [*politeia: the conditions and rights of a citizen*] in which there is the same law for all, a polity administered [*dioikeo: to manage a house or oikos with dia, through*] with regard to equal rights and equal freedom of speech [*isegoria: isos + agora or assembly, the business of public speaking*], and the idea of a kingly government which respects most of all the freedom [*eleutheria*] of the governed; I learned from him also consistency [*homales: level as in level ground*] and undeviating steadiness [*eutonos: well-strung, vigorous*] in my regard [*time: worship, esteem, honor*] for philosophy; and a disposition to do good, and to give to others

[*eumetadotos: easily changing*] readily [*ektenos: cf. 1.4 as liberally*] and to cherish good hopes, and to believe that I am loved [*phileo: to regard with affection from which "friends" is derived, philos*] by my friends; and in him I observed no concealment [*anepikrumtos: an + epi (upon) + krupto*] of his opinions with respect to those whom he condemned, and that his friends had no need to conjecture [*stochasmos, noun: connotes aiming*] what he wished or did not wish, but it was quite plain.

1.15. From Maximus [*para*] I learned self-government [*to kratein beoutou: literally, the prevailing or holding sway of oneself*], and not to be led aside by anything; and cheerfulness [*euthumos: cf. 1.13 where used as adverb and re. thumos*] in all circumstances [*peristasis: a standing around*], as well as in illness; and a just admixture [*eukratos: well-tempered*] in the moral character [*ethos: cf. 1.7 as character*] of sweetness [*meilichios: kind*] and dignity [*geraros: revered; connotes old in the sense of mature*], and to do [*katergazomai: to carry on business, prepare*] what was set before me without complaining [*schetlios, adverb: connotes cruelty*]. I observed that everybody believed that he thought [*phroneo: connotes being wise, prudent*] as he spoke, and that in all that he did he never had any bad intention [*not in Greek text*]; and he never showed amazement and surprise [*anekplektos: undaunted, intrepid*], and was never in a hurry, and never put off doing [*okneo: to shrink, hesitate*] a thing, nor was perplexed [*amechanos: without means or resource, at a loss*] nor dejected, nor did he ever laugh to disguise his vexation, nor, on the other hand, was he ever passionate or suspicious. He was accustomed to do acts of beneficence [*euergetikos*], and was ready to forgive [*suggnomonikos: indulgent; noun means acknowledgment, confession*], and was free from all falsehood; and he presented [*parecho: cf. 1.0 as showed*] the appearance [*phantasia: cf. 1.14 as idea*] of a man who could not be diverted from right rather than of a man who had been improved. I observed, too, that no man could ever think that he was despised by Maximus, or ever venture to think himself a better man. He had also the art of being humorous in an agreeable way [*eucharis*].

1.16. In [*para*] my father I observed mildness of temper [*hemeros: tame, civilized*], and unchangeable [*menetikos: stable*] resolution [*asalentos, adverb: not agitated, as regarding the sea*] in the things which he had determined after due deliberation [*exetasmenos, adverb: after full investigation*]; and no vainglory [*akenodoxos*] in those things which men call honors [*time: cf. 1.14 as regard*]; and a love of labor and perseverance [*endelechēs: connotes that which is perpetual, continuous*]; and a readiness to listen to those who had anything to propose [*eisphero: literally, to bring into*] for the common weal [*koikopheles: koinos + ophelia, utility*]; and undeviating firmness [*aparatreptos, adverb: connotes being undeviating*] in giving to every man according to his deserts [*kat' axian: literally, according to what is right*]; and a knowledge derived from experience [*empeiros*] of the occasions for vigorous action [*entasis: tension, earnestness*] and for remission [*anesis: a loosening, relaxing*]. And I observed that he had overcome all passion [*eros*] for boys; and he considered himself no more than any other citizen; and he released his friends from all obligation to sup with him or to attend him of necessity when he went abroad, and those who had failed to accompany him, by reason of any urgent circumstances, always found him the same [*aei homoiōs*]. I observed too his habit of careful [*akribos, adverb: with precision*] inquiry in all matters of deliberation [*sumboulia: counsel*], and his persistency [*epimonos: literally, remaining upon*], and that he never stopped his investigation [*ereuna*] through being satisfied with appearances [*phantasia: cf. 1.15*] which first present themselves; and that his disposition [*not in Greek text*] was to keep [*diateretikos: dia (through) connotes thoroughness or persistence*] his friends, and not to be soon tired of [*apsikoros: quickly satiated, fickle*] them, nor yet to be extravagant [*epimanes: mad*] in his affection; and to be satisfied [*autarkes: independent, sufficient*] on all occasions, and cheerful [*phaidros: bright*]; and to foresee [*pronoetikos: cautious, wary; pros + noeo: to perceive, notice*] things a long way off, and to provide for [*prodioiketikos: to regulate, manage beforehand; pros + oikos (noun, as in 1.9, family)*] the smallest without display [*atragodos, adverb: without pomp or tragedy*]; and to check [*susstalasso: to fuse together*] immediately popular applause and all flattery; and to be ever watchful [*phulaktikon*] over the things which were necessary for the administration of the empire [*arche: rule, beginning*], and to be a good manager [*tamientikos: the verb means to be a paymaster, dispense*] of the expenditure, and patiently to endure [*hupomenetikos: the verb means literally to stand under*] the blame which he got for such conduct [*katatitiasis: charge, accusation*]; and he was neither superstitious [*deisidaimos: combination of deus + with noun daimonion or divine power, fortune*] with respect to the gods, nor did he court [*demokopikos: the verb means to court the mob*] men by

gifts or by trying to please them, or by flattering the populace; but he showed sobriety [*nepbos*: verb means to drink no wine] in all things and firmness [*bebaios*], and never any mean [*apeirokalos*: ignorant of the beautiful] thoughts or action, nor love of novelty. And the things which conduce in any way to the commodity [*eumareia*: ease, opportunity, with *eis* or *into*] of life, and of which fortune gives [*parecho*; cf. 1.15 as presented] an abundant supply, he used without arrogance and without excusing himself; so that when he had them, he enjoyed [*apto*: to touch] them without affectation [*anepitedeutos*, adverb: unfit, unserviceable; with *ana* + *epi*], and when he had them not, he did not want them. No one could ever say of him that he was either a sophist or a home-bred flippant slave or a pedant; but everyone acknowledged him to be a man ripe [*pepeiros*: mature, softened], perfect [*teleios*: complete, without blemish], above flattery, able to manage [*proistemi*: to set before] his own and other men's affairs. Besides this, he honored [*timetikos*: forming an estimate] those who were true philosophers, and he did not reproach those who pretended to be philosophers, nor yet was he easily led by them. He was also easy in conversation, and he made himself agreeable [*eucharis*: cf. 1.16, in an agreeable way] without any offensive affectation [*katakoros*, adverb: excessively, *koros* meaning satiety]. He took a reasonable care [*epimeletikos*: connotes a pursuit; with *epi* or *upon*] of his body's health, not as one who was greatly attached to life [*philozoos*: philos as in 1.14 + life], nor out of regard to personal appearance, nor yet in a careless way [*oligoros*, adverb: little caring], but so that, through his own attention [*prosoche*: from *prosecho*, to turn to], he very seldom stood in need of the physician's art or of medicine or external applications [*epithema*: remedy, literally, put-upon]. He was most ready to give way [*parachreo*: to make room] without envy [*abaskanos*, adverb: without slander] to those who possessed any particular faculty [*dunamis*: power, strength], such as that of eloquence or knowledge of the law or of morals, or of anything else; and he gave them his help [*suspoudastikos*: connotes making haste], that each might enjoy reputation [*eudokimos*: honored, famous] according to his deserts; and he always acted conformably to the institutions of his country, without showing any affectation [*epitedeuto*: to practice, train] of doing so. Further, he was not fond of change nor unsteady, but he loved to stay [*endiatriptikos*: fond of lingering, with *en* & *dia*] in the same places, and to employ himself about the same things; and after his paroxysms of headache he came immediately fresh and vigorous to his usual [*sunethes*: cf. 1.13 for noun, disposition] occupations. His secrets [*ta aporreta*: those which are unutterable] were not but very few and very rare, and these only about public matters; and he showed prudence [*emphron*: in one's mind or *phren* which also means midriff] and economy in the exhibition of the public spectacles [*theoria*] and the construction of public buildings, his donations to the people, and in such things, for he was a man who looked to what ought to be done, not to the reputation [*eudoxia*] which is got by a man's acts. He did not take the bath at unseasonable hours; he was not fond of building houses, nor curious [*epinoetes*: conceivable; *epi* + *noeo* as in #16 above, foresee] about what he ate, nor about the texture and color of his clothes, nor about the beauty of his slaves. His dress came from Lorum, his villa on the coast, and from Lanuvium generally. We know how he behaved to the toll-collector at Tusculum who asked his pardon; and such was all his behavior [*tropos*: direction, course, manner]. There was in him nothing harsh, nor implacable, nor violent, nor, as one may say, anything carried to the sweating point; but he examined [*logizomai*: to calculate, reckon] all things severally [*dieilemma*: from *dialambano*, to receive separately, with *dia* or *through*], as if he had abundance of time [*schole*: cf. 1.12 as no leisure], and without confusion, in an orderly way [*tetagmenos*, from *tasso*], vigorously [*erromenos*: pertains to health] and consistently [*sumphronos*, adverb: connotes suitability, expediency]. And that might be applied to [*epharmozo*: to fit, be adapted, with *epi* or *upon*] him which is recorded [*mnaomai*: to remember] of Socrates, that he was able both to abstain from [*apechomai*], and to enjoy [*apolauo*] those things which many are too weak to abstain from, and cannot enjoy without excess. But to be strong enough both to bear [*kartereo*: connotes patience] the one and to be sober in the other is the mark of a man who has a perfect [*artios*: suitable, exactly fitted] and invincible [*aettetos*: connotes lack of inferiority] soul, such as he showed in the illness of Maximus.

1.17. To [*para*] the gods I am indebted for having good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen [*oikeios*: cf. 1.14 as kin] and friends, nearly everything good. Further, I owe it to the gods that I was not hurried into any offence [*plemmeleo*: cf. 1.7 as disposed me wrong] against any of them, though I had a disposition [*diathesis*: arrangement, composition] which, if opportunity had

offered, might have led me to do something of this kind; but, through their favor [*eupoia: eu + poieo, to make well*], there never was such a concurrence [*sundrome: literally, a running together*] of circumstances as put me to the trial [*elegcho: to disgrace, be convicted*]. Further, I am thankful to the gods that I was not longer brought up [*trepho: to increase, become firm*] with my grandfather's concubine, and that I preserved [*diasozo: dia connotes thoroughness*] the flower of my youth, and that I did not make proof of my virility before the proper season [*pro horas androthenai: literally, to reach the hour of manhood*], but even deferred [*epilambano: cf. 1.10 as refrain*] the time; that I was subjected to a ruler and a father who was able to take away all pride [*tuphos: smoke, vapor*] from me, and to bring me to the knowledge [*ennoia: with eis, into; cf. 1.9*] that it is possible for a man to live in a palace without wanting either guards or embroidered dresses, or torches and statues, and such-like show; [*kompos: noise, din*] but that it is in such a man's power to bring himself [*sustello: to draw together, to humble*] very near to the fashion of a private person, without being for this reason either meaner in thought, or more remiss [*thumikos: from thumos in action; cf. 1.13*], with respect to the things which must be done for the public interest in a manner that befits a ruler. I thank the gods for giving [*tugchano: to hit upon*] me such a brother, who was able by his moral character [*ethos: with dia or through; cf. 1.15*] to rouse [*epepeigro: to wake up*] me to vigilance [*epimeleia: care, attention & used with pros; epi or upon connotes special attention*] over myself, and who, at the same time, pleased me by his respect [*time; cf. 1.16 as honors*] and affection [*storge: especially between parents and children*]; that my children have not been stupid nor deformed in body; that I did not make more proficiency [*prokope: progress as in a journey*] in rhetoric, poetry, and the other studies [*epitedeumma: pursuits, business; connotes training*], in which I should perhaps have been completely engaged [*katecho: to check, restrain*], if I had seen [*aisthanomai: to perceive or apprehend by the senses*] that I was making progress [*proiemi: to send before with euodos (adverb, easily or literally, well on the road)*] in them; that I made haste [*phthano: to overtake, outstrip*] to place [*katatithemi: with kata, according to*] those who brought me up [*trepho: also in #17*] in the station of honor, which they seemed to desire, without putting them off with hope of my doing it some time after, because they were then still young; that I knew Apollonius, Rusticus, Maximus; that I received clear [*enargos, adverb: clear, visible*] and frequent impressions [*to phantasthenai: or phantizomai, to become visible*] about living according to nature [*physis: as in 1.9, with kata*] and what kind of a life that is, so that, so far as depended on the gods, and their gifts, and help [*sullepsis: a taking together*], and inspirations [*epinoia: thought, inventiveness; epi or upon + nous or mind*], nothing hindered me from forthwith living according to nature, though I still fall short of it through my own fault [*aitia: cause*], and through not observing [*diatero: dia or through implies closeness*] the admonitions [*bupomnesis: a reminding*] of [*ek or from*] the gods, and, I may almost say, their direct [*mononouchi, adverb: monos or alone + ouch or not*] instructions [*didaskalia*]; that my body has held out so long in [*epi: upon*] such a kind of life; that I never touched either Benedicta or Theodotus, and that, after having fallen into amatory passions [*en erotikois pathei: eros + pathos*], I was cured; and, though I was often out of humor [*chalepaino: to be severe, angry*] with Rusticus, I never did anything of which I had occasion to repent [*metagignosko: to change one's mind*]; that, though it was my mother's fate to die young, she spent [*oikeo: to dwell*] the last years of her life with me; that, whenever I wished to help [*epikoureo: to act as an ally; with epi, upon*] any man in his need, or on any other occasion, I was never told that I had not the means of doing it; and that to myself the same necessity [*chrema: property, matter*] never happened, to receive anything from another; that I have such a wife, so obedient, and so affectionate [*philostorgos: especially between parents and children; cf. 1.9*], and so simple; that I had abundance of good masters for [*eis: into*] my children; and that remedies have been shown to me by dreams [*onar: vision in sleep*], both others, and against bloodspitting and giddiness...; and that, when I had an inclination [*epithumeo: cf. 1.6 as desire, with epi or upon*] to philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of any sophist, and that I did not waste [*apokathistemi: to restore, deliver*] my time on writers of histories, or in the resolution of syllogisms, or occupy myself [*katagignosko: to remark, discover, lay a charge; with kata or according to*] about the investigation of appearances in the heavens [*meteorologikos: skilled in meteorology, one who talks about heavenly bodies*]; for all these things require the help of the gods and fortune [*tuche: the good which one obtains by the favor of the gods*].

## BOOK TWO (Among the Quadi at the Granua)

2.1. Begin the morning by saying [*prolego: to state publically, proclaim*] to yourself, I shall meet with the busy-body [*periergos: overly careful*], the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these things happen [*sumbaino: to go with*] to them by reason of [*para*] their ignorance [*agnoia*] of what is good and evil. But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful [*kalos: cf. 1.8 as merits*], and of the bad that it is ugly [*aischros: causing shame*], and the nature of him who does wrong [*hamartano: to miss the mark*], that it is akin to me [*suggenes*], not only of the same blood or seed, but that it participates [*metecho*] in the same intelligence [*nous: cf. 1.17, epinoia*] and the same portion [*apomoirra*] of the divinity, I can neither be injured by any of them, for no one can fix on [*periballo: literally, to cast around*] me what is ugly [*aischros: also in #1*], nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him, for we are made for co-operation [*sunergia: literally, a working with, with sun*], like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one another then is contrary to nature [*para phusin*]; and it is acting against one another to be vexed and to turn away.

2.2. Whatever this is that I am, it is a little flesh and breath, and the ruling part [*to hegemonikon: from hegemoneno, to lead the way, command*]. Throw away your books; no longer distract [*spao: to draw, snatch*] yourself: it is not allowed; but as if you wast now dying, despise [*kataphroneo: to think down upon*] the flesh; it is blood and bones and a network, a contexture of nerves, veins, and arteries. See the breath [*pneuma*] also, what kind of a thing it is, air, and not always the same, but every moment [*ede: always*] sent out and again sucked in. The third then is the ruling part: consider [*epinoeo: to form plans, invent; cf. epinoia in 1.17 as inspirations*] thus: You are an old man; no longer let this be a slave, no longer be pulled by the strings [*neurospao: cf. spao, #2; used with horme, impulse along with kata*] like a puppet to unsocial movements [*akoinonetos: not having koinonia or fellowship*], no longer either be dissatisfied with your present lot [*paron: neuter participle; from pareimi, to be beside*], or shrink from the future.

2.3. All that is from the gods is full of Providence [*pronoia: foresight; compare with epinoia as in 1.17*]. That which is from fortune [*tuche: cf. 1.17*] is not separated from [*aneu: without*] nature or without an interweaving [*sugkelosis: pertains to the thread of destiny*] and involution [*epiploke: a planning together, combination; with epi, upon*] with the things which are ordered [*dioikeo: cf. 1.14 as administrated; dia connotes thoroughness*] by Providence. From thence all things flow; and there is besides necessity [*to anagkaion: akin to tuche or fortune*], and that which is for the advantage [*sumphero: to bring together, collect*] of the whole universe [*kosmos: order, dress; implies adornment*], of which you are a part. But that is good for every part [*meros*] of nature which the nature of the whole brings, and what serves to maintain [*sostikon: from sozo, also in #3*] this nature. Now the universe is preserved [*sozo: to save; cf. 1.17 as preserved*], as by the changes [*metabole: change, revolution*] of the elements [*stoicheion: one of a row, a letter*] so by the changes of things compounded [*sugkerima: a body formed by combination, structure*] of the elements. Let these principles be enough for you, let them always be fixed opinions [*dogma: cf. 1.9 as principles*]. But cast away the thirst after books, that you mayest not die murmuring, but cheerfully, truly, and from your heart thankful [*eucharistos*] to the gods.

2.4. Remember how long you have been putting off [*anaballo: to thron, toss up*] these things, and how often you received an opportunity [*prothesmios, adjective: fore-appointed*] from [*para*] the gods, and yet dost not use it. You must now at last perceive [*aisthanomai: cf. 1.17 as had seen*] of what universe [*kosmos: cf. #3*] you are a part [*meros: cf. #3*], and of what administrator [*dioikeo: cf. #3*] of the universe your existence [*buphistemi: from huphistemi, to place or set under*] is an efflux [*aporroia: a flowing off, stream*], and that a limit of time [*horos*] is fixed [*perigrapho: to draw a line around*] for you, which if you dost not use for clearing away the clouds [*apaitthriazo: expose to the air*] from your mind [*not in Greek text*], it will go and you will go, and it will never return.

2.5. Every moment think [*phrontizo: to devise, contrive*] steadily [*stibaros: connotes compactness, being sturdy*] as a Roman and a man to do what you have in hand with perfect [*akribes: precise, exact*] and simple dignity

[*semnotes: solemnity*], and feeling of affection [*philostorgia: cf. 1.9 as affectionate, adjective*], and freedom, and justice; and to give yourself relief [*schole: cf. 1.16 as abundance of time*] from all other thoughts [*phantasia: cf. 1.16 as appearances*]. And you will give yourself relief [*porizo: to furnish, bring about*], if you do every act of your life as if it were the last, laying aside [*apostrepbo: to turn to flight*] all carelessness and passionate aversion [*empathos: cf. 1.17 with pathos*] from the commands of reason [*logos*], and all hypocrisy, and self-love [*philautia*], and discontent with the portion which has been given to you [*pros ta summemoiramena: literally, to what has been given in due proportion*]. You see how few the things are, the which if a man lays hold of, he is able to live a life which flows in quiet [*eurous: well-flowing*], and is like the existence of the gods; for the gods on their part will require nothing more from [*para*] him who observes [*phulasso*] these things.

