

The Republic by Plato
(two of four)

403 None whatever.

Any affinity to wantonness and intemperance [*hubris & akolasia*]?

Yes, the greatest.

And is there any greater or keener [*oxus: sharp, keen*] pleasure [*hedone: cf. 402e as pleasure*] than that of sensual love [*aphrodisia: cf. 389e*]?

No, nor a madder [*manikos: frantic*].

Whereas true love [*orthos eros*] is a love [*erao: cf. 402d*] of beauty and order [*kalos: cf.402d as loveliest & kosmios: cf. 399e*]—temperate and harmonious [*sophronos, adverb: cf. 332a as (not in) right senses & mousikos, adverb: suitably*]?

Quite true, he said.

Then no intemperance or madness [*akolasia: cf. a & manikos: cf. a*] should be allowed to approach [*suggenes: natural, congenital*] true love?

Certainly not.

b Then mad or intemperate pleasure [*hedone: cf. a*] must never be allowed to come near [*koinoneo: cf. 370a as partnership*] the lover and his beloved [*erastes & paidikos: cf. 402e*]; neither of them can have any part in it if their love is of the right sort?

No, indeed, Socrates, it must never come near them.

Then I suppose that in the city which we are founding [*oikizo: cf. 371c*] you would make a law [*nomotheteo: cf. 398b as will follow*] to the effect that a friend [*phileo: cf. 334b as love*] should use no other familiarity to his love [*suneimi: to be with & hupto: cf. 401d as fasten*] than a father would use [*peitho: cf. 399b as persuasion (meta prefixed to verb)*] to his son, and then only for a noble purpose [*kalos, cf. a as beauty*], and he must first have the other's consent [*homileo: to be in company with*]; and this rule is to limit him in all his intercourse, and he is never to be seen going further [*suggignomai: cf. c 330c as company*], or, if he exceeds, he is to be deemed [*huphiemi: to let down, surrender*] guilty [*psogos: cf. 360e as censuring*] of coarseness and bad taste [*amousia: lack of refinement & apeirokalia: ignorance*].

I quite agree, he said.

Thus much of music [*ho peri mousikes logos*], which makes a fair ending [*phaino: cf. 402b as recognize & telos: cf. 392c as enough*]; for what should be the end of [*teleute: completion*] music if not the love of beauty [*ta erotika & kalos: cf. b as nobler*]?

I agree, he said.

After music comes gymnastic in which our youth are next to be trained [*threpteos: to be fed*].

Certainly.

Gymnastic as well as music should begin in early years; the training [*trepho: cf. 402a as trained*] in it should be careful [*akribos, adverb: cf. 346b as exact*] and should continue through life. Now my belief

d is,—and this is a matter upon which I should like to have your opinion in confirmation of my own [*skeptomai: cf. 392c as treated*], but my own belief is [*phaino: cf.c as fair ending*]—not that the good body by any bodily excellence [*arete: cf. 402e as virtue*] improves the soul [*psuche: cf. 402d & agathos: cf. 402a as good*], but, on the contrary, that the good soul, by her own excellence, improves [*parecho: cf. 344d as defend his position & beltistos: superlative of agathos*] the body as far as this may be possible. What do you say [*phaino: cf. d*]?

Yes, I agree.

Then, to the mind [*dianoia: cf. 400e*] when adequately trained [*hikanos: worthily & therapeuo: to be an attendant, to serve*], we shall be right in handing over [*paradidomai:cf. 372d as bequeath*] the more particular care [*akribologemai: to be precise*] of the body; and in order to avoid prolixity [*marologeo: to e speak at length*] we will now only give [*huphegeomai: to guide, show the way*] the general outlines of the subject [*tupos: cf. 398d as set*].

Very good.

That they must abstain from intoxication [*methe*] has been already remarked by us; for of all persons a guardian should be the last to get drunk and not know where in the world he is.

Yes, he said; that a guardian should require another guardian to take care of him is ridiculous [*geloios: cf. 392d*] indeed.

But next, what shall we say of their food; for the men are in training [*athletes*]: for the great contest [*agon: assembly*] of all—are they not?

Yes, he said.

404 And will the habit [*hexis: possession*] of body of our ordinary athletes be suited to [*proseko: cf. 395c*] them?

Why not?

I am afraid, I said, that a habit of body such as they have is but a sleepy sort of thing, and rather perilous to health [*sphaleros: likely to trip & hugieia, with pros*]. Do you not observe that these athletes [*asketes*] sleep away their lives, and are liable to most dangerous illnesses if they depart, in ever so slight a degree, from their customary regimen [*diaitia mode of life*]?

Yes, I do.

Then, I said, a finer sort of training [*askesis*] will be required for our warrior athletes [*athletes: cf. 403e as training*], who are to be like wakeful dogs, and to see and hear with the utmost keenness; amid the many changes of water and also of food, of summer heat and winter cold, which they will have to

b endure when on a campaign, they must not be liable to break down [*akrosphales: able to trip or fall*] in health.

That is my view [*phaino: cf. 403d as say*].

The really excellent [*beltistos: cf. 403d as improves*] gymnastic is twin sister of that simple music which we were just now describing.

How so?

Why, I conceive that there is a gymnastic which, like our music, is simple and good; and especially the military gymnastic.

What do you mean?

My meaning may be learned [*manthano: cf. 402e as perceive*] from [*para*] Homer; he, you know, feeds his heroes at their feasts, when they are campaigning, on soldiers' fare; they have no fish, although they **c** are on the shores of the Hellespont, and they are not allowed boiled meats but only roast, which is the food most convenient for soldiers, requiring only that they should light a fire, and not involving the trouble of carrying about pots and pans.

True.

And I can hardly be mistaken in saying that sweet sauces are nowhere mentioned in Homer. In proscribing them, however, he is not singular; all professional athletes [*asketes: cf. 404a*] are well aware that a man who is to be in good condition [*eu hexis: cf. 404a as habit*] should take nothing of the kind.

Yes, he said; and knowing this, they are quite right in not taking them.

d Then you would not approve of Syracusan dinners, and the refinements of Sicilian cookery?

I think [*dokeo: cf. 402a as agree*] not.

Nor, if a man is to be in condition [*eu somatos hexein*], would you allow him to have a Corinthian girl as his fair friend?

Certainly not.

Neither would you approve of the delicacies, as they are thought, of Athenian confectionery?

Certainly not.

All such feeding and living [*diaitia: cf. 404a as regimen*] life may be rightly compared [*apeikazo: cf. 396d e as make a study*] by us to melody and song composed in the panharmonic style, and in all the rhythms.

Exactly.

There complexity [*poikilia: embellishment*] engendered license [*akolasia: cf. 403a as intemperance*], and here disease; whereas simplicity [*haplotes*] in music was the parent of temperance in the soul [*sophrosune: cf. 402e & psuche: cf. 403d*]; and simplicity in gymnastic of health [*hugieia: cf. 404a*] in the body.

Most true, he said.

405 But when intemperance and disease [*akolasia: cf. 404e as license & nosos*] multiply in a state, halls of justice and medicine are always being opened; and the arts of the doctor and the lawyer give themselves airs, finding how keen is the interest which not only the slaves but the freemen of a city take [*spoudazo: cf. 336e: doing our utmost*] them.

Of course.

And yet what greater proof can there be of a bad and disgraceful state of education [*paideia: cf. 385e as instruction*] than this, that not only artisans and the meaner sort of people need the skill of first-rate

physicians and judges, but also those who would profess to have had a liberal education [*en eleuthero b schemati (schema: cf. 393c as imitation): in the manner of free men*]? Is it not disgraceful, and a great sign [*tekmerion: cf. 360c as proof*] of want of good-breeding, that a man should have to go abroad for his law and physic because he has none of his own at home, and must therefore surrender himself into the hands of other men whom he makes lords and judges over him [*aporia: at a loss & oikeios: cf. 392a as gain, or at a loss as to handle the situation*]?

Of all things, he said, the most disgraceful.

Would you say 'most,' I replied, when you consider [*dokeo: cf. 404d as think*] that there is a further stage of the evil in which a man is not only a life-long litigant, passing all his days in the courts, either as plaintiff or defendant, but is actually led by his bad taste to pride [*peitho: cf. 403b as would use & kallopizo: to beautify, embellish*] himself on his litigiousness; he imagines that he is a master in c dishonesty; able to take every crooked turn, and wriggle into and out of every hole, bending like a withy and getting out of the way of justice: and all for what?—in order to gain small points not worth mentioning, he not knowing that so to order [*parecho: cf. 403d as improves*] his life as to be able to do without a napping judge is a far higher and nobler [*kalos: cf. 403b & ameionon: better, stronger*] sort of thing. Is not that still more disgraceful?

Yes, he said, that is still more disgraceful.

Well, I said, and to require the help of medicine, not when a wound has to be cured, or on occasion of d an epidemic, but just because, by indolence and a habit of life [*diaitia: cf. 340d as living*] such as we have been describing [*dierchomai: cf. 396e as illustrated*], men fill themselves with waters and winds, as if their bodies were a marsh, compelling the ingenious sons of Asclepius to find more names for diseases, such as flatulence and catarrh; is not this, too, a disgrace?

Yes, he said, they do certainly give very strange and newfangled [*atopos: out of place*] names to diseases.

Yes, I said, and I do not believe that there were any such diseases in the days of Asclepius; and this I e infer from the circumstance that the hero Eurypylos, after he has been wounded in Homer, drinks a posset of Pramnian wine well besprinkled with barley-meal and grated cheese, which are certainly 406 inflammatory, and yet the sons of Asclepius who were at the Trojan war do not blame the damsel who gives him the drink, or rebuke Patroclus, who is treating his case.

Well, he said, that was surely an extraordinary drink to be given to a person in his condition.

Not so extraordinary, I replied, if you bear in mind that in former days, as is commonly said, before the time of Herodicus, the guild of Asclepius did not practice our present system of medicine, which may be said to educate diseases. But Herodicus, being a trainer, and himself of a sickly constitution, by a b combination of training and doctoring found out a way of torturing first and chiefly himself, and secondly the rest of the world.

How was that? he said.

By the invention of lingering death; for he had a mortal disease which he perpetually tended, and as recovery was out of the question, he passed his entire life as a valetudinarian; he could do nothing but attend upon himself, and he was in constant torment whenever he departed in anything from his usual regimen, and so dying hard, by the help of science [*sophia: cf. 398a as gentlemen*] he struggled on to old age.

A rare [*kalos: cf. c as nobler*] reward of his skill [*techne: cf. 402c as study*]!

c Yes, I said; a reward which a man might fairly expect who never understood [*eido: cf. 382d as ignorant (me)*] that, if Asclepius did not instruct [*agnoia: cf. 376b as ignorance & apeiria: inexperience*] his descendants in valetudinarian arts, the omission arose, not from ignorance or inexperience of such a branch of medicine, but because he knew that in all well-ordered [*prostetaktos*] states every individual has an occupation to which he must attend [*ergazomai: cf. 374c as acquired & anagkaios: cf. 373b as natural want*], and has therefore no leisure [*schole: cf. 395a as hardly*] to spend in continually being ill. This we remark [*aisthanomai: cf. 402c as recognize*] in the case of the artisan, but, ludicrously enough, do not apply the same rule [*also aisthanomai*] to people of the richer sort [*eudaimoneo: cf. 395e as happiness*].

How do you mean? he said.

d I mean this: When a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough and ready cure; an emetic or a purge or a cautery or the knife,—these are his remedies. And if some one prescribes for him a course of dietetics, and tells him that he must swathe and swaddle his head, and all that sort of thing, he replies at once that he has no time to be ill, and that he sees no good in a life which is spent in nursing his disease to the neglect of his customary employment; and therefore bidding good-bye to

e this sort of physician, he resumes his ordinary habits [*diaitia: cf. 405d*], and either gets well and lives and does his business, or, if his constitution falls, he dies and has no more trouble.

Yes, he said, and a man in his condition of life ought to use the art of medicine thus far only.

407 Has he not, I said, an occupation [*ergon; cf. 380a as works*] and what profit would there be in his life if he were deprived of his occupation?

Quite true, he said.

But with the rich man this is otherwise; of him we do not say that he has any specially appointed work [*prokeimai: to set before one & ergon: cf. a as occupation*] which he must perform, if he would live [*apecho: to desist from & abiotos: unlivable*].

He is generally supposed to have nothing to do.

Then you never heard of the saying of Phocylides, that as soon as a man has a livelihood he should practice virtue [*askeo: to form by art, exercise & arete: cf. 403d as excellence*]?

No, he said, I think that he had better begin somewhat sooner.

Let us not have a dispute [*machomai: cf. 391b as lay hands*] with him about this, I said; but rather ask [*didasko: cf. 344d as learned*] ourselves: Is the practice of virtue [*meletao: to care for, attend*] obligatory on the rich man, or can he live without it [*abiotos: cf. a as would live*]? And if obligatory on him, then

b let us raise a further question, whether this dieting of disorders which is an impediment to the application of the mind [*prosexis: attention & nous: cf. 399b as circumstances*] in carpentering and the mechanical arts, does not equally stand in the way of [*empodizo: to fetter, thwart*] the sentiment [*parakeleuma: exhortation*] of Phocylides?

Of that, he replied, there can be no doubt; such excessive care [*epimeleia*] of the body, when carried beyond the rules of gymnastic, is most inimical to the practice of virtue.

Yes, indeed, I replied, and equally incompatible with the management of a house, an army, or an office of state.

And, what is most important of all, irreconcilable [*chalepos: cf. 378a as objectionable*] with any kind of

c study or thought or self-reflection [*mathesis & ennoeseis & melete: cf. 402c as study*]—there is a constant suspicion [*aei hupopteo*] that headache and giddiness are to be ascribed to [*eggignomai: to be born, innate*]

philosophy, and hence all practicing [*askeo: cf. a*] or making trial [*dokimazo*] of virtue [*arete: cf. a*] in the higher sense is absolutely stopped [*empodios: in the way, impeding*]; for a man is always fancying [*oiomai: cf. 402c as believing*] that he is being made ill, and is in constant anxiety [*mepote or never with lego: to stay, abate*] about the state of his body.

Yes, likely enough.

And therefore our politic Asclepius may be supposed to have exhibited [*gignosko: cf. 362a as understand*] the power of his art only to persons who, being generally of healthy constitution and habits of life [*diaitia: cf. 406e*], had a definite ailment; such as these he cured by purges and

d operations, and bade them live as usual, herein consulting the interests of the state [*politikos: cf. 345e*]; but bodies which disease had penetrated through and through he would not have attempted to cure by gradual processes of evacuation and infusion: he did not want to lengthen out good-for-nothing lives [*diaitia: cf. c*], or to have weak fathers begetting weaker sons;—if a man was

e not able to live in the ordinary way he had no business to cure him; for such a cure would have been of no use [*lusiteleo: cf. 392c as advantageous*] either to himself or to the state.

Then, he said, you regard Asclepius as a statesman.

Clearly; and his character is further illustrated by his sons. Note that they were heroes in the days of **408** old and practiced the medicines of which I am speaking at the siege of Troy: you will remember [*mimnesko: cf. 394d as imitate*] how, when Pandarus wounded Menelaus, they sucked the blood out of the wound, and sprinkled soothing remedies, but they never prescribed what the patient was afterwards to eat or drink in the case of Menelaus, any more than in the case of Eurypylos; the remedies, as they conceived, were enough to heal any man who before he was wounded was healthy and regular in

b habits [*diaitia: cf. d as lives*]; and even though he did happen to drink a posset of Pramnian wine, he might get well all the same. But they would have nothing to do with unhealthy and intemperate subjects, whose lives were of no use [*oute lusiteleo: cf. e*] either to themselves or others; the art [*techne: cf. 406b as skill*] of medicine was not designed for their good, and though they were as rich as Midas, the sons of Asclepius would have declined to attend them.

They were very acute [*komposos: cf. 376a as charming*] persons, those sons of Asclepius.

Naturally so, I replied. Nevertheless, the tragedians and Pindar disobeying [*apeitheo: to be disobedient*] our

behests, although they acknowledge that Asclepius was the son of Apollo, say also that he was bribed into healing a rich man who was at the point of death, and for this reason he was struck by lightning. But we, in accordance with the principle already affirmed [*proereo: to say beforehand*] by us, **c** will not believe [*peitho: cf. 405b as pride*] them when they tell us both;—if he was the son of a god, we maintain that he was not avaricious [*aischrokerdes: greedy of gain in a sordid way*]; or, if he was avaricious he was not the son of a god.

All that, Socrates, is excellent; but I should like to put a question to you: Ought there not to be good physicians in a state, and are not the best those who have treated the greatest number of constitutions good and bad? And are not the best judges in like manner those who are acquainted

d [*homileo: cf. 403b as consent*] with all sorts of moral natures [*phusis: cf. 401c*]?

Yes, I said, I too would have good judges and good physicians. But do you know whom I think good?

Will you tell me?

I will, if I can. Let me however note that in the same question [*logos: cf. 403c with music*] you join two things [*pragma: cf. 353b as assent*] which are not the same.

How so? he asked.

Why, I said, you join physicians and judges. Now the most skillful [*deinos: cf. 386b as terrible*] physicians are those who, from their youth upwards, have combined with the knowledge of their art [*manthano: cf. 404b as learned & techne: cf. b*] the greatest experience [*homileo: cf. d as acquainted*] of **e** disease; they had better not be robust in health, and should have had all manner of diseases in their own persons [*phusis: cf. d as natures*]. For the body, as I conceive, is not the instrument with which they cure [*therapeuo: cf. 403d as trained*] the body; in that case we could not allow them ever to be or to have been sickly; but they cure the body with the mind [*psuche: cf. 404e as soul*], and the mind which has become and is sick can cure nothing.

That is very true, he said.

409 But with the judge it is otherwise; since he governs mind [*archo: cf. 353e as superintendent & psuche: cf. 408e*] by mind; he ought not therefore to have been trained [*trepho: cf. 403c*] among vicious [*poneros: cf. 342a as deficient*] minds, and to have associated [*homileo: cf. 408d as experience*] with them from youth upwards, and to have gone through the whole calendar of crime, only in order that he may quickly infer [*oxeos: sharply & tekmaïromai: cf. 368b*] the crimes of others as he might their bodily diseases from his own self-consciousness; the honorable mind which is to form a healthy judgment should have had no experience or contamination [*apeiros: cf. 373d as unlimited & akeraïos: cf. 342b as faultless*] of evil habits [*ethos: cf. 400e as character*] when young. And this is the reason why in youth good men often appear [*phaino: cf. 404b as view*] to be simple, [*euethes: cf. 350b as amusing*] and are **b** easily practiced upon by the dishonest, because they have no examples [*paradeigma*] of what evil is in their own souls [*homoïopathe: similar feeling*].

Yes, he said, they are far too apt to be deceived [*pascho: cf. 368a as argue*].

Therefore, I said, the judge should not be young; he should have learned [*horao: cf. 357c as recognize*] to know [*aisthanomai: cf. 406c as recognize*] evil, not from [*en, in*] his own soul [*psuche: cf. a; here with oikeios: contained within the context of 405a*], but from late and long observation [*allogros: belonging to another & in pollo chrono, in much time & diaisthanomai: cf. 360e as knows*] of the nature of evil in others: knowledge **c** [*episteme: cf. 366c*] should be his guide, not personal experience [*empeiria: acquaintance with & oikeios: cf. b*].

Yes, he said, that is the ideal [*gennaïos: cf. 361b as nobleness*] of a judge.

Yes, I replied, and he will be a good man [*agathos: cf. 403d as improves*] (which is my answer to your question); for he is good who has a good soul [*psuche: cf. b with two uses of agathos*]. But the cunning and suspicious [*deinos: cf. 408d as skillful & kachupoptos*] nature of which we spoke,—he who has committed many crimes, and fancies [*oiomai: cf. 407c*] himself to be a master in [*sophos: cf. 390a as wisest*] wickedness, when he is amongst his fellows, is [*phaino: cf. a as appear*] wonderful [*deinos: cf. c as suspicious & paradeigma: cf. b as examples*] in the precautions which he takes, because he judges [*apokopeo: to look steadily, away from*] of them by himself: but when he gets into the company of men of virtue, who have the experience of age, he appears [*phaino: cf. c as is*] to be a fool [*abelteros: stupid*] again, owing to his unseasonable suspicions [*kairos, with para: cf. 374c as opportunities & apistos: not to d be trusted*]; he cannot recognize [*agignosko*] an honest man [*hugies: sound, healthy & ethos: cf. a as habits*], because he has no pattern [*paradeigma: along with deinos*] of honesty in himself; at the same time, as the bad [*pleonktikos: greedy & poneros: cf. a as*

vicious] are more numerous than the good, and he meets with them oftener, he thinks [*dokeo*: cf. 405b] as consider himself, and is by others thought to be, rather wise than foolish [*sophos*: cf. c as master & *amathestos*: not learned].

Most true, he said.

Then the good and wise [*agathos*: cf. c & *sophos*: cf. d] judge whom we are seeking is not this man, but the other; for vice [*poneria*: cf. 392a, re. laxity of morals] cannot know virtue [*arete*: cf. 407c] too, but a virtuous nature [*phusis*: cf. 408e as persons & *arete*], educated by time [*paideuo*: cf. 402c & *chronos*: cf. b], will acquire [*lambano*] a knowledge [*episteme*: cf. c] both of virtue and vice [*poneria*: cf. d]: the e virtuous, and not the vicious [*kakos*: cf. 379b as evil], man has wisdom [*sophos*, adjective: cf. d as wise]—in my opinion [*dokeo*: cf. d as thinks].

And in mine [*sundokeo*] also.

This is the sort of medicine, and this is the sort of law, which you sanction [*nomotheteo*: cf. 403b as 410 make a law] in your state. They will minister to [*therapeuo*: cf. 408e as cure] better natures [*euphues*: of good natural disposition], giving health both of soul and of body [*soma*: cf. 402d as bodily & *psuche*: cf. c]; but those who are diseased in their bodies they will leave to die, and the corrupt and incurable [*kakophues* & *aniatos*: incorrigible] souls [*using kata*] they will put an end to [*apokteino*: to kill, slay] themselves.

That is clearly the best thing [*to ariston*: superlative of *agathos*] both for the patients and for the state.

And thus our youth, having been educated only in that simple [*haplos*: cf. 404e for noun, simplicity] music which, as we said, inspires temperance [*entikto*: to bear, produce & *sophrosune*: cf. 404e], will be reluctant [*eulabeomai*: to be discreet, cautious] to go to law.

Clearly.

b And the musician, who, keeping to the same track [*ichne*: trace], is content to practice the simple gymnastic, will have nothing to do with medicine unless in some extreme case.

That I quite believe [*dokeo*: cf. 409e as opinion].

The very exercises and toils which he undergoes are intended to stimulate the spirited element [*thumoeides*: cf. 376c as spirit] of his nature, and not to increase his strength; he will not, like common athletes, use [*metacheirazo*: to administer, manage] exercise and regimen to develop his muscles.

Very right, he said.

Neither are the two arts of music and gymnastic really designed [*kathistemi*: cf. 395 as continuing], as is c often supposed [*oiomai*: cf. 409c as fancies] Glaucon, the one for the training of the soul [*paideuo*: cf. 409d & *psuche*: cf. 410a], the other for the training [*therapeuo*: cf. a as minister to] of the body.

What then is the real object of them?

I believe, I said, that the teachers of both have in view [*kinduneuo*: cf. 334e as to have fallen] chiefly the improvement [*kathistemi*: cf. b as designed] of the soul.

How can that be?, he asked.

Did you never observe [*ennoeo*: cf. 377d as know], I said, the effect [*homileo*: cf. 409a as associated] on the mind [*dianoia*: cf. 403d] itself of exclusive devotion to [*diatithemi*: to arrange, dispose] gymnastic, or the opposite effect of an exclusive devotion to music?

In what way shown?, he said.

d The one producing a temper of hardness and ferocity [*agriotes*: savagery & *sklerotes*: toughness], the other of softness and effeminacy [*malakia* & *hemerotes*: gentleness], I replied.

Yes, he said, I am quite aware that the mere athlete becomes [*apobaino*: cf. 399c as in the event] too much [*akratos*: cf. 397d as pure] of a savage [*agriotes*: cf. 329c as furious], and that the mere musician is melted and softened [*malakos*: cf. 387c as effeminate] beyond what is good [*kalos*: cf. 406b as rare] for him.

Yet surely, I said, this ferocity [*agriotes*: cf. d] only comes [*phusis*: cf. 409d as nature & *parecho*: cf. 405c as to order] from spirit [*thumoeides*: cf. b], which, if rightly educated [*trepho*: 409a as trained], would give courage [*andreios*: cf. 399e as courageous], but, if too much intensified [*epitithemi*: to put on, impose], is liable to become hard and brutal [*skleros*: cf. d for *sklerotes*, toughness & *chalepos*: cf. 407b as irreconcilable].

