

**The Republic by Plato**  
(translation by Benjamin Jowett)  
(one of four)

**Introduction**

This document is not a commentary on the **Republic** but a series of insertions. That is to say, it contains transliterated Greek works of key concepts and phrases enabling the reader to get a better grasp of the text. As with all documents on this Home Page, the current one is offered with the intent of reading the **Republic** in the spirit of *lectio divina* which, I believe, is in line with the way ancient philosophy had been carried out. Usually this phrase applies to Scripture and the Church Fathers. However, the slow, meditative spirit of *lectio divina* can be applied to such a foundational document. The idea is not to read the **Republic** in order to gain information but to participate more fully in its dialogue format, of becoming a partner with Socrates. Perhaps at a later date the insertions may be enhanced with fuller notations.

As for the English text, the reader will find references to the previous word/phrase which enables making cross-references and see how it is used elsewhere. In other words, one can search forward or backward. The translation itself is the one by Benjamin Jowett. A more preferable one is **Plato: Complete Works**, edited by John M. Cooper (1997). The Jowett translation is used simply because its copyright is expired and therefore lies with “common domain.” Numerous sites on the Internet have it for downloading. This translation is not the most desirable for inserting Greek words and phrases due to its older English style. On numerous occasions when the similar words and phrases were used by differed widely, I had to use the phrase “in context of the sentence” instead of inserting an English translation.

The Jowett translation employs the traditional method of marking the text. I used the same format, however, when uploading the text, often I found difficulty in retaining precisely the same format. Nevertheless, all numerical and alphabetical markings are included.

*Books Nine and Ten are in Tahoma script in an attempt to retain original formatting for uploading to Internet.*

**Book One**

**327** I went down [*katabaino, with eis, into: to descend*] yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon the son of Ariston, that I might offer up my prayers [*proseuxomai: implies making a vow*] to the goddess; and also because I wanted to see [*theaomai: to look on*] in what manner they would celebrate the festival [*heorte: holiday*], which was a new thing [*tropon poiesousin: making it for the first time*]. I was delighted with the procession [*pompe: escort*] of the inhabitants; but that of the Thracians was [*phaino: to appear*] equally, if not more, beautiful [*kalos*]. When we had finished our prayers and viewed [*theoreo: to behold*] the spectacle, we turned in the direction of [*pros*] the city [*astu*]; and at that instant Polemarchus the son of Cephalus chanced to catch sight of [*horaο: to see, observe*] us from a distance as we were starting on our way home, and told his servant [*pais: child*] to run and bid us wait for [*perimeno: to attend*] him. The servant took hold of me by the cloak behind, and said: Polemarchus desires you to wait. I turned round [*metastrepho*], and asked him where his master was. There he is, said the youth, coming after you, if you will only wait. Certainly we will, said Glaucon.

**c** In a few minutes Polemarchus appeared, and with him Adeimantus, Glaucon’s brother, Niceratus the son of Nicias, and several others who had been at the procession. Polemarchus said to me: I perceive [*dokeο: to think, suppose*], Socrates, that you and our companion are already on your way to the city. You are not far wrong [*kakos, adverb: with evil intent*], I said. But do you see, he rejoined, how many we are? Of course. And are you stronger [*kreisson: more powerful*] than all these? For if not, you will have to remain where you are. May there not be the alternative, I said, that we may persuade [*peitho: to prevail upon*] you to let us go?

But can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you? he said.

Certainly not, replied Glaucon.

Then we are not going to listen; of that you may be assured [*dianoemai: to intend, purpose*].

**328** Adeimantus added: Has no one told you of the torch-race on horseback in honor of the goddess [*theos: god*] which will take place in the evening?

With horses! I replied: That is a novelty. Will horsemen carry torches and pass them one to another during the race?

Yes, said Polemarchus, and not only so, but a festival will be celebrated at night [*pannuchidos, with pros: all night long*], which you certainly ought to see [*theomai: cf 327a*]. Let us rise soon after supper and see this festival; there will be a gathering of [*sunerchomai; to come together*] young men, and we will have a good talk [*dialegomai: to converse with*]. Stay then, and do not be perverse [*ne allos poieite: do not do otherwise*].

**b** Glaucon said: I suppose, since you insist, that we must.

Very good, I replied.

Accordingly we went with [*eis*] Polemarchus to his house; and there we found his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and with them Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, Charmantides the Paeanian, and Cleitophon the son of Aristonymus. There too was Cephalus the father of Polemarchus, whom

I had not seen for a long time, and I thought him very much aged [*presbutes*]. He was seated on a **c** cushioned chair, and had a garland on his head, for he had been sacrificing in the court; and there were some other chairs [*diphros: chariot-board*] in the room arranged in a semicircle, upon which we sat down by him. He saluted [*aspazomai: to welcome kindly*] me eagerly, and then he said: --You don't come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought: If I were still able to go and see you I would not ask you to come to **d** me. But at my age I can hardly get to the city, and therefore you should come oftener to the Piraeus. For let me tell you, that the more the pleasures [*hedone*] of the body fade away [*apomaraionomia: to waste or wither away*], the greater to me is the pleasure and charm [*epithumia: desire, longing & hedone*] of conversation [*logos, with peri*]. Do not then deny my request, but make our house your resort and keep company with [*suniemai: to bring or sit together*] these young men; we are old friends, and you will be quite at home [*oikeios: of the household*] with [*para*] us.

I replied: There is nothing which for my part I like better, Cephalus, than conversing [*dialegomai: cf 328a*] with aged men; for I regard them as travelers who have gone a journey which I too may have **e** to go, and of whom I ought to enquire [*punthanomai: to learn by inquiry*], whether the way is smooth and easy, or rugged and difficult. And this is a question which I should like to ask of you who have arrived at [*epi*] that time [*helikia: time of life*] which the poets call the 'threshold of old age' [*Illiad, xxii.60, xxiv.246, 348, xxiii.212*]-Is life harder [*chalepos: painful, sore*] towards the end, or what report do you give of it?

**329** I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling [*phaino: cf 327a*] is. Men of my age flock together; we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says; and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is --I cannot eat, I cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away: there was a good time once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life. Some complain of **b** the slights which are put upon them by relations, and they will tell you sadly of how many evils [*kakos: cf 327e*] their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that which is not really in fault. For if old age were the cause, I too being old, and every other old man, would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experience, nor that of others whom I have

**c** known. How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the question, How does love suit with age, Sophocles,--are you still the man you were? Peace [*euphemeo: to use words of good omen*], he replied; most gladly have I escaped the thing of which you speak; I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious [*lussao: to be raging, mad & agrios: wild, savage*] master [*despotes*]. His words have often occurred to my mind since, and they seem as good to me now as at the time when he uttered them. For certainly old age [*geras*] has a great sense of calm and freedom [*eirene & eleutheria*]; when the passions [*epithumia: cf 328d*] relax [*pauo: to cease*] their hold [*katateino: to stretch out*], then, as Sophocles says, we are freed from [*apallasso: to be released from*] the grasp not of one mad

**d** [*mainomai: to rage, be furious*] master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates, that these regrets, and also the complaints about relations, are to be attributed to the same cause, which is not old age, but men's characters and tempers [*tropos: way; translates as "the way of men"*]; for he who is of a calm and happy nature [*kosmios: well-ordered & eukolos: easily satisfied*] will hardly feel the pressure [*epiponos: painful, toilsome*] of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden [*chalepos: cf 328e*].

e I listened in admiration, and wanting to draw him out, that he might go on --Yes, Cephalus, I said: but I rather suspect that people in general are not convinced [*apodechomai: to accept from*] by you when you speak thus; they think that old age sits lightly [*rhadios*] upon you, not because of your happy disposition [*tropos, with dia: cf 329d as tempers*], but because you are rich [*ousia: substance*], and wealth is well known to be a great comforter [*paramuthia: encouragement*].

You are right [*alethos: true*], he replied; they are not convinced [*apodechomai: cf 329e*]: and there is something in what they say; not, however, so much as they imagine [*oiomai: to suppose*]. I might

**330** answer them as Themistocles answered the Seriphian who was abusing him and saying that he was famous, not for his own merits but because he was an Athenian: 'If you had been a native of my country or I of yours, neither of us would have been famous [*eudokimos: in good repute*].' And to those who are not rich and are impatient [*chalepos, adverb: cf 329d as burden*] of old age, the same reply may be made; for to the good poor man old age cannot be a light burden, nor can a bad rich man ever have peace [*eukolos: cf 329 as happy*] with himself.

May I ask, Cephalus, whether your fortune was for the most part inherited or acquired by you?

Acquired! Socrates; do you want to know how much I acquired? In the art of making money I have **b** been midway between my father and grandfather: for my grandfather, whose name I bear, doubled and trebled the value of his patrimony, that which he inherited being much what I possess now; but my father Lysanias reduced the property below what it is at present: and I shall be satisfied if I leave to these my sons not less but a little more than I received.

That was why I asked you the question, I replied, because I see that you are indifferent [*ou spodra agapan: not excessively loving (agapao) it*] about money, which is a characteristic rather of those who have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them [*aspazomai: cf 328c as saluted*]; the

**c** makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own, resembling [*hosper*] the affection [*agapao*] of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their children, besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad company [*chalepos: cf 330a as impatient & sugginomai: to be with, hold converse with*], for they can talk about nothing but the praises of wealth. That is true, he said.

**d** Yes, that is very true, but may I ask another question? What do you consider to be the greatest blessing [*to agathon: agathos or good*] which you have reaped from your wealth [*ousia: cf 229e as rich*]?

One, he said, of which I could not expect easily to convince [*peitho: cf 327 as persuade*] others. For let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks himself to be near death [*teleutao: to complete, finish*], fears and cares [*deos: awe & phrontis: thought*] enter into [*eischerchomai*] his mind which he never had before; the tales [*muthos*] of a world below [*Haidēs*] and the punishment [*dike: lawsuit, custom*] which is exacted there of deeds done here were once a laughing matter to him, but now he [*psuche: soul*] is

**e** tormented with the thought that they may be true: either from the weakness of age, or because he is now drawing nearer to that other place, he has a clearer view of [*kathorao: to look down upon, perceive*] these things; suspicions and alarms crowd thickly upon him, and he begins to reflect and consider [*analogizomai: to calculate, consider & skopeo: to look after*] what wrongs he has done to others. And when he finds that the sum of his transgressions [*adikema*] is great he will many a time like a child start up in his sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings [*ze meta kaes elpidos: lives in hope of bad*

**331** things]. But to him who is conscious of no sin [*suneidesis: conscience & adikos: unjust*], sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is the kind nurse [*gerotrophos*] of his age:

Hope, he says, cherishes the soul [*kardia: heart*] of him who lives in justice and holiness and is the nurse of his age and the companion [*suneoros: linked with*] of his journey; --hope which is mightiest to sway [*kubernao: to steer*] the restless soul [*gnome: means of knowing, mind*] of man.

How admirable are his words! And the great blessing of riches, I do not say to every man, but to a **b** good man, is, that he has had no occasion to deceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally [*epieikes: fitting & kosmios: cf 329d as happy*]; and when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace of mind [*nous*] the possession of wealth greatly contributes; and therefore I say, that, setting one thing against another, of the many advantages which wealth has to give, to a man of sense this is in my opinion the greatest. Well said [*pagkalos, adverb*], Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice [*dikaioisune*], what is it? --to

**c** speak the truth and to pay your debts --no more than this? And even to this are there not exceptions [*dikaios & adikos, adverbs: rightly and wrongly*]? Suppose that a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind [*para & sophronizo: to learn self-control*], ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought or that I should be right [*dikaios*] in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition.

**d** You are quite right, he replied. But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition [*horos: boundary*] of justice.

Quite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed [*peitho: cf 330d as convince*], said Polemarchus interposing.

I fear, said Cephalus, that I must go now, for I have to look after [*epimelomai: to take care of*] the sacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polemarchus and the company.

Is not Polemarchus your heir?, I said.

To be sure, he answered, and went away laughing to the sacrifices.

**e** Tell me then, O heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, about justice that you consider correct.

He said that the repayment of a debt is just, and in saying so he appears to me to be right [*kakos legein: to speak well or beautifully*].

I should be sorry to doubt [*rhadios, adverb: easily*] the word of such a wise and inspired [*sophos & theios: divine*] man, but his meaning, though probably clear to you, is the reverse of clear to me [*agnoeo: not to perceive or know*]. For he certainly does not mean, as we were now saying that I ought to return a return a deposit of arms or of anything else to one who asks for it when he is not in his right senses **332** [*me sophronos, adverb: cf 331c for sophronizo*]; and yet a deposit cannot be denied to be a debt.

True.

Then when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no means to make the return?

Certainly not.

When Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was justice, he did not mean to include that case?

Certainly not; for he thinks that a friend [*philos*] ought always to do good [*agathos: cf 330c as blessing*] to a friend and never evil [*kakos: cf 329e*].

[*manthano: I understand, which comes before this sentence*] You mean that the return of a deposit [*para + kata + tithemi*] of gold which is to the injury [*blaberos: hurtful*] of the receiver, if the two parties are **b** friends, is not the repayment of a debt, --that is what you would imagine [*phemi: to declare*] him to say [*lego*]?

Yes.

And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them? To be sure, he said, they are to receive what we owe them, and an enemy, as I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to [*proskeimai: to be placed upon*] him --that is to say, evil.

Simonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem [*phaino: cf 329a as feeling*] to have spoken darkly [*ainissomai: to speak in riddles*] of the nature of justice; for he really meant [*dianoemai: cf 327e as assured*] to say that justice is the giving to each man what is proper [*to prosekon: proseko, to be near c at hand*] to him, and this he termed a debt.

That must have been his meaning, he said.

By heaven!, I replied; and if we asked him what due or proper thing [*techne: craft*] is given by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to us?

He would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to human bodies.

And what due or proper thing is given by [*techne*] cookery, and to what?

**d** Seasoning to food.

And what is that which justice gives, and to whom?

If, Socrates, we are to be guided [*akoloutheo: to follow, as a sequence*] at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies.

That is his meaning then?

I think so.

And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in time of sickness?

The physician.

**e** Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea?

The pilot.

And in what sort of actions [*pragma*] or with a view to what result [*ergos, with pros*] is the just man most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friends?

In going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other.

But when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a physician?

No.

And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot?

No.

Then in time of peace justice will be of no use?

I am very far from thinking so.

You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war?

**333** Yes.

Like husbandry for the acquisition of corn?

Yes.

Or like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes, --that is what you mean?

Yes.

And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace?

In contracts [*sumbolaion: a mark, sign*], Socrates, justice is of use.

And by contracts you mean partnerships [*koinonema: act of communication*]?

Exactly.

**b** But is the just man or the skillful player a more useful and better partner [*koinonos*] at a game of draughts?

The skillful player.

And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better partner than the builder?

Quite the reverse.

Then in what sort of partnership [*koinonia*] is the just man a better partner than the harp-player, as in playing the harp the harp-player is certainly a better partner than the just man?

In a money partnership.

Yes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money; for you do not want a just man to be your counselor the purchase or sale of a horse; a man who is knowing about horses would be better for

**c** that, would he not?

Certainly.

And when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be better?

True.

Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is to be preferred?

When you want a deposit to be kept safely.

You mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie?

Precisely.

That is to say, justice is useful when money is useless?

**d** That is the inference [*kinduneuo: to be daring, be possible*].

And when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, then justice is useful to the individual and to the state; but when you want to use it, then the art of the vine-dresser?

Clearly [*phaino: cf 332b as would seem*].

And when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you would say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the art of the soldier or of the musician?

Certainly.

And so of all the other things; --justice is useful when they are useless, and useless when they are useful?

That is the inference.

Then justice is not good for much. But let us consider [*skeptomai: to look after, watch*] this further

**e** point: Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting best able to ward off a blow?

Certainly.

And he who is most skillful in preventing or escaping from a disease is best able to create one?

True.

**334** And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to steal a march upon the enemy?

Certainly.

Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief?

That, I suppose, is to be inferred.

Then if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing it.

That is implied in the argument.

Then after all the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is a lesson which I suspect [*kinduneo, with para: cf 333d as inference*] you must have learnt [*manthano: to perceive*] from Homer; for he, **b** speaking of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a favorite of his, affirms that He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury. And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that justice is an art of theft; to be practiced however 'for the good of friends and for the harm of enemies,' --that was what you were saying?

No, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say; but I still stand by the latter words.

Well, there is another question: By friends and enemies do we mean those who are so really, or only in seeming [*dokeo: cf 327c as perceive*]?

Surely, he said, a man may be expected to love [*phileo: to show affection*] those whom he thinks good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil [*poneros: toilsome, grievous*].

**c** Yes, but do not persons often err [*hamartano: to sin*] about good and evil: many who are not good seem to be so, and conversely?

That is true.

Then to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their friends?

True.

And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to the good?

Clearly.

**d** But the good are just and would not do an injustice?

True.

Then according to your argument [*logos: cf 328d as conversation*] it is just to injure those who do no wrong?

No, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral [*poneros & logos*].

Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm [*blapto: to disable, hinder*] to the unjust?

I like that better [*kalos: cf 327c as beautiful & phaino: cf 333d as clearly*]. But see the consequence [*sumbaino: to come together, happen*]: --Many a man who is ignorant [*diarmtano: to go quite astray: cf 334c for hamartano as err*] of human nature has friends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to them; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we shall be saying

**e** the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides.

Very true, he said: and I think that we had better correct [*metatithemi: to change*] an error into which we seem to have fallen [*kinduneuo: cf 333d as inference*] in the use of the words 'friend' and 'enemy.'

What was the error, Polemarchus? I asked.

We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good.

And how is the error to be corrected?

We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good; and that he who seems only, **335** and is not good, only seems to be and is not a friend; and of an enemy the same may be said.

You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?

Yes.

And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is just to do good to our friends when they are good and harm to our enemies when they are evil?

**b** Yes, that appears to me to be the truth [*kalos, adverb: beautifully*].

But ought the just to injure any one at all?

Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies.

When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated?

The latter.

Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?

Yes, of horses.

**c** And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities [*arete: virtue, the best part*] of dogs, and not of horses?

Of course.

And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue [*arete*] of man?

Certainly.

And that human virtue is justice [*dikaiosune*: cf 331b]?

To be sure.

Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?

That is the result.

But can the musician by his art make men unmusical?

Certainly not.

Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen?

Impossible.

**d** And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can the good by virtue make them bad?

Assuredly not.

Any more than heat can produce cold?

It cannot.

Or drought moisture?

Clearly not.

Nor can the good harm any one?

Impossible.

And the just is the good?

Certainly.

Then to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man, but of the opposite, who is the unjust?

I think [*dokeo*: cf 334b as seeming] that what you say is quite true, Socrates.

**e** Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and that good is the debt which a man owes to his friends, and [*noeo*: to perceive, notice] evil the debt which he owes to his enemies, --to say this is not wise [*sophos*: cf 331e as inspired]; for it is not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just.

I agree [*sugchoreo*: to give place, concede] with you, said Polemarchus.

Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against any one who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other wise man or seer [*makarios*: blessed, happy]?

I am quite ready to do battle at your side, he said.

**336** Shall I tell you whose I believe the saying [*rhema*: word, subject of speech] to be?

Whose?

I believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban, or some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power, was the first to say that justice is 'doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies.'

Most true, he said.

Yes, I said; but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what other can be offered?

Several times in the course of the discussion [*dialogizomai*: to take full account of] Thrasymachus had

**b** made an attempt to get the argument into his own hands [*antilambano*: to receive instead of & logos], and had been put down by the rest of the company, who wanted to hear the end. But when Polemarchus and I had done speaking and there was a pause, he could no longer hold his peace [*hesuchia*: stillness, rest]; and, gathering himself up [*suntrepho*: to feed together, be organized], he came at us like a wild beast [*therion*], seeking to devour us.

We were quite panic-stricken [*diaptoeo*] at the sight of him. He roared out to the whole company [*eis to meson*: literally, into the midst]: What folly [*phluaria*]. Socrates, has taken possession of you all? And why, sillybillies [*euethizo*: to be simple-minded], do you knock under to [*hupokataklineo*: to lay down under]

**c** one another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should not only ask but answer, and you should not seek honor [*philotimeomai*: to be jealous] to yourself from the refutation [*elecho*] of an opponent, but have your own answer; for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now I will not have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or

**d** interest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me; I must have clearness and accuracy [*saphos & akribos*, adverbs].

I was panic-stricken [*explesso*] at his words, and could not look at him without trembling. Indeed I believe [*dokeo*: cf 335d as think] that if I had not fixed my eye upon him, I should have been struck dumb: but when I

saw his fury rising [*exagriaino: to become savage*], I looked at him first, and was therefore able to reply to him: Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don't be hard [*chalepos: cf 333c as bad*] upon us. Polemarchus and I may have been guilty of a little mistake [*examartano: cf 334d for diarmtano, to be ignorant*] in the argument, but I can assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking [*zeteo: to inquire*] for a piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were 'knocking under to one another,' and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when we are seeking for justice, a thing [*pragma: cf 333e as actions*] more precious than many pieces of gold, do you say that we are weakly [*anoetos: without understanding*] yielding to one another and not doing our utmost [*spoudazo: to be eager*] to get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious to do so, but **337** the fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us.