2.6. Do wrong [*hubrizo: to run riot, outrage*] to yourself, do wrong to yourself, my soul; but you will no longer have the opportunity [*kairos: cf. 1.9 as time*] of honoring [*timao: cf. time as in 1.17 as respect*] yourself. Every man's life is sufficient. But yours is nearly finished [*dianuo: in reference to a thing or passage*], though your soul reverences [*aideomai: to have a sense of shame*] not itself but places your felicity [*eumoiria: good portion or fate*] in the souls of others.

2.7. Do the things external which fall upon you distract [*perispao: to strip off, be engaged or distracted in business*] you? Give yourself time [*parecho as in 1.16 (excusing) with schole as in #5 (relief)*] to learn something new and good, and cease to be whirled around [*rhembomai: to roam, roll about*]. But then you must also avoid [*phulasso: as in #5, observes*] being carried about [*periphora, noun: circuit*] the other way. For those too are triflers [*lereo: to be foolish*] who have wearied themselves in life by their activity, and yet have no object [*skopos: goal, aim*] to which to direct every movement [*horme: cf. #2, pulled by the strings*], and, in a word, all their thoughts [*phantasia: cf. #5*].

2.8. Through not observing [*epistamai: to understand*] what is in the mind [*psuche: soul*] of another a man has seldom been seen to be unhappy [*kakodaimonos: kakos or evil and adjective which means belonging to a daimon or god; connotes divine intervention*]; but those who do not observe [*parakoloutho: to follow or attend closely; para implying being besides or in the presence*] the movements [*kinema*] of their own minds must of necessity be unhappy.

2.9. This you must always bear in mind [*mnaomai: to remember as in 1.16*] what is the nature [*phusis: as in 1.17*] of the whole, and what is my nature, and how this is related to that [*literally, having that to (pros) that*], and what kind of a part it is of what kind of a whole; and that there is no one who hinders [*koluo: to prevent*] you from always doing and saying the things which are according [*ta akoloutha: from akoloutho, to follow as in a sequence; cf. #8, parakoloutho, to observe*] to the nature of which you are a part.

2.10. Theophrastus, in his comparison [*sugkerisis: a compounding*] of bad acts [*hamartano: to miss the mark; cf. #7 as does wrong*]—such a comparison as one would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind—says, like a true philosopher [*philosophos, adverb: philosophically*], that the offences [*plemmeleo: literally, to make a false note in music; cf. 1.7 as done me wrong*] which are committed through desire [*epithumia: cf. 1.7 thumikos or remiss. The epi (upon) signifies an intensification of thumos*] are more blameable than those which are committed through anger [*thumos*]. For he who is excited by anger seems to turn away from [*apostrepbo: to put to flight*] reason [*logos: cf. #5*] with a certain pain and unconscious contraction [*lanthano (to forget) & sustole (a drawing together, limitation)*]; but he who offends through desire [*kata, with epithumia*], being overpowered by pleasure [*hedone: delight*], seems to be in a manner more intemperate [*akolastos: undisciplined*] and more womanish [*thelus: gentle*] in his offences. Rightly then, and in a way worthy of philosophy, he said that the offence which is committed with pleasure is more blameable [*hamartano: cf. #10, bad acts*] than that which is committed with pain; and on the whole the one is more like a person who has been first wronged and through pain is compelled to be angry [*thumeo: cf. #10, thumos*]; but the other is moved [*hormao: cf. horme as in #7, movement*] by his own impulse to [*pros: in the direction towards which*] do wrong, being carried towards [*epi:*



upon] doing something by [*kata*: according to] desire.

2.11. Since it is possible that you may depart from life this very moment, regulate [*poieo*: to make] every act and thought [*dianoemai*: to intend, purpose; verbal root for nous or intelligence, #1]. But to go away from among men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not involve [*periballo*: cf. #1 as can fix on] you in evil; but if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no concern [*melo*: applies to thought as well as action] about human affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe [*kosmos*; cf. #2] devoid of gods or devoid of Providence [*pronoia*: cf. #3]? But in [*kata*: according to] truth they do exist, and they do care for human things, and they have put all the means in man's power to enable him not to fall [*peripipto*: to fall around as to embrace] into real evils. And as to the rest, if there was anything evil, they would have provided [*proorao*: to see beforehand] for this also, that it should be altogether in a man's power not to fall into it. Now that which does not make a man worse, how can it make a man's life worse? But neither through ignorance [*agnoia*: cf. #1], nor having the knowledge [*eido*, verb], but not the power to guard against [*prophulasso*: cf. #7 as avoid, without preposition] or correct [*diorthoo*: to make straight] these things, is it possible that the nature of the universe has overlooked [*parorao*: orao with para; compared with proorao in #11] them; nor is it possible that it has made so great a mistake [*hamartano*; cf. #10 as blamable], either through want of power [*a + dunamia*] or want of skill [*a + technia*: implies a craft], that good and evil should happen [*sumbaino*: cf. #1] indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death certainly, and life, honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure, all these things equally happen to good men and bad, being things which make us neither better [*kalos*: cf. #1 as beautiful] nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil.

2.12. How quickly all things disappear [*enaphainizo*: from *phaino*; cf. 1.16, appearances (*phantasia*)], in the universe the bodies themselves, but in time the remembrance [*mneme*: cf. 1.10, suggestion or *parupomnesis*: reminding by the way or para + *mneme* of them]; what is the nature of all sensible things [*ta aistheta* cf. #4 as perceive, *aisthanomai*], and particularly those which attract with the bait of pleasure [*hedone*: cf. #10] or terrify by pain [*ponos*: labor, hard work], or are noised abroad by vapory fame; how worthless, and contemptible, and sordid, and perishable, and dead they are- all this it is the part of the intellectual faculty [*noeras* (*nous*: cf. #1, intelligence) *dunameos* (*dunamis*: cf. 1.16)] to observe [*ephistemi*: to set upon]. To observe [*horao*: to see] too who these are whose opinions and voices give [*parecho*: cf. #7 as give time] reputation; what death is, and the fact that, if a man looks at [*eido*; cf. #11 as knowledge] it in itself, and by the abstractive power of reflection [*ennoia*: cf. 1.17 as knowledge. In the case at hand, the noun includes abstractive power] resolves [*dialuo*: loosens; dia or through, implying thoroughness] into their parts all the things which present themselves to the imagination [*emphantizo*: compare with *enaphinizo* in #12] in it, he will then consider [*hupolambano*: literally, to take up by getting under] it to be nothing else than an operation [*ergon*] of nature; and if any one is afraid of an operation of nature, he is a child. This, however, is not only an operation of nature, but it is also a thing which conduces to the purposes [*sumphero*: cf. #3 as advantage] of nature. To observe too how man comes near to [*bapto*: to join, touch] the deity [*theos*], and by what part of him, and when this part of man is so disposed [*diakeimai*: dia or through connotes thoroughness].

2.13. Nothing is more wretched than a man who traverses everything in a round, and pries into the things beneath the earth, as the poet says, and seeks by conjecture what is in the minds [*psuche*: cf. #2] of his neighbors, without perceiving [*aisthanomai*: cf. #12, sensible things] that it is sufficient to attend to the daemon [*daimon*: cf. #8, *kakodaimonos*] within him, and to reverence it sincerely [*therapeuo* or to be an attendant or do service, with *gnosios* or from the verbal root *gignosko* (*gnosis*)]. And reverence of the daemon consists in keeping [*diatero*: cf. 1.17 as observing] it pure from passion [*pathe*: cf. 1.9, *apathes*] and thoughtlessness [*eikaiotes*: without purpose, aimless], and dissatisfaction with what comes from gods and men. For the things from the gods merit veneration [*aidesima*: cf. 2.6, reverences or *aideomai*, to have a sense of shame] for their excellence [*arete*: also as virtue]; and the things from men should be dear to us by reason of kinship [*suggeneia*: cf. 2.1, *akin to me* or *suggenes*], and sometimes even, in a manner, they move our pity [*eleemos*] by reason of men's ignorance [*agnoia*: cf. #11] of good and bad; this defect being not less than that which deprives us of the power of

distinguishing [*diakrino: to separate*] things that are white and black.

2.14. Though you should be going to live three thousand years, and as many times ten thousand years, still remember that no man loses [*apoballo: literally, casts away*] any other life than this which he now lives, nor lives any other than this which he now loses. The longest and shortest are thus brought [*kathistemi: to settle, establish (kata or according to & histemi, make to stand)*] to the same. For the present is the same to all, though that which perishes is not the same; and so that which is lost appears [*anaphaino: cf. #12 as enaphainizo, to disappear*] to be a mere moment [*akariaios, adjective: brief; verbal root is keiro, to cut*]. For a man cannot lose either the past or the future: for what a man has not, how can any one take this from him? These two things then you must bear in mind [*mnaomai: cf. #9 as bear in mind*]; the one, that all things from eternity are of like forms [*homoeidos: eidos, that which is seen*] and come round in a circle, and that it makes no difference [*diaphero: literally, to carry over or across*] whether a man shall see the same things during a hundred years or two hundred, or an infinite time; and the second, that the longest liver and he who will die soonest lose just the same. For the present [*to paron: from pareimi, to be present or literally, to go by or beside*] is the only thing of which a man can be deprived [*stereo: implies bereavement*], if it is true that this is the only thing which he has, and that a man cannot lose a thing if he has it not.

2.15. Remember that all is opinion [*bupolepsis: literally, a taking up; a rejoinder or reply*]. For what was said by the Cynic Monimus is manifest [*delos: clear*]: and manifest too is the use of what was said, if a man receives what may be got out of it as far as it is true.

2.16. The soul [*psuche: cf. #13 as minds*] of man does violence [*hubrizo: cf. #6 as to do wrong*] to itself, first of all, when it becomes an abscess and, as it were, a tumor on the universe [*kosmos: cf. #11*], so far as it can. For to be vexed [*duscheraino: to bear with an ill grace*] at anything which happens is a separation [*apostasis*] of ourselves from nature [*phusis: cf. #9*], in some part of which the natures of all other things are contained [*periecho: to encompass*]. In the next place, the soul does violence to itself when it turns away from [*apostrepho: cf. #10*] any man, or even moves towards him with the intention of injuring, such as are the souls of those who are angry [*orgizo*]. In the third place, the soul does violence to itself when it is overpowered by pleasure [*hedone: cf. #12*] or by pain [*ponos: cf. #12*]. Fourthly, when it plays a part, and does or says anything insincerely [*bupokrinomai: to reply, play a part*] and untruly. Fifthly, when it allows any act [*praxis*] of its own and any movement [*horme: cf. #7*] to be without an aim [*skopos: cf. #7 as object*], and does anything thoughtlessly [*eike: without purpose*] and without considering [*aparakolouthetos, adverb: not to be attained or a + para + akoloutho*] what it is, it being right that even the smallest things be done with reference [*anaphora: literally, a carrying back*] to an end [*telos*]; and the end of rational [*logikos, or having logos*] animals is to follow the reason [*logos*] and the law [*thesmos: that which is laid down*] of the most ancient city and polity [*politeia: cf. 1.14*].

2.17. Of human life the time [*chronos: compare with kairos as opportunity, #6*] is a point, and the substance [*ousia*] is in a flux [*rheo, verb: to flow*], and the perception [*aisthesis: cf. #13 as had seen aisthanomai*] dull [*amurdos: indistinct, illegible*], and the composition [*sugkerisis: cf. #10 as comparison*] of the whole body subject to putrefaction, and the soul [*psuche: cf. #16*] a whirl, and fortune [*tuche: cf. #3*] hard to divine [*dustekmartos: hard to make out from signs*], and fame a thing devoid of judgement [*akritos*]. And, to say all in a word, everything which belongs to the body is a stream [*potamos: which does rheo as in #17*], and what belongs to the soul is a dream [*oneiros*] and vapor [*tuphos: cf. 1.17 as pride*], and life is a warfare and a stranger's sojourn [*epidemia: verbal root means to be at home, stay in a place*], and after-fame is oblivion [*lethe: forgetfulness*]. What then is that which is able to conduct [*parapempo: literally, to send past*] a man? One thing and only one, philosophy. But this consists in keeping the daemon [*daimon: cf. #13*] within a man free from violence [*anubristos: without hubrizo as in #16*] and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing nothing without purpose [*eike: cf. #16 as thoughtlessly*], nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's doing or not doing anything; and besides, accepting all that happens, and all that is allotted [*aponemo: to apportion*], as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he himself came; and, finally, waiting for death with a

cheerful mind [*hileos + gnome: meanings of knowing, thought, judgment*], as being nothing else than a dissolution [*lusis*] of the elements [*stoicheion: cf. #3*] of which every living being is compounded [*sugkrino: verbal root of sugkrisis as in #17*]. But if there is no harm [*deinos: fear, dread*] to the elements themselves in each continually [*dienekos: without breaks*] changing [*metaballo: to throw into a different position*] into another, why should a man have any apprehension [*hupodeido: to cover before*] about the change [*metabole: cf. #3 & cf. metaballo, #17*] and dissolution [*dialusis: cf. #17, lysis; dia or through implies thoroughness*] of all the elements? For it is according to nature [*kata & phusis, cf. #16*], and nothing is evil which is according to nature.

This in Carnuntum.

## BOOK THREE

3.1. We ought to consider [*logizomai: cf. 1.16 as examined*] not only that our life is daily wasting away [*analisko: to use up, lavish*] and a smaller part of it is left, but another thing also must be taken into the account, that if a man should live longer, it is quite uncertain whether the understanding [*dianoia: thought, intention, intelligence; dia + nous or mind. Cf. 2.11*] will still continue sufficient for the comprehension [*sunesis, with pros: union, intelligence*] of things, and retain the power of contemplation [*theoria: cf. 1.16 as spectacles*] which strives [*suneteino: to stretch together, hasten*] to acquire the knowledge [*empeira: experience, acquaintance*] of the divine and the human. For if he shall begin to fall into dotage, perspiration and nutrition and imagination [*phantizomai: cf. 1.17 as impressions*] and appetite [*horme: cf. 2.16 as movement*], and whatever else there is of the kind, will not fail; but the power of making use of ourselves, and filling up [*akribazo: to use accurately*] the measure of our duty, and clearly separating all appearances [*prophaino: cf. 2.12 as disappear or enaphainizo*], and considering whether a man should now depart from life, and whatever else of the kind absolutely requires a disciplined reason [*logismos: cf. #1 for verbal root (logizomai) + suggumazo: to exercise together*], all this is already extinguished. We must make haste then, not only because we are daily nearer to death, but also because the conception [*ennoia: cf. 2.12 as reflection*] of things and the understanding [*parakoloutho: to follow with the mind, attend*] of them cease first.

3.2. We ought to observe [*paraphulasso: cf. 2.7 as to guard against, without para*] also that even the things which follow after the things which are produced [*gignomai: to come into being*] according to nature contain something pleasing [*eucharis: cf. 1.8 for charis as favors*] and attractive [*epago: to bring upon, introduce*]. For instance, when bread is baked some parts are split at the surface, and these parts which thus open, and have a certain fashion [*tropos: cf. 1.16 as behavior*] contrary to the purpose of the baker's art [*epaggelma: promise, profession*], are beautiful in a manner, and in a peculiar way excite a desire [*prothumia, with pros or direction towards which; cf. 2.10 for thumeo, to be angry*] for eating. And again, figs, when they are quite ripe, gape open; and in the ripe olives the very circumstance of their being near to rottenness adds a peculiar beauty [*kallos: cf. 1.1 as good*] to the fruit. And the ears of corn bending down, and the lion's eyebrows, and the foam which flows from the mouth of wild boars, and many other things- though they are far from being beautiful, if a man should examine [*skopeo: cf. 2.16 for skopos or aim*] them severally- still, because they are consequent upon [*epikoloutho: cf. #1 for parakoloutho, understanding*] the things which are formed by nature, help to adorn [*sunepikosmeo: sun (with) + epi (upon) + kosmeo; verbal root for kosmos or universe*] them, and they please the mind [*psuchagogo: to lead souls to the nether world; to persuade*]; so that if a man should have a feeling [*pathos: anything that befalls one, suffering, misfortune*] and deeper insight [*ennoia: cf. #1 as conception*] with respect to the things which are produced in the universe [*en to holo (holos): compare with kosmos, 2.16*], there is hardly one of those which follow by way of consequence [*epikoloutho: cf. #2, to be consequent upon*] which will not seem to him to be in a manner disposed [*diasunistano, dia + sun + istemi: to set forth, signify clearly*] so as to give [*sumbaino: cf. 2.11 as should happen*] pleasure [*hedone: cf. 2.16*]. And so he will see even the real gaping jaws of wild beasts with no less pleasure than those which painters and sculptors show by imitation; and in an old woman and an old man he will be able to see a certain maturity [*akme: point, edge, bloom*] and comeliness

[*bora*: implies prime of life; compare with *kallos*, #2]; and the attractive loveliness of young persons he will be able to look on with chaste [*sophronizo*: to be temperate, self-controlled] eyes; and many such things will present themselves [*prospipto*: to fall upon], not pleasing to every man, but to him only who has become truly familiar [*oikeioo*: cf. 1.6 as to have become intimate] with nature and her works.

3.3. Hippocrates, after curing many diseases, himself fell sick and died. The Chaldaei foretold [*proegoreo*: to speak for another] the deaths of many, and then fate [*to pepromenon*: from *poro*, to offer, grant] caught them too. Alexander, and Pompeius, and Caius Caesar, after so often completely destroying whole cities, and in battle cutting to pieces many ten thousands of cavalry and infantry, themselves too at last departed from life. Heraclitus, after so many speculations [*phusiologeo*: to investigate natural causes] on the conflagration of the universe [*kosmos*: cf. 2.17], was filled with water internally and died smeared all over with mud. And lice destroyed Democritus; and other lice killed Socrates. What means all this? You have embarked, you have made the voyage, you are come to shore; get out. If indeed to another life, there is no want of gods, not even there. But if to a state without sensation [*anaesthesia*: cf. 1.17 for *aisthesia*, perception], you will cease to be held by pains [*ponos*: cf. 2.16] and pleasures [*hedone*: cf. #2], and to be a slave to the vessel, which is as much inferior as that which serves it is superior: for the one is intelligence [*nous*: cf. #1 for *dianoia*, understanding] and deity [*daimon*: cf. 2.17 as *daemon*]; the other is earth and corruption [*luthros*: defilement from blood].