That I quite think.

e On the other hand the philosopher will have the quality of gentleness [*phusis*: cf. d as nature & *hemeros*: tame]. And this also, when too much indulged [*anatithemi*: to refer, ascribe], will turn to softness [*malakos*: cf. d as softened], but, if educated [*trepho*: cf. d] rightly, will be gentle and moderate [*hemeros* & *kosmios*: cf. 403a as order].

True.

And in our opinion the guardians ought to have both these qualities [*phusis: cf. e*]?

Assuredly.

And both should be in harmony [*harmozo, with pros: cf. 397d as unsuitable (with ouk)*]?

Beyond question.

And the harmonious soul is both temperate and courageous [*sophronizo: cf. 399e as wisely & andreios: 411 cf. d*]?

Yes.

And the inharmonious is cowardly and boorish [*deilos: miserable & agroikos: cf. agrios, 410d as ferocity*]?

Very true.

And, when a man allows [*parecho: cf. 410d as comes*] music to play upon him and to pour into his soul [*katacheo & psuche: cf. 410c*] through the funnel of his ears those sweet and soft and melancholy airs [*threnodes: like a dirge & harmonia: cf. 401d as harmony*] of which we were just now speaking, and his whole life is passed [*diateleo: cf. 395d as beginning*] in warbling and the delights of song; in the first stage of the process the passion or spirit [*thumoeides: cf. 410d*] which is in him is tempered like iron, and **b** made useful, instead of brittle and useless. But, if he carries on [*epecho: to direct towards, aim*] the softening and soothing process [*aniemi: to produce, devote oneself & keleo: cf. 358b as charmed*], in the next stage he begins to melt and waste, until he has wasted away [*leibo: to pour out*] his spirit [*thumos: cf. 375a*] and cut out the sinews of his soul; and he becomes a feeble warrior [*malthakos: cf. 410e for malakos, softness & aichmetes: spearman*].

Very true.

If the element of spirit is naturally weak [*athumos: lacking thumos as in b*] & *phusis: cf. 410e as qualities*] in him the change is speedily accomplished [*diaprasso: to effect, settle*], but if he have a good deal [*thumoeides: cf. a*], then the power of music weakening the spirit [*thumos: cf. b*] renders him excitable [*apergazomai: cf. 374c as done & oxuppos: turning quickly*];—on the least provocation he flames up at once, and is speedily extinguished; instead of having spirit [*thumoeides: cf. b*] he grows irritable and **c** passionate [*akracholos: quick to anger & orgilos: prone to anger*] and is quite impracticable [*duskolia: discontent & empiplēmi: to fill*].

Exactly.

And so in gymnastics, if a man takes violent exercise [*polla pone: much hard work*] and is a great feeder, and the reverse [*hapto: cf. 401d as to fasten; here as never touches*] of a great student of music and philosophy, at first the high condition [*ischos: strong*] of his body fills him with pride and spirit [*phronema: mind, spirit, arrogance & thumos: cf. b*], and he becomes twice the man [*andreios: cf. 410e as courageous*] that he was. Certainly.

And what happens? If he do nothing else, and holds no converse [*koinoneo: cf. 403b as come near*] with **d** the Muses, does not even that intelligence which there may be in him [*philomathes: cf. 376b & psuche: cf. a*], having no taste of [*metecho: cf. 396e as will be*] any sort of learning or enquiry or thought or culture [*mathema & zetema & logos: cf. 408d as question*], grow feeble and dull and blind, his mind never waking up or receiving nourishment, and his senses [*aisthesis: perception*] not being purged [*diakathairo: to cleanse thoroughly*] of their mists?

True, he said.

And he ends by becoming a hater of philosophy [*misologos & amousos: hating music*], uncivilized, never using the weapon of persuasion [*peitho: cf. 408c as believe, here with logos*],—he is like a wild beast, all **e** violence and fierceness [*bia: bodily strength, force & agriotes: cf. 410d*], and knows no other way of dealing [*diaprasso: cf. b as accomplished*]; and he lives in all ignorance and evil conditions [*amathos: without knowledge & skaiotes: awkwardness, left-handedness*], and has no sense of propriety and grace [*arruthmia: want of rhythm & acharistia: ingratitude*].

That is quite true, he said.

And as there are two principles of human nature, one the spirited and the other the philosophical, some God, as I should say [*phaino: cf. 409c as appears*], has given mankind two arts [*techne: cf. 408d*] answering to them (and only indirectly to [*parergon: beside the main subject & epi: upon*] the soul and body), in order that these two principles (like the strings of an instrument) may be relaxed or drawn **412** tighter [*aniemi: cf. b as softening & epiteino: to stretch on a frame*] until they are duly harmonized [*sunharmozo*].

That appears to be the intention.

And he who mingles [*kerannumi: cf. 397d as mixed*] music with gymnastic in the fairest proportions [*kalos, used in superlative: cf. 410d as good*], and best impresses [*prosphero: to apply & metrios: cf. 439b as wisely*] it on the soul, may be rightly [*teleos, adverb: cf. 361a as perfectly*] called [*sunistemi: to set together, associate*] the true musician and harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of the strings.

You are quite right, Socrates.

And such a presiding genius [*epistates: one who stands near, a commander*] will be always required in our state if the government is to last [*politeia: cf. 397d as state & sozo: to save*].

b Yes, he will be absolutely necessary.

Such, then, are our principles [*tupos: cf. 403e as subject*] of nurture and education [*trophe: cf. 401d as instrument & paideia: cf. 405a*]. What would be the use of going into further details about the dances of our citizens, or about their hunting and coursing, their gymnastic and equestrian contests? For these all follow [*hepo: cf. 400d as depend*] the general principle, and having found that, we shall have no difficulty in discovering [*chalepos: cf. 410d as brutal & heurisko: cf. 373e*] them.

I dare say that there will be no difficulty.

Very good, I said; then what is the next question? Must we not ask who are to be rulers and who subjects [*arxousi & arxontai (from archo: cf. 389b as rulers)*]?

c Certainly.

There can be no doubt that the elder must rule the younger.

Clearly.

And that the best [*aristos: cf. 381c*] of these must rule.

That is also clear.

Now, are not the best husbandmen those who are most devoted to husbandry?

Yes.

And as we are to have the best [*aristos: cf. c*] of guardians for our city, must they not be those who have most the character of guardians [*phulasso: cf. 367a as watch*]?

Yes.

And to this end they ought to be wise and efficient [*phronimos: cf. 381a & dunatos: strong*], and to have a special care of [*kedeuo: cf. 395d*] the state?

d True.

And a man will be most likely to care about that which he loves [*kedeuo: cf. c & phileo: cf. 403b as friend*]?

To be sure.

And he will be most likely to love [*phileo*] that which he regards as having the same interests [*sumphero: cf. 367c as interest*] with himself, and that of which the good or evil fortune [*eu & prasso (cf. 400e as aim) and me*] is supposed by him at any time most to affect [*sumbaino: cf. 375c as infer*] his own?

Very true, he replied.

Then there must be a selection [*eklego: to pick out, choose*]. Let us note among the guardians those who in their whole life show [*phaino: cf. 411e as say*] the greatest eagerness [*skopeo: cf. 387d as right*] to **e** do what is for the good [*sumphero: cf. d as interests & prothumia: readiness, willingness*] of their country [*polis: cf. 389b as state*], and the greatest repugnance to do what is against her interests [*meden & tropos: cf. 400d as style*]. Those are the right men [*epitedeios: cf. 390c as sort of thing*].

And they will have to be watched [*tereo: to guard, with dokeo: cf. 410b as believe*] at every age, in order that we may see whether they preserve their resolution [*phulaktikos: observant, vigilant with dogma: opinion, ordinance*], and never, under the influence either of force or enchantment [*biazo: cf. 365d & goeteuo: cf. 381e as witchcraft*], forget or cast off their sense [*doxa: cf. 367d as good*] of duty [*beltistos: cf. 404b as excellent*] to the state.

How cast off?, he said.

I will explain to you, I replied. A resolution may go out of a man's mind [*phaino: cf. d as show & dianoiia: cf. 410c*] either with his will or against his will [*hekousios & akousios, adverbs*]; with his will

413 when he gets rid of a falsehood [*pseude: cf. 389b for pseudos, a lie*] and learns [*metamanthano: to learn different; cf. 408d for manthano as art*] better, against his will whenever he is deprived of a truth [*alethe*].

I understand [*manthano: cf. a*], he said, the willing loss of a resolution; the meaning of the unwilling [*to hekousios & to akousios: for adverbs, cf. 412e*] I have yet to learn [*manthano*].

Why, I said, do you not see that men are unwillingly deprived of good [*stereo: cf. 353e & agathos: cf. 409d*], and willingly of evil [*kakos: cf. 409e as vicious*]? Is not to have lost the truth an evil, and to possess the truth

a good? And you would agree that to conceive [*doxazo: cf. 363e as reputed*] things as they are is to possess the truth?

Yes, he replied; I agree with you in thinking that mankind is deprived [*stereo: cf. a*] of truth against their will [*akontes*].

b And is not this involuntary deprivation caused either by theft, or force, or enchantment [*goeteuo: cf. 412e*] ? Still, he replied, I do not understand [*manthano: cf. a*] you.

I fear that I must have been talking darkly [*kinduneuo: cf. 410c as have in view*], like the tragedians. I only mean that some men are changed by persuasion [*metapeitho: cf. 399b*] and that others forget [*epilanthanomai: cf. 402a for lanthano as slighting*] argument [*logos: cf. 411d*] steals away [*exaireo: to take out of*] the hearts of one class, and time of the other; and this I call theft. Now you understand [*manthano: cf. a*] me?

Yes.

Those again who are forced [*biazo: cf. 412e*] are those whom the violence of some pain or grief compels to change their opinion [*metadoxazo: cf. 412e for doxa*].

I understand [*manthano: cf. b*], he said, and you are quite right.

c And you would also acknowledge that the enchanted [*goeteuo: cf. b*] are those who change their minds [*metadoxazo: cf. b as change their opinion*] either under the softer influence [*keleo: to enchant, bewitch*] of pleasure [*hedone: cf. 403b*], or the sterner influence of fear [*phobos*]?

Yes, he said; everything that deceives [*apatao: cf. 380d*] may be said to enchant [*goeteuo: cf. c*].

Therefore, as I was just now saying, we must enquire [*zeteo: cf. 342b as correct*] who are the best [*aristos: cf. 412c*] guardians of their own conviction [*dogma: cf. 412e as resolution*] that what they think the interest [*beltistos: cf. 412e as duty*] of the state is to be the rule of their lives. We must watch [*tereo: cf. 412e*] them from their youth upwards, and make them perform [*protithemi: to set before*] actions [*ergos: cf. 400a as duty*] in which they are most likely to forget or to be deceived [*epilanthanomai: cf. b & exapatao: cf. 381e as deception*], and he who remembers and is not deceived [*dusexapatao: to be hard to deceive*] is to **d** be selected [*egkriteon*], and he who falls in the trial is to be rejected. That will be the way?

Yes.

And there should also be toils and pains and conflicts [*ponos & algedon & agon: cf. 403e as contest*] prescribed [*theteon: from tithemi, to set, place as in 348e*] for them, in which they will be made to give further proof [*tereteon: from tereo as c, watch*] in of the same qualities.

Very right, he replied.

And then, I said, we must try them with enchantments [*goeteia: cf. goeteuo, b*] that is the third sort of test [*eidosis: cf. 402d as mold & hamilla: a trial of strength*]—and see what will be their behavior: like those who take colts amid noise and tumult to see [*skopeo: cf. 412d as eagerness*] if they are of a timid [*phoberos: fearful*] nature, so must we take our youth amid terrors of some kind, and again pass

e [*metaballo: cf. 385a as transform*] them into pleasures [*hedone: cf. c*], and prove [*basanizo: to torment*] them more thoroughly than gold is proved in the furnace, that we may discover [*phaino: cf. 412e with respect to man's mind*] whether they are armed against all enchantments [*dusgoeteuo*], and of a noble bearing [*euschemon: cf. 401c as graceful*] always, good guardians of themselves and of the music which they have learned [*manthano: cf. b as understand*], and retaining [*parecho: cf. 411a as allows*] under all circumstances a rhythmical and harmonious nature [*euruthmos & euarmonstos*], such as will be most serviceable [*chresimos*] to the individual and to the state. And he who at every age, as boy and **414** youth and in mature life, has come out of the trial [*basanizo: cf. e as prove*] victorious and pure, shall be appointed a ruler [*archo: cf. 412b*] and guardian of the state; he shall be honored in life and death [*teleute: cf. 403c as end*], and shall receive sepulture and other memorials of honor, the greatest that we have to give. But him who fails, we must reject [*apokrino: to separate, set apart*]. I am inclined to think that this is the sort of way in which our rulers and guardians should be chosen and appointed. I speak generally [*tupos, with en (in): cf. 412b as principles*], and not with any pretension to exactness [*akribeia, with dia & me (not): cf. 395c as wholly*].

b And, speaking generally, I agree with you [*phaino: cf. 413e as discover*], he said.

And perhaps the word 'guardian' in the fullest sense [*orthos: cf. 403a as true*] ought to be applied to this higher class [*panteles: complete, entire*] only who preserve us against foreign enemies and maintain peace among our citizens at home, that the one may not have the will, or the others the power, to harm [*kakourgo: kakos & ergo*] us. The young men whom we before called guardians may be more properly designated auxiliaries and supporters of the principles [*epikouros & boethos & dogma: cf. 413c as conviction*] of the rulers. I agree with you [*dokeo: cf. 412e*], he said.

How then may we devise [*gignomai: cf. 380b as author & mechane: instrument*] one of those needful falsehoods [*pseudos: cf. 413a & en deonti*] of which we lately spoke—just one royal lie which may c deceive the rulers, if that be possible [*peitho: cf. 411d as persuasion*], and at any rate the rest of the city? What sort of lie?, he said.

Nothing new, I replied; only an old Phoenician tale of what has often occurred before now in other places, (as the poets say, and have made the world believe [*peitho: cf. c as possible*],) though not in our time [*eph' hemon: literally, upon us*], and I do not know whether such an event could ever happen again, or could now even be made probable [*peitho: used twice*], if it did.

How your words seem to hesitate [*okneo: to shrink from*] on your lips!

You will not wonder, I replied, at my hesitation when you have heard.

Speak, he said, and fear not.

d Well then, I will speak, although I really know not how to look you in the face [*tolma: courage*], or in what words to utter the audacious fiction, which I propose to communicate [*peitho: cf. c*] gradually, first to the rulers, then to the soldiers, and lastly to the people. They are to be told that their youth was a dream, and the education and training [*trepho: cf. 410e as educated & paideuo: cf. 410c*] which they received from us, an appearance [*oneiros: dream with pascho: cf. 410b as deceived*] only; in reality during all that time they were being formed and fed in the womb of the earth, where they themselves

e and their arms and appurtenances were manufactured; when they were completed [*pantelos, adverb: completely*], the earth, their mother, sent them up; and so, their country being their mother and also their nurse, they are bound to advise for her good, and to defend her against attacks, and her citizens they are to regard [*dianoeomai: cf. 349a as mind*] as children of the earth and their own brothers.

You had good reason, he said, to be ashamed [*aischuno: cf. 396c*] of the lie [*pseudos: cf. b as falsehoods*] which you were going to tell.

415 True, I replied, but there is more coming; I have only told you half [*muthos: cf. 398b as myth*]. Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale [*muthologeio: cf. 392b as say*], you are brothers, yet God has framed [*plasso: cf. 377c as fashioned*] you differently. Some of you have the power of command [*hikanos: 403d as adequately & archo: cf. 409a as governs*], and in the composition [*genesis: cf. 359a as origin*] of these he has mingled [*summignumi: to commingle*] gold, wherefore also they have the greatest honor [*timios: honored*]; others he has made of silver, to be auxiliaries [*epikouros: cf. 414b*]; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of brass and iron; and the species [*suggenes: cf. 403a as allowed to approach*] will generally be preserved [*polu homoios (cf. 349d as like): b much alike*] in the children. But as all are of the same original stock, a golden parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden son. And God [*ho theos: cf. 392a as gods*] proclaims [*paraggello: to transmit as a message*] as a first principle [*proton*] to the rulers, and above all else, that there is nothing which should so anxiously guard [*phulasso: cf. 412c as guardians; verbal root of (good) guardians*], or of which they are to be such good guardians, as of the purity of the race [*ekgonos: born of*]. They should observe what elements mingle [*paramignumi: to intermix, with psuche: cf. 411d*] in their offspring; for if the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron, then nature orders a transposition of ranks [*proseko: cf. 404a as suited to & time: honor; cf. a as timios*], and c the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful towards [*kateleoo & tropos: cf. 412e as interests*] the child because he has to descend in the scale [*eis, into*] and become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be sons of artisans who having an admixture of gold or silver in them are raised to honor, and become guardians or auxiliaries [*phulake: cf. 388a as defenders & epikouria: aid; cf. a for epikouros*]. For an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the state, it will be destroyed. Such is the tale [*muthos: cf. a for half*]; is there any possibility of making our citizens believe [*peitho: cf. 414d as communicate*] in it?

d Not in the present generation, he replied; there is no way of accomplishing this; but their sons may be made to believe in the tale, and their sons' sons, and posterity after them.

I see [*manthano: cf. 413e as learned*] the difficulty, I replied; yet the fostering of such a belief will make them care [*kedeuo: cf. 412d as loves*] more for the city and for one another. Enough, however, of the fiction, which may now fly abroad upon the wings of rumor [*pheme: voice, common saying*], while we arm our earth-born heroes, and lead them forth under the command of their rulers. Let them look round and select a spot whence they can best [*kalos: cf. 412a as fairest*] suppress insurrection, if any

e prove refractory within, and also defend themselves against enemies, who like wolves may come down on the fold from without; there let them encamp, and when they have encamped, let them sacrifice to the proper Gods and prepare their dwellings [*eune: marriage bed, abode*].

Just so, he said.

And their dwellings must be such as will shield them against the cold of winter and the heat of summer.

I suppose that you mean houses, he replied.

Yes, I said; but they must be the houses of soldiers, and not of shop-keepers.

416 What is the difference [*diaphero: cf. 351d as quarrel*]? he said.

That I will endeavor [*peirao: cf. 392e as in illustration*] to explain, I replied. To keep watchdogs, who, from want of discipline or hunger, or some evil habit, or evil habit or other, would turn upon the sheep and worry them, and behave not like dogs but wolves, would be [*homoioo: cf. 400d as assimilate*] a foul and monstrous thing [*kakos: cf. 413a as evil & ethos: cf. 409d as honest man & kakouergo: to do evil*] in a shepherd?

Truly monstrous [*deinos: cf. 409d as no*], he said.

b And therefore every care must be taken [*phulasso: cf. 415b as guard & tropos: cf. 415c re. pitiful towards*] that our auxiliaries [*epikouros: cf. 415a*], being stronger than our citizens, may not grow to be too much for them and become savage tyrants [*agrios: cf. 411a as boorish & despotes: cf. 329c as master*] instead of friends and allies [*summacheo: to fight along with others & eumeneo: to be gracious*]?

Yes, great care should be taken.

And would not a really good education [*paideuo: cf. 415d*] furnish [*paraskeuazo: cf. 372a as established*] the best safeguard [*eulabeia: caution, reverence*]?

But they are well-educated already, he replied.

I cannot be so confident [*diischurizomai: to lean upon, rely, affirm*], my dear Glaucon, I said; I am much **c** certain that they ought to be, and that true education [*orthos: cf. 414b as fullest sense & paideia: cf. 412b*], whatever that may be, will have the greatest tendency to civilize and humanize [*hemeros, with pros: cf. 410e as moderate*] them in their relations to one another, and to those who are under their protection [*phulasso: cf. care must be taken*].

Very true, he replied.

And not only their education but their habitations [*paideia: cf. c & oikesis*] and all [*ousia: cf. 362a as money*] that belongs to them, should be such [*phaino: cf. 414b as agree with*] as will neither impair their virtue [*pauo: cf. 329c as relax*] as guardians [*aristos: cf. 414c; prefaced to guardians*], nor tempt them to **d** prey upon [*peirao: cf. a as endeavor & kakourgo: cf. 414b as to harm*] the other citizens. Any man of sense must acknowledge that.

Then let us consider what will be their way [*tropos: cf. b as care*] of life [*oikeo: to inhabit, occupy*], if they are to realize our idea of them. In the first place, none of them should have any property of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary; neither should they have a private house or store closed against any one who has a mind to enter; their provisions should be only such as are required by trained

e warriors, who are men of temperance and courage [*sophronos: cf. 403a & andreios: cf. 411c as twice the man*]; they should agree to receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay, enough to meet the expenses of the year and no more; and they will go and live together like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from God [*para theon (plural)*]; the diviner metal is within them [*psuche: cf. 415a*], and they have therefore no need of the dross which is current among men, and ought not to pollute [*miaino: to stain, dye*] the divine [*hosios: cf. 395c as holy & ktisis: cf. 373d as accumulation*] by any such earthly admixture [*summignumi; cf. 415a as mingled*] for that commoner metal has been the **417** (number 418 missing in critical edition) source [*nomisma: custom, usage, coin*] of many unholy deeds [*anosios: cf. 363d as wicked*], but their own is undefiled [*akeratos: unmixed*]. And they alone of all the citizens may not touch or handle [*hpto: cf. 411c as the reverse & metacheirazo: cf. 410b as use*] silver or gold, or be under the same roof with them, or wear them, or drink from them. And this will be their salvation, and they will be the saviors [*sozo: cf. 412a as to last; verb used twice*] of the state. But should they ever acquire homes or lands or moneys of their own, they will become housekeepers and

b husbandmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants [*despotes: cf. 416b*] instead of allies [*summacheo: cf. 416b*] of the other citizens; hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they will pass their whole life in much greater terror of internal than of external [*endon/exothen*] enemies, and the hour of ruin [*olethros: death*], both to themselves and to the rest of the state, will be at hand. For all which reasons may we not say that thus shall our state be ordered, and that these shall be the regulations appointed by us [*nomotheteo: cf. 409e as sanction with kataskeuazo: cf. 400e, regarding houses of guardians*] for guardians concerning their houses and all other matters? Or don't you agree?

Yes, said Glaucon.

Book Four

419 Here Adeimantus interposed a question [*hupolambano: cf. 394b as conceived*], How would you answer [*apologeomai: to defend oneself*], Socrates, said he, if a person were to say that you are making these people miserable [*eudaimoneo: cf. 406c as richer sort; with me (not)*], and that they are the cause of their own unhappiness [*di' heautous or through themselves*]; the city in fact belongs to them, but they are none the better for it [*apolauo: to enjoy, have the benefit; with meden*]; whereas other men acquire lands, and build large and handsome houses, and have everything handsome about them, offering sacrifices to the gods on their own account, and practicing hospitality; moreover, as you were saying just now, they have gold and silver, and all that is usual [*nomizo: cf. 372d as why*] among the favorites of fortune; but our poor citizens are no better [*phaino: cf. 416c as should be such*] than

420 mercenaries [*epikouros: cf. 416b as auxiliaries*] who are quartered in the city and are always mounting guard [*phoureo: to keep watch*]?

Yes, I said; and you may add that they are only fed, and not paid in addition to their food, like other men; and therefore they cannot, if they would, take a journey of pleasure; they have no money to spend on a mistress or any other luxurious fancy, which, as the world goes, is thought to be happiness [*eudaimoneo: cf. 419a*]; and many other accusations [*katēgoria*] of the same nature might be added.

But, said he, let us suppose all this to be included in the charge.

b You mean to ask, I said, what will be our answer [*apologeomia: cf. 419a*]?

Yes.