How characteristic of Socrates!, he replied, with a bitter laugh [*anakagchazo: to burst out laughing*]; --that's your ironical style [*eironeia: assumed ignorance & etho: to be accustomed*]! Did I not foresee --have I not already told you, that whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony [*eirroneuomai*] or any other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answering?

You are a philosopher [*sophos: cf 335e as wise*], Thrasymachus, I replied, and well know that if you ask a person what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit him whom you ask from answering **b** twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, 'for this sort of nonsense will not do [*phluareo: cf 336b for folly, phluaria*] for me,' --then obviously, that is your way of putting the question [*punthanomai: cf 328 as inquire*], no one can answer you. But suppose that he were to retort, 'Thrasymachus, what do you mean? If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right one? --is that your meaning?'

**c** How would you answer him?

Just as if the two cases were at all alike! he said.

Why should they not be? I replied; and even if they are not, but only appear [*phaino: cf 335d for I like that better*] to be so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he thinks, whether you and I forbid him or not?

I presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers?

I dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection I approve of any of them.

**d** But what if I give you an answer about justice other and better, he said, than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to [*peitho: cf 331 as believed*] you?

Done to me! --as becomes the ignorant [*me eidote*], I must learn [*manthano: cf 334c*] from the wise--that is what I deserve to have done to me.

What, and no payment! a pleasant notion!

I will pay when I have the money, I replied.

But you have, Socrates, said Glaucon: and you, Thrasymachus, need be under no anxiety about money, for we will all make a contribution [*eisphero: to bring in*] for Socrates.

Yes, he replied, and then Socrates will do as he always does [*to eiothos: that which is customary*] --refuse **e** to answer himself, but take and pull to pieces [*elegcho: to reproach, cross examine*] the answer of some one else.

Why, my good friend, I said, how can any one answer who knows, and says that he knows, just nothing; and who, even if he has some faint notions of his own, is told by a man of authority not to utter **338** them? The natural thing is, that the speaker should be some one like yourself who professes to know and can tell what he knows. Will you then kindly answer [*phthoneo: to bear ill-will*], for the edification of the company and of myself?

Glaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request and Thrasymachus, as any one might see, was in reality eager [*epithumeo: to long after*] to speak; for he thought that he had an excellent [*pagkalos: literally, all beautiful*] answer, and would distinguish himself [*eudokimazo: to be of good repute*]. But at first he to insist on my answering; at length he consented to begin. Behold, he said, the wisdom [*sophia*] **b** of Socrates; he refuses to teach [*didasko*] himself, and goes about learning [*manthano cf 337d*] of others, to whom he never even says thank you.

That I learn of [*para*] others, I replied, is quite true; but that I am ungrateful I wholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in praise, which is all I have: and how ready [*prothumos, adverb: zealously*] I am to praise any one who appears to me to speak well you will very soon find out when you answer; for I expect that you will answer well.



c Listen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not me? But of course you won't.

Let me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the interest [*sumphero: to be expedient*] of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, is stronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right and just for us?

d That's abominable [*bdeluros: disgusting*] of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense which is most damaging [*kalourgeo: to do evil*] to the argument [*logos*].

Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I wish that you would be a little clearer [*saphes*].

Well, he said, have you never heard that forms of government differ; there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?

Yes, I know.

And the government is the ruling power [*to archon*] in each state?

Certainly.

And the different forms of government make laws [*nomos: custom*] democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses

e [*paranomeo*] them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all states [*polis: city-state*] there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the 339 government [*arche: beginning, with sumphero: cf 338*]; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable [*logizomai: to reckon*] conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger.

Now I understand [*manthano: cf 338c as learning*] you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will try to discover [*manthano*]. But let me remark, that in defining justice you have yourself used the word 'interest' which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words 'of the stronger' [*kreitton: comparative of kratus, better*] are added.

b A small addition, you must allow, he said.

Great or small, never mind about that: we must first inquire [*skeptomai: cf 333d as consider*] whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed [*homologeio: to speak the same language with*] that justice is interest [*prostithemi: to put to*] of some sort, but you go on to say 'of the stronger'; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further.

Proceed.

I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just or subjects to obey their rulers?

I do.

c But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible [*anamartetos: without sinning*], or are they sometimes liable to err [*hamartano: cf 334d for diarmatano as ignorant; to go quite astray*]?

To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err.

Then in making their laws [*epicheireo: to put one's hand on, with nomos as in 338d*] they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?

True.

When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest [*sumphero: cf 339a*]; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest [*asumphoros*]; you admit that?

Yes.

And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects, --and that is what you call justice?

Doubtless.

d Then justice, according to your argument [*logos*], is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger but the reverse?

What is that you are saying? he asked. I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest [*to beltiston: the best; superlative of agathos*] in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted [*homologeio: cf 339 bas agreed*]?

Yes.

e Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest [*asumphoros: cf 339c*] of the

stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury [*kakos: cf 332a as evil*]. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?

**340** Nothing can be clearer [*saphos: cf 337d for clearness, adverb*], Socrates, said Polemarchus.

Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his witness [*marturos*].

But there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice.

Yes, Polemarchus, --Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just.

**b** Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions [*themenos: titithemi: to set, place*], he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger.

But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest, --this was what the weaker had to do; and this was affirmed by him to be justice.

Those were not his words, rejoined Polemarchus.

Never mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept his statement. Tell me,

**c** Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?

Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken [*examartano: cf hamartano, 339c as err*] the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?

Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible [*anamartetos: cf 339c*] but might be sometimes mistaken.

**d** You argue like an informer [*sukophantes: false accuser, slanderer*], Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their **e** skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should

**341** say that the ruler, in so far as he is the ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest [*to beltiston: cf 339c*]; and the subject is required to execute his commands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger.

Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an informer?

Certainly, he replied.

And you suppose that I ask these questions with any design [*epiboule: a plot*] of injuring you in the argument?

**b** Nay, he replied, 'suppose' is not the word --I know it; but you will be found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail [*biazo to overpower*]:

I shall not make the attempt [*epicheireo: cf 339c as making*], my dear man [*makarios: cf 335e as seer*]; but to avoid any misunderstanding occurring between us in future, let me ask, in what sense do you speak [*diorizo: to draw a boundary*] of a ruler or stronger whose interest, as you were saying, he being the superior, it is just that the inferior should execute --is he a ruler in the popular or in the strict sense of the term?

In the strictest of all senses [*akribestatos: from akribes, accurate*], he said. And now cheat and play the informer if you can; I ask no quarter at your hands [*pariemi: to let drop beside, disregard*]. But you never will be able, never.

**c** And do you imagine, I said, that I am such a madman as to try and cheat, Thrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion.

Why, he said, you made the attempt a minute ago, and you failed.

Enough, I said, of these civilities [*aden, adverb: to one's fill*]. It will be better that I should ask you a question: Is the physician, taken in that strict sense of which you are speaking, a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And remember that I am now speaking of the true physician [*ton iatron onta*].

A healer of the sick, he replied.

And the pilot --that is to say, the true [*orthos, adverb: truly*] pilot --is he a captain of sailors or a mere sailor?  
A captain of sailors.

**d** The circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into account [*to hupologisteon*]; neither is he to be called a sailor; the name pilot by which he is distinguished has nothing to do with sailing, but is significant of his skill [*techne: cf 332c as is given by*] and of his authority [*arche: cf 339a as government*] over the sailors. Very true, he said.

Now, I said, every art [*techne*] has an interest?

Certainly.

For which the art has to consider and provide [*zeteo: cf 336e as seeking & ekporizo: to furnish*]?

Yes, that is the aim of art.

And the interest of any art is the perfection [*teleios, adjective*] of it --this and nothing else?

**e** What do you mean?

I mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body. Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficing or has wants [*exarkeo & prosdeomai*], I should reply: Certainly the body has wants; for the body may be ill and require to be cured, and has therefore interests to which the art of medicine ministers; and this is the origin and intention [*paraskeuako: to prepare, provide*] of medicine, as you will acknowledge.

Am I not right?

**342** Quite right, he replied.

But is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient [*poneros: cf 334d as immoral*] in any quality [*arete: cf 335c as virtue*] in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight or the ear fail of hearing, and therefore requires another art to provide for the interests of seeing and hearing --has art in itself, I say, any similar liability to fault or defect, and does every art require another supplementary art to provide for its interests, and that another and another without end [*aperantos: boundless, infinite*]?

**b** Or have the arts to look only after their own interests [*sumphero: cf 339c*] Or have they no need either of themselves or of another? --having no faults or defects [*poneria & hamartia*], they have no need to correct [*zeteo: cf 341d as provide*] them, either by the exercise of their own art or of any other; they have only to consider the interest of their subject-matter. For every art remains pure and faultless [*ablabes: without harm & akeraios: unmixed, pure*] while remaining true --that is to say, while perfect and unimpaired. Take the words in your precise sense [*skopeco: cf 330e as look after & to akribei logo*], and tell me whether I am not right. Yes, clearly [*phaino: cf 337c as appear*].

**c** Then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the interest of the body?

True, he said.

Nor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art of horsemanship, but the interests of the horse; neither do any other arts care for [*prosdeco: to need besides*] themselves, for they have no needs; they care only for that which is the subject of their art?

True [*phaino*], he said.

But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of their own subjects?

To this he assented [*sunehoreo: to make room for another with*] with a good deal of reluctance.

**d** Then, I said, no science [*episteme: acquaintance with*] or art considers or enjoins [*skopeco: cf c as proper sense & epitasso: to put on as a duty*] the interest of the stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker.

He made an attempt [*epicheireo: to put one's hand to*] to contest [*machomai: to fight*] this proposition also, but finally acquiesced [*sunhomologeo: to say the same thing with*].

Then, I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient; for the true physician is also a ruler having the human body as a subject, and is not a mere money-maker; that has been admitted [*homologeo: to speak together*]?

Yes.

And the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term [*akribes: cf 342b as strictest of all senses, akribestatos*] is a ruler of sailors and not a mere sailor?

**e** That has been admitted.

And such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the interest of the sailor who is under him, and not for his own or the ruler's interest?

He gave a reluctant 'Yes.'

Then, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far as he is a ruler, considers or enjoins

what is for his own interest, but always what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his art [*demourgeo: to practice a trade, to fabricate*]; to that he looks [*blepo*], and that alone he considers in everything which he says and does.

**343** When we had got to this point in the argument, and every one saw that the definition of justice had been completely upset [*touantios, with eis & perieisteko*], Thrasymachus, instead of replying to me, said: Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse [*tithe*]?

Why do you ask such a question, I said, when you ought rather to be answering?

Because she leaves you to snivel, and never wipes your nose: she has not even taught you to know [*gignosko*] the shepherd from the sheep.

What makes you say that? I replied.

**b** Because you fancy [*oiomai: to suppose*] that the shepherd or cowherd fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view [*blepo: cf 342e*] to their own good [*to agathon: cf 330d as blessing*] and not to the good of himself or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of states, if they are true rulers, never think [*dianoemai: to be minded, intent*] of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying [*skopeo: cf 342 d as enjoins*] their own advantage day and night. Oh, no; and so entirely

**c** astray [*porro, adverb: far off*] are you in your ideas about the just and unjust as not even to know [*agnoeo: cf 331e as reverse of clear*] that justice and the just are in reality [*to onti*] another's good; that is to say, the interest [*sumphero: cf 342b*] of the ruler and stronger, and the loss [*blabe: hurt, damage*] of the subject and servant; and injustice the opposite; for the unjust is lord over the truly simple [*euethikos: good-natured*] and just: he is the stronger, and his subjects do what is for his interest, and

**d** minister to his happiness [*eudaimoneo: to be prosperous, have a good daimon*], which is very far from being their own. Consider [*skopeo: cf b*] further, most foolish [*euethikos: cf c*] Socrates, that the just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust. First of all, in private contracts: wherever the unjust is the partner [*koinono: to make common*] of the just you will find that, when the partnership is dissolved, the unjust man has always more and the just less. Secondly, in their dealings with the State [*polis: cf 338e*]: when there is an income tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same

**e** amount of income; and when there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and the other much. Observe also what happens when they take an office; there is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, and getting nothing out of the public, because he is just; moreover he is hated by his friends and acquaintances [*oikeios: of the house & gnorimos: familiar*] for refusing to

**344** serve [*hupereteo: to do service on board ship*] them in unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man. I am speaking, as before, of injustice on a large scale in which the advantage of the unjust is more apparent; and my meaning will be most clearly seen if we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the criminal is the happiest of men [*eudaimoneo: cf c*], and the sufferers or those who refuse to do injustice are the most miserable [*athlios: struggling*] --that is to say tyranny [*turannis*], which by fraud and force takes away the property of others, not little by little but

**b** wholesale; comprehending in one, things sacred as well as profane, private and public; for which acts of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating any one of them singly, he would be punished and incur great disgrace [*oneidos: reproach*]--they who do such wrong in particular cases are called robbers of temples, and man-stealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man besides taking

**c** away the money of the citizens has made slaves of them, then, instead of these names of reproach [*aischros: causing shame*], he is termed happy and blessed [*eudaimoneo: cf a & makarios: cf 341b as dear*], not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of injustice. For mankind censure injustice, fearing that they may be the victims [*pascho: to suffer*] of it and not because they shrink from committing it. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery [*despotikos*] than justice; and, as I said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest [*Iusiteleo: to pay what is due & sumphero: cf c*].

**d** Thrasymachus, when he had thus spoken, having, like a bathman, deluged our ears with his words, had a mind to go away. But the company would not let him; they insisted that he should remain and defend his position [*parecho: to furnish, supply*]; and I myself added my own humble request that he would not leave us. Thrasymachus, I said to him, excellent man [*daimon*], how suggestive are your remarks! And are you going to run away before you have fairly taught or learned [*didasko: cf 338b & mathano*] whether they are true or not?

Is the attempt to determine [*diorizocf 341b as*

**e** *speak*] the way of man's life [*diagoge*] so small a matter in your eyes --to determine how life may be passed

[*diago: to continue*] by each one of us to the greatest advantage [*lusiteleo: cf c as interest*]?

And do I differ from you, he said, as to the importance of the enquiry?

You appear rather, I replied, to have no care or thought about us, Thrasymachus --whether we live better [*beltion; cf 341a for interest, to beltiston (superlative)*]: or worse from not knowing [*agnoeo: cf 343c*] what you say you know [*phrontizo: to consider, reflect*], is to you a matter of indifference. But, **345** friend, do not keep your knowledge to yourself [*prothumos: cf 338c as ready & endeiknumi: to mark, point out*]; we are a large party; and any benefit which you confer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my own part I openly declare that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe [*peitho: cf 337d as to have done*] injustice to be more gainful [*kerdaleos: crafty, cunning*] than justice, even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play [*diakoluo: to hinder, prevent*]. For, granting that there may be an unjust man who is able to commit injustice either by fraud or force [*lanthano: to escape notice & b diamachomai: cf 342d for machomai as to contest*], still this does not convince [*peitho*] me of the superior advantage of injustice, and there may be others who are in the same predicament with myself. Perhaps we may be wrong; if so, you in your wisdom should convince us that we are mistaken in preferring justice to injustice.

And how am I to convince you [*peitho*], he said, if you are not already convinced by what I have just said; what more can I do for you? Would you have me put the proof [*logos: cf 339d as argument*] bodily into your souls [*psuche, singular: cf 330d*]?

Heaven forbid! I said; I would only ask you to be consistent [*emmeno: to abide in a place*]; or, if you change [*metatithemi: cf 334e as correct*], change openly and let there be no deception. For I must **c** remark, Thrasymachus, if you will recall [*episkeptomai: to pass in review*] what was previously said, that although you began by defining [*horizo*] the true physician in an exact sense [*alethos, adverb: truly*], you did not observe a like exactness [*akribos, adverb: cf 336d as accuracy & phulasso: to guard*] when speaking of the shepherd; you thought that the shepherd as a shepherd tends the sheep not with a view to their own good [*blepo: cf 343b & beltiston: cf 341a*], but like a mere diner or banqueter with a view to the pleasures of the table; or, again, as a trader for sale in the market, and

**d** not as a shepherd. Yet surely the art of the shepherd is concerned [*melo: to be an object of care*] only with the good of his subjects; he has only to provide the best for them, since the perfection of the art is already ensured whenever all the requirements of it are satisfied. And that was what I was **e** saying just now about the ruler. I conceived that the art of the ruler, considered as ruler, whether in a state or in private life [*politikos & idiotikos*], could only regard the good of his flock or subjects; whereas you seem to think that the rulers in states, that is to say, the true rulers [*archo*], like being in authority [*archo*].

Think! Nay, I am sure of it.

Then why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them willingly without payment, unless **346** under the idea that they govern for the advantage not of themselves but of others? Let me ask you a question: Are not the several arts [*techne: cf 341d*] different, by reason of their each having a separate function [*dunamis: power, strength*]? And, my dear illustrious friend [*makarios: cf 344c as blessed*], do say what you think, that we may make a little progress [*peraino: to finish*].

Yes, that is the difference, he replied.

And each art gives us a particular [*idios*] good and not merely a general one [*koinos: common*]--medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea, and so on?

Yes, he said.

**b** And the art of payment has the special function of giving pay: but we do not confuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the pilot is to be confused with the art of medicine, because the health of the pilot may be improved by a sea voyage. You would not be inclined to say, would you, that navigation is the art of medicine, at least if we are to adopt your exact use of language [*akribos, adverb: cf 345c as exactness & diorizo: cf 341b as speak*]?

Certainly not.

Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not say that the art of payment is medicine?

I should say not.

Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man takes fees when he is engaged in healing?

**c** Certainly not.

And we have admitted [*homologeio: cf 342d*], I said, that the good of each art is specially confined [*ophelia:*

help, aid] to the art?

Yes.

Then, if there be any good [*ophelia*] which all artists [*demiourgos: cf 342e for demiourgeo: to practice a trade, to fabricate*] have in common, that is to be attributed to something of which they all have the common use?

True, he replied.

And when the artist is benefitted by receiving pay the advantage is gained by an additional use of the art of pay, which is not the art professed by him?

He gave a reluctant assent to this.

**d** Then the pay [*lepsis: taking hold, with misthos, reward*] is not derived by the several artists from their respective arts. But the truth is [*skopeo: cf 343d as consider*], that while the art of medicine gives health, and the art of the builder builds a house, another art attends [*hepo: to be busy with*] them which is the art of pay. The various arts may be doing their own business and benefitting that over which they preside, but would the artist receive any benefit from his art [*techne: cf 346a*] unless he were paid as well?

I suppose [*phaino: cf 342c as true*] not.

**e** But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing [proix: gift, dowery]?

Certainly, he confers a benefit.

Then now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts nor governments [*arche: cf 341d as authority*] provide for their own interests; but, as we were before saying, they rule and provide for the interests [*paraskeuazo: to prepare, procure*] of their subjects who are the weaker and not the stronger --to their good they attend [*sumphero: cf 345c as interest*] and not to the good of the superior. And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus, why, as I was just now saying, no one is willing to govern [*archo: to make a beginning, lead the way*]; because no one likes to take in hand [*metaxeirizo: to administer*] the reformation of evils which are not his concern without remuneration. For, in the

**347** execution of his work [*kalos, adverb: cf 335b as in truth*], and in giving his orders to another, the true artist does not regard his own interest [*beltiston: cf 345c as good*], but always that of his subjects; and therefore in order that rulers may be willing to rule, they must be paid in one of three modes of payment: money, or honor, or a penalty for refusing.

What do you mean, Socrates? said Glaucon. The first two modes of payment are intelligible enough, but what the penalty is I do not understand, or how a penalty can be a payment.

You mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment which to the best men is the great

**b** inducement to rule? Of course you know that ambition and avarice are held to be, as indeed they are, a disgrace [*oneidos: cf 344b*]?

Very true.

And for this reason, I said, money and honor [*time*] have no attraction for them; good men do not wish to be openly [*phaneros*] demanding payment for governing and so to get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not being ambitious they do not care about honor. Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them, and

**c** they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment. And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office, instead of waiting to be compelled, has been deemed dishonorable. Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive [*phaino: cf 346d as suppose*], induces the good to take office, not because they would, but because they cannot help --not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit

[*agathos, with epi: cf 332a as good*] or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and

**d** because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to any one who is better than themselves, or indeed as good. For there is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to obtain office is at present; then we should have plain proof that the true [*alethinos*] ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest [*sumphero: cf 346e as attend*], but that of his subjects; and every one who knew this would choose rather to receive a benefit [*opheleo: to be of use; cf 346c for ophelia as good*] from another than to have the trouble of conferring one. So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is the interest

**e** of the stronger. This latter question need not be further discussed [*sugchoreo: cf 335e as agree*] at present; but when Thrasymachus says that the life of the unjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement appears to me to be of a far more serious character. Which of us has spoken truly? And which sort of life [*alethesteros, adverb: more truly*], Glaucon, do you prefer?

I for my part deem the life of the just to be the more advantageous, he answered.

**348** Did you hear all the advantages of the unjust which Thrasymachus was rehearsing?

Yes, I heard him, he replied, but he has not convinced [*peitho: cf 345b*] me.