3.4. Do not waste [*katatribo*: to rub down, away; *kata* or according to intensifies the meaning] the remainder [*meros*: cf. 2.4 as part in the sense of portion] of your life in thoughts [*phantasia*: cf. 2.12 as appearances] about others, when you do not refer [*anaphora*: noun, cf. 2.16 as reference] your thoughts [word lacking in Greek text] to some object of common utility [*koinopheles*]. For you lose [*stereo*: to be deprived] the opportunity of doing something else when you have such thoughts [*phantasia*, also in #5] as these. What is such a person doing, and why, and what is he saying, and what is he thinking of, and what is he contriving, and whatever else of the kind makes us wander away from [*aporrembomai*: to hesitate] the observation [*parateresis*: para or about, a watching-about] of our own ruling power [*to hegemonikon*; cf. 2.2]. We ought then to check [*periistemi*: literally, to place round] in the series [*heirmos*: sequence, connection] of our thoughts [*phantasia*, also in #5] everything that is without a purpose and useless [*mate*: vain], but most of all the over-curious feeling [*to periergon*: adjective used as noun, careful, elaborate, superfluous] and the malignant; and a man should use himself to think [*phantazomai*: to become visible, show oneself] of those things only about which if one should suddenly ask, What have you now in your thoughts [*dianoemai*: cf. 2.12]? With perfect openness [*parresia*: cf. 1.6 as freedom of speech] you might, immediately answer, This or That; so that from your words it should be plain that everything in you is simple [*aploos*: sincere, frank] and benevolent [*eumenes*: cf. 1.9 as benevolent disposition], and such as befits a social [*koinonikos*: cf. 2.2, unsocial movements or *akoinonetos*: not having *koinonia* or fellowship] animal, and one that cares not for thoughts [*phantasma*: appearance; cf. *phantasia*, #5] about pleasure or sensual enjoyments at all, nor has any rivalry or envy and suspicion, or anything else for which you would blush if you should say that you had it in your mind [*nous*: cf. #4 as intelligence]. For the man who is such and no longer delays [*hupertithemi*: to set on the other side, carry over] being among the number of the best [*aristos*: noble, brave or in the moral sense], is like a priest and minister of the gods, using [*hidruo*: to be seating, found, dedicate] too the deity [not in Greek text] which is planted within him, which makes [*parecho*: cf. 2.12 as give] the man uncontaminated [*akraino*: unstained] by pleasure [*hedone*: cf. #4], unharmed [*atropos*: unmoved; cf. 3.2 for *tropos*, fashion] by any pain, untouched by any insult [*hubris*: wanton violence, outrage], feeling no wrong, a fighter [*athlete*] in the noblest fight [*athlon*: prize of contest], one who cannot be overpowered by any passion [*pathos*: cf. 3.2 as feeling], dyed [*bapto*] deep with justice [*dikaiosune*], accepting with all his soul [*psuche*: cf. 2.17] everything which happens [*sumbaino*: cf. 3.2 as to give] and is assigned to him as his portion [*aponemo*: to assign, take a share of]; and not often, nor yet without great necessity and for the general interest [*koinophelos*: *koinos* (*koinonikos*, #5) + *opheleia*, assistance, use], imagining [*phantazomai*: cf. #5 as think] what another says, or does, or thinks [*dianoemai*: cf. #5 as thoughts]. For it is only what belongs to himself that he makes the matter for his activity [*energeia*: with pros or directions towards which]; and he constantly [*dienekos*: cf. 2.17 as continually] thinks [*ennoeo*: to reflect, have a notion; cf. 3.2 for *ennoia*, insight] of that which is allotted [*sugklotbo*: literally, to twist together by

*spinning*] to himself out of the sum total of things, and he makes [*parecho*: cf. #5 as using] his own acts fair [*kalos*: cf. 2.11 as better (beautiful)], and he is persuaded that his own portion is good [*agathos*]. For the lot [*moira*: fate] which is assigned [*nemo*: to distribute, dispense, manage] to each man is carried along with [*sumphero*: cf. 2.12 as conduces] him and carries him along with it. And he remembers [*mnomai*: cf. 2.14 as bear in mind] also that every rational animal [*to logikon*: *logikos* as in 2.16, rational] is his kinsman, and that to care for [*kedeno*: to take charge of, be allied] all men is according to man's nature [*physis*: cf. 2.17]; and a man should hold on [*antekteon*: adjective of *antecho*, to cleave to] to the opinion not of all, but of those only who confessedly [*homologeon*: literally, to speak together] live according to nature. But as to those who live not so, he always bears in mind what kind of men they are both at home and from home, both by night and by day, and what they are, and with what men they live [*diateleo*: to bring to an end, dia or through] an impure life. Accordingly, he does not value at all the praise [*logos*: cf. 2.16 as reason] which comes from such men, since they are not even satisfied with [*aresko*: to make good, appease] themselves.

3.5. Labor not unwillingly, nor without regard to the common interest [*akoinonetos*: without *koinonia*; cf. 3.4], nor without due consideration [*anexetastos*: not inquired into (*exetazo*)], nor with distraction [*antbelko*: to draw or pull in a contrary fashion]; nor let studied ornament [*kompsia*: refinement, especially with regard to language; verbal root is *kosmeo* as in 3.2, to adorn or *sunepikosmeo*] set off [*kallopizo*: to beautify, embellish] your thoughts [*dianoia*: cf. #1], and be not either a man of many words, or busy about too many things [*polupragmon*: meddlesome, being a busybody]. And further, let the deity [*theos*; cf. 2.12] which is in you be the guardian [*prostata*: one who stands before] of a living being [*zoon*], manly and of ripe age, and engaged in matter political, and a Roman, and a ruler, who has taken his post like a man waiting for the signal which summons him from life, and ready to go [*eulotos*: easy to untie], having need neither of oath nor of any man's testimony. Be cheerful [*phaidros*: cf. 1.16 as cheerful] also, and seek not external help [*aprosdees*: no need of more] nor the tranquility [*hesuchia*: stillness, rest, quiet] which others give. A man then must stand erect, not be kept erect by others.

3.6. If you find in human life anything better than justice, truth, temperance [*sophrosune*: soundness of mind, moderation], fortitude, and, in a word, anything better than your own mind's [*dianoia*: cf. #5 as thoughts] self-satisfaction in the things which it enables [*parecho*: cf. #4 as makes] you to do according to right reason [*kata ton logon ton orthon*], and in the condition that is assigned [*aponemo*: cf. #4] to you without your own choice; if, I say, you see anything better than this, turn to it with all your soul [*pusche*], and enjoy [*apolauo*: cf. #1.16] that which you have found to be the best [*aristos*: cf. #4]. But if nothing appears [*phaino*: cf. 2.12 (*enaphainizo*, to disappear)] to be better than the deity [*daimon*: cf. 3.3] which is planted [*enidruo*: to set in a place] in you, which has subjected [*hupotasso*: to place or arrange under] to itself all your appetites [*horme*: to be moored, at anchor; cf. *horme*, as in 3.1, appetite], and carefully examines [*exetazo*: cf. #5, *anexetastos*] all the impressions [*phantasia*: cf. #4 as thoughts], and, as Socrates said, has detached [*aphaireo*: to take from, be deprived] itself from the persuasions of sense, and has submitted [*hupotasso*, also in #6] itself to the gods, and cares for [*prokedeomai*; *kedeno*: to take charge of, ally oneself in marriage] mankind; if you find everything else smaller and of less value than this, give place to nothing else, for if you once diverge [*rhupo*: to include downward] and incline [*apoklino*: to turn aside] to it, you will no longer without distraction [*aperispastos*: adverb, reckless or without periorao] be able to give the preference [*protimao*: to honor one before, prefer] to that good thing which is your proper possession and your own; for it is not right that anything of any other kind, such as praise from the many, or power, or enjoyment of pleasure, should come into competition with that which is rationally [*logikos*: cf. 2.16] and politically or practically good. All these things, even though they may seem to adapt [*enarmoizo*: to act in harmony; cf. 1.9 as accommodating (*enarmostos*: to be well harmonized)] themselves to the better things in a small degree, obtain the superiority [*katakrateo*: to prevail] all at once, and carry us away. But do you, I say, simply and freely choose the better, and hold to [*antecho*: to hold out against, endure] it. But that which is useful [*sumphero*: cf. 3.4 as carried along with] is the better. Well then, if it is useful to you as a rational being [*logikos*: also cf. #6], keep to [*phulasso*: cf. 2.7 as avoid] it; but if it is only useful to you as an animal, say so, and maintain your judgement without arrogance [*atuphos*, adverb: not puffed up]: only take care that you make the inquiry [*exetasis*] by a sure method [*asphalos*, adverb: safe from falling].

3.7. Never value [*timao: cf. 2.6 as honoring*] anything as profitable [*sumphero: cf. #6 as useful*] to yourself which shall compel you to break [*parabaino: to pass beside*] your promise [*pistis: faith*], to lose your self-respect [*aidos: shame, modesty*], to hate any man, to suspect, to curse, to act the hypocrite, to desire [*epithumeo: cf. 1.17 as had an inclination*] anything which needs walls and curtains: for he who has preferred [*proerchomai: to go before*] to everything intelligence [*nous: cf. 3.4 as mind*] and daemon [*daimon: cf. #6 as deity*] and the worship [*orgia: orgies, secret rites*] of its excellence [*arete: cf. 2.14*], acts no tragic part, does not groan, will not need either solitude or much company; and, what is chief of all, he will live without either pursuing or flying from death; but whether for a longer or a shorter time [*diastema: interval, distance, extension*] he shall have the soul [*psuche: cf. #4*] inclosed [*perierchomai: to go round about*] in the body, he cares [*melo: cf. 2.11 as concern*] not at all: for even if he must depart immediately, he will go as readily as if he were going to do anything else which can be done with decency [*aidomonos, adverb: cf. aidos in #7 as shame*] and order [*kosmios, adverb: cf. kosmos in #2 as to adorn, sunepikosmeo*] taking care of [*eulabeomai: to have care, be discreet*] this only all through [*para*] life, that his thoughts [*dianoia: cf. #6 as mind*] turn not away from anything which belongs [*anoikeios: not of the family or oikos; cf. 1.6 for become intimate oikeioo, to become intimate*] to an intelligent [*noeros: intellectual; cf. nous in #7*] animal and a member of a civil community [*trope: way, means*].

3.8. In the mind [*dianoia: cf. #7*] of one who is chastened and purified you will find no corrupt matter [*puodes: like pus*], nor impurity, nor any sore skinned over. Nor is his life incomplete [*asuntelos: a + sun + telos (cf. 2.16 as end)*] when fate [*he pepromene (here in the feminine: cf. #3)*] overtakes [*katalambano: to seize*] him, as one may say of an actor who leaves the stage before ending and finishing the play. Besides, there is in him nothing servile, nor affected [*kompso: well-dressed, refined*], nor too closely bound to other things, nor yet detached [*apochizo: to split, cleave*] from other things, nothing worthy of blame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place.

3.9. Reverence [*sebo: to honor, devote oneself*] the faculty [*dunamis: cf. 2.12*] which produces opinion [*te hupoleptike: from hupolambano as in 2.12, to consider*]. On this faculty it entirely depends whether there shall exist in your ruling part [*hegemonikon: cf. 2.2*] any opinion [*hupolepsis: cf. 2.15*] inconsistent with [*anakolouthos: i.e., without akolouthia or sequence*] nature and the constitution [*kataskheue: preparation*] of the rational animal. And this faculty promises freedom from hasty judgement [*aproptosis: that which is unforeseen*], and friendship [*oikeiosis, with pros: appropriation; cf. 1.6, become intimate, oikeioo*] towards men, and obedience [*akolouthia: cf. #9: to have the right sequence regarding the gods*] to the gods.

3.10. Throwing away then all things, hold to [*sunecho: literally, to have with*] these only which are few; and besides bear in mind [*summinneskomai: literally, to remember with; cf. 1.16, mnaomai, to remember*] that every man lives only this present time, which is an indivisible point [*akariaios: cf. 2.14 as mere moment*], and that all the rest of his life is either past or it is uncertain. Short then is the time which every man lives, and small the nook of the earth where he lives; and short too the longest posthumous fame, and even this only continued by a succession [*diadoche: relief, relay*] of poor human beings, who will very soon die, and who know [*eido: cf. 2.12 as look at*] not even themselves, much less him who died long ago.

3.11. To the aids which have been mentioned let this one still be added: Make for yourself a definition [*boros: cf. 2.4 as limit of time*] or description [*hupographe: literally, a writing under*] of the thing [*phantastos: acting upon appearances; cf. 3.1 for phantizomai*] which is presented to you, so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing it is in its substance [*ousia: cf. 2.17*], in its nudity, in its complete entirety, and tell yourself its proper name, and the names of the things of which it has been compounded, and into which it will be resolved [*analuo: to unloose*]. For nothing is so productive of elevation of mind [*megalphrosune: cf. 2.5 for phrontizo, to think*] as to be able to examine [*elegcho: to put to shame, cross-examine*] methodically and truly every object which is presented [*hupopto: to fall under*] to you in life, and always to look at things so as to see [*sun + epi + ballo: to apply one's mind also*] at the same time what kind of universe [*kosmos: cf. #7 as order*] this is, and what kind of

use everything performs [*parecho: cf. #6 as enables*] in it, and what value everything has with reference to [*pros: towards which*] the whole, and what with reference to man, who is a citizen of the highest city, of which all other cities are like families [*polite: citizen*]; what each thing is, and of what it is composed, and how long [*chronos: cf. 2.17 as time*] it is the nature of this thing to endure [*parameno: to stay beside*] which now makes an impression [*phantasia: cf. #6*] on me, and what virtue [*arete: cf. #7 as excellence*] I have need of with respect to it, such as gentleness, manliness, truth, fidelity, simplicity, contentment [*autarkes: cf. 1.16 as to be satisfied*], and the rest. Wherefore, on every occasion a man should say: this comes from [*para*] God; and this is according to the apportionment [*sullexis: a joining together by lot*] and spinning of the thread of destiny [*sugklosis*], and such-like coincidence [*sunteuxis*] and chance [*teuche*]; and this is from [*para*] one of the same stock, and a kinsman and partner, one who knows not however what is according [*kata*] to his nature. But I know; for this reason I behave towards him according to the natural law [*nomos: custom*] of fellowship [*koinonia: cf. #5, akoinonetos: without koinonia*] with benevolence and justice. At the same time however in things indifferent [*men: participle meaning on the other hand*] I attempt to ascertain [*sustochazomai: to aim together*] the value of each [*kata' axian: according to the worthiness*].

3.12. If you work [*energazomai: cf. 2.12 for ergon as operation*] at that which is before you, following right reason [*logos: cf. 2.16*] seriously, vigorously, calmly, without allowing anything else to distract [*parapipto: to fall beside*] you, but keeping your divine part [*daimon: cf. #7*] pure, as if you should be bound to give it back immediately; if you hold to this [*sunapto: to tie or bind together*], expecting nothing, fearing nothing, but satisfied with your present activity [*pareimi & energieia*] according to nature, and with heroic truth in every word and sound which you utter, you will live happy [*euzaō*]. And there is no man who is able to prevent this.

3.13. As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready [*procheiros: at hand*] for cases which suddenly require their skill [*therapeuoma: medical treatment*], so do you have principles [*dogma: cf. 3.2 as opinion*] ready for the understanding [*eido: cf. #10 as know*] of things divine [*ta theia: from theios*] and human, and for doing everything, even the smallest, with [*pros: towards which*] a recollection [*mnaomai: cf. #10, summinneskomai*] of the bond [*sundesmos*] which unites [*sun + ana + phero: to ascend together with*] the divine and human to [*epi: upon*] one another. For neither will you do anything well which pertains to man without at the same time having a reference to things divine; nor the contrary.

3.14. No longer wander at hazard; for neither will you read your own memoirs, nor the acts of the ancient Romans and Hellenes, and the selections from books which you were reserving for your old age. Hasten [*spendo: to seek earnestly*] then to the end [*telos with eis: cf. 2.16*] which you have before you, and throwing away idle hopes, come to your own aid [*boetheo*], if you care [*melos: cf. #7*] at all for yourself, while it is in your power [*exesti: it is allowed*].

3.15. They know not how many things are signified [*semaino: to indicate by a sign*] by the words stealing, sowing, buying, keeping quiet, seeing what ought to be done; for this is not effected by the eyes, but by another kind of vision [*opsis: look, appearance, aspect of a person*].

3.16. Body, soul, intelligence [*soma, psuche, nous (cf. #7)*]: to the body belong sensations [*aisthesis: cf. 2.17 as perception*], to the soul appetites [*horme: cf. #6 for appetites re. hormeo: to be moored, at anchor*], to the intelligence principles [*i.e., dogma (cf. #13) of nous, #16*]. To receive the impressions of forms by means of appearances [*tupto (to beat, strike) & the adverb phantastikos (by means of mental images; cf. phantasma as thoughts, #4)*] belongs even to animals [*boskema: that which is fed or fattened such as cattle*]; to be pulled by the strings of desire [*neurospasteo: to have motion by means of strings; can refer to a puppet show & hormetikos, adverb: cf. horme, #16*] belongs both to wild beasts [*ther*] and to men who have made themselves into women, and to a Phalaris and a Nero: and to have the intelligence [*nous: cf. #16*] that guides [*hegemoneuo: to rule, take command, with epi or upon*] to the things which appear suitable [*phaino (cf. #6 & katheko, to have come down, to reach, be fit)*] belongs

also to those who do not believe [*nomizo*: cf. #1.9 for *patronomizo* (*pater* + *nomizo*, to use customarily)] in the gods, and who betray their country, and do their impure deeds when they have shut the doors. If then everything else is common to all that I have mentioned, there remains that which is peculiar [*phileo*: to love and cherish, to welcome] to the good [*agathos*: cf. #4] man, to be pleased [*aspazomai*: to welcome kindly] and content with what happens [*sumbaino*: cf. #4], and with the thread which is spun [*sugkelotbo*: cf. #4 for allotted] for him; and not to defile [*idroo*: to sweat, perspire] the divinity [*daimon*: cf. #12 for divine part] which is planted in his breast, nor disturb it by a crowd of images [*phantasia*: cf. #11 as impression], but to preserve [*diateroo*: cf. 2.13 as keeping] it tranquil [*hilaos*: propitious, gracious], following it obediently [*kosmios*: cf. #7 as order, adverb] as a god, neither saying anything contrary [*para*] to the truth, nor doing anything contrary to justice. And if all men refuse to believe that he lives a simple, modest [*aidemonos*, adverb: cf. 2.13 for veneration (*aidesima*)], and contented [*euthumos*, adverb: cf. 1.15 as cheerfulness] life, he is neither angry [*chalpaino*: to be severe] with any of them, nor does he deviate from the way which leads to the end [*telos*: cf. #14] of life, to which a man ought to come pure, tranquil [*hesuchios*], ready to depart, and without any compulsion [*abiastos*, adverb] perfectly reconciled [*sunarmozo*: to put together, adapt] to his lot [*moira*: cf. #4].

## BOOK FOUR

4.1. That which rules [*kurienoo*: to have power, authority] within, when it is according to nature [*kata* + *phusis*], is so affected [*histemi*: to make to stand; cf. 2.14 for *kathistemi*: to settle, establish] with respect to the events which happen [*pros*, with *sumbaino*: cf. 3.4 as what happens], that it always easily adapts [*metatithemi*: to place among, substitute; with *pros*] itself to that which is and is presented to it. For it requires [*phileo*: cf. 3.16 as peculiar] no definite material [*hule*], but it moves towards [*hormao*, with *pros*; cf. 2.10] its purpose [*ta prosegoumena*: *prosgo*, to put to, add], under certain conditions [*hupexairesis*: from a verb meaning to praise or exalt exceedingly. Verb not in Liddell-Scott Lexicon] however; and it makes a material for itself out of that which opposes it [*anti* + *eis* + *ago*], as fire lays hold of what falls into it, by which a small light [*luchnos*: portable light, lamp] would have been extinguished: but when the fire is strong, it soon appropriates [*exoikeioo*: cf. 1.6 for *oikeioo*: to make one's own] to itself the matter which is heaped on it, and consumes it, and rises higher by means of this very material.