If we proceed along the old path, my belief, I said, is that we shall find the answer. And our answer will be that, even as they are [*thaumastos: wonderful*], our guardians may very likely be the happiest of men [*eudaimoneo: cf. a*]; but that our aim [*blepo, with pros touto or to this: cf. 345c as with a view*] in founding [*oikizo: cf. 403b*] the state was not the disproportionate happiness [*diapherontos (adverb): differently, at odds with & eudaimon: cf. 392b as happy*] of any one class, but the greatest happiness of the whole; we thought [*oiomai: cf. 410c as supposed & heurisko: cf. 412b as discovering*] that in a state which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should be most likely to find justice, and in the ill-ordered [*kakizo: to abuse, be worsted*] state injustice [*adikia: cf. 376d*] and, having found them,

c we might then decide [*kateidon: cf. 376d as final end*] which of the two is the happier. At present, I take it, we are fashioning the happy state [*plasso: cf. 415a as framed & eudaimoneo: b*], not piecemeal, or with a view of [*tithemi: cf. 348e as set in place*] making a few happy citizens, but as a whole; and by-and-by we will proceed to view [*skeptomai: cf. 403d as in confirmation*] the opposite kind of state. Suppose that we were painting a statue, and some one came up to us and said, Why do you not put the most beautiful colors on the most beautiful parts of the body—the eyes ought to be purple, but you

d have made them black—to him we might fairly answer, Sir, you would not surely have us beautify the eyes to such a degree that they are no longer eyes; consider [*athreo: to gaze, observe*] rather whether, by giving this and the other features their due proportion [*proseko: cf. 415b as a transposition of ranks*], we make the whole beautiful [*kalos: cf. 415d*]. And so I say to you, do not compel [*anagkazo*] us to assign [*prosapto: to attach to, attribute*] to the guardians a sort of happiness [*eudaimonia: cf. 365c*] which will

e make them anything but guardians; for we too can clothe our husbandmen in royal apparel, and set crowns of gold on their heads, and bid them till the ground as much as they like, and no more. Our potters also might be allowed to repose on couches, and feast by the fireside, passing round the wine cup, while their wheel is conveniently at hand, and working at pottery only as much as they like; in this way we might make every class happy [*makarios: cf. 358a*]—and then, as you imagine, the whole state would be happy [*eudaimoneo: cf. c*]. But do not put this idea into our heads [*noutheto: to admonish, advise*]; for, if we listen to [*peitho: cf. 415c as believe*] you, the husbandman will be no longer a

421 husbandman, the potter will cease to be a potter, and no one will have the character of any distinct class [*schema: cf. 405a as education*] in the state. Now this [*logos: cf. 413b as argument*] is not of much consequence where the corruption of society, and pretension to be what you are not [*phaulos: cf. 397a as lie & diphtheiro: to destroy utterly, corrupt*], is confined to cobblers; but when the guardians of the laws [*nomos: cf. 385e*] and of the government are only seemingly and not real [*me ontes alla dokountes*] guardians, then see how they turn the state upside down [*apollumi: to destroy, demolish*]; and on the other hand they alone have the power of giving order and happiness [*kairos: cf. 409c as unseasonable & b eu oikeo: cf. 416d as life &*

eudaimoneo: cf. 420e] to the state. We mean our guardians to be true saviors [*alethos*, adverb: cf. 382b] and not the destroyers [*kakourgos*] of the state, whereas our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival, who are enjoying a life of revelry, not of citizens who are doing their duty to the state. But, if so, we mean different things, and he is speaking of something which is not a state. And therefore we must consider [*skeptomai*: cf. 420c as proceed to view] whether in appointing [*kathistemi*: cf. 410c as improvement] our guardians we would look to [*blepo*: cf. 420b as aim] their greatest happiness [*eudaimoneo*: cf. b] individually, or whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the state as a whole. But the latter be the truth, then the c guardians and auxiliaries, and all others equally with them, must be compelled or induced [*peitho*: cf. 420e as listen to] to do their own work in the best way [*aristos*: cf. 416c as prefaced to guardians]. And thus the whole state will grow up in a noble order [*kalos*, adverb: cf. 394e as well & *oikizo*: cf. 420b as founding], and the several classes will receive the proportion of happiness [*metalambano*: cf. 369c as exchange & *eudaimonia*: cf. 420d] which nature assigns [*phusis*: cf. 411b & *apodidomi*: to give back, restore] to them.

I think that you are quite right [*kalos*, adverb: cf. c & *dokeo*: cf. 414b as agree with].

I wonder whether you will agree with another remark which occurs to me [*to toutou adelphon* (of this relation or brother) & *dokeo*: cf. c].

What may that be?

d There seem to be [*skeptomai*: cf. b as consider] two causes of the deterioration [*diaphtheiro*: to destroy utterly] of the arts [*demiourgos*: cf. 395b as business; also as skilled craftsman].

What are they?

Wealth, I said, and poverty [*ploutos* & *penia*].

How do they act?

The process is as follows: When a potter becomes rich, will he, think [*dokeo*: cf. c as occurs] you, any longer take the same pains with his art [*epimeleomai*: cf. 365e as care & *techné*: cf. 411e]?

Certainly not.

He will grow more and more indolent and careless [*argos*: not working the ground & *ameles* or lacking *epimeleomai*]?

Very true.

And the result will be that he becomes a worse [*kakos*: cf. 416a as monstrous thing] potter?

Yes; he greatly deteriorates.

But, on the other hand, if he has no money [*parecho*: cf. 413e as retaining & *penia*, with *hupo*: cf. d as poverty], and cannot provide himself tools or instruments, he will not work equally well [*cheiron*: worse, e inferior] himself, nor will he teach [*didasko*: cf. 407a as ask] his sons or apprentices to work equally well.

Certainly not.

Then, under the influence either of poverty or of wealth, workmen and their work are equally liable to degenerate [*cheiron*: cf. e as not equally well]?

That is evident [*phaino*: cf. 419e as no better].

Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, against which the guardians will have to watch [*tropos*: cf. 416d as way (as in every way) & *heurisko*: cf. 420b with *oiomai* (thought)], or they will creep into [*paraduomai*: to encroach] the city unobserved [*lanthano*: cf. 402a as slighting & 413b with *epi* prefixed to verb].

What evils?

422 Wealth, I said, and poverty [*ploutos* & *penia*: cf. 421d]; the one is the parent of luxury and indolence [*truphe*: cf. 399e & *argia*: cf. 421d for *argos* as careless], and the other of meanness and viciousness [*aneleutheria*: servility & *kakoergia*: cf. 421b for *kakourgos* or destroyers], and both of discontent [*neoterismos*: revolution, innovation].

That is very true, he replied; but still I should like to know [*skopeo*: cf. 413d as see], Socrates, how our city will be able to go to war, especially against an enemy who is rich and powerful, if deprived of the sinews of war [*ktaoma* (with me, not): cf. 382b re. as highest part of themselves & *chrema*: cf. 439d as use].

There would certainly be a difficulty, I replied, in going to war with one such enemy; but there is no

b difficulty where there are two of them.

How so?, he asked.

In the first place, I said, if we have to fight, our side will be trained warriors [*athletes*: cf. 404a as athletes] fighting against an army of rich men.

That is true, he said.

And do you not suppose, Adeimantus, that a single boxer who was perfect in his art [*paraskeuazo*: cf. 416b as

furnish] would easily be a match for two stout and well-to-do gentlemen who were not boxers?

Hardly, if they came upon him at once.

What, not, I said, if he were able to run away and then turn and strike at the one who first came up?

c And supposing he were to do this several times under the heat of a scorching sun, might he not, being an expert, overturn more than one stout personage?

Certainly, he said, there would be nothing wonderful in that.

And yet rich men probably have [*metecho: cf. 411d as having no taste of*] a greater superiority in the science and practice [*episteme: cf. 411e as knowledge & empeira: experience*] of boxing than they have in military qualities.

Likely enough.

Then we may assume that our athletes [*athletes: cf. b as warriors*] will be able to fight with two or three times their own number?

I agree with [*sugchoreo: cf. 402e*] you, for I think you right [*orthos (adverb): cf. 416c as true (adjective) & legein: to speak rightly*].

d And suppose that, before engaging, our citizens send an embassy [*presbeia: age, seniority, rank*] to one of the two cities, telling them what is the truth: silver and gold we neither have nor are permitted [*themis: cf. 398a as law*] to have, but you may; do you therefore come and help us in war [*sumpolemeo: to fight with*], of and take the spoils of the other city: who, on hearing these words, would choose to fight against lean wiry dogs, rather than, with the dogs on their side, against fat and tender sheep?

That is not likely [*dokeo: cf. 421d as think*]; and yet there might be a danger [*kindunos: risk*] to the poor **e** state if the wealth of many states were to be gathered into one.

But how simple [*eudaimos: cf. 356e as happy*] of you to use the term state [*kataskeuazo: cf. 418e as appointed*] at all of any but our own!

Why so?

You ought to speak of other states in the plural number; not one of them is a city, but many cities, as they say in the game [*paizo: to play*]. For indeed any city, however small, is in fact divided into two, **423** one the city of the poor [*penos: cf. penia, 422a*], the other of the rich [*plousios: cf. 422a for ploutos*]; these are at war with one another; and in either there are many smaller divisions, and you would be altogether beside the mark if you treated [*prosphero: cf. 413a as impresses*] them all as a single state. But if you deal with them as many, and give the wealth or power [*dunamis: cf. 367a as nature*] or persons of the one to the others, you will always have a great many friends [*summachos: allied with, fighting along with*] and not many enemies [*polemios: pertaining to war*]. And your state, while the wise order [*oikeo: cf. 421a as giving order & sophronos, adverb: cf. 403a as harmonious*] which has now been prescribed continues to prevail in her, will be the greatest of states, I do not mean to say in reputation or appearance [*eudokimeo: to be held in esteem*], but in deed and truth, though she number not more than a thousand defenders. A single state which is her equal you will hardly find, either

b among Hellenes or barbarians, though many that appear [*dokeo: cf. d as likely*] to be as great and many times greater.

That is most true, he said.

And what, I said, will be the best limit [*kalos: cf. 421c as right & horos: cf. 373d*] for our rulers to fix when they are considering the size of the state and the amount of territory which they are to include, and beyond which they will not go [*aphorizo: to mark off by boundaries*]?

What limit would you propose?

I would allow the state to increase so far as is consistent with unity [*auxo: to grow: here, as wish to grow*]; that, I think, is the proper limit [*auxo: not grown beyond that*].

c Very good [*kalos, adverb: cf. 421c as quite right*], he said.

Here then, I said, is another order [*prostagma*] which will have to be conveyed to [*prostasso: to assign, appoint*] our guardians: let our city be accounted [*dokeo: cf. b as appear*] neither large nor small, but one and self-sufficing [*hikanos: cf. 415a as power of*].

And surely, said he, this is not a very severe [*phaulos: cf. 421a as pretension to be*] order which we impose upon [*protasso: cf. c as conveyed to*] them.

And the other, said I, of which we were speaking before [*epimnemoneuo: to bear in mind*] is lighter [*phaulos: cf. c as not a very severe*] still—I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the guardians when inferior, and of elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring of the lower classes, when

d naturally superior [*spoudaios: earnest, excellent*]. The intention was, that, in the case of the citizens generally, each individual should be put to the use for which nature which nature intended him [*pros ho tis pepyken*], one to one work, and then every man would do his own business, and be one and not many; and so the whole city would be one and not many.

Yes, he said; that is not so difficult.

The regulations which we are prescribing [*prostasso: cf. c as conveyed to*], my good Adeimantus, are not, as might be supposed [*dokeo: cf. c as be accounted*], a number of great principles, but trifles [*phaulos: cf. c as not a very severe*] all, if care be taken [*phulasso: cf. 416c as protection*], as the saying is, of the **e** one great thing,—a thing, however, which I would rather call, not great, but sufficient [*hikanos: cf. c*] for our purpose.

What may that be?, he asked.

Education, I said, and nurture [*paideia: cf. 416c & trophe: cf. 412b*] of our citizens are well educated [*paideuo cf. 416b*], and grow into sensible [*metrios: cf. 412a as best*] men, they will easily see their way through [*diorao*] all these, as well as other matters which I omit; such, for example, as marriage, the possession of women and the procreation of children, which will all follow the general principle that

424 friends have all things in common [*koinos: cf. 352c as together*], as the proverb says.

That will be the best way of settling them.

Also, I said, the state, if once started well, moves with accumulating force [*hormao: cf. 366d with beginning of the argument & auxano: to increase*] like a wheel. For good nurture and education [*trophe: cf. 423e & paideusis*] implant good constitutions, and these good constitutions taking root [*antilambano: cf. 336b as to get*] in a good education improve more and more [*sozo: cf. 418a as will be saviors & b chrestos: useful*], and this improvement [*beltion: cf. 381b as better*] affects the breed in man as in other animals.

Very possibly, he said.

Then to sum up [*brachus: short, brief*]: This is the point to which, above all, the attention of our rulers should be directed [*anthekteon: verbal adjective as one must cleave to & epimeletes: one who is in charge*],—that music and gymnastic be preserved in their original form [*taxis, with para: cf. 392a as question; here as counter to order & phulasso: cf. 423d as care can be taken*], and no innovation made [*lanthano: cf. 421e as unobserved & diaphtheiro: cf. 421d as deterioration*]. They must do their utmost to maintain [*phulasso: also in c*] them intact. And they should fear to hear anyone say:

People care most for the song

That is newest from the singer's lips. [*Odyssey i.351-52*]

c And this ought not to be praised, or conceived to be the meaning of the poet; for any musical innovation [*tropos: cf. 421e as will have to watch*] is full of danger [*kinduneuo: cf. 413b as talking darkly*] to the whole state, and ought to be prohibited [*hupolambano, with me (not): cf. 419a as interposed a question*]. So Damon tells me, and I can quite believe [*peitho: cf. 421c as induced*] him;—he says that when modes [*eidōs: cf. 413d as sort*] of music change [*tropos: also in this sentence as musical modes*], of the state always change with them. Yes, said Adeimantus; and you may add my suffrage [*peitho: cf. c as believe*] to Damon's and your own.

d Then, I said, our guardians must lay the foundations [*oikodometeon: verbal adjective, one must build*] of their fortress [*phulakterion*] in music?

Yes, he said; the lawlessness [*paranomia*] of which you speak too easily steals in [*lanthano: cf. b as no innovation made & paraduomai: cf. 421e*].

Yes, I replied, in the form of amusement; and at first sight it appears harmless [*kakos, with ouden: cf. 421d as worse*].

Why, yes, he said, and there is no harm; were it not that little by little this spirit of licence, finding a home [*eisokizo: to bring in as a settler*], imperceptibly penetrates into [*huporroeo: to flow gradually*] manners and customs [*ethe: cf. 402d as form & epitedeuma: cf. 395a as life*]; whence, issuing with greater force [*meizon: comparative of megas*], it invades contracts [*sumbolaion: cf. 333a*] between man and man, and from contracts goes on to laws and constitutions [*nomos: cf. 421a & politeia: cf. 412a as*

e government], in utter recklessness [*aselgeia: licentiousness*], ending [*teleutao: c. 330d as to be near*] at last, Socrates, by an overthrow [*anatrepo*] of all rights, private as well as public [*idios: cf. 346a as particular & demosios: belonging to the people*].

Is that true?, I said.

That is my belief [*dokeo: cf. 423d as supposed*], he replied.

Then, as I was saying, our youth should be trained from the first in a stricter system [*ennomos: within the law*], for if amusements [*paidia: play, sport*] become lawless [*paranomos*], and the youths themselves become lawless, they can never grow up [*auxano: cf. a as accumulating force*] into well-conducted and **425** virtuous citizens [*ennomos: cf. e & spoudaios: cf. 423d as superior*].

Very true, he said.

And when they have made a good [*kalos, adverb: cf. 423c as very good*] beginning in play, and by the help of music have gained the habit [*eisdechomai: to enter*] of good order [*eunomia*], then this habit of order, in a manner how unlike the lawless play of the others will accompany them in all their actions and be a principle of growth to them [*sunapto: to bind together & auxo: cf. 423b as proper limit*], and if there be any fallen places a principle in the state will raise them up again [*epanorthoo: to correct, amend*].

Very true, he said.

Thus educated, they will invent for themselves any lesser rules [*dokeo: cf. 424e as belief & exeurisko: to find out, discover & nomimos: conformable to custom*] which their predecessors have altogether neglected [*apollumi: cf. 422a as turn upside down*].

What do you mean?

b I mean such things as these:—when the young are to be silent before their elders; how they are to show respect to them by standing and making them sit; what honor is due to parents; what garments or shoes are to be worn; the mode of dressing the hair; deportment and manners in general. You would agree with [*oiomai: cf. 421e with tropos & heurisko*] me?

Yes.

But there is, I think, small wisdom in legislating [*euethes: cf. 409a as simple & nomotheteo: cf. 418e as regulations*] about such matters,—I doubt if it is ever done; nor are any precise written enactments [*logos: cf. 421a as this & gramma: letter*] about them likely to be lasting.

Impossible.

It would seem [*kinduneo: vg. 350c as inference*], Adeimantus, that the direction in which education **c** starts [*paideia: cf. 423e & hormao: cf. Cf. 424a as accumulating force*] a man, will determine [*hepo: cf. 412b as follow*] his future life. Does not like always attract [*parakaleo: to call, send for*] like?

To be sure.

Until some one rare and grand result is reached [*oiomai: cf. b as would agree & teleos: cf. 371e as perfected & teleutao: cf. 424e as ending*] which may be good, and may be the reverse [*apobaino: cf. 410d as becomes*] of good?

That is not to be denied.

And for this reason, I said, I shall not attempt to legislate [*epicheireo: cf. 391d as affirm & nomotheteo: cf. b*] further about them.

Naturally enough, he replied.

Well [*pros theon: by the gods*], and about the business of the agora, dealings and the ordinary dealings **d** between man and man, or again about agreements with the commencement with artisans; about insult and injury, of the commencement of actions, and the appointment of juries, what would you say? There may also arise questions about any impositions and extractions of market and harbor dues which may be required, and in general about the regulations of markets, police, harbors, and the like. But, oh heavens! Shall we condescend to legislate [*nomotheteo: cf. c*] on any of these particulars?

I think, he said, that there is no need [*ouk & axios: cf. 374d as price*] to impose [*epitasso: cf. 342d as enjoins*] laws about them on good men [*kalos: cf. 423b as best & agathos: cf. 413a as good*]; what **e** regulations [*nomotheteo: cf. d*] are necessary they will find out soon enough for themselves.

Yes, I said, my friend, if God will only preserve [*theos, noun: cf. 415b & soteria: salvation*] to them the laws which we have given them.

And without divine help, said Adeimantus, they will go on for ever making and mending [*tithemi: cf. 420c as with a view of & epanorthoo: cf. 425a as will raise up again & diateleio: cf. 411a as is passed*] their laws and their lives in the hope of attaining perfection [*epilambano & beltistos: cf. 413c as interest*].

You would compare them, I said, to those invalids who, having no self-restraint [*akolasia, with hupo: cf. 405a as intemperance*], will not leave off their habits of intemperance [*diaita: cf. 373a as way of life & poneros: cf. 409d as bad*]?

Exactly.

426 Yes, I said; and what a delightful life [*chairo: cf. 401e as praises and rejoices*] they lead [*diateleio: cf. 425e*]!

They are always doctoring and increasing and complicating their disorders, and always fancying that they will be cured by any nostrum [*pharmakon*: cf. 389b as medicine] which anybody advises [*sumbouleuo*: cf. 390e as counsel] them to try.

Such cases are very common, he said, with invalids of this sort.

Yes, I replied; and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst enemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that, unless they give up eating and drinking and wenching and idling, neither drug **b** nor cautery nor spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail [*oniemi*: to derive benefit].

Charming!, he replied. I see nothing charming in going into a passion [*chalepaino*: cf. 385c as arouse anger] with a man who tells you what is right.

These gentlemen, I said, do not seem to be in your good graces.

Assuredly not.

Nor would you praise [*epaino*: cf. 391a as approved] the behavior of states which act like the men whom I was just now describing. For are there [*phaino*: cf. 421e as evident] not ill-ordered [*kakos*, adverb: cf. 392b as guilty] states in which the citizens are forbidden [*proagoreuo*: to speak or proclaim publically] **c** under pain of death to alter the constitution [*politeuo*: to conduct government]; and yet he who most sweetly courts those who live under this regime and indulges them and fawns upon them and is skillful in anticipating and gratifying their humors [*hupotrecho*: to run under, insinuate & progignosko & boulesis: intention & deinos: cf. 416a as monstrous] is held to be a great and good [*sophos*: cf. 409e as wisdom; this adjective included here] statesman—do not these states resemble the persons whom I was describing?

Yes, he said; the states are [*dokeo*: cf. 425a, in that context] as bad as the men; and I am very far from praising [*epaino*: cf. b] them.

d But do you not admire [*prothumeomai*: to be ready], I said, the coolness and dexterity [*andreia*: manly spirit; cf. 416e for the adjective, *andreios* & *euchereia*: readiness] of these ready ministers [*therapeuo*: cf. 410c as training] of political corruption?

Yes, he said, I do; but not all of them, for there are some whom the applause of the multitude has deluded into the belief [*exapatao*: to beguile thoroughly & oiomai: cf. 425c as is reached] that they are really statesmen, and these are not much to be admired [*epaineo*: cf. 391e as approved].

What do you mean?, I said; you should have more feeling [*sugginmosko*: to know with] for them. When a man cannot measure, and a great many others who cannot measure declare that he is four cubits **e** high, can he help believing [*hegeomai*: cf. 387d as consider] what they say?

Nay, he said, certainly not in that case.

Well, then, do not be angry with [*chalepaino*: cf. b as going into a passion] them; for are they not as good as a play [*charies*: graceful, clever], trying their hand at paltry reforms [*nomotheteo*: cf. 425e as regulations] such as I was describing; they are always fancying [*oiomai*: cf. d] that by legislation they will make an end [*epanorthoo*: cf. 425e as mending] of frauds in contracts, and the other rascalities which I was mentioning, not knowing that they are in reality cutting off the heads of a hydra?

427 Yes, he said; that is just what they are doing.

I have thought, then, that the true legislator will not trouble himself with this class of enactments [*eidōs*: cf. 424c as modes & *nomos*: cf. 425d as constitutions] whether concerning laws or the constitution either in an ill-ordered or in a well-ordered state [*politeuo*: cf. c as constitution & *kakos*, adverb: cf. b & eu, adverb]; for in the former they are quite useless, and in the latter there will be no difficulty in devising them; and many of them will naturally [*automatos*: acting of one's own will] flow out of our previous regulations [*epitedeuma*: cf. 424d as customs].

b What, then, he said, is still remaining to us of the work of legislation [*nomotheteo*: cf. 426e as reforms]?

Nothing to us, I replied; but to Apollo, the God of Delphi, there remains the ordering [*nomotheteo*: cf. b] of the greatest and noblest and finest [*kalos*: cf. 425d as good] things of all.

Which are they?, he said.

The institution [*hidrusis*: founding, establishment] of temples and sacrifices, and the entire service [*therapeia*] of gods, demigods, and heroes; also the ordering of the repositories of the dead, and the rites which have to be observed by him who would propitiate [*hupereteo*: cf. 344a as service & *hileos*, adverb: kindly, gracious] the inhabitants of the world below. These are matters of which we are ignorant [*epistamai*: to know (with oute)] ourselves, and as founders of a city [*oikizo*: cf. 421c as grow up]

c we should be [*peitho*: cf. 424c as suffrage] unwise in trusting them to any interpreter [*exegetes*: one who expounds] but our ancestral deity. He is the god who sits in the center, on the navel [*omphalos*] of the earth

[referring to Delphi], and he is the interpreter of religion [*exegeomai: to be leader, direct*] to all mankind. You are right [*kalos, adverb: cf. 425a as good*], and we will do as you propose.

But where, amid all this, is justice? son of Ariston, tell me where. Now that our city has been made habitable [*oikazo: cf. b as founders of a city*], light a candle and search [*skopeo: cf. 422a as know*], and get your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of our friends to help, and let us see where in it we can discover justice and where injustice [*dike: cf. 330d as punishment & dikaiosune: cf. 392c*], and in what they differ [*diaphero: cf. 416a*] from one another, and which of them the man who would be happy [*eudaimoneo: cf. 421b*] should have for his portion [*ptaomai: cf. 382b with reference to highest part*], whether seen or unseen [*lanthano: cf. 424d as steal in*] by gods and men.

Nonsense, said Glaucon: did you not promise [*hupischneomai: to undertake*] to search yourself, saying that for you not to help justice in her need [*tropos: cf. 425b in context of would agree with*] would be an impiety?

I do not deny that I said so, and as you remind [*hupomimnesko: to suggest*] me, I will be as good as my word; but you must join [*sullambano: to collect*].

We will, he replied.

Well, then, I hope to make the discovery [*heurisko: cf. 425b in context of would agree with*] in this way: I mean to begin with the assumption that our state, if rightly ordered [*oikizo: cf. b as founders of a city & orthos: cf. 422c*], is perfect [*teleos, adverb: cf. 412a as rightly*].

That is most certain.

And being perfect, is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just [*andreios: cf. 416e as courage & sophron: of sound mind & dikaios: cf. 392b as good*].

That is likewise clear.

And whichever of these qualities we find in the state, the one which is not found will be the residue [*hupoloios: left behind*]?

428 Very good.

If there were four things, and we were searching [*zeteo: cf. 413c as enquire*] for one of them, wherever it might be, the one sought for might be known [*gignosko: cf. 407c as exhibited*] to us from the first, and there would be no further trouble; or we might know the other three first, and then the fourth would clearly be the one left.

Very true [*orthos, adverb: cf. 427e as rightly*], he said.

And is not a similar method to be pursued [*zeteo: cf. a as searching*] about the virtues, which are also four in number?

Clearly.

First among the virtues found in the state, wisdom comes into view [*sophia: cf. 406b as science & katadelos: clear, evident*], and in this I detect a certain peculiarity [*phaino: cf. 426b as are there & atopos: cf. 405d as newfangled*].

What is that?

The state which we have been describing [*dierchomai: cf. 405d*] is said to be wise [*sophos: cf. 426c as good*] as being good in counsel [*euboulos: prudent*]?

Very true.

