

## The Republic by Plato

(three of four)

**473** I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language [*prasso: cf. 464d as actions & lego: cf. 470a as commanded*]? Does not the word express more than the fact [*lexis: cf. 400d as style & praxis: cf. 443e as action*], and must not the actual, whatever a man may think, always, in the nature of things, fall short of the truth [*dokeo: cf. 470a as judgment*]? What do you say [*homologeō: cf. 472c in context of the sentence*]? I agree [*homologeō: cf. a*].

Then you must not insist [*anagkazo, with me: cf. 472c in context of the sentence*] on my proving [*dierchomai: cf. 466c as described*] that the actual state will in every respect coincide with the ideal [*apophaino: to show forth, display & ergos: cf. 468e as business*]; if we are only able to discover [*heurisko: cf. 472b*] how a city may be governed [*oikeo: cf. 472e as ordered*] nearly as we proposed

**b** [*egguaō: cf. 472c as approximation*], you will admit that we have discovered [*exeurisko: cf. 458a*] the possibility which you demand [*tugchano: cf. 379a in context of the sentence*]; and will be contented [*agapao: cf. 472c as will be enough*]. I am sure that I should be contented—will not you?

Yes, I will.

Let me next endeavor to show [*peirazo: cf. 548b & zeteo: cf. 472c as enquiring into & apodeiknumi: cf. 472e as to show*] what is that fault [*kakos, adverb: cf. 463e in context of the sentence*] in states which is the cause of their present mal-administration [*oikeo, with ouk: cf. a as governed*], and what is the least change which will enable a state to pass into [*metaballo: cf. 413e as pass*] the truer form [*tropos: cf. 471c in context of the sentence*]; and let the change, if possible, be of one thing only, or if not, of two; at any rate, let the changes be as few and slight as possible.

**c** Certainly, he replied.

I think [*dokeo: cf. a in context of the sentence*], I said, that there might be a reform [*metaballo: cf. b as pass into*] of the state if only one change [*metapipto: to undergo a change*] were made, which is not a slight or easy though still a possible one.

What is it?, he said.

Now then, I said, I go to meet that which I liken to the greatest of the waves; yet shall the word be spoken, even though the wave break and drown me in laughter and dishonor; and do you mark [*skopeo: cf. 470d as consider*] my words.

Proceed.

I said: Until philosophers are kings [*basileuo: to rule as a king*], or the kings and princes of this world **d** have the spirit and power of philosophy [*gnēsios: wisely & hikanos: worthily*], and political greatness and wisdom [*dunamis: cf. 466c in context of the sentence, with politikos cf. 430c as of a citizen & philosophia, noun*] meet in one [*sumpipto: cf. 461e as favors*], and those commoner natures [*phusis: cf. 470c*] who pursue [*poreuo: to make to carry, bestow*] either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils [*kakos: cf. 465c as meannesses*],—nor the

**e** human race, as I believe,—and then only will this our state have a possibility [*dunatos, with eis: cf. 472e as possibility is highest*] of life and behold the light of day. Such was the thought, my dear Glaucon, which I would fain [*oknos: a shrinking, hesitation*] have uttered if it had not seemed too extravagant [*ero: cf. 353c as point out & doxa: cf. 470a as opinion*]; for to be convinced that in no other state can there be happiness private or public [*eudaimoneo: cf. 427d as would be happy with idios & demosios: cf. 424e*] is indeed a hard thing [*chalepos: cf. 455b as difficulty*].

Socrates, what do you mean? I would have you consider that the word [*rhema: cf. 463e as lips & logos: cf. 472a as proposal*] which you have uttered is one at which numerous persons, and very respectable **474** persons too, in a figure pulling off their coats all in a moment, and seizing any weapon that comes to hand, will run at you might and main, before you know where you are, intending to do heaven knows what [*thaumasios: wonderful*]; and if you don't prepare an answer [*amuno: to ward off & logos: cf. 473e as word*], and put yourself in motion, you will really pay the penalty [*dike: cf. 471b as satisfaction*] of general derision.

You got me into [*aitios: cf. 471b as compelled*] the scrape, I said.

And I was quite right [*kalos, adverb: cf. 471c as very good*]; however, I will do all I can to get you out [*amuno: cf. a as prepare*] of it; but I can only give you good-will and good advice [*eunoia: cf. 470a as good feeling & parakeleuomai: to order, address*], and, perhaps, I may be able to fit [*emmeles: sounding in unison, harmony*]

answers to your questions better than another—that is all. And now, having such an **b** auxiliary [*boethos*: cf. 414b as supporters], you must do your best [*peirao*: cf. 416c as tempt] to show [*endeiknumi*: cf. 452d as perceived] the unbelievers [*apisteuo*] that you are right. I ought to try, I said, since you offer me such invaluable assistance [*summachia*: alliance]. And I think [*dokeo*: cf. 473c] that, if there is to be a chance of our escaping, we must explain [*diorizo*: cf. 436b as to determine] to them whom we mean when we say that philosophers are to rule [*archo*: cf. 414a as appointed a ruler] in the state; then we shall be able to defend [*amuno*: cf. a as get out] ourselves. There will be discovered [*endeiknumi*: cf. b] to be some natures who ought to study [*hapto*: cf. 453c in context c of the sentence] philosophy and to be leaders in the state; and others who are not born to be philosophers, and are meant to be followers [*akoloutheo*: cf. 455a as accompany] rather than leaders. Then now for a definition [*horizo*: cf. 455c as distinguish], he said. Follow [*akoloutheo*: cf. c] me, I said, and I hope that I may in some way or other be able to give you a satisfactory explanation [*exegeomai*: cf. 427c as interpreter]. Proceed.

I dare say that you remember [*anamimnesko*: cf. 472b as remind], and therefore I need not remind [*mimnesko*: cf. 471c as forget (with oute)] you, that a lover [*phileo*: cf. 412d as to love], if lie is worthy of the name, ought to show [*phaino*: cf. 472c as might judge] his love, not to some one part of that which he loves, but to the whole [*phileo & stergo*: to love (as with parents & children), to be fond of].

**d** I really do not understand [*noeo*: cf. 440d], and therefore beg of you to assist my memory [*anamimnesko*: cf. c].

Another person, I said, might fairly reply as you do; but a man of pleasure [*erotikos*: cf. 458d as lovers] like yourself ought to know [*amimnesko*: cf. c as remember] that all who are in the flower of youth do somehow or other raise a pang or emotion [*dakno*: to bite & *kineo*: cf. 436c as in motion] in a lover's breast [*philopaidos*: loving young boys], and are thought by him to be worthy of his affectionate regards [*epimeleia*: cf. 464e as matter of necessity]. Is not this a way which you have with the fair: one has a snub nose, and you praise his charming face; the hook-nose of another has, you say, a royal look; while he **e** who is neither snub nor hooked has the grace of regularity: the dark visage is manly, the fair are children of the gods; and as to the sweet 'honey pale,' as they are called, what is the very name but the invention of a lover [*poima*: a thing done & *erastos*] who talks in diminutives [*hupokorizomai*: cf. 400e as euphemism], and is not adverse to paleness if appearing on the cheek of youth? In a word, there is no **475** excuse which you will not make, and nothing which you will not say, in order not to lose a single flower that blooms in the spring-time of youth.

If you make me an authority in matters of love [*erotikos*: cf. 474d as pleasure], for the sake of the argument, I assent [*logos*: cf. 474a as answer & *sugchoreo*: cf. 470d as agree].

And what do you say of lovers of wine? Do you not see them doing the same? They are glad of any pretext [*aspazomai*: cf. 402e as love & *prophasis*: allegation, excuse] of drinking any wine.

Very good.

And the same is true of ambitious men [*philotimos*: loving of honor]; if they cannot command an army, **b** they are willing to command a file; and if they cannot be honored by really great and important persons, they are glad [*agapao*: cf. 473b as will be contented] to be honored by lesser and meaner people, but honor of some kind they must have [*epithumeo*: cf. 458b as should like & *time*: cf. 468d as compliment].

Exactly.

Once more let me ask: Does he who desires [*epithumeo*: cf. b] any class of goods, desire the whole class [*eidos*: cf. 454d in context of the sentence] or a part only?

The whole.

And may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover [*epithumetes*], not of a part of wisdom [*sophia*: cf. 443e] only, but of the whole?

Yes [*alethos*: cf. 443c as true], of the whole.

And he who dislikes learning [*mathema*: cf. 442a as lessons], especially in youth, when he has no power **c** [*logos*: cf. a as assent] of judging what is good and what is not, such an one we maintain not to be a philosopher or a lover of knowledge [*philomathe*], just as he who refuses his food is not hungry, and may be said to have [*epithumeo*: cf. b as desires] a bad appetite and not a good one?

Very true [*orthos*, adverb: cf. 451c as in the proper place], he said.

Whereas he who has a taste [*geuo*: cf. 358e as had an experience of] for every sort of knowledge [*thelo*: cf. 437c as dislike (with me, not) & *eucheros*, adverb: in an accommodating way & *mathema*: cf. b as learning] and

who is curious to learn [*hasmenos, adverb: gladly & manthano: cf. 456d as answered*] and is never satisfied [*aplestos, adverb: cf. 442a as insatiable*], may be justly termed a philosopher? Am I not right?

**d** Glaucón said: If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will find many a strange being [*atopos: cf. 428b as peculiarity*] will have a title to the name. All the lovers of sights [*philotheaomai*] have a delight in learning [*chairo: cf. 462b as joy & katamanthano: cf. 376b as knowing*], and must therefore be included. Musical amateurs, too, are a folk strangely out of place [*atopos: cf. d*] among philosophers, for they are the last persons in the world who would come to anything like a philosophical discussion [*diatribe: a way of spending time*], if they could help, while they run about at the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear every chorus; whether the performance is in town or country—that makes no difference—they are there. Now are we to maintain that all these and any who have similar tastes

**c** [*mathetikos: disposed to learn*], as well as the professors of quite minor arts [*technudrion: diminutive of techne as in 455a*], are philosophers?

Certainly not, I replied; they are only an imitation [*homoios: cf. 349d as like*].

He said: Who then are the true philosophers?

Those, I said, who are lovers of the vision of truth [*philotheaomai: cf. d*].

That is also good, he said; but I should like to know what you mean?

To another, I replied, I might have a difficulty [*rhadios, adverb: cf. 455b*] in explaining; but I am sure that you will admit [*homologeō: cf. 473a as agree*] a proposition which I am about to make.

What is the proposition?

That since beauty [*kalos: cf. 472d as beautiful*] is the opposite of ugliness [*aischros: cf. 457b as base*], they are two?

**476** Certainly.

And inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one?

True again.

And of just and unjust [*dikaios: cf. 469b as right & adikos: cf. 392b as wicked*], good and evil [*agathos: cf. 472e as perfect & kakos: cf. 473e*], and of every other class [*eidōs: cf. 475b*], the same remark [*logos: cf. 475c as power*] holds: taken singly, each of them one; but from the various combinations of them with actions and things [*praxis: cf. 443e & soma: cf. 445a as bodily*] and with one another, they are seen [*phainō: cf. 474c as show*] in all sorts of lights and appear [*phainō: cf. a*] many? Very true.

And this is the distinction which I draw [*diairo: to lift, raise up*] between the sight-loving, art-loving,

**b** practical class and those of whom I am speaking, and who are alone worthy [*orthos, adverb: cf. 475c as very true*] of the name of philosophers.

How do you distinguish them? he said.

The lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, are fond of [*aspazomai: cf. 475a as pretext*] fine tones and colors and forms and all the artificial products that are made out of [*demiourgeo: to practice a trade*] them, but their mind is incapable [*dianoia: cf. 470e as temper & adunatos: cf. 395b*] of seeing or loving [*eido: cf. 457d as know & aspazomai: cf. b*] absolute beauty [*kalos: cf. 475e*].

True, he replied.

Few are they who are able to attain to the sight of this.

**c** Very true.

And he who, having a sense of beautiful things [*nomizo: cf. 470d as think of & kalos: cf. b*] has no sense of absolute beauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge [*gnosis*] of that beauty is unable to follow—of such an one I ask, is he awake or in a dream only [*onar: & hupar: cf. 382e*]? Reflect [*skopeō: cf. 473c as mark*]: is not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar things, who puts the copy in the place of the real object [*einai & eoiken*]?

I should certainly say that such an one was dreaming.

But take the case of the other, who recognizes [*hegeomai: cf. 471a as regarded*] the existence of absolute

**d** beauty [*kalos: cf. c*] and is able to distinguish [*kathorao: cf. 432c as show*] the idea from the objects which participate in the idea [*metecho & oute metecho: cf. 472c as attainment*], neither putting the objects in the place of the idea nor the idea in the place of the objects—is he a dreamer, or is he awake [*hupar & onar: cf. c*]?

He is wide awake.

And may we not say that the mind [*dianoia: cf. b*] of the one who knows has knowledge [*gignosko: cf. 466c as learn & gnome: cf. 331a as soul*], and that the mind of the other, who opines only, has opinion [*doxa: cf. 473e*].

in context of the sentence & doxazo: cf. 457e as admit].

Certainly.

But suppose that the latter should quarrel [*chalepaino*: cf. 440c as chafes] with us and dispute our statement [*gignosko*: cf. d (with ou, not) & *amphisbeteo*: cf. 457d as dispute], can we administer any soothing cordial or advice to him [*paramutheomai*: cf. 450b as encourage & *peitho*: cf. 471e as turn to the e question], without revealing [*epikrupto*: conceal] to him that there is sad disorder in his wits [*hugiaino*: to be healthy]?

We must certainly offer him some good advice, he replied.

Come, then, and let us think [*skopeo*: cf. c as reflect] of something to say to him. Shall we begin by assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge [*punthanomai*: cf. 353a as asked the question & *phthonos*: jealous] which he may have, and that we are rejoiced at his having it? But we should like to ask him a question: Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing? (You must answer for him.)

I answer that he knows [*gignosko*: cf. d] something.

Something that is or is not?

477 Something that is; for how can that which is not ever be known [*gignosko*: cf. e]?

And are we assured, after looking at [*skopeo*: cf. 476e as think] the matter from many points of view, that absolute being is or may be absolutely known [*gnostos*], but that the utterly non-existent [*me on*] is utterly unknown?

Nothing can be more certain.