4.2. Let no act be done [*energema*; with verb *energeo*] without a purpose [*eike*: cf. 21.7], nor otherwise than according to the perfect principles [*sumpleroo*: to fill up completely] of art [*technē*: skill, craft].

4.3. Men seek retreats [*anachoresis*: refuge] for themselves, houses in the country, sea-shores, and mountains; and you too are wont to desire [*potheo*: to long for, yearn] such things very much. But this is altogether a mark of the most common sort of men [*idiotikos*: private], for it is in your power [*eis heauton*: into oneself] whenever you shall choose to retire [*anachoreo*: to separate; cf. *anachoresis*, #3] into yourself. For nowhere either with more quiet [*hesuchios*: cf. 3.16, tranquil] or more freedom from trouble [*apragmaseutos*: inexperienced] does a man retire than into [*eis*] his own soul, particularly when he has within him such thoughts [*word lacking in Greek text*] that by looking into them he is immediately in perfect tranquility [*eumareia*: cf. 1.16 as commodity]; and I affirm that tranquility is nothing else than the good ordering of the mind [*eukosmia*: *eu* + *kosmos*: cf. 3.17 as order]. Constantly [*sunechos*: adjective means holding together] then give to yourself this retreat, and renew yourself [*ananeomai*: *ana* implies up-ness]; and let your principles [*stoicheion*: cf. 2.17 as elements] be brief and fundamental, which, as soon as you shall recur to [*apantao*: to meet, encounter] them, will be sufficient to cleanse the soul completely, and to send you back free from all discontent [*duscheraino*: to be unable to endure] with the things to which you return [*epi* + *ana* + *erchomai*]. For with what are you discontented? With the badness of men? Recall to your mind [*analogizomai*: to calculate] this conclusion, that rational [*logikos*: cf. 3.6 as rational being] animals exist for one another, and that to endure [*anecho*: to hold up, lift up] is a part of justice, and that men do wrong [*hamartano*: to miss the mark] involuntarily; and consider how many already, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred, and fighting, have been stretched dead, reduced to ashes; and be quiet [*paoo*: to cease] at last. But perhaps you are dissatisfied with that which is assigned to [*aponemo*: cf. 3.6] you out of the universe [*ek ton holon*: literally, from the all]. Recall to your recollection [*ananeomai*: to renew, revive]



this alternative [*diazengnumai: to be disjoined*]; either there is providence [*pronoia: cf. 2.11*] or atoms, fortuitous concurrence of things [*apodeiknumi: to bring forward, exhibit*]; or remember the arguments by which it has been proved that the world is a kind of political community [*kosmos/polis*], and be quiet [*word lacking in Greek text*] at last. But perhaps corporeal things will still fasten upon [*apto: cf. 1.16 as enjoyed*] you. Consider [*ennoeo: cf. 3.4 as thinks*] then further that the mind [*dianoia: cf. 3.8*] mingles not with the breath, whether moving gently or violently, when it has once drawn itself apart [*apo + lambano: to take, receive from another*] and discovered [*gnorizo: to explain, give knowledge*] its own power [*exousia: authority*], and think also of all that you have heard and assented to about pain and pleasure, and be quiet [*sug + kata + echo: to keep together*] at last. But perhaps the desire of the thing called fame will torment you [*perispao: to strip off, draw round*]. See how soon everything is forgotten, and look at the chaos of infinite time [*aion: a period of existence, age; here with apeiros, boundless*] on each side of the present, and the emptiness of applause, and the changeableness [*eumetabolos: eu + metaballo, to turn quickly (cf. 2.17)*] and want of judgement in those who pretend to give praise, and the narrowness of the space [*topos: place*] within which it is circumscribed [*perigrapho: cf. 2.4 as fixed*], and be quiet [*lacking in Greek text*] at last. For the whole earth is a point [*stigma: spot, moment*], and how small a nook in it is this your dwelling [*katoikesis: cf. 1.6 for oikos, family or household*] and how few are there in it, and what kind of people are they who will praise you.

(This paragraph is part of 4.3) This then remains: Remember [*mnaomai: cf. 3.13 as recollection*] to retire into this little territory [*agridion: diminutive for agros, field, farm*] of your own, and above all do not distract [*spao: cf. 2.2*] or strain [*katateino: to stretch*] yourself, but be free, and look at things as a man [*aner: opposed to a woman*], as a human being [*anthropos*], as a citizen [*polites: belonging to a polis; cf. #3, community*], as a mortal. But among the things readiest to your hand [*procheiros: cf. 3.13*] to which you shall turn, let there be these, which are two. One is that things do not touch [*apto: cf. #3 as fasten upon*] the soul, for they are external and remain immovable [*atrepo*]; but our perturbations [*ochleseis*] come only from the opinion [*bupolepsis: cf. 3.9*] which is within. The other is that all these things, which you see, change [*metaballo: cf. #3*] immediately and will no longer be; and constantly bear in mind [*sunechos (cf. #3) & dianoia (cf. #3)*]: how many of these changes you have already witnessed. The universe [*kosmos: cf. #3*] is transformation [*alloiosis: change, alteration*]: life is opinion.

4.4. If our intellectual part [*to noeron cf. 3.7 as intelligent*] is common, the reason [*logos*] also, in respect of which we are rational beings [*logikos: cf. 4.3*], is common [*koinos: shared*]: if this is so, common [*prostaktikos: for commanding, imperative*] also is the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is so, there is a common law [*nomos: cf. 3.11*] also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens [*polites: cf. #3, "This paragraph is part of 4.3."*]; if this is so, we are members [*metecho: cf. 2.1 as participates; meta + echo, to have with*] of some political community [*politeuma*]; if this is so, the world [*kosmos: cf. 4.3, "This paragraph is part of 4.3*] is in a manner a state [*polis*]. For of what other common political community will any one say that the whole human race are members [*metecho: cf. 4.4*]? And from thence, from this common political community comes also our very intellectual faculty and reasoning faculty [*to noeron (#4) & to logikon (#4)*] and our capacity for law; or whence do they come? For as my earthly part is a portion given to me [*apomeiromai: to distribute*] from certain earth, and that which is watery from another element, and that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar source [*stoicheios: cf. #3 as principles*] (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as nothing also returns to non-existence), so also the intellectual part [*to noeron: cf. #4*] comes from some source.

4.5. Death is such as generation is, a mystery [*musterion: secret doctrine*] of nature; a composition [*sugkerisis: cf. 2.17, compounded or sugkerino*] out of the same elements [*stoicheion: cf. 4.4, source*], and a decomposition [*lusis: cf. 2.17 for dissolution, dialysis*] into the same; and altogether not a thing of which any man should be ashamed, for it is not contrary [*para to exes: literally, beside the outside*] to the nature of a reasonable [*noeros: cf. 3.7 as intelligible*] animal, and not contrary [*para*] to the reason [*logos*] of our constitution [*kataskene: cf. 3.9*].

4.6. It is natural that these things should be done by such persons, it is a matter of necessity [*anagke*]; and if a man will not have it so, he will not allow the fig-tree to have juice. But by all means bear this in mind [*mnaomai*: cf. #3 as remember], that within a very short time both you and he will be dead; and soon not even your names will be left behind.

4.7. Take away your opinion [*hupolepsis*: cf. #3], and then there is taken away the complaint, "I have been harmed." Take away the complaint, "I have been harmed," and the harm [*blabe*: mischief] is taken away.

4.8. That which does not make a man worse than he was, also does not make his life worse, nor does it harm him either from without or from within.

4.9. The nature of that which is universally useful [*sumphero*: cf. 3.7 as profitable] has been compelled to do this.

4.10. Consider that everything which happens [*sumbaino*: cf. #1], happens justly, and if you observe [*para* + *phulasso*: cf. 3.2 (without para) as keep to] carefully [*akribos*: cf. 1.16], you will find it to be so. I do not say only with respect to the continuity of the series of things [*kata to exes*], but with respect to what is just, and as if it were done by one who assigns [*aponemo*: cf. #3 as assigned to] to each thing its value. Observe then as you have begun; and whatever you do, do it in conjunction with this, the being good [*agathos*: cf. 3.16], and in the sense in which a man is properly understood to be good. Keep to this in every action [*energeia*: cf. 3.12 as activity].

4.11. Do not have such an opinion [*hupolambano*: cf. 3.9 for produces opinion, *te hupoleptike*] of things as he has who does you wrong, or such as he wishes you to have, but look at them as they are in truth [*kat' aletheian* or according to truth].

4.12. A man should always have these two rules in readiness [*etoimotes*: state of preparation]: the one, to do [*pros to praxai*] only whatever the reason [*logos*] of the ruling and legislating faculty [*basilikos*: royal, kingly & *nomothetikos* (nomos, law)] may suggest [*hupoballo*: to put or throw under] for the use of men; the other, to change your opinion [*metatithemi*: to place differently, with *pros*], if there is any one at hand who sets you right and moves [*metago*: to convey from one place to another] you from any opinion [*oiesis*; from *oiomai*, to suppose]. But this change [*metagoge*] of opinion must proceed only from a certain persuasion, as of what is just or of common advantage, and the like, not because it appears [*phaino*: cf. 3.16 as appear suitable] pleasant or brings reputation.

4.13. Have you reason [*logos*]? I have. Why then do not you use it? For if this does its own work, what else dost you wish?

4.14. You have existed as a part [*enuparcho*: to be present in]. You shall disappear [*enaphanizo*: to hide] in that which produced you; but rather you shall be received back into its seminal principle [*to spermatikon*] by transmutation [*metabole*: cf. 2.17 as change, with *kata*].

4.15. Many grains of frankincense on the same altar: one falls before, another falls after; but it makes no difference [*diaphero*: cf. 2.14].

4.16. Within ten days you will seem a god to those to whom you are now a beast and an ape, if you will return [*anakampto*: to bend back] to your principles [*dogma*: cf. 3.16] and the worship of reason [*sebasma*, with *logos*].

4.17. Do not act as if you wert going to live ten thousand years. Death hangs over you. While you lives,

while it is in your power [*existemi: to stand aside from, possess*], be good.

4.18. How much trouble [*euscholia: abundant leisure*] he avoids who does not look to see what his neighbor says or does or thinks [*dianoemai: to think, suppose; cf. dianoia, #3*], but only to what he does himself, that it may be just and pure [*bosios: hallowed*]; or as Agathon says, look not round at the depraved morals [*ethos: custom, usage; cf. 1.17*] of others, but run straight along the line [*gramme*] without deviating from it.

4.19. He who has a vehement desire [*eptoemenos*] for posthumous fame does not consider [*phantazomai: cf. 3.4 as imagining*] that every one of those who remember him will himself also die very soon; then again also they who have succeeded them, until the whole remembrance [*mneme: cf. 2.12*] shall have been extinguished as it is transmitted [*proiemi: cf. 1.17 as progress*] through men who foolishly admire and perish. But suppose [*hupotithemi: to place under, suggest*] that those who will remember are even immortal, and that the remembrance will be immortal, what then is this to you? And I say not what is it to the dead, but what is it to the living? What is praise except indeed so far as it has a certain utility [*oikonomia: management of a household; cf. oikos, 1.6*]? For you now reject unseasonably [*akairos: cf. kairos in 2.6 as opportunity*] the gift of nature, clinging to something else...

4.20. Everything which is in any way beautiful [*kalos: cf. 3.4 as fair*] is beautiful in itself, and terminates [*katalago: to stop; kata signifying according to*] in itself, not having praise as part of itself. Neither worse than nor better is a thing made by being praised. I affirm this also of the things which are called beautiful by the vulgar, for example, material things and works of art. That which is really [*ontos*] beautiful has no need of anything; not more than law, not more than truth, not more than benevolence [*eunoia: good-will, favor: eu + nous (cf. 3.16 as intelligence)*] or modesty [*aidos: cf. 3.7 as decency*]. Which of these things is beautiful because it is praised, or spoiled by being blamed? Is such a thing as an emerald made worse than it was, if it is not praised? Or gold, ivory, purple, a lyre, a little knife, a flower, a shrub?

4.21. If souls continue [*diameno: literally, to remain through*] to exist, how does the air contain [*choreo: to make room, give way*] them from eternity? But how does the earth contain the bodies of those who have been buried from time so remote? For as here the mutation [*metabole: cf. #14, transmutation*] of these bodies after a certain continuance [*epidiamone: continued existence; cf. diameno, #21*], whatever it may be, and their dissolution make room for other dead bodies; so the souls which are removed [*methistemi: to place in another way, change*] into the air after subsisting [*summeno: to hold together, continue*] for some time are transmuted [*metaballo: cf. #3 as change*] and diffused [*cheo: to pour*], and assume [*ana + lambano: cf. 4.3 with apo, as drawn itself apart apo + lambano*] a fiery nature by being received into the seminal intelligence [*spermatikos (cf. #14) & logos*] of the universe [*ton holon: literally, of the all*], and in this way make room [*parecho: cf. 3.11 as perform*] for the fresh souls which come to dwell [*pros + sun + oikizo (to found as a colony)*] there. And this is the answer which a man might give on the hypothesis [*hupothesis: literally, a setting under*] of souls continuing [*diameno: cf. #21*] to exist. But we must not only think of the number of bodies which are thus buried, but also of the number of animals which are daily eaten by us and the other animals. For what a number is consumed, and thus in a manner buried in the bodies of those who feed on them! And nevertheless this earth receives them by reason of the changes of these bodies into blood, and the transformations [*alloiosis: cf. #3*] into the aerial or the fiery element.

(This paragraph is part of #21). What is the investigation [*historia: learning by inquiry*] into the truth in this matter? The division [*diairesis*] into that which is material [*to bulikon: cf. 4.1 for hule*] and that which is the cause of form, the formal [*aitiodes: resembling a cause; cf. aitia in 1.17 as fault, cause*].

4.22. Do not be whirled about [*aporrembomai: to wander from*], but in every movement [*horme: cf. 3.16 as appetite*] have respect to justice, and on the occasion of every impression [*phantasia: cf. 3.16 as image*] maintain [*sozo: cf. 2.3 as preserve*] the faculty of comprehension or understanding [*to kataleptikon; from*

*katalambano as in 3.8, overtake, seize*].

4.23. Everything harmonizes [*sunarmozō*: cf. 3.16 as reconciled] with me, which is harmonious [*euarmostos*] to you, O Universe [*kosmos*: cf. 4.4]. Nothing for me is too early nor too late, which is in due time [*eu kairos*: cf. #19 as unseasonably, *akairos*] for you. Everything is fruit to me which your seasons bring, O Nature: from you are all things, in you are all things, to [*eis*, into] you all things return. The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops; and will not you say, Dear city of Zeus?

4.24. Occupy [*prasso*: to accomplish, achieve] yourself with few things, says the philosopher, if you would be tranquil [*euthumeo*: to be gracious]. But consider if it would not be better to say, Do what is necessary, and whatever the reason of the animal which is naturally social [*politikos*: cf. #4 for state or polis] requires, and as it requires. For this brings not only the tranquility [*euthumia*: cheerfulness; cf. *thumeo* in 2.10, to be angry] which comes from doing well [*kalos*, adverb: beautiful, #20], but also that which comes from doing few things. For the greatest part of what we say and do being unnecessary, if a man takes this away, he will have more leisure [*euscholos*] and less uneasiness [*ataraktos*: untroubled]. Accordingly on every occasion a man should ask [*hupomimnesko*: cf. 1.7 as be acquainted with] himself, Is this one of the unnecessary things? Now a man should take away not only unnecessary acts, but also, unnecessary thoughts [*phantasia*: cf. #22 as impression], for thus superfluous acts [*parelko*: to draw aside] will not follow after [*epi* + *akoloutheo*: cf. 2.16 for without considering, with *a* + *para* prefixed to verb].

4.25. Try how the life of the good man suits [*choreo*: cf. #21 as contain] you, the life of him who is satisfied [*aresko*: cf. 3.4] with his portion [*aponemo*: cf. 4.10 as assigns] out of the whole, and satisfied with his own just acts and benevolent disposition [*diathesis*: cf. 17 & *eumeneo*: to be gracious].

4.26. Have you seen those things? Look also at these. Do not disturb [*tarasso*: to stir up] yourself. Make yourself all simplicity [*aplooo*: to make single, unfold]. Does any one do wrong [*bamatano*: cf. #3]? It is to mark himself that he does the wrong. Has anything happened [*sumbaino*: cf. #10] to you? Well, out of the universe from the beginning [*arche*: cf. 1.16 as empire] everything which happens has been apportioned [*sugkatheimarmai*: to have been decided by fate; *sug* or *sum* + *kata*] and spun out [*sunekluo*: *sun* + *ek* + *luo*: cf. 2.17 as dissolution] to you. In a word, your life is short. You must turn to profit the present by the aid of reason [*eulogistia*: *eu* + *logos*] and justice. Be sober [*nepho*: to drink no wine] in your relaxation [*aniemi*: to send forth, relax].

4.27. Either it is a well-arranged universe [*kosmos*: cf. #23] or a chaos [*kukeon*: mixed drink, potion] huddled together [*sumpephoremēnos*: closely pressed together], but still a universe. But can a certain order [*kosmos*: also in #27] subsist in you [*huphistemi*: cf. 2.4, existence (*hupēstes*: from *huphistemi*, to place or set under)], and disorder [*akosmia*: lack of *kosmos*] in the All? And this too when all things are so separated and diffused and sympathetic [*sumpathos*].

4.28. A black character [*ethos*: cf. #18 as morals], a womanish character, a stubborn character, bestial, childish, animal, stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous, fraudulent, tyrannical.

4.29. If he is a stranger to the universe who does not know [*gnorizō*: cf. #3 as discovered] what is in it, no less is he a stranger who does not know what is going on in it. He is a runaway, who flies from social reason [*politikon* (cf. #24) *logon*]; he is blind, who shuts the eyes of the understanding [*noeros*: cf. #5 as reasonable]; he is poor, who has need of another, and has not from [*para*] himself all things which are useful for [*eis*] life. He is an abscess [*apostema*: distance, interval] on the universe who withdraws and separates himself from the reason [*logos*] of our common nature through being displeased with the things which happen [*sumbaino*: cf. #26], for the same nature produces this, and has produced you too: he is a piece rent asunder [*aposphisma* & *aposphizo*] from the state, who tears his own soul from that of reasonable animals [*ton logikon* or *logikos* as #4,

rational beings], which is one.

4.30. The one is a philosopher without a tunic, and the other without a book: here is another half naked: Bread I have not, he says, and I abide by reason [*logos*]. And I do not get the means of living out of my learning [*mathema: lesson*], and I abide by my reason.

4.31. Love [*phileo: cf. #1 as requires*] the art [*technion: diminutive of techne as in #2*], poor as it may be, which you have learned, and be content with [*prosanapano: to cause to rest beside, pros + ana*] it; and pass through the rest of life like one who has intrusted [*epitrepho: to turn around*] to the gods with his whole soul all that he has, making [*kathistemi: cf. 2.14 as brought*] yourself neither the tyrant nor the slave of any man.