And good counsel [*euboulia: cf. 348d as discretion*] is clearly a kind of knowledge [*episteme: cf. 422c as science*], for not by ignorance [*amathia: cf. 351a*], but by knowledge, do men counsel well [*boulomai & eu: to will*]?

Clearly.

And the kinds of knowledge in a state are many and diverse [*pantodapos: cf. 398a as any one*]?

Of course.

There is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of knowledge which gives a city the title [*prosrteos: addressed*] of wise and good in counsel?

c Certainly not; that would only give a city the reputation of skill in carpentering.

Then a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge which counsels for the best [*beltistos: cf. 425e as perfection*] about wooden implements?

Certainly not.

Nor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen pots, I said, nor as possessing any other similar knowledge?

Not by reason of any of them, he said.

Nor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth; that would give the city the name of agricultural?

Yes [*dokeo*: cf. 426c as are].

Well, I said, and is there any knowledge [*episteme*: cf. b] in our recently founded state [*oikizo*: cf. 427e d as ordered] among any of the citizens which advises [*bouleuo*: cf. 399b as counsels], not about any particular thing in the state, but about the whole, and considers how a state can best deal with [*aristos*: cf. 421c & *homilos*: any assembled crowd] itself and with other states?

There certainly is.

And what is knowledge, and among whom is it found?, I asked.

It is the knowledge of the guardians [*phulakikos*: belonging to the guardians], he replied, and found among those whom we were just now describing as perfect [*teleos*: cf. 427e] guardians.

And what is the name which the city derives [*prosagoreuo*: to address, greet] from the possession of this sort of knowledge?

The name of good in counsel and truly wise [*euboulos*: cf. b & *sophos*: cf. b].

e And will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more smiths?

The smiths, he replied, will be far more numerous.

Will not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a name from the profession of some kind of knowledge?

Much the smallest.

And so by reason of the smallest part or class, and of the knowledge which resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself [*proistemi*: to set before & *archo*: cf. 415a as command], the whole state, being thus constituted according to nature [*oikizo*: cf. e as founded & *phusis*, with *kata*: cf. 412c], will be wise; and 429 this, which has the only knowledge worthy to be called wisdom [*sophia*: cf. a], has been ordained [*metagalchano*: to have a share] by nature to be of all classes the least.

Most true.

Thus, then, I said, the nature and place [*tropos*: cf. 427e as need] in the state of one of the four virtues has somehow or other been discovered [*heurisko*: cf. 427e as discovery & *hidruo*: to make to sit down, found].

And, in my humble opinion [*dokeo*: cf. 428c as yes], very satisfactorily [*apochrontos*, adverb: enough] discovered, he replied.

Again, I said, there is no difficulty [*chalepos*: cf. 412b] in seeing the nature of courage [*andreia*: cf. 426d as coolness]; and in what part that quality resides which gives the name of courageous to the state.

How do you mean?

b Why, I said, every one who calls any state courageous or cowardly [*andreios*: cf. 427e as valiant & *deilos*: cf. 411a], will be thinking of [*apoblepo*: cf. 387b as reject] the part which fights and goes out to war on the state's behalf.

No one, he replied, would ever think of any other.

Certainly not.

The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly but their courage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect [*kurios*: cf. 401d as more potent] of making the city either the one or the other.

The city will be courageous in virtue [*dunamis*: cf. 423a as power] of a portion of herself which

c preserves [*sozo*: cf. 424a as more and more] under all circumstances that opinion [*doxa*: cf. 413b] about the nature of things to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator educated [*nomothetes* & *paideia*: cf. 425b as education] them; and this is what you term courage [*andreia*: cf. a].

I should like to hear [*manthano*: cf. 415d as see] what you are saying once more, for I do not think that I perfectly understand you.

I mean that courage is a kind of salvation [*soteria*: cf. 425e as preserve].

Salvation of what?

Of the opinion [*doxa*: cf. c] respecting things to be feared, what they are and of what nature, which the law [*nomos*: cf. 427a as enactments] implants through education [*gignomai*: to come into being & *paideia*: cf. b]; and I mean by the words 'under all circumstances' [*diapantos*: literally, through all] to

d intimate [*lego*: to gather, pick up] that in pleasure or in pain [*epithumios*: cf. 390c for *epithumia* or rapture & *phobios*], or under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves [*diasozo*: cf. 395b as adhere], and does not lose this opinion [*ekballo*, with *me* (not): to cast out]. Shall I give you an illustration [*apeikazo*: cf. 404d as compared]?

If you please.

You know, I said, that dyers, when they want to dye wool for making the true sea-purple, begin by selecting their white color first; this they prepare and dress with much care and pains, in order that the white ground may take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds; and **e** whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast color, and no washing either with lyes or without them can take away the bloom. But, when the ground has not been duly prepared, you will have noticed how poor is the look either of purple or of any other color.

Yes, he said; I know that they have a washed-out and ridiculous appearance.

Then now, I said, you will understand what our object was [*hupolambano: cf. 424c as prohibited (with me)*] in selecting [*exlego: cf. c for lego, to intimate*] our soldiers, and educating [*paideuo: cf. 423e*] them **430** in music and gymnastic; we were contriving influences [*peitho: cf. 427c as should be*] which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in perfection [*kalos: cf. 427b as finest*], and the color of their opinion [*doxa: cf. c*] about dangers and of every other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training [*phusis: cf. 428e as nature & trophe: cf. 424a with epitedeios: cf. 412e as right*], not to be washed away by such potent lyes as pleasure [*hedone: cf. 413e*]—mightier agent far in washing the soul **b** than any soda or lye; or by sorrow, fear, and desire [*lupe: cf. 402e as pain & phobos: cf. 413c & epithumia: cf. 390c as rapture*], the mightiest of all other solvents. And this sort of universal saving power [*dunamis: cf. b as virtue & soteria: cf. c as salvation*] of true opinion [*doxa: cf. b with orthos: cf. 416c*] in conformity with law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be courage [*andreia: cf. c*], unless you disagree.

But I agree, he replied; for I suppose [*dokeo: cf. 429a as opinion*] that you mean to exclude mere uninstructed courage [*paideia, with aneu: as without education; cf. 429c*], such as that of a wild beast or of a slave—this, in your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains [*nomimos: cf. 425a as rules & hegeomai: cf. 426e as believing*], and ought to have another name.

c Most certainly.

Then I may infer courage [*apodechomai: cf. 389a as suffer & andreia: cf. b*] to be such as you describe?

Why, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words ‘of a citizen,’ [*politikos: cf. 407d as of the state*] you will not be far wrong [*apodechomai: cf. c & orthos, adverb: cf. 428a as very true*];—hereafter, if you like, we will carry the examination further, but at present we are seeking [*zeteo: cf. 428a as pursued*] not for courage but justice [*dikaiosune: cf. 427d*]; and for the purpose of our enquiry [*zetesis*] we have said enough.

You are right [*kalos, adverb: cf. 427c*], he replied.

Two virtues remain to be discovered in the state—first temperance [*sophrosune: cf. 410a*], and then **d** justice which is the end of our search [*zeteo: cf. c*].

Very true.

Now, can we find justice without troubling ourselves [*pragmateuomai: cf. 408d for pragma as things*] about temperance [*sophrosune: cf. c*]?

I do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that justice should be brought to light [*phaino: cf. 428b as certain peculiarity*] and temperance lost sight of [*episkeptomai: cf. 369a as enquire into*]; and therefore I wish that you would do me the favor of considering [*skeptomai: cf. 421d as seems to be*] temperance first.

e Certainly, I replied, I should not be justified [*adikeo: to do wrong*] in refusing your request.

Then consider [*skeptomai: cf. d*], he said.

Yes, I replied; I will; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony [*sumphonia: cf. 398c as consistent & harmonia: cf. 411a as airs*] than the preceding. How so?, he asked.

Temperance, I replied, is the ordering [*kosmos: decoration*] or controlling of certain pleasures and desires [*egkrateia: cf. 390b as temperance & hedone: cf. a & epithumia: cf. b*]; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of ‘a man being his own master [*kreisson: stronger, more powerful*]’ and other traces [*ichne: cf. 410b as track*] of the same notion may be found in language.

No doubt, he said.

There is something ridiculous [*geloios: cf. 403e*] in the expression ‘master of himself; for the master is **431** also the servant and the servant the master; and in all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted [*prosagoreuo: cf. 428d as derives*].

Certainly.

The meaning is, I believe [*phaino: cf. 430d as brought to light*], that in the human soul [*psuche: cf. 416e as*

within] there is a better and also a worse principle [*to beltion: cf. 424b as improvement & to cheiron: cf. 421e as to degenerate*]; and when the better has the worse under control [*egkrates: holding fast, in possession*], then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise [*epaino: cf. 426c*]; but when, owing to evil education or association [*kakos: cf. 427a as ill-ordered & trophe: cf. 430a as nurture & homilia: company*], the better principle, which is also the smaller, is overwhelmed [*krateo: cf. b 388d as self-control*] by the greater mass of the worse—in this case he is blamed [*psego: cf. 402a*] and is called the slave of self and unprincipled [*akolastos: undisciplined & diakeimai: cf. 361e as thought unjust*].

Yes, there is reason in that.

And now, I said, look at [*apoblepo: cf. 429b as thinking of*] our newly created state, and there you will find one of these two conditions realized; for the state, as you will acknowledge [*prosagoreuo: cf. a as denoted*], may be justly called master of itself, if the words ‘temperance’ and ‘self-mastery’ [*sophron: cf. 427e & kreisson: cf. 430e as master*] truly express the rule [*archo: cf. 428e as ruling part*] of the better part over the worse.

Yes, he said, I see [*apoblepo: cf. b as look at*] that what you say is true.

Let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains [*epithumia: cf. c 431e & hedone: cf. 431e & lupe: cf. 430b*] are generally found in children and women and servants, and in the freemen so called who are of the lowest [*phaulos: cf. 423d as trifles*] and more numerous class.

Certainly, he said.

Whereas the simple and moderate desires [*haplos: cf. 410a & metrios: cf. 423e as sensible*] which follow reason [*noos, with meta: cf. 376a in context of never struck me*], and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion [*ago: to lead, guide & logismos: counting, reckoning & doxa: cf. 430b with orthos*], are to be found only in a few, and those the best born and best educated [*beltistos: cf. 428c & paideuo: cf. 429e*].

Very true.

These two, as you may perceive [*horao: cf. 409b as learned*], have a place in our state; and the meaner desires [*epithumia: cf. b*] of the inferior [*phaulos: cf. c as lowest*] are held down [*krateo: cf. a as overwhelmed*] **d** by the virtuous desires and wisdom [*phronesis: cf. 344e for phrontizo, to know*] of the few [*epieikes: cf. 329d as happy*].

That I perceive, he said.

Then if there be any city which may be described [*prosagoreuo: cf. b as acknowledge*] as master [*kreittos: cf. b*] of its own pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a designation [*prosrteos: to be addressed, called*]?

Certainly, he replied.

It may also be called temperate [*sophroneo: verbal root of sophron as in b, self-mastery*], and for the same reasons?

Yes.

And if there be any state in which rulers and subjects will be agreed [*doxa: cf. c as opinion*] as to the **e** question who are to rule [*archo: cf. b*], that again will be our state?

Undoubtedly.

And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will temperance [*sophroneo: cf. d*] be found [*eniemi: to put in*] —in the rulers or in the subjects [*archo: used twice; cf. e*]?

In both, as I should imagine, he replied.

Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess [*manteuomai: cf. 394d as suspect*] that temperance was a sort of harmony [*homoioo: cf. 416a as would be & harmonia: cf. 430e*]?

Why so?

Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom [*andreia: cf. 430c & sophia: cf. 429a*], each of **432** which resides [*eniemi: cf. e as found*] in a part only, the one making [*parecho: cf. 421d in the context of money*] the state wise and the other valiant; not so temperance, which extends [*teino: to stretch & atechnos, adverb: simply, just*] to the whole, and runs through [*parecho: cf. e*] all the notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or power or numbers or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then may we deem [*orthoo: to set up, be true*] temperance to be the agreement [*homonoia: cf. 351d as harmony*] of the naturally [*phusis, with kata: cf. 428e as according to nature*] superior and inferior, as to the right to rule [*archo: cf. e*] of either, both in states and individuals.

b I entirely agree with [*sundokeo: cf. 409e as and in mine*] you.

And so, I said, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been discovered [*katopteuo: to spy out,*

observe closely] in our state. The last of those qualities which make a state virtuous [*arete*: cf. 409d with *metecho*: cf. 422c as have] must be justice [*dikaiousune*: cf. 430c], if we only knew [*deloo*: cf. 392e as in illustration] what that was.

The inference is obvious [*delos*: cf. 375b as clear].

The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should surround a wood, and look sharp [*prosecho*: cf. 396b as apply their minds & *noos*: cf. 431c as reason] that justice does not steal away, and pass out of sight and escape us; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this country: watch

c [*horao*: cf. 431c as perceive] therefore and strive to catch a sight of [*kathorao*: cf. 330e as have a clearer view & *prothumos*: cf. 345a in the context of to yourself] her, and if you see her first, let me know.

Would that I could but you should regard me rather as a follower [*hepo*: cf. 425c as determine] who can see things when you show him [*kathorao*: cf. c & *deiknumi*: to display, exhibit]—that is about as much as I am good for.

Offer up a prayer [*euchomai*] with me and follow.

I will, but you must show me the way [*ago*: cf. 431c as guidance].

Here is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing [*phaino*: cf. 431a as I believe]; still we must push on.

d Let us push on.

Here I saw something: Hello!, I said, I begin to perceive a track, and I believe [*dokeo*: cf. 430b as suppose] that the quarry will not escape.

Good news, he said.

Truly, I said, we are stupid fellows [*blakikos*: lazy & *pathos*: cf. 376a as instinct].

Why so?

Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our enquiry, ages ago, there [*phaino*: cf. c] was justice tumbling out at [*kulindo*: to roll] our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for [*zeteo*: cf. 430d as search] what they have in their hands—that was the way

e with us—we looked [*apoblepo*: cf. 431b as see] not at what we were seeking [*aposkopoeo*: cf. 409c as judges], but at what was far off in the distance; and therefore, I suppose, we missed her [*lanthano*: cf. 428d as unseen].

What do you mean?

I mean [*dokeo*: cf. d as I believe] to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of justice, and have failed to recognize [*manthano*: cf. 429c as hear, with *tropos*: cf. 429a as place] her.

I grow impatient [*epithumeo*: cf. 367b as I want] at the length of your exordium [*prooimion*: cf. 357a as beginning].

433 Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the original principle [*arche*, with *ex* (from): cf. 370c as begin] which we were always laying down [*tithemi*: cf. 425e as mending] at the foundation of the state [*katoikizo*: to settle], that [*dokeo*: cf. 423e as mean] one man should practice one thing [*eidosis*: cf. 427a as class] only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted [*phusis*: cf. 432a as naturally & *epitedeuo*: cf. 395c as does (not) bear];—now justice is this principle or a part of it.

Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.

Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business [*prasso*, with *ta auta*: cf. 400e as aim], and not being a busybody [*polupragmoneo*: to be meddling]; we said so again and again, and many

b others have said the same to us.

Yes, we said so.

Then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be justice [*kinduneo*: cf. 425b as seem].

Can you tell me whence I derive this inference [*tekmairomai*: cf. 409a]?

I cannot, but I should like to be told.

Because I think [*dokeo*: cf. a] that this is the only virtue which remains [*to hupoloipon*] in the state when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted [*sophrosune*: cf. 430d & *andreia*: cf. 431e & *phronesis*: cf. 431d & *skeptomai*: cf. 430e as consider]; and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition [*dunamis*: cf. 430b as power] of the existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative [*parecho*: cf. 431a as runs through & *soteria*: cf. 430b as saving]; and we

c were saying that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one.

That follows of necessity.

If we are asked to determine [*krino*: cf. 399e as preferring] which of these four qualities by its presence contributes [*apergazomai*: cf. 411b as render] most to the excellence [*agathos*: cf. 425d as good] of the state,

whether the agreement [*homodoxia: unanimity*] of rulers and subjects, or the preservation [*soteria: cf. c*] in the soldiers of the opinion which the law [*ennomos: cf. 424e as well-conducted*] ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness [*phronesis: cf. b & phulake: cf. 415c as guardians*] in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is found in children and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject,—the quality, I mean, of every one doing his own work, and not being a busybody [*polupragmoneo: cf. b*], would claim the palm—the question is not so easily answered.

Certainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which.

Then the power [*dunamis: cf. b*] of each individual in the state to do his own work appears to compete [*enamillos: engaged in equal contest*] with the other political virtues [*arete: cf. 432b as virtuous*], wisdom [*sophia: cf. 431e*], temperance, courage.

Yes, he said.

e And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?

Exactly.

Let us look at the question [*skopeo: cf. 427d as search*] from another point of view [*dokeo: cf. b as think*]. Are not the rulers in a state those to whom you would entrust [*protasso: cf. 423c as impose upon*] the office of determining suits at law [*dikazo: to decide, judge*]?

Certainly.

And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what is another's, nor be deprived [*stereo: cf. 413a*] of what is his own?

Yes; that is their principle.

Which is a just [*dikaioi: cf. 427e*] principle?

Yes.

Then on this view also justice will be admitted [*homologeio: cf. 402d as are cast*] to be the having and 434 doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him?

Very true.

Think [*eidon: cf. 399e as discover*], now, and say whether you agree with [*sundokeo: cf. 432b*] me or not.

Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter; and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you think [*dokeo: cf. 433e as point of view*] that any great harm [*blapto: cf. 367d as injustice*] would result to the state?

Not much.

But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, having his heart lifted b up [*epairo: to stir up, excite*] by wealth or strength or the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class [*eidos: cf. 427a*] of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you will agree with [*dokeo: cf. a as think*] me in saying that this interchange and this meddling [*metabole: cf. 397c & polupragmosune: 433d for poluporgamoneo, being a busybody*] of one with another is the ruin [*olethros: cf. 418e*] of the state.

Most true.

Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes [*genos: race, stock*], any meddling c [*polupragmosune: cf. b*] of one with another, or the change [*metabole: cf. b as meddling*] of one into another, is the greatest harm [*blabe: cf. 343c as loss*] to the state, and may be most justly termed evil-doing [*kakourgia*]?

Precisely.

And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice [*adikia: cf. 420b*]?

Certainly.

This then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make [*parecho: cf. 433b as preservative*] the city just.

I agree [*dokeo: cf. b*] with you.

d We will not, I said, be over-positive [*pagios, adverb: positively*] as yet; but if, on trial, this conception [*eidos: cf. b as class*] of justice be verified [*homologeio: cf. 433e as admitted*] in the individual as well as in the state, there will be no longer any room for doubt [*sugchoreo: cf. 422c as agree with*]; if it be not verified, we must have a fresh enquiry [*skeptomai: c.433b as abstracted*]. First let us complete [*ekteleo: to accomplish*] the old investigation [*skepsis*], which we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could previously

examine [*epicheireo*: cf. 425c as attempt to & *theaomai*: cf. 402d as to see] justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty [*rhaon*: neuter adjective used as adverb; cf. 331e for *rhadios*] in discerning [*kateidon*: cf. 420c for *decide*] her in the individual. That larger example

e appeared [*phaino*: cf. 432d as there] to be the state, and accordingly we constructed [*oikizo*: cf. 428e as constituted] as good a one as we could, knowing [*eido*: cf. 406c as understood] well that in the good state justice would be found. Let the discovery which we made [*phaino*: cf. c] be now applied to [*epanaphero*: to throw back upon] the individual—if they agree, we shall be satisfied [*homologeō*: cf. d as verified & *kalos*, adverb: cf. 430c as right with *exeimi*: to come forward]; or, if there be [*phaino*: cf. e] a difference in the individual, we will come back to the state and have another trial [*basanizo*: cf. 414a] 435 of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed [*phaneros*: cf. 360a as reappeared] we will fix in [*para*] our souls.

That will be in regular course; let us do as you say.

I proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called [*prosagoreuo*: cf. 431d as described] the same?

Like, he replied.

b The just man then, if we regard the idea [*eidōs*: cf. 434d as conception] of justice only, will be like the just state?

He will.

And a state was thought [*doxazo*: cf. 413a as conceive] by us to be just when the three classes in the state [*phusis*: cf. 433a as nature] severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise [*sophron*: cf. 431b as temperance & *andreios*: cf. 429b as courageous & *sophos*: cf. 428d] by reason of certain other affections and qualities [*pathe*: a passive state, emotion & *hexis*: cf. 404c as condition] of these same classes?

True, he said.

And so of the individual; we may assume [*axioo*: to deem worthy] that he has the same three principles c [*eidōs*: cf. b as idea] in his own soul [*psuche*: cf. 431a] which are found in the state; and he may be rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected [*pathe*: cf. b as affections & *axioo*: cf. b] in the same manner?

Certainly, he said.

Once more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy question—whether the soul [*psuche*: cf. c, with *peri*] has these three principles [*eidōs*: cf. c] or not?

An easy question [*dokeo*: cf. 434d as agree & *phaulos*: cf. 431c as inferior]! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is the good [*chalepos*: cf. 429a as difficulty & *kalos*: cf. 430a as perfection].

Very true [*phaino*: cf. 434e as if there be], I said; and I do not think [*doxa*: cf. 431d as agreed] that the d method [*methodos*: pursuit] which we are employing is at all adequate [*akribos*, adverb: cf. 403c as careful] to the accurate solution of this question; the true method [*hodos*: road, way] is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a solution not below [*axios*, adverb] the level of the previous enquiry.

May we not be satisfied with that? he said;—under the circumstances, I am quite content.

I too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied [*agapetos*: beloved; in neuter, one must be content].

Then faint [*apokamno*: to grow weary] not in pursuing [*skopeo*: cf. 433e as question] the speculation, he said.

e Must we not acknowledge [*homologeō*: cf. 434ee as satisfied], I said, that in each of us there are the same principles and habits [*eidōs*: c & *ethe*: cf. 424d] which there are in the state; and that from the individual they pass into the state?—how else can they come [*aphikneomai*: to come to, arrive] there? Take the quality of passion or spirit [*thumoeides*: cf. 411b];—it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality, when found in states, is not derived from the individuals who are supposed to possess it, e.g. the Thracians, Scythians, and in general the northern nations; and the same may be said of the love of

436 knowledge [*philomathes*: cf. 411d], which is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or of the love of money, which may, with equal truth, be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians.

Exactly so, he said.

There is no difficulty [*chalepos*: cf. 435c as hard] in understanding this.

None whatever.

But the question is not quite so easy [*chalepos*: cf. a] when we proceed to ask whether these principles are three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn [*manthano*: cf. 432e as recognize] with one part of our nature, are angry [*thumoo*: cf. 411c for *thumos* or spirit] with another, and with a third part desire [*epithumeo*: cf.

432e as grow impatient] the satisfaction of our natural [adelphos: related, as brother or sister] appetites [hedone: cf. 431b as desires]; or whether the whole soul [psuche: cf. c] comes into play in each sort of action—to determine [diorizo: cf. 346b as language] that is the difficulty.

Yes, he said; there lies the difficulty.

Then let us now try and determine [epicheireo: cf. 434d as examine & horizo: cf. 376b] whether they are the same or different.

How can we?, he asked.

I replied as follows: The same thing clearly cannot [thelo: to will] act or be acted upon [poieo: cf. 396a as be practiced & pascho: cf. 415d, used with a noun in that instance] in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs [heurisko: cf. 429a as discovered] in things apparently the same, we know [eido: cf. 434e] that they are really not the same, but different.

Good.

For example, I said, can the same thing be at rest and in motion [histemi: to stand, be set & kineo: cf. 380e as discomposed] at the same time in the same part?

Impossible.

Still, I said, let us have a more precise statement of terms [homologeio: cf. 435e as acknowledge & akribos: 435d as adequate], lest we should hereafter fall out by the way [amphisbeteo: to disagree]. Imagine the case of a man who is standing and also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person to say that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same moment—to such a mode of speech we should object [axioo: cf. 435c with a noun used in that instance], and should rather d say that one part of him is in motion while another is at rest.

Very true.

And suppose the objector was to refine [charientizomai: to be witty, jest] still further, and to draw the nice distinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops, when they spin round with their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and in motion at the same time (and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the same spot), his objection would not be admitted [apodechomai: cf. 430c: will (not) be far wrong] by us, because in such cases things are not at rest and in motion in the same parts of themselves; we should rather say that they have both an axis and a circumference, and that the axis stands still, for there is no deviation from the perpendicular; and that the circumference goes round. But if, while revolving, the axis inclines either to the right or left, forwards or backwards, then in no point of view can they be at rest.

That is the correct mode [orthos, adverb: cf. 430c] of describing them, he replied.

Then none of these objections will confuse [ekplesso: to strike out of, astound] us, or incline [peitho: cf. 430a as influences] us to believe that the same thing at the same time, in the same part or in relation to 437 the same thing, can act or be acted upon in contrary ways.