Then shall we try to find some way of convincing him, if we can, that he is saying what is not true?

Most certainly, he replied.

If, I said, he makes a set speech [*logos: cf 345b as proof*] and we make another recounting all the advantages [*agathos: cf 347c as benefit*] of being just, and he answers and we rejoin, there must be a **b** numbering and measuring [*arithmeo & metreo*] of the goods which are claimed on either side, and in the end we shall want judges to decide [*dikastes & diakrino*]; but if we proceed in our enquiry [*anomologeomai: to agree upon*] as we lately did, by making admissions [*skopeo: cf 346d as truth is*] to one another, we shall unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons.

Very good, he said.

And which method do I understand you to prefer? I said.

**c** That which you propose.

Well, then, Thrasymachus, I said, suppose you begin at the beginning and answer me. You say that perfect [*teleos*] injustice is more gainful [*lusiteleo: cf 344e as advantage*] than perfect justice?

Yes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons.

And what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue [*arete: cf 342a as quality*] and the other vice [*kakia: evil*]?

Certainly.

I suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice?

What a charming notion! So likely too, seeing that I affirm injustice to be profitable and justice not.

What else then would you say?

The opposite, he replied.

And would you call justice vice?

**d** No, I would rather say sublime simplicity [*kakoetheia: bad disposition*].

Then would you call injustice malignity?

No; I would rather say discretion [*euboulia: good counsel, prudence*].

And do the unjust appear [*phronimos: in one's right mind*] to you to be wise and good?

Yes, he said; at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly unjust, and who have the power of subduing states and nations; but perhaps you imagine [*oiomai: cf 343b as fancy*] me to be talking of pickpockets. Even this profession if undetected has advantages, though they are not to be compared with those of which I was just now speaking.

**e** I do not think that I misapprehend [*agnoeo: cf 344e as not knowing*] your meaning, Thrasymachus, I replied; but still I cannot hear without amazement that you class [*tithemi: to place*] injustice with [*en, in*] wisdom [*sophia: 338a*] and virtue, and justice with the opposite.

Certainly I do so class them.

Now, I said, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable ground; for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had been admitted by you as by others to be vice and deformity [*kakia: cf c as evil & aschros: disgraceful*], an answer might have been given to you on received principles [*nomizo: to hold as custom; cf 339c for nomos as laws*]; but now I perceive [*delos: clear, manifest*] that you will call injustice honorable and strong [*kalos: cf 334d as better & ischuros*], and to the

**349** unjust you will attribute [*prostithemi cf 339b as interest*] all the qualities which were attributed by us before to the just, seeing that you do not hesitate to rank injustice with wisdom and virtue [*sophia: cf e & arete with en: cf c*].

You have guessed most infallibly [*alethos: cf 345c as exact sense*], he replied.

Then I certainly ought not to shrink from [*apokneo*] going through with the argument [*logos: cf 348a as speech*] so long as I have reason [*skopeo: cf 348b as making admission*] to think [*hupolambano: to seize, reply*] that you, Thrasymachus, are speaking your real mind [*dianoemai: cf 332b as meant*]; for I do believe that you are now in earnest [*aletheia, with peri: truth*] and are not amusing yourself at our expense [*dokeo: cf 336d a believe*].

I may be in earnest or not, but what is that [*diaphero: to carry over, make a difference*] to you? --to refute [*elegcho: cf 337e as pull to pieces*] the argument is your business.

**b** Very true, I said; that is what I have to do: But will you be so good as answer yet one more question? Does

the just man try to gain any advantage over the just?

Far otherwise; if he did would not be the simple, amusing [*asteios: polite & euethes: good-hearted*] creature which he is.

And would he try to go beyond just action?

He would not.

And how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage [*pleonekteo: to be greedy*] over the unjust; would that be considered by him as just or unjust?

He would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage; but he would not be able.

**c** Whether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. My question is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust? Yes, he would.

And what of the unjust --does he claim to have more than the just man and to do more than is just.

Of course, he said, for he claims to have more than all men.

And the unjust man will strive and struggle [*pleonekteo: cf b & hamillaomai: to compete, contend*] to obtain more than the unjust man or action, in order that he may have more than all?

True.

We may put the matter thus, I said --the just does not desire more than his like but more than his **d** unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than both his like and his unlike [*homoios & anomoios*]?

Nothing, he said, can be better than that statement.

And the unjust is good and wise [*phronimos: cf 348d as appear*], and the just is neither?

Good again, he said.

And is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them?

Of course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are of a certain nature; he who is not, not.

Each of them, I said, is such as his like is?

Certainly, he replied.

Very good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts: you would admit that one **e** man is a musician and another not a musician?

Yes.

And which is wise and which is foolish [*phronimos: cf d & aphronos*]?

Clearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish.

And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is foolish?

Yes.

And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?

Yes.

And do you think, my excellent friend [*aristos: best, noblest*], that a musician when he adjusts the lyre would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the tightening and loosening the strings?

I do not think that he would.

But he would claim to exceed the non-musician?

Of course.

**350** And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and drinks would he wish to go beyond [*pleonkteo: cf 349c as strive*] another physician or beyond the practice of medicine?

He would not.

But he would wish to go beyond the non-physician?

Yes.

And about knowledge and ignorance [*episteme: cf 342d as science & anepistamai*] in general; see whether you think [*dokeo: cf 349a as at our expense*] that any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or do the same as his like in the same case?

That, I suppose, can hardly be denied.

**b** And what of the ignorant? Would he not desire to have more than either the knowing or the ignorant?

I dare say.

And the knowing is wise?

Yes.

And the wise is good?



True.

Then the wise and good will not desire to gain [*pleonekteo: cf 350a as go beyond*] more than his like, but more than his unlike and opposite?

I suppose so.

Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both?

Yes [*phaino: cf 347c as conceive*].

But did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his like and unlike? Were not these your words? They were.

They were.

c And you also said that the just will not go beyond his like but his unlike?

Yes.

Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and ignorant [*amathes*]?

That is the inference [*kinduneo: cf 334a as suspect*].

And each of them is such as his like is?

That was admitted.

Then the just has turned out to be wise and good and the unjust evil and ignorant.

Thrasymachus made all these admissions [*homologeō: cf 346c as admitted*], not fluently, as I repeat d them, but with extreme reluctance [*helko: to draw*]; it was a hot summer's day, and the perspiration poured from him in torrents; and then I saw what I had never seen before, Thrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed [*diomologeō*] that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance [*amathia: cf c for amathes, ignorant*], I proceeded to another point:

Well, I said, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but were we not also saying that injustice had strength [*ischuros: cf 348e as strong*]; do you remember?

Yes, I remember, he said, but do not suppose that I approve [*aresko: to make good, satisfy*] of what you are saying or have no answer; if however I were to answer, you would be quite certain to accuse

e me of haranguing [*demegoreō: to speak in the assembly*]; therefore either permit me to have my say out, or if you would rather ask, do so, and I will answer 'Very good,' as they say to story-telling [*muthos: myth*] old women, and will nod 'Yes' and 'No.'

Certainly not, I said, if contrary to your real opinion [*doxa: notion, glory*].

Yes, he said, I will, to please you, since you will not let me speak.

What else would you have?

Nothing in the world, I said; and if you are so disposed I will ask and you shall answer.

Proceed.

Then I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order that our examination [*logos: cf 349a 351 as argument*] of the relative nature of justice and injustice may be carried on [*diaskopeō: to consider well*] regularly [*hexes: in order*]. A statement was made that injustice is stronger and more powerful than justice, but now justice, having been identified with wisdom and virtue, is easily shown [*phaino: cf 350b as yes*] to be stronger than injustice, if injustice is ignorance [*amathia: cf 350d*]; this can no longer be questioned [*agnoeo: cf 348e as misapprehend*] by any one. But I want [*epithumeō: cf 338a as eager*] to view [*skopeō: cf 349a as have reason*] the matter, Thrasymachus, in a different way: You would not

b deny that a state [*polis: cf 343d*] may be unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave other states, or may have already enslaved them, and may be holding many of them in subjection?

True, he replied; and I will add the best and perfectly [*aristos: cf 359e as excellent (friend) & teleios: cf 342d as perfection*] unjust state will be most likely to do so.

I know [*manthano: cf 339a as discover*], I said, that such was your position [*logos: cf 350a as examination*]; but what I would further consider [*skopeō: cf a as view*] is, whether this power [*dunamis: cf 346a as function*] which is possessed by the superior state can exist or be exercised without justice.

c If you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, then only with justice; but if I am right, then without justice.

I am delighted, Thrasymachus, to see you not only nodding assent and dissent, but making answers which are quite excellent [*kalos, adverb: cf 347a as work*].

That is out of civility to you, he replied.

You are very kind, I said; and would you have the goodness also to inform me, whether you think that a state, or an army, or a band of robbers and thieves, or any other gang of evil-doers could act at all if they injured

one another?

**d** No indeed, he said, they could not.

But if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act together better?

Yes.

And this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting, and justice imparts harmony and friendship [*homonoia & philia*]; is not that true, Thrasymachus?

I agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel [*diaphero: cf 349a as what is that*] with you.

How good of you [*aristos: cf 351b as perfectly*], I said; but I should like to know also whether injustice, having this tendency to arouse hatred, wherever existing, among slaves or among freemen, will not make them hate one another and set them at variance [*stasiazo: to rebel, quarrel*] and render

**e** them incapable of common action?

Certainly.  
And even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel and fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just

They will.

And suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say that she loses or that she retains her natural power?

Let us assume that she retains her power.

Yet is [*phaino: cf 351a as shown*] not the power [*dunamis: cf b*] which injustice exercises of such a nature that wherever she takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an army, in a family, or in any

**352** other body, that body is, to begin with, rendered incapable of united action by reason of sedition and distraction; and does it not become its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes it, and with the just?

Is not this the case?

Yes, certainly.

And is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single person; in the first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity [*homoneo: to be of one mind*] with himself, and in the second place making him an enemy to himself and the just? Is not that true, Thrasymachus?

Yes.

And O my friend, I said, surely the gods are just?

Granted that they are.

**b** But if so, the unjust will be the enemy [*echthros*] of the gods, and the just will be their friend [*philos: cf 332a*]?

Feast away in triumph [*euocheo: to entertain sumptuously*], and take your fill of the argument [*logos: cf 351b as position*]; I will not oppose you, lest I should displease the company.

Well then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the remainder of my repast [*hestiasis: banquet*]. For we have already shown [*phaino: cf 351e as is*] that the just are clearly wiser and better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of common action [*met' allelon*]; for

**c** when we speak of men who are evil acting at any time vigorously together [*koinos: cf 346a as general one*], is not strictly true, for if they had been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one another; but it is evident that there must have been some remnant of justice in them, which enabled them to combine; if there had not been they would have injured one another as well as their victims; they were but half --villains in their enterprises; for had they been [*hormao: to urge, set in motion*] whole villains, and utterly unjust, they would have been utterly incapable of action. That, as I believe, is

**d** the truth of the matter, and not what you said at first. But whether the just have a better and happier [*eudaimoneo: cf 344c as blessed*] life than the unjust is a further question which we also proposed to consider [*skeptomai: cf 339b as inquire*]. I think [*phaino: cf b as shown*] that they have, and for the reasons which I have given; but still I should like to examine [*skeptomai*] further, for no light matter is at stake, nothing less than the rule of human life [*peri tou hontina tropon(-s): cf 329e as disposition*].

Proceed.

I will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a horse has some end [*ergos: cf 333e as result*]?

**e** I should.

And the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well [*aristos: cf 351d as good*] accomplished, by any other thing?

I do not understand [*manthano: cf 351c as know*], he said.

Let me explain: Can you see, except with the eye?

Certainly not.

Or hear, except with the ear?

No.

These then may be truly said to be the ends [*ergos: cf 332e as result*] of these organs?

They may.

**353** But you can cut off a vine-branch with a dagger or with a chisel, and in many other ways?

Of course.

And yet not so well as with a pruning-hook made for the purpose?

True.

May we not say that this is the end of a pruning-hook?

We may.

Then now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding [*manthano: cf 352e as understand*] my meaning when I asked the question [*punthanomai: cf 337b*] whether the end of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well [*kallistos, superlative of kalos*] accomplished [*apergazomai: to finish off, complete*] by any other thing?

**b** I understand your meaning, he said, and assent [*pragma: cf 336e as thing & ergos: 352e as ends*].

And that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence [*arete: cf 349a as virtue*]? Need I ask again whether the eye has an end [*cf b*]?

It has.

And has not the eye an excellence?

Yes.

And the ear has an end and an excellence also?

True.

And the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end and a special excellence?

That is so.

Well, and can the eyes fulfil their end [*kalos, adverb: cf 351c as excellent*] if they are wanting in their own proper excellence [*arete: cf b & oikeios cf 343e as acquaintances*] and have a defect [*kakia: cf 348e as deformity*] instead?

How can they, he said, if they are blind and cannot see?

You mean to say, if they have lost their proper excellence, which is sight; but I have not arrived at that point [*ero: to speak, tell*] yet. I would rather ask the question more generally, and only enquire whether the things which fulfil their ends fulfil them by their own proper [*oikeios: cf c*] excellence, and fall of fulfilling them by their own defect [*kakia & kakos, adverb*]?

Certainly, he replied.

I might say the same of the ears; when deprived of their own proper excellence they cannot fulfil their end [*apergazomai: cf a as accomplished & ergos*]?

True.

**d** And the same observation [*logos: cf 352b as argument*] will apply to all other things?

I agree [*dokeo: cf 350a as think*].

Well; and has not the soul [*psuche: cf 345b*] an end which nothing else can fulfil? for example, to superintend and command and deliberate [*epimeleomai: to have charge of & archo: cf 345e as being in authority & bouleuo: to wish*] and the like. Are not these functions proper [*dikaios, adverb: rightly*] to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to any other?

To no other.

And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?

Assuredly, he said.

And has not the soul an excellence [*arete: cf c*] also?

Yes.

**e** And can she or can she not fulfil [*apergazomai: cf c*] her own ends when deprived [*stereo*] of that excellence? She cannot.

Then an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent [*archo: cf d as command & epimeleomai: cf d as superintend*], and the good soul a good ruler [*eu prattein: to do well*]?

Yes, necessarily.

And we have admitted [*sunchoreo: to make room together*] that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice the defect [*kakia: cf c*] of the soul?

That has been admitted.

Then the just soul and the just man will live well [*eu*], and the unjust man will live ill [*kakos, adverb: cf c as defect*]?

That is what your argument [*logos: cf d as observation*] proves [*phaino: cf 352d as think*].

**354** And he who lives well is blessed and happy [*makarios: cf 346a as friend & eudaimos: cf 343d for happiness or eudaimoneo: to be prosperous*], and he who lives ill the reverse of happy?

Certainly.

Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?

So be it.

But happiness [*eudaimoneo: cf a*] and not misery [*athlios: cf 344a as miserable*] is profitable [*lusiteleo: cf 348c as gainful*].

Of course.

Then, my blessed [*makarios: cf a as happy*] Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable than justice. Let this, Socrates, he said, be your entertainment [*hestiazō: cf 352b for repast as hestiasis*] at the Bendidea.

For which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle [*praos: soft*] towards me

**b** and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been well entertained; but that was my own fault and not yours. As an epicure snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table, he not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so have I gone from one subject to another without having discovered [*heurisko: to find*] what I sought [*skopeo: cf 351b as consider*] at first, the nature of justice. I left that enquiry and turned away to consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly; and when there arose [*hormao: cf 352c as had been*] a further question [*to skepsasthai: cf skeptomai: cf 352d as examine*] about the comparative advantages of justice and injustice [*amathos: cf 351a for amathia as ignorance*], I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result

**c** of the whole discussion [*dialogos*] has been that I know [*eido: to see*] nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy [*eudaimos: cf 354a*] or unhappy.

## Book Two

**357** With these words I was thinking that I had made an end of the discussion; but the end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning [*prooimion: introduction*]. For Glaucon, who is always the most pugnacious of men [*andreios: stubborn*], was dissatisfied at Thrasymachus' retirement [*aporresis: prohibition, giving up a point*]; he wanted to have the battle out. So he said to me: Socrates, do you

**b** wish really to persuade [*peitho: cf. 348a as convinced*] us, or only to seem to have persuaded us, that to be just is always better than to be unjust?

I should wish really to persuade [*haireo: to take, grasp*] you, I replied, if I could.

Then you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now: --How would you arrange goods --are there not some which we welcome for their own sakes, and independently of their consequences, as, for example, harmless pleasures and enjoyments [*to chairein (chairō: to rejoice) & hedone: cf. 328d as charm*], which delight us at the time, although nothing follows from them [*meden eis ton epeita chronon (time)*]?

I agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied.

**c** Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge [*phroneo: to think, have understanding*], sight, health, which are desirable [*agapao: to love*] not only in themselves, but also for their results?

Certainly, I said.

And would you not recognize [*horao: cf. 327b as catch sight of*] a third class, such as gymnastic, and the care of the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of money-making --these do us good [*opheleo: cf. 347d as receive a benefit*] but we regard them as disagreeable; and no one would choose

**d** them (no "e" section under 357) for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some reward [*misthos: cf. 346d as pay*] or result which flows from them?

There is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask?

Because I want to know in which of the three classes you would place justice?

**358** In the highest [*kallistos: superlative of kalos: cf. 353a as well*], class, I replied, --among those goods which

he who would be happy [*makarios: cf. 354a*] desires [*agapao: cf. c*] both for their own sake and for the sake of their results.

Then the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be reckoned in the troublesome class [*epiponos: toilsome & eidos: form, shape*], among goods which are to be pursued [*epitedeuo: to pursue, practice*] for the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable and rather to be avoided.

I know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking [*dokeo: cf. 353d as agree*], and that this was the thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he censured justice and praised injustice. But I am too stupid [*dusmathes: hard to learn*] to be convinced by him.

**b** I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then I shall see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me [*phaino: cf. 353e as proves*] like a snake, to have been charmed [*keleo: to bewitch*] by your voice sooner than he ought to have been; but to my mind [*noos, with kata: perception*] the nature [*apodeixis: exposition, setting forth*] of justice and injustice have not yet been made clear. Setting aside their rewards and results, I want [*epithumeo: cf. 351b as want*] to know what they are in themselves [*kath' auto, with dunamis: cf. 351e as power*], and how they inwardly [*enon*] work **c** in the soul [*psuche: cf. 353d*]. If you, please, then, I will revive the argument [*logos: cf. 353e*] of Thrasymachus. And first I will speak of the nature and origin of justice according to the common view of them. Secondly, I will show that all men who practice [*epitedeuo: cf. a as pursued*] justice do so against their will, of necessity [*anagkaios*], but not as a good [*agathos: cf. 348a as advantages*]. And thirdly, I will argue that there is reason [*eikotos, adverb: in all likelihood*] in this view, for the life of the unjust is after all better far than the life of the just --if what they say is true, Socrates, since I myself am not of their opinion [*dokeo: cf. a as thinking*]. But still I acknowledge that I am perplexed [*aporeo: to be at a loss*] when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others dinning [*diathruleo: to be commonly reported, talked deaf*] in my ears; and, on the other hand, I have never yet heard the

**d** superiority of justice to injustice maintained by any one in a satisfactory way. I want to hear justice praised [*egkomiazō*] in respect of itself [*kath' auto: cf. b*]; then I shall be satisfied, and you are the person from whom I think that I am most likely to hear this; and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the utmost of my power, and my manner of speaking will indicate [*endeiknumi: cf. 345a*] the manner [*tropos: cf. 329e as disposition*] in which I desire to hear you too praising justice and censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of my proposal?

Indeed I do; nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense [*noos: cf. b as mind*] would oftener wish to converse.

**e** I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by speaking, as I proposed, of the nature and origin [*ti on kai hothen*] of justice.

They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, evil; but that the evil is greater [*hyperballo: to outstrip*] than the good. And so when men have both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of [*geuo: to taste*] both, not being able to avoid the one and obtain the

**359** other, they think that they had better agree [*suntithemi: to put together*] among themselves to have [*lusiteleo: cf. 356a as profitable*] neither; hence there arise laws and mutual covenants; and that which is ordained by law [*nomos, with hupo: cf. 348e as principles*] is termed by them lawful and just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature [*genesis & ousia: cf. 330d as wealth*] of justice; --it is a mean or compromise [*metaxu, preposition: between*], between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle point [*en meso*] between the two, is tolerated [*agapao: cf. 358a as desires*] not

**b** as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honored by reason of the inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a man would ever submit to such an agreement [*suntithemi: cf. a as had better agree*] if he were able to resist; he would be mad [*mainomai: cf. 329d*] if he did. Such is the received account [*logos: cf. c as argument*], Socrates, of the nature and origin of justice.