4.32. Consider [*epinoeo: cf. 2.2*], for example, the times [*kairos: cf. #23 as due time, eukairos*] of Vespasian. You will see all these things, people marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying, warring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating the ground, flattering, obstinately arrogant, suspecting, plotting, wishing for some to die, grumbling about the present, loving, heaping up treasure, desiring consulship, kingly power. Well then, that life of these people no longer exists at all. Again, remove to the times of Trajan. Again, all is the same. Their life too is gone. In like manner view [*epitheoreo: examine over again or upon, epi*] also the other epochs of time [*epigraphē (inscription) & chronos (cf. 3.11 as long)*]: and of whole nations, and see how many after great efforts soon fell and were resolved [*analuo: cf. 3.11*] into the elements [*stoicheion: cf. #5*]. But chiefly you should think of those whom you have yourself known distracting themselves about idle things, neglecting to do what was in accordance with their proper constitution [*kataskeneue: cf. #5*], and to hold firmly [*aprix: with closed teeth*] to this and to be content [*arkeo: to ward off, suffice*] with it. And herein it is necessary to remember that the attention [*epistrophe: a turning about*] given to everything has its proper value [*praxis: cf. 2.16 as act*] and proportion [*summetria*]. For thus you will not be dissatisfied [*apoduspeteo: to desist through impatience*], if you apply yourself [*katagignosko: to remark, discover*] to smaller matters no further than is fit [*proseko: to be present, near at hand*].

4.33. The words which were formerly familiar [*sunethes: cf. 1.16 as usual*] are now antiquated: so also the names of those who were famed of old, are now in a manner antiquated, Camillus, Caeso, Volesus, Leonnatus, and a little after also Scipio and Cato, then Augustus, then also Hadrian and Antoninus. For all things soon pass away [*exitelos: going out, evanescent*] and become a mere tale [*mutbode*], and complete oblivion [*lethe: cf. 2.17*] soon buries them. And I say this of those who have shone in a wondrous way. For the rest, as soon as they have breathed out their breath, they are gone, and no man speaks of them. And, to conclude the matter, what is even an eternal remembrance [*aeimneston*]? A mere nothing. What then is that about [*peri*] which we ought to employ [*eisphero: literally, to bring into*] our serious pains [*sponde: cf. 1.6 as trifling things (akenospondos, shunning vain pursuits: a + kenos + sponde)*]? This one thing, thoughts [*dianoia: cf. 4.3 as mind*] just, and acts social, and words which never lie, and a disposition [*diathesis: cf. #25*] which gladly accepts all that happens [*sumbainos: cf. sumbaino, #29*] as necessary, as usual, as flowing from a principle [*arche: cf. 26 as beginning*] and source [*pege: fountain*] of the same kind.

4.34. Willingly give yourself up [*sun + epi + didomai*] to Clotho, one of the Fates [*not in Greek text*], allowing [*parecho: cf. #21 as to make room*] her to spin your thread [*sunnetho*] into whatever things she pleases.

4.35. Everything is only for a day, both that which remembers [*mnemoneuo: compare with #6, mnaomai*] and that which is remembered.

4.36. Observe constantly [*theoreo: cf. 1.9, without consideration or atheoretos, lacking in theoreo & dienekos, 3.4*] with that all things take place by change [*metabole: cf. #21 as mutation*], and accustom [*etbizō*] yourself to consider [*ennoeo: cf. #3*] that the nature of the Universe [*ton holon: cf. #23*] loves [*phileo: cf. #31*] nothing so much as to change [*metaballo: cf. #21 as transmuted*] the things which are and to make new things like them. For

everything that exists is in a manner the seed [*sperma*] of that which will be. But you are thinking [*phantazomai*: cf. #19 as consider] only of seeds which are cast into the earth or into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion [*lian idiotikon* (cf. #3, common): literally, excessively rude, unskilled].

4.37. You will soon die, and you are not yet simple [*aploos*: cf. #3.4], not free from perturbations [*atarachos*: not disturbed, steady: a key Stoic attribute], nor without suspicion of being hurt by external things, nor kindly disposed [*hileos & phroneo*: cf. 1.15 as thought] towards [*pros*] all; nor do you yet place wisdom only in acting justly.

4.38. Examine [*dia + blepto*: look through] men's ruling principles [*hegemonikon*: cf. 2.2 as ruling part], even those of the wise [*phroneo*: cf. #37], what kind of things they avoid, and what kind they pursue.

4.39. What is evil to you does not subsist in the ruling principle [*hegemonikon*: cf. #38] of another; nor yet in any turning [*trophē*] and mutation [*heteroioo*: to alter] of your corporeal covering [*periecho*: cf. 2.16 as contained]. Where is it then? It is in that part of you in which subsists the power of forming opinions [*bupolambano*: cf. #11] about evils. Let this power then not form such opinions, and all is well. And if that which is nearest to it, the poor body, is burnt, filled with matter and rottenness, nevertheless let the part which forms opinions about these things be quiet [*hesuchazo*: cf. #3 for quiet or *hesuchios*], that is, let it judge that nothing is either bad or good which can happen [*sumbaino*: cf. #33] equally to the bad man and the good. For that which happens equally to him who lives contrary to nature and to him who lives according to [*kata*] nature, is neither according to nature nor contrary [*para*] to nature.

4.40. Constantly regard the universe [*kosmos*: cf. #27] as one living being, having one substance [*ousia*: cf. 3.11 as substance] and one soul; and observe how all things have reference [*anadidomi*: to hold up] to one perception [*aisthesis*, with *eis*: cf. 3.16], the perception of this one living being; and how all things act with one movement [*horme*: cf. #22]; and how all things are the cooperating causes [*sunaitia*: cf. 1.17 as *aitia*, fault] of all things which exist; observe too the continuous spinning of the thread [*sunnesis*] and the contexture of the web [*summerusis*].

4.41. You are a little soul bearing about a corpse, as Epiktetus used to say.

4.42. It is no evil for things to undergo change [*metabole*: cf. #36], and no good for things to subsist [*buphitemi*: cf. #27] in consequence of change.

4.43. Time is like a river made up of the events which happen, and a violent stream; for as soon as a thing has been seen, it is carried away, and another comes in its place [*paraphero*], and this will be carried away too.

4.44. Everything which happens [*sumbaino*: cf. #39] is as familiar [*sunethes*: cf. #33] and well known as the rose in spring and the fruit in summer; for such is disease, and death, and calumny, and treachery, and whatever else delights fools or vexes [*lupeo*: to give pain to] them.

4.45. In the series of things those which follow are always aptly [*oikeios*: domestic; cf. *oikos* or house, 1.6] fitted to those which have gone before; for this series is not like a mere enumeration [*katarithmesis*: a detailed account] of disjointed things [*apartao*: to hang up from, detach] which has only a necessary sequence [*katanagkatzo*: to force, be inevitable], but it is a rational connection [*sunapheia & enlogos*]: and as all existing things are arranged together harmoniously [*sun + tasso*: cf. 1.16, in an orderly way (*tetagmenos*, from *tasso*) & *sun + harmozo*: cf. 1.9 as accommodating (*euarmostos*: to be well harmonized, *armozo*)] so the things which come into existence exhibit [*emphaino*: cf. #12 for *phaino*, appears] no mere succession [*diadoche*: cf. 3.10] but a certain wonderful relationship [*oikeiotes*: cf. *oikeios*, #45].

4.46. Always remember the saying of Heraclitus, that the death of earth is to become water, and the death of water is to become air, and the death of air is to become fire, and reversely. And think [*cf. #5 as remembers, mnemoneuo*] too of him who forgets [*epilanthanomai: cf. 2.10 for unconscious, lanthano*] whither the way leads, and that men quarrel [*diaphero: cf. #15, makes no difference*] with that with which they are most constantly [*dienekos: cf. #36*] in communion [*bomileo: cf. 1.9 for homilia, intercourse*], the reason [*logos*] which governs [*dioikeo: cf. 2.4 as administrator*] the universe [*cf. #36 for ton bolon*]; and the things which daily meet with seem [*phaino: cf. #12*] to them strange: and consider that we ought not to act and speak as if we were asleep, for even in sleep we seem to act and speak; and that we ought not, like children who learn from their parents, simply to act and speak as we have been taught.

4.47. If any god told you that you shall die tomorrow, or certainly on the day after tomorrow, you would not care much whether it was on the third day or on the morrow, unless you were in the highest degree mean-spirited—for how small is the difference? So think it no great thing to die after as many years as you can name [*nomizo: cf. 3.16 as believe*] rather than tomorrow.

4.48. Think continually [*ennoeo: cf. #6 as consider & sunechos: cf. #3, constantly*] how many physicians are dead after often contracting their eyebrows over the sick; and how many astrologers [*mathematikos: a mathematician*] after predicting with great pretensions the deaths of others; and how many philosophers after endless discourses on death or immortality; how many heroes after killing thousands; and how many tyrants who have used their power over men's lives with terrible insolence [*phruagma: violent snorting or neighing*] as if they were immortal; and how many cities are entirely dead, so to speak, Helice and Pompeii and Herculaneum, and others innumerable. Add to the reckoning all whom you have known, one after another. One man after burying another has been laid out dead, and another buries him: and all this in a short time. To conclude, always observe [*kateidon: infinitive, look down upon*] how ephemeral and worthless human things are, and what was yesterday a little mucus tomorrow will be a mummy or ashes. Pass then through [*dia + erbomai*] this little space of time conformably [*bileos: cf. #37, kindly disposed*] to [*kata*] nature, and end [*kataluo: cf. 2.17 for dissolution, dialysis*] your journey in content, just as an olive falls off when it is ripe, blessing [*euphemeo: to use words of good omen*] nature who produced it, and thanking [*charis: cf. 1.8 as favors*] the tree on which it grew.

4.49. Be like the promontory against which the waves continually [*dienekos: cf. #46 as constantly*] break, but it stands firm and tames [*komizo: to take care of*] the fury of the water around it.

(This paragraph is part of 4.50). Unhappy am I because this has happened [*sumbaino: cf. #44*] to me. Not so, but happy [*eutuches: compare with unhappy, atuches*] am I, though this has happened to me, because I continue [*diatelo: dia + telos, end as in 3.16*] free from pain [*alupos: no grief*], neither crushed by the present nor fearing the future. For such a thing as this might have happened to every man; but every man would not have continued free from pain on such an occasion. Why then is that rather a misfortune than this a good fortune [*atuchema/eutuchema*]? And do you in all cases call that a man's misfortune, which is not a deviation [*apotengma: failure*] from man's nature? And does a thing seem to you to be a deviation from man's nature, when it is not contrary to the will [*boulema, with kata*] of man's nature? Well, do you know the will of nature. Will then this which has happened prevent you from being just, magnanimous, temperate [*sophroneo: to be discreet*], prudent [*emphron: in one's mind*], secure [*aproptotos: not falling*] against inconsiderate opinions and falsehood; will it prevent you from having modesty [*aidemai: cf. #20 for aidos modesty*], freedom, and everything else, by the presence [*sum + para + istemi*] of which man's nature obtains [*apecho: to refrain from*] all that is its own? Remember too on every occasion which leads you to vexation [*lupe: cf. #49 for alupos, no grief*] to apply this principle: not that this is a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly [*gennaios: to be of good birth*] is good fortune.

4.50. It is a vulgar [*idiotikos: cf. 4.3 for common sort of men*] but still a useful help towards contempt

[*kataphronesis: a thinking down upon*] of death to pass in review [*en + dia + tribo*] those who have tenaciously stuck to life. What more then have they gained than those who have died early? Certainly they lie in their tombs somewhere at last, Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus, or any one else like them, who have carried out many to be buried, and then were carried out themselves. Altogether the interval [*diastema: cf. 3.7 for shorter time*] is small between birth and death; and consider with how much trouble, and in company with what sort of people and in what a feeble body this interval is laboriously passed. Do not then consider [*verb not in Greek text*] life a thing of any value [*pragma: cf. 1.12 for occupations*]. For look to the immensity [*achanes: not opening the mouth, yawning gulf*] of time behind you, and to the time which is before you, another boundless space. In this infinity then what is the difference between him who lives three days and him who lives three generations?

4.51. Always run to the short way; and the short way is the natural [*kata phusin: literally, according to nature*]: accordingly say and do everything in conformity with the soundest reason [*bugiestatos, with kata*]. For such a purpose [*prothesis: a placing in public*] frees a man from trouble and warfare and all artifice [*oikonomia: cf. #19 as utility*] and ostentatious display [*kompseia: refinement of language*].

## BOOK FIVE

5.1. In the morning when you rise unwillingly, let this thought be present [*procheiros: cf. 4.3 as hand. "Thought" not in Greek text*]: I am rising to the work of a human being. Why then am I dissatisfied if I am going to do the things for which I exist and for which I was brought into the world [*kosmos: cf. 4.40 as universe*]? Or have I been made for this, to lie in the bed-clothes and keep myself warm? But this is more pleasant. Do you exist then to take your pleasure, and not at all for action or exertion? Do you not see the little plants, the little birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees working together to put in order their several parts of the universe [*kosmos: cf. #1*]? And are you unwilling to do the work of a human being, and do you not make haste to do that which is according [*kata*] to your nature? But it is necessary to take rest also. It is necessary: however nature has fixed bounds [*metron: measure, rule*] to this too: she has fixed bounds both to eating and drinking, and yet you go beyond [*prochoreo, with huper: to come forward, advance*] these bounds, beyond what is sufficient; yet in your acts it is not so, but you stop short of what you can do. So you love [*phileo: cf. 4.36*] not yourself, for if you did, you would love your nature and her will [*boulema: cf. 4.49*]. But those who love their several arts [*techne: cf. 4.2*] exhaust themselves in working at them unwashed and without food; but you value your own nature less than the turner values the turning art, or the dancer the dancing art, or the lover of money values his money, or the vainglorious man his little glory. And such men, when they have a violent affection [*prospascho: to be disposed in a certain way*] to a thing, choose neither to eat nor to sleep rather than to perfect [*euteleo: cf. 2.49 for diatelo, to continue*] the things which they care for [*diaphero: cf. 4.46 as quarrel*]. But are the acts which concern society [*koinonikos: cf. 3.4 as social*] more vile in your eyes and less worthy of your labor [*spoude: cf. 4.33 as pains*]?

5.2. How easy it is to repel and to wipe away every impression [*phantasia: cf. 4.24 as thoughts*] which is troublesome or unsuitable [*anoikeios: not oikeios or of the house, domestic; cf. 1.15 as kin*], and immediately to be in all tranquility [*galene: stillness of the sea, calm*].

5.3. Judge every word and deed which are according [*kata*] to nature to be fit for you; and be not diverted [*parapato: to deceive*] by the blame which follows [*epikoloutho: cf. 3.2 as by way of consequence*] from any people nor by their words, but if a thing is good to be done or said, do not consider it unworthy of you. For those persons have their peculiar leading principle [*hegemonkion: cf. 4.39*]: and follow their peculiar movement [*horme: cf. 4.40*]; which things do not you regard, but go straight on [*eutheios: straight, direct (euthus)*], following [*akoloutho: cf. 4.24 as follow after, with epi prefaced to verb*] your own nature and the common nature; and the way of both is one.



5.4. I go through the things which happen according to [*kata*] nature until I shall fall and rest, breathing out my breath into that element out of which I daily draw it in, and falling upon that earth out of which my father collected the seed, and my mother the blood, and my nurse the milk; out of which during so many years I have been supplied with food and drink; which bears me when I tread on it and abuse it for so many purposes.

5.5. You say, “Men cannot admire the sharpness of your wits [*drimutes: pungency, vehemence*].” Be it so: but there are many other things of which you can not say, I am not formed for them by nature. Show [*parecho: cf. 4.34 as allowing*] those qualities then which are altogether in [*epi*] your power, sincerity [*to akibdelon: unadulterated*], gravity [*to semnon: cf. 1.9*], endurance of labor [*to phereponon*], aversion to pleasure [*to aphiledonon: no sensibility*], contentment with your portion [*to amempsimoiron: not complaining about one’s lot*] and with few things, benevolence, frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from trifling magnanimity. Do you not see how [*aisthanomai: cf. 2.13 as perceiving*] many qualities you are immediately able to exhibit [*parecho: cf. #5 as show*], in which there is no excuse of natural incapacity [*aphues: simple, unschooled*] and unfitness [*anepitedeiotos: without purpose*], and yet you still remain voluntarily below the mark [*kato, adverb*]? Or are you compelled through being defectively furnished by nature to murmur, and to be stingy, and to flatter, and to find fault with your poor body, and to try to please men, and to make great display, and to be so restless in your mind [*psuche: cf. 3.16 as soul*]? No, by the gods: but you might have been delivered from these things long ago. Only if in truth you can be charged with being rather slow and dull of comprehension [*dusparakolouthetos: dus + para + akoloutheo (cf. #3)*], you must exert yourself [*askeo: to form by art, exercise*] about this also, not neglecting [*para + en + thumeomai: to disregard*] it nor yet taking pleasure [*emphileo: cf. #1 for phileo as love*] in your dulness.

5.6. One man, when he has done a service to [*peri*] another, is ready [*procheiros: cf. #1 as be present*] to set it down to his account as a favor [*charis: cf. 4.48 as thanking*] conferred [*logizomai: cf. 3.1 as consider*]. Another is not ready to do this, but still in his own mind [*para, with beauto*] he thinks [*dianoemai: cf. 3.4*] of the man as his debtor, and he knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even know what he has done, but he is like a vine which has produced grapes, and seeks for [*pros + epi + zeteo*] nothing more after it has once produced its proper fruit. As a horse when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the game, a bee when it has made the honey, so a man when he has done a good act, does not call out for others to come and see, but he goes on [*metabaino: to change*] to another act, as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes in season. Must a man then be one of these, who in a manner act thus without observing it [*aparakoluthetos, adverb: inconsequently; cf. akoloutheo, #5*]? Yes. But this very thing is necessary, the observation of what a man is doing [*parakoloutheo to follow, attend closely*]: for, it may be said, it is characteristic of the social animal [*koionikos: cf. #1 as society*] to perceive [*aisthanomai: cf. #5 as see*] that he is working in a social manner [*koionikos, adverb*], and indeed to wish that his social partner also should perceive it. It is true what you say, but you do not rightly understand [*parekdechomai: to misconstrue*] what is now said: and for this reason you will become one of those of whom I spoke before, for even they are misled by a certain show of reason [*logikos, adjective: cf. 4.29 & pithanotes: persuasiveness*]. But if you will choose to understand [*suniami: to bring together*] the meaning of what is said, do not fear that for this reason you will omit any social act.

5.7. A prayer [*euche: vow*] of the Athenians: Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, down on the ploughed fields of the Athenians and on the plains. In truth we ought not to pray [*euchomai*] at all, or we ought to pray in this simple and noble fashion [*eleutheros, adverb: freely*].