Certainly not, according to my way of thinking.

Yet, I said, that we may not be compelled to examine all such objections [anaykazo: to force & amphisbeteo: cf. 436c as fall out by the way], and prove at length [mekuno: to lengthen] that they are untrue, let us assume [hupotithemi: to place under] their absurdity, and go forward on the understanding [homologeio: cf. 436c as statement of terms] that hereafter, if this assumption turns out to be untrue, all the consequences [sumbaino: cf. 412d as affect] which follow shall be withdrawn [lanthano: cf. 432e as missed].

Yes, he said, that will be the best way.

b Well, I said, would you not allow that assent and dissent [epineuo: to nod & ananeuo], desire and aversion [ephistemi: cf. 386b as control over & aparneomai: to deny utterly], attraction and repulsion [prosago: to furnish, supply & apotheo: to thrust away], are all of them opposites, whether they are regarded as active or passive [poiema: anything made & pathema: cf. 393b as events], for that makes no difference [diaphero: cf. 427d] in the fact of their opposition?

Yes, he said, they are opposites.

Well, I said, and hunger and thirst, and the desires [epithumia: cf. 431c] in general, and again willing and wishing [thelo: cf. 436b as cannot & boulomai: cf. 428b as counsel],—all these you would refer to the c classes [eidōs: cf. 435e as habits] already mentioned. You would say—would you not?—that the soul [psuche: cf. 436b] of him who desires [epithumeo: cf. 436a] is seeking after [ephistemi: cf. b as desire] the object of his desires [epithumeo: cf. c]; or that he is drawing to [prosago: cf. b as attraction] himself the thing

which he wishes [*boulomai: cf. b*] to possess: or again, when a person wants anything to be given him, his mind, longing for the realization of his desires [*eporego: to stretch oneself towards*], intimates his wish to have it by a nod of assent [*epineuo: cf. b*], as if he had been asked a question?

Very true.

And what would you say of unwillingness and dislike [*aboulomai & thelo (with me, not): cf. b*] and the absence of desire [*epithumeo: cf. c*]; should not these be referred to the opposite class of repulsion and rejection [*apotho: cf. b & apelauno: to drive away*]?

d Certainly.

Admitting this to be true of desire [*epithumia: cf. b*] generally, let us suppose a particular class [*eidōs: cf. c*] of desires, and out of these we will select hunger and thirst, as they are termed, which are the most obvious [*enarges: visible, palpable*] of them?

Let us take that class, he said.

The object of one is food, and of the other drink?

Yes.

And here comes the point: is not thirst the desire which the soul [*epithumia: cf. d & psuche: cf. c*] has of drink, and of drink only; not of drink qualified by anything else; for example, warm or cold, or much or little, or, in a word, drink of any particular sort: but if the thirst be accompanied by heat, then the desire is of cold drink; or, if accompanied by cold, then of warm drink; or, if the thirst be excessive, then the

e drink which is desired [*epithumia: cf. c*] will be excessive; or, if not great, the quantity of drink will also be small: but thirst pure and simple will desire [*epithumia: cf. e*] drink pure and simple, which is the natural [*phuo: cf. 401e as phunon*] satisfaction of thirst, as food is of hunger?

Yes, he said; the simple desire is, as you say, in every case of the simple object, and the qualified desire of the qualified object.

438 But here a confusion may arise [*askeptos: inconsiderate & thorubeo: to make an uproar*]; and I should wish to guard against an opponent starting up and saying that no man desires [*epithumeo: cf. 437c*] drink only, but good drink, or food only, but good food; for good is the universal object of desire [*epithumeo: cf. a*], and thirst being a desire [*epithumia: cf. 437e*], will necessarily be thirst after good drink; and the same is true of every other desire.

Yes, he replied, the opponent might have something to say.

Nevertheless I should still maintain [*dokeo: cf. 435c as question*], that of relatives some have a quality

b [*poios: of what sort*] attached to either term of the relation; others are simple and have their correlatives simple.

I do not know what you mean.

Well, you know of course that the greater is relative to the less?

Certainly.

And the much greater to the much less?

Yes.

And the sometime greater to the sometime less, and the greater that is to be to the less that is to be?

Certainly, he said.

c And so of more and less, and of other correlative terms, such as the double and the half, or again, the heavier and the lighter, the swifter and the slower; and of hot and cold, and of any other relatives;—is not this true of all of them?

Yes.

And does not the same principle [*tropos: cf. 432e, in context of the word at hand*] hold in the sciences [*episteme: cf. 428c as knowledge*]?

The object of science is knowledge [*mathema: cf. 411d as learning*]

(assuming that to be the true definition), but the object of a particular science is a particular kind of

d knowledge; I mean, for example, that the science of house-building is a kind of knowledge which is defined and distinguished from other kinds and is therefore termed architecture.

Certainly.

Because it has a particular quality which no other has?

Yes.

And it has this particular quality because it has an object of a particular kind; and this is true of the other arts and sciences [*techne: cf. 421d as art & episteme: cf. c*]?

Yes.

Now, then, if I have made myself clear, you will understand my original meaning in what I said about relatives. My meaning [*manthano*: cf. 436a as learn] was, that if one term of a relation is taken alone, e the other is taken alone; if one term is qualified, the other is also qualified. I do not mean to say that relatives may not be disparate, or that the science of health is healthy, or of disease necessarily diseased, or that the sciences [*episteme*: cf. d] of good and evil are therefore good and evil; but only that, when the term science is no longer used absolutely, but has a qualified object which in this case is the nature of health and disease, it becomes defined [*prosgignomai*: to attach oneself; be added], and is hence called not merely science, but the science of medicine.

I quite understand [*manthano*: cf. d as meaning], and I think [*dokeo*: cf. a as maintain] as you do. Would you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative terms, having clearly a relation—
Yes, thirst is relative to drink.

439 And a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink; but thirst taken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor bad, nor of any particular kind of drink, but of drink only?

Certainly.

Then the soul [*psuche*: cf. 437d] of the thirsty one, in so far as he is thirsty, desires [*boulomai*: cf. 437c b as wishes] only drink; for this he yearns and tries to obtain it [*orego*: to stretch out & *hormao*: cf. 425c as starts]? That is plain.

And if you suppose something which pulls [*antheleko*: to draw, pull against] a thirsty soul away from drink, that must be different from the thirsty principle which draws [*ago*: cf. 432c as show] him like a beast to drink; for, as we were saying, the same thing cannot at the same time with the same part of itself act in contrary ways about the same.

Impossible.

No more than you can say that the hands of the archer push and pull the bow at the same time, but what you say is that one hand pushes and the other pulls.

c Exactly so, he replied.

And might a man be thirsty, and yet unwilling to drink?

Yes, he said, it constantly happens.

And in such a case what is one to say? Would you not say that there was something in [*eniemi*: cf. 432a as resides] the soul [*psuche*: cf. b] bidding a man to drink, and something else forbidding him, which is other and stronger than the principle which bids [*keleuo*: to urge, order] him?

I should say so [*dokeo*: cf. 438e as think].

And the forbidding principle [*koluo*] is derived from reason [*logismos*: cf. 431c as mind], and that which d bids and attracts [*ago*: cf. b as draws & *helko*: cf. 350d as reluctance] proceeds from passion [*pathema*: cf. 437b as passive] and disease?

Clearly.

Then we may fairly assume that they are two [*logos*, adverb, with *ou* or *not* & *axioo*: cf. 436c as object], and that they differ from one another; the one with which man reasons [*logizomai*: cf. 366a as reflection], we may call the rational principle of the soul [*prosagoreuo*: cf. 335a as called & *logistikos* & *psuche*: cf. c], the other, with which he loves [*erao*: cf. 403a] and hungers and thirsts and feels the flutterings [*petaomai*: to fly] of any other desire [*epithumia*: cf. 438a], may be termed the irrational or appetitive [*alogistos* & *epithumetikos*], the ally of sundry pleasures [*hedone*: cf. 436b as appetites] and satisfactions?

e Yes, he said, we may fairly assume them to be different.

Then let us finally determine [*horizo*: cf. 436b as determine] that there are two principles existing in the soul [*eniemi*: cf. c as something in & *psuche*: cf. c]. And what of passion or spirit [*thumos*: cf. 411c & *thuo*: to rush on, rage]? Is it a third, or akin [*homophues*: of the same race or stock] to one of the preceding?

I should be inclined to say—akin to desire [*epithumetikos*: cf. d as appetitive].

Well, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and in which I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a desire to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them; for a time he struggled and covered his eyes, but at length the **440** desire [*epithumia*: cf. d] got the better of [*krateo*: cf. 431c as held down] him; and forcing them open, he ran up to the dead bodies, saying, Look, you wretches [*kakodaimone*], take your fill of the fair sight.

I have heard the story myself, he said.

The moral of the tale [*logos* & *semaino*: cf. 439d where both are used together] is, that anger [*orge*] at times

goes to war with desire, as though they were two distinct things.

Yes; that is the meaning [*semaino: cf. a*], he said.

And are there not many other cases in which we observe [*aisthanomai: cf. 409b as known*] that when a **b** man's desires violently prevail over his reason [*biazo: cf. 413b as forced & logismos: cf. 439c, with para*], he reviles himself [*loidoreo: cf. 395d as vaunting*], and is angry at the violence [*thuo: cf. 439e as spirit & biazo: cf. b*] within him, and that in this struggle, which is like the struggle of factions [*stasiazo: cf. 351d as set at variance & summachos: cf. 423a as many friends*] in a state, his spirit [*thumos: cf. 439e*] is on the side of his reason [*logos: cf. a as tale*];—but for the passionate or spirited element to take part with [*epithumia: cf. a & koinoneo: cf. 411c as holds (no) converse*] the desires when reason that she should not be opposed [*logos & antiprasso: to act against*], is a sort of thing which thing which I believe that you never observed [*aisthanomai: cf. a*] occurring in yourself, nor, as I should imagine, in any one else?

Certainly not.

c Suppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to [*oiomai: cf. 426e as fancying & adikeo: cf. 430e as not be justified*] another, the nobler [*gennaios: cf. 409c as ideal*] he is the less able is he to feel indignant [*orgizo: cf. 366c in context of that sentence*] at any suffering, such as hunger, or cold, or any other pain which the injured person may inflict upon him—these he deems to be just, and, as I say, his anger refuses to be excited [*thumos: cf. b as spirit & egeiro: to awaken, rouse*] by them.

True, he said.

But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong [*adikeo: cf. c as has done a wrong*], then he boils and chafes [*zeo: to seethe & chalepaino: cf. 426e as angry with*], and is on the side of [*summachomai: to fight along with, be an ally*] what he believes [*dokeo: cf. 439c as should say so*] to be justice; and because he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere

d [*hupomeno: cf. 402e as be patient*] and conquer. His noble spirit [*gennaios: cf. c*] will not be quelled until he either slays or is slain; or until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason [*logos: cf. b*], bidding his dog bark no more.

The illustration is perfect [*eioke: to seem likely*], he replied; and in our state, as we were saying, the auxiliaries [*epikouros: cf. 420a as mercenaries*] were to be dogs, and to hear the voice [*hupekoos: listening to*] of the rulers, who are their shepherds.

I perceive, I said, that you quite understand [*noeo: cf. 335e in the context of that sentence*] me; there is, however, a further point which I wish you to consider [*enthumeomai: to lay to heart*].

e What point?

You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight [*phaino: cf. 435c as very true*] to be a kind of desire [*thumoeidos*], but now we should say quite the contrary; for in the conflict of the soul spirit [*epithumetikos: cf. 439e as desire*] is arrayed on the side of the rational principle [*logistikos: cf. 439d as rational principle*].

Most assuredly.

But a further question arises: is passion different from reason also, or only a kind of reason [*eidōs: cf. 437d as class & logistikos: e as rational principle*]; in which latter case, instead of three principles in the soul [*psuche: cf. 439e*], there will only be two, the rational and the concupiscent [*logistikos & epithumetikos: cf. e as spirit*]; or rather, as the state was composed of [*sunecho: to hold together*] three **441** classes, traders, auxiliaries, counselors, so may there not be in the individual soul a third element which is passion or spirit [*thumoeides: cf. 435e*], and when not corrupted by bad education [*diaphtheiro: cf. 424b, in the context of the sentence & trophe: cf. 431a*] is the natural auxiliary of reason [*epikouros: cf. d & logistikos: cf. 440e*].

Yes, he said, there must be a third.

Yes, I replied, if passion, which has already been shown [*phaino: cf. 440e as sight*] to be different from desire, turn out also to be different from reason.

But that is easily proved [*phaino: cf. a & chalepos (with ou, not): cf. 436a as not quite so easy*]:—We may observe even in young children that they are full of spirit [*thumos: cf. 440c as excited*] almost as soon as they are born, whereas some of them never seem to attain to the use of reason [*metalambano:*

b *cf. 421c as proportion & logismos: cf. 440b*], and most of them late enough.

Excellent [*kalos, adverb: cf. 434e, in context of the sentence*], I said, and you may see passion equally in brute animals [*therion: cf. 336b as wildbeast*], which is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying. And we may once more appeal [*martureo: to be a witness*] to the words of Homer, which have been already quoted by us:

He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul [*cf. 390d*].

For in this verse Homer has clearly [*saphos, adverb*] supposed [*poieo: cf. 436b as acted upon*] the power **c** which reasons about [*analogizomai: cf. 330e as consider*] the better and worse [*beltion & cheiron: cf. 431a*] to be different from the unreasoning anger [*alogistos (adverb) & thumoo: cf. 436a*] which is rebuked [*epiplesso: to strike at*] by it.

Very true [*orthos, adverb: cf. 436e as correct mode*] he said.

And so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed [*homologeio: cf. 437a as on the understanding*] that the same principles which exist in the state exist [*eniemi: cf. 439e*] also in the individual [*psuche: cf. 440e as soul*], and that they are three in number.

Exactly.

Must we not then infer [*anagkaios: cf. 406c as must*] that the individual is wise [*sophos: cf. 435b*] in the same way, and in virtue of the same quality which makes the state wise?

Certainly.

d Also that the same quality which constitutes courage [*andreios: cf. 435b as valiant*] in the state constitutes courage [*andreia: cf. 433b*] in the individual, and that both the state and the individual bear the same relation to all the other virtues [*arete: cf. 433d*]?

Assuredly.

And, Glaucon, the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way [*tropos: cf. 438c as principle*] in which the state is just [*dikaioi: cf. 433e*]?

That follows, of course.

We cannot but remember [*epilanthano: for lanthano, cf. 431a as shall be withdrawn*] that the justice of the state consisted in each of the three classes doing the work [*prasso: cf. 433a as doing one's own business*] of its own class?

We are not very likely to have forgotten [*epilanthano: cf. d*], he said.

We must recollect [*mnemoneuo*] that the individual in whom the several qualities of his nature do their **e** own work [*prasso: cf. d*] will be just, and will do his own work?

Yes, he said, we must remember that too.

And ought not the rational principle [*logistikos: cf. 441a as reason*], which is wise [*sophos: cf. c*], and has the care of the whole soul [*prometheia: foresight, held in consideration & psuche: cf. c*], to rule [*archo: cf. 432a*], and the passionate or spirited principle to be the subject and ally [*thumoeides: cf. a & hupekoos: cf. 440d as to hear the voice & summachos: cf. 440b as struggle*]?

Certainly.

And, as we were saying, the united influence [*krasis: power, strength*] of music and gymnastic will bring them into accord [*sumphonos: of one voice*], nerving and sustaining [*epiteino: cf. 412a as drawn tighter & trepho: cf. 414d as training*] the reason with noble [*kalos: cf. 435c as good*] words and lessons

442 [*mathema: cf. 438c as knowledge*], and moderating and soothing and civilizing [*aniemi: cf. 411e as may be relaxed & paramutheomai: to encourage & hemereuo: to spend the day*] the wildness of passion by harmony and rhythm [*harmonia: cf. 401d for both terms*]?

Quite true, he said.

And these two, thus nurtured and educated [*trepho: cf. 441e as sustaining & manthano: cf. 438e as understand*], and having learned truly to know their own functions [*paideuo: cf. 431c as educated*], will rule over the concupiscent [*prostithemi: cf. 369d as add & epithumetikos: cf. 440e as concupiscent*], which in each of us is the largest part of the soul [*psuche: cf. 441e*] and by nature most insatiable of gain [*aplestos: not to be filled & chrema: cf. 422a, in context of the sentence*]; over this they will keep guard [*tereo: cf. 423d as give further proof*], lest, waxing great and strong with the fulness of bodily pleasures [*hedone: cf. 439d*], as they are termed, the concupiscent soul, no longer confined to her own

b sphere, should attempt to enslave and rule [*epicheireo: cf. 436b as try & katadoulo & archo: cf. 441e*] those who are not her natural-born subjects, and overturn [*anatrepo: cf. 424e*] the whole life of man?

Very true, he said.

Both together will they not be the best defenders [*kalos: cf. 441e as noble & phulattoites: from phulasso as in 424b, maintain*] of the whole soul and the whole body [*psuche: cf. a & soma: cf. 410a*] against attacks from without; the one counseling [*bouleuo: cf. 428d as advises*], and the other fighting under his leader, and courageously executing his commands and counsels [*hepo: cf. 432c as follower & andreios: cf. 441d as courage & epiteleio: to complete, finish & bouleuo: cf. b*]?

True.

And he is to be deemed courageous [*oiomai: cf. 440c as thinks & andreios: cf. b*] whose spirit **c** [*thumoeides: cf. 441e as spirited principle*] retains in pleasure and in pain [*diasozo: cf. 429d as preserves & hedone: cf. a & lupe: cf. 431c*] the commands of reason [*logos: cf. 440d*] about what he ought or ought not to fear?

Right, he replied.

And him we call wise [*sophos: cf. 441e*] who has in him that little part which rules [*archo: cf. b*], and which proclaims [*paraggello: cf. 415b*] these commands; that part too being supposed to have a knowledge [*episteme: cf. 438e as sciences*] of what is for the interest [*sumphero: cf. 412e as what is for the good & koimos: cf. 424a as common*] of each of the three parts and of the whole?

Assuredly.

And would you not say that he is temperate [*sophroneo: cf. 431e*] who has these same elements in friendly harmony [*philios & sumphonia: cf. 430d*], in whom the one ruling principle of reason [*to archon & archo: cf. c & logistikos: cf. 441e as rational principle*], and the two subject ones of spirit and desire **d** are equally agreed [*homodoxeo*] that reason ought to rule, and do not rebel [*stasiazo: cf. 440b as struggle*]? Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance [*sophrosune: cf. 433b*] whether in the state or individual.

And surely, I said, we have explained again and again how and by virtue of what quality a man will be just [*dikaios: cf. 441d*].

That is very certain.

And is justice dimmer [*dikaiosune: cf. 432b & apambluno: to blunt*] in the individual, and is her form [*dokeo: cf. 440c as believes*] different, or is she the same which we found [*phaino: cf. 441a as proved*] her to be in the state?

There is no difference in my opinion [*dokeo: cf. d*], he said.

Because, if any doubt [*amphibeteo: cf. 437a in context of the sentence*] is still lingering in our minds **e** [*psuche: cf. b*], a few commonplace instances will satisfy [*phortikos: cf. 367a as grossly (adverb) & prosphero: cf. 423a as treated*] us of the truth of what I am saying.

What sort of instances do you mean?

If the case is put to us [*anomologeomai: cf. 348b as enquiry*], must we not admit that the just state, or the man who is trained [*tethrammenou: ?*] in the principles of such a state, will be less likely than the **443** unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver? Would any one deny [*oiomai: cf. c as deemed*] this?

No one, he replied.

Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery either to his friends or to his country?

Never.

Neither will he ever break faith [*apistos: cf. 409c as suspicions*] where there have been oaths or agreements [*horkos & homologia*]?

Impossible.

No one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonor his father and mother, or to fall in his religious duties [*atherapeusia: neglect & theos: cf. 425e as God*]?

No one.

b And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business [*aitios: cf. 380c as author*], whether in ruling or being ruled [*archo: cf. 442c*]?

Exactly so.

Are you satisfied then that the quality [*dunamis: cf. 333d as power*] which makes [*parecho: cf. 434c*] such men and such states is justice [*dikaiosune: cf. 442d*], or do you hope to discover some other?

Not I, indeed.

Then our dream has been realized [*enupnion: a thing seen in sleep or dream & teleos: cf. 428d as perfect & apoteleo: to bring to an end*]; and the suspicion [*hupoteuo*] which we entertained at the beginning of our work of construction, that some divine power [*theos, with kata: cf. a*] must have conducted [*oikizo: cf. 432e as constructed*] us to a primary form [*archo, with eis: cf. b as ruled & tupos: c cf. 412b as principles*] of justice, has now been verified [*bebaioo: to make firm, establish*]?

Yes, certainly.

And, Glaucon, the division of labor which required the carpenter and the shoemaker and the rest of the

citizens to be doing each his own business, and not another's, was a shadow of justice [*eidolon*: cf. 382b as image & *dikaiousune*: cf. b], and for that reason it was of use?

Clearly [*phaino*: cf. 442d as found].

But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned however, not with the outward man, but with the inward [*echo/entos*], which is the true self [*alethos* (adverb): cf. 421b as true, with *d peri heauton*] and his own: for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with [*polupragmoneo*: cf. 433d as being a busybody] one another, or any of them to do the work of others,—he sets in order his own inner life [*psuche*: cf. 432e as minds], and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself [*oikeios*: cf. 409c as personal & *tithemi*: cf. 433a as laying down & *archo*: cf. b as ruled & *kosmeo*: to order, arrange]; and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals—when he has bound all these together [*sunarmoizo*: to fit together & *philos*: e cf. 352b as friend], and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature [*sophron*: 435b & *harmoizo*: cf. 411a as in harmony], then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment [*therapeia*: cf. 427b as service] of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business [*sumbolaiois*: concerning contracts]; always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates [*sunapergazomai*: to help in completing] with this harmonious condition [*hexis*: cf. 435b as qualities & *sozo*: cf. 429c as preserves], just and good action [*kalos*: cf. 442a as best & *praxis*: cf. 399b as to be used], and the knowledge [*episteme*: cf. 442c] which presides over it, wisdom [*sophia*: cf. 433d], and that which at any time impairs this condition, he will call 444 unjust action, and the opinion [*doxa*: cf. 435c as think] which presides over [*ephistemi*: cf. 437c as seeking after] it ignorance [*amathia*: cf. 428b].

You have said the exact truth, Socrates.

Very good; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered [*heurisko*: cf. 436b as occurs] the just man and the just state, and the nature of justice in each of them, we should not be telling a falsehood [*pseudo*: cf. 365a as deceive]?

Most certainly not.

May we say so, then?

Let us say so.

And now, I said, injustice has to be considered [*skepteos*: from *skeptomai* as in 434d, inquiry].

Clearly.

b Must not injustice be a strife [*stasis*: a standing, faction] which arises among the three principles—a meddlesomeness and interference [*polupragmosune*: cf. 434b & *allogiopragmosune*: estrangement], and rising up [*epanastasis*] of a part of the soul against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority [*archo*: cf. 443d as law & *proseko*: cf. 420d as due proportion], which is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural vassal,—what is all this confusion and delusion [*tarache*: cf. 391c as disordered & *akolasia*: cf. 425e as no self-restraint] but injustice, and intemperance and cowardice and ignorance [*adikia*: cf. 434c & *deilia* & *amathia*: cf. 444a], and every form of vice [*kakia*: cf. 401b as deformity]?

Exactly so.

c And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning of acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will also be perfectly clear [*katadelos*: cf. 428a as come into view]?

What do you mean? he said.

Why, I said, they are like [*diaphero*: cf. 437b as no difference] disease and health; being in the soul just what disease and health are in the body.

How so?, he said.

Why, I said, that which is healthy causes [*empoieo*: to make in, introduce] health, and that which is unhealthy causes disease.

Yes.

And just actions cause [*prasso*: cf. 441e as work] justice, and unjust actions cause [*empoieo*: cf. c]

d injustice?

That is certain.

And the creation of health is the institution of a natural order [*phusis*, with *kata*: cf. 435b as state & *kathistemi*: cf. 421b as appointing] and government [*krateo*: cf. 440a as got the better] of one by another in the parts of the body; and the creation of disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this natural order?

True.

And is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order [*phusis & kathistemi: cf. d*] and government [*archo: cf. b as authority*] of one by another in the parts of the soul, and the creation of injustice [*adikia: cf. b*] the production of a state of things at variance with the natural order [*phusis, with para*]?

Exactly so, he said.

Then virtue [*arete: cf. 441d*] is the health and beauty and well-being [*hugieia: cf. 405e & kallos or kalos: cf. 443e as good & euexia: a good habit of body*] of the soul, and vice the disease and weakness and deformity [*kakia: cf. d as injustice & nosos: cf. 405a & aischos: shame & astheneia*] of the same?

True.

And do not good practices [*kalos: cf. d & epitedeuma: cf. 428a as regulations*] lead to virtue [*arete, with eis: cf. d*], and evil practices to vice [*aischros: cf. e & kakia: cf. e*]?