Now that those who practice [*epitedeuo: cf. 358c*] justice do so involuntarily [*adunamia*] and because they have not the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine [*aisthanomai: to apprehend by*

**c** *the senses*] something of this kind: having given both to the just and the unjust power [*exousia: authority*] to do what they will, let us watch and see [*theoreo: cf. 327a as viewed*] whither desire [*epithumia: cf. 329c as passions*] will lead [*epakoloutheo: to follow close upon*] them; then we shall discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be proceeding along the same road [*eis tauton ionta*], following their interest [*pleonexia:*

*greediness*], which all natures deem [*dioko: to chase, pursue*] to be their good, and are only diverted into the path of justice [*time: cf. 357b*] by the force of law [*nomos: cf. a*]. The liberty [*exousia: cf. b as power*] which we are supposing may be most completely given to them **d** in the form of such a power [*dunamis: cf. 358b*] as is said to have been possessed by Gyges the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more than [*kata*] human, and having nothing on but a gold ring; **e** this he took from the finger of the dead and re-ascended. Now the shepherds met together, according to custom [*eiothotos*], that they might send their monthly report about the flocks to the king; into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the setting of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible [*aphanos*] to the

**360** rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present. He was astonished [*thaumazo*] at this, and again touching the ring he turned the setting outwards and reappeared [*phaneros: cf. 347b as openly*]; he made several trials of the ring, and always with the same result—when he turned the setting inwards he became invisible, when outwards he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court; where as

**b** soon as he arrived he seduced the queen, and with her help conspired against the king and slew him, and took the kingdom [*arche: cf. 346e as governments*]. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature [*adamas: untamed, unconquerable*] that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or

**c** go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a god [*isotheos*] among men. Then the actions [*prasso, verb*] of the just would be as [*diaphoros, adjective: different*] the actions of the unjust; they would both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof [*tekmerion*] that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks [*oiomai: cf. 348d as imagine*] that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe **d** in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable [*lusiteleio*] to the individual than justice [*dikaiousune: cf. 335c*], and he who argues as I have been supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine any one obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, he would be thought [*doxazo: to imagine, suppose*] by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another's faces, and keep up appearances [*exapatao: to deceive thoroughly*] with one another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice. Enough of this.

**e** Now, if we are to form a real judgment [*krisis*] of the life of the just and unjust, we must isolate [*diistemi: to separate*] them; there is no other way; and how is the isolation [*diastasis*] to be effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely unjust, and the just man entirely just; nothing is to be taken away from either of them, and both are to be perfectly [*teleos, adjective: cf. 348c as perfect*] furnished for the work [*epitedeuma: business, pursuit*] of their respective lives. First, let the unjust be like other distinguished masters of craft [*demiourgos*]; like the skillful pilot or physician, who knows [*diaisthanomai: to perceive distinctly; cf. aisthanomai in 359b as imagine*] intuitively his own powers [*ta 361 adunta & ta dunata with respect to techne: cf. 346d as art*], and keeps within their limits [*epicheireo: to attempt, set to work at*], and who, if he fails at any point, is able to recover himself [*epanorthoo: to correct oneself*]. So let the unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he means to be great in his injustice (he who is found out is nobody): for the highest reach of injustice is to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say that in the perfectly [*teleos, adverb*] unjust man we must assume the most perfect [*teleios: cf. 341d as perfection*] injustice; there is to be no **b** deduction [*aphairetos: to be taken away*], but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have acquired the greatest reputation [*doxa: cf. 351b as opinion*] for justice. If he have taken a false step he must be able to recover himself [*epanorthoo: cf. a*]; he must be one who can speak with effect [*pros ti to peithein or peitho: cf. 357b as persuade*], if any of his deeds come to light [*menuo: to disclose*], and who can force his way where force is required his courage and strength, and command of money [*ousia: cf. 359a as nature*] and friends. And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity [*haploos & gennaios: noble by birth*], wishing, as Aeschylus says, to be and not to seem

**c** good. There must be no seeming [*to dokein or dokeo: cf. 358c as opinion*], for if he seems to be just he will

be honored and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of honors and rewards; therefore, let him be clothed in justice only, and have no other covering; and he must be imagined in a state of life [*dikeimai: to be in a certain state*] the opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, and let him be thought the worst; then he will have been put to the proof; and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear of infamy and its consequences.

**d** And let him continue thus [*ametastatos: unchangeable*] to the hour of death; being just and seeming to be unjust. When both have reached the uttermost extreme, the one of justice and the other of injustice, let judgment be given which of them is the happier [*eudaimoneo: cf. 356a as happiness*] of the two.

Heavens! my dear Glaucon, I said, how energetically you polish them up for the decision [*krisis: cf. 360e as judgement*], first one and then the other, as if they were two statues.

I do my best, he said. And now that we know what they are like there is no difficulty in tracing out **e** [*epexerchomai: to go out against*] the sort of life which awaits [*epimeno: to continue as they are*] either of them. This I will proceed to describe; but as you may think the description a little too coarse, I ask you to suppose, Socrates, that the words which follow are not mine. --Let me put them into the mouths **362** of the eulogists of injustice: They will tell you that the just man who is thought [*diakeimai: cf. c as imagined in a state of life*] unjust will be scourged, racked, bound --will have his eyes burnt out; and, at last, after suffering every kind of evil, he will be impaled: then he will understand [*gignosko: cf. 343a as know*] that he ought to seem [*dokeo: cf. 361c as seeming*] only, and not to be, just; the words of Aeschylus may be more truly spoken of the [*kata*] unjust than of the just. For the unjust is pursuing a reality [*to onti*]; he does not live with a view to appearances [*doxa, with pros: cf. 361b as reputation*]-he wants to be really unjust and not to seem only:--

His mind has a soil deep and fertile,

**b** Out of which spring his prudent counsels.

In the first place, he is thought [*dokeo: cf. a as seem*] just, and therefore bears rule in the city; he can marry whom he will, and give in marriage to whom he will; also he can trade and deal where he likes, and always to his own advantage [*kerdaino: to gain, profit*], because he has no misgivings [*duscheraino: to be unable to endure, displeased*] about injustice and at every contest, whether in public or private, he **c** gets the better of his antagonists, and gains at their expense, and is rich, and out of his gains he can benefit his friends, and harm his enemies; moreover, he can offer sacrifices, and dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly and magnificently, and can honor the gods or any man whom he wants to honor in a far better style than the just, and therefore he is likely to be dearer [*theophiles*] than they are to the gods. And thus, Socrates, gods and men are said to unite in making the life of the unjust better [*paraskeuazo: cf. 346e as provide for their interests*] than the life of the just.

**d** I was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when Adeimantus, his brother, interposed: Socrates, he said, you do not suppose that there is nothing more to be urged [*logos, with peri: cf. 359b as account*]?

Why, what else is there? I answered.

The strongest point of all has not been even mentioned, he replied.

Well, then, according to the proverb, 'Let brother help brother' --if he fails in any part do you assist him; although I must confess that Glaucon has already said quite enough to lay me in the dust [*katapalaio: to throw in wrestling*], and take from me the power [*adunatos: lacking power*] of helping justice.

**e** Nonsense, he replied. But let me add something more: There is another side to Glaucon's argument [*logos: cf. d*] about the praise and censure of justice and injustice, which is equally required in order to bring out what I believe to be his meaning [*saphos: clear, plain*]. Parents and tutors are

**363** always telling their sons and their wards that they are to be just; but why? Not for the sake of justice, but for the sake of character and reputation [*eudokimeseis*]; in the hope of obtaining for him who is reputed just some of those offices, marriages, and the like which Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing to the unjust from the reputation of justice. More, however, is made of appearances by this class of persons than by the others; for they throw in the good opinion [*eudokimeseis: cf. a as reputation*] of the gods, and will tell you of a shower of benefits which the heavens, as they say, rain upon the pious; and this accords with the testimony of the noble Hesiod

**b** and Homer, the first of whom says, that the gods make the oaks of the just--

To hear acorns at their summit, and bees in the middle;

and the sheep the bowed down bowed the with the their fleeces.

And many other blessings of a like kind are provided for them. And Homer has a very similar strain; for he speaks of one whose fame is--

As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god, Maintains justice to whom the black earth  
c brings forth wheat and barley, whose trees are bowed with fruit, And his sheep never fail to bear, and the sea gives him fish.

Still grander are the gifts of heaven which Musaeus and his son vouchsafe to the just; they take them down into the world below [*Haidēs*], where they have the saints [*hosios*] lying on couches at a feast, everlastingly drunk, crowned with garlands; their idea seems to be that an immortality [*aionion: lasting d for an age*] of drunkenness is the highest meed of virtue [*kallistos: cf. 358a & misthos: cf. 357d as reward & arete: cf. 353d as excellence*]. Some extend [*apoteino: to stretch out*] their rewards [*para theon: from the gods*] yet further; the posterity, as they say, of the faithful [*hosios: cf. c for saints*] and just shall survive to the third and fourth generation. This is the style in which they praise [*egkomiāzo: cf. 358d*] justice. But about the wicked [*anosios: lacking hosios*] there is another strain; they bury them in a slough in Hades, and make them carry water in a sieve; also while they are yet living they bring  
e them to infamy [*eis kakas doxas (opinion)*], and inflict upon them the punishments which Glaucon described as the portion of the just who are reputed [*doxazo: cf. 360d as thought*] to be unjust; nothing else does their invention supply. Such is their manner of praising the one and censuring [*psogos: blemish, flaw*] the other. Once more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider [*skeptomai cf. 356b as question*] another way of speaking about justice and injustice, which is not confined to the poets, but is found in prose writers. **364** The universal voice of mankind is always declaring [*humneo: to sing, celebrate*] that justice and virtue [*sophrosune: moderation, discretion*] are honorable [*kalos: cf. 349e as strong*], but grievous and toilsome [*chalepos: cf. 366e as hard & epiponos: cf. 358a as troublesome*]; and that the pleasures [*hedu*] of vice and injustice are easy of attainment, and are only censured by law and opinion [*nomos: cf. 359c & doxa: cf. 362a as appearances*]. They say also that honesty is for the most part less profitable [*Iusiteleo: cf. 360c*] than dishonesty; and they are quite ready to call wicked men happy [*eudaimonizo*], and to honor them both in public and private when they are rich or in any other way influential, while they despise and overlook [*atimazo & huperorao*] those who may be weak and poor, even though

b acknowledging [*homologeō: cf. 350c as made admissions*] them to better than the others. But most extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking about virtue [*arete: cf. d*] and the gods: they say that the gods apportion [*nemo*] calamity and misery to many good men, and good and happiness [*enantia: the opposite & moira: portion, part*] to the wicked. And mendicant prophets [*mantis: one who divines*] go to rich men's doors and persuade them that they have a power committed to them by the gods of making an atonement for a man's own or his ancestor's sins by sacrifices or charms, with rejoicings and c feasts; and they promise to harm an enemy, whether just or unjust, at a small cost; with magic arts and incantations binding heaven, as they say, to execute their will. And the poets are the authorities to whom they appeal, now smoothing the path of vice with the words of Hesiod; --

d Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; the way is smooth and her dwelling-place is near. But before virtue the gods have set toil and a tedious and uphill road: then citing Homer as a witness that the gods may be influenced [*paragoge: a leading by, misleading*] by men; for he also says:

The gods, too, may be turned from their purpose; and men pray to them and avert their wrath by  
e sacrifices and soothing entreaties, and by libations and the odor of fat, when they have sinned and transgressed.

And they produce a host of books written by Musaeus and Orpheus, who were children of the Moon and the Muses --that is what they say --according to which they perform their ritual [*egkoneo: to be quick and active*], and persuade [*peitho: cf. 361c as to speak with effect*] not only individuals, but

**365** whole cities, that expiations and atonements for sin may be made by sacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour, and are equally at the service of the living and the dead; the latter sort they call mysteries [*telete: initiation into the mysteries*], and they redeem [*apoluo: to loosen from*] us from the pains of hell [*kakos: cf. 353e as ill*], but if we neglect [*thusanaoo: to offer sacrifice*] them no one knows what awaits us. He proceeded: And now when the young hear all this said about virtue and vice, and the way in which gods and men regard [*oiomai: cf. 360c as think*] them, how are their minds [*psuche: cf. 358c as soul*] likely to be affected, my dear Socrates, --those of them, I mean, who are quick-witted, and, like bees on the wing, light on every flower, and from all that they hear are prone to draw conclusions [*epipetomai: to fly towards & sullogizomai: to collect or conclude from premises*] as to what manner of persons they should be and in what way they should walk if they would make the best of life

b [*aristos: cf. 352e as well*]? Probably the youth will say to himself in the words of Pindar--Can I by justice or



by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my days? For what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought [*dokeo*: cf. 362b] just profit [*ophelos*] there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand are unmistakable. But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation [*doxa*: cf. 364a as opinion] of justice, a heavenly life [*thespesios*: divine, c ineffable] is promised to me. Since then, as philosophers [*sophos*: cf. 337a] prove [*deloo*: to make visible, manifest], appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness [*eudaimonia*], to appearance I must devote myself [*trepo*: to turn]. I will describe [*perigrapho*: to write around] around me a picture [*schema*: form, shape] and shadow [*skiagraphia*: a sketch; literally, shadow writing] of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my house; behind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus, greatest of sages, recommends. But I hear some one exclaiming that the concealment [*lanthano*: cf. 345a as fraud] of wickedness is often difficult; to which I answer, nothing great is easy [*eupetes*]. Nevertheless, d the argument indicates this, if we would be happy [*eudaimoneo*: cf. 361d], to be the path along which we should proceed. With a view to concealment we will establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs. And there are professors of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force [*peitho*: cf. 364e & biazō], I shall make unlawful gains [*pleonekteo*: cf. 350b] and not be punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived, neither can they be compelled. But what if there are no gods? or, suppose them to have no care [*melo*: cf. 345d as concerned] of human things --why in either case should we mind [*melo*] about concealment? e And even if there are gods, and they do care [*epimeleomai*: to have charge of] about us, yet we know of them only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets; and these are the very persons who say that they may be influenced and turned by 'sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by offerings.' Let us be consistent then, and believe [*peitho*: cf. d] both or neither. If the poets speak truly, why then we had 366 better be unjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice; for if we are just, although we may escape the vengeance of heaven, we shall lose the gains of injustice; but, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, and by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods will be propitiated, and we shall not be punished. 'But there is a world below [*Haidēs*: cf. 363c] in which either we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust deeds.' Yes, my friend, will be the reflection [*logizomai*: cf. 339a as reasonable] but there are mysteries and atoning [*telete*: cf. 365a & *lusios*: releasing] deities, and these have great power.

b That is what mighty cities declare; and the children of the gods, who were their poets and prophets, bear a like testimony [*menuo*: cf. 361b as come to light].

On what principle [*logos*: cf. 362e as argument], then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than the worst injustice? When, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard to appearances [*euschemosune*: gracefulness, decorum], we shall fare [*prasso*: cf. 360c as actions] to our mind both with gods and men, in life and after death, as the most numerous and the highest authorities [*logos*] tell us. Knowing all c this, Socrates, how can a man who has any superiority of mind [*dunamis*: cf. 359d as power & *huparcho*: to begin, possible & *psuche*: cf. 365a] or person or rank or wealth, be willing to honor justice; or indeed to refrain from laughing when he hears justice praised? And even if there should be some one who is able to disprove [*pseudos*: false] the truth of my words, and who is satisfied that justice is best [*aristos*: cf. 365b], still he is not angry with the unjust, but is very ready to forgive [*suggnome*: pardon] them, because he also knows that men are not just of their own free will [*ouk orgizo*: not angry]; unless, peradventure, there be some one whom the divinity within him [*theios*: cf. 331e as inspired & *phusis*: nature] may have inspired with a hatred of injustice, or who has attained knowledge [*episteme*: cf. 350a] d of the truth--but no other man. He only blames injustice who, owing to cowardice or age or some weakness, has not the power [*dunamis*: cf. c] of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when he obtains the power, he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be. The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning of the argument [*logos*: cf. b as authorities & *hormao*: cf. 356b as arose], when my brother and I told you how astonished we were to e find that of all the professing panegyrists [*epaineo*: to praise] of justice --beginning with the ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us, and ending with the men of our own time --no one has ever blamed injustice or praised justice except with a view to the glories, honors, and benefits which flow from them. No one has ever adequately described [*exerchomai*: to go out & *logos*: cf. d as argument] either in verse or prose the true essential nature of either of them abiding in the soul [*psuche*: cf. c], and invisible to any human or divine eye; or shown that of all the things of a man's soul which he has within him, justice is the greatest good, and injustice the greatest evil. Had this been 367 the universal strain [*ex arches*: cf. 360b as kingdom], had you sought to persuade [*peitho*: cf. 365e as

*believe*] us of this from our youth upwards, we should not have been on the watch [*phulasso*: cf. 345c as observe] to keep one another from doing wrong, but every one would have been his own watchman, because afraid, if he did wrong, of harboring [*pulax*: *guard (from phulasso) & sunoikos*: *dwelling in the same house*] in himself the greatest of evils.

I dare say that Thrasymachus and others would seriously hold the language which I have been merely repeating, and words even stronger than these about justice and injustice, grossly [*phortikos*, *adverb*: *coarsely*], as I conceive [*dokeo*: cf. 365b as thought], perverting [*metastrepho*: *to turn about*] their true nature [*dunamis*: cf. 366d as power]. But I speak in this vehement manner, as I must frankly confess to **b** you, because I want [*epithumeo*: cf. 358b] to hear from you the opposite side; and I would ask you to show not only the superiority [*kreitton*: *comparative of agathos*] which justice has over injustice, but what effect they have on [*dia*] the possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil to him. And please, as Glaucon requested of you, to exclude reputations [*doxa*: cf. 365b]; for **c** unless you take away from each of them his true reputation and add on the false [*to dokein (dokeo)*], we shall say that you do not praise justice, but the appearance of it; we shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep injustice dark [*lanthano*: cf. 365c as concealment], and that you really agree with [*homologeo*: cf. 365b as acknowledging] Thrasymachus in thinking that justice is another's good and the interest of the stronger, and that injustice is a man's own profit and interest [*sumpheros*: *from sumphero, to agree with (cf. 347d) & lusiteleo*: cf. 364a as profitable], though injurious [*asumpheros*] to the weaker. Now as you have admitted [*homologeo*: cf. c] that justice is one of that highest class of goods [*agathos*: cf. 358c] which are desired indeed for their results [*ktaomai*: *to possess & apobaino*: *to*

**d go out**], but in a far greater degree for their own sakes --like sight or hearing or knowledge or health, or any other real and natural and not merely conventional good [*doxa*: cf. b as reputations]--I would ask you in your praise of justice to regard one point only: I mean the essential good [*oninesis*: *delight*] and evil which justice and injustice work [*blapto*: cf. 334d as harm] in the possessors of them. Let others praise [*egkomiazō*: cf. 363d] justice and censure [*loidoreo*: *to rebuke*] injustice, magnifying the rewards and honors of the one and abusing the other; that is a manner of arguing which, coming from them, I am ready to tolerate, but **e** from you who have spent your whole life in the consideration [*skopeo*: cf. 356d as sought] of this question, unless I hear the contrary from your own lips, I expect something better. And therefore, I say, not only prove [*endeiknumi*: cf. 358d as indicate] to us that justice is better than injustice, but show what they either of them do to the possessor of them, which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil, whether seen or unseen [*lanthano*: cf. b as dark] by gods and men.

I had always admired the genius [*phusis*: cf. 366c] of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on hearing these **368** words I was quite delighted, and said: sons of an illustrious father, that was not a bad beginning of the Elegiac verses which the admirer of Glaucon made in honor of you after you had distinguished yourselves at the battle of Megara:--

'Sons of Ariston,' he sang, 'divine offspring of an illustrious hero.'

The epithet is very appropriate [*eu & dokeo*: cf. 367c], for there is something truly divine in being able to argue [*pascho*: cf. 344c as may be the victims (to suffer)] as you have done for the superiority of

**b** injustice, and remaining unconvinced [*peitho*: cf. 367a as persuade] by your own arguments. And I do believe that you are not convinced --this I infer from [*tekmairomai*: *to fix by a mark, enjoin*] your general character [*tropos*: cf. 358d as manner], for had I judged only from your speeches [*logos*: cf. 366e] I should have mistrusted you. But now, the greater my confidence in you, the greater is my difficulty [*aporeo*: cf. 358c as perplexed] in knowing what to say. For I am in a strait between two; on the one hand I feel that I am unequal [*adunatos*: cf. 362d] to the task; and my inability is brought home to me by the fact that you were not satisfied with the answer which I made to Thrasymachus, proving [*apodeiknumi*: *to point out*], as I thought, the superiority which justice has over injustice. And yet I

**c** cannot refuse to help, while breath and speech remain to me; I am afraid that there would be an impiety [*oud' hosion (hosios)*: cf. 363d] in being present [*paragignomai*: *to come to one's side*] when justice is evil spoken of [*kakegoreo*: *to abuse, slander*] and not lifting up a hand [*apagoreuo*: *to forbid, fail*] in her defense. And therefore I had best give such help [*epikoreo*: *to act as an ally*] as I can.

Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question drop, but to proceed in the investigation [*logos*: cf. b as speeches]. They wanted to arrive at [*diereunao*: *to search through, examine closely*] the truth, first, about the nature of justice and injustice, and secondly, about their relative advantages. I told them, what I --really thought, that the enquiry [*zetema*] would be of a serious nature, **d** and would require

[*phaino: cf. 358b as seems*] very good eyes [*oxu blepontos: seeing sharply*]. Seeing then, I said, that we are no great wits, I think that we had better adopt a method which I may illustrate thus; suppose that a short-sighted person had been asked by some one to read small letters from a distance; and it occurred to some one else that they might be found in another place which was larger and in which the letters were larger --if they were the same and he could read the larger letters first, and then proceed to the lesser --this would have been thought a rare piece of good fortune [*hermaion: god-send, wind-fall*].