5.8. Just as we must understand when it is said that Aesculapius prescribed [*suntasso: cf. 4.46 as harmoniously*] to this man horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water or going without shoes; so we must understand it when it is said that the nature of the universe [*ton holon: cf. 4.46*] prescribed to this man disease or mutilation or loss or anything else of the kind. For in the first case Prescribed means [*semaino: cf. 3.15 as signifies*] something like this: he prescribed this for this man as a thing adapted [*katallasso: to change, with eis*] to

procure health; and in the second case it means: that which happens [*sumbaino*: cf. 4.49] to (or suits) every man is fixed in a manner for him suitably to his destiny [*meiromai*: to receive as one's portion or due, with eis]. For this is what we mean when we say that things are suitable [*sumbaino*: cf. #8] to us, as the workmen say of squared stones in walls or the pyramids, that they are suitable, when they fit [*sunarmoizo*: cf. 4.23 as *harmonizes*] them to one another in some kind of connection [*sunthesis*: a putting together]. For there is altogether one fitness, harmony [*harmonia*: cf. #8 for *sunarmonizo*]. And as the universe [*kosmos*: cf. #1] is made up [*sumpleroo*: cf. 4.2 as *perfect principles*] out of all bodies [*soma*: cf. 3.16] to be such a body as it is, so out of all existing causes [*aitia*: cf. 4.40 as *thread*] necessity (destiny) is made up to be such a cause as it is. And even those who are completely ignorant [*idioteuo*: cf. 1.9 for *idiotes* or *ignorant persons* & *teleos*: cf. *telos* in 3.16 as *end*] understand what I mean, for they say, It (necessity, destiny) brought this to such a person. This then was brought and this was prescribed to him. Let us then receive these things, as well as those which Aesculapius prescribes. Many as a matter of course even among his prescriptions are disagreeable, but we accept them in the hope of health. Let the perfecting [*anosis*: *compete, finish*] and accomplishment [*sunteleia*: a finishing with; cf. *telos*, #8] of the things, which the common nature judges to be good, be judged by you to be of the same kind as your health. And so accept [*aspazomai*: cf. 3.16 as *to be pleased*] everything which happens, even if it seem disagreeable [*apenes*: *rough, harsh*], because it leads to this, to [*epi, upon*] the health of the universe and to the prosperity [*euodia*: a good journey] and felicity [*eupragia*: good work] of Zeus (the universe). For he would not have brought on any man what he has brought, if it were not useful [*sunphero*: to bring together] for the whole. Neither does the nature of anything, whatever it may be, cause anything which is not suitable [*katallasso*: cf. #8] to that which is directed [*dioikeo*: cf. 4.46 as *governs*] by it. For two reasons [*logos*] then it is right to be content with that which happens to you; the one, because it was done for you and prescribed for you, and in a manner had reference to [*pros*] you, originally from the most ancient causes spun with your destiny [*sugklotbo*: cf. 3.16]; and the other, because even that which comes severally to every man is to the power which administers [*dioikeo*: cf. #8] the universe a cause of felicity [*euodia*: cf. #8 as *prosperity*] and perfection [*sunteleia*: cf. #8 as *accomplishment*], nay even of its very continuance [*summone*: holding together]. For the integrity of the whole [*holokleros*] is mutilated, if you cut off anything whatever from the conjunction [*sunapheia*: cf. 4.45 as *connection*] and the continuity [*sunecbeia*: literally, a holding together] either of the parts or of the causes. And you do cut off [*diakopto*: literally, to cut through], as far as it is in your power [*epi soi*: literally, upon you], when you art dissatisfied, and in a manner try to put anything out of the way [*anaireo*: to take up and carry off].

5.9. Be not disgusted [*sikechaino*: to loathe, dislike], nor discouraged [*apaudao*: to prohibit, shun], nor dissatisfied [*apoduspeteo*: to desist through impatience] if you do not succeed [*katapuknoo*: to stud thickly, consolidate] in doing everything according to right principles [*dogma*: cf. 4.16]; but when you have failed [*ekkerouo*: to knock out, drive back], return back again and be content [*asmeneo*: to welcome] if the greater part of what you do is consistent with man's nature, and love [*phileo*: cf. #5 as *emphileo*, taking pleasure] this to which you return [*epi + ana + erchomai*: cf. 4.3]; and do not return to philosophy as if she were a master [*paidagogos*: the slave who went with a boy from home to school, with *epi*], but act like those who have sore eyes and apply a bit of sponge and egg, or as another applies a plaster, or drenching with water. For thus you will not fail to obey [*epideiknumi*: cf. 1.7] reason [*logos*], and you will repose in [*pros + ana + pauo*] it. And remember that philosophy requires only the things which your nature requires; but you would have something else which is not according to [*kata*] nature. It may be objected, "Why what is more agreeable [*prosenes*: cf. 1.9] than this which I am doing?" But is not this the very reason why pleasure [*hedone*: cf. 3.4] deceives [*sphallo*: to make to fall] us? And consider [*theomai*: to behold] if magnanimity, freedom, simplicity, equanimity [*eugnomosune*: courtesy, being considerate], piety [*hosiotetes*: holiness], are not more agreeable. For what is more agreeable than wisdom [*phronesis*: purpose, intention] itself, when you think of the security [*aptaistos*: not stumbling] and the happy course [*eueroos*: flowing well] of all things which depend on [*parakolouthetikos*: cf. 2.8 for *observe* (*parakoloutheo*: to follow or attend closely)], the faculty [*dunamis*: cf. 3.9] of understanding [*epistemonikos*] and knowledge [*enthumethes*: consideration, esteem; cf. 2.10, compelled to be angry (*thumeo*)]?

5.10. Things are in such a kind of envelopment [*egkalyptosis: veil*] that they have seemed to philosophers, not a few nor those common philosophers, altogether unintelligible [*a + katalambano: not being able to be grasped; cf. 3.9 as overtake*]; nay even to the Stoics themselves they seem difficult to understand [*dus + katalambano*]. And all our assent [*sugkathesis: sum + kata + thesis; approval, agreement*] is changeable [*metaptotos*]; for where is the man who never changes? Carry [*metatithemi: cf. 4.12 as change your opinion*] your thoughts then to [*epi, upon*] the objects [*hupo + keimai: to lie under*] themselves, and consider how short-lived they are and worthless [*euteles: easily paid for, cheap; cf. telos, #8*], and that they may be in the possession of a wretch or a whore or a robber. Then turn [*epitithemi, with epi*] to the morals [*ethos: cf. 4.28 as character*] of those who live with you, and it is hardly possible to endure [*anechomai: cf. 1.9 for to tolerate, anektos*] even the most agreeable of them, to say nothing of a man being hardly able to endure himself. In such darkness then and dirt and in so constant a flux both of substance and of time, and of motion and of things moved, what there is worth being highly prized or even an object of serious pursuit [*spoudazo: cf. #1 for spoude, labor*] I cannot imagine [*epinoeo: cf. 4.32 as consider*]. But on the contrary it is a man's duty to comfort [*paramutheoma*] himself, and to wait for [*perimeno: literally, to wait around*] the natural dissolution [*luisis: cf. 4.5 as decomposition*] and not to be vexed at the delay [*diatribe: a way of spending time; from diatribo, to rub away*], but to rest in [*pros + ana + pauo: cf. #9, repose in*] these principles only: the one, that nothing will happen [*sumbaino: cf. #8 as suitable*] to me which is not conformable [*kata*] to the nature of the universe; and the other, that it is in my power never to act contrary [*para*] to my god and daemon [*daimon: cf. 3.16 as divinity*]: for there is no man who will compel me to [*parabaino: cf. 3.7 as to break*] this.

5.11. About [*pros*] what am I now employing my own soul? On [*para*] every occasion I must ask myself [*epanereromai: to question again*] this question and inquire [*exetazo: cf. 3.6 as carefully examine*], what have I now in this part of me which they call the ruling principle [*hegemonikon: cf. 3.9*]? And whose soul have I now? That of a child, or of a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a tyrant, or of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast?

5.12. What kind of things those are which appear good to the many, we may learn even from this. For if any man should conceive [*epinoeo: cf. #10 as imagine*] certain things as being [*huparcho: to take the initiative*] really good, such as prudence [*phronesis: cf. #9 as wisdom*], temperance [*sophrosune: cf. 3.6*], justice, fortitude, he would not after having first conceived [*pro + epi + noeo: cf. epinoeo, #12*] these endure to listen to anything which should not be in harmony with what is really good. But if a man has first conceived as good the things which appear [*phaino: cf. 4.46 as seem*] to the many to be good, he will listen and readily [*rhadios: easily*] receive as very applicable [*oikeios, adverb: cf. 4.45 as aptly*] that which was said by the comic writer. Thus even the many perceive [*phantazomai: cf. 4.36 as thinking*] the difference [*diaphora: from diaphero in #1 as care for*]. For were it not so, this saying would not offend and would not be rejected in the first case, while we receive it when it is said of [*epi, upon*] wealth and of the means which further luxury and fame, as said fitly and wittily. Go on then and ask if we should value [*timeteno: to be the censor*] and think [*hupolambano: cf. 4.39 as forming opinions*] those things to be good, to which after their first conception in the mind the words of the comic writer might be aptly applied—that he who has them, through pure abundance has not a place to ease himself in.

5.13. I am composed [*sunistemi: literally, to stand together*] of the formal [*aitiodos: cf. aitia as cause, #8*] and the material [*bulikos: cf. 4.21*]; and neither of them will perish into non-existence [*eis to me on*], as neither of them came into existence [*hupistemi: compare with sunistemi, #13*] out of non-existence. Every part of me then will be reduced [*katatasso: to draw up in order*] by change [*metabole, with kata: cf. 4.43*] into some part of the universe [*kosmos: cf. #8*], and that again will change [*metaballo: cf. 4.36*] into another part of the universe, and so on forever [*apeiros: cf. 4.3 as boundless, with eis*]. And by consequence of such a change I too exist, and those who begot me, and so on forever in the other direction. For nothing hinders us from saying so, even if the universe is administered [*dioikeo: cf. #8*] according to definite periods [*peraino: to bring to and end, purpose*] of revolution [*periodos, with kata*].

5.14. Reason [*logos*] and the reasoning art [*techne*: cf. #1 & *logikos*: cf. #6] (philosophy) are powers [*dunamis*: cf. #9 as *faculty*] which are sufficient [*arkeo*: cf. 4.32 as *to be content*] for themselves and for their own [*kath' autas*] works. They move [*hormao*: cf. 4.1] then from a first principle [*arche*: cf. 4.33] which is their own [*oikeios*: cf. #12 as *applicable (adverb)*], and they make their way to the end [*telos*: cf. 3.16] which is proposed to them; and this is the reason why such acts are named catorthoseis or right acts, which word signifies [*semaino*: cf. #8 as *means*] that they proceed by the right road.

5.15. None of these things ought to be called a man's which do not belong [*tereo*: *to watch, keep guard*] to a man as man. They are not required [*epiballo*: cf. 3.11 for *to see, sun + epi + ballo*: *to apply one's mind also*] of a man, nor does man's nature promise them, nor are they the means of man's nature attaining its end [*teleiotes*: cf. *telos*, #14]. Neither then does the end of man lie in these things, nor yet that which aids to the accomplishment of this end, and that which aids [*sumpleroo*: cf. #8 as *made up*] towards this end is that which is good. Besides, if any of these things did belong [*epiballo*: cf. #15] to man, it would not be right for a man to despise [*hyperphroneo*: *to have high thoughts*; cf. 4.28 as *to be wise*] them and to set himself against [*kata + ana + istemi*] them; nor would a man be worthy of praise who showed [*parecho*: cf. #5 as *exhibit*] that he did not want these things, nor would he who stunted himself in any of them be good, if indeed these things were good. But now the more of these things a man deprives [*aphaireo*: *to take from*] himself of or of other things like them, or even when he is deprived of any of them, the more patiently he endures the loss, just in the same degree he is a better man.

5.16. Such as are your habitual thoughts [*phantazomai*: cf. #12 as *perceive*], such also will be the character of your mind [*dianoia*: cf. 4.33 as *thoughts*]; for the soul is dyed [*baptizo*: *to baptize*] by the thoughts [*phantasia*: cf. #2 as *impression*]. Dye it then with a continuous series [*sunecheios*: cf. #8 for *sunecheia, continuity*] of such thoughts as these: for instance, that where a man can live, there he can also live well. But he must live in a palace, well then, he can also live well in a palace. And again, consider that for whatever purpose each thing has been constituted [*kataskenazo*: *to equip, furnish*; cf. 4.32 for *kataskene or constitution*], for this it has been constituted, and towards [*pros*] this it is carried; and its end [*telos*: cf. #14] is in that towards which it is carried; and where the end is, there also is the advantage [*sumpheros*: cf. 4.9 for *sumphero, useful*]: and the good of each thing. Now the good for the reasonable [*logikos*: cf. #14 as *reasoning*] animal is society [*koinonia*: cf. 3.11 as *fellowship*]; for that we are made for [*pros*] society has been shown above. Is it not plain that the inferior exist for the sake of the superior? But the things which have life are superior to those which have not life, and of those which have life [*empsochos*] the superior are those which have reason [*logikos*].

5.17. To seek what is impossible is madness [*manikos*] and it is impossible that the bad should not do something of this kind.

5.18. Nothing happens [*sumbaino*: cf. #10] to any man which he is not formed by nature to bear. The same things happen to another, and either because he does not see that they have happened or because he would show a great spirit [*megalophrosune*: cf. 3.11 as *elevation of mind*], he is firm and remains unharmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and conceit should be stronger than wisdom [*phronesis*: cf. #12 as *prudence*].

5.19. Things [*pragma*: cf. 4.50 as *value*] themselves touch not the soul, not in the least degree; nor have they admission [*eisodos, with pros*] to the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul: but the soul turns and moves itself alone, and whatever judgements it may think proper to make, such it makes for itself the things which present [*prosphero*] themselves to it.

5.20. In one respect man is the nearest thing [*oikeios*: cf. #14 as *own*] to me, so far as I must do good to men and endure [*anechomai*: cf. #10] them. But so far as some men make themselves obstacles to my proper [*oikeios*: cf. #20] acts, man becomes to me one of the things which are indifferent [*a + diaphoros*], no less

than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now it is true that these may impede my action [*energeia*: cf. 4.10], but they are no impediments to my affects [*horme*: cf. #3 as movement] and disposition [*diathesis*: cf. 4.33], which have the power of acting conditionally [*hupexairesis*: removal] and changing [*peritrope*: a turning around]: for the mind [*dianoia*: cf. #16] converts [*peritrepo*: cf. peritrope] and changes [*methistemi*: cf. 4.21 as subsisting] every hindrance [*koluma*: precaution] to its activity [*energeia*: cf. #20] into an aid [*progeomai*: to go first and lead the way]; and so that which is a hindrance is made a furtherance [*ephektikos*] to an act; and that which is an obstacle on the road helps us on [*pros*] this road.

5.21. Reverence [*timao*: cf. 3.7 as value] that which is best [*to kratiston*: strongest] in the universe [*kosmos*: cf. #13]; and this is that which makes use of all things and directs [*diepo*: to arrange] all things. And in like manner also reverence that which is best in yourself; and this is of the same kind [*homogenes*] as that. For in [*epi*] yourself also, that which makes use of everything else, is this, and your life is directed [*dioikeo*: cf. #13 as administered] by this.

5.22. That which does no harm [*blapto*: to hinder] to the state does no harm to the citizen [*polites*: cf. 4.4]. In the case of every appearance [*phantasia*: cf. #16 as thought] of harm apply this rule [*kanon*: rod, beam]: if the state is not harmed by this, neither am I harmed. But if the state is harmed, you must not be angry with him who does harm to the state. Show [*parorao*: to look at by the way] him where his error is.

5.23. Often think [*enthumeomai*: cf. 2.10 for thumeo, to be angry] of the rapidity with which things pass by [*parapheromai*: to be borne aside, carried away] and disappear [*hupexagoge*: withdrawal], both the things which are and the things which are produced. For substance [*ousia*: cf. 4.40] is like a river in a continual [*dienekes*] flow, and the activities [*energeia*: cf. #20] of things are in constant change [*suneches*: cf. 5.16 for continuous series, *sunecheios* & *metabole*, #13], and the causes [*aitia*: cf. #8] work in infinite varieties [*trope*: cf. 3.7 as community]; and there is hardly anything which stands still [*pareggus*, adverb: near at hand]. And consider this which is near to you, this boundless abyss [*achanes*: cf. 4.50 as immensity] of the past and of the future in which all things disappear [*enaphanizo*]. How then is he not a fool [*moros*] who is puffed up with such things or plagued about them and makes himself miserable? For they vex [*enochleo*: to trouble] him only for a time, and a short time.

5.24. Think of [*mimnesko*: to remember] the universal substance [*sumpases ousias*, genitive case] of which you have [*metecho*: cf. 4.4 as members] a very small portion; and of universal time [*sumpantos aionos*, genitive case], of which a short and indivisible [*akariaios*: cf. 3.10 as indivisible point] interval [*diastema*: cf. 4.50] has been assigned [*aporizo*: to mark off by boundaries] to you; and of that which is fixed by destiny [*meiromai*: cf. #8], and how small a part of it you are.

5.25. Does another do me wrong [*hamatano*: cf. 4.3]? Let him look to it. He has his own disposition [*diathesis*: cf. #20], his own activity [*energeia*: cf. #23]. I now have what the universal [*koinos*: cf. 4.4 as common] nature wills me to have; and I do what my nature now wills me to do.

5.26. Let the part of your soul which leads [*to hegemonikon*: cf. #11 as ruling principle] and governs [*kurieuo*: cf. 4.1 as rules] be undisturbed [*atrepos*] by the movements [*kinesis*] in the flesh, whether of pleasure or of pain; and let it not unite [*sugkerannumi*: to mix together] with them, but let it circumscribe [*perigrapho*: cf. 4.3] itself and limit [*periorizo*: to mark by boundaries] those affects [*peitho*: to prevail upon] to their parts. But when these affects rise up to the mind [*dianoia*: cf. #20, with eis] by virtue of [*kata*] that other sympathy that naturally exists in a body which is all one, then you must not strive to resist [*antibaino*] the sensation [*aisthesis*: cf. 4.40 as perception], for it is natural: but let not the ruling part of itself add to [*prostithemai*] the sensation the opinion [*hupolepsis*: cf. 4.7] that it is either good or bad.

5.27. Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly [*sunechos*: cf. 4.48] shows to them

that his own soul is satisfied [*aresko: cf. 4.25*] with that which is assigned to [*aponemo: cf. 4.25 as portion*] him, and that it does all that the daemon [*daimon: cf. #10*] wishes which Zeus has given to every man for his guardian [*prostates: one who stands before*] and guide [*hegeomai: verbal root of hegemonikon, #26*], a portion [*apospasma: that which is torn off*] of himself. And this is every man's understanding [*nous: cf. 3.16 as intelligence*] and reason [*logos*].

5.28. Are you angry with him whose armpits stink? Are you angry with him whose mouth smells foul? What good will this danger do you? He has such a mouth, he has such armpits: it is necessary that such an emanation must come from such things-but the man has reason [*logos*], it will be said, and he is able, if he takes pain to discover wherein he offends [*plemmeleo: to make a false note in music*]-I wish you well of your discovery [*sunnoeo: to meditate or reflect; cf. noeo, #12 as conceived with pro & epi*]. Well then, and you have reason: by your rational faculty [*logikos: cf. #16 as reason & diathesis: cf. #25 as disposition*] stir up [*kineo: to set in motion; cf. #26 for kinesis as movement*] his rational faculty; show him his error, admonish him. For if he listens, you will cure [*therapuo: to be an attendant*] him, and there is no need of anger, the tragic stuff of actors and whores.