Assuredly.

Still our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and injustice has not been answered **445** [*skeptomai: cf. 434d as inquiry*]: which is the more profitable [*lusiteleo: cf. 408b as (no) use*], to be just and act justly and practice virtue [*kalos: cf. e & epitedeuo: cf. 433a as adapted*], whether seen or unseen [*lanthano: cf. 431a as shall be withdrawn*] of gods and men, or to be unjust and act unjustly, if only unpunished and unreformed [*beltion: cf. 441c as better & kolazo: to chastize*]?

In my judgment, Socrates, the question [*skemma: subject of speculation*] has now become [*phaino: cf. 443c as clearly*] ridiculous [*skeptomai: cf. a as answered & geloios: cf. 430e*]. We know that, when the bodily constitution is gone [*soma: cf. 442b & phusis: cf. 444d as natural & diaphtheiro: cf. 441a as corrupted*], life is [*dokeo: cf. 442d as in my opinion*] no longer endurable, though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and having all wealth and all power; and shall we be told that when the very **b** essence of the vital principle [*to bion*] is undermined and corrupted [*tarasso: cf. 381a as confused & diaphtheiro: cf. a*], life is still worth having [*bouleuo: cf. 442b as counsels*] to a man, if only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception that he is not to acquire justice and virtue [*ktaomai: cf. 427d as portion & dikaiosune: cf. 443c & arete: cf. 4443*], or to escape from injustice and vice [*apallasso: cf. 329c & kakia: cf. 444e & adikia: cf. 444d*]; assuming [*phaino: cf. a*] them both to be such as we have described [*dierchomai: cf. 428b*]?

Yes, I said, the question is, as you say, ridiculous [*geloios: cf. a*]. Still, as we are near the spot [*erchomai: to come*] at which we may see the truth in the clearest manner [*saphos: cf. 362e, in context of the sentence*] with our own eyes, let us not faint [*apokamno: cf. 435d*] by the way.

Certainly not, he replied.

c Come up hither, I said, and behold the various forms of vice [*eidos: cf. 440e as kind & kakia: cf. b*], those of them, I mean [*dokeo: cf. a*], which are worth looking at [*theaomai: cf. 434d as examine*].

I am following you, he replied: proceed.

I said, the argument seems to have reached a height [*logos: cf. 442c as reason & phaino: cf. b*] from which, as from some tower of speculation [*skopia: look-out*], a man may look down and see that virtue [*eidos: cf. c & arete: cf. b*] is one, but that the forms of vice are innumerable [*kakia: cf. c & apeiros: cf. 409a as no experience*]; there being four special ones which are deserving of note [*axios: cf. 425d as need & epimnaomai: to remember (upon)*].

What do you mean?, he said.

I mean, I replied, that there appear to be as many forms [*eidos: cf. c*] of the soul as there [*kinduneuo: cf. 424c as full of danger*] are distinct forms [*tropos: cf. 441d as way*] of the state.

How many?

d There are five of the state, and five of the soul, I said.

What are they?

The first [*tropos: cf. c*], I said, is that which we have been describing [*dierchomai: cf. b*], and which may be said to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy, accordingly as rule is exercised by one distinguished [*diaphero: cf. 444c as like*] man or by many.

True, he replied.

e But I regard the two names as describing one form [*eidos: cf. c*] only; for whether the government is in the hands of one or many, if the governors have been trained in the manner [*trophe: cf. 441a as education & paideia: cf. 430b as courage*] which we have supposed, the fundamental laws [*nomos: cf. 429c*] of the state will be maintained [*chrao: to furnish what is needful & dierchomai: cf. d*].

That is true, he replied.

Book Five

449 Such is the good and true [*agathos: cf. 433c as excellence & orthos: cf. 431c as true*] city or state [*polis: cf. 413e & politeia: cf. 425d as constitutions*], and the good and man is of the same pattern; and if this is right every other is wrong [*hamartano: cf. 395e as sin*]; and the evil is one which affects not only the ordering [*dioikesis: administration*] of the state, but also the regulation of the individual soul [*kataskeue: preparation & tropos: cf. 448d as first & psuche: cf. 443d as inner life*], and is exhibited in four forms [*eidos: cf. 448e*]. What are they?, he said.

I was proceeding to tell the order in which the four evil forms appeared [*phaino: cf. 448c as seems*] to **b** me to succeed [*metabaino: to pass from one place to another*] one another, when Polemarchus, who was sitting a little way off, just beyond Adeimantus, began to whisper to him: stretching forth his hand, he took hold of the upper part of his coat by the shoulder, and drew him towards him, leaning forward himself so as to be quite close and saying something in his ear, of which I only caught the words, 'Shall we let him off, or what shall we do?'

Certainly not, said Adeimantus, raising his voice.

Who is it, I said, whom you are refusing to let off?

You, he said.

c I repeated, Why am I especially not to be let off?

Why, he said, we think that you are lazy, and mean to cheat [*aporrathumeo: to neglect from faint-heartedness*] us out of a whole chapter [*eidos: cf. a as forms*] which is a very important part of the story [*logos: cf. 448c as argument*]; and you fancy that we shall not notice [*oiomai: cf. 443a as deny & lanthano: cf. 448a as unseen*] your airy way of proceeding; as if it were self-evident to everybody, that in the matter of women and children 'friends have all things in common [*koinos: cf. 442c in context of the sentence*].'

And was I not right, Adeimantus?

Yes, he said; but what is right [*orthos, adverb: cf. 441c as very true*] in this particular case, like everything else, requires to be explained [*logos: cf. c as story*]; for community may be of many kinds [*koinonia: cf. 402e as affinity & tropos: cf. a in context of the sentence*]. Please, therefore, to say what

d sort of community you mean. We have been long expecting that you would tell [*mnemoneuo: cf. 441d as recollect*] us something about the family life of your citizens—how they will bring children into the world, and rear them when they have arrived, and, in general, what is the nature of this community of women and children—for we are of opinion that the right or wrong management of such matters will have a great and paramount influence on the state [*politeia, with eis: cf. a*] for good or for evil. And now, since the question is still undetermined, and you are taking in hand [*epilambano: cf. 435e as attaining*] another state, we have resolved, as you heard, not to let you go until you give an account

450 [*dierchomai: cf. 448e as will be maintained*] of all this.

To that resolution, said Glaucon, you may regard me as saying Agreed [*psephos: a small stone used for voting*]. And without more ado, said Thrasymachus, you may consider [*nomizo: cf. 419e in the context of the sentence*] us all to be equally agreed.

I said, You know not what you are doing in thus assailing [*epilambano: cf. 449e as taking in hand*] me: what an argument [*logos: cf. 449c as explained*] are you raising about the state! Just as I thought that I had finished, and was only too glad that I had laid this question to sleep [*apodechomai: cf. 436c as would not be admitted*], and was reflecting how fortunate I was in your acceptance of what I then said, **b** you ask me to begin again at the very foundation, ignorant of what a hornet's nest [*hesmos: swarm*] of words you are stirring. Now I foresaw this gathering trouble [*ochlos: crowd, mob*], and avoided it.

For what purpose do you conceive that we have come here, said Thrasymachus,—to look for gold, or to hear discourse?

Yes, but discourse should have a limit [*metrios: cf. 431c as moderate*].

Yes, Socrates, said Glaucon, and the whole of life is the only limit [*metron: measure*] which wise men [*noos: cf. 432b, in the context of the sentence*] assign to the hearing of such discourses [*logos: cf. a as argument*]. But never mind about us; take heart yourself and answer the question in your own way:

c What sort of community [*koinonia: cf. 449c*] of women and children is this which is to prevail among our guardians, and how shall we manage the period between birth and education [*paideia: cf. 448e as trained*], which seems to require the greatest care [*epiponos: cf. 364a as toilsome*]? Tell us how [*tropos: cf. 449c as*

kind] these things will be.

Yes, my simple [*eudaimos*: cf. 422e] friend, but the answer [*dierchomai*: cf. 449e as give an account] is the reverse of easy; many more doubts [*apistia*: disbelief] arise about this than about our previous conclusions [*dierchomai*: cf. c]. For the practicability of what is said may be doubted [*apisteo*: to disbelieve]; and looked at in another point of view, whether the scheme, if ever so practicable, would be for the best, is also doubtful. Hence I feel a reluctance to approach the subject [*logos*: cf. b as discourses], lest our aspiration, my dear friend, should turn out to be a dream only [*dokeo*: cf. 448c as mean & *euche*: cf. 399b as prayer].

Fear [*okneo*: cf. 414c as to hesitate] not, he replied, for your audience will not be hard upon you; they are not skeptical or hostile [*agnoeo*: cf. 376b as not knowing & *apistos*: cf. 444a as break faith].

I said: My good friend [*aristos*: cf. 428d as best], I suppose that you mean to encourage [*tharseo*] me by these words.

Yes, he said.

Then let me tell you that you are doing just the reverse; the encouragement [*paramuthia*: cf. 329e as comforter] which you offer would have been all very well had I myself believed that I knew [*eido*: cf. 436b] what I was talking about: to declare the truth about matters of high interest which a man honors and loves among wise men who love [*phronimos*: cf. 412c as wise & *philos*: cf. 443d in the context of the e sentence] him need occasion no fear or faltering [*asphales*: not liable to fall & *tharraleos*: bold] in his mind; but to carry on an argument [*logos*: cf. c as subject] when you are yourself only a hesitating [*apisteo*: cf. c as doubted] enquirer, which is my condition, is a dangerous and slippery thing [*phoberos*: 451 cf. 413d as timid & *sphaleros*: cf. 404a as perilous]; and the danger is not that I shall be laughed at (of which the fear would be childish), but that I shall miss the truth [*sphallo*, with me (not): cf. 396d as overtaken & *aletheia*: cf. 349a as in earnest] where I have most need to be sure of my footing [*sphallo*: cf. a], and drag my friends after me in my fall. And I pray [*proskuneo*: cf. 398a as worship] Adrastea [*a kind of Nemesis*] not to visit upon me the words which I am going to utter. For I do indeed believe [*elpizo*: to hope] that to be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver [*apatao*: cf. 413c as deceives] about beauty or goodness or justice [*kalos*: cf. 445a as virtue & *agathos*: cf. 449a & *dikaios*: cf. 442d] in the matter of laws [*nomimos*: cf. 430b]. And that is a risk which I would rather run [*kindeuneuma* & *kinduneuo*: cf. 448c in the context of the sentence] among enemies than among

b friends, and therefore you do well to encourage [*paramutheomai*: cf. 442a as soothing] me.

Glaucon laughed and said: Well then, Socrates, in case you and your argument [*logos*: cf. 450e] do us any serious injury [*pascho*: cf. 436b as acted upon] you shall be acquitted [*aphiemi*: to send forth, discharge & *katharos*: clean, pure] beforehand and shall not be held to be a deceiver [*apatao*: cf. a]; take courage [*tharseo*: cf. 450d] then and speak.

Well, I said, the law says that when a man is acquitted he is free from guilt [*katharos*: cf. a], and what holds at law [*nomos*: cf. 448e] may hold in argument.

Then why should you mind?

Well, I replied, I suppose that I must retrace my steps and say what I perhaps ought to have said before c in the proper place [*orthos*, adverb: cf. 449c as right]. The part of the men has been played out, and now properly enough comes the turn of the women. Of them I will proceed to speak, and the more readily since I am invited by you.

For men born and educated [*paideuo*: cf. 442a as learned] like our citizens, the only way, in my opinion [*doxa*: cf. 444a], of arriving at a right conclusion about the possession and use of women and children is to follow the path on which we originally started, when we said that the men were to be [*kathistemi*: cf. 444d as institution] the guardians and watchdogs of the herd [*agele*].

True.

d Let us further suppose [*akoloutheo*: cf. 400e as depend] the birth and education [*trophe*: cf. 448e as manner] of our women to be subject to similar or nearly similar regulations; then we shall see [*skopeo*: cf. 435d as pursuing] whether the result accords with our design [*prepo*: cf. 400b as expressive of].

What do you mean?

What I mean may be put into the form of a question, I said: Are dogs divided into hes and shes, or do they both share equally in hunting and in keeping watch and in the other duties of dogs or do we entrust to the males the entire and exclusive care [*epimeleia*: cf. 407b] of the flocks, while we leave the females at home, under the idea that the bearing and suckling their puppies is labor enough for them?

e No, he said, they share alike; the only difference between them is that the males are stronger and the females weaker.

But can you use different animals for the same purpose, unless they are bred and fed in the same way?

You cannot.

Then, if women are to have the same duties as men, they must have the same nurture and education [*didakteon: verb, adjective of didasko, to teach as in 421e*]?

452 Yes.

The education which was assigned to the men was music and gymnastic.

Yes.

Then women must be taught music and gymnastic and also the art [*techne: cf. 438d*] of war, which they must practice [*chresteon: verb, adjective of chrao: cf. 448e as maintained*] like the men?

That is the inference, I suppose.

I should rather expect, I said, that several of our proposals [*ethos: cf. 416a, in the context of the sentence*], if they are carried out, being unusual, may appear ridiculous [*geloios: cf. 448b*].

No doubt of it.

Yes, and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the sight of women naked in the palaestra, exercising b with the men, especially when they are no longer young; they certainly will not be a vision of beauty, any more than the enthusiastic old men who in spite of wrinkles and ugliness continue to frequent the gymnasia.

Yes, indeed, he said: according to present notions the proposal would be thought [*phaino: cf. 449a as appeared*] ridiculous.

But then, I said, as we have determined to speak our minds, we must not fear the jests [*skomma*] of the wits which will be directed against this sort of innovation [*metabole: cf. 434c as change*]; how they will

c talk of women's attainments both in music and gymnastic, and above all about their wearing armor and riding upon horseback!

Very true, he replied.

Yet having begun we must go forward to the rough places of the law [*trachus & nomos: cf. 451b*]; at the same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their life to be serious [*spoudazo: cf. 405a as take*]. Not long ago, as we shall remind [*hupomimnesko: cf. 427e*] them, the Hellenes were of the opinion [*dokeo: cf. 450d, in the context of the sentence*], which is still generally received among the barbarians, that the sight of a naked man was ridiculous and improper [*geloios: cf. a & aischros: cf. 444e as vice*]; and when first the Cretans and then the Lacedaemonians introduced the custom, the wits of that day might equally have ridiculed the innovation [*komodeo: to represent in a comedy*]. Or don't you think

d [*oiomai: cf. 449c as notice*] so?

No doubt.

But when experience showed [*phaino: cf. b as thought*] that to let all things be uncovered was far better than to cover them up, and the ludicrous effect to the outward eye vanished before the better principle which reason asserted [*logos: cf. 451b as argument & menuo: cf. 366b as to bear a like testimony & aristos: cf. 450d as good friend*], then the man was perceived [*endeiknumi: cf. 367e as prove*] to be a fool who directs the shafts of his ridicule at any other sight but that of folly and vice, or seriously

e inclines to weigh [*spoudazo: cf. c*] the beautiful [*kalos: cf. 451a*] by any other standard [*skopos: mark, object*] but that of the good [*agathos: cf. 451a*].

Very true, he replied.

First, then, whether the question [*anamologeomai: to agree, sum up*] is to be put in jest or in earnest [*philopaignon: fond of play & spoudastikos: serious*], let us come to an understanding about the

453 nature of woman: is she capable of sharing [*koinoneo: cf. 440b as take part with*] either wholly or partially in the actions of men, or not at all? And is the art of war one of those arts in which she can or can not share?

That will be the best [*kallistos: superlative of kalos*] way of commencing the enquiry, and will probably lead to the fairest conclusion [*teleutao: cf. 425c as reached*].

That will be much the best way.

Shall we take the other side [*boulomai: cf. 439a as desires*] first and begin by arguing against ourselves [*amphibeteo: cf. 442d as doubt, with pros*]; in this manner the adversary's position [*logos: cf. d as reason*] will not be undefended.

b Why not? he said.

Then let us put a speech into the mouths of our opponents. They will say: 'Socrates and Glaucon, no

adversary need convict [*amphisbeteo: cf. a as arguing against*] you, for you yourselves, at the first foundation [*katoikisis*] of the state, admitted [*homologeo: cf. 441c as agreed*] the principle that everybody was to do the one work suited to his own nature [*phusis, with kata: cf. 445a as constitution*].¹ And certainly, if I am not mistaken, such an admission [*homologeo: cf. b*] was made by us. ¹

And do not the natures of men and women differ [*diaphero: cf. 448d as distinguished*] very much indeed?

And we shall reply: Of course they do.

Then we shall be asked, 'Whether the tasks assigned to men and to women should not be different, and **c** such as are agreeable to their different natures?'

Certainly they should. ¹

But if so, have you not fallen into a serious inconsistency [*hamartano: cf. 449a as wrong*] in saying that men and women, whose natures are so entirely different, ought to perform the same actions?'

What defense [*hexis: cf. 443e as condition*] will you make for us, my good Sir, against any one who offers these objections [*apologeomai: cf. 419a as making answer*]?

That is not an easy question [*rhadios: cf. 434d in the context of the sentence*] to answer when asked suddenly; and I shall and I do beg of you to draw out the case [*hermeneuo: to interpret*] on our side.

These are the objections, Glaucon, and there are many others of a like kind, which I foresaw [*prooraō*] long ago; they made me afraid and reluctant [*okneo: cf. 450d as fear & hapto: cf. 418a as touch*] to take **d** in hand any law [*nomos: cf. 452c*] about the possession and nurture [*ktesis: cf. 416e in the context of the sentence & trophe: cf. 541d as education*] of women and children.

By Zeus, he said, the problem to be solved is anything but easy.

Why yes, I said, but the fact is that when a man is out of his depth, whether he has fallen into a little swimming bath or into mid-ocean, he has to swim all the same.

Very true.

And must not we swim and try to reach the shore: we will hope that Arion's dolphin or some other miraculous help [*soteria: cf. 433c as preservation*] may save [*sozo: cf. 443e in the context of the sentence*] us?

e I suppose so, he said.

Well then, let us see if any way of escape [*exodos*] can be found. We acknowledged [*homologeo: cf. b as admission*], did we not, that different natures [*phusis: cf. b*] ought to have different pursuits [*epitedeuo: cf. 448a as practice*], and that men's and women's natures are different. And now what are we saying?—that different natures ought to have the same pursuits,—this is the inconsistency which is charged [*katagoreo: to accuse*] upon us.

Precisely.

454 Verily, Glaucon, I said, glorious is the power of the art of contradiction [*antilogike*]!

Why do you say so?

Because I think that many a man falls into the practice against his will [*akontes: cf. 413a*]. When he thinks that he is reasoning he is really disputing [*dialego: to converse with & erizo*], just because he cannot define and divide [*diaireo: to take one from another & eidōs, with kata: cf. 449c as chapter*], and so knows [*episkopeo: cf. 375d as think over*] that of which he is speaking; and he will pursue a merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and not of fair discussion [*eris: strife & diakektos: discourse, debate*].

Yes, he replied, such is very often the case [*pathos: cf. 432d in the context of the sentence*]; but what has that to do [*teino: cf. 432a as extends*] with us and our argument [*en to paronti: in the present*]?

b A great deal; for there is certainly a danger [*kinduneuo: cf. 451a as run (risk)*] of our getting unintentionally into a verbal opposition [*antilogia: controversy*].

In what way?

Why, we valiantly and pugnaciously [*andreios & eristikos, adverbs*] insist [*dioko: cf. 399e as seek out*] upon the verbal truth, that different natures ought to have different pursuits [*epitedeuo: cf. 453e*], but we never considered at all what was the meaning [*eidōs: cf. a in the context of the sentence*] of sameness or difference of nature [*phusis: cf. 453e*], or why we distinguished them when we assigned different pursuits [*epitedeuma: cf. 444e as practices*] to different natures [*horizo: cf. 439e as determine & teino (to teinon): cf. a as to do*] and the same to the same natures.

Why, no, he said, that was never considered [*episkopeo: cf. a as knows*] by us.

c I said: Suppose that by way of illustration we were to ask the question whether there is not an opposition [*enantia: cf. 364b in the context of the sentence*] in nature between bald men and hairy men; and if this is admitted by us, then, if bald men are cobblers, we should forbid the hairy men to be cobblers, and conversely?

That would be a jest [*geloios: cf. 452c as ridiculous*], he said.

Yes, I said, a jest; and why? Because we never meant when we constructed the state, that the opposition of natures should extend [*epitithemi: cf. 410d as intensified*] to every difference, but only to those **d** differences which affected the pursuit [*epitedeuma: cf. b & teino (to teinon): cf. b*] in which the individual is engaged [*eidōs: cf. b as meaning*]; we should have argued, for example, that a physician and one who is in mind [*psuche: cf. 449a as soul*] a physician may be said to have the same nature.

True.

Whereas the physician and the carpenter have different natures?

Certainly.

And if, I said, the male and female sex appear to differ [*diapheros*] in their fitness for any art or pursuit [*techne: cf. 452a & epitedeuma: cf. d*], we should say that such pursuit or art ought to be assigned to one or the other of them; but if the difference consists only in women bearing and men begetting **e** children, this does not amount to a proof that a woman differs from a man in respect of the sort of education she should receive; and we shall therefore continue to maintain that our guardians and their wives ought to have the same pursuits [*epitedeumo: cf. b*].

Very true, he said.

Next, we shall ask our opponent how, in reference to [*didasko: cf. 421e as teach*] any of the pursuits or **455** arts of civic life [*techne: cf. d & kataskeue: cf. 449a as regulation & polis: cf. 449a as state*], the nature of a woman differs from that of a man?

That will be quite fair [*dikaios: cf. 451a as justice*].

And perhaps he, like yourself, will reply that to give a sufficient answer on the instant is not easy; but after a little reflection [*episkopeo: 454b as considered*] there is no difficulty [*chalepos: cf. 441a in the context of the sentence*].

Yes, perhaps.

Suppose then that we invite him to accompany us in the argument [*akoloutheo: cf. 451d as suppose & antilego: to speak against*], and then we may hope to show him that there is nothing peculiar in the **b** constitution [*epitedeuma: cf. 454d as pursuit*] of women which would affect them in the administration [*dioikesis: cf. 449a as ordering*] of the state.

By all means.

Let us say to him: Come now, and we will ask you a question:—when you spoke of a nature gifted or not gifted [*euphuēs & aphuēs*] in any respect, did you mean to say that one man will acquire [*manthano: cf. 442 as educated*] a thing easily, another with difficulty [*rhadios, adverb: cf. 453c as adjective & chalepos, adverb: cf. a as adjective*]; a little learning [*mathesis: cf. 407c as self-reflection*] will lead the one to discover [*heuretikos: inventive*] a great deal; whereas the other, after much study and application [*mathesis: cf. b & melete: cf. 408c as self-reflection*], no sooner learns than he forgets; or again, did you mean, that the one has a body which is a good servant to his mind [*huperetos: literally, an under-rower; assistant & dianōia: cf. 412e*], while the body of the other is a hindrance to him? Would **c** not these be the sort of differences which distinguish [*horizo: cf. 454b in the context of the sentence*] the man gifted by nature from the one who is ungifted?

No one will deny that.

And can you mention any pursuit [*meletao: cf. 407a as practice*] of mankind in which the male sex has not all these gifts and qualities in a higher degree [*diapherontos, adverb*] than the female? Need I waste time in speaking of the art of weaving, and the management of pancakes and preserves, in which womankind does really appear to be great, and in which for her to be beaten by a man is of all things **d** the most absurd?

You are quite right, he replied, in maintaining [*krateo: cf. 444d in the context of the sentence*] the general inferiority of the female sex: although many women are in many things superior [*beltion: cf. 448a in the context of the sentence*] to many men, yet on the whole what you say is true.

And if so, my friend, I said, there is no special faculty of administration [*epitedeuma: cf. b as constitution & dioikeo: to manage a house*] in a state which a woman has because she is a woman, or which a man has by virtue of his sex, but the gifts of nature are alike diffused [*diasparmēno*] in both; all the pursuits **e** [*epitedeuma: cf. d*] of men are the pursuits of women also, but in all of them a woman is inferior [*asthenēs: weak*] to a man.

Very true.

Then are we to impose all our enactments [*prostasso: cf. 423d as prescribing*] on men and none of them on

women?

That will never do.

One woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is a musician, and another has no music in her nature [*phusis: cf. 454b*]?

Very true.

456 And one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises, and another is unwarlike and hates gymnastics?

Certainly.

And one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy; one has spirit, and another is without spirit [*thumoeides: cf. 442c & athumos: cf. 411b as weak*]?

That is also true.

Then one woman will have the temper of a guardian, and another not. Was not the selection [*exelegcho*] of the male guardians determined by differences of this sort?

Yes.

Men and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian; they differ only in their comparative strength or weakness.

Obviously [*phaino: cf. 452d as showed*].

b And those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the companions and colleagues [*sunoikeyo: to live together & sumphulasso: to guard together*] of men who have similar qualities and whom they resemble [*suggenes: cf. 415a as species*] in capacity and in character?