Good. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and not to be [*einai & me einai*], that will have a place intermediate [*metaxu* cf. 394b as intermediate] between pure being and the absolute negation of being [*eilikrinos* (adverb): unmixed with ontos & ontos with medame]?

Yes, between them.

And, as knowledge [*gnosis*: cf. 476cv] corresponded to being and ignorance of necessity [*agnosia & anagke*: cf. 464e] to not-being, for that intermediate between being and not-being there has to be

**b** discovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge [*agnosia*: cf. a & *episteme*: cf. 443e], if there be such?

Certainly.

Do we admit the existence of opinion [*doxa*: cf. 476d]?

Undoubtedly.

As being the same with knowledge [*episteme*: cf. b], or another faculty [*dunamis*: cf. 473d as greatness]?

Another faculty.

Then opinion and knowledge [*gignosko*: cf. a] have to do with different kinds of matter corresponding to this difference of faculties?

Yes.

And knowledge is relative to being and knows being. But before I proceed further I will make [*dokeo*: cf. 474b as think] a division [*dialuo*: cf. 466d as to be made].

What division?

**c** I will begin by placing faculties [*dunamis*: cf. b] in a class by themselves: they are powers in us [*dunamai*: to be able, signify], and in all other things, by which we do as we do. Sight and hearing, for example, I should call faculties. Have I clearly explained [*manthano*: cf. 475c as learn] the class [*eidōs*: cf. 476a] which I mean?

Yes, I quite understand [*manthano*: cf. c].

Then let me tell you my view [*phaino*: cf. 476a as appear] about them. I do not see them, and therefore the distinctions [*schema*: cf. 421a as class] of fire, color, and the like, which enable me to discern [*diorizo*: cf. 474b as explain] the differences of some things, do not apply to them. In speaking of a faculty I think **d** only of its sphere and its result [*apergazomai*: cf. 464c as make]; and that which has the same sphere and the same result I call the same faculty, but that which has another sphere and another result I call different. Would that be your way of speaking?

Yes.

And will you be so very good to answer one more question? Would you say that knowledge is a faculty, or in what class [*genos*: cf. 434b] would you place it?

Certainly knowledge is a faculty, and the mightiest of all faculties [*erromenos*: in good health, vigorous & *dunamis*: cf. c].

**e** And is opinion [*doxa*: cf. b] also a faculty [*dunamis*, with *eis & eidōs*: cf. c as class]?

Certainly, he said; for opinion is that with which we are able to form an opinion [*doxazo*: cf. 476c].

And yet you were acknowledging [*homologeo: cf. 475e as admit*] a little while ago that knowledge [*episteme: cf. b*] is not the same as opinion?

Why, yes, he said. How can any reasonable being [*nous: cf. 407b as mind*] ever identify that which is infallible with that which errs [*anamartetos, used twice: cf. 340c as not infallible*]?

An excellent answer [*kalos, adverb: cf. 474a as quite right*] proving [*homologeo: cf. e*], I said, that we are **478** quite conscious of a distinction between them [*episteme & doxa*].

It is different.

Then knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also distinct spheres or subject-matters?

That is certain.

Being [*epi to onti*] is the sphere or subject-matter of knowledge [*episteme: cf. a*], and knowledge [*gignosko: cf. 477c*] is to know the nature of being?

Yes.

And opinion [*doxa: cf. a*] is to have an opinion?

Yes.

And do we know what we opine or is the subject-matter of opinion the same as the subject-matter of knowledge?

No, he replied, that has been already disproven [*homologeo: cf. 477e as proving, with adunatos: cf. 476b as incapable*]; if difference in faculty implies difference in the sphere or subject-matter, and if, as we were saying, opinion and knowledge are

**b** distinct faculties, then the sphere of knowledge and of opinion cannot be the same [*egchoreo, with ouk: to be allowed*].

Then if being is the subject-matter of knowledge, something else must be the subject-matter of opinion?

Yes, something else.

Well then, is not-being [*to me on*] the subject-matter of opinion or, rather, how can there be an opinion at all about not-being? Reflect [*ennoeo: cf. 410c as observe*]: when a man has an opinion, has he not an opinion about something? Can he have an opinion which is an opinion about nothing?

Impossible.

He who has an opinion has an opinion about some one thing?

Yes.

**c** And not-being is not one thing but, properly speaking [*prosagoreuo: cf. 463a as give*], nothing?

True.

Of not-being, ignorance [*me onti & agnoia: cf. 406c as did not instruct*] was assumed to be the necessary correlative; of being, knowledge [*ontoi & gnosis: cf. 477a*]?

True [*orthos, adverb: cf. 476b as worthy*], he said.

Then opinion is not concerned either with being or with not-being [*on & me on*]?

Not with either.

And can therefore neither be ignorance nor knowledge [*agnoia & gnosis: cf. c*]?

That seems to be true.

But is opinion to be sought [*hyperbaino: to go beyond*] without and beyond either of them, in a greater clearness [*sapheneia, noun*] than knowledge, or in a greater darkness [*asapheios, adjective*] than ignorance?

In neither.

Then I suppose [*phaino: cf. 477c as my view*] that opinion appears to you to be darker [*skotios*] than knowledge, but lighter [*phaneros: cf. 435a as revealed*] than ignorance?

Both; and in no small degree.

**d** And also to be within and between them?

Yes.

Then you would infer that opinion is intermediate [*metaxu: cf. 477a*]?

No question.

But were we not saying before, that if anything appeared to be of a sort which is and is not at the same time, that sort of thing would appear also to lie in the interval [*to metaxu: cf. d*] between pure being and absolute not-being [*ontos with eilikrinos, adverb: cf. 477a & pantos, adverb with me ontos*]; and that the corresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance, but will be found in the interval between them?

True [*orthos, adverb: cf. c*].

And in that interval there has now been discovered something which we call opinion?

There has.

**e** Then what remains to be discovered [*heurisko: cf. 473a*] is the object which partakes [*metecho: cf. 476d as participate*] equally of the nature of being and not-being [*tou einai & me einai*], and cannot rightly [*orthos, adverb: cf. d*] be termed [*prosagoreuo: cf. 478c as properly speaking*] either, pure and simple [*eilikrines: cf. adverb in d*]; this unknown term, when discovered [*phaino: cf. c as suppose*] we may truly call the subject of opinion, and assign [*prosagoreuo: cf. e*] each to their proper faculty,—the extremes [*akron: the highest or furthest point*] to the faculties of the extremes and the mean [*metaxu: cf. d as interval*] to the faculty of the mean.

True.

This being premised [*hupokeimai: to put under, submit*], I would ask the gentleman who is of opinion **479** that there is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty [*kalos: cf. 476d & idios: cf. 473e as private*]  
—in whose opinion [*nomizo: cf. 476c as having an opinion*] the beautiful is the manifold [*pollos*]  
—he, I say, your lover of beautiful sights [*philotheama*], who cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is one, and the just [*dikaios: cf. 476a*] is one, or that anything is one—to him I would appeal, saying, Will you be so very kind, sir, as to tell us whether, of all these beautiful things, there is one which will not be found ugly [*phaino: cf. e as discovered & aischros; cf. 475e*]; or of the just, which will not be found unjust; or of the holy, which will not also be unholy [*hosios: cf. 469b as honors & anosios: cf. 417a*]?

**b** No, he replied; the beautiful will in some point of view [*anagke: cf. 477a as necessity*] be found ugly; and the same is true of the rest.

And may not the many which are doubles be also halves?  
—doubles, that is, of one thing, and halves of another [*phaino: cf. a*]?

Quite true.

And things great and small, heavy and light, as they are termed, will not be denoted [*prosagoreuo: cf. a as assign*] by these any more than by the opposite names?

True; both these and the opposite names will always attach to all of them.

And can any one of those many things which are called by particular names be said to be this rather than not to be this? He replied.

They are like the punning riddles which are asked at feasts or the children's puzzle about the eunuch

**c** aiming at the bat, with what he hit him, as they say in the puzzle, and upon what the bat was sitting. The individual objects of which I am speaking are also a riddle, and have a double sense: nor can you fix [*pagios, adverb: cf. 434b as over-positive*] them in your mind [*noeo: cf. 474d as understand*], either as being or not-being [*einai & me einai*], or both, or neither.

Then what will you do with them?, I said. Can they have a better [*kalos: cf. a as beauty*] place than between [*metaxu: cf. a as mean*] being and not-being? For they are clearly not in greater darkness or negation [*me ontos*] than not-being [*me einai & phaino: cf. b, in context of the sentence*], or more full of **d** light and existence than being [*phaneros: cf. 478c as lighter & ontos & einai*].

That is quite true, he said.

Thus then we seem to have discovered [*heurisko: cf. 478e*] that the many ideas [*nomimos: cf. 457a as enactment*] which the multitude entertain about the beautiful and about all other things are tossing about [*kulindo: cf. 432d as tumbling out*] in some region which is half-way between [*metaxu: cf. c*] not-being and pure being [*me ontos & tou ontos, with eilikrinos, adverb: cf. 478d*]?

We have [*heurisko: cf. d*].

Yes; and we had before agreed [*proomologeo*] that anything of this kind which we might find [*phaino: cf. c in context of the sentence*] was to be described as matter of opinion [*doxaston*], and not as matter of knowledge [*gnoston*]; being the intermediate flux which is caught and detained [*planetos: wandering & haliskomai: to be taken*] by the intermediate faculty [*metaxu: cf. d & dunamis: cf. 477e*].

Quite true [*homologeo: cf. 478a as disproven*].

**e** Then those who see [*theaomai: cf. 468e as view*] the many beautiful [*kalos: cf. c as better*], and who yet neither see [*horao: cf. 432c as watch*] absolute beauty [*to kalon*], nor can follow any guide who points the way thither; who see the many just [*dikaios: cf. 479a*], and not absolute justice [*to dikaion*], and the like,—such persons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge [*doxazo: cf. 477e & gignosko: cf. 478a*]?

That is certain.

But those who see [*theaomai: cf. e*] the absolute and eternal and immutable [*aei kata tauta hosautos onta*] may be said to know, and not to have opinion only?

Neither can that be denied.

The one love and embrace [*phileo: cf. 474c & aspazomai: cf. 476b as loving*] the subjects of knowledge, **480** the other those of opinion [*gnosis: cf. 478c & doxa: cf. 478a*]? The latter are the same, as I dare say you will remember [*mimnesko: cf. 474c as remind*], who listened to sweet sounds and gazed upon fair colors, but would not tolerate [*anecho: to hold up, maintain*] the existence of absolute beauty [*to kalos hos ti on*].

Yes, I remember.

Shall we then be guilty of any impropriety [*plemmeleo: to go wrong*] in calling them lovers of opinion [*philodoxos*] rather than lovers of wisdom [*philosophos*], and will they be very angry with us for thus describing them?

I shall tell them not to be angry; no man should be angry at what is true.

But those who love [*aspazomai: cf. 479e as embrace*] the truth in each thing are to be called lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion.

Assuredly.

## Book Six

**484** And thus, Glaucon, after the argument [*logos: cf. 476a as remark*] has gone a weary way, the true and the false philosophers have at length appeared in view [*anaphaino: to show forth*].

I do not think, he said, that the way could have been shortened [*rhadios: cf. 453c as easy*].

I suppose not [*phaino: cf. 489d as find*], I said; and yet I believe that we might have had a better view of both of them if the discussion [*ero: cf. 473e in context of the sentence*] could have been confined to this one subject and if there were not many other questions awaiting us, which he who desires to see [*katopteuo: cf. 432b as discovered*] in what respect the life of the just differs [*diaphero: cf. 472b as fail*]

**b** from that of the unjust must consider.

And what is the next question?, he asked.

Surely, I said, the one which follows next in order. Inasmuch as philosophers only are able to grasp [*ephapto: to make fast*] the eternal and unchangeable [*aei: cf. 479e as immutable & hosauthos, adverb: in like manner*], and those who wander [*planao*] in the region of the many and variable [*panoios, adverb*] are not philosophers, I must ask you which of the two classes should be the rulers of our state?

And how can we rightly answer that question?

Whichever of the two are best able to guard [*phaino: cf. a as suppose & phulasso: cf. 424b as maintain*] the laws and institutions of [*nomos: cf. 468b in context of the sentence & epitedeuma: cf. 456b as*

**c** *pursuits*] our state—let them be our guardians.

Very good [*orthos, adverb: cf. 478e as rightly*].

Neither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to keep [*tereo: cf. 442b as guard*] anything should have eyes rather than no eyes?

There can be no question of that.

And are not those who are verily and indeed wanting [*diaphero: cf. a as differs & dokeo: cf. 477b as will make*] in the knowledge [*gnosis: cf. 479e*] of the true being [*to onti tou ontos*] of each thing, and who have in their souls [*psuche: cf. 462c*] no clear pattern [*enarges: cf. 437d as obvious & paradeigma: cf. 472e as ideal*], and are unable as with a painter's eye to look at [*apoblepo: cf. 472c*] the absolute truth [*to d alethestaton, with eis*] and to that original to repair [*theo: cf. 467c as see & akribestatos; akribos: cf. 436c as precise*], and having perfect vision of the other world to order the laws [*nomimos: cf. 479d as ideas*] about beauty, goodness, justice in this, if not already ordered [*tithemi: cf. 471b as enact*], and to guard and preserve the order [*sozo: cf. 453d as save & ta keimna; keimai: to be laid, proposed*] of them—are not such persons, I ask, simply blind?

Truly, he replied, they are much in that condition.

And shall they be our guardians when there are others who, besides being their equals in experience [*empeiria: cf. 467a as practicing*] and falling short [*hustereo: to be behind, come late*] of them in no particular of virtue [*arete: cf. 457a*], also know [*gignosko: cf. 479e as knowledge*] the very truth of each thing?

There can be no reason [*atopos: cf. 475b as out of place*], he said, for rejecting those who have this greatest of all great qualities; they must always have the first place [*schedon, adverb: close, at hand*] unless they fail [*leipo: to leave behind*] in some other respect.

**485** Suppose then, I said, that we determine how far [*tropos: cf. 473b as form*] they can unite this and the other excellences.

By all means.

In the first place, as we began by observing [*logos: cf. 484a as argument*], the nature [*phusis: cf. 473d*] of the philosopher has to be ascertained [*katamanthano: cf. 475b as learning*]. We must come to an understanding [*homologeō: cf. 479d as quite true*] about him, and, when we have done so, then, if I am not mistaken, we shall also acknowledge [*homologeō: cf. a*] that such an union of qualities is possible, and that those in whom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in the state.