5.29. As you intend [*dianoeomai: cf. #6 as thinks*] to live when you have gone out, so it is in your power to live here. But if men do not permit you, then get away out of life, yet so as if you were suffering no harm. The house is smoky, and I quit it. Why do you think that this is any trouble [*pragma: cf. #19 as things*]? But so long as nothing of the kind drives me out, I remain, am free, and no man shall hinder [*koluo: cf. 2.9*] me from doing what I choose; and I choose to do what is according to [*kata*] the nature of the rational and social [*logikos (cf. #28) & koinonikos (cf. #6)*] animal.

5.30. The intelligence [*nous: cf. #27 as understanding*] of the universe [*holon: cf. #8*] is social [*koinonikos: cf. #29*]. Accordingly it has made the inferior things for the sake of the superior, and it has fitted [*sunarmoizo: cf. #8*] the superior to one another. You see how it has subordinated [*bupotasso: cf. 3.6 as submitted*], coordinated [*suntasso: cf. #5 as prescribed*] and assigned [*aponemo: cf. #27*] to everything its proper portion [*to kata' axian*], and has brought together into concord [*homonoia: oneness of mind; cf. nous, #30*] with one another the things which are the best.

5.31. How have you behaved [*pros + en + echomai*] hitherto to the gods, your parents, brethren, children, teachers, to those who looked after your infancy, to your friends, kinsfolk, to your slaves? Consider if you have hitherto behaved to all in such a way that this may be said of you: Never has wronged a man in deed or word. And call to recollection [*anamimnesko: cf. 1.13 as reported*] both how many things you have passed through, and how many things you have been able to endure [*bupomeno: literally, to remain under*]: and that the history of your life is now complete and your service [*leitourgia*] is ended: and how many beautiful things you have seen: and how many pleasures and pains you have despised [*huperorao: to look down upon*]; and how many things called honorable you have spurned [*parorao: to observe by the way, overlook*]; and to how many ill-minded folks you have shown a kind disposition [*eugnomon: of good feeling*].

5.32. Why do unskilled [*atechnos: cf. 2.11 for atechnia, want of skill*] and ignorant souls disturb him who has skill [*entechnos*] and knowledge [*epistemon: cf. #9 for understanding, epistemonikos*]? What soul then has skill and knowledge? That which knows beginning and end, [*arche (cf. #15 as first principle) & telos (cf. #16)*] and knows the reason [*logos*] which pervades [*dieko: to extend, reach*] all substance [*ousia: cf. #23*] and through all time [*aion: cf. 4.3 as infinite time*] by fixed periods [*periodos: cf. #13 as revolution*] administers [*oikonomeo: cf. oikos or house, 1.6*] the universe [*holon: cf. #30*].

5.33. Soon, very soon, you will be ashes or a skeleton, and either a name or not even a name; but name is sound and echo. And the things which are much valued in life are empty and rotten and trifling and like little dogs biting one another and little children quarreling, laughing, and then straightway weeping. But

fidelity and modesty and justice and truth [*pistis* (cf. 3.7 as *promise*), *aidos* (cf. 4.20), *dike*, *aletheia*] have fled up to Olympus from the wide-spread earth. What then is there which still detains [*katecho*: cf. 1.17 as *engaged*] you here? If the objects of sense [*aisthema*] are easily changed and never stand still, and the organs of perception [*aistheteria*] are dull and easily receive false impressions; and the poor soul itself is an exhalation from blood. But to have good repute [*endokimeo*: to be famous, with *para*] amidst such a world as this is an empty thing. Why then do you not wait in tranquility [*perimeno* (cf. #10), with *hileos* (cf. 4.48 as *comfortably*)] for your end, whether it is extinction [*sbesis*: *quenching*] or removal [*metastasis*] to another state? And until that time [*kairos*: cf. 4.32] comes, what is sufficient? Why, what else than to venerate [*sebomai*: to feel awe or shame] the gods and bless them and to do good to men and to practice tolerance [*anecho*: cf. 4.3 as *endure*] and self-restraint [*apecho*: cf. 4.49 as *obtains*]; but as to everything which is beyond the limits of the poor flesh and breath, to remember that this is neither yours nor in your power [*epi soi*: literally, upon you].

5.34. You can pass your life [*euroeo*: to flow well] in an equable flow of happiness if you can go by the right way and think [*bupolambano*: cf. #12] and act in the right way. These two things are common both to the soul of God and to the soul of man and to the soul of every rational being [*logikos*: cf. #29]: not to be hindered by another; and to seek the good in the disposition [*diathesis*: cf. #28 as *faculty*] to justice and the practice of it, and in this to let your desire [*orexis*: *appetite*] find its termination [*apolego*: to leave off, *desis*].

5.35. If this is neither my own badness, nor an effect [*energeia*: cf. #25 as *activity*, with *kata*] of my own badness, and the common weal is not injured, why am I troubled [*diaphero*: cf. 5.1 as *care for*; also implies *being at variance*] about it? And what is the harm to the common weal [*koinos*: cf. #25 as *universal*] ?

5.36. Do not be carried along [*sunarpazo*] inconsiderately [*holoscheros*: completely] by the appearance [*phantasia*: cf. 22] of things, but give help to all according to your ability [*dunamis*: cf. #14 as *powers*] and their fitness; and if they should have sustained loss in matters which are indifferent, do not imagine [*phantazomai*: cf. #16 as *thoughts*] this to be a damage. For it is a bad habit [*ethos*: cf. #10 as *morals*]. But as the old man, when he went away, asked back his foster-child's top, remembering that it was a top, so do you in this case also.

(This paragraph is part of 5.36). When you are calling out on the Rostra, have you forgotten, man, what these things are? Yes; but they are objects of great concern [*perispoudazo*: cf. #10 for *spoudazo*, *serious pursuit*] to these people. Will you too then be made a fool [*moros*: cf. #23] for these things? I was once a fortunate man [*eumoiros*: *blessed with possessions*], but I lost it, I know not how. But fortunate means that a man has assigned to himself a good fortune [*moira*: cf. 3.16 as *lot & eumoiros*, #36]: and a good fortune is good disposition [*trope*: cf. #23 as *varieties*] of the soul, good emotions [*horme*: cf. #20 as *affects*], good actions.

## BOOK SIX

6.1. The substance [*ousia*: cf. 5.32] of the universe [*bolon*: cf. 5.32] is obedient [*eupeithes*] and compliant [*eutrepes*: *readily turning*]; and the reason [*logos*] which governs [*dioikeo*: cf. 5.21 as *directed*] it has in itself no cause for doing evil, for it has no malice, nor does it do evil to anything, nor is anything harmed by it. But all things are made and perfected [*peraino*: cf. 5.13 as *periods*] according [*kata*] to this reason.

6.2. Let it make no difference to you whether you are cold or warm, if you are doing your duty [*to prepon*: from *prepo*, to be distinguished] that which is ; and whether you are drowsy or satisfied with sleep; and whether ill-spoken of or praised; and whether dying or doing something else. For it is one of the acts [*praxis*: cf. 4.22 as *value*] of life, this act by which we die: it is sufficient then in this act also to do well what we have in hand.

6.3. Look within. Let neither the peculiar quality of anything [*pragma*: cf. 5.29 as *trouble*] nor its value escape

[*paratrecho*: to outrun] you.

6.4. All existing things [*hupokeimai*: literally, to put under] soon change [*metaballo*: cf. 5.13], and they will either be reduced to vapor, if indeed all substance [*ousia*: cf. #1] is one, or they will be dispersed.

6.5. The reason [logos] which governs [*dioikeo*: cf. #1] knows what its own disposition [*diakeimai*: cf. 2.12 as disposed] is, and what it does, and on what material [*hule*: cf. 4.1] it works.

6.6. The best [*aristos*: cf. 3.6] way of avenging yourself is not to become like [*exomoiazō*: to assimilate] the wrong doer.

6.7. Take pleasure [*terpo*: to satisfy, delight] in one thing and rest in [*prosanapauo*: cf. 4.31 as be content with] it, in passing [*metabaino*: cf. #6 as goes on] from one social act [*praxis*: cf. #2] to another social act, thinking [*mnaomai*: cf. 4.35 as remembers] of God.

6.8. The ruling principle [*hegemonikon*: cf. 5.11] is that which rouses and turns itself, and while it makes itself such as it is and such as it wills to be, it also makes everything which happens appear [*phaino*: cf. 5.12] to itself to be such as it wills.

6.9. In conformity to [*kata*] the nature of the universe [*holon*: cf. #1] every single thing is accomplished [*peraino*: cf. #1 as perfected], for certainly it is not in conformity to any other nature that each thing is accomplished, either a nature which externally comprehends [*periecho*: cf. 4.39 as covering] this, or a nature which is comprehended [*emperiecho*]: within this nature, or a nature external and independent of this.

6.10. The universe is either a confusion [*kekeon*: cf. 4.27 as chaos], and a mutual involution [*antemphloke*: mutual entwining] of things and a dispersion; or it is unity [*henosis*] and order [*taxis*] and providence [*pronoia*: cf. 4.3]. If then it is the former, why do I desire [*epithumeo*: cf. 3.7] to tarry [*diatribo*: to rub away; cf. 5.10 as delay which is from diatribe, a way of spending time] in a fortuitous combination [*sugkrima*: cf. 2.3 as compounded] of things and such a disorder [*phurmos*: mixture, confused mass]? And why do I care about anything else than how I shall at last become earth? And why am I disturbed [*tarasso*: cf. 4.26], for the dispersion [*skedasmos*: a scattering] of my elements [*ep' eme*: literally, upon me] will happen whatever I do. But if the other supposition is true, I venerate [*sebo*: cf. 3.9 as reverence], and I am firm, and I trust in him who governs [*dioikeo*: cf. #5].

6.11. When you have been compelled by circumstances to be disturbed [*diatarasso*: cf. #10 for tarasso] in a manner, quickly return to [*epanistemi*: to set up again (epi & ana), with eis] yourself and do not continue [*existemi*: cf. 4.17 as in your power] out of tune [*rhuthmos*] longer than the compulsion lasts; for you will have more mastery [*egkrateo*] over the harmony [*harmonia*: cf. 5.8] by continually [*sunechos*: cf. 5.27 as constantly] recurring to [*epi + ana + erchomai*: cf. 5.9 as recurring] it.

6.12. If you had a step-mother and a mother at the same time, you would be dutiful [*therapeuo*: cf. 2.17 as reverence sincerely] to your step-mother, but still you would constantly return to your mother. Let the court and philosophy now be to you step-mother and mother: return [*epi + ana + istemi*: compare with *epi + ana + erchomai*, #11] to philosophy frequently and repose [*prosanapauo*: cf. #7] in her, through whom what you meet with in the court appears to you tolerable [*anektos*: cf. 5.10 as to endure], and you appear tolerable in the court.

6.13. When we have meat before us and such eatables we receive the impression [*phantasia*: cf. 5.36 as appearance] that this is the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead body of a bird or of a pig; and again, that this Falernian is only a little grape juice, and this purple robe some sheep's wool dyed with the blood of a shell-fish: such then are these impressions, and they reach [*paratribo*: to rub beside; cf. diatribo, #10] the



things [*sunousia*: a being with; cf. *ousia* as substance, #4], themselves and penetrate them [*epi ton*], and so we see what kind [*spasma*: a piece torn off used with *muxarion*, literally as a small piece of mucus] of things they are. Just in the same way ought we to act [*diexerchomai*: to go through] all through life, and where there are things which appear [*phantazomai*: cf. 5.36 as imagine] most worthy of our approbation [*kathikneomai*: to come down to, reach], we ought to lay them bare and look at [*kathorao*: to look down upon] their worthlessness [*euteleia*: cf. 5.10 for *euteles*, worthless] and strip them of all the words by which they are exalted. For outward show is a wonderful perverter of the reason [*paralogismos*: false reasoning, deception], and when you are most sure that you are employed about [*katagignosko*: to remark, discover] things worth your pains [*spoudaios*: cf. 5.10 for *spoudazo*, serious pursuit] it is then that it cheats you most. Consider [*horao*: cf. 2.12 as observe] then what Crates says of Xenocrates himself.

6.14. Most of the things which the multitude admire are referred to objects of the most general kind, those which are held together [*sunecho*: cf. 3.10 as hold to] by cohesion or natural organization [*exis*: possession, with *phusis*] such as stones, wood, fig-trees, vines, olives. But those which are admired by men who are a little more reasonable [*kata psilon to plethos*] are referred to the things which are held together by a living principle, as flocks, herds. Those which are admired by men who are still more instructed are the things which are held together by a rational [*logikos*: cf. #34] soul, not however a universal soul, but rational so far as it is a soul skilled [*technikos*: cf. 5.14 for *techne*, art] in some art, or expert in some other way, or simply rational so far as it possesses a number of slaves. But he who values [*timao*: cf. 5.21 as reverence] rational soul, a soul universal and fitted for political life, regards nothing else except this; and above all things he keeps [*diasozo*: cf. 1.17 as preserved] his soul in a condition and in an activity conformable to reason [*logikos*, adverb, as in 3.6] and social life [*koinonikos*, adverb; cf. 5.30], and he co-operates [*sunergo*: to work together] to this end with those who are of the same kind as himself.

6.15. Some things are hurrying into existence, and others are hurrying out of it; and of that which is coming into existence, part is already extinguished [*apobennumi*: to quench]. Motions and changes [*rhusis*: flowing & alloiosis: cf. 4.21 as transformations] are continually [*dienekos*: cf. 4.49] renewing [*ananeuo*: to throw the head back] the world [*kosmos*: cf. 5.21 as universe], just as the uninterrupted course of time [*apeiros* (cf. 5.13 as forever) with *aion* (cf. 5.32)] is always renewing [*parecho*: cf. 5.15 as showed] the infinite [*adialeptos*: a + *dialepto*, not leaving an interval] duration of ages [*chronos*: cf. 4.32 as time]. In this flowing stream then, on which there is no abiding [*stasis*: standing], what is there of the things which hurry by on which a man would set a high price [*ektimao*]? It would be just as if a man should fall in love [*phileo*: cf. 5.9] with one of the sparrows which fly by, but it has already passed out of sight. Something of this kind is the very life of every man, like the exhalation of the blood and the respiration of the air. For such as it is to have once drawn in the air and to have given it back, which we do every moment, just the same is it with the whole respiratory power, which you did receive at your birth yesterday and the day before, to give it back to the element [*ekei*: there] from which you first draw it.

6.16. Neither is transpiration [*diapneuo*: to blow through], as in plants, a thing to be valued [*timios*: cf. #15 for *ektimao* as set a high price], nor respiration, as in domesticated animals and wild beasts, nor the receiving of impressions by the appearances of things [*tupto* & *phantasia*: cf. 3.16 for similar expression, with *kata*], nor being moved [*neurospao*: cf. 2.2 as pulled by the strings] by desires [*horme*: cf. 5.36 as emotions] as puppets by strings, nor assembling in herds, nor being nourished by food; for this is just like the act of separating and parting with the useless part of our food. What then is worth being valued? To be received with clapping of hands? No. Neither must we value the clapping of tongues, for the praise which comes from the many is a clapping of tongues. Suppose then that you have given up this worthless thing called fame, what remains that is worth valuing [*timios*: cf. #16]? This in my opinion, to move yourself and to restrain [*ischano*] yourself in conformity to [*kata*] your proper constitution [*kataskeue*: cf. 4.32], to which end both all employments and arts [*epimeleia*: care, attention & *techne*: cf. 5.14] lead. For every art aims at [*stochazomai*: cf. 3.11 as to ascertain, *sustochazomai*] this, that the thing which has been made [*kataskeuazo*: cf. 5.16 as constituted]

should be adapted [*epitedeios, adverb*] to the work [*ergon, with pros: cf. 2.12 as operation*] for which it has been made [*kataskenazo: cf. #16*]; and both the vine-planter who looks after the vine, and the horse-breaker, and he who trains the dog, seek this end. But the education and the teaching [*paidagogia (cf. 5.9 as a master (paidagogos) & didaskalion*] of youth aim at [*speudo: cf. 3.14 as hasten, with epi*] something. In this then is the value of the education and the teaching. And if this is well, you will not seek [*peripoeo: literally, to make around*] anything else. Will you not cease to value many other things too? Then you will be neither free, nor sufficient for your own happiness [*autarkes: cf. 3.11 as contentment*], nor without passion [*apathe: cf. 1.9*]. For of necessity you must be envious, jealous, and suspicious of those who can take away those things, and plot against those who have that which is valued by you. Of necessity a man must be altogether in a state of perturbation who wants any of these things; and besides, he must often find fault with the gods. But to reverence and honor [*aidos: cf. 4.120 as modesty & time (cf. #15 for verb, values)*] your own mind [*dianoia: cf. 5.26*] will make you content [*arestos: acceptable, pleasing*] with yourself, and in harmony [*euarmostos: cf. 4.45 as accommodating*] with society, and in agreement with [*sumphonos: agreeing in sound*] the gods, that is, praising all that they give and have ordered [*dianemo: to dispense as with nemo in 3.5 as assigned & diatasso: cf. 1.16, in an orderly way (tetagmenos)*].

6.17. Above, below, all around are the movements [*phora: a carrying*] of the elements [*stoicheion: cf. 4.32*]. But the motion of virtue [*kinesis (cf. 5.26) & arete (cf. 3.11)*] is in none of these: it is something more divine, and advancing by a way hardly observed [*dus + epinoeo: cf. 5.12 as conceive, without dia*] it goes happily on its road [*proiemi (cf. 4.19 as transmitted) & euodos (cf. 1.17 as progress)*].

6.18. How strangely men act. They will not praise those who are living at the same time and living with themselves; but to be themselves praised by posterity, by those whom they have never seen or ever will see, this they set much value on [*euphemeo: cf. 4.48 as blessing*]. But this is very much the same as if you should be grieved because those who have lived before you did not praise you.

6.19. If a thing is difficult to be accomplished [*duskataponeo*] by yourself, do not think that it is impossible for man: but if anything is possible for man and conformable to his nature [*oikeios: cf. 5.20 as proper*], think [*nomizo: cf. 4.47 as name*] that this can be attained by yourself too.

6.20. In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a man has torn you with his nails, and by dashing against your head has inflicted a wound. Well, we neither show any signs [*episemnaio*] of vexation, nor are we offended, nor do we suspect him afterwards as a treacherous fellow; and yet we are on our guard against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet with suspicion, but we quietly [*eumenes: cf. 3.4 as benevolent*] get out of his way. Something like this let your behavior be in all the other parts of life; let us overlook [*parenthumeomai: to disregard*] many things in those who are like antagonists in the gymnasium. For it is in our power, as I said, to get out of the way, and to have no suspicion nor hatred.

6.21. If any man is able to convince [*elegcho: cf. 3.11 as to examine*] me and show [*paristemi: to place beside*] me that I do not think or act right, I will gladly change [*metatithemi: cf. 5.10 as carry*]; for I seek the truth by which no man was ever injured. But he is injured who abides in his error and ignorance.

6.22. I do my duty: other things trouble me [*perispao: cf. 4.3 as torment*] not; for they are either things without life [*apsuchos: without psuche; cf. 5.5 for mind*] or things without reason [*alogos: cf. 1.13*] or things that have rambled and know not the way.

6.23. As to the animals which have no reason [*alogos: cf. #22*] and generally all things and objects, do you, since you have reason [*logos*] and they have none, make use of them with a generous and liberal spirit [*megalophronos (phronesis in 5.18 as wisdom & eleutheros (freely): adverbs)*]. But towards human beings, as they have reason, behave in a social spirit [*koinonikos, adverb: cf. #14*]. And on all occasions call on the gods, and do

not perplex [*diaphero*: cf. 5.34 as troubled] yourself about the length of time in which you shall do this; for even three hours so spent are sufficient.