Very true.

And ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits [*epitedeuma: cf. 455e*]?

They ought.

Then, as we were saying before, there is nothing unnatural [*phusis, with para: cf. 455e*] in assigning [*apodidomi: cf. 421c*] music and gymnastic to the wives of the guardians—to that point we come round again.

Certainly not.

The law [*nomos: cf. 453d*] which we then enacted was agreeable to nature [*nomotheteo: cf. 427b as ordering & phusis, with kata*], and therefore not an impossibility or mere aspiration; and the contrary

c practice, which prevails at present, is in reality a violation of nature [*phusis, with para: cf. b*].

That appears to be true.

We had to consider [*episkopeo: cf. 455a as reflection*], first, whether our proposals were possible, and secondly whether they were the most beneficial [*beltion: cf. 455d as superior*]?

Yes.

And the possibility has been acknowledged [*diomologeo: cf. 394d as come to an understanding*]?

Yes.

The very great benefit [*beltion: cf. b*] has next to be established [*diomologeo: cf. b*]?

Quite so.

You will admit that the same education which makes a man a good guardian will make a woman a good **d** guardian; for their original nature is the same [*paralambano: cf. 369c as supply*]?

Yes.

I should like to ask you a question.

What is it?

Would you say [*hupolambano: cf. 429e in the context of the sentence*] that all men are equal in excellence, or is one man better than another?

Certainly not.

And in the commonwealth which we were founding [*oikizo: cf. 443b as conducted*] do you conceive the guardians who have been brought up on our model system [*paideia: cf. 450c as education*] to be more perfect men, or the cobblers whose education [*paideuo: cf. 541c as educated*] has been cobbling?

What a ridiculous question [*geloios: cf. 454c as jest*]!

You have answered [*manthano: cf. 455b as will acquire*] me, I replied: Well, and may we not further say **e** that our guardians are the best [*aristos: cf. 452d in the context of the sentence*] of our citizens?

By far the best.

And will not their wives be the best [*beltion: cf. c as benefit*] women?

Yes, by far the best.

And can there be anything better for the interests of the state than that the men and women of a state should be as good as possible [*aristos: cf. e as best*]?

There can be nothing better.

And this is what the arts of music and gymnastic, when present [*paragignomai: cf. 368c*] in such **457** manner as we have described, will accomplish [*apergazomai: cf. 433c as contributes*]?

Certainly.

Then we have made an enactment [*nomimos: cf. 451a as laws*] not only possible but in the highest degree beneficial [*aristos: cf. 456e as good*] to the state?

True.

Then let the wives of our guardians strip, for their virtue [*arete: cf. 448c*] will be their robe, and let them share in [*koinoneteon: verbal adjective*] the toils of war and the defense of their country; only in the distribution of labors the lighter are to be assigned to the women, who are the weaker natures, but in other respects their duties are to be the same. And as for the man who laughs at naked women

b exercising their bodies from the best [*beltion: cf. 456e*] of motives, in his laughter he is plucking 'A fruit of unripe wisdom' [Pindar, fragment 209], and he himself is ignorant of what he is laughing at, or what he is about;—for that is, and ever will be, the best [*kalos: cf. 453a*] of sayings, that the useful is the noble [*ophelimos & kalos*] and the hurtful is the base [*blaberos: cf. 391e as bad effect & aischros: cf. 452c as improper*].

Very true.

Here, then, is one difficulty [*kuma: wave of criticism*] in our law [*nomos: cf. 456b*] about women, which we may say that we have now escaped; the wave has not swallowed us up alive [*kataklyzo: to dash over, flood*] for enacting that the guardians of either sex should have all their pursuits in common [*epitedeuo: cf. 454e & koinos: cf. 449c*]; to the utility and also to the possibility of this arrangement [*ophelima: c usefulness*] the consistency of the argument [*logos: cf. 453a as position*] with itself bears witness [*homologeo: cf. 453e as acknowledged*].

Yes, that was a mighty wave which you have escaped.

Yes, I said, but a greater is coming; you will of this when you see the next.

Go on; let me see.

The law [*nomos: cf. b*], I said, which is the sequel of this and of all that has preceded, is to the following **d** effect,—'that the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know [*eido: cf. 450d*] his own child, nor any child his parent.'

Yes, he said, that is a much greater wave than the other; and the possibility as well as the utility [*ophelima: cf. c as usefulness*] of such a law are far more questionable [*apistia: cf. 450c as doubts*].

I do not think, I said, that there can be any dispute [*amphibeteo: cf. 453b as convict*] about the very great utility [*ophelima: cf. d*] of having wives and children in common [*koinos: cf. b*]; the possibility is quite another matter, and will be very much disputed [*amphibeteo: cf. d*].

e I think that a good many doubts may be raised about both.

You imply that the two questions must be combined [*logos: cf. c as argument & sustasis: a putting together*], I replied. Now I meant that you should admit [*doxazo: cf. 435b as thought*] the utility; and in this way, as I thought; I should escape from one of them, and then there would remain only the possibility [*logos: cf. e*]. But that little attempt is detected [*lanthano: cf. 449c as notice*], and therefore you will please to give a defense [*logos: cf. e as possibility*] of both.

Well, I said, I submit to my fate [*dike: cf. 427d as injustice*]. Yet grant me a little favor: let me feast **458** [*heortazo: to keep a festival*] my mind [*dianoia: cf. 455b*] with the dream as day dreamers are in the habit of feasting themselves when they are walking alone; for before they have discovered [*exeurisko: cf. 425a as invent*] any means [*tropos: cf. 450c as how*] of effecting their wishes [*epithumeo: cf. 438a as desire*]
—that is a matter which never troubles them—they would rather not tire themselves by thinking about possibilities [*dunatos, with peri: cf. 412c as efficient*]; but assuming that what they desire [*huparcho: cf. 376c*] is already granted to them, they proceed with their plan [*boulomai: cf. 453a as take the other side*], and delight in detailing [*diexerchomai: to go through in succession*] what they mean to do when their wish has come true—
that is a way which they have of not doing much good to a capacity which was never good for much [*argos: cf. 422a as indolence & psuche: cf. 454d as mind*]. Now I myself **b** am beginning to lose heart [*malthakizomai: to become soft*], and I should like [*epithumeo: cf. a as wishes*], with your permission, to pass over the question of possibility [*episkopeo: cf. 456c as consider*] at present. Assuming therefore the possibility of the proposal

[*thesis: setting*], I shall now proceed to enquire [*skeptomai: cf. 448a as has become*] how the rulers will carry out [*diistemi: cf. 360e as isolate*] these arrangements, and I shall demonstrate that our plan, if executed [*gignomai: cf. 429c as implants*], will be of the greatest benefit [*sumphero: cf. 442c as interest*] to the state and to the guardians. First of all, then, if you have no objection, I will endeavor [*peirazo: to make proof, try*] with your help to consider the advantages of the measure [*sundiaskopeo: to look through, examine*]; and hereafter the question of possibility.

I have no objection; proceed [*skoepo: cf. 451d as shall see*].

First, I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to be worthy [*axios: cf. 448c as deserving of note*] **c** of the name which they bear, there must be willingness to obey [*epikoureo: to act as an ally*] in the one and the power of command in the other; the guardians must themselves obey the laws [*peitho: cf. 436e as incline & nomos: cf. 457c*], and they must also imitate [*mimeomai: cf. 396d as play a part*] the spirit of them in any details which are entrusted to their care [*epitrepho: to commit*].

That is right, he said.

You, I said, who are their legislator [*nomothetes: cf. 429c*], having selected the men, will now select the women and give them to them;—they must be as far as possible of like natures with them [*homophues: cf. 439e as akin*]; and they must live in common houses and meet at common meals, none of them will have anything specially his or her own; they will be together [*homou, adverb*], and will be brought up **d** together, and will associate [*anamignumi: to mix together*] at gymnastic exercises. And so they will be drawn by a necessity [*anagke*] of their natures to have intercourse with each other—necessity is not too strong a word, I think [*dokeo: cf. 452c as opinion*]?

Yes, he said;—necessity, not geometrical, but another sort of necessity which lovers [*erotikos*] know, and which is far more convincing and constraining [*drimusso: to smart, be bitter & peitho: cf. c as obey*] to the mass of mankind.

True, I said; and this, Glaucon, like all the rest, must proceed after an orderly fashion [*ataktos, adverb: disorderly & meignumi: to be mixed up*]; in a city of the blessed [*eudaimon: cf. 420b as happiness*], **e** licentiousness is an unholy [*hosios, with ou (not): cf. 416e as divine*] thing which the rulers will forbid.

Yes, he said, and it ought not to be permitted [*dikaios, with ou (not): cf. 455a as fair*].

Then clearly the next thing will be to make matrimony sacred [*hieros: cf. 398a as holy*] in the highest degree, and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred?

Exactly.

459 And how can marriages be made most beneficial [*opheleo: cf. 357e as do good*]—that is a question which I put to you, because I see in your house dogs for hunting, and of the nobler sort of birds not a few. Now, I beseech you, do tell me, have you ever attended to [*prosecho: cf. 432b as look sharp*] their pairing and breeding?

In what particulars?

Why, in the first place, although they are all of a good sort, are not some better [*aristos: cf. 457a as beneficial*] than others?

True.

And do you breed from them all indifferently, or do you take care [*prothumeomai: cf. 426d as admire*] to breed from the best [*aristos: cf. a*] only?

From the best.

b And do you take the oldest or the youngest, or only those of ripe age?

I choose only those of ripe age.

And if care was not taken in the breeding, your dogs and birds would greatly deteriorate?

Certainly.

And the same of horses and animals in general?

Undoubtedly.

Good heavens!, my dear friend, I said, what consummate skill [*akros: outermost, highest, best*] will our rulers need if the same principle holds of the human species!

c Certainly, the same principle holds; but why does this involve any particular skill?

Because, I said, our rulers will often have to practice upon the body corporate with medicines [*pharmakon: cf. 426a as nostrum*]. Now you know that when patients do not require medicines, but have only to be put under a regimen [*hupakouo: to hearken to & diaita: cf. 425e as habits*], the inferior sort of practitioner is deemed [*hegeomai: cf. 430b as ordains*] to be good enough; but when medicine has to be given, then the doctor should

be more of a man [*andreios: cf. 442b as courageous*].

That is quite true, he said; but to what are you alluding?

I mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit [*pseudos: cf. 414e as lie & apate*] necessary for the good [*ophelia, with epi: cf. 347d as benefit*] of their subjects: we were saying that the use of all these things regarded as medicines might be of advantage [*chresimos: cf. 413e as serviceable*].

And we were very right.

And this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the regulations of marriages and births.

How so?

Why, I said [*homologeō: cf. 457c as bears witness*], the principle has been already laid down that the best [*aristos: cf. a*] of either sex should be united with [*suggignomai: cf. 403b as going further*] the best as often, and the inferior [*phaulos: cf. 435c as easy*] with the inferior, as seldom as possible; and that they should rear the offspring of the one sort of union, but not of the other, if the flock is to be maintained in first-rate condition. Now these goings on must be a secret [*lanthano: cf. 457e as detected*] which the rulers only know, or there will be a further danger of our herd [*agele: cf. 451c*], as the guardians may be termed, breaking out into rebellion [*astasiastos: not disturbed by faction*].

Very true.

Had we not better appoint certain festivals [*nomotheteō: cf. 456b as agreeable & heorte: cf. 327a*] at **460** which we will bring together the brides and bridegrooms, and sacrifices will be offered and suitable hymeneal songs composed by our poets: the number of weddings is a matter which must be left to [*epi*] the discretion of the rulers, whose aim will be to preserve [*diasozo: cf. 442c as retains*] the average of population? There are many other things which they will have to consider [*apokopeō: cf. 432e as seeking*], such as the effects of wars and diseases and any similar agencies, in order as far as this is possible to prevent the state from becoming either too large or too small.

Certainly, he replied.

We shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots [*kleros & kompsos: cf. 408b as acute*] which the less worthy [*phaulos: cf. 459d as inferior*] may draw on each occasion of our bringing them together, and then they will accuse their own ill-luck [*tuche: cf. 399b as fortune*] and not the rulers.

To be sure, he said.

b And I think that our braver and better [*agathos: cf. 452e as good*] youth, besides their other honors and rewards, might have greater facilities of intercourse [*exousia: cf. 359c as liberty & sugkoimesis*] with women given them; their bravery will be a reason, and such fathers ought to have as many sons as possible.

True.

And the proper officers, whether male or female or both, for offices are to be held by women as well as by men.

Yes.

c [*dokeō: cf. 458d as think*] The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place [*aporretos: cf. 378a as mystery & adelos: unclear & katakrupō: to hide*], as they should be.

Yes, he said, that must be done if the breed of the guardians is to be kept pure [*katharos: cf. 451b as free from guilt*].

They will provide for [*epimeleomai: cf. 421d as take pains*] their nurture, and will bring the mothers to the fold when they are full of milk, taking the greatest possible care that no mother recognizes

d [*aisthanomai: cf. 440b as observed*] her own child; and other wet-nurses may be engaged if more are required. Care will also be taken that the process of suckling shall not be protracted too long; and the mothers will have no getting up at night or other trouble, but will hand over all this sort of thing to the nurses and attendants.

You suppose the wives of our guardians to have a fine easy time of it when they are having children.

Why, said I, and so they ought. Let us, however, proceed with our scheme [*dierchomai: cf. 450c as conclusions & protithemi: cf. 413c as perform*]. We were saying that the parents should be in the prime of life [*akmazo*]?

Very true.

e And what is [*sundokeō: cf. 434a as agree with*] the prime of life? May it not be defined as a period of about twenty years in a woman's life, and thirty in a man's?

Which years do you mean to include?

A woman, I said, at twenty years of age may begin to bear children to the state, and continue to bear them until forty; a man may begin at five-and-twenty, when he has passed the point at which the pulse of life beats quickest, and continue to beget children until he be fifty-five.

461 Certainly, he said, both in men and women those years are the prime of physical as well as of intellectual vigor [*phronesis: cf. 433d as wisdom & akme: point, edge*].

Any one above or below the prescribed ages who takes part in common reproduction [*gennesis*] shall be said to have done an unholy and unrighteous thing [*hosios: cf. 458e & dikaios: 459e, both with ou (not)*]; the child of which he is the father, if it steals into life, will have been conceived under auspices very unlike the sacrifices and prayers [*thusis & euche: cf. 540d as dream*], which at each marriage festival priestesses and priest and the whole city will offer, that the new generation may be better and more useful [*ophelos: cf. 365b as profit*] than their good and useful parents, whereas his child will be the

b offspring of darkness and strange lust [*akrateia: want of self-control*].

Very true, he replied.

And the same law [*nomos: cf. 458c*] will apply to any one of those within the prescribed age who forms a connection with any woman in the prime of life without the sanction [*sunerchomai: cf. 328a as gathering*] of the rulers; for we shall say that he is raising up a bastard to the state, uncertified and unconsecrated [*anegguos: not wedded & anieros: unholy*].

Very true, he replied.

This applies [*aphiemi: cf. 451b as acquitted*], however, only to those who are within the specified age: after that we allow them to range at will, except that a man may not marry his daughter or his **c** daughter's daughter, or his mother or his mother's mother; and women, on the other hand, are prohibited from marrying their sons or fathers, or son's son or father's father, and so on in either direction. And we grant all this, accompanying the permission with strict orders to prevent any embryo which may come into being from seeing the light; and if any force a way to the birth, the parents must understand that the offspring of such an union cannot be maintained, and arrange accordingly.

That also, he said, is a reasonable proposition [*metrios, adverb: in due measure*]. But how will they **d** know [*diagignosko: to distinguish, discern*] who are fathers and daughters, and so on?

They will never know. The way will be this:—dating from the day of the marriage, the bridegroom who was then married will call all the male children who are born in the seventh and tenth month afterwards his sons, and the female children his daughters, and they will call him father, and he will call their children his grandchildren, and they will call the elder generation grandfathers and grandmothers. All who were begotten at the time when their fathers and mothers came together will be called their

e brothers and sisters, and these, as I was saying, will be forbidden to inter-marry. This, however, is not to be understood as an absolute prohibition of the marriage of brothers and sisters; if the lot favors [*kleros: cf. 460a & sumpipto: cf. 402d as harmonizes*] them, and they receive the sanction of the Pythian oracle, the law will allow them [*nomos: cf. b & prosanaireo: to give an answer besides (re. an oracle)*].

Quite right, he replied.

Such is the scheme, Glaucon, according to which the guardians of our state are to have their wives and families in common [*koinonia: cf. 450c as community*]. And now you would have the argument show that this community is consistent with [*hepo: cf. 442b as executing*] the rest of our polity [*politeia: cf. 449e as state*], and also that nothing can be better [*bebaioo: cf. 443c as verified, with logos: cf. 457e as defense*]—would you not?

Yes, certainly.

462 Shall we try to find a common basis [*homologia: cf. 443a as agreements*] by asking of ourselves what ought to be the chief aim [*to megiston agathon: highest good*] of the legislator in making laws [*nomotheteo: cf. 459e as appoint & stoicheo: to go in a line, follow a principle*] and in the organization [*kataskeue: cf. 455a in the context of the sentence*] of a state,—what is the greatest good, and what is the greatest evil, and then consider [*episkopeo: cf. 458b as possibility*] whether our previous description has [*harmozo: cf. 443e in the context of the sentence & anarmosteo: to not to fit or suit*] the stamp [*ichnos: track, footprint*] of the good or of the evil?

By all means.

Can there be any greater evil than discord [*diaspao: to tear asunder*] and distraction and plurality where **b** unity ought to reign [*anti mias*] or any greater good than the bond [*sundeio: to bind*] of unity?

There cannot.

And there is unity [*koinonia*: cf. 461e as common] where there is community of pleasures and pains [*sundeo*: cf. b as bond & *hedone*: cf. 442c for both]—where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions [*paraplesios*: nearly, equal] of joy and sorrow [*chairo*: cf. 426a as delightful & *lupeo*: to pain, grieve]? No doubt.

Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling [*idiosis*: property, peculiarity] a state is disorganized [*dialuo*: cf. 400c as analysis]—when you have one half of the world triumphing and the other plunged in grief at the same events [*pathema*: cf. 439d as passion] happening to the city or the citizens?

Certainly.

Such differences commonly originate in a disagreement [*phtheggomai*: to speak, call by name] about the use of the terms 'mine' and 'not mine,' 'his' and 'not his.'

Exactly so.

And is not that the best-ordered state in which the greatest number of persons apply [*dioikeo*: cf. 455d as administration] the terms 'mine' and 'not mine' in the same way to the same thing?

Quite true.

Or that again which most nearly approaches to [*egguaō*: to give as a pledge] the condition of the individual—as in the body, when but a finger of one of us is hurt, the whole frame [*koinonia*: cf. b as unity], drawn towards the soul [*teino*: cf. 454a as affected & *psuche*: cf. 458a in context of the sentence] a center and forming one kingdom under the ruling power therein [*suntaxis*: arrangement, order & *archo*: cf. 444d as government], feels [*aisthanomai*: cf. 460d as recognizes] the hurt and sympathizes [*sunalgeo*: d to share in suffering] all together with the part affected, and we say that the man has a pain in his finger; and the same expression [*logos*: cf. 461e in context of the sentence] is used about any other part of the body, which has a sensation of pain at suffering or of pleasure [*lupe*: cf. 442c & *hedone*: cf. b] at the alleviation of suffering.

Very true, he replied; and I agree with you that in the best-ordered [*aristos*: cf. 459d] state there is the nearest approach [*egguaō*: cf. c] to this common feeling [*politeuo*: cf. 427a as state & *oikeo*: 423a as order] which you describe.

Then when any one of the citizens experiences [*pascho*: cf. 451b as injury] any good or evil, the whole state will make his case [*to paschon*: *pascho*] their own, and will either rejoice or sorrow [*sunaisthanomai*: to feel with & *sullupeo*: cf. *lupeo*, b] with him?

Yes, he said, that is what will happen [*anagke*: cf. 458d as necessity] in a well-ordered state.

It will now be time, I said, for us to return to [*epaneimai*, with *epi*] our state and see [*skopeo*: cf. 458b as proceed] whether this or some other form is most in accordance [*homologeō*: cf. 459d as said] with these fundamental principles.

Very good.

463 Our state like every other has rulers and subjects [*demos*: democracy, country, land]?

True.

All of whom will call one another citizens?

Of course.

But is there not another name which people give [*prosagoreuo*: cf. 439d as call] to their rulers in other states?

Generally they call them masters, but in democratic states they simply call them rulers.

And in our state what other name besides that of citizens do the people give the rulers?

b They are called saviors and helpers [*soter* & *epikoureo*: cf. 458c as obey], he replied.

And what do the rulers call the people?

Their maintainers and foster-fathers.

And what do they call them in other states?

Slaves.

And what do the rulers call one another in other states?

Fellow-rulers.

And what in ours?

Fellow-guardians.

Did you ever know an example in any other state of a ruler who would speak of one of his colleagues as his friend [*oikeios*: cf. 443d in context of the sentence] and of another as not being his friend?

Yes, very often.

And the friend he regards and describes as one in whom he has an interest [*nomizo: cf. 450a as c consider*], and the other as a stranger in whom he has no interest?

Exactly.

But would any of your guardians think [*nomizo: cf. b*] or speak of any other guardian as a stranger [*allotrios: cf. 409b as late*]?

Certainly he would not; for every one whom they meet [*enteugchano: to converse with*] will be regarded by them either as a brother or sister, or father or mother, or son or daughter, or as the child or parent of those who are thus connected with him.

Very fine [*kalos: cf. 457b as noble*], I said; but let me ask you once more: shall they be [*nomizo: cf. b as d has an interest*] a family in name only; or shall they in all their actions be true to [*prasso: cf. 44c as cause*] the name? For example, in the use of the word 'father,' would the care of a father be implied and the filial reverence and duty and obedience to him which the law [*nomos: cf. 461e*] commands; and is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an impious and unrighteous [*hosios & dikaios: cf. 461a for both (with oute)*] person who is not likely to receive much good either at the hands of God [*theos, with pros: cf. 443b as divine*] or of man? Are these to be or not to be the strains [*humneo: cf. 364a as declaring*] which the children will hear repeated in their ears by all the citizens about those who are intimated to them to be their parents and the rest of their kinsfolk?

e These, he said, and none other; for what can be more ridiculous [*geloios: cf. 456d*] than for them to utter [*phtheggomai: cf. a as originate in a disagreement*] the names of family ties with the lips [*rhema: cf. 336a as saying*] only and not to act [*kakos, adverb: cf. 427a as ill-ordered*] in the spirit of them?

Then in our city the language of harmony and concord [*sumphoneo: to agree in sound*] will be more often heard than in any other. As I was describing before, when any one is well or ill [*eu: cf. 428b & kakos: cf. e, adverbs*], the universal word will be with me 'it is well' or 'it is ill.'

Most true.

464 And agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking, were we not saying that they will have [*sunakoloutheo: to accompany, follow closely*] their pleasures and pains in common [*hedone & lupe: cf. 462d & koinos: 457d*]?

Yes, and so they will.

And they [*polites: cf. 375b as everyone else*] will have a common interest [*koinoneo: cf. 453a as capable of sharing*] in the same thing which they will alike call 'my own,' and having this common interest they will have a common feeling of pleasure and pain [*koinonia: cf. 462c as frame; hedone & lupe: cf. a*]?

Yes, far more so than in other states.

And the reason of this, over and above the general constitution [*katastasis: institution*] of the state, will be that the guardians will have a community [*koinonia: cf. a*] of women and children?

That will be the chief reason.

b And this unity of feeling we admitted [*homologeo: cf. 462e as in accordance*] to be the greatest good [*agathos: cf. 460b*], as was implied in our own comparison [*apeikazo: cf. 429d as make an illustration*] of a well-ordered [*oikeo, with eu: cf. 462d in context of the sentence*] state to the relation of the body and the members, when affected by pleasure or pain [*hedone & lupe: cf. a*]?

That we acknowledged [*homologeo: cf. b*], and very rightly.

Then the community [*koinonia: cf. a*] of wives and children among our citizens is clearly the source of the greatest good to the state?

Certainly.

And this agrees with [*prostithemi: cf. 442a as rule over*] the other principle which we were affirming [*homologeo: cf. b*]—that the guardians were not to have houses or lands or any other property; their **c** pay was to be their food, which they were to receive from the other citizens, and they were to have no private expenses; for we intended them to preserve their true [*ontos, adverb: truly*] character of guardians. Right, he replied.

Both the community of property and the community of families, as I am saying, tend to make [*apergazomai: cf. 457a as will accomplish*] them more truly guardians; they will not tear the city in pieces [*diaspao: cf. 462a as discord*] by differing about 'mine' and 'not mine;' each man dragging any

d acquisition which he has made into a separate house of his own, where he has a separate wife and children and private pleasures and pains [*hedone: cf. b & algedon: cf. 413d*] but all will be affected as far as may be by the same pleasures and pains because they are all of one opinion [*dogma: cf. 414b as principles*] about what is

near and dear to them, and therefore they all tend towards [*teino: cf. 462c as drawn*] a common end [*to dunaton, with eis*].