What do you mean?

Let us suppose [*homologeō: cf. a as understanding*] that philosophical minds [*phusis: cf. a as nature*] **b** always love knowledge [*erao: cf. 468c as lover & mathema: cf. 475c*] of a sort which shows them the eternal nature [*aei: cf. 484b & ousia: cf. 416c as all*] not varying from generation and corruption [*genesis: cf. 415a as composition & phthora: ruin*].

Agreed [*homologeō: cf. a as suppose*].

And further, I said, let us agree that they are lovers of all true being; there is no part whether greater or less, or more or less honorable, which they are willing to renounce [*aphiemi: cf. 461b as applies*]; as we said before of the lover and the man of ambition [*erotikos: cf. 475a as matters of love & philotimos: cf. 475a*].

True.

And if they are to be what we were describing [*skopeo: cf. 477a as looking at*], is there not another **c** quality which they should also possess [*phusis: cf. a as nature; i.e., in their natures*]?

What quality?

Truthfulness [*apseudeia: not lying*]: they will never intentionally receive [*prosdechomai: to admit*] into their mind falsehood [*pseudos: cf. 459c*], which is their detestation [*miseo: to hate*], and they will love the truth [*stergo: cf. 474c & aletheia: cf. 451a*].

Yes, that may be safely affirmed of them.

'May be,' my friend, I replied, is not the word; say rather 'must be affirmed' [*anagke: cf. 479b in context of the sentence*]: for he whose nature is amorous [*erotikos, adverb*] of anything cannot help loving [*agapao: cf. 475b as glad*] all that belongs or is akin [*suggenes: cf. 470c as friendship & oikeios: cf. 471a as friends*] to the object of his affections [*paidikos: cf. 403b as beloved*].

Right, he said.

And is there anything more akin [*oikeios: cf. c*] to wisdom than truth [*sophia: cf. 475b & aletheia: cf. c*]?

How can there be?

Can the same nature [*phusis: cf. c in the context of the sentence*] be a lover of wisdom and a lover of **d** falsehood [*philosophos: cf. 483e & philopseude*]?

Never.

The true lover of learning [*philomathe: cf. 475c*] then must from his earliest youth, as far as in him lies, desire [*orgao: to swell*] all truth [*aletheia: cf. c*]?

Assuredly.

But then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong [*epithumia: cf. 440b as spirited element & sphodros: excessive*] in one direction will have them weaker [*asthenes: cf. 455e as inferior*] in others; they will be like a stream which has been drawn off into another channel.

True.

He whose desires are drawn towards [*rheo: to flow, stream*] knowledge [*mathema: cf. b as knowledge*] in every form will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul [*hedone: cf. 464d & psuche: cf. 484c*], and will hardly feel [*ekleipo: to forsake, abandon*] bodily pleasure—I mean, if he be a true philosopher and not a **e** sham one [*peplasmēnos, adverb: by pretense*].

That is most certain.

Such an one is sure to be temperate [*sophron: cf. 443e*] and the reverse of covetous [*philochrema: cf. 391c as avarice, with oudame*]; for the motives which make [*spoudazo: cf. 452e as inclined to weigh*] another man desirous of having and spending, have no place in his character [*proseko: cf. 467a as giving the opportunity & spoudazo*].

Very true.

**486** Another criterion of the philosophical nature [*philosophos: cf. 485d as lover of wisdom & phusis: cf. c*] has also to be considered [*skopeo: cf. 486b as were considering*].

What is that?

There should be [*metecho: cf. 478e as partakes*] no secret corner of illiberality [*aneleutheria*]; nothing can

more antagonistic than meanness to a soul [*smikrologia & psuche: cf. 485d*] which is ever longing after [*eporego: cf. 437c as longing for realization of desires*] the whole of things both divine and human. Most true, he replied.

Then how can he who has magnificence of mind [*megaloprepeios & dianoia: cf. 476d*] and is the spectator [*theoria*] of all time and all existence [*ousia: cf. 485b as nature*], think [*dokeo: cf. 484c in context of the sentence*] much of human life?

He cannot.

**b** Or can such an one account [*hegeomai: cf. 467c as recognizes*] death fearful?

No indeed.

Then the cowardly and mean nature [*deilos: cf. 429b & aneleutheros: not fit for a free man*] has no part [*metecho: cf. a as should be*] in true philosophy?

Certainly not [*dokeo: cf. a as think*].

Or again: can he who is harmoniously constituted [*kosmios: cf. 410e as moderate*], who is not covetous or mean [*aneleutheros: cf. b*], or a boaster, or a coward—can he, I say, ever be unjust [*adikos: cf. 476a*] or hard in his dealings?

Impossible.

Then you will soon observe [*skopeo: cf. a as considered*] whether a man is just and gentle [*dikaios: cf. 479e & hemeros: cf. 470e as civilized*], or rude and unsociable; these are the signs [*episkopeo: cf. 462a as consider*] which distinguish even in youth the philosophical nature from the un-philosophical.

True.

**c** There is another point which should be remarked [*paraleipo: cf. 401e as omissions, with ou*].

What point?

Whether he has or has not a pleasure in learning [*eumathes & dusmathes, with prosdokeo: to expect*]; for no one will love [*stergo: cf. 485c*] that which gives him pain, and in which after much toil he makes little progress [*anuo: to effect, make haste*].

Certainly not.

And again, if he is forgetful [*manthano, with meden: cf. 477c as understand*] and retains [*sozo: cf. 484e as preserve*] nothing [*lethes: forgetful*] of what he learns, will he not be an empty vessel [*episteme: cf. 478a as knowledge*]?

That is certain.

Laboring in vain [*anonetos: without profit*], he must [*anagkazo: cf. 473a as insist*] end in hating himself and his fruitless occupation? Yes.

**d** Then a soul [*psuche: cf. a*] which forgets [*epilanthanomai: cf. 413c*] cannot be ranked [*egkrino: to be reckoned*] among genuine philosophic natures; we must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory [*mnemonikos, adjective*]?

Certainly.

And once more, the inharmonious and unseemly [*amousos: cf. 411d as hater & aschemonos: not becoming*] nature can only tend to disproportion [*ametria: lack of measure*]?

Undoubtedly.

And do you consider truth [*aletheia: cf. 485d*] to be akin [*suggenes: cf. 485c*] to proportion or to disproportion [*emmetria (one 'm' compared with ametria in d) & ametria*]?

To proportion.

Then, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally well-proportioned and gracious mind [*eucharis: pleasing & dianoia: cf. a*], which will move spontaneously [*euago & autophues: natural*] towards the true being [*epi ten tou ontos*] of everything.

Certainly.

**e** Well, and do not all these qualities, which we have been enumerating, go together, and are they not, in a manner, necessary to a soul [*anagkaios: cf. 441c as must (not) infer & psuche: cf. d*], which is to have a full and perfect participation of being [*metalambano: cf. 441a as to the use of & hikanos, adverb: cf. 473d in context of the sentence & teleos, adverb: cf. 473c as perfectly & ousia: cf. a as existence*]?

**487** They are absolutely necessary, he replied.

And must not that be a blameless study [*memphomai: to blame, censure & epitedeuma: cf. 484b as institutions*] which he only can pursue [*epitedeuo: cf. 487b as have pursuits in common*] who has the gift of a good memory, and is quick to learn [*hikanos, adverb: cf. 486e full & eumathes: cf. 486c as pleasure in*]

learning],—noble, gracious [*megaloprepes: befitting a great man & eucharis: cf. 486d*], the friend of truth, justice, courage [*andreia: cf. 441d, temperance & sophrosune: cf. 442d*], who are his kindred? The god of jealousy [*Momos: personification of blame and censure*] himself, he said, could find no fault [*memphomai: cf. a*] with such a study.

And to men like him, I said, when perfected [*teleioo: to accomplish*] by years and education [*paideia: cf. 456d as model system*], and to these only you will entrust [*epitrepo: cf. 469b as allow*] the state.

**b** Here Adeimantus interposed and said: to these statements, Socrates, no one can offer a reply; but when you talk in this way, a strange feeling passes over the minds [*pascho: cf. 465c as suffer*] of your hearers. They fancy that they are led astray [*apeiria: cf. 406c as never understood*] a little at each step in the argument [*logos: cf. 485a as by observing*], owing to their own want of skill [*paragignomai: cf. 456e as present*] in asking and answering questions; these little accumulate, and at the end of the discussion they are found to have sustained a mighty overthrow and all their former notions appear to be turned upside down [*anaphaino: cf. 484a as appeared in view with enantion, opposite*]. And as unskillful players of checkers are at last shut up by their more skillful adversaries and have no piece to move, so they too find **c** themselves shut up at last; for they have nothing to say in this new game of which words are the counters [*psephos: cf. 450a as agreed*]; and yet all the time they are in the right. The observation is suggested to me by what is now occurring [*phaino: cf. 484b in context of the sentence*]. For any one of us might say, that although in words he is not able to meet you at each step [*enantioomai: to oppose*] of the argument, he sees as a fact that the votaries [*hormao: cf. 439b as obtain*] of philosophy, when they carry on the study [*paideuo: cf. 456d as education*], not only in youth as a part of education, but as the

**d** pursuit [*endiatribo: to spend, continue in the practice of something*] of their maturer years, most of them become strange monsters [*panponeros: thoroughly depraved*], not to say utter rogues, and that those who may be considered the best of them [*epieikes: cf. 431d in context of the sentence*] are made useless [*achrestos*] to the world by the very study [*epitedeuma: cf. a*] which you extol.

Well, and do you think that those who say so are wrong [*pseudo: cf. 444a as telling a falsehood*]?

I cannot tell, he replied; but I should like to know what is your opinion [*hedeos, adverb: cf. 470a as have the pleasure & dokeo: cf. 486b as certainly not*].

Hear my answer; I am of opinion [*phaino: cf. c as occurring*] that they are quite right.

**e** Then how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from evil [*kakos: cf. 476a*] until philosophers rule in them, when philosophers are acknowledged [*homologeo: cf. 485b as agreed*] by us to be of no use [*achrestos: cf. d*] to them?

You ask a question, I said, to which a reply can only be given in a parable [*eikon: cf. 401c as images*].

Yes, Socrates; and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at all accustomed, I suppose.

I perceive, I said, that you are vastly amused at having plunged me into such a hopeless discussion [*logos: 488 cf. 487b as argument & dusapodeiktos: hard to demonstrate*]; but now hear the parable, and then you will be still more amused at the meagerness of my imagination [*glischros, adverb: with difficulty, greedily & eikazo: cf. 377e as representation is made*]: for the manner in which the best men [*epieikes: cf. 487d as best & pathos: cf. 454a as the case*] are treated in their own states is so grievous [*chalepos: cf. 473e as hard thing*] that no single thing on earth is comparable to it; and therefore, if I am to plead their cause [*apologeomai: cf. 453c as offers these objections*], I must have recourse to fiction [*sunago: to bring together (from many sources)*], and put together a figure made up of many things, like the fabulous unions of goats and stags which are found in pictures. Imagine [*noeo: cf. 479c as mind*] then a fleet or a **b** ship in which there is a captain who is taller and stronger than any of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not much better. The sailors are quarreling with one another about the steering—every one is of opinion that he has a right to steer, though he has never learned the art of navigation and cannot tell who taught him or when he learned, and will further assert that it cannot be taught [*manthano: cf. 486c as forgetful, with meden*], and they are ready to cut in pieces any one who says the contrary. They throng about the captain, begging and

**c** praying him to commit the helm to them; and if at any time they do not prevail, but others are preferred to them, they kill the others or throw them overboard, and having first chained up the noble captain's senses with drink or some narcotic drug, they mutiny and take possession of the ship and make free with the stores; thus, eating and drinking, they proceed on their voyage in such a manner as might be expected of them. Him who is their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot for getting the ship out of the captain's hands into their own whether by force or persuasion, they compliment with the

d name of sailor, pilot, able seaman, and abuse the other sort of man, whom they call a good-for-nothing; but that the true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky and stars and winds, and whatever else belongs to his art, if he intends to be really qualified for the command of a e ship, and that he must and will be the helmsman, whether other people like or not—the possibility of this union of authority with the helmsman's art has never seriously entered into their thoughts or been made part of their calling. Now in vessels which are in a state of mutiny and by sailors who are

489 mutineers, how will the true pilot be regarded? Will he not be called by them a prater, a star-gazer, a good-for-nothing?

Of course, said Adeimantus.

Then you will hardly need, I said, to hear the interpretation of the figure [*exetazo: to examine well & eikon: cf. 487e as parable*], which describes the true philosopher in his relation to the state [*diathesis: disposition, arrangement*]; for you understand [*manthano: cf. 488b as (cannot) be taught*] already.

Certainly.

Then suppose you now take this parable to the gentleman who is surprised [*thaumazo: cf. 376a as curious*] at finding that philosophers have no honor [*timao: cf. 468e*] in their cities; explain [*didasko: cf. 454e in context of the sentence*] it to him and try to convince [*peitho: cf. 476d as advice*] him that their b having honor would be far more extraordinary [*thaumastos: cf. 420b in context of the sentence*].

I will.

Say to him, that, in deeming the best [*epieikes: cf. 488a*] among the philosophers to be useless [*achrestos: cf. 487e as of no use*] to the rest of the world, he is right; but also tell him to attribute [*aitiaomai: to charge, accuse*] their uselessness to the fault of those who will not use them, and not to themselves. The pilot should not humbly beg the sailors to be commanded by him—that is not the order of nature [*phusis: cf. 486a*]; neither are 'the wise to go to the doors of the rich'—the ingenious author of this saying told a lie—but the truth is, that, when a man is ill, whether he be rich or poor, to c the physician he must go, and he who wants to be governed, to him who is able to govern. The ruler who is good for anything ought not to beg his subjects to be ruled by him; although the present governors of mankind are of a different stamp; they may be justly compared to the mutinous sailors, and the true helmsmen to those who are called by them good-for-nothings and star-gazers [*achrestos: cf. b as useless & meteoroleschos: one who prates on things above*]. Precisely so, he said.