6.24. Alexander the Macedonian and his groom by death were brought to the same state [*katastasis*: an appointing]; for either they were received among the same seminal principles of the universe [*spermatikos* (cf. 4.21) & *kosmos* (cf. #15 as world)], or they were alike dispersed among the atoms.

6.25. Consider [*enthumeomai*: cf. 5.23 as think] how many things in the same indivisible [*akariaios*: cf. 5.24] time take place in each of us, things which concern the body and things which concern the soul: and so you will not wonder if many more things, or rather all things which come into existence in that which is the one and all, which we call Cosmos [*kosmos*: cf. #24 as universe], exist [*enuphizo*: to settle down in] in it at the same time.

6.26. If any man should propose to you the question, how the name Antoninus is written, would you with a straining of the voice utter each letter? What then if they grow angry, will you be angry too? Will you not go on with composure [*praos*, adverb: soft, gentle] and number every letter? Just so then in this life also remember that every duty is made up of [*sumpleroo*: cf. 5.15 as aids] certain parts. These it is your duty to observe [*tereo*: cf. 5.15 as belong] and without being disturbed or showing anger towards those who are angry with you to go on your way and finish [*peraino*: cf. 6.9 as accomplished] that which is set before you.

6.27. How cruel [*omos*: raw, undressed] it is not to allow men to strive [*hormao*: cf. 5.14 as move, with *epi*] after the things which appear [*phaino*: cf. #8] to them to be suitable [*oikeios*: cf. #19 as conformable] to their nature and profitable [*sumphero*: cf. 4.9 as useful]! And yet in a manner you do not allow them to do this, when you are vexed because they do wrong [*hamartano*: cf. 4.3]. For they are certainly moved towards things because they suppose them to be suitable to their nature and profitable to them. “But it is not so.” Teach [*didasko*] them then, and show [*deiknumi*] them without being angry.

6.28. Death is a cessation [*anapaula*: repose; cf. 5.10 for *pros* + *ana* + *pauo*, to rest in] of the impressions through the senses [*antitupia* (resistance of a hard body) & *aisthetikos* (cf. 5.33 for organs of perception, *aistheteria*), and of the pulling of the strings [*neurospastia*: cf. #16 for being moved, *neurospao*] which move the appetites [*hormetikos*: cf. 3.16 as desire], and of the discursive movements of the thoughts [*dianoetikos* (cf. *dianoia* in #16 as mind) & *diexodos* (literally, a passing through)], and of the service [*leitourgia*: cf. 5.31, with *pros*] to the flesh.

6.29. It is a shame for the soul to be first to give way [*apaoudao*: to forbid] in this life, when your body does not give way [*prosapoudao*].

6.30. Take [*horao*: cf. #13 as consider] care that you are not made into a Caesar, that you are not dyed [*bapto*: cf. 3.4] with this dye; for such things happen. Keep [*tereo*: cf. #26 as observe] yourself then simple [*aploos*: cf. 4.27], good, pure [*akeraios*: unmixed], serious [*semnos*: cf. 1.9 as gravity], free from affectation [*akompsos*: unadorned, rude], a friend of justice, a worshiper of the gods [*theosebes*: cf. 1.3 as piety], kind [*eumenes*: cf. #20 as quietly], affectionate [*philostorgos*: loving tenderly], strenuous [*rhonnumi*: to strengthen, with *pros*] in all proper acts. Strive [*agonizomai*: to contend for a prize] to continue to be [*summeno*: cf. 4.21 as subsisting] such as philosophy wished to make you. Reverence [*aideomai*: cf. 2.6] the gods and help [*sozo*: cf. 4.22 as maintain] men. Short is life. There is only one fruit of this terrene life, a pious disposition [*diathesis*: cf. 5.34 with *hosios*: cf. 4.18 as pure] and social [*koinonikos*: cf. #23 as social spirit] acts. Do everything as a disciple [*mathetes*: pupil] of Antoninus. Remember his constancy [*eunos*: cf. 1.14 as steadiness] in every act which was conformable to reason [*logos*, with *kata*], and his evenness in all things and his piety [*hosios*: cf. #30 as pure] and the serenity [*eudios*: calm, fine] of his countenance and his sweetness [*meiligma*: anything that serves to soothe] and his disregard [*katalepsis*: a seizing] of empty fame and his efforts [*philotimos*: loving honor] to understand things; and how he would never let anything pass without having first most carefully examined [*kateidon*: cf. 4.48 as

observe] it and clearly understood [*noeo*: cf. 5.28 as discovering, prefixed with *sum*] it; and how he bore with those who blamed him unjustly without blaming them in return; how he did nothing in a hurry; and how he listened [*dechomai*: to receive] not to calumnies, and how exact an examiner [*exetastes*] of manners [*ethos*: cf. 5.36 as habit] and actions he was; and not given to reproach people, nor timid, nor suspicious, nor a sophist; and with how little he was satisfied, such as lodging, bed, dress, food, servants; and how laborious [*philoponos*: loving burdens] and patient; and how he was able on account of his sparing diet to hold out to the evening, not even requiring to relieve himself by any evacuations except at the usual hour; and his firmness and uniformity in his friendships [*philia*: cf. 1.16 for *philozoos*, attached to life]; and how he tolerated freedom of speech [*parresia*: cf. 3.4 as openness] in those who opposed his opinions [*gnome*: cf. 2.17 for cheerful mind, prefaced with *bileos*]; and the pleasure that he had [*chairō*] when any man showed him anything better; and how religious [*theosebes*: cf. #30] he was without superstition [*deisidaimoneo*: cf. *daimon* in 5.27]. Imitate all this that you may have as good a conscience [*eusuneideo*: *eu* + *sun* + *eido*, to know as in 3.13, understanding] when your last [*teleutaios*: cf. 5.32 as end or telos] as hour comes, as he had.

6.31. Return to your sober senses [*ananephō*] and call yourself back; and when you have roused yourself from sleep and have perceived [*ennoeo*: cf. 4.48 as think continually] that they were only dreams which troubled you, now in your waking hours look at these (the things about you) as you did look at those (the dreams).

6.32. I consist of a little body and a soul. Now to this little body all things are indifferent [*adiaphoros*: cf. 5.12 for *diaphora* or difference] for it is not able to perceive differences [*diaphero*: cf. #23 as perplex]. But to the understanding [*dianoia*: cf. #16 as mind] those things only are indifferent, which are not the works of its own activity [*energema*: cf. 4.2 as act]. But whatever things are the works of its own activity, all these are in its power [*ep' aute*]. And of these however only those which are done with reference to the present; for as to the future and the past activities of the mind, even these are for the present indifferent.

6.33. Neither the labor [*ponos*: cf. 3.3 as pains] which the hand does nor that of the foot is contrary to [*para*] nature, so long as the foot does the foot's work and the hand the hand's. So then neither to a man as a man is his labor contrary to nature, so long as it does the things of a man. But if the labor is not contrary to his nature, neither is it an evil to him.

6.34. How many pleasures [*hedone*: cf. 5.9] have been enjoyed by robbers, patricides, tyrants.

6.35. Do you not see how the handicraftsmen accommodate themselves [*harmoζo*: cf. 4.45 as harmoniously, with *sun* prefixed to verb] up to a certain point to those who are not skilled in their craft [*pros tous idiotas or idotes*; cf. 5.8 for ignorant or idioteuo]—nevertheless they cling to [*antecho*: cf. 3.6 as hold to] the reason [*logos*] (the principles) of their art [*technē*: cf. #16] and do not endure to depart from it? Is it not strange if the architect and the physician shall have more respect [*aideomai*: cf. #30 as reverence] to the reason (the principles) of their own arts than man to his own reason, which is common to [*pros*] him and the gods?

6.36. Asia, Europe are corners of the universe: all the sea a drop in the universe; Athos a little clod of the universe: all the present time is a point in eternity [*stigma* (cf. 4.3) & with *aion* (cf. #13 as time)]. All things are little, changeable [*eutreptos*: easily changed], perishable [*enaphanizo*: cf. 5.23 as disappear]. All things come from thence, from that universal ruling power [*hegemonikon*: cf. #8 as ruling principle] either directly proceeding [*hormao*: cf. #27 as strive] or by way of sequence [*epakoloutheo*: to follow close upon; cf. *akoloutheo* as in 5.3, following]. And accordingly the lion's gaping jaws and that which is poisonous and every harmful thing as a thorn, as mud, are after-products of the grand and beautiful [*semnos* (cf. #30 as serious) & *kalos* (cf. 4.20)]. Do not then imagine [*phantazomai*: cf. #13 as appear] that they are of another kind from that which you do venerate [*sebomai*: cf. 5.34], but form a just opinion [*epilogizos*] of the source of all.

6.37. He who has seen present things has seen all, both everything which has taken place from all eternity

[*aidios: adjective*] and everything which will be for time without end [*apeiros: cf. #15 as uninterrupted course of time*]; for all things are of one kin and of one form [*homogenos & homoeidos*].

6.38. Frequently consider [*enthumeomai: cf. #25*] the connection [*episundesisis*] of all things in the universe [*kosmos: cf. #25*] and their relation [*schesis: cf. 1.12, with pros*] to one another. For in a manner all things are implicated [*epipleko: to wreath*] with one another, and all in this way are friendly [*philos: cf. #15 for phileo, to fall in love*] to one another; for one thing comes in order after another, and this is by virtue of the active movement [*tonikos (stretching, capable of extension) & kinesis (cf. #17 for motion)*] and mutual conspiracy [*sumpnoia*] and the unity of the substance [*benosis (cf. #10) & ousia (cf. #4)*].

6.39. Adapt [*sunbarmozo: cf. #35 as accommodate, without sun*] yourself to the things with which your lot has been cast: [*sugklero: to embrace in one lot*] and the men among whom you have received your portion, love [*phileo: cf. #38*] them, but do it truly, sincerely.

6.40. Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for which it has been made [*kataskenazo: cf. #16, with pros*], is well, and yet he who made it is not there. But in [*epi*] the things which are held together [*sunecho: cf. #14*] by nature there is within and there abides in [*parameno: cf. 3.11 as endure*] them the power [*dunamis: cf. 5.36 as ability*] which made them; wherefore the more is it fit to reverence [*aideomai: cf. #35 as respect*] this power, and to think [*nomizo: cf. #19*] that, if you do live and act [*diexago: to lead through*] according to its will [*boulema, with kata: cf. 5.1*], everything in you is in conformity to intelligence [*nous, with kata: cf. 5.30*]. And thus also in the universe [*to panti*] the things which belong to it are in conformity to intelligence.

6.41. Whatever of the things which are not within your power [*aproairetos: a + pros + aireo*] you shall suppose to be good for you or evil, it must of necessity be that, if such a bad thing befall [*peripipto: to fall around*] you or the loss of such a good thing, you will blame the gods, and hate men too, those who are the cause of the misfortune or the loss, or those who are suspected of being likely to be the cause; and indeed we do much injustice because we make a difference [*diaphora, with pros: cf. 5.12*] between these things. But if we judge only those things which are in our power [*epi' hemon*] to be good or bad, there remains no reason either for finding fault with God or standing in a hostile attitude [*stasis & polemos*] to [*pros*] man.

6.42. We are all working together to one end [*apotelesma, with eis: cf. telos or end in 5.32*], some with knowledge and design [*eidotos & parakolouthetikos, adverbs: para + akoloutheo (cf. 5.5 prefaced with dus, dull of comprehension)*], and others without knowing what they do [*anepistatos, adverb or without episteme or acquaintance with*]; as men also when they are asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, I think, who says that they are laborers and co-operators in the things which take place in the universe [*kosmos: cf. #38*]. But men co-operate after different fashions: and even those co-operate abundantly, who find fault with what happens and those who try to oppose it and to hinder it; for the universe had need even of such men as these. It remains then for you to understand [*suniemai: cf. 5.6*] among what kind of workmen you place [*katatasso: cf. 5.13 as reduced, with eis*] yourself; for he who rules all things will certainly make [*dioikeo: cf. 6.10 as governs*] a right use [*kalos, adverb: beautifully; cf. 4.4 as well*] of you, and he will receive you among [*eis*] some part of the co-operators and of those whose labors conduce to one end [*sumergo: cf. #14 as co-operates*]. But be not you such a part as the mean and ridiculous verse in the play, which Chrysippus speaks of [*mimnesko: cf. 5.24 as to think of*].

6.43. Does the sun undertake to do the work of the rain, or Aesculapius the work of the Fruit-bearer (the earth)? And how is it with respect to each of the stars, are they not different [*diaphora: cf. #41 as difference*] and yet they work together to [*pros*] the same end?

6.44. If the gods have determined [*bouleuo, with peri: cf. boulema in #40 as will*] about me and about the things which must happen to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy even to imagine [*epinoeo: cf. 5.12 as conceive*] a deity without forethought; and as to doing me harm, why should they have any desire [*horme, with*

*dia*: cf. #16 as desires] towards that? For what advantage would result to them from this or to the whole, which is the special object of their providence [*pronoos*: cf. 2.3 for *pronoia* as providence]? But if they have not determined about me individually [*kat' idian*], they have certainly determined about the whole at least, and the things which happen by way of sequence [*epikolouthos*: cf. 5.3 as follows] in this general arrangement [*sumbaino*: cf. 5.18 as happens] I ought to accept with pleasure and to be content with them. But if they determine about nothing—which it is wicked [*hosios*, with *ouk*: cf. #30 as piety] to believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them nor do anything else which we do as if the gods were present [*pariemi*, with *pros*] and lived with us—but if however the gods determine about none of the things which concern us [*kath' hemas*], I am able to determine about myself, and I can inquire about that which is useful [*sumphero*: cf. #27 as profitable]; and that is useful to every man which is conformable to his own constitution [*kataskeneue*, with *kata*: cf. #16] and nature. But my nature is rational and social [*logikos* (cf. #14) & *politikos* (cf. 4.24)]; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world [*kosmos*: cf. #42 as universe]. The things then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me.

6.45. Whatever happens to [*sumbaino*: cf. #44 as general arrangement] every man, this is for the interest of the universal: this might be sufficient. But further you will observe [*para + phulasso*: cf. 4.10 as to observe] this also as a general truth, if you do observe, that whatever is profitable to any man is profitable also to other men. But let the word profitable be taken here in the common sense as said of things of the middle kind [*epi ton meson*], neither good nor bad.

6.46. As it happens [*prosistemi*: to stand nearby] to you in the amphitheater and such places, that the continual sight of the same things and the uniformity make the spectacle wearisome [*proskore*: *koros* means satiety], so it is in [*epi*] the whole of life; for all things above, below, are the same and from the same. How long then?

6.47. Think continually [*ennoeo*: cf. #31 as perceived & *sunechos*, #11] that all kinds of men and of all kinds of pursuits [*epiteudeuma*] and of all nations are dead, so that your thoughts come down even to Philistion and Phoebus and Origanion. Now turn your thoughts [*metatithemi*: cf. #21 as change; “thoughts” lacking in Greek text] to the other kinds of men. To that place then we must remove [*metaballo*: cf. #4], where there are so many great orators, and so many noble philosophers, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates; so many heroes of former days, and so many generals after them, and tyrants; besides these, Eudoxus, Hipparchus, Archimedes, and other men of acute natural talents, great minds, lovers of labor, versatile, confident, mockers even of the perishable and ephemeral life of man, as Menippus and such as are like him. As to all these consider [*ennoeo*: cf. #47 as think] that they have long been in the dust. What harm then is this to them; and what to those whose names are altogether unknown? One thing here is worth a great deal, to pass your life in truth and justice, with a benevolent disposition [*eumenes*: cf. #30 as kind] even to liars and unjust men.

6.48. When you wish to delight [*euphraino*] yourself, think [*enthumeomai*: cf. #38 as consider] of the virtues [*proterema*: advantage, victory] of those who live with you; for instance, the activity [*drasterios*, adjective: vigorous] of one, and the modesty [*aidemon*, adjective: cf. 1.2] of another, and the liberality [*eumetadotos*, adjective: readily imparting] of a third, and some other good quality of a fourth. For nothing delights so much as the examples of the virtues [*arete*: cf. #17] when they are exhibited [*emphaino*: cf. 4.45] in the morals [*ethos*: cf. #30 as manners] of those who live with us and present themselves [*sumpipto*: to fall together] in abundance, as far as is possible. Wherefore we must keep them before us [*procheiros*: cf. 5.6 as ready].

6.49. You are not dissatisfied [*duscheraino*: cf. 4.3 as discontent], I suppose, because you weigh only so many pounds and not three hundred. Be not dissatisfied then that you must live only so many years and not more; for as you are satisfied with the amount of substance [*ousia*: cf. #38] which has been assigned to [*aphorizo*: to mark off by boundaries] you, so be content with the time [*chronos*: cf. #15 as ages].

6.50. Let us try to persuade [*peitho*: cf. 5.27 as affects] men. But act even against their will, when the principles [*logos*] of justice lead that way. If however any man by using force stands in your way, betake [*metabaino*: cf. #7 as passing] yourself to contentment and tranquility, [*euarestos* (well pleasing) & *alupos* (without pain), adjectives], and at the same time employ the hindrance towards the exercise of [*eis*] some other virtue; and remember that your attempt was with a reservation, that you did not desire to do impossibilities. What then did you desire?—Some such effort as this.—But you attain [*proecho*: to hold before] your object, if the things to which you were moved are accomplished.

6.51. He who loves fame considers [*bupolambano*: cf. 5.34 as think] another man's activity [*energeia*: cf. 5.35 as effect] to be his own good; and he who loves pleasure, his own sensations; but he who has understanding [*nous*: cf. #40 as intelligence] considers his own acts to be his own good.

6.52. It is in our power to have no opinion [*bupolambano*: cf. #51 as considers] about a thing, and not to be disturbed [*ochleo*: to move, trouble] in our soul; for things themselves have no natural power to form our judgements.

6.53. Accustom [*ethizo*: cf. 4.36] yourself to attend carefully [*aparenthumetos*: a + para + en + thumos (cf. 2.10 as anger): carelessly, undisturbed] to what is said by another, and as much as it is possible, be in the speaker's mind [*psuche*: cf. 5.5].

6.54. That which is not good for the swarm, neither is it good for [*sumphero*: cf. #44 as useful] the bee.

6.55. If sailors abused the helmsman or the sick the doctor, would they listen to anybody else; or how could the helmsman secure the safety of those in the ship or the doctor the health of those whom he attends?

6.56. How many together with whom I came into the world [*kosmos*: cf. #44] are already gone out of it.

6.57. To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and to those bitten by mad dogs water causes fear; and to little children the ball is a fine thing. Why then am I angry [*orgizo*: cf. 2.16]? Do you think [*dokeo*: to suppose, imagine] that a false opinion has less power than the bile in the jaundiced or the poison in him who is bitten by a mad dog?

6.58. No man will hinder you from living according to the reason [*logos*, with *kata*] of your own nature: nothing will happen to [*sumbaino*: cf. #45] you contrary to [*para*] the reason of the universal [*koinos*: cf. 5.35 as common weal] nature.

6.59. What kind of people are those whom men wish to please, and for what objects, and by what kind of acts [*energeia*: cf. #51 as activity]? How soon will time [*aion*: cf. 5.32] cover all things, and how many it has covered already.