Certainly, he replied.

And as they have nothing but their persons which they can call their own, suits and complaints will have **e** no existence [*oichomai: to be done*] among them; they will be delivered from all those quarrels [*stasiazo: cf. 442d as rebel*] of which money or children or relations are the occasion.

Of course they will.

Neither will trials for assault or insult [*biaios: forceful, violent & aikia: injurious treatment*] ever be likely to occur among them. For that equals should defend themselves against equals we shall maintain to be honorable and right [*kalos: cf. 463c as very fine & dikaios: cf. 463 as (un)righteous*]; we shall make the protection of the person a matter of necessity [*tithemi: cf. 443 in context of the sentence & epimeleia: cf. 451d as care & anagke: cf. 462e as what will happen*].

That is good, he said.

465 Yes; and there is a further good in the law [*orthos: cf. 451c as proper & nomos: cf. 463d*]; that if a man has a quarrel [*thuo: cf. 440b as angry*] with another he will satisfy his resentment [*thumos: cf. 441a as spirit*] then and there, and not proceed to more dangerous lengths.

Certainly.

To the elder shall be assigned the duty of ruling and chastising [*archo: cf. 462c & kolazo: cf. 448a as (un)punished*] the younger.

Clearly.

Nor can there be a doubt that the younger will not strike or do any other violence [*biazo: cf. 440b*] to an elder, unless the magistrates command him; nor will he slight [*tupto: to beat, strike*] him in any way. For there are two guardians, shame and fear [*aidos & deos: cf. 330d*], mighty to prevent him [*koluo: cf. 439c as forbidding*]: shame, which makes men refrain from laying hands on those who are to them in

b the relation of parents; fear, that the injured one will be succored by the others who are his brothers, sons, some as his fathers.

That is true [*sumbaino: cf. 437a as consequences*], he replied.

Then in every way the laws [*nomos: cf. a*] will help the citizens to keep the peace [*eirene: cf. 372d*] with one another?

Yes, there will be no want of peace.

And as the guardians will never quarrel [*stasiazo: cf. 464e*] among themselves there will be no danger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or against one another.

None whatever.

I hardly like even to mention the little meannesses [*kakos: cf. 431a as evil*] of which they will be rid, for **c** they are beneath notice [*aprepeia: unseemliness*]: such, for example, as the flattery of the rich by the poor, and all the pains and pangs which men experience in bringing up a family, and in finding money to buy necessaries for their household, borrowing and then repudiating, getting how they can, and giving the money into the hands of women and slaves to keep—the many evils of so many kinds which people suffer [*pascho: cf. 462d as experiences*] in this way are mean [*agennes: low-born*] enough and obvious enough, and not worth speaking of.

d Yes, he said, a man has no need of eyes in order to perceive that.

And from all these evils they will be delivered [*apallazo: cf. 448b as escape*], and their life will be blessed [*makarios: cf. 420e as happy*] as the life of Olympic victors and yet more blessed.

How so?

The Olympic victor, I said, is deemed [*huparcho: cf. 458a as desire*] happy [*eudaimonizo: cf. 364a*] in receiving a part only of the blessedness which is secured to our citizens, who have won a more glorious victory [*nike*] and have a more complete maintenance [*trophe: cf. 453d as nurture*] at the public cost. For the victory which they have won is the salvation [*soteria: cf. 453d as help*] of the whole state; and the crown with which they and their children are crowned is the fulness of all that life needs; they **e** receive rewards from the hands of their country while living, and after death have [*metecho: cf. 432b as make*] an honorable burial.

Yes, he said, and glorious [*kalos: cf. 464e as honorable*] rewards they are.

Do you remember [*mimnesko: cf. 408a*], I said, how in the course of the previous discussion [*logos: cf. 462d as expression*] some one who shall be nameless accused us of making our guardians unhappy

466 [*eudaimonizo*, with *ou* (not): cf. *d*]—they had nothing and might have possessed all things—to whom we replied that, if an occasion offered, we might perhaps hereafter consider [*skeptomai*: cf. *458b* as *enquire*] this question, but that, as at present advised, we would make our guardians truly guardians, and that we were fashioning [*poieo*: cf. *441b* as *supposed*] the state with a view to [*apoblepo*: cf. *432e* as *looked*] the greatest happiness [*eudaimon*: cf. *458d* as *blessed*], not of any particular class [*ethnos*: a number of people], but of the whole?

Yes, I remember [*mimnesko*: cf. *465e*].

And what do you say, now that the life of our protectors [*epikouros*: cf. *441a* as *auxiliary*] is made out to be far better [*kalos*: cf. *465e* as *glorious*] and nobler than that of Olympic victors—is the life of

b shoemakers, or any other artisans, or of husbandmen, to be compared [*phaino*: cf. *456a* as *obviously*] with it? Certainly not.

At the same time I ought here to repeat what I have said elsewhere, that if any of our guardians shall try to be happy [*eudaimon*: cf. *a*] in such a manner that he will cease to be a guardian, and is not content [*aresko*: cf. *350d* as *approve*] with this safe and harmonious life [*bebaios*: *firm* & *metrios*: cf. *450b* as *limit*], which, in our judgment, is of all lives the best [*aristos*: cf. *462d*], but infatuated [*anoetos*: cf. *336e* as *weakly*] by some youthful conceit [*doxa*: cf. *451c* as *opinion* & *meirakiodes*] of happiness which gets

c up into his head shall seek to appropriate [*oikeioo*: *to win favor, conciliate*] the whole state to himself

[*dunamis*, with *epi*: cf. *443b* as *quality*], then he will have to learn [*gignosko*: cf. *428a* as *known*] how wisely [*sophos*: cf. *442c* as *wise*] Hesiod spoke, when he said, 'half is more than the whole' [*Works and Days*, 40].

If he were to consult [*sumbouleuo*: cf. *426a* as *advises*] me, I should say to him: stay where you are, when you have the offer of such a life.

You agree [*sugchoreo*: cf. *434d* as *longer any room for doubt*] then, I said, that men and women are to have a common way of life [*koinonia*: cf. *464b* as *community*] such as we have described [*dierchomai*: cf. *560d* as *scheme*]—common education, common children; and they are to watch over the citizens in common whether abiding in the city or going out to war; they are to keep watch together, and to hunt

d together like dogs; and always and in all things, as far as they are able, women are to share with the men?

And in so doing they will do what is best [*beltistos*: cf. *431c*], and will not violate [*phusis*: cf. *456c* as *nature; with ou & para*], but preserve the natural relation [*koinoneo*: cf. *464a* as *common interest*] of the sexes.

I agree [*sugchoreo*: cf. *c*] with you, he replied.

The enquiry, I said, has yet to be made [*dialuo*: cf. *462b* as *disorganized*], whether such a community [*koinonia*: cf. *c*] be found possible—as among other animals, so also among men—and if possible, in what way possible?

You have anticipated the question which I was about to suggest [*hupolambano*: cf. *456d* as *say*]

e There is no difficulty, I said, in seeing how war will be carried on by them.

How?

Why, of course they will go on expeditions together; and will take with them any of their children who are strong enough, that, after the manner of the artisan's child, they may look on [*theoreo*: cf. *372e* as *see*] at the work which they will have to do when they are grown up; and besides looking on they will **467** have to help and be of use in war, and to wait upon [*therapeuo*: cf. *426d* as *ministers*] their fathers and mothers. Did you never observe in the arts how the potters' boys look on [*theoreo*: cf. *466e*] and help, long before they touch the wheel?

Yes, I have.

And shall potters be more careful in educating [*epimelomai*: cf. *331d* as *look after* & *paideutos*: cf. *402c*] their children and in giving them the opportunity [*proseko*: cf. *444b* in *context of the sentence*] of seeing and practicing [*theomai*: cf. *448c* as *looking at* & *empeiria*: cf. *409c* as *experience*] their duties than our guardians will be?

The idea is ridiculous [*katagelaston*: *verbal adjective*], he said.

There is also the effect on the parents, with whom, as with other animals, the presence [*pariemi*: cf.

b *374c* in *context of the sentence*] of their young ones will be the greatest incentive to valor.

That is quite true, Socrates; and yet if they are defeated, which may often happen in war, how great the danger is [*sphallo*: cf. *451a* as *be sure of my footing; with ou smikros*]! The children will be lost as well as their parents, and the state will never recover [*analambano*: *to take up again*].

True, I said; but would you never allow them to run any risk [*paraskeuasteon*: *verbal adjective* & *kinduneo*: cf. *433b* as *may assumed to be*]?

I am far from saying that.

Well, but if they are ever to run a risk [*kindunos: cf. 422d as danger & theoreo: cf. a*] should they not do so on some occasion when, if they escape disaster, they will be the better for it?

Clearly.

Whether the future soldiers do or do not see [*theoreo: cf. b*] war in the days of their youth is a very important matter, for the sake of which some risk may fairly be incurred.

Yes, very important.

This then must be our first step [*huparkteon: verbal adjective*],—to make our children spectators [*theoros*] of war; but we must also contrive that they shall be secured [*asphaleia*] against danger; then all will be well [*kalos, adverb: cf. 441b as excellent & hexis: cf. 453c as defense*].

True.

Their parents may be supposed not to be blind [*amathes: cf. 382b as uninformed*] to the risks of war, but to know [*gnomonikos*], as far as human foresight can, what expeditions are safe and what dangerous? That may be assumed.

And they will take them on the safe expeditions and be cautious about the dangerous ones?

True.

And they will place them under the command of experienced veterans who will be their leaders and teachers [*hegemoneuo & paidagogos cf. 397d as attendant*]?

Very properly.

Still, the dangers of war cannot be always foreseen; there is a good deal of chance about them?

True.

Then against such chances the children must be at once furnished with wings, in order that in the hour of need they may fly away and escape.

e What do you mean?, he said.

I mean that we must mount them on horses in their earliest youth, and when they have learnt to ride, take them on horseback to see war [*thea: a seeing, with epi*]: the horses must be spirited [*thumoeidos: cf. 440e as desire*] and warlike, but the most tractable [*euenios: obedient to the reins*] and yet the swiftest that can be had. In this way they will get an excellent view [*kalos: cf. 466a as better & theaomai: cf. 467a as seeing*] of what is hereafter to be their own business [*ergos: cf. 413c as actions*]; and if there is danger they have only to follow their elder leaders and escape.

I believe that you are right, he said.

468 Next, as to war; what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one another and to their enemies? I should be inclined to propose that the soldier who leaves his rank or throws away his arms, or is guilty of any other act of cowardice, should be degraded into the rank of a husbandman or artisan. What do you think [*kataphaino: to declare, make known*]?

By all means, I should say.

And he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a present of to his enemies; he is their lawful prey, and let them do what they like with him.

b Certainly.

But the hero who has distinguished himself [*aristeuo: to be the best, bravest*], what shall be done to him? In the first place, he shall receive honor [*eudokimeo: cf. 423a as reputation*] in the army from his youthful comrades; every one of them in succession shall crown him. What do you say?

I approve.

And what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship?

To that too, I agree.

But you will hardly agree to my next proposal [*dokeo: cf. 460c in context of the sentence*].

What is your proposal?

That he should kiss and be kissed by them.

Most certainly, and I should be disposed to go further [*prostithemi: cf. 464c as agree with & nomos: cf. 465b as law*], and say: let no one whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be kissed by him while the expedition lasts. So that if there be a lover [*erao: cf. 439d as loves*] in the army, whether his love be youth or maiden, he may be more eager to win the prize of valor.

Excellent [*kalos, adverb: cf. 467c as well*], I said. That the brave [*agathos: cf. 464b as good*] man is to have more wives than others has been already determined: and he is to have first choices [*hairesis*] in such matters

more than others, in order that he may have as many children as possible?

Agreed.

Again, there is another manner in which, according to Homer, brave [*agathos: cf. c*] youths should be d honored [*timao: cf. 386a*]; for he tells how Ajax, after he had distinguished himself in battle, was rewarded with long chins, which seems to be a compliment appropriate [*time: cf. 415b as ranks*] to a hero in the flower of his age [*hebao*], being not only a tribute of honor [*timao: cf. c*] but also a very strengthening thing [*ischos: cf. 411b as high condition & auxano: cf. 424e as grow up*].

Most true, he said.

Then in this, I said, Homer shall be [*peitho: cf. 458d as convincing*] our teacher; and we too, at sacrifices and on the like occasions, will honor the brave [*agathos: cf. c*] according to the measure of their valor [*phaino: cf. 466b as to be compared & agathos*], whether men or women, with hymns and those other distinctions [*timao: cf. d as honor*] which we were mentioning; also with seats of precedence, and meats e and full cups; and in honoring [*timao*] them, we shall be at the same time training [*askeo: cf. 407c as practicing*] them.

That, he replied, is excellent [*kalos: cf. 467e*].

Yes, I said; and when a man dies gloriously [*teleutao: cf. 453a as conclusion & eudokimeo: cf. b as shall receive honor*] in war shall we not say, in the first place, that he is of the golden race?

To be sure.

Nay, have we not the authority [*peitho: cf. d as shall be*] of Hesiod for affirming that when they are dead:

469 They are holy angels [*daimon: cf. 392a as demigods*] upon the earth, authors of good, Protectors against evil, the guardians of speech-gifted men? [*Iliad, vii.321 & viii.162*]

Yes; and we accept [*peitho: cf. 468e*] his authority.

We must learn of the god [*diapunthanomai: to search out by questioning & theos: cf. 463d*] how we are to order the sepulture of divine and heroic personages, and what is to be their special distinction [*diaphoros: cf. 360c in context of the sentence*] and we must do as he bids?

By all means.

And in ages to come we will reverence them and kneel [*therapeuo: cf. 467a as wait upon & proskuneo: b cf. 451a as pray*] before their sepulchers as at the graves of heroes. And not only they but any who are deemed [*nomizo: cf. 463c as shall be*] pre-eminently good [*diapherontos, adverb & agathos: cf. 468d as valor*], whether they die from age, or in any other way [*tropos: cf. 458a as means*], shall be admitted to the same honors [*hosios: cf. 463d as impious (with oute)*].

That is very right [*dikaio: cf. 464e*], he said.

Next, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies? What about this?

In what respect do you mean?

First of all, in regard to slavery? Do you think [*dokeo: cf. 468b as proposa*] it right that Hellenes should enslave Hellenic states, or allow [*epitrepo: cf. 395d*] others to enslave them, if they can help [*dunatos, with kata: cf. 458a as possibilities*]? Should not their custom [*ethizo*] be to spare them, considering [*eulabeomai: cf. 410a as will be reluctant*] the danger which there is that the whole race may c one day fall under the yoke of the barbarians?

To spare them is infinitely better.

Then no Hellene should be owned by them as a slave; that is a rule which they will observe and advise [*sumbouleuo: cf. 466c as consult*] the other Hellenes to observe.

Certainly, he said; they will in this way be united against the barbarians and will keep their hands off one another.

Next as to the slain; ought the conquerors, I said, to take anything but their armor? Does not the d practice of despoiling an enemy afford an excuse for not facing the battle? Cowards skulk [*kuptazo: to keep stooping*] about the dead, pretending that they are fulfilling a duty, and many an army before now has been lost from this love of plunder.

Very true.

And is [*dokeo: cf. b as think*] there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse, and also [*nomizo: cf. b as deemed*] a degree of meanness and womanishness in making an enemy of the dead body when the e real enemy has flown away and left only his fighting gear behind him,—is not this rather like a dog who cannot get at his assailant, quarreling with the stones which strike him instead?

Very like a dog, he said.

Then we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial?

Yes, he replied, we most certainly must.

Neither shall we offer up arms at the temples of the gods, least of all the arms of Hellenes, if we care to **470** maintain good feeling [*mello: to intend to do & eunoia: goodwill*] with other Hellenes; and, indeed, we have reason to fear that the offering of spoils taken from kinsmen may be a pollution [*miasma: defilement*] unless commanded [*lego: cf. 439d as intimate*] by the god himself?

Very true.

Again, as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of houses, what is to be the practice?

May I have the pleasure [*hedeos, adverb: cf. 372b as happy*], he said, of hearing your opinion [*doxa: cf. 466b as conceit*]?

Both should be forbidden, in my judgment [*dokeo: cf. 469d as is*]; I would take the annual produce **b** [*karpos: fruit*] and no more. Shall I tell you why?

Pray do.

Why, you see, there is [*phaino: cf. 468d in context of the sentence*] a difference [*diaphoros: cf. 469a as distinction*] in the names 'discord' and 'war,' and I imagine that there is also a difference in their natures; the one is expressive of what is internal and domestic [*oikeios: cf. 463b as friend & suggenes: cf. 456b as resemble*], the other of what is external and foreign [*allotrios: cf. 463c as stranger & othneios: alien*]; and the first of the two is termed discord, and only the second, war.

That is a very proper distinction [*tropos: cf. 469b as way*], he replied.

c And may I not observe with equal propriety [*tropos: cf. b as distinction*] that the Hellenic race is all united together by ties of blood and friendship [*oikeios: cf. b as internal & suggenes: cf. b as domestic*], and alien and strange [*allotrios: cf. b as external & othneios: cf. b as foreign*] to the barbarians?

Very good [*kalos, adverb: cf. 468c as excellent*], he said.

And therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians and barbarians with Hellenes, they will be described by us as being at war when they fight, and by nature [*phusis: cf. 466d in context of sentence*] enemies, and this kind of antagonism should be called war; but when Hellenes fight with one another we shall say that Hellas is then in a state of disorder and discord [*stasiazo: cf. 465b as quarrel & stasis: cf. 44b as d strife*], they being by nature friends and such enmity is to be called discord.

I agree to think of [*sugchoreo: cf. 466d & nomizo: cf. 469d in context of sentence*] it that way.

Consider [*skopeo: cf. 462e as see*] then, I said, when that which we have acknowledged [*homologeio: cf. 464b as affirming*] to be discord occurs, and a city is divided, if both parties destroy the lands and burn the houses of one another, how wicked does the strife appear! No true lover of his country would bring himself to tear in pieces [*keiro: to shear, cut off*] his own nurse and mother. There might be reason in **e** the conqueror depriving the conquered of their harvest, but still they would have the idea of [*dianoeomai: cf. 414e as regard*] peace in their hearts and would not mean to go on fighting for ever.

Yes, he said, that is a better temper [*dianoia: cf. 458a as mind*] than the other.

And will not the city, which you are founding [*oikizo: cf. 456d*], be an Hellenic city?

It ought to be, he replied.

Then will not the citizens be good and civilized [*agathos: cf. 469b & hemeros: cf. 416c as humanize*]?

Yes, very civilized.

And will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas as their own land [*oikeios: cf. c as ties of blood*], and share [*koinoneo: cf. 466d as preserve natural relation*] in the common temples?

Most certainly.

471 And any difference [*diaphora*] which arises among them will be regarded [*hegeomai: cf. 459c as deemed*] by them as discord [*stasis: cf. 470c*] only—a quarrel among friends [*oikeios: cf. 470e as own land*], which is not to be called a war?

Certainly not.

Then they will quarrel [*diallasso: to interchange*] as those who intend some day to be reconciled [*diaphero: cf. 453b as differ*]?

Certainly.

They will use friendly correction [*sophronizo: cf. 410e as temperate*], but will not enslave or destroy their opponents; they will be moderators [*sophronizo*], not enemies?

Just so.

And as they are Hellenes themselves they will not devastate [*keiro: cf. 470d as tear in pieces*] Hellas, nor will

they burn houses, not even suppose [*homologeo: cf. 470d as acknowledged*] that the whole population of a city—men, women, and children—are equally their enemies, for they know that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many are their friends. And for all these

b reasons they will be unwilling to waste [*keioro: cf. a*] their lands and raze their houses; their enmity to them will only last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled [*anagkazo: cf. 420d*] the guilty few [*aitios: cf. 443b as business*] to give satisfaction [*dike: cf. 457e as fate*]?

I agree [*homologeo: cf. a as suppose*], he said, that our citizens should thus deal [*prosphero: cf. 442e in context of the sentence*] with their Hellenic enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one another.

Then let us enact [*tithemi: cf. 464e as matter*] this law also for our guardians:—that they are neither to

c devastate the lands of Hellenes nor to burn their houses.

Agreed; and we may agree also in thinking that these, all our previous enactments, are very good [*kalos, adverb: cf. 470c*].

But still I must say, Socrates, that if you are allowed to go on in this way you will entirely forget [*mimnesko (with oute): cf. 466a as remember*] the other question which at the commencement of this discussion you thrust aside:—Is such an order of things [*politeia: cf. 461e as polity*] possible, and how, if at all [*tropos: cf. 470c as propriety*]? For I am quite ready to acknowledge that the plan which you propose, if only feasible, would do all sorts of good to the state. I will add, what you have omitted, that

d your citizens will be the bravest [*aristos: cf. 466b as best*] of warriors, and will never leave their ranks, for they will all know one another, and each will call the other father, brother, son; and if you suppose the women to join their armies, whether in the same rank or in the rear, either as a terror to the enemy, or as auxiliaries in case of need, I know that they will then be absolutely invincible; and there are many

e domestic advantages which might also be mentioned and which I also fully acknowledge [*homologeo: cf. b as agree*]: but, as I admit all these advantages and as many more as you please, if only this state [*politeia: cf. c*] of yours were to come into existence, we need say no more about them; assuming then the existence of the state, let us now turn to the question [*peitho: cf. 469a as accept*] of possibility and ways and means [*dunatos (used twice): cf. 469b as can help*]—the rest may be left.

472 If I loiter for a moment, you instantly make a raid [*katadrome*] upon me [*logos: cf. 465e as discussion*], I said, and have no mercy; I have hardly escaped the first and second waves, and you seem not to be aware that you are now bringing upon me the third, which is the greatest and heaviest. When you have seen and heard the third wave, I think you be more considerate [*suggnomon: disposed to pardon & hexis: cf. 467c in context of the sentence*] and will acknowledge that some fear and hesitation was natural respecting a proposal so extraordinary [*logos: cf. a & paradoxos: paradoxical*] as that which I have now to state and investigate [*diaskopeo: cf. 351a as may be carried on*].

b The more appeals of this sort which you make, he said, the more determined are we that you shall tell us how such a state is possible: speak out and at once [*diatribo, with me: to rub between, delay*].

Let me begin by reminding [*anamimnesko: cf. 394c as remember*] you that we found our way hither in the search after justice and injustice [*dikaosune & adikia: cf. 448b*].

True, he replied; but what of that?

I was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them [*heurisko: cf. 444a*], we are to require that the just man should in nothing fail [*diaphero: cf. 471a as reconciled*] of absolute justice; or may we be

c satisfied [*agapao: cf. 359a as tolerated*] with an approximation [*egguaio: cf. 462d as approach*], and the attainment [*metecho: cf. 465e in context of the sentence*] in him of a higher degree of justice than is to be found in other men?

The approximation will be enough [*agapao: cf. c*].

We are enquiring into [*zeteo: cf. 432d as looking for*] the nature [*paradeigma: cf. 409d as pattern*] of absolute justice and into the character of the perfectly [*teleos, adverb: cf. 427e*] just, and into injustice and the perfectly unjust, that we might have an ideal. We were to look at [*apoblepo: cf. 466a as with a view to*] these in order that we might judge [*phaino: cf. 470b in context of the sentence*] of our own happiness and unhappiness [*eudaimonia: cf. 421c & enantios: cf. 396c as opposite*] according to the standard [*anagkazo: cf. 471b as compelled & homologeo: cf. 471e as acknowledge*] which they exhibited

d and the degree in which we resembled [*homoites: likeness & moira: cf. 364b in context of the sentence, again, with homoites*] them, but not with any view [*apodeiknumi: cf. 368b as proving*] of showing that they could exist in fact.

True, he said.

Would a painter be any the worse [*zographos: anyone who paints from life & agathos, with hetton: cf. 470e as good*] because, after having delineated with consummate art an ideal [*paradeigma: cf. c as nature*] of a perfectly beautiful [*kalos: cf. 471c*] man, he was unable to show [*apodeiknumi: cf. d as with any view*] that any such man could ever have existed?

He would be none the worse.

e Well, and were we not creating an ideal [*paradeigma: cf. d*] of a perfect [*agathos: cf. c*] state?

To be sure.

And is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to prove [*apodeiknumi: cf. d as show*] the possibility of a city being ordered [*oikeo: cf. 464b*] in the manner described?

Surely not, he replied.

That is the truth, I said. But if, at your request, I am trying to show [*prothumeomai: cf. 459a as take care & apodeiknumi: cf. e*] how and under what conditions the possibility is highest [*dunatos: cf. 471e as ways and means*], I must ask you, having this in view [*apodeixis: cf. 358b as nature*], to repeat your former admissions [*diomologeo: cf. 456c as to be established*].

What admissions?