For these reasons, and among men like these, philosophy, the noblest pursuit [*beltistos: cf. 466d as best & epitedeuma: cf. 487d as study*] of all, is not likely [*rhadios, with ou (not): cf. 484a as could have been shortened*] to be much esteemed [*eudokeo*] by those of the opposite faction; not that the greatest and d most lasting injury [*diabole: false accusation*] is done to her by her opponents, but by her own professing followers [*phasko: to say, affirm & epitedeuo: cf. 487a as pursue*], the same of whom you suppose the accuser to say, that the greater number of them are arrant rogues [*pamponeros: thoroughly depraved*], and the best are useless [*epieikes: cf. b & achrestos: cf. c as good-for-nothings*] in which opinion I agreed [*sugchoreo: cf. 475a as assent*].

Yes.

And the reason why the good are useless has now been explained [*dierchomai: cf. 473a as proving*]?

True.

Then shall we proceed to show that the corruption [*poneria: cf. 409d as vice*] of the majority is also unavoidable, and that this is not to be laid to the charge [*peirazo: cf. 473b as show & aitia: accusation*] e of philosophy any more than the other?

By all means.

And let us ask and answer in turn, first going back [*anamimnesko: cf. 474d as assist my memory*] to the description of the gentle and noble nature [*kalos: cf. 483e as absolute beauty & agathos: cf. 476a as 490 good & phusis: cf. b*]. Truth [*aletheia: cf. 486d*], as you will remember, was his leader [*hegemonueo: cf. 487d*] whom he followed [*dioko: cf. 454b as insist*] always and in all things; failing in this, he was an impostor [*alazon: a vagabond*], and had no part or lot [*meteimi: to go after*] in true philosophy.

Yes, that was said.

Well, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at variance with present notions [*doxa, with para: cf. 489a as opinion*] of him?

Certainly, he said.

And have we not a right to say in his defense [*apologeomai: cf. 488a as plead their cause*], that the true lover

of knowledge [*philomathes: cf. 436a*] is always striving after being [*hamillaomai: cf. 349c & pros to on*]  
—that is his nature; he will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only  
**b** [*doxazo: cf. 479e as to have opinion*], but will go on—the keen edge will not be blunted [*ambluno: to  
become dull*], nor the force of his desire abate [*eros: cf. 403a as love & apolego: to pick out, decline*] until he  
have attained the knowledge of the true nature [*phusis: cf. a*] of every essence [*hapto: cf. 474b as study*] by a  
sympathetic and kindred power in the soul [*psuche: cf. 486e & ephapto: cf. 484b as grasp*], and by that power  
drawing near and mingling [*pleiazio & mignumi*]: and becoming incorporate [*sungignomai: to hold converse*]  
with very being [*to onti ontos*], having begotten mind and truth [*noos: cf. 450b as wise men & aletheia: cf. a*],  
he will have knowledge [*gignosko: cf. 484e as know*] and will live and grow truly, and then, and not till then,  
will he cease from his travail [*hodis: labor pains*].

Nothing, he said, can be more just than such a description of him [*metreo: cf. 348b as measuring*].

And will the love [*agapao: cf. 485c*] of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will he not utterly hate a  
lie?

**c** He will.

And when truth is the captain [*aletheia: cf. b & hegeomai: cf. 486b in context of the sentence*], we cannot  
suspect any evil of the band which he leads [*choros: a round dance, actor & akoloutheo: cf. 474c as follow*]?  
Impossible.

Justice and health of mind will be of the company [*dikaioi: cf. 486b as just & hugies: cf. 409d as honest man &  
ethos: cf. 452a as proposals*], and temperance will follow after [*sophrosune: cf. 487a as courage & epeimi: to be  
set upon*]?

True, he replied.

Neither is there any reason why I should again set in array the philosopher's virtues [*choros: cf. c as leads &  
phusis: cf. b*], as you will doubtless remember [*mimnesko: cf. 483e*] that courage, magnificence, apprehension,  
memory, [*andreia: cf. 487a & megaloprepeia & eumatheia: readiness in learning, docility & mneme*] were his  
natural gifts [*sumbaino: cf. 465b as true*]. And you objected [*epilambano: cf. 450a as d assailing*] that,  
although no one could deny what I said then, still, if you leave [*homologeio: cf. 487e as acknowledged*] words  
and look at facts, the persons who are thus described are some of them manifestly useless [*achrestos: cf. 489d*],  
and the greater number utterly depraved [*kakia: cf. 448c as vice*]; we were then led to enquire [*episkopeo: cf.  
486b as signs*] into the grounds of these accusations [*diabole: cf. 489d as injury*], and have now arrived at the  
point of asking why are the majority bad [*kakos: cf. 487e as evil*], which question of necessity [*anagke: cf. 485b  
as must be affirmed*] brought us back to the examination and definition [*horizo: cf. 474c as definition*] of the  
true philosopher.

**e** Exactly.

And we have next to consider [*theomai: cf. 479e as see*] the corruptions [*phthora: cf. 485b*] of the philosophic  
nature, why so many are spoiled [*diollumi: to destroy utterly*] and so few escape spoiling—I am speaking of  
those who were said to be useless but not wicked [*achrestos: cf. d & poneros: cf. 435e as intemperance*]  
—and, when we have done with them, we will speak of the imitators [*mimeomai: cf.*

**491** *458e*] of philosophy, what manner of men are they who aspire after a profession [*epitedeuma: cf. 489c as  
pursuit*] which is above them [*psuche: cf. b as soul*] and of which they are unworthy [*anaxios: cf. 397a as  
unscrupulous*], and then, by their manifold inconsistencies [*plemmeleo: cf. 483e as impropriety*], bring upon  
[*prosapto: cf. 430d as assign*] philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal reprobation [*doxa: cf. a as  
notion*] of which we speak.

What are these corruptions?, he said.

I will see if I can explain [*dierchomai: cf. 489d*] them to you. Every one will admit [*homologeio: cf. 490d as  
leave*] that a nature [*phusis: cf. 490c*] having in perfection all the qualities which we required

**b** [*protasso: cf. 433e as entrust*] in a philosopher, is a rare plant which is seldom seen among men.  
Rare indeed.

And what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy [*olethros: cf. 434b as ruin*] these rare natures!

What causes?

In the first place [*thaumazo: cf. 489a as surprised*] there are their own virtues, their courage, temperance, and  
the rest of them, every one of which praise worthy qualities (and this is a most singular circumstance) destroys  
and distracts [*apollumi: cf. 425a as neglected & apospao: to drag away from*] from philosophy the soul [*psuche:  
cf. a*] which is the possessor of them.

That is very singular [*atopos: cf. 484e as no reason*], he replied.

c Then there are all the ordinary goods [*agathos*: cf. 489e as gentle] of life—beauty, wealth, strength, rank, and great connections [*kallos*: cf. 444d & *ploutos*: cf. 423a as rich & *ischus* & *rhonnumi*: cf. 401d as fasten] in the state—you understand the sort of things [*oikeios*: cf. 485c as akin]—these also have a corrupting and distracting effect [*phtheiro*: to ruin & *apospao*: cf. b as distract].

I understand; but I should like to know more precisely [*hedeos*, adverb: cf. 487d & *akribos*: cf. 484d in context of the sentence] what you mean [*punthanomai*: cf. 476e as knowledge] about them.

Grasp [*lambano*: cf. 410e as acquire] the truth as a whole, I said, and in the right way [*orthos*, adverb: cf. 484c very good]; you will then have no difficulty [*eudelos*: quite clear] in apprehending the preceding remarks, and they will no longer appear strange [*phaino*: cf. 487d as opinion & *atopos*: cf. b as very singular] to you.

And how am I to do so [*keleuo*: cf. 439c as bids]?, he asked.

d Why, I said, we know that all germs or seeds, whether vegetable or animal, when they fail to meet with proper nutriment or climate or soil, in proportion to their vigor, are all the more sensitive to the want of a suitable environment, for evil [*kakos*: cf. 490d] is a greater enemy to what is good [*agathos*: cf. c] than what is not.

Very true.

There is reason in supposing [*oiomai*: cf. 452d as think & *logos*: cf. 487e as discussion] that the finest natures [*aristos*: cf. 471d as bravest & *phusis*: cf. a], when under alien conditions [*allos*: cf. 470a], receive more injury than the inferior, because the contrast [*apallasso*: cf. 465d as will be delivered] is greater.

Certainly.

e And may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted minds [*euphues*: cf. 455b & *psuche*: cf. b as soul], when they are ill-educated [*paidagogia*: education], become pre-eminently [*diapherontos*, adverb: cf. 469b] bad? Do not great crimes [*adikema*: cf. 330e as transgressions] and the spirit of pure evil [*akratos*: cf. 410d as too much & *poneria*: cf. 489d as corruption] spring out of a fulness of nature [*neanikos*: youthful & *phusis*: cf. d] ruined by education [*trophe*: cf. 465d as maintenance] rather than from any inferiority, whereas weak [*asthenos*] natures are scarcely capable [*aitia*: cf. 489d as charge] of any very great good or very great evil [*agathos*: cf. d & *kakos*: cf. d]?

There I think that you are right.

492 And our philosopher follows the same analogy [*tithemi*: cf. 484e as ordered & *phusis*: cf. e]—he is like a plant which, having proper nurture, must necessarily grow and mature into all virtue [*arete*: cf. 484e] but, if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the most noxious of all weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power [*tugchano*: cf. 473b as demand & *boetheo*: to come to aid & *theos*: cf. 469a as god]. Do you really think, as people so often say, that our youth are corrupted [*diaphtheiro*: cf. 448b] by Sophists, or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of? Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all Sophists? And do they not educate to

b perfection [*paideuo*: cf. 487c as study & *teleiosis*: fulfillment] young and old, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts [*apergazomai*: cf. 477d as result & *boulomai*: cf. 458a as plan]?

When is this accomplished?, he said.

When they meet together [*sugkathizo*], and the world sits down at an assembly [*ekklesia*] or in a court of law or a theater or a camp or in any other popular resort, and there is a great uproar, and they praise some things which are being said or done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating both, shouting and clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they are assembled redoubles c the sound of the praise or blame—at such a time will not a young man's heart, as they say, leap within him [*kardia*: cf. 331a as soul & *ischo*: to hold, check]? Or will any private training enable him to stand firm against the overwhelming flood of popular opinion [*psogos*: cf. 403c as guilty] or will he be carried away by the stream? Will he not have the notions of good and evil [*kalos*: cf. 489e as gentle & *aischros*: cf. 479a as ugly] which the public in general have—he will do as they do, and as they are, such will he be?

d Yes, Socrates; necessity [*anagke*: cf. 490d] will compel him.

And yet, I said, there is a still greater necessity, which has not been mentioned.

What is that?

The gentle force of disenfranchisement [*atimia*: dishonor] or confiscation or death which, as you are aware, these new Sophists and educators [*paideutes*] who are the public, apply when their words are powerless [*peitho*, with me: cf. 489a as convince].

Indeed they do; and in right good earnest.

Now what opinion [*logos*: cf. 491d in context of the sentence] of any other Sophist, or of any private person,

can be expected to overcome [*krateo*: cf. 455d as maintaining] in such an unequal contest?

e None, he replied.

No, indeed, I said, even to make the attempt [*epicheireo*: cf. 442b] is a great piece of folly [*anoia*: cf. 400e]; there neither is, nor has been, nor is ever likely to be, any different type of character [ethos: cf. 490c in context of the sentence] which has had no other training in virtue [*paideia*: cf. 487a as education & arete: cf. a] but that which is supplied by public opinion [*anthropeios*: belonging to man]—I speak, my friend, of human virtue only; what is more than human [*theios*: cf. 382e as divine], as the proverb says, is not included: for I would not have you ignorant [*eido*: cf. 476b as seeing] that, in 493 the present evil state [*katastasis*: cf. 464a as constitution] of governments, whatever is saved and comes to good is saved [*sozo*: cf. 486c as retains] by the power [*moira*: cf. 472d in context of the sentence] of God, as we may truly say.

I quite assent [*dokeo*: cf. 487d as opinion], he replied.

Then you should also agree [*doxazo*: cf. 490b in context of the sentence] to this.

What are you going to say?

Why, that all those mercenary [*mistharneo*: to work for hire] individuals, whom the many call Sophists and whom they deem to be their adversaries [*antitechnaomai*: to contrive in opposition], do, in fact, teach [*paideuo*: cf. 492a as educate] nothing but the opinion [*dogma*: cf. 464d] of the many, that is to say, the opinions of their assemblies [*doxazo*: cf. a as agree & *athroizo*: to gather together]; and this is their wisdom [*sophia*: cf. 485c]. I might compare them to a man who should study the tempers and

b desires [*orge*: cf. 440a as anger & *epithumia*: cf. 485d] of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him—he would learn how to approach and handle him, also at what times and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his several cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is soothed or infuriated; and you may suppose further, that when, by continually attending upon him [*katamanthano*: cf. 485a as ascertained & *sunousia*: social intercourse], he has become perfect in all this, he calls his knowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or art [*techne*: cf. 475c], which he proceeds to teach [*didaskalia*: instruction], although he has no real notion of what he means by the principles or passions [*dogma*: cf. a as opinion & *epithumia*: cf. b as desires] of which he is speaking, but c calls this honorable and that dishonorable [*dikaios*: cf. 490c as justice & *adikos*: cf. 486b as unjust], or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute. Good he pronounces to be that in which the beast delights and evil to be that which he dislikes; and he can give no other account of them except that the just and noble are necessary [*anagkaios*: cf. 486c], having never himself seen, and having no power of explaining [*deiknumi*: cf. 432c as show] to others the nature of either [*phusis*: cf. 492a, in context of the sentence], or the difference between them, which is immense. By heaven [*Dios*: divine], would not such an one be a rare educator [*atopos*: cf. 491c as strange & *paideutes*: cf. 492d]?

Indeed, he would.

And in what way does he who thinks [*dokeo*: cf. a as assent] that wisdom is the discernment [*katanoeo*: d to observe well, consider] of the tempers and tastes [*orge*: cf. b & *hedone*: cf. 485d as pleasures] of the motley multitude, whether in painting or music, or, finally, in politics, differ [*diaphero*: cf. 484c in context of sentence] from him whom I have been describing? For when a man consorts with the many, and exhibits [*epideiknumi*: cf. 398a] to them his poem or other work of art or the service [*demiourgia*: cf. 401a & *diakonia*: cf. 371c as office of salesmen] which he has done the state, making them his judges when he is not obliged, the so-called necessity [*anagkaios*: cf. c] of Diomedes will oblige him to produce whatever they praise. And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous [*katagelastos*] which they give in confirmation of their own notions [*logos*: cf. 492d as opinion] about the honorable and good. Did you ever hear any of them which were not?

e No, nor am I likely to hear.