**e** Very true, said Adeimantus; but how does the illustration apply to our enquiry [*to dikaion: concerning justice*]?

I will tell you, I replied; justice, which is the subject of our enquiry, is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and sometimes as the virtue of a state [*polis: 351b*].

True, he replied.

And is not a state larger than an individual?

It is.

Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more easily discernible

**369** [*katamanthano: to observe well*]. I propose therefore that we enquire into [*episkeptomai: cf. 345c as recall*] the nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in the state, and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing them.

That, he said, is an excellent [*kalos, adverb: cf. 353b as end*] proposal.

And if we imagine [*theomai: cf. 328a as see*] the state in process of creation, we shall see the justice and injustice of the state in process of creation also.

I dare say.

When the state is completed there may be a hope that the object of our search will be more easily discovered [*eupetes: cf. 365c as easy*].

**b** Yes, far more easily.

But ought we to attempt to construct one? I said; for to do so, as I am inclined to think, will be a very serious task. Reflect [*skeptomai: cf. 363e as consider*] therefore.

I have reflected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you should proceed.

A state, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is self-sufficing [*autarkes: independent*], but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin [*arche: cf. 360b as kingdom*] of a state be imagined [*oikizo: to found as a colony or new settlement*]?

There can I be no other.

**c** Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply [*paralambano: to undertake*] them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation [*sunoikia*] the body of inhabitants is termed a state.

True, he said.

And they exchange [*metadidomai: to give a share*] with one another, and one gives, and another receives, under the idea that the exchange [*metalambano: to get possession of*] will be for their good.

Very true.

Then, I said, let us begin [*arche, with ex: cf. b as origin*] and create in idea [*logos: cf. 368c as investigation*] a state; and yet the true creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention.

Of course, he replied.

**d** Now the first and greatest of necessities is [*paraskeue: preparation*] food, which is the condition of life and existence.

Certainly.

The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like.

True.

And now let us see how our city will be able to supply [*paraskeue: cf. d*] this great demand: we may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, some one else a weaver --shall we add [*prostithemi: cf. 349a as attribute*] to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some other purveyor to our bodily wants?

Quite right.

The barest notion [*anagkaios: constraining, necessary*] of a state must include four or five men.

**e** Clearly [*phaino: cf. 368d as require*].

And how will they proceed? Will each bring [*katatithemi: to put, propose*] the result of his labors into a common stock? --the individual husbandman, for example, producing for four, and laboring four times as long

and as much as he need in the provision of food with which he supplies others as well as himself; or will he have nothing to do with others and not be at the trouble of producing for **370** them, but provide for himself alone a fourth of the food in a fourth of the time, and in the remaining three-fourths of his time be employed in making a house or a coat or a pair of shoes, having no partnership with [*koinoneo*] others, but supplying himself all his own wants?

Adeimantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at producing everything.

Probably, I replied, that would be the better way; and when I hear [*ennoeo: to think, consider*] you **b** say this, I am myself reminded that we are not all alike; there are diversities of natures [*phusis: cf. 367e as genius*] among us which are adapted to different occupations.

Very true.

And will you have a work better [*kalos: cf. 369a as excellent*] done when the workman has many occupations [*techne: cf. 360e*], or when he has only one?

When he has only one.

Further, there can be no doubt that a work is spoiled when not done at the right time [*kairos: event*]?

No doubt.

For business is not disposed to wait [*parameno: to stay near*] until the doer of the business is at leisure; **c** but the doer must follow up [*epakoloutheo: cf. 359c as will lead*] what he is doing, and make the business his first object.

He must.

And if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully and easily and of a better [*kalos: cf. b*] quality when one man does one thing which is natural [*phusis, with kata: cf. b*] to him and does it at the right time [*kairos: cf. b*], and leaves other things.

Undoubtedly.

Then more than four citizens will be required; for the husbandman will not make his own plough or **d** mattock, or other implements of agriculture, if they are to be good for anything. Neither will the builder make his tools --and he too needs many; and in like manner the weaver and shoemaker.

True.

Then carpenters, and smiths, and many other artisans, will be sharers [*koinonos: cf. 333b as partner*] in our little state, which is already beginning to grow?

True.

Yet even if we add cowherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen, in order that our husbandmen may **e** have oxen to plough with, and builders as well as husbandmen may have draught cattle, and couriers and weavers fleeces and hides, --still our state will not be very large.

That is true; yet neither will it be a very small state which contains all these.

Then, again, there is the situation of the city --to find a place [*katoikeo: to settle, colonize*] where nothing need be imported is well-nigh impossible.

Impossible.

Then there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required supply [*komizo: to carry, bear*] from another city?

There must.

**371** But if the trader goes empty-handed, having nothing which they require who would supply his need, he will come back empty-handed.

That is certain.

And therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for themselves, but such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate those from whom their wants are supplied.

Very true.

Then more husbandmen and more artisans will be required?

They will.

Not to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants?

Yes.

Then we shall want merchants?

We shall.

**b** And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skillful sailors will also be needed, and in considerable numbers?

Yes, in considerable numbers.

Then, again, within the city, how will they exchange their productions? To secure such an exchange was, as you will remember, one of our principal objects when we formed them into a society [*koinonia: cf. 333b as partnership*] and constituted [*oikizo: cf. 369b*] a state.

Clearly they will buy and sell.

Then they will need a market-place, and a money-token for purposes of exchange.

Certainly.

**c** Suppose now that a husbandman, or an artisan, brings some production to market, and he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with him, --is he to leave his calling and sit idle in the market-place?

Not at all; he will find people there who, seeing the want, undertake the office of salesmen [*diakonia: service*].

In well-ordered [*orthos, adverb: cf. 341c as true & oikizo: cf. b as constituted*] states they are commonly those who are the weakest in bodily strength, and therefore of little use for any other purpose; their duty is to be in the market, and to give money in exchange for goods to those who

**d** desire to sell and to take money from those who desire to buy. This want, then, creates a class of retail-traders in our state. Is not 'retailer' the term which is applied to those who sit in the market-place engaged in buying and selling, while those who wander from one city to another are called merchants?

Yes, he said.

**e** And there is another class of servants [*diakonos*], who are intellectually hardly on the level of companionship [*dianoia: thought, intention, purpose & axio + koinizo*]; still they have plenty of bodily strength for labor, which accordingly they sell, and are called, if I do not mistake, hirelings, hire being the name which is given to the price of their labor.

True.

Then hirelings will help to make up our population?

Yes.

And now, Adeimantus, is our state matured and perfected [*teleos: cf. 360e as perfectly*]?

I think so.

Where, then, is justice, and where is injustice, and in what part of the state did they spring up?

**372** Probably [*ennoeo: cf. 370a as hear*] in the dealings of these citizens with one another who cannot imagine that they are more likely to be found anywhere else.

I dare say that you are right [*kalos, adverb: cf. 369a as excellent*] in your suggestion, I said; we had better think the matter out [*skeptomai: cf. 369b as reflect*], and not shrink from the enquiry [*apokneo: to hesitate*].

Let us then consider [*skeptomai: cf. a as think the matter out*], first of all, what will be their way of life

[*diaitao*], now that we have thus established [*paraskeuazo: cf. 362c*] them. Will they not produce corn, and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and build houses for themselves? And when they are housed,

**b** they will work, in summer, commonly, stripped and barefoot, but in winter substantially clothed and shod.

They will feed on barley-meal and flour of wheat, baking and kneading them, making noble cakes and loaves; these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or on clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew or myrtle. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made,

wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the praises of the gods, in happy converse [*hedeos, adverb & suniemi: cf. 328d as keep company with*] with one another. And they will take care

**c** that their families do not exceed their means; having an eye to poverty or war.

But, said Glaucon, interposing, you have not given them a relish to their meal.

True, I replied, I had forgotten; of course they must have a relish-salt, and olives, and cheese, and they will boil roots and herbs such as country people prepare; for a dessert we shall give them figs, and peas, and beans; and they will roast myrtle-berries and acorns at the fire, drinking in moderation. And with

**d** such a diet they may be expected to live in peace [*eirene: cf. 329c as freedom*] and health to a good old age, and bequeath [*paradidomai: to hand over*] a similar life to their children after them.

Yes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for [*kataskeuazo: to prepare*] a city of pigs, how else would you feed the beasts?

But what would you have, Glaucon? I replied.

Why [*nomizo: cf. 349e as received principles*], he said, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life.

People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and dine off tables, and they

**e** should have sauces and sweets in the modern style [*nun: now*].

Yes, I said, now I understand [*manthano: cf. 353a as understanding*]: the question which you would have me

consider [*skeptomai*: cf. 372a] is, not only how a state, but how a luxurious [*truphao*: to live delicately] state is created; and possibly there is no harm [*kakos*, adverb: cf. 353e as ill] in this, for in such a state we shall be more likely to see [*kateidon*: kata & eido] how justice and injustice originate [*emphuo*: to implant, grow]. In my opinion [*dokeo*: cf. 368a as appropriate] the true and healthy constitution of the state is the one which I have described. But if you wish also to see [*theo*: cf. 359c] a state at fever heat

**373** [*plegmaino*: to be heated, inflamed], I have no objection [*apokoluo*: to hinder]. For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with the simpler way of life [*diaita*: cf. a for *diaitao*]. They will be for adding sofas, and tables, and other furniture; also dainties, and perfumes, and incense, and courtesans, and cakes, all these not of one sort only, but in every variety; we must go beyond the necessities of which I was at first speaking, such as houses, and clothes, and shoes: the arts of the painter and the embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and all sorts of materials must be procured.

**b** True, he said.

Then we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy [*hugieinos*: wholesome] state is no longer sufficient. Now will the city have to fill and swell [*ogkos*: bulk, size, mass; with *empestels*: to be filled] with a multitude of callings which are not required by any natural want [*ouketi tou anagkaios*]; such as the whole tribe of hunters and actors, of whom one large class have to do with forms and colors; another will be the votaries of music --poets and their attendant train of rhapsodists, players, dancers,

**c** contractors; also makers of divers kinds of articles, including women's dresses. And we shall want more servants [*diakonos*: cf. 371e]. Will not tutors be also in request, and nurses wet and dry, beauticians and barbers, as well as confectioners and cooks; and swineherds, too, who were not needed and therefore had no place [*eneimi*: to be in (a place)] in the former edition of our state, but are needed now? They must not be forgotten: and there will be animals of many other kinds, if people eat them.

Certainly.

**d** And living in this way [*diaitao*: cf. 372a as way of life] we shall have much greater need of physicians than before?

Much greater.

And the country which was enough to support [*trepho*: to nourish] the original inhabitants will be too small now, and not enough?

Quite true.

Then a slice of our neighbor's land will be wanted by us for pasture and tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity [*horos*: cf. 331d as definition & *anakaios*], and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation [*apeiros*: boundless & *ktesis*: possession] of wealth?

**e** That, Socrates, will be inevitable.

And so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not?

Most certainly, he replied.

Then without determining as yet whether war does [*ergazomai*: to work, labor] good or harm, thus much we may affirm, that now we have discovered [*heurisko*: cf. 356b] war to be derived from causes which are also the causes [*gignomai*: to come into being] of almost all the evils in states, private as well as public.

Undoubtedly.

And our state must once more enlarge; and this time the will be nothing short of a whole army,

**374** which will have to go out and fight with the invaders for all that we have, as well as for the things and persons whom we were describing above.

Why?, he said; are they not capable of defending themselves?

No, I said; not if we were right in the principle [*homologe*: cf. 367c as admitted & *kalos* (adverb): cf. 372e] which was acknowledged by all of us when we were framing the state: the principle, as you will remember, was that one man cannot practice [*ergazomai*: cf. e as does] many arts [*techne*: cf. 370b as occupations] with success [*kalos*, adverb: cf. a].

Very true, he said.

**b** But is not war an art [*technikos*, skillful]?

Certainly.

And an art requiring as much attention [*kedeuo*: to take charge of, attend to] as shoemaking?

Quite true.

And the shoemaker was not allowed [*diakoluo*: cf. 345a as to have free play] by us to be husbandman, or a weaver, a builder --in order that we might have our shoes well made; but to him and to every other worker

was assigned one work for which he was by nature fitted [*ergos: cf. 325e as ends, with kalos (adverb)*], and at that he was to continue working [*ergazomai: cf. a*] all his life long and at no other **c** [*schole: leisure, with ou pariemai: cf. 341b as ask no quarter at your hands*]; he was not to let opportunities [*kairos: cf. 370c as right time, with kalos (adverb)*] slip, and then he would become a good workman. Now nothing can be more important than that the work of a soldier should be well done [*apergazomai: cf. 353e as fulfil*]. But is war an art [*techne: cf. a*] so easily acquired [*ergazomai: cf. b*] that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other artisan; although no one in the world would be a good dice or checkers player who merely took up the game as a recreation, and had not from his earliest years devoted himself [*epitedeuo cf. 359b as practice*] to this and nothing else?

**d** No tools will make a man a skilled workman, or master of defense, nor be of any use to him who has not learned how to handle them, and has never bestowed any attention [*epistememon: any distinguishing mark*] upon them. How then will he who takes up a shield or other implement of war become a good fighter all in a day, whether with heavy-armed or any other kind of troops?

Yes, he said, the tools [*organon: organ, instrument*] which would teach men their own use would be beyond price [*axios: of like value, worth*].

And the higher the duties of the guardian [*phulax: a watcher*], I said, the more time [*schole: cf. c*], and **e** skill, and art [*techne: cf. c & epimeleia: care, attention*], and application will be needed by him?

No doubt, he replied.

Will he not also require natural aptitude [*phusis: cf. 370c & epitedeios: adapted for, useful*] for [*eis, into*] his calling [*epitedeuma: cf. 360e as work*]?

Certainly.

Then it will be our duty to select [*haireo: cf. 357b as persuade*], if we can, natures which are fitted for [*apodeilaton, adverb, used with ouk or not: one must flinch; from apodeiliao, to play the coward*] the task of guarding the city?

**375** It will.

And the selection will be no easy matter, I said; but we must be brave and do our best.

We must.

Is not the noble youth very like a well-bred dog in respect of guarding and watching?

What do you mean?

I mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and swift to overtake the enemy when they see him; and strong too if, when they have caught him, they have to fight with him.

All these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required by them.

Well, and your guardian must be brave [*andreios: cf. 357a as pugnacious*] if he is to fight well?

Certainly.

And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit [*thumoeides: courageous, restive*] whether horse or dog or any other animal? Have you never observed [*ennoeo: cf. 372a as probably*] how invincible and unconquerable is spirit [*thumos: soul, breath, life, heart*] and how the presence [*pareimi: to come forward, go*

**b beside**]: of it makes the soul [*psuche: cf. 366e*] of any creature to be absolutely fearless and indomitable?

I have.

Then now we have a clear notion [*delos: cf. 348e as perceive*] of the bodily qualities which are required in the guardian.

True.

And also of the mental ones [*ta tes psuches or psuche: cf. b*]; his soul is to be full of spirit [*thumoeides: cf. a*]?

Yes.

But are not these spirited natures apt to be savage with one another and with everybody else [*polites: citizen*]?

A difficulty by no means easy to overcome, he replied.

**c** Whereas, I said, they ought to be dangerous to their enemies, and gentle to their friends [*oikeios: cf. 353c as proper*]; if not, they will destroy themselves without waiting for their enemies to destroy them.

True, he said.

What is to be done then? I said; how shall we find a gentle nature which has also a great spirit [*praos: cf. 356a & megalothumos: cf. a for thumos*], for the one is the contradiction of the other?

True [*phaino: cf. 369e as clearly*].

He will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two qualities; and yet the combination of them appears to be impossible; and hence we must infer [*sumbaino: cf. 334d as*

d consequence] that to be a good guardian is impossible.

I am afraid that what you say is true, he replied.

Here feeling perplexed [*aporeo*: cf. 368b as difficulty] I began to think over [*episkopeo*: to look upon, regard] what had preceded. My friend, I said, no wonder that we are in a perplexity [*aporeo*]; for we have lost sight of the image [*eikon*] which we had before us.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean [*ennoeo*: cf. a as observed] to say that there do exist natures gifted with those opposite qualities.

And where do you find them?

Many animals, I replied, furnish examples of them; our friend the dog is a very good one: you know e that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars and acquaintances, and the reverse to strangers.

Yes, I know.

Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our finding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities?

Certainly not.

Would not he who is fitted to be a guardian, besides the spirited nature [*thumoeides*: cf. b], need to have the qualities of a philosopher?

I do not apprehend your meaning.

The trait of which I am speaking, I replied, may be also seen in the dog, and is remarkable in the animal.

376 What trait?

Why, a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance, he welcomes him, although the one has never done him any harm, nor the other any good. Did this never strike you as curious [*thaumazo*: cf. 360a as astonished]?

The matter never struck me [*prosecho*: to bring to & *noos*: cf. 358d as sense] before; but I quite recognize the truth of your remark.

And surely this instinct [*pathos*: any passive state, condition] of the dog is very charming [*komposos*: b refined, elegant]; --your dog is a true philosopher.

Why?

Why, because he distinguishes [*diakrino*: cf. 348b as decide] the face of a friend and of an enemy only by the criterion of knowing and not knowing [*katamanthano*: cf. 369a as discernable & *agnoeo*: cf. 351a as questioned].

And must not an animal be a lover of learning [*philomathes*] who determines [*horizo*: cf. 345c as defining] what he likes and dislikes by the test of knowledge and ignorance [*suniami*: cf. 372b as converse & *agnoia*]?

Most assuredly.

And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy?

They are the same, he replied.

And may we not say confidently of man [*en anthropon*] also, that he who is likely to be gentle [*praos*: cf. c 375c as great spirit] to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature [*phusis*: cf. 374e as natural aptitude] be a lover of wisdom and knowledge?

That we may safely affirm.

Then he who is to be a really good and noble [*kalos & agathos*: cf. 367c] guardian of the state will require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit [*thumoeides*: cf. 375e as spirited nature] and swiftness and strength? Undoubtedly.

Then we have found the desired natures [*huparcho*: cf. 366c as superiority of mind] and now that we have found them, how [*tropos*: cf. 368b as character] are they to be reared and educated [*paideuo*: to bring up a child]? Is not this enquiry [*skopeo*: cf. 367d as consideration] which may be expected to d throw light on the greater enquiry which is our final end [*kateidon*, with *pros*: cf. 372e as to see]--How do justice and injustice [*dikaioisune*: cf. 360d & *adikia*] grow up in states? For we do not want either to omit what is to the point [*hikanos*: worthy & *logos*: cf. 369c as idea] or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient length.

The brother of Glaucon thought that the enquiry would be of great service to us.

Then, I said, my dear friend, Adeimantus, the task must not be given up, even if somewhat long.

Certainly not.

Come then, and let us pass a leisure hour [*schole*: cf. 374d as time] in story-telling [*muthologeio*: to tell mythic tales], and our story shall be the education [*paideuo*: cf. c] of our heroes.

e By all means.



And what shall be their education [*paideia*]? Can we find a better than the traditional sort [*tes hupo tou pollou chronou*]? --and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body, and music for the soul [*psuche: cf. 375b as mental ones*].

True.

Shall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastic afterwards?

By all means.

And when you speak of music, do you include literature [*logos: cf. d as point*] or not?

I do.

And literature may be either true or false [*alethes & pseudos: cf. 366c as disprove*]?

Yes.

**377** And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the false?

I do not understand [*manthano: cf. 372e*] your meaning, he said.

You know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories [*muthos: cf. 350e as story-telling*] which, though not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; and these stories are told them when they are not of an age to learn gymnastics.

Very true.

That was my meaning when I said that we must teach [*hapto: to join, apprehend*] music before gymnastics.

Quite right, he said.

You know also that the beginning is the most important part of any work, especially in the case of a **b** young and tender thing; for that is the time at which the character [*tupos: form*] is being formed [*plasso*] and the desired impression is more readily taken [*ensemaino: to be indicated, expressed*].

Quite true.

And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds ideas for the most part the very opposite of those which we should wish them to have when they are grown up?

We cannot.

Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors **c** receive any tale of fiction [*muthos: cf. a as stories*] which is good, and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorised ones only. Let them fashion [*plasso: cf. b as formed*] the mind with such tales, even more fondly than they mold the body with their hands; but most of those which are now in use must be discarded.

Of what tales are you speaking? he said.

You may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I said; for they are necessarily of the same type **d** [*tupos: cf. b as character*], and there is the same spirit in both of them.

Very likely, he replied; but I do not as yet know [*ennoeo: cf. 375d as mean*] what you would term the greater.

Those, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of the poets, who have ever been the great story-tellers of mankind [*pseudos: cf. 376e as false & suntithemi: cf. 359b as agreement*].

But which stories do you mean, he said; and what fault [*memphomai*] do you find with them?

A fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and, what is more, a bad [*kalos, adverb: cf. 374a as with success*] lie.