You recognize [*ennoeo*: cf. 478b as reflect] the truth of what I have been saying [*anamimnesko*: cf. 489e as going back]? Then let me ask you to consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in the existence of absolute beauty [*to kalon*: cf. 479e] rather than of the many beautiful, or of 494 the absolute in each kind rather than of the many in each kind?

Certainly not.

Then the majority cannot possibly be a philosopher?

Impossible.

And therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure [*psego*: cf. 431b as blamed] of the majority?

They must.

And of individuals who consort with [*prosomilogeo*] the mob and seek to please [*epithumeo*: cf. 475c in

context of the sentence] them?

That is evident.

Then, do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved [*soteria*: cf. 465d as salvation] in his calling to the end? And remember [*homologeo*: cf. 491a as admit] what we were saying of him, that **b** he was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence [*eumatheia* & *mneme* & *andreia* & *megaloprepeia*: for all, cf. 490c]—these were admitted by us to be the true philosopher's gifts.

Yes.

Will not such an one from his early childhood be in all things first among all, especially if his bodily endowments are like his mental ones [*psuche*: cf. 491e as minds]?

Certainly, he said.

And his friends and fellow-citizens will want to use him as he gets older for their own purposes?

No question.

**c** Falling at his feet, they will make requests to him and do him honor and flatter him, because they want to get into their hands [*prokatalambano*: to seize beforehand & *prokolakeuo*: to flatter beforehand] now, the power which he will one day possess.

That often happens, he said.

And what will a man such as he be likely to do under such circumstances, especially if he be a citizen of a great city, rich and noble, and a tall proper youth? Will he not be full of boundless aspirations [*amechanos*: without resources & *elpis*: hope] and fancy himself able to manage the affairs [*prasso*: cf. 473a in context of the sentence] of Hellenes and of barbarians, and having got such notions into his

**d** head will he not dilate and elevate himself in the fulness of vain pomp and senseless pride [*empiplemi*: to fill & *schematismos*: appearance, assumption & *phronema*: cf. 411c]?

To be sure he will.

Now, when he is in this state of mind [*diatithemi*: cf. 410c as devotion to], if some one gently [*hemeros*: cf. 486b] comes to him and tells him that he is a fool and must get understanding [*ketos*, with *ou* (not): not in possession of], which can only be got by slaving for it, do you think that under such adverse circumstances he will be easily induced [*eupetes*: cf. 369a as easily discovered] to listen?

Far otherwise.

And even if there be some one who through inherent goodness or natural reasonableness [*suggenes*: cf. **e** 486e as akin & *eis* + *aistanomai*: cf. 462c as feels] has had his eyes opened a little and is humbled and taken captive [*helko*: cf. 439d as attracts] by philosophy, how will his friends behave when they think that they are likely to lose the advantage [*chreia*: usefulness] which they were hoping to reap from his companionship? Will they not do and say [*peitho*: cf. 492d in context of the sentence] anything to prevent him from yielding to his better nature [*peitho*, with *peri*] and to render his teacher powerless, using to this end [*kathistemi*: cf. 451c in context of the sentence & *epibouleuo*: cf. 378b as mean] private intrigues as well as public prosecutions?

**495** There can be no doubt of it.

And how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher?

Impossible.

Then were we not right in saying that even the very qualities which make a man a philosopher may, if he be ill-educated [*kakos*, adverb: cf. 473b as fault], divert him from philosophy, no less than riches and their accompaniments and the other so-called goods of life [*paraskeue*: cf. 369d as supply]?

We were quite right [*orthos*, adverb: cf. 491c as right way].

Thus, my excellent friend, is brought about all that ruin and failure [*olethros*: cf. 491b as destroy &

**b** *diaphthora*: ruin] which I have been describing of the natures [*phusis*: cf. 493c] best adapted to the best of all pursuits [*beltistos* & *epitedeuma*: cf. 489c for both]; they are natures which we maintain to be rare [*oligos*: small, few] at any time; this being the class out of which come the men who are the authors of the greatest evil [*kakos*: cf. 491e] to states and individuals; and also of the greatest good [*agathos*: cf. 491e] when the tide carries them in that direction [*rheo*: cf. 485d as drawn towards]; but a small man never was the doer of any great thing either to individuals or to states.

That is most true, he said.

And so philosophy is left desolate [*ekpipto*: to fall out], with her marriage rite incomplete: for her own **c** have fallen away and forsaken her, and while they are leading [*proseko*: cf. 485e as having no place] a false and unbecoming life, other unworthy persons, seeing that she has no kinsmen to be her protectors, enter in and dishonor her; and fasten upon her the reproaches [*oneidos*: cf. 347b as disgrace] which, as you say, her

reprovers [*oneidizo: to reproach*] utter, who affirm of her votaries that some are good for nothing, and that the greater number deserve the severest punishment.

That is certainly what people say.

Yes; and what else would you expect, I said, when you think of the puny creatures [*anthropiskos*] who, seeing this land open to them—a land well stocked with fair names and showy titles—like prisoners d running out of prison into a sanctuary, take a leap out of [*ekpedao*] their trades into philosophy; those who do so being probably the cleverest hands [*kompos: cf. 460a as ingenious*] at their own miserable crafts? For, although philosophy be in this evil case, still there remains a dignity [*megaloprepes: cf. 487a as gracious*] about her which is not to be found in the arts. And many are thus attracted by her whose natures are imperfect [*phusis: cf. b & atelos: not complete*] and whose souls are maimed and disfigured e [*psuche: cf. 494b & sugkiao: to be cramped & aporregnumi: to be broken off*] by their meanness, as their bodies are by their trades and crafts. Is not this unavoidable?

Yes.

Are they not exactly like a bald little tinker who has just got out of jail and come into a fortune; he takes a bath and puts on a new coat, and is decked out as a bridegroom going to marry his master's daughter, who is left poor and desolate?

**496** A most exact parallel [*diaphero, with ou (not): cf. 493d as differ*].

What will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and bastard [*phaulos: cf. 460a as less worthy & nothos*]?

There can be no question of it.

And when persons who are unworthy of education [*paideusis: cf. 424a*] approach philosophy and make an alliance with [*homileo: cf. 410c as effect*] her who is a rank above them what sort of ideas and opinions [*dianoema & doxa: cf. 491a as reprobation*] are likely to be generated? Will they not be sophisms captivating to the ear, having nothing in them genuine, or worthy of or akin to true wisdom [*phronesis: cf. 460a as intellectual vigor*]?

No doubt, he said.

Then, Adeimantus, I said, the worthy disciples [*homileo: cf. a*] of philosophy will be but a small remnant: b perchance some noble and well-educated person [*eu tethrammenon ethos: cf. 492e as character*], detained by exile in her service, who in the absence of corrupting influences [*aporia: cf. 405b in context of the sentence & diaphtheiro: cf. 492s*] remains devoted to her [*axia, with kata: worth, value*]; or some lofty soul [*psuche: cf. 495e*] born in a mean city, the politics of which he contemns and neglects; and there may be a gifted few [*euphues: cf. 491e*] who leave the arts, which they justly despise, and come to her;—or peradventure there are some who are restrained by our friend Theages' bridle; for everything in c the life of Theages conspired [*paraskeuazo: cf. 422b as perfect in his art*] to divert [*ekpipto: cf. 495b as left desolate*] him from philosophy; but ill-health kept him away from politics. My own case of the daemonic sign [*daimonios & semeion*] is hardly worth mentioning, for rarely, if ever, has such a monitor been given to any other man. Those who belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession [*hedus: cf. 397d as charming & makarios: cf. 465d & ktéma*] philosophy is, and have also seen enough of the madness [*mania: cf. 382e*] of the multitude; and they know that no politician is honest,

d nor is there any champion of justice at whose side they may fight and be saved. Such an one may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts—he will not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but neither is he able singly to resist all their fierce natures, and therefore seeing that he would be of no use to the state or to his friends, and reflecting that he would have to throw away his life without doing any good either to himself or others, he holds his peace [*hesuchia: cf. 336b*], and goes his own way [*prasso: cf. 494c as manage the affairs*]. He is like one who, in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries along, retires under the shelter of a wall; and seeing the rest of mankind full of wickedness [*anomia: lawlessness*], he is content [*agapao: cf. 490b as love*] if only he can live his own life e and be pure from evil or unrighteousness and depart in peace and good-will with bright hopes [*elpis: cf. 494c as aspirations & hileos, adverb: cf. 427b in context of the sentence & eumenes: favorable*].

**497** Yes, he said, and he will have done a great work [*diaprasso: cf. 411e as dealing*] before he departs.

A great work—yes; but not the greatest, unless he find a state suitable [*proseko: cf. 495c as leading*] to him; for in a state which is suitable to him, he will have a larger growth and be the savior [*sozo: cf. 493a as saved*] of his country as well as of himself.

The causes why philosophy is in such an evil name [*diabole: cf. 490d as accusations*] have now been

sufficiently explained: the injustice of the charges [*dikaïos, adverb, with ou (not): cf. 353d as proper*] against her has been shown—is there anything more which you wish to say?

Nothing more on that subject, he replied; but I should like to know which of the governments [*politeia: cf. 471e as state*] now existing is in your opinion the one adapted [*proseko: cf. a*] to her.

**b** Not any of them, I said; and that is precisely the accusation which I bring against them [*epaitiomai: to accuse*]—not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature [*phusis: cf. 495d*], and hence that nature is warped and estranged [*strepho: to turn about & alloioo: cf. 381c as change*];—as the exotic [*xenikos: foreign*] seed which is sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized, and is wont to be overpowered [*dunamis, with ou (not): cf. 479d as faculty*] and to lose itself in the new soil, even so this growth of philosophy, instead of persisting, degenerates and receives another character [*ethos: cf. 496b in context of the sentence & allotrios: cf. 491d as alien*]. But if philosophy ever finds in the state that perfection

**c** [*aristos: cf. 491d as finest*] which she herself is, then will be seen that she is in truth divine [*theios: cf. 492e as more than human*], and that all other things, whether natures [*phusis: cf. b*] of men or institutions [*epitedeuma: cf. 495b as pursuits*], are but human;—and now, I know that you are going to ask, what that state is.

No, he said; there you are wrong, for I was going to ask another question—whether it is the state of which we are the founders and inventors [*oikazo: cf. 427d as made habitable*], or some other?

Yes, I replied, ours in most respects; but you may remember my saying before, that some living authority would always be required [*eniemi: cf. 441c as exist*] in the state having the same idea [*logos: cf. 493d as d notions*] of the constitution [*politeia: cf. a*] which guided you when as legislator [*nomothetes: cf. 458c*] you were laying down the laws [*nomos: cf. 484b*].

That was said, he replied.

Yes, but not in a satisfactory manner [*hikanos, adverb: cf. 487a as quick*]; you frightened us by interposing objections [*antilambano: cf. 424a as taking root*], which certainly showed that the discussion [*apodeixis: cf. 472e as having this in view*] would be long and difficult; and what still remains is the reverse of easy.

What is there remaining?

The question how the study of philosophy may be so ordered [*metacheirazo: cf. 418a as handle*] as not to be the ruin [*diollumi: cf. 490e as spoiled*] of the state. All great attempts are attended with risk; 'hard is the good [*chalepos: cf. 487a as grievous & kalos: cf. 492c*],' as men say.

Still, he said, let the point be cleared up, and the enquiry will then be complete.

**e** I shall not be hindered [*diakoluo: cf. 374b as not allowed*], I said, by any want of will [*boulomai, with ou (not): cf. 492b in context of sentence*], but, if at all by a want of power [*dunamai: cf. 477c in context of the sentence*]; my zeal [*prothumia: cf. 412e as eagerness*] you may see for yourselves; and please to remark in what I am about to say how boldly and unhesitatingly [*prothumos, adverb: cf. 432c as adjective & parakinduneutikos, adverb: rashly*] I declare that states should pursue [*hapto: cf. 490b in context of sentence*] philosophy [*epitedeuma: cf. c*], not as they do now, but in a different spirit.

In what manner?

At present, I said, the students of philosophy [*hapto: cf. e*] are quite young; beginning when they are **498** hardly past childhood, they devote [*plesiazō: cf. 490b as drawing near*] only the time saved from moneymaking and housekeeping to such pursuits; and even those of them who are reputed to have most of the philosophic spirit, when they come within sight of the great difficulty of the subject [*chalepos: cf. d*], I mean dialectic [*peritous logous*], take themselves off. In after life when invited by some one else, they may, perhaps, go and hear a lecture, and about this they make much ado, for philosophy is not considered by them to be their proper business: at last, when they grow old, in most cases they are

**b** extinguished more truly than Heracleitus' sun, inasmuch as they never light up again.

But what ought to be their course?

Just the opposite. In childhood and youth their study and what philosophy they learn should [*metacheirazo: cf. 497d as ordered*] be suited to their tender years: during this period while they are growing up towards manhood, the chief and special care should be given [*epimeleomai: cf. 460c as will provide for*] to their bodies that they may have them to use in the service [*huperesia: body of rowers*] of philosophy. As life advances and the intellect begins to mature [*teleo: cf. 389d as carried out*], let them increase [*teino: cf. 464d as tend towards*] the gymnastics of the soul [*psuche: cf. 496b*]; but when the

**c** strength [*rhōmē*] of our citizens fails and is past civil and military duties, then let them range at will and engage in no serious labor, as we intend them to live happily [*eudaimonos*] here, and to crown this life with a

similar happiness in another [*teleutao: cf. 469e as dies*].

How truly in earnest [*prothumos, adverb: cf. 497e as boldly*] you are, Socrates!, he said. I am sure of that; and yet most of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still more earnest in their opposition to you, and will never be convinced; Thrasymachus least of all.

Do not make a quarrel [*diaballo: to pass over, cross*], I said, between Thrasymachus and me, who have **d** recently become friends, although, indeed, we were never enemies; for I shall go on striving [*aniemi: cf. 442a as moderating*] to the utmost until I either convert [*peitho: cf. 494e in context of sentence*] him and other men, or do something which may profit [*eutucho: cf. 399c as fortunate*] them against the day when they live again, and hold the like discourse in another state of existence.

You are speaking of a time which is not very near.

Rather, I replied, of a time which is as nothing in comparison with eternity [*pros ton apanta*]. Nevertheless, I do not wonder that the many refuse to believe [*peitho: cf. d*]; for they have never seen that of which we are now speaking realized [*gignomai: cf. 458b as executed*]; they have seen only a **e** conventional imitation of philosophy, consisting of words artificially brought together [*exepitedes, adverb: of set purpose, with malice or pretense*], not like these of ours having a natural unity [*sumpipto: cf. 473d as met in one & homoioo: cf. 431e as harmony*]. But a human being who in word and work [*ergos: cf. 473a in context of sentence & logos: cf. 497c as idea*] is perfectly [*teleos, adverb: cf. 486e*] molded, as far as he can be, into the proportion and likeness of virtue [*paristemi: to be near & homoioo: cf. e & arete: cf. 492e*]**c**—such a man ruling in a city which bears the same image, they have never yet **499** seen, neither one nor many of them—do you think that they ever did?

No indeed.

No, my friend, and they have seldom, if ever, heard free and noble sentiments [*kalos: cf. 497d as good*]; such as men utter when they are earnestly [*suntetamenos: vigorously*] and by every means [*tropos: cf. 485a in context of sentence*] in their power seeking after truth [*to alethes: cf. 382e*] for the sake of knowledge [*gignosko: cf. 490b*], while they look coldly on the subtleties of controversy [*erizo: cf. 454a as disputing*], of which the end is opinion and strife [*doxa: cf. 496a & eris: cf. 454a as discussion*], whether they meet with them in the courts of law or in society.

They are strangers, he said, to the words of which you speak.

And this was what we foresaw [*prooraio: cf. 453c*], and this was the reason why truth forced [*anagkazo: b cf. 486c as must*] us to admit, not without fear and hesitation, that neither cities nor states nor individuals will ever attain perfection [*teleos: cf. 443b in context of sentence*] until the small class of philosophers whom we termed useless but not corrupt [*achrestos & poneros (with ou, not): for both, cf. 490e*] are providentially compelled [*tuche: cf. 460a as ill-luck & anagke: cf. 492d as necessity*], whether they will or not, to take care of [*epimeleomai: cf. 498b*] the state, and until a like necessity be laid on the state to obey them; or until kings, or if not kings, the sons of kings or princes, are divinely inspired [*theios: cf. 497c & epipnoia: a breathing upon*] with a true love [*eros, adverb: cf. 490b as desire (noun)*] **c** of true philosophy. That either or both of these alternatives are impossible, I see no reason to affirm: if they were so, we might indeed be justly ridiculed [*katagelao*] as dreamers and visionaries [*euche: cf. 461a as prayers*]. Am I not right?

Quite right.

If then, in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in some foreign clime which is far away and beyond our ken, the perfected philosopher is or has been or hereafter shall be compelled [*anagke: cf. d b*] by a superior power to have the charge of [*epimeleomai: cf. b*] the state, we are ready to assert to the death [*diamachomai: cf. 345b as force*], that this our constitution [*politeia: cf. 497d*] has been, and is—yea, and will be whenever the Muse of Philosophy is queen [*egkrates: cf. 431a as under control*]. There is no impossibility in all this; that there is a difficulty [*chalepos: cf. 498a*], we acknowledge [*homologeio: cf. 494a as remember*] ourselves.

My opinion agrees with [*dokeo: cf. 493c as thinks*] yours, he said.

But do you mean to say that this is not the opinion [*dokeo*] of the multitude?

I should imagine not, he replied.

O my friend [*makarios: cf. 346a for same use*], I said, do not attack [*katagoreo: cf. 453e as charged*] the **e** multitude: they will change their minds, if, not in an aggressive spirit [*philoneikeo: to be fond of strife*], but gently and with the view of soothing [*paramutheomai: cf. 476c as advice*] them and removing their dislike of education [*diabole: cf. 497a as evil name & philomatheia: love of learning*], you show them your philosophers as they really are and describe as you were just now doing their character and **500** profession [*phusis: cf. 497c*]

& *epitedeuma*: cf. 497e as *philosophy*], and then mankind will see that he of whom you are speaking is not such as they supposed—if they view [*theo*: cf. 484d as *repair*] him in this new light, they will surely change their notion [*doxa*: cf. 499a as *opinion*] of him, and answer in another strain. Who can be at enmity [*chalepaino*: cf. 476d as *quarrel*] with one who loves them, who that is himself gentle and free from envy [*praos*: cf. 387e as *equanimity* & *aphthonos*] will be jealous of one in whom there is no jealousy? Nay, let me answer for you, that in a few this harsh temper [*chalepos*: cf. 499d as *difficulty* & *phusis*: cf. a] may be found but not in the majority of mankind.

I quite agree with [*sunoimai*] you, he said.

**b** And do you not also think [*sunoimai*: cf. a], as I do, that the harsh feeling [*chalepos*, *adverb*: cf. 455b as *with difficulty*] which the many entertain [*diakeimai*: cf. 431b in *context of sentence*] towards philosophy originates in the pretenders [*exothern*: cf. 381a as *external*], who rush in uninvited, and are always abusing them, and finding fault with them, who make persons instead of things the theme of their conversation? Nothing can be more unbecoming [*prepos*, *with ou (not)*: *becoming*] in philosophers than this.

It is most unbecoming.

For he, Adeimantus, whose mind [*dianoia*: cf. 486d] is fixed upon true being [*alethos*, *adverb*: cf. 421b & *pros tois ousi*], has surely no time [*schole*: cf. 406c as *leisure*] to look down upon the affairs of earth

**c** [*pragma*: cf. 408d as *things* & *anthropos*: *man*], or to be filled with malice and envy, contending against men; his eye is ever directed towards things fixed and immutable [*horao*: cf. 479e as *see* & *theo*: cf. a as *view*], which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason [*kosmos*: cf. 430e & *logos*, *with kata*: cf. 498e as *word*]; these he imitates, and to these he will, as far as he can, conform himself [*mimeomai*: cf. 490e as *imitators* & *aphomoioo*: cf. 396b as *copy*]. Can a man help imitating [*mimeomai*: cf. c] that with which he holds reverential converse [*agaomai*: *to revere*]?

Impossible.

And the philosopher holding converse with the divine order [*homileo*: cf. 496a in *context of sentence* & **d** *theios*: cf. 499b & *kosmios*: cf. 486b as *harmoniously constituted*], becomes orderly and divine, as far as the nature of man allows; but like every one else, he will suffer from detraction [*diabole*: cf. 499e as *dislike*].

Of course.

And if a necessity [*anagke*: cf. 499 as *compelled*] be laid upon him of fashioning [*meletao*: cf. 455c as *pursuit* & *ethe*: cf. 435e as *habits*], not only himself, but human nature generally, whether in states or individuals, into that which he beholds elsewhere, will he, think you, be an unskillful artificer [*kakos*: cf. 495b as *evil* & *demiourgos*: cf. 421d as *arts*] of justice, temperance [*dikaio*: cf. 472b & *sophrosune*: cf. 490c], and every civil virtue [*demotikos* & *arete*: cf. 498e]?

Anything but unskillful.

And if the world perceives [*aisthanomai*: cf. 494e in *context of sentence*] that what we are saying about him is the truth [*alethos*: cf. b as *true*], will they be angry with [*chalepaino*: cf. a as *be at enmity*]

**e** philosophy? Will they disbelieve us, when we tell them that no state can be happy [*eudaimoneo*: cf. 473e as *happiness*] which is not designed [*diagraphe*: *to delineate, mark out by lines*] by artists who imitate the heavenly pattern [*zographo*: *to paint from life* & *theios*: cf. c as *divine* & *paradeigma*: cf. 484c]?

They will not be angry [*chalepaino*: cf. d] if they understand, he said [*aisthanomai*: cf. d as *perceives*]. **501** But how will they draw out the plan [*diagraphe*: cf. e as *designed* & *tropos*: cf. 499a as *means*] of which you are speaking?

They will begin by taking the state and the manners [*ethe*: cf. 500d in *context of sentence*] of men from which, as from a tablet, they will rub out the picture, and leave a clean [*katharos*: cf. 460c as *pure*] surface. This is no easy task. But whether easy or not, herein will lie the difference between them and every other legislator,—they will have nothing to do either with individual or state, and will inscribe no laws [*nomos*: cf. 497d], until they have either found [*paralambano*: cf. 456d in *context of sentence*], or themselves made, a clean surface. They will be very right, he said.

Having effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the constitution [*hupographo*: *to write under* & *schema*: cf. 477c as *distinctions* & *politeia*: cf. 499d]?

No doubt.

**b** And when they are filling in the work [*apergazomai*: cf. 492b as *fashion*], as I conceive, they will often turn their eyes upwards and downwards: I mean that they will first look at absolute justice and beauty and temperance [*phusis*: cf. 500a & *dikaio*: cf. 493c as *honorable* & *kalos*: cf. 499a as *noble* & *sophon*: cf. 485e as *temperate*], and again at the human copy; and will mingle and temper [*suggmeignumi*: *to mix together* &

*kerannumi*: cf. 412 as *mingles*] the various elements of life [*epitedeuma*: cf. 500a as *character*] into the image of a man [*andreikelon*: *pigment*]; and thus they will conceive [*kaleo*: to call, summon] according to that other image [*tekmaïromai*: cf. 433b as *inference*], which, when existing among men, Homer calls the form and likeness of God [*theoides* & *thoeikelos*].

Very true, he said.

And one feature they will erase, and another they will put in, they have made the ways of men [*ethe*: cf. c a as *manners*], as far as possible, agreeable to the ways of God [*theophilos*: *loving God*]?

Indeed, he said, in no way could they make a fairer picture [*kalos*: cf. b as *beauty & graphe*].

And now, I said, are we beginning to persuade [*peitho*: cf. 498d as *believe*] those whom you described as rushing at us with might and main, that the painter of constitutions [*zographos*: cf. 472d & *politeia*: cf. a] is such an one as we are praising; at whom they were so very indignant [*chalepaino*: cf. 500e as *angry*] because to his hands we committed [*paradidomai*: cf. 403d as *handing over*] the state; and are they growing a little calmer [*prauno*: to soften, soothe] at what they have just heard?

Much calmer, if there is any sense [*sophroneo*: cf. 442c as *temperate*] in them.

d Why, where can they still find any ground for objection [*amphisbeteo*: to disagree with]? Will they doubt that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being [*erastes*: cf. 403b & *aletheia*: cf. 490c & *einai*: cf. 479d]?

They would not be so unreasonable [*atopos*: cf. 493c as *rare*].

Or that his nature [*phusis*: cf. b in context of sentence], being such as we have delineated [*dierchomai*: cf. 491a as *explain*], is akin to the highest good [*oikeios*: cf. 485c & *aristos*: cf. 497c as in truth]?

Neither can they doubt this.

But again, will they tell us that such a nature, placed under favorable circumstances [*proseko*: cf. 497a as *adapted* & *epitedeuma*: cf. b as *elements of life*], will not be perfectly good and wise [*teleos*, adverb: cf. 498e & *agathos*: cf. 495b & *philosophos*: cf. 486a as *philosophical*] if any ever was? Or will they prefer those whom we have rejected?

e Surely not.

Then will they still be angry [*agriaino*: to be provoked] at our saying, that, until philosophers bear rule [*egkrates*: cf. 499d as *queen*], states and individuals will have no rest from evil [*paula* & *kakos*: cf. 500d as *unskilled*], nor will this our imaginary state ever be realized [*muthologeio*: cf. 415a as *tale*; & *logos* & *ergos*: cf. 498e for both as *word and work*]?

I think that they will be less angry.

Shall we assume that they are not only less angry but quite gentle [*praos*: cf. 500a], and that they have 502 been converted [*peitho*: cf. c as *persuade*] and for very shame, if for no other reason, cannot refuse to come to terms [*homologeio*: cf. 499d as *acknowledge*]?

By all means, he said.

Then let us suppose that the reconciliation has been effected [*peitho*: cf. a]. Will any one deny the other point, that there may be sons of kings or princes who are by nature [*phusis*: cf. 501d] philosophers?

Surely no man, he said.

And when they have come into being will any one say that they must of necessity be destroyed [*anagke*: cf. 500d & *diaphtheiro*: cf. 498b as *corrupting*]; that they can hardly be saved [*sozo*: cf. 497a as *savior*] b is not denied even by us; but that in the whole course of ages no single one of them can escape—who will venture to affirm this [*amphisbeteo*: cf. 401d as *ground for objection*]?

Who indeed!

But, said I, one is enough [*hikanos*: cf. 497d as *satisfactory manner*]; let there be one man who has a city obedient [*peitho*: cf. a] to his will, and he might bring into existence [*epiteleio*: cf. 442b as *executing*] the ideal polity about which the world is so incredulous.

Yes, one is enough.

The ruler may impose the laws and institutions [*nomos*: cf. 501a & *epitedeuma*: cf. 501d as *circumstances*] which we have been describing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them?

Certainly.

And that others should approve [*dokeo*: cf. 499d as *opinion*] of what we approve, is no miracle [*thaumastos*: cf. 489b as *extraordinary*] or impossibility?

c I think not.

But we have sufficiently shown [*dierchomai*: cf. 501d as *delineated*] in what has preceded that all this, if only possible, is assuredly for the best [*beltistos*: cf. 495b].

We have.

And now we say not only that our laws [*nomothesia: legislation*], if they could be enacted, would be for the best [*aristos: cf. 501d as highest*], but also that the enactment of them, though difficult [*chalepos: cf. 500b as harsh temper (adverb)*], is not impossible.

Very good [*sumbaino: cf. 490c in context of sentence*].

And so with pain and toil we have reached the end [*telos: cf. 403c as ending*] of one subject, but more remains to be discussed;—how and by what studies and pursuits [*mathema: cf. 485d as knowledge & d epitedeuma: cf. b as institutions*] will the saviors [*soter: cf. 463b*] of the constitution be created, and at what ages are they to apply [*hapto: cf. 497e in context of sentence*] themselves to their several studies?

Certainly.

I omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women and the procreation of children and the appointment [*katastasis: cf. 493a as state*] of the rulers because I knew that the perfect state would be eyed with jealousy [*sophos: cf. 466c as wisely*] and was difficult of attainment; but that piece of cleverness was not of much service to me, for I had to discuss them all the same. The women and e children are now disposed of, but the other question of the rulers must be investigated [*meterchomai: to go after, seek*] from the very beginning. We were saying, as you will remember [*mimnesko: cf. 490c*], 503 that they were to be lovers of their country, tried by the test of pleasures and pains [*basanizo: cf. 434e as trial & hedone: cf. 493d as tastes & lupe: cf. 464b*], and neither in hardships, nor in dangers, nor at any other critical moment were to lose their patriotism [*dogma: cf. 493b as principles*]**—**he was to be rejected who failed, but he who always came forth pure, like gold tried in the refiner's fire, was to be made a ruler, and to receive honors and rewards in life and after death. This was the sort of thing which was being said, and then the argument turned aside and veiled her face; not liking to stir [*kineo: cf. 474d in context of b sentence*] the question which has now arisen.

I perfectly remember, he said.

Yes, my friend, I said, and I then shrank [*oknos: cf. 473e as would fain*] from hazarding the bold word [*apotelmao*]; but now let me dare [*tolmao*] to say—that the perfect [*akribos: cf. 491c as precisely*] guardian must be [*kathistemi: cf. 494e as using to this end*] a philosopher.

Yes, he said, let that be affirmed.

And do not suppose [*noeo: cf. 488a as imagine*] that there will be many of them; for the gifts which were deemed [*huparcho: cf. 465d*] by us to be essential rarely grow together; they are mostly found in shreds and patches.

c What do you mean?, he said.

You are aware, I replied, that quick intelligence, memory, sagacity, cleverness [*eumathes: cf. 487a as quick to learn & mnemones & agchinois: readiness of mind*], and similar qualities, do not often grow together, and that persons who possess them and are at the same time high-spirited and magnanimous [*megaloprepes: cf. 495d as dignity & dianoiā: cf. 500b as mind*] are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly and in a peaceful and settled manner [*kosmios, adverb & hesuchia: cf. 496d as peace & bebaiotes: firmness, stability*]; they are driven any way by their impulses [*oxutes: sharpness*], and all solid principle [*bebaios: cf. 466b as safe*] goes out of them.

Very true, he said.

On the other hand, those steadfast natures [*bebaios: cf. c*] which can better be depended upon d [*eumetabolos: reliable, changeable*], which in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable, are equally immovable when there is anything to be learned [*mathesis: cf. 455b as study*]; they are always in a torpid state, and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any intellectual toil [*diaponeo: to work out with labor*].

Quite true.

And yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary [*kalos, adverb: cf. 477e as excellent*] in those to whom the higher education is to be imparted [*paideia: cf. 492e as training & metecho: cf. 486b as no part*], and who are to share in any office or command [*metadidomi: to give a share & arche: cf. 443b as primary*].

Certainly, he said.

And will they be a class which is rarely [*spanios*] found?

Yes, indeed.

e Then the aspirant must not only be tested [*basanizo: cf. 503a as tried*] in those labors and dangers and pleasures [*ponos: cf. 413d as toils & phobos: cf. 430b as fear & hedone: cf. 503a*] which we mentioned before, but there is another kind of probation [*gumnazo: to train naked*] which we did not mention [*skopeo: cf. 486b*]

as observe]—he must be exercised also in many kinds of knowledge [*mathema*: cf. 402c as studies], to see whether the soul will be able to endure [*phero*: to bear, carry] the highest of all, 504 will faint [*apodeiliao*: cf. 374e in context of sentence] under them, as in any other studies and exercises.

Yes, he said, you are quite right in testing [*skoepo*: cf. 503e as mention] him. But what do you mean by the highest of all knowledge [*mathema*: cf. 503e]?

You may remember [*mnemoneuo*: cf. 449d as tell], I said, that we divided the soul [*psuche*: cf. 498b] into three parts [*eidōs*: cf. 477e as faculty] and distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom [*dikaiosune* & *sophrosune*: cf. 500d & *andreia*: cf. 494b & *sophia*: cf. 493a]?

Indeed, he said, if I had forgotten [*mnemoneuo*, with me (not)], I should not deserve [*dikaios*: cf. 501b as justice] to hear more.

And do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of them?

To what do you refer?

**b** We were saying, if I am not mistaken, that he who wanted to see them in their perfect beauty [*kallos*: cf. 491c] must take a longer and more circuitous way [*periodos*] at the end of which they would appear [*kataphanes*: clearly seen]; but that we could add on a popular exposition [*proereo*: cf. 408b as affirmed] of them on a level with the discussion [*apodeixis*: cf. 497d as discussion] which had preceded. And you replied that such an exposition would be enough for you, and so the enquiry [*ero*: cf. 484a as discussion] was continued in what to me seemed to be a very inaccurate manner; [*akribeia*: cf. 414a as exactness] whether you were satisfied or not, it is for you to say.

Yes, he said, I thought and the others thought [*phaino*: cf. 491c as appear] that you gave us a fair measure [*metrios*, adverb: cf. 461c as reasonable proposition] of truth.

**c** But, my friend, I said, a measure [*metron*: cf. 450b as limit] of such things which in any degree falls short of the whole truth is not fair measure; for nothing imperfect [*ateles*: not brought to an end] is the measure of anything, although persons are too apt to be contented and think that they need search [*zeteo*: cf. 473b as show] no further.

Not an uncommon case when people are indolent [*rhathumia*: relaxation, indifference].

Yes, I said; and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the state and of the laws.

True.

The guardian then, I said, must be required to take the longer circuit, and toll at learning [*manthano*: cf. d 489a as understand] as well as at gymnastics, or he will never reach [*proseko*: cf. 501d in context of sentence] the highest knowledge [*telos*: cf. 502c as end & *mathema*: cf. a] of all which, as we were just now saying, is his proper calling.

What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this—higher than justice [*dikaiosune*: cf. a] and the other virtues?

Yes, I said, there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the outline [*theomai*: cf. 490e as consider & *hupographe*] merely, as at present—nothing short of the most finished picture [*teleos*: cf. 499b as perfection & *apergasia*: a finishing off] should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated

**e** [*sunteino*: to stretch together] with an infinity of pains [*akribes*: cf. 342d as strict] in order that they may appear in their full beauty and utmost clearness [*katharos*: cf. 501a as clean], how ridiculous [*geloios*: cf. 463e] that we should not think the highest truths worthy of attaining the highest accuracy [*akribeia*: cf. b as inaccurate]!

A right noble thought [*dianoema*: cf. 496a as ideas]; but do you suppose that we shall refrain [*aphiemi*: cf. 485b as renounce] from asking you what is this highest knowledge?

No, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have heard the answer many times, and now you either do not understand [*ennoeo*: cf. 493e as recognize] me or, as I rather think, you are disposed to be 505 troublesome [*pragma*: cf. 500c as affairs & *parecho*: cf. 443b as makes]; for you have often been told that the idea of good [*idea*: cf. 380d as image & *agathos*: cf. 501d] is the highest knowledge [*mathema*: cf. d], and that all other things become useful and advantageous [*dikaios*: cf. 504a as deserve & *proschaomai*: to avail oneself & *chresimos*: cf. 459d as be of advantage] only by their use of this. You can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak, concerning which, as you have often heard me say, we know so little; and, without which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind will profit [*ophelos*: cf. 461a as useful] us nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things is of any

**b** value if we do not possess the good [*ktesis*: cf. 453d & *agathos*: cf. a] or the knowledge of all other things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness [*phroneo*: cf. 357c & *kalos*: cf. 501c as fairer & *agathos*]?

Assuredly not.

You are further aware that most people affirm [*dokeo*: cf. 502b as approve] pleasure [*hedone*: cf. 503e] to be the good, but the more sophisticated [*kompsoi*: cf. 495d as cleverest] say it is knowledge [*phronesis*: cf. 495a as wisdom].

Yes.

And you are aware too that the latter cannot explain [*deiknumi*: cf. 493c as explaining] what they mean by knowledge, but are obliged after all [*teleutao*: cf. 498c in context of sentence] to say knowledge of the good? How ridiculous [*geloios*: cf. 504e]!

c Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching [*oneidizo*: cf. 495c as reprovers] us with our ignorance [*eido*: cf. 492e] of the good, and then presume our knowledge [*phronesis*: cf. b] of it—for the good they define to be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood [*sunieimi*: cf. 394c as see] them when they use [*phtheggomai*: cf. 463e as utter] the term 'good'—this is of course ridiculous.

Most true, he said.

And those who make [*horizo*: cf. 490d as definition] pleasure their good are in equal perplexity [*plane*: wandering]; for they are compelled to admit [*anagkazo*: cf. 499a as forced & homologeo: cf. 502a as come to terms] that there are bad pleasures as well as good.

Certainly.

And therefore to acknowledge [*sumbaino*: cf. 402c as very good & homologeo: cf. c] that bad and good are the same?

d True.

There can be no doubt [*phaneros*: cf. 479d in context of sentence] about the numerous difficulties [*amphibeteo*: cf. 402b as venture to affirm] in which this question is involved.

There can be none.

Further, do we not see that many are willing to do or to have or to seem to be what is just and honorable without the reality [*kan e me ein*]; but no one is satisfied with the appearance [*ta dokounta* (*dokeo*: cf. b as affirm)] of good—the reality [*ta onta*] is what they seek [*zeteo*: cf. 504c as search]; in the case of the good, appearance [*doxa*: cf. 500a as notion] is despised [*atimazo*: cf. 402c as slighting] by every one.

Very true, he said.

Of this then, which every soul [*psuche*: cf. 504a] of man pursues and makes the end of all his actions e [*prasso*: cf. 496d as goes his own way], having a presentiment [*apomanteuomai*: to announce as a prophet] that there is such an end, and yet hesitating [*aporeo*: cf. 375d as perplexity] because neither knowing the nature nor having the same assurance [*lambano*: cf. 491c as grasp] of this as of other things, and therefore losing [*pisteuo*, with *oude*: to believe] whatever good there is in other things,—of a principle [*ophelos*: cf. 505a as profit] such and so great as this ought the best men [*beltistos*: cf. 502c] in 506 our state, to whom everything is entrusted [*egcheirizo*: to put one's hands in], to be in the darkness of ignorance?

Certainly not, he said.

I am sure, I said, that he who does not know now the beautiful and the just [*agnoeo*: cf. 450d as skeptical & *agathos*: cf. 505b & *dikaioi*: cf. 505a as useful] are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them; and I suspect that no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge [*gignosko*: cf. 499a & *hikanos*, adverb: cf. 497d as satisfactory manner] of them.

That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours [*manteuomai*: cf. 431e as guess & *kalos*, adverb: cf. 403d as necessary].

And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge [*epistamai*: cf. 427b as ignorant] our state will b be perfectly ordered [*kosmeo*: cf. 443d in context of sentence]?

Of course, he replied; but I wish that you would tell me whether you conceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure [*episteme*: cf. 486c in context of sentence & *hedone*: cf. 505b] or different from either.

Yes, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman like you would not be contented with the thoughts [*dokeo*: cf. 505d as appearance] of other people about these matters.

True, Socrates; but I must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime in the study of philosophy [*pragmateuomai*: cf. 430d as troubling ourselves] should not be always repeating the opinions [*dogma*: cf. 503a as patriotism] of others, and never telling his own.

Well, but has any one a right [*dikaioi*: cf. a as just] to say positively what he does not know?

Not, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty; he has no right to do that: but he may say what he thinks

[*oiomai*: cf. 491d as supposing], as a matter of opinion.

And do you not know [*aisthanomai*: cf. 500e as said], I said, that all mere opinions [*doxa*: cf. 505d as appearance] are bad, and the best [*beltistos*: cf. 505e] of them blind? You would not deny that those who have any true notion [*doxazo*: cf. 493a as opinions] without intelligence [*episteme*: cf. b as knowledge] are only like blind men who feel their way along the road?

Very true.

And do you wish to behold [*theaomai*: cf. 504d] what is blind and crooked and base, when others will d tell you of brightness and beauty [*phanos*: light & kalos: cf. 505b as beauty]?

Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal [*telos*, with *epi*: cf. 404d as highest]; if you will only give such an explanation [*dierchomai*: cf. 502c as shown] of the good as you have already given of justice and temperance [*dikaiosune*: cf. 404d & *sophrosune*: cf. 404a] and the other virtues, we shall be satisfied [*arkeo*: to ward off, be sufficient].

Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot help fearing that I shall fall, and that my indiscreet zeal [*prothumeomai*: cf. 472e as trying] will bring ridicule [*gelao*: to laugh] upon me. No, e sweet sirs [*makarios*: cf. 449d as friend], let us not at present ask what is the actual nature of the good [*agathos*: cf. 506a as beautiful], for to reach what is now in my thoughts [*pariemi*: cf. 467a as presence] would be an effort [*horme*: violent movement, attempt] too great for me. But of the child of the good [*ekgonos*: cf. 415b as race & *agathos*] who is like him, I would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished to hear—otherwise, not.

By all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our debt for the account of the parent.

507 I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, the account of the parent, and not, as now, of the offspring [*tokos*: interest] only; take, however, this latter by way of interest [*tokos*: offspring], and at the same time have a care that I do not render a false account, although I have no intention [*eulabeomai*: cf. 469b as considering] of deceiving [*exapatao*: cf. 426d as deluded] you.

Yes, we will take all the care that we can: proceed.

Yes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding [*diomologeo*: cf. 472e as admissions] with you, and remind [*anamimnesko*: cf. 493e as saying] you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and at many other times.

**b** What?

The old story, that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so of other things which we describe and define [*diorizo*: cf. 477c as discern]; to all of them 'many' is applied.

True, he said.

And there is an absolute [*auto*] beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to which the term 'many' is applied there is an absolute; for they may be brought under a single idea [*idea*: cf. 505a], which is called [*prosagoreuo*: cf. 479b as denoted] the essence [*ho estin*] of each.

Very true.

The many, as we say, are seen [*horao*: cf. 500c in context of sentence] but not known, and the ideas are known [*noeo*: cf. 503b as suppose] but not seen.

Exactly.

**c** And what is the organ with which we see the visible things?

The sight [*opsis*], he said.

And with the hearing [*akoe*], I said, we hear, and with the other senses perceive [*aisthesis*: cf. 411d & *aisthanomai*: cf. 406c as know] the other objects of sense?

True.

But have you remarked [*ennoeo*: cf. 504e as understand] that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived [*polutes*: expensive & *demiourgos*: cf. 500d & *demiourgeo*: cf. 476b as made out of]?

No, I never have, he said.

**d** Then reflect; has the ear or voice need of any third or additional nature in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be heard?