But when is this fault committed?

**e** Whenever an erroneous representation is made [*eikazo: to represent by a likeness*] of the nature of [*peri*] gods and heroes, --as when a painter paints a portrait [*grapho: to write*] not having the shadow of a likeness to the original.

Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blamable; but what are the stories which you mean?

First of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies, in high places, which the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie too, --I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did, and how Cronus retaliated

**378** on him. The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and thoughtless persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery [*dia & aporetos: prohibited, not spoken*], and they should sacrifice not a common pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim; and then the number of the hearers will be very few indeed.

Why, yes, said he, those stories are extremely objectionable [*chalepos: cf. 364a as toilsome*].

**b** Yes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be repeated in our state; the young man should not be told that in

committing the worst of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous; and that even if he chastises his father when does wrong, in whatever manner [*tropos: cf. 376c as how*], he will only be following the example [*drao: to do, do something great*] of the first and greatest among the gods.

I entirely agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are quite unfit [*epitedeios: cf. 374e as aptitude*] to be repeated.

Neither, if we mean [*epibouleuo: to purpose, design*] our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrel among themselves as of all things the basest, should any word be said to them of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, for they are not true. No, we shall never mention the battles of the giants, or let them be embroidered on garments; and we shall be silent about the innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes with their friends and relatives. If they would only believe us we would tell them that quarrel is unholy [*hosios, with oute: cf. 368c as impiety*], and that never up to this time has there been any, quarrel between citizens; this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children; and when they grow up, the poets also should be told to compose for them in a similar spirit. But the narrative of Hephaestus binding Here his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods in Homer --these tales must not be admitted [*paradekteon: verbal adjective*] into our state, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning [*huponoia: a hidden thought, conjecture*] or not. For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal; anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to become indelible and unalterable; and therefore it is most important that the tales which the young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts [*kalos: cf. 376c as good & muthologeio: cf. 376d as story-telling, with arete (pros)*].

There you are right, he replied; but if any one asks where are such models to be found and of what tales [*muthos: cf. 377c as tale of fiction*] are you speaking --how shall we answer him?

I said to him, you and I, Adeimantus, at this moment are not poets, but founders of a state [*oikistes & 379 polis: cf. 368e*] now the founders of a state ought to know the general forms [*tupos: cf. 377d as type*] in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which must be observed [*epitrepton: verbal adjective, one must permit*] by them, but to make the tales is not their business.

Very true, he said; but what are these forms of theology [*theologia*] which you mean?

Something of this kind, I replied: --God is always to be represented as he truly is [*tugchano: to hit upon, obtain with hon & aei apodoteon: verbal adjective, one must refer*], whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric or tragic, in which the representation is given.

Right.

**b** And is he not truly good [*theos to onti*]? and must he not be represented [*lekteos: to be said or spoken*] as such?

Certainly.

And no good thing is hurtful [*blaberos: cf. 332a as injury*]?

No, indeed.

And that which is not hurtful hurts not?

Certainly not.

And that which hurts not does no evil [*kakos: cf. 372e as harm*]?

No.

And can that which does no evil be a cause [*aitios: blameworthy, responsible*] of evil?

Impossible.

And the good is advantageous [*eupragia: welfare, success*]?

Yes.

And therefore the cause of well-being?

Yes.

It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but of the good only?

**c** Assuredly.

Then God, if he be good [*agathos: cf. 376c as noble*], is not the author [*aitios: cf. b as cause*] of all things, as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him.

That appears [*dokeo: cf. 372e as opinion*] to me to be most true, he said.

Then we must not listen to [*apodekteon, verbal adjective: one must receive from others*] Homer or to  
d any other poet who is guilty of the folly [*hamartia: cf. 342b as defects*] of saying--

two casks lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of evil lots,  
and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two--  
Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good;  
but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill,  
Him wild hunger drives o'er the beauteous earth.

e And again: Zeus, who is the dispenser [*tamias: one who carves and distributes*] of good and evil to us.--

And if any one asserts that the violation [*sugchusis: confusion*] of oaths and treaties, which was really the work  
of Pandarus, was brought about by Athene and Zeus, or that the strife and contention of the gods was  
instigated by Themis and Zeus, he shall not have our approval [*epaineo: to commend*];

**380** neither will we allow our young men to hear the words of Aeschylus--  
that God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house.

And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe --the subject of the tragedy in which these iambic verses occur  
--or of the house of Pelops, or of the Trojan war or on any similar theme, either we must not permit him to  
say that these are the works [*ergon*] of God, or if they are of God, he must devise some explanation [*logos: cf. 376e as literature*]  
of them such as we are seeking; he must say

b that God did what was just and right, and they were the better for being punished; but that those who are  
punished are miserable, and that God is the author [*poietes*] of their misery --the poet is not to be permitted  
to say; though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are  
benefitted by receiving punishment from God; but that God being good is the author [*gignomai: cf. 373e as causes*]  
of evil to any one is to be strenuously denied, and not to be said or

c sung [*muthologeio: cf. 378e as thoughts*] or heard in verse or prose by any one whether old or young in any  
well-ordered commonwealth [*polis: cf. 379a as state*]. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious [*hosios, with oute: cf. 378c as unholy*].

I agree with [*sumpsephos: voting with or together*] you, he replied, and am ready to give my assent to the law  
[*nomos: cf. 365a as opinion*].

Let this then be one of our rules and principles [*nomos: cf. c as law & tupos: cf. 379a as forms*] concerning  
[*peri*] the gods, to which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform --that God is not the author  
[*aitios: cf. 379c*] of all things, but of good only.

That will do, he said.

d And what do you think of a second principle? Shall I ask you whether God is a magician [*goes: one who howls out enchantments*],  
and of a nature to appear [*phantazomai*] insidiously [*epiboule, with ex: a plot*] now in one shape [*idea: form, a kind, look*],  
and now in another --sometimes himself changing [*allasso*] and passing into many forms [*eidos: cf. 358a as class, with morphē: form, shape*], sometimes deceiving [*apatao: to cheat, trick*]  
us with the semblance of such transformations [*peri hautou toiauta dokein*]; or is he one and the same [*haploos: cf. 361c as simplicity*]  
immutably fixed [*exbaino: to come out, be fulfilled*] in his own proper image [*idea: cf. d as shape*]?

I cannot answer you, he said, without more thought.

Well, I said; but if we suppose a change in anything [*existemi: to step out & idea: cf. d as image*], that  
e change must be effected [*methistemi: to change*] either by the thing itself, or by some other thing?

Most certainly.

And things which are at their best [*aristos: cf. 366c*] are also least liable to be altered or discomposed [*allasso: cf. d & kineo: to set in motion*];  
for example, when healthiest and strongest, the human frame is least liable to be affected by meats and drinks,  
and the plant which is in the fullest vigor also suffers

**381** least from winds or the heat of the sun or any similar causes.

Of course.

And will not the bravest and wisest [*andreios: cf. 375a & phronimos: cf. 349e*] soul [*psuche: cf. 376e*] be least  
confused or deranged [*tarasso: to trouble & alloioo: to make different, change*] by any external [*ti exothen*]  
influence?

True.

And the same principle, as I should suppose, applies to all composite things [*sunthetos*]—furniture, houses, garments; when good and well made, they are least altered [*alloioo*: cf. *a as deranged*] by time and circumstances [*kronos & pathema*: *calamity, misfortune*].

Very true.

**b** Then everything which is good [*kalos*, *adverb*: cf. *377d as bad*], whether made by art or nature, or both, is least liable to suffer change [*metabole*] from without?

True.

But surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect [*aristos*: cf. *380e as best*]?

Of course they are.

Then he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many shapes [*morphe*: cf. *Cf. 380d as form*]?

He cannot.

But may he not change and transform himself [*metaballo & alloioo*: cf. *a as altered*]?

Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all.

And will he then change himself for the better and fairer [*beltion*: cf. *344e & kalos*: cf. *378e as virtuous*], or for the worse and more unsightly [*aischros*: cf. *344c as reproach*]?

**c** If he change at all he can only change for the worse, for we cannot suppose him to be deficient either in virtue or beauty [*arete*: cf. *378e as virtuous & kalos*: cf. *b*].

Very true, Adeimantus; but then, would any one, whether God or man, desire to make himself worse?

Impossible.

Then it is impossible that God should ever be willing to change [*alloioo*: cf. *b as transform*]; being, as is supposed, the fairest and best [*kalos*: cf. *c & aristos*: cf. *b as perfect*] that is conceivable, every god remains absolutely [*haplos*, *adverb*: *simply*] and forever [*aei*: cf. *379a*] in his own form [*morphe*: cf. *b as shapes*].

That necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment [*dokeo*: cf. *379c as appears*].

**d** Then, I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that--

the gods, taking the disguise of strangers from other lands, walk up and down cities in all sorts of forms;

And let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let any one, either in tragedy or in any other kind of poetry, introduce Here disguised in the likeness of a priestess asking an alms for--

the life-giving daughters of Inachus the river of Argos;

**e** Nor let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have mothers under the influence [*anapeitho*: *to convince, persuade*] of the poets scaring their children with a bad [*kakos*, *adverb*: cf. *372e as harm*] version of these myths --telling how certain gods, as they say, 'Go about by night in the likeness of so many strangers and in divers forms [*indallomai*: *to appear like, seem*]; but let them take heed lest they make cowards of their children, and at the same time speak blasphemy against the gods.

Heaven forbid, he said.

But although the gods are themselves unchangeable [*me metaballo*: cf. *b as transform*], still by witchcraft and deception [*goeteuo*: *to bewitch, beguile & exapatao*: cf. *360d as keep up appearances*] they may make us think [*dokeo*: cf. *c as judgment*] that they appear [*phaino*: cf. *375c as true*] in various forms?

Perhaps, he replied.

**382** Well, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, whether in word or deed, or to put forth a phantom [*phantasma*] of himself?

I cannot say, he replied.

Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if such an expression may be allowed, is hated of gods and men?

What do you mean? he said.

I mean that no one is willingly deceived in that which is the truest and highest part of himself [*kuriakos*: *dominated, possessed*], or about the truest and highest matters; there, above all, he is most afraid of a lie having possession [*ktaomai*: *to procure, possess*] of him.

Still, he said, I do not comprehend [*manthano*: cf. *Cf. 377a as understand*] you.

**b** The reason is, I replied, that you attribute some profound meaning [*semnos*: *revered, solemn*] to my words; but I am only saying that deception [*pseudo*: *to cheat, be deceived*], or being deceived or uninformed [*amathes*: cf. *350d as ignorance*] about the highest realities in the highest part of themselves [*ktaomai*: cf. *a as comprehend*], which is the soul, and in that part of them to have and to hold the lie, is what mankind least like; --that, I say, is what they utterly detest.

There is nothing more hateful to them.

And, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul of him who is deceived may be called the true lie

[*alethos*, adverb: cf. 345c as exact sense & *pseudos*: cf. 377d as story-tellers of mankind]; for the lie in words is only a kind of imitation [*mimema*] and shadowy image [*eidolon*: image, phantom] of a previous affection [*pathema*: cf. 381a as circumstances] of the soul, not pure unadulterated falsehood. Am I not right? Perfectly right.

The true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men?

Yes [*dokeo*: cf. 381e as think].

Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases [*logos*: cf. 380a as explanation] useful and not hateful; in dealing with [*pros*] enemies --that would be an instance; or again, when those whom we call our friends in a fit of madness [*mania*] or illusion are going to do some harm, then it is useful and is a sort of medicine or preventive; also in the tales of mythology, of which we were just now speaking--because we do not know the truth about ancient times, we make falsehood as much like truth as we can, and so turn it to account.

Very true, he said.

But can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we suppose that he is ignorant [*me eido*: cf. 372e as see] of antiquity, and therefore has recourse to invention [*aphomoioo*: to become like, copy]?

That would be ridiculous, he said.

Then the lying poet has no place in our idea of God?

I should say [*dokeo*: cf. c as yes] not.

Or perhaps he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies?

e That is inconceivable.

But he may have friends [*oikeios*: cf. 375c] who are senseless or mad [*anoia*: folly, want of understanding & *mania*: cf. c]?

But no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God [*theophiles*: cf. 362c as dearer].

Then no motive can be imagined why God should lie?

None whatever.

Then the superhuman and divine [*to daimonion*: cf. 344d for daimon as excellent man & *theios*: cf. 366c] is absolutely incapable of falsehood?

Yes.

Then is God perfectly simple and true [*haploos*: cf. 380d as same & *alethes*: cf. 376e] both in word and deed [*logos*: cf. c as cases & *ergos*: cf. 374b as fitted]; he changes not; he deceives not, either by sign or word [*phantasia*: imagination & *logos*], by dream or waking vision [*hupar* & *onar*].

**383** (numbers 384 & 385 not given in the text) Your thoughts, he said, are the reflection [*phaino*: cf. 381e as appear] of my own.

You agree with [*sugchoreo*: cf. 347e as discussed] me then, I said, that this is the second type or form [*tupos*: cf. 380c as principles] in which we should write and speak about divine things [*theos*, with *peri*: cf. 379b as good]. The gods are not magicians [*goes*: cf. 380d] who transform [*metaballo*: cf. 381e as unchangeable, with me] themselves, neither do they deceive [*pseudo*: cf. 382b as deception] mankind in any way [*logos* & *ergos*: both as in 382e].

I grant that.

Then, although we are admirers [*epaineo*: cf. 379e as approval] of Homer, we do not admire the lying dream which Zeus sends to Agamemnon; neither will we praise the verses of Aeschylus in which

**b** Thetis says that Apollo at her nuptials--

Was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose days were to be long, and to know no sickness. And when he had spoken of my lot [*tuche*: favor of the gods, fortune] as in all things blessed of heaven he raised a note of triumph and cheered my soul. And I thought that the word of Phoebus being divine and full of prophecy [*mantikos*], would not fail. And now he himself who uttered the strain, he who was present at the banquet, and who said this --he it is who has slain my son.

**c** These are the kind of sentiments about [*peri*] the gods which will arouse our anger [*chalepaino*: to be violent, angry]; and he who utters them shall be refused a chorus; neither shall we allow teachers to make use of them in the instruction [*paideia*: cf. 376e as education] of the young, meaning, as we do, that our guardians, as far as men can be, should be true worshipers of the gods [*theosebes*: fearing the gods] and like them.

I entirely agree, he said, in these principles [*tupos*: cf. a as form], and promise [*sugchoreo*: cf. a as agree with] to make them my laws [*nomos*: cf. 380c as principles].

### Book Three

**386** Such then, I said, are our principles of theology [*atta: some & theos with peri: cf. 385a as divine things*]—some tales are to be told, and others are not to be told to our disciples from their youth upwards, if we mean them to honor [*timao*] the gods and their parents, and to value friendship [*philia: cf. 351d*] with one another. Yes; and I think that our principles are [*phaino: cf. 383a as reflection*] right, he said.

But if they are to be courageous [*andreios: cf. 381a as wisest*], must they not learn other lessons besides **b** these, and lessons of such a kind as will take away the fear of death? Can any man be courageous who has the fear of death [*deima: terror*] in him?

Certainly not, he said.

And can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle rather than defeat and slavery, who believes the world below [*Haidēs: cf. 366a*] to be real and terrible [*deinos: fearful*]?

Impossible.

Then we must assume a control over [*ephistemi: to set up, establish*] the narrators of this class of tales [*muthos: cf. 378e*] as well as over the others, and beg them not simply to but rather to commend

**c** [*epaineo: cf. 383a as admirers*] the world below, intimating them that their descriptions are untrue, and will do harm to our future warriors.

That will be our duty, he said.

Then, I said, we shall have to obliterate [*exaleipho: to plaster or wash over*] many obnoxious passages, beginning with the verses, I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor and portionless man than rule over all the dead who have come to nought. [Odyssey xi.489-91]

We must also expunge the verse, which tells us how Pluto feared, Lest the mansions grim and squalid **d** which the gods abhor should he seen both of mortals and immortals. [Iliad xx.64-5]

And again: O heavens! Verily in the house of Hades [*cf. b*] there is soul and ghostly form but no mind at all! [Iliad xxiii.103-4]

Again of Tiresias:—[To him even after death did Persephone grant mind,] that he alone should be wise; but the other souls are flitting shades. [Odyssey x.495]

Again:—The soul flying from the limbs had gone to Hades [*cf. d*], lamenting her fate, leaving manhood and youth.

**387** Again:—And the soul, with shrilling cry, passed like smoke beneath the earth. [Iliad xxiii.100-01]

And,—As bats in hollow of mystic cavern, whenever any of the has dropped out of the string and falls from the rock, fly shrilling and cling to one another, so did they with shrilling cry hold together as they moved. [[Odyssey xxiv.6-9]

**b** And we must beg [*paraiteomai: to entreat, intercede*] Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we strike out these and similar passages, not because they are not poetical, or unattractive [*hedus: sweet*] to the popular ear [*tois pollois: to the many*], but because the greater the poetical charm [*poietikos: poetic*] of them, the less are they meet for the ears of boys and men who are meant to be free, and who should fear slavery more than death.

Undoubtedly.

Also we shall have to reject [*apoblepo: to look away from*] all the terrible and appalling names describe the world below—Cocytus and Styx, ghosts under the earth [*eneroi*], and sapless shades [*alibas: corpse*], **c** and any similar words [*tupos: cf. 385e as principles*] of which the very mention causes a shudder to pass through [*phrisso: to bristle*] the inmost soul of him who hears them. I do not say that these horrible stories may not have a use of some kind; but there is a danger that the nerves of our guardians may be rendered [*phrikos: (from phrisso): horrible*] too excitable and effeminate by them [*thermos: warm & malakos: soft*].

There is a real danger, he said.

Then we must have no more of them.

True.

Another and a nobler strain must be composed and sung by us [*enantion, with tupos: cf. c as similar words*]. Clearly.

**d** And shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous [*ellogimos: held in account*] men? They will go with the rest.

But shall we be right [*skopeo: cf. 376c as enquiry*] in getting rid of them? Reflect: our principle is that the good man will not consider [*hegeomai: to go before, lead*] death terrible to any other good man who is his

comrade.

Yes; that is our principle.

And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as though he had suffered anything terrible?

He will not.

Such an one, as we further maintain, is sufficient for himself [*autarkes: cf. 369b as self-sufficing*] and his own happiness [*pros to eu*], and therefore is least in need [*prosdeomai, with hekista*] of other men.

True, he said.

And for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the deprivation of fortune, is to him of all men least terrible.

Assuredly.

And therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will bear with the greatest equanimity [*praos: cf. 376b as gentle*] any misfortune [*sumphora: circumstance*] of this sort which may befall [*katalambano: to lay hold of*] him.

Yes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than another.

Then we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of famous [*onomastos: named, infamous*] men, and making them over to women (and not even to women who are good for anything), or to men of

**388** a baser sort, that those who are being educated [*trepho: cf. 373d as support*] by us to be the defenders [*phulake, with epi: watching, guard*] of their country may scorn to do the like.

That will be very right.

Then we will once more entreat [*deo: to stand in need*] Homer and the other poets not to depict Achilles, who is the son of a goddess,

first lying on his side, then on his back, and then on his face; then starting up and sailing in a frenzy along the shores of the barren sea. [Iliad xxiv.3-12]

Now taking the sooty ashes in both his hands and pouring them over his head, or weeping and **b** wailing in the various modes which Homer has delineated. Nor should he describe Priam the kinsman of the gods as praying and beseeching,

Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name. [Iliad xviii.23-4]

Still more earnestly will we beg of him at all events not to introduce the gods lamenting and saying,

**c** Alas! my misery! Alas, that I bore the harvest to my sorrow. [Iliad xviii.54]

But if he must introduce the gods, at any rate let him not dare so completely to misrepresent the greatest of the gods, as to make him say—

O heavens! With my eyes verily I behold a dear friend of mine chased round and round the city, and my heart is sorrowful.

Or again:—

Woe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon, dearest of men to me, **d** subdued at the hands of Patroclus the son of Menoetius. [Iliad xxii.168-9 & xvi.433-34]

For if, my sweet [*philos: cf. 352b as friend*] Adeimantus, our youth seriously listen to such unworthy representations of the gods, instead of laughing at them as they ought, hardly will any of them deem that he himself, being but a man, can be dishonored by similar actions; neither will he rebuke any inclination which may arise in his mind to say and do the like. And instead of having any shame or self-control [*aischuno & kratoo: to be strong*], he will be always whining and lamenting on slight occasions [*pathema: cf. 382c as affection*].

**e** Yes, he said, that is most true.

Yes, I replied; but that surely is what ought not to be, as the argument has just proved to us [*logos: cf. 385a as way & semnaino: to show by a sign*]; and by that proof we must abide [*peitho: cf. 368b as unconvinced*] until

it is disproved by a better [*kalos: cf. 381c as best*].

It ought not to be.

Neither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a fit of laughter which has been indulged to excess [*ischuros: cf. 350d as strength*] almost always produces a violent reaction [*metabole: cf. 381b as change*].

So I believe.

Then persons of worth, even if only mortal men, must not be represented [*apodekteon cf. 379c as listen* **389 to**] as overcome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of the gods be allowed.

Still less of the gods, as you say, he replied.

Then we shall not suffer [*apodechomai: cf. 329e as convinced*] such an expression to be used about the gods as that of Homer when he describes how

Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods, when they saw Hephaestus bustling about the mansion. [Iliad i.599-600]

On your views [*logos: cf. 388e as proved to*], we must not admit [*apodekteon: cf. 388e as represented*] them.

**b** On my views, if you like to father them on me; that we must not admit them is certain [*apodekteon: cf. a as admit*].

Again, truth should be highly valued [*peri pollou*]; if, as we were saying, a lie [*pseudos: cf. 382b*] is useless to the gods, and useful only as a medicine [*pharmakon: drug*] to men, then the use of such medicines should be restricted to physicians; private individuals have no business with them.

Clearly not, he said.

Then if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers [*archo cf. 346e as govern*] of the state [*polis: cf. 380c as commonwealth*] should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either with enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the public good. But nobody else should meddle

**c** with anything of the kind; and although the rulers have this privilege, for a private man to lie to them in return is to be deemed a more heinous fault [*hamartema: sin*] than for the patient or the pupil of a gymnasium not to speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses to the physician or to the trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the captain what is happening about the ship and the rest of the crew, and how things are going [*praxis: a doing, trading*] with himself or his fellow sailors.

Most true, he said.

**d** If, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in the state,

Any of the craftsmen, whether he priest or physician or carpenter [Odyssey xvii.383-4],

he will punish him for introducing a practice [*epitedeuma: cf. 374e as calling*] which is equally subversive and destructive [*anatruptikos: like to upset & olethrios: deadly*] of ship or state.

Most certainly, he said, if our idea [*logos: cf. a as views*] of the state is ever carried out [*teleo: to complete, fulfill*].

In the next place our youth must be temperate [*sophrosune: cf. 364a as virtue*]?

Certainly.

Are not the chief elements of temperance [*sophrosune: cf. d*], speaking generally, obedience to

**e** commanders and self-control in sensual pleasures [*aphrodisia: sexual intercourse & hedone: cf. 357b as enjoyments*]?

True [*dokeo: cf. 382d as I should say*].

Then we shall approve such language as that of Diomedes in Homer,

Friend, sit still and obey my word,

and the verses which follow:

The Greeks marched breathing prowess,

...in silent awe of their leaders,

and other sentiments of the same kind.

We shall.

What of this line,

O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog and the heart of a stag [last three citations respectively are Iliad iv.412, iii.8 & iv.431],

**390** and of the words which follow [*kalos, adverb: cf. 381b as good*]? Would you say that these, or any similar impertinences [*neanieuma: that which pertains to a youth, wanton act or word*] which private individuals are



supposed to address to their rulers, whether in verse or prose, are well or ill spoken?

They are ill spoken [*ou kalos, adverb: cf. a as which follow*].

They may very possibly afford some amusement [*epitedeios: cf. 378b as unfit*], but they do not conduce to temperance [*sophrosune: cf. 389d*]. And therefore they are likely to do harm to our young men—you would agree with [*phaino: cf. 386a as our principles are*] me there?

Yes.

And then, again, to make the wisest [*sophos: cf. 365c as philosophers*] of men say that nothing in his opinion is more glorious [*kalos: cf. 388e as better*] than

When the tables are full of bread and meat, and the cup-bearer  
**b** carries round wine which he draws from the bowl and pours into the cups.

Is it fit or conducive to temperance [*egkrateia, with pros: mastery, self-control*] for a young man to hear such words? Or the verse,

The saddest of fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger? [Odyssey ix.8-10]

What would you say again to the tale of Zeus, who, while other gods and men were asleep and he the only person awake [*egregorao*], lay devising plans, but forgot them all in a moment through his lust  
**c** [*epithumia: cf. 359c as desire*], and was so completely overcome [*explesso: cf. 336d as panic-stricken*] at the sight of Hera that he would not even go into the hut, but wanted to lie with her on the ground, declaring that he had never been in such a state of rapture [*epithumia: cf. c as lust*] before, even when they first met one another without the knowledge of their parents; or that other tale of how Hephaestus, because of similar goings on, cast a chain around Ares and Aphrodite?

Indeed, he said, I am strongly of opinion [*phaino: cf. a as agree with*] that they ought not to hear that sort of thing [*epitedeios: cf. a as amusement*].

**d** But any deeds of endurance [*karteros: strong, desperate*] which are done or told by famous [*ellogimos: cf. 387d*] men, these they ought to see and hear; as, for example, what is said in the verses,

He smote his breast, and thus reproached his heart,  
Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou endured! [Odyssey xx.17-18]

Certainly, he said.

In the next place, we must not let them be receivers of gifts or lovers of money [*philochrema*].

Certainly not.

**e** Neither must we sing to them of--

Gifts persuading gods, and persuading reverend kings. [unknown source; cf. Medea 964 by Euripides].

Neither is Phoenix, the tutor [*paidagogos: the slave who went with a boy from home to school*] of Achilles, to be approved [*epaino: cf. 386c as commend*] or deemed to have given his pupil good counsel [*sumbouleuo: to recommend, advise*] when he told him that he should take the gifts of the Greeks and assist [*epiamuno: to come to aid*] them; but that without a gift he should not lay aside his anger. Neither will we believe or acknowledge [*homologeo: cf. 374a as principle*] Achilles himself to have been such a lover of money [*philochrema: cf. d*] that he took Agamemnon's or that when he had received

**391** payment he restored the dead body of Hector, but that without payment he was unwilling to do so.

Undoubtedly, he said, these are not sentiments which can be approved [*epaino: cf. 390e as approved*].

Loving Homer as I do, I hardly like to say [*okneo: to shrink, hesitate*] that in attributing these feelings to [*kata*] Achilles, or in believing that they are truly to [*hosios: cf. 380c as impious, with oude*] him, he is guilty of downright impiety. As little can I believe the narrative of his insolence to Apollo, where he says,

Thou hast wronged me, O far-darter, most abominable of deities.

Verily I would he even with thee, if I had only the power, [Iliad xxiv.15, 20]

**b** or his insubordination [*apeithos, with pros, adverb*] to the river-god, on whose divinity he is ready to lay hands [*machomai: cf. 345b as force*]; or his offering to the dead Patroclus of his own hair, which had been previously dedicated to the other river-god Spercheius, and that he actually performed [*drao: cf. 378b as following the example*] this vow; or that he dragged Hector round the tomb of Patroclus, and slaughtered the captives at the pyre; of all this I cannot believe that he was guilty, any more than I

**c** can allow our citizens to believe that he, the wise Cheiron's pupil, the son of a goddess and of Peleus who was the gentlest [*sophronikos: having sophrosune as in 390a, temperance*] of men and third in descent from Zeus, was so disordered [*tarache: trouble*] in his wits as to be at one time the slave of two seemingly inconsistent passions [*nosema: disease, plague*], meanness, not untainted by avarice [*philochrema: cf. 390e as lover of money*], combined with overweening contempt [*huperephania: arrogance*] of gods and men. You are quite right, he replied.

And let us equally refuse to believe [*peitho: 388e as abide*], or allow to be repeated, the tale of Theseus **d** son of Poseidon, or of Peirithous son of Zeus, going forth as they did to perpetrate a horrid rape; or of any other hero or son of a god daring to do such impious [*asebos*] and dreadful things as they falsely ascribe to them in our day: and let us further compel [*prosanagkazo*] the poets to declare either that these acts were not done by them, or that they were not the sons of gods;—both in the same breath they shall not be permitted to affirm [*epicheireo: cf. 361a as keep within their limits*]. We will not have them trying to persuade [*peitho: cf. c as believe*] our youth that the gods are the authors of evil, and that heroes are no better than men—sentiments which, as we were saying, are neither pious [*hosios: cf.*

**e 391a as truly to**] nor true, for we have already proved [*epideiknumi: to show forth*] that evil cannot come from the gods.

Assuredly not.

And further they are likely to have a bad effect [*blaberos: cf. 379b as hurtful*] on those who hear them; for everybody will begin to excuse his own vices [*suggnome: cf. 366c as forgive*] when he is convinced [*peitho: cf. d as persuade*] that similar evils are always being perpetrated by—

The kindred of the gods, the relatives of Zeus, whose ancestral altar, the altar of Zeus, is aloft in air on the peak of Ida,

and who have the blood of deities yet flowing in their veins. [Thought to be from Aeschylus' lost play Niobe].

And therefore let us put an end to such tales [*muthos: cf. 386b*], lest they engender [*entikto: to cause, 392 create*] laxity of morals among [*euchereia: readiness, licentiousness & poneria: cf. 342b as defects*] the young.

By all means, he replied.

But now that we are determining what classes of subjects [*eidos: cf. 380d as form & logos: cf. 390d as idea*] are or are not to be spoken of, let us see whether any have been omitted by us. The manner in which gods and demigods and heroes [*theos: cf. 386a as theology & daimon: cf. 382e as superhuman & heros: chiefly as object of worship*] and the world below [*Haidos: cf. 386e*] should be treated has been already laid down.

Very true.

And what shall we say about men? That is clearly the remaining portion of our subject.

Clearly so.

But we are not in a condition to answer this question [*taxis: an arranging, drawing up*] at present, my friend. Why not?

Because, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that about men poets and story-tellers [*logopoios*] **b** are guilty [*kakos, adverb; with lego: cf. 381e as bad*] of making the gravest misstatements when they tell us that wicked men [*adikos: cf. 331a*] are often happy [*eudaimon: blessed with a good genius*], and the good miserable [*dikaioi: cf. 353d as proper & athlios: cf. 356a as misery*]; and that injustice [*to adikein*] is profitable [*lusiteleo: cf. 367c as interest*] when undetected [*lanthano: cf. 367e as unseen*], but that justice is a man's own loss and another's gain [*oikeios: of the house, domestic*]**c**—these things we shall forbid [*apeipon: to speak out, declare*] them to utter, and command them to sing and say [*muthologeo: cf. 380c as sung*] the opposite.

To be sure we shall, he replied.

But if you admit [*homologeio: cf. 390e as acknowledge*] that I am right in this, then I shall maintain that you have implied the principle [*homologeio*] for which we have been all along contending.

I grant the truth of your inference [*hupolambano: cf. 349a as think*].

**c** That such things are or are not to be said about men is a question which we cannot determine [*diomologeio: to make an agreement*] until we have discovered what justice [*dikaioisune: cf. 376d*] is, and how naturally

advantageous [*lusiteleo: cf. b as profitable*] cf. to the possessor, whether he seems to be just or not.

Most true, he said.

Enough [*telos: end, completion*] of the subjects of poetry: let us now speak of the style [*lexis: saying, speech*]; and when this has been considered, both matter and manner will have been completely treated [*skeptomai: cf. 372e*].

I do not understand [*manthano: cf. 382a as comprehend*] what you mean, said Adeimantus.

**d** Then I must make you understand; and perhaps I may be more intelligible if I put the matter in this way.

You are aware, I suppose, that all mythology and poetry [*muthologos & poiectos: that which is made*] is a narration [*diegesis*] of events, either past, present, or to come [*peiraino: cf. 346a as progress*]?

Certainly, he replied.

And narration may be either simple narration, or imitation [*mimesis*], or a union of the two?

That again, he said, I do not quite understand [*manthano: cf. c*]

I fear that I must be a ridiculous [*geloios: laughable*] teacher when I have so much difficulty in making myself apprehended [*asaphes: indistinct, faint*]. Like a bad speaker, therefore, I will not take the whole of the subject, but will break a piece off in illustration [*peirao: to attempt, endeavor & deloo: cf. 365c as prove*] of my meaning. You know the first lines of the Iliad, in which the poet says that Chryses prayed Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that Agamemnon flew into a passion with him; whereupon

**393** Chryses, failing of his object, invoked the anger of the God against the Achaeans. Now as far as these lines,

And he prayed all the Greeks, but especially the two sons of Atreus,  
the chiefs of the people,

the poet is speaking in his own person; he never leads us to suppose [*dianoia: cf. 371e as companionship*] that he is any one else. But in what follows he takes the person of Chryses, and then he does all that

**b** he can to make us believe that the speaker is not Homer, but the aged priest himself. And in this double form he has cast the entire narrative [*diegesis: cf. d*] of the events [*pathema: cf. 388d as occasions*] which occurred at Troy and in Ithaca and throughout the Odyssey.

Yes.

And a narrative it remains both in the speeches which the poet recites from time to time and in the intermediate passages?

Quite true.

**c** But when the poet speaks in the person of another, may we not say that he assimilates his style [*lexis: cf. 392c*] to that of the person who, as he informs you, is going to speak?

Certainly.

And this assimilation of himself to another, either by the use of voice or gesture, is the imitation of the person [*schema, with kata: cf. 365c as picture & mimeomai: to mimic, represent*] whose character he assumes [*homoioo: to make like*]?

Of course.

Then in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to proceed by way of imitation [*mimesis, with dia: cf. 392d*]?

Very true.

Or, if the poet everywhere appears and never conceals himself, then again the imitation is dropped,

**d** and his poetry becomes simple narration. However, in order that I may make my meaning quite clear, and that you may no more say, 'I don't understand [*manthano: cf. 392d*],' I will show how the change might be effected. If Homer had said, 'The priest came, having his daughter's ransom in his hands, supplicating the Achaeans, and above all the kings;' and then if, instead of speaking in the person of Chryses, he had continued in his own person, the words would have been, not imitation, but simple narration. The passage would have run as follows (I am no poet, and therefore I drop

**e** the meter), 'The priest came and prayed the gods on behalf of the Greeks that they might capture Troy and return safely home, but begged that they would give him back his daughter, and take the ransom which he brought, and respect the God. Thus he spoke, and the other Greeks revered the priest and assented. But Agamemnon was wroth, and bade him depart and not come again, lest the staff and chaplets of the God should be of no avail to him—the daughter of Chryses should not be released, he said—she should grow old

with him in Argos. And then he told him to go away and not to

**394** provoke him, if he intended to get home unscathed. And the old man went away in fear and silence, and, when he had left the camp, he called upon Apollo by his many names, reminding him of everything which he had done pleasing to him, whether in building his temples, or in offering sacrifice, and praying that his good deeds might be returned to him, and that the Achaeans might

**b** expiate his tears by the arrows of the god,'—and so on. In this way the whole becomes simple narrative. I understand, he said.

Or you may suppose [*manthano*: cf. 393d as understand] the opposite case—that the intermediate [*ta metaxu*: cf. 359a as compromise] passages are omitted, and the dialogue [*amoibaioi*: alternate, as in verses] only left. That also, he said, I understand; you mean, for example, as in tragedy.

You have conceived [*hupolambano*: cf. 392b as inference] my meaning perfectly; and if I mistake not, what you failed to apprehend before is now made clear to you, that poetry and mythology

**c** [*muthologia*] are, in some cases, wholly imitative [*mimesis*, with *dia*: cf. 393c as imitation]—instances of this are supplied by tragedy and comedy; there is likewise the opposite style, in which the my poet is the only speaker—of this the dithyramb affords the best example; and the combination of both is found in epic, and in several other styles of poetry. Do I take [*manthano*: cf. b as suppose] you with me?

Yes, he said; I see [*suniami*: cf. 376b as knowledge] now what you meant.

I will ask you to remember [*anamimnesko*: to recall, mention] also what I began by saying, that we had done with the subject and might proceed to the style.

Yes, I remember [*mimnesko*].

**d** In saying this, I intended to imply that we must come to an understanding [*diomologeo*: cf. 392c as determine] about the mimetic art [*mimnesko*: cf. c & *poietos*: cf. 392d as poetry],—whether the poets, in narrating [*diegesis*: cf. 393b as narrative] their stories, are to be allowed [*eao*] by us to imitate [*mimnesko*: cf. d], and if so, whether in whole or in part, and if the latter, in what parts; or should all imitation be prohibited? You mean, I suspect [*manteuomai*: to divine, surmise], to ask whether tragedy and comedy shall be admitted [*paradechomai*: to receive as an inheritance] into our state?

Yes, I said; but there may be more than this in question: I really do not know as yet, but whither the argument [*logos*: cf. 392a as subjects] may blow [*pneuma*: spirit; here as wind], thither we go.

And go we will, he said.

**e** Then, Adeimantus, let me ask you whether our guardians ought to be imitators [*mimetikos*]; or rather, has not this question been decided by the rule already laid down that one man can only do one thing well [*epitedeuma*: cf. 389d as practice & *kalos*, adverb: cf. 390 as ill spoken (with *ou*)], and not many; and that if he attempt many, he will altogether fall [*apotugchano*: to fail] of gaining much reputation [*ellogimos*: cf. 390d as famous] in any?

Certainly.

And this is equally true of imitation [*mimesis*: cf. c]; no one man can imitate many things as well as he would imitate a single one?

He cannot.

**395** Then the same person will hardly [*schole*: cf. 376d as leisure hour] be able to play a serious part in life [*epitedeuma*: cf. e & *epitedeuo*: cf. 374c as devote himself], and at the same time to be an imitator [*mimetikos*: cf. e] and imitate many other parts as well; for even when two species of imitation are nearly allied, the same persons cannot succeed in both, as, for example, the writers of tragedy and comedy—did you not just now call them imitations?

Yes, I did; and you are right in thinking that the same persons cannot succeed in both.

Any more than they can be rhapsodists and actors [*hupokrites*: an interpreter] at once?

True.

Neither are comic and tragic actors the same; yet all these things are but imitations.

**b** They are so.

And human nature, Adeimantus, appears [*phaino*: cf. 390c as opinion] to have been coined into yet smaller pieces [*katakermatizo*: to divide into small parts], and to be as incapable [*adunatos*: cf. 368b as unequal] of imitating many things well, as of performing well the actions of which the imitations are copies [*aphomoioma*: resemblance].

Quite true, he replied.

If then we adhere [*diasozo*: to persevere through] to our original notion [*logos*: cf. 394d as argument] and bear

in mind that our guardians, setting aside every other business [*demiourgos: cf. 360e as craft*], are to **c** dedicate themselves wholly [*panu with akribeia: exactness, accuracy*] to the maintenance of freedom [*eleutheria: cf. 329c*] in the state, making this their craft, and engaging in no work which does not bear on [*epitedeuo: cf. a as play a serious part*] this end, they ought not to practice or imitate anything else; if they imitate at all, they should imitate from youth upward only those characters which are suitable [*proseko: cf. 332b as what is proper*] to their profession—the courageous, temperate, holy, free [*andreios: cf. 386a & sophronos: cf. 331e as (not) in right senses & hosios: cf. 391d as pious & eleutheros: cf. noun in c*], and the like; but they should not depict or be skillful at imitating any kind of illiberality **d** or baseness, lest from imitation they should come to be what they imitate. Did you never observe [*aisthanomai: cf. 359b as imagine*] how imitations [*mimesis: cf. 394e*], beginning [*diateleo: to accomplish*] in early youth and continuing [*kathistemi: to set down, establish, with phusis or nature as in 376c*] far into life, at length grow into habits and become a second nature, affecting body, voice, and mind [*dianoia: cf. 393a as suppose*]?

Yes, certainly, he said.

Then, I said, we will not allow [*epitrepo: to turn towards*] those for whom we profess a care [*kedeuo: cf. 374b as attention*] and of whom we say that they ought to be good men, to imitate a woman, whether young or old, quarreling with her husband, or striving and vaunting against the gods [*loidoreo: cf. 367d e as censure, with pros*] in conceit of her happiness [*eudaimoneo: cf. 366d*], or when she is in affliction, or sorrow, or weeping; and certainly not one who is in sickness, love, or labor.

Very right, he said.

Neither must they represent slaves, male or female, performing the offices of slaves?

They must not.

And surely not bad men, whether cowards or any others, who do the reverse [*enantios: opposite*] of what we have just been prescribing, who scold or mock or revile one another in drink or out of in drink or, or who in any other manner sin [*hamartano: cf. 340c as mistaken*] against themselves and their **396** neighbors in word or deed, as the manner of such is. Neither should they be trained [*ethisteon: verbal adjective: one must accustom*] to imitate the action or speech of men or women who are mad [*mainomai: cf. 359b*] or bad; for madness, like vice, is to be known but not to be practiced [*poieo: to make, produce*] or imitated.

Very true, he replied.

Neither may they imitate smiths or other artificers, or oarsmen, or boatswains, or the like?

**b** How can they, he said, when they are not allowed to apply their minds [*prosecho: 376a as struck & nous: cf. 331b*] to the callings of any of these?

Nor may they imitate the neighing of horses, the bellowing of bulls, the murmur of rivers and roll of the ocean, thunder, and all that sort of thing?

Nay, he said, if madness [*mainomai: cf. a*] be forbidden [*apeirgo*], neither may they copy [*aphomoioo: cf. 382d as invention*] the behavior of madmen.

You mean, I said, if I understand [*manthano: cf. 394c as take*] you aright, that there is one sort [*eidos: cf. 392a as subjects*] of narrative style [*lexis: cf. 393c & diegesis: cf. 394d*] which may be employed by a **c** truly [*kalos: cf. 390a as glorious*] good man when he has anything to say, and that another sort [*anomoios: cf. 349d as unlike & eidos: cf. b*] will be used by a man of an opposite character [*ho enantios, adverb; cf. adjective, 395e as reverse*] and education [*phus: cf. phuo, to put forth & trepho: cf. 388a as educated*].

And which are these two sorts? he asked.

Suppose [*dokeo: cf. 389e as true*], I answered, that a just and good man [*metrios: within measure, moderate & aner*] in the course of a narration comes on some saying or action of another good [*agathos: cf. 379c*] man,—I should imagine that he will like to personate [*apaggello: to bring tidings, narrate*] him, and will not be ashamed of [*aischuno: cf. 388d as (lack of) self-control*] this sort of imitation: he will be most ready to play the part of [*mimeomai: cf. 393c*] the good man when he is acting firmly and wisely

**d** [*asphalos: not liable to fall & emphronos: rational, in one's mind*]; in a less degree when he is overtaken [*sphallo: to make to fall*] by illness or love or drink, or has met with any other disaster [*sumphora: cf. 387e as misfortune*]. But when he comes to a character which is unworthy of him, he will not make a study of [*apeikazo: to form from a model*] that; he will disdain such a person, and will assume his likeness, if at all, for a moment only when he is performing some good action; at other times he will be ashamed to play a part [*mimeomai: cf. c*] which he has never practiced [*agumnastos: not exercised*], nor will he like to fashion and

frame [*ekmasso: to wipe off, model*] himself after the baser  
e models [*tupos: cf. 387c as strain*]; he feels the employment of such an art, unless in jest [*paidikos: like a child, puerile*], to be beneath him [*atimazo: to hold in no honor*], and his mind [*dianoia: cf. 395d*] revolts at it. So I should expect, he replied.

Then he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have illustrated from [*dierchomai: to go through, tell in detail*] Homer, that is to say, his style will be [*metecho: to partake of*] both imitative and narrative; but there will be very little of the former, and a great deal of the latter. Do you agree?

Certainly, he said; that is the model [*tupos: cf. e*] which such a speaker must necessarily take.

**397** But there is another sort of character who will narrate anything, and, the worse lie [*phaulos: slight, common*] is, the more unscrupulous he will be [*oiomai: cf. 365a as regard with anaxios: unworthy*]; nothing will be too bad for him: and he will be ready [*spoude: zeal, exertion*] to imitate anything, not as a joke, but in right good earnest, and before a large company. As I was just now saying, he will attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the noise of wind and hall, or the creaking of wheels, and pulleys, and the various sounds of flutes; pipes, trumpets, and all sorts of instruments: he will bark like a dog,

b bleat like a sheep, or crow like a cock; his entire art will consist in imitation [*mimesis: cf. 395d*] of voice and gesture, and there will be very little narration.

That, he said, will be his mode of speaking.

These, then, are the two kinds of style [*eidos: cf. 396c as sort & lexis: cf. 396b*]?

Yes.

And you would agree with me in saying that one of them is simple and has but slight changes [*metabole: cf. 388e as reaction*]; and if the harmony and rhythm [*harmonia & rhuthmos*] are also chosen for their simplicity [*prepo: to suit, resemble*], the result is that the speaker, if he speaks correctly, is always pretty much the same in style, and he will keep within the limits of a single harmony (for the changes are not great), and in like manner he will make use of nearly the same rhythm?

c That is quite true, he said.

Whereas the other [*eidos: cf. b as style*] requires all sorts of harmonies and all sorts of rhythms, if the music and the style are to correspond [*oikeios, adverb: familiarity*], because the style has all sorts of changes [*morphe: cf. 381c as form & metabole: cf. b*].

That is also perfectly true, he replied.

And do not the two styles, or the mixture of the two, comprehend [*epitugchano: to hit upon, meet with tupos: cf. 396e as model*] all poetry, and every form of expression in words? No one can say anything except in one or other of them or in both together [*sugkerannumi: to mix up, blend*].

They include all, he said.

d And shall we receive [*paradechomai: cf. 394d as admitted*] into our state all the three styles, or one only of the two unmixed [*akratos*] styles? Or would you include the mixed [*kerannumi: cf. sugkerannumi in c*]?

I should prefer only to admit the pure [*akratos: cf. d as unmixed*] imitator of virtue [*epieikeuomai: to be suitable*].

Yes, I said, Adeimantus, but the mixed style is also very charming [*hedus: cf. 387b as (un)attractive*] and indeed the pantomimic [*polu hedistos (hedus)*], which is the opposite of the one chosen by you, is the most popular style with children and their attendants [*paidagogos: cf. 390e as tutor*], and with the world in general.

I do not deny it.

But I suppose you would argue that such a style is unsuitable [*ouk harmozo*] to our state [*politeia: e government, condition and rights of a citizen*], in which human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man plays [*prasso: cf. 366b as fare*] one part only?

Yes; quite unsuitable.

And this is the reason why in our state, and in our state only, we shall find a shoemaker to be a shoemaker and not a pilot also, and a husbandman to be a husbandman and not a juror also, and a soldier a soldier and not a trader also, and the same throughout?

True, he said.

**398** And therefore when any one of these pantomimic gentlemen [*sophia, with hupo: cf. 349a as wisdom & pantodapos: of every kind, manifold*], who are so clever that they can imitate anything, comes to us, and makes a proposal to exhibit [*epideiknumi: cf. 391e as proved*] himself and his poetry, we will fall down and worship [*proskuneo: to make obeisance*] him as a sweet and holy [*hieros*] and wonderful being; but we must also inform him that in our [*para*] state such as he are not permitted to exist; the law [*themis: that which is laid*

down by custom] will not allow them. And so when we have anointed him with myrrh, and set a garland of wool upon his head, we shall send him away to another city. For we mean to employ for our souls' health the rougher and severer [*austeros & aedes: unpleasant to the*

**b** *taste*] poet or story-teller [*muthologos: cf. 392d as mythology*], who will imitate the style of the virtuous only [*epieikeuomai: cf. 397d as virtue*], and will follow [*nomotheteo: to make laws*] those models [*tupos: cf. 397c, used with comprehend*] which we prescribed at first when we began the education [*paideuo: cf. 376d*] of our soldiers.

We certainly will, he said, if we have the power [*ep' hemin*].

Then now, my friend, I said, that part of music or literary education which relates to the story or myth [*logos: cf. 395b as notion & muthos: cf. 391e as tales*] may be considered to be finished [*diaperaino: to bring to a conclusion*]; for the matter and manner have both been discussed.

I think so too, he said.

**c** Next in order will follow melody and song.

That is obvious.

Every one can see already what we ought to say about them, if we are to be consistent [*sumphonia: concord or unison of sound*] with ourselves.

I fear, said Glaucon, laughing, that the words 'every one' hardly includes me, for I cannot at the moment say [*sumballo: to throw together*] what they should be; though I may guess [*hupopteuo*].

**d** At any rate you can tell that a song or ode has three parts [*sugkeimai: to be composed*]*—*the words, the melody, and the rhythm; that degree of knowledge I may presuppose?

Yes, he said; so much as that you may.

And as for the words, there surely be no difference words between words which are and which are not set [*tupos: cf. b as models*] to music; both will conform to the same laws, and these have been already determined [*proereo: to declare publically*] by us?

Yes.

And the melody and rhythm will depend [*akoloutheo: cf. 332d as guided*] upon the words?

Certainly.

**e** We were saying, when we spoke of the subject-matter, that we had no need of lamentations and strains of sorrow?

True.

And which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow [*harmonia: cf. 397b & threodia: lamentation*]? You are musical, and can tell me.

The harmonies which you mean are the mixed or tenor Lydian, and the full-toned or bass Lydian, and such like.

These then, I said, must be banished [*aphaireo: to take away from*]; even to women who have a character to maintain [*epieikes: cf. 331b as intentionally*] they are of no use, and much less to men. Certainly.

In the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly unbecoming [*aprepes: indecent*] the character of our guardians.

Utterly unbecoming.

And which are the soft or drinking harmonies?

The Ionian, he replied, and the Lydian; they are termed 'relaxed.'

**399** Well, and are these of any military use?

Quite the reverse, he replied; and if so the Dorian and the Phrygian are the only ones which you have left.

I answered: of the harmonies I know nothing, but I want to have one warlike, to sound the note or accent which a brave man utters in the hour of danger and stern resolve, or when his cause is failing, and he is going to wounds or death or is overtaken by some other evil, and at every such crisis

**b** [*sumphora: cf. 396d as disaster*] meets the blows of fortune [*tuche: cf. 385b as lot*] with firm step and a determination to endure; and another to be used [*praxis: cf. 389c as how things are going*] by him in times of peace and freedom of action, when there is no pressure of necessity, and he is seeking to persuade [*peitho: cf. 391e as convinced*] a god by prayer [*euche: vow*], or man by instruction [*didache*] and admonition [*noutheteo: to put in mind*], or on the other hand, when he is expressing his willingness to yield to persuasion [*metapeitho: cf. peitho*] or entreaty or admonition, and which represents him when by prudent conduct he has attained his end, not carried away by his success [*me huperephanos, adverb: arrogantly*], but acting moderately and wisely [*sophronos: cf. 395c as temperate (adjective) & metrios: cf. 396c as good (adjective)*] under the circumstances

[*prasso*: cf. 397e as plays & nous, with *kata*: cf. 396e as minds],  
c and acquiescing in the event [*apobaino*: cf. 367c as results]. These two harmonies I ask you to leave; the strain of necessity and the strain of freedom, the strain of the unfortunate and the strain of the fortunate [*eutuchoe* & *dustuchoe*], the strain of courage, and the strain of temperance; these, I say, leave [*kalos*: cf. 396c as truly; here can be used as 'best'].

And these, he replied, are the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies of which I was just now speaking.

Then, I said, if these and these only are to be used in our songs and melodies, we shall not want  
d multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic scale?

I suppose [*phaino*: cf. 395b as appears] not.

Then we shall not maintain the artificers of lyres with three corners and complex scales, or the makers of any other many-stringed curiously-harmonized instruments?

Certainly not.

But what do you say to flute-makers and flute-players? Would you admit them into our state when you reflect that in this composite use of harmony the flute is worse than all the stringed instruments put together; even the panharmonic music is only an imitation of the flute?

Clearly not.

There remain then only the lyre and the harp for use [*chrema*, with *kata*: thing, matter] in the city, and the shepherds may have a pipe in the country.

That is surely the conclusion to be drawn from the argument [*logos*: cf. 398b as story & *semaino*: to indicate].

e The preferring [*krino*: to separate, choose] of Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his instruments is not at all strange [*kainos*: new], I said.

Not at all [*phaino*: cf. d as suppose], he replied.

And so, by the dog of Egypt, we have been unconsciously [*lanthano*: cf. 392b as undetected] purging [*diakathairo*: to cleanse thoroughly] the state, which not long ago we termed luxurious [*truphe*: delicacy, wantonness].

And we have done wisely [*sophronizo*; cf. 331c as right mind (with para)] he replied.

Then let us now finish the purgation [*kathairo*: cf. c. for *diakathairo*], I said. Next in order to harmonies, rhythms will naturally follow, and they should be subject to the same rules, for we ought not to seek out [*dioko*: cf. 359c as deem] complex systems of meter, or meters of every kind, but rather to discover [*idein* (*eidon*): to see] what rhythms are the expressions of a courageous and harmonious [*kosmios*: cf. 331b as (un)intentionally & *andreios*: cf. 395c as free] life; and when we have found them, we shall adapt the foot and the melody to words having a like spirit, not the words to the foot and melody. To say

400 what these rhythms are will be your duty [*ergos*: cf. 385c as way]—you must teach me them, as you have already taught me the harmonies.

But, indeed, he replied, I cannot tell you. I only know that there are some three principles [*eidos*: cf. 397c as other] of rhythm out of which metrical systems are framed [*pleko*: to plait, weave], just as in sounds there are four notes out of which all the harmonies are composed; that is an observation which I have made. But of what sort of lives they are severally the imitations I am unable to say.

b Then, I said, we must take Damon into our counsels [*bouleuo*: cf. 353d as proper]; and he will tell us what rhythms are expressive of [*prepo*: cf. 397b as simplicity] meanness, or insolence, or fury, or other unworthiness, and what are to be reserved for the expression of opposite feelings. And I think that I have an indistinct recollection of his mentioning a complex Cretic rhythm; also a dactylic or heroic, and he arranged them in some manner which I do not quite understand, making the rhythms equal in the rise and fall of the foot, long and short alternating; and, unless I am mistaken, he spoke of an iambic as

c well as of a trochaic rhythm, and assigned to them short and long quantities. Also in some cases he appeared to praise or censure the movement of the foot quite as much as the rhythm; or perhaps a combination of the two; for I am not certain what he meant. These matters, however, as I was saying, had better be referred to Damon himself, for the analysis [*dialuo*: to loose one from another] of the subject would be difficult, you know.

Rather so, I should say.

But there is no difficulty in seeing that grace or the absence of grace is [*euschemosune*: decorum & *aschemosune*] an effect [*akoloutheo*: cf. 398d as depend] of good or bad rhythm.

None at all.

d And also that good and bad rhythm naturally assimilate [*homoioo*: cf. 393c as assumes] to a good [*kalos*: cf.



399c] and bad style [*lexis: cf. 397b*]; and that harmony and discord [*to euarmoston & to anarmoston*] in like manner follow style; for our principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by the words and not the words by them.

Just so, he said, they should follow [*akoloutheo: cf. c as effect*] the words.

And will not the words and the character of the style [*logos: cf. 399d as argument & tropos: cf. 378c as manner & lexis: cf. d*] depend [*hepo: to be busy with*] on the temper of the soul [*ethos: custom, usage & psuche: cf. 381a*]?

Yes.

And everything else on the style?

Yes.

Then beauty of style and harmony and grace and good rhythm [*eulogia: good language & euarmostia & e euschemosune: cf. c as grace & euruthmia*] depend [*akoloutheo: cf. d as follow*] on simplicity [*euetheia: goodness of heart*],—I mean the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly [*alethos: cf. 382b & kalos: cf. 394e as well, both adverbs*] ordered [*kataskeuazo: cf. 372d as providing for*] mind and character [*dianoia: cf. 396e & ethos: cf. d*], not that other simplicity which is only an euphemism [*hupokorizomai: to call by endearing names*] for folly [*anoia: cf. 382e as mad*]?

Very true, he replied.

And if our youth are to do [*diokteos: to be pursued*] their work in life, must they not make these graces and harmonies their perpetual aim [*prasso: cf. 399b as circumstances*]?

They must.

**401** And surely the art of the painter and every other creative and constructive art [*demiourgia*] are full of them,—weaving, embroidery, architecture, and every kind of manufacture; also nature, animal and vegetable,—in all of them there is grace or the absence of grace [*euschemosune & aschemosune: for both, cf. c*]. And ugliness and discord [*arruthmia: lack of rhythm*] and inharmonious motion [*anarmostia*] are nearly allied to ill words and ill nature [*kakoetheia*], as grace and harmony [*sophronos: cf. 395c as temperate & ethos (with agathos): cf. e*] are the twin sisters of goodness and virtue and bear their likeness [*mimema: cf. 382b as imitation*].

That is quite true, he said.

**b** But shall our superintendence [*prosanagkazo: to command, discipline*] go no further, and are the poets only to be required by us to express the image of the good [*eikon: cf. 375d & agathos: cf. a*] in their works, on pain, if they do anything else, of expulsion from our state? Or is the same control to be extended [*epistateo: to be set over, be in charge*] to other artists, and are they also to be prohibited from exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and indecency in sculpture and building and the other creative arts; and is he who cannot conform to this rule of ours to be prevented from practicing his art in our state, lest the taste of our citizens be corrupted by him? We would not have our guardians grow up amid images of moral deformity [*eikon: cf. b & kakia: cf. 353e*

**c as defect**], as in some noxious pasture, and there browse and feed upon many a baneful herb and flower day by day, little by little, until they silently gather a festering mass of corruption in their own soul [*psuche: cf. 400d*]. Let our artists rather be those who are gifted [*euphuos, adverb: naturally suited or adapted*] to discern [*ichneuo: to track, hunt*] the true nature of the beautiful and graceful [*phusis: cf. 395d & kalos: cf. 400d & euschemon: elegant in figure, graceful*]; then will our youth dwell in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, and receive the good in everything; and beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall flow into the eye and ear, like a health-giving breeze from a purer region, and insensibly

**d** draw the soul from earliest years into likeness and sympathy [*homoiotes & philia: cf. 386a as friendship & sumphunia: concord, unison*] with the beauty of reason [*kalos: cf. c & logos: cf. 400d as style*].

There can be no nobler training [*kalos: cf. d & trepho: cf. 396c as education*] than that, he replied.

And therefore, I said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent instrument [*kurios: having power, authority & trophe: nourishment*] than any other, because rhythm and harmony [*rhuthmos & harmonia: cf. 397b for both*] find their way [*kataduo: to go down, sink*] into the inward places of the soul [*eis to entos tes psuches*], on which they mightily fasten [*rhonnumi: to strengthen & hopto: cf. 377a as teach*], imparting grace [*euschemosune: cf. 401a*], and making the soul of him who is rightly educated [*trepho: cf. d as trained*] graceful, or of him who is ill-educated ungraceful; and also because he who has received **e** this true education of the inner being will most shrewdly perceive [*oxutonos: piercing & aisthanomai: cf. 395d as observe*] omissions [*paraleipo: to leave remaining & me kalos (adverb: cf. 400e as nobly) & demiourgeo: cf. 342e as to*

practice a trade] or faults in art and nature [*ne kalos (adverb) phunon (phuo: cf. 396c)*], and with a true taste [*me duscheraino: to be unable to endure*], while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his soul [*chairo: cf. 357b as enjoyments & 402 katadechomai; to admit, with psuche: cf. c & trepho: cf. e as educated*] the good, and becomes noble and good [*kalos: cf. d as nobler & agathos: cf. b*], he will justly blame [*psego: to censure*] and hate the bad, now in the days of his youth, even before he is able to know the reason [*logos, with prin: cf. d*] why; and when reason comes he will recognize and salute [*gnorizo: to make known, explain & aspazomai: cf. 330b as acquired*] the friend [*oikeiotes: intimacy, kindness*] with whom his education has made him long familiar [*trepho: cf. e*].

Yes, he said, I quite agree [*dokeo: cf. 396c as suppose*] with you in thinking that our youth should be trained [*trepho: cf. a as familiar*] in music and on the grounds which you mention.

Just as in learning to read, I said, we were satisfied when we knew the letters of the alphabet, which are very few, in all their recurring sizes and combinations; not slighting [*lanthano: cf. 399e as unconsciously*] them as unimportant whether they occupy a space large or small, but everywhere eager to make them

**b** out [*aisthanomai: cf. e as perceive*]; and not thinking ourselves perfect in the art of reading until we recognize them wherever they are found.

True.

Or, as we recognize [*emphaino: cf. 399e for phaino as not at all*] the reflection of letters in the water, or in a mirror, only when we know the letters themselves; the same art and study [*techne: cf. 374e & melete: care, attention*] giving us the knowledge of both.

Exactly.

Even so [*pros theon: by the gods*], as I maintain, neither we nor our guardians, whom we have to **c** educate [*paideutos: verbal adjective of paideuo as in 398e*], can ever become musical until we and they know the essential forms [*eidōs: cf. 400a as principles, with sophrosune: ,cf. 390a as temperance*] in all their combinations [*adelphos: kinsman*], and can recognize [*gnorizo: cf. 402a as salute & aisthanomai: cf. b as to make out*] them and their images wherever they are found, not slighting [*atimazo: cf. 396e as to be beneath*] them either in small things or great, but believing [*oiomai: cf. 397a as will be*] them all to be within the sphere of one art and study [*techne & melete: cf. b for both*].

Most assuredly.

**d** And when a beautiful soul harmonizes [*sumpipto: to fall together*] with a beautiful form [*kale ethe or ethos: cf. 400e*], and the two are cast [*homologeō: cf. 392b as principle*] in one mold [*eidōs: cf. c as form*], that will be the fairest of sights to him who has an eye to see [*theama: sight & theaomai: cf. 369a as imagine*] it?

The fairest indeed.

And the fairest is also the loveliest [*kalos: cf. 402a as good & erasmios: desired*]?

That may be assumed.

And the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in love [*erao*] with the loveliest [*malista: superlative for mala*]; but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul [*asumphonos: discordant*]?

That is true, he replied, if the deficiency [*elleipo: to leave behind, fall short of, with psuche: cf. 401e*] be in his soul; but if there be any merely bodily [*soma, with kata*] defect in another he will be patient of

**e** [*hupomeno: to stay behind, submit to*] it, and will love [*aspazomai: cf. 402a as salute*] all the same.

I perceive, [*manthano: cf. 396b as understand*] I said, that you have or have had experiences of this sort

[*paidikos, adjective: boyish, youthful. Reference is to a relationship with a young boy*], and I agree [*sugchoreo: cf. 385e as promise*]. But let me ask you another question: has excess of pleasure [*hupoballo: to cast beyond & hedone: cf. 389e*] any affinity to temperance [*koinonia: cf. 371b as society & sophrosune: cf. c as essential forms*]?

How can that be?, he replied; pleasure deprives a man of the use of his faculties quite as much as pain [*lupe: grief*].

Or any affinity to virtue [*arete: cf. 381c*] in general?