Nothing of the sort.

No, indeed, I replied; and the same is true of most, if not all, the other senses—you would not say that any of them requires such an addition?

Certainly not.

But you see [*ennoeo*: cf. c as remarked] that without the addition of some other nature there is no seeing or

being seen?

How do you mean?

Sight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and he who has eyes wanting to see; color being also present in them, still unless there be a third nature specially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eyes will see nothing and the colors will be invisible.

Of what nature are you speaking?

Of that which you term light, I replied.

True, he said.

Noble, then, is the bond which links together [*aisthesis: cf. c as senses*] sight and visibility, and great **508** beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature; for light is their bond, and light is no ignoble thing [*atimos: dishonored*]?

Nay, he said, the reverse of ignoble.

And which, I said, of the gods in heaven [*ouranos*] would you say was the lord [*kurios cf. 429b as effect*] of this element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly [*kalos: cf. 506d as beauty*] and the visible to appear?

You mean the sun, as you and all mankind say.

May not the relation of sight to this deity be described as follows?

How?

**b** Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun?

No.

Yet of all the organs of sense [*aisthesis: cf. 507e*] the eye is the most like the sun?

By far the most like.

And the power [*dunamis: cf. 496b as overpowered*] which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispensed [*tamieuo: to be paymaster*] from the sun?

Exactly.

Then the sun is not sight, but the author [*aitios: cf. 474a as got into*] of sight who is recognized [*horao: cf. 507b as are seen*] by sight.

True, he said.

And this is he whom I call the child of the good [*ekgonos & agathos: cf. 406e*], whom the good begat in his own likeness [*analogos: proportionate*], to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world [*noetos: perceptible to the mind & topos: place*] in **c** relation to mind and the things of mind [*nous: cf. 477e as reasonable being & noeo: cf. 507b as are known*]. Will you be a little more explicit?, he said.

Why, you know, I said, that the eyes, when a person directs [*trepo: cf. 365c as must direct myself*] them towards objects on which the light of day is no longer shining, but the moon and stars only, see dimly, and are nearly blind; they seem to have no clearness of vision in [*eniemi: cf. 497c as would be required*] them?

Very true.

**d** But when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines, they see clearly and there is sight in them?

Certainly.

And the soul is [*noeo: cf. c*] like the eye: when resting upon [*apereido: to fix, settle*] that on which truth and being [*aletheia: cf. 501d & to on*] shine, the soul perceives and understands [*noeo: cf. d & gignosko: cf. 506a as knowledge*] and is radiant with intelligence [*phaino: cf. 504b as thought & nous: cf. c as mind*]; but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and perishing [*gignomai: cf. 498d as realized & apollumi: cf. 491b as destroys*], then she has opinion [*doxazo: cf. 506c as have any notion*] only, and goes blinking about, and is first of one opinion [*doxa: cf. 506c*] and then of another, and seems to have no intelligence [*nous: cf. d*]?

Just so.

**e** Now, that which imparts truth to the known [*parecho: cf. 505a as disposed & aletheia: cf. d & gignosko: cf. d*] and the power [*dunamis: cf. 508b*] of knowing to the knower is what I would have you term the idea of good [*idea: cf. 507b & agathos: cf. c*], and this you will deem to be the cause of science [*episteme: cf. 506c as intelligence*] and of truth in so far as the latter becomes the subject of knowledge [*dianoemai: cf. 470e as would have the idea of*]; beautiful too, as are both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming [*hegeomai: 490c in context of sentence*] this other nature as more beautiful [*kalos: cf. 508a as perfectly*] than either; and, as in the previous instance, light and sight may be truly said

**509** [*nomizo: cf. 479a as opinion*] to be like the sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this other sphere, science [*episteme: cf. e*] and truth may be deemed [*nomizo: cf. a*] to be like the good, but not the good; the good has a place of honor [*hexis: cf. 472a in context of sentence & timeteos*] yet higher.

What a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is the author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty; for you surely cannot mean to say that pleasure is the good?

God forbid, I replied; but may I ask you to consider the image in another point of view?

In what point of view?

You would say, would you not, that the sun is only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not generation?

**b** Certainly.

In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known [*gignosko: cf. 508e*], but of their being and essence [*to einai & ousia: cf. 486e as being*], and yet the good [*agathos: cf. 508e*] is not essence, but far exceeds [*huperbaino: cf. 478c as to be sought*] essence in dignity and power [*presbeia: cf. 422d as embassy & dunamis: cf. 508e*].

**c** Glaucon said, with a ludicrous earnestness: By the light of heaven, how amazing [*daimonios: cf. 496c as daemonic & huperbole: superiority, over-shooting*]!

Yes, I said, and the exaggeration may be set down to you; for you made me utter my fancies [*dokeo: cf. 506b as thoughts*].

And pray continue to utter them; at any rate let us hear if there is anything more to be said about the similitude [*homoiotēs: cf. 401d as likeness*] of the sun.

Yes, I said, there is a great deal more.

Then omit nothing, however slight.

I will do my best, I said; but I should think that a great deal will have to be omitted.

**d** You have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling powers [*basileuo: cf. 473c as are kings*], and that one of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible [*noetos & topos: cf. 508b*]. I do not say heaven, lest you should fancy that I am playing upon [*sophizo: to make wise, be clever*] the name (*ourhanoz, orhatou*). May I suppose that you have this distinction of the visible and intelligible [*horatos & noetos*] fixed in your mind?

I have.

Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible [*horatos & noetos: cf. d*], and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness [*sapheneia: cf. 478c & asapheia*], and you will find that the first section in the sphere

**e** of the visible consists of images [*eikon: cf. 489a as figure*]. And by images I mean, in the first place, **510** shadows [*skia*] and in the second place, reflections [*phantasma: cf. 382a as phantom*] in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like. Do you understand [*katanoeo: cf. 493c as discernment*]?

Yes, I understand.

Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made.

Very good.

Would you not admit that both the sections of this division have different degrees of truth [*aletheia: cf. 508e*], and that the copy is to the original [*to homoiothen, with pros & homoioo: cf. 498e as likeness*] as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge [*doxastos & gnostos*]?

**b** Most undoubtedly.

Next proceed to consider [*skopeo: cf. 504a as testing*] the manner in which the sphere of the intellectual is to be divided.

In what manner?

Thus:—There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given [*mimeomai: cf. 499c as imitating*] by the former division as images; the enquiry can only be hypothetical [*hupothesis: foundation, subject under discussion*], and instead of going upwards to a principle [*arche: cf. 503d as command*] descends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images [*eikon: cf. 509e*] as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas [*eidōs: cf. 504a as parts*] themselves.

I do not quite understand [*manthano: cf. 504c as learning*] your meaning, he said.

**c** Then I will try again; you will understand me better when I have made some preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches of science; these are their hypotheses, which they and everybody are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give any account [*logos: cf. 501e in context of sentence*] of them either to themselves or others; but they **d** begin with them, and go on until they arrive [*homologeo: cf. 505c as acknowledge & hormema: impulse*] at last, and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?

Yes, he said, I know.

And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms [*eidos: cf. b as ideas*] and reason about [*dianoemai: cf. 508e as subject of knowledge*] them, they are thinking not of these, but of **e** the ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on—the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections [*skia: cf. 510a & eikon: cf. b as images*] in water of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold [*zeteo: cf. 505d & eido: cf. 505c as ignorance*] the things

**511** themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind [*dianoia: cf. 503c in context of sentence*]? That is true.

And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible [*eidos: cf. 510d as forms & noetos: cf. 509d as intelligible*], although in the search after it the soul [*psuche: cf. 505d*] is compelled to use hypotheses [*hypothesis: cf. 510b*]; not ascending to a first principle [*arche: cf. 510b*], because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis, but employing the objects of which the shadows below are resemblances [*apeikazo: cf. 464b as comparison*] in their turn as images, they having in relation to the shadows and reflections of them a greater distinctness [*enarges: cf. 484c as clear*], and therefore a higher value [*doxazo: cf. 508d as has opinion*].

**b** I understand [*manthano: cf. 510b*], he said, that you are speaking of the province of geometry and the sister arts [*techne: cf. 493b*].

And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible [*noetos: cf. a*] you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains [*hapto: cf. 502d as apply*] by the power of dialectic [*dialego: cf. 454a as disputing*], using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses—that is to say, as steps and points of departure [*epibasis: approach & horme: cf. 506e as effort*] into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle [*arche: cf. a*] of the whole; and clinging [*hapto: cf. b*] to this and then to that which depends

**c** on this, by successive steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible [*aisthetos*] object, from ideas [*eidos: cf. a as intelligible*], through ideas, and in ideas she ends [*teleutao: cf. 505b in context of sentence*].

I understand you, he replied; not perfectly [*hikanos, adverb: cf. 506a as true*], for you seem [*dokeo: cf. 509c as fancies*] to me to be describing a task which is really tremendous; but, at any rate, I understand you to say that knowledge and being [*noetos: cf. b as intelligible & ontos: cf. 490b*], which the science of dialectic contemplates [*episteme: cf. 509a & dialego: cf. b & theoreo: cf. 500c in context of sentence*], are clearer than the notions of the arts [*techne: cf. b*] as they are termed, which proceed from hypotheses only: these are also contemplated by the understanding [*theomai: cf. 506c as behold & dianoia: cf. a as mind*], and not by the senses [*aisthesis: cf. 508b*]; yet, because they start from hypotheses and do not

**d** ascend to a principle [*arche: cf. b*], those who contemplate [*theomai: cf. c*] them appear [*skopeo: cf. 510b as consider*] to you not to exercise the higher reason [*nous: cf. 508d as intelligence*] upon them, although when a first principle is added to them they are cognizable [*dokeo: cf. c as seem*] by the higher reason [*noetos: c as knowledge*]. And the habit [*hexis: cf. 509a as place*] which is concerned with geometry and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term understanding and not reason [*nous: cf. d*];, as being intermediate between opinion and reason [*doxa: cf. 508d & dianoia: cf. c as understanding*].

You have quite conceived my meaning, I said; and now, corresponding to these four divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul [*pathema: cf. 462b as events & psuche: cf. 511a*]-reason [*noesis*] answering to **e** the highest, understanding [*dianoia: cf. d*] to the second, faith [*pistis*] to the third, and perception of shadows [*eikasia: comparison, conjecture*] to the last—and let there be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties have [*metecho: cf. 503d as imparted*] clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth [*aletheia: cf. 510a*].

I understand, he replied, and give my assent [*sugchoreo: cf. 489d as agreed*], and accept your arrangement [*tasso: to arrange*].

## Book Seven

**514** And now, I said, let me show in a figure [*apeikazo: cf. 511a as resemblances*] how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened [*phusis: cf. 502a & paideia: cf. 503d as education & apaideusia: lack of education*]. Imagine [*eido: cf. 510e as behold*] human beings living in a underground den [*spelaiodes: cave-like*], which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have **b** been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads [*periago: to turn around*]. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players [*thaumatopoiros: a wonder worker, juggler*] have in front of them, over which they show the puppets [*thaua: wonder, trick*].

I see.

**c** And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying [*paraphero: to bring forward*] all sorts of **515** vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.

You have shown me a strange image [*atopos: cf. 501d as unreasonable*], and they are strange prisoners. Like [*homoios: cf. 475e as imitation*] ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows [*skia: cf. 510e as reflections*], or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws [*prospipto: to strike against*] on the opposite wall of the cave?

True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their **b** heads?

And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?

Yes, he said.

And if they were able to converse with [*dialego: cf. 513c as dialectic*] one another, would they not suppose that they were naming [*nomizo: cf. 509a as deemed*] what was actually before them?

Very true [*anagke: cf. 502a as of necessity*].

And suppose further that the prison [*desmoterion: literally, place of binding*] had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy [*hegeomai: cf. 508e as esteeming*] when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?

No question, he replied.

**c** To them, I said, the truth would be [*to alethes: cf. 499a & nomizo: cf. a*] literally nothing but the shadows of the images [*skia: cf. a & skeuastos: prepared, artificial*].

That is certain [*anagke: cf. b*].

And now look [*skopeo: cf. 513d as appear*] again, and see what will naturally follow [*sumbaino: cf. 505c as acknowledge*] it if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error [*luisis: a loosening & iasis: healing & aphrosune: folly, thoughtlessness*]. At first, when any of them is liberated [*luo: to loosen*] and compelled suddenly [*anagkazo: cf. 505c & exaiphnes*] to stand up and turn [*anistemi: to wake from sleep & periago: cf. 514b*] his neck round and walk [*badizo: to go slowly*] and look towards [*anablepto, with pros: to look up at*] the light, he will suffer sharp pains [*algos: distress*]; the glare will distress him [*marmaruge: a flashing, quick twinkling*] and he will be unable to see [*kathorao: cf. 476d as distinguish*] **d** the realities of which in his former state he had seen [*horao: cf. 508b as recognized*] the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion [*phluaria: silly talk, nonsense*] but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being [*eggus: at hand & ontos: cf. 513c*] and his eye is turned towards more real existence [*blepo: cf. 421b as look to & orthos: cf. 465a as good & ontos*], he has a clearer vision, what will be his reply [*apokrino: cf. 414a as reject*]? And you may further imagine [*oiomai: cf. 506c as thinks*] that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them. Will he not be perplexed [*aporeo: cf. 505e as hesitating*]? Will he not fancy [*hegeomai: cf. a*] that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer [*alethos: cf. 500d*] than the objects which are now shown [*deiknumi: cf. 505b as explain*] to him?

Far truer.

**e** And if he is compelled [*anagkazo: cf. c*] to look straight at [*pros: towards-which*] the light, will he not have a pain [*algeo: to feel bodily pain, distress*] in his eyes which will make him turn away [*pheugo: to flee & apostrepho: to turn to flight*] and take in the objects of vision [*kathorao, with pros: cf. c as see*] which he can

see, and which he will conceive [*nomizo: cf. c as would be*] to be in reality [*tauta to onti*] clearer [*saphos: cf. 448e as clearest*] than the things which are now being shown [*deiknumi: cf. d*] to him?

True, he said.

And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up [*helko: cf. 494e as taken captive*] a steep and rugged ascent [*anabasis*], and held fast until he's forced [*exelko: to drag out*] into the presence of the **516** sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated [*odunao: to suffer & aganakteo: to be vexed*]? When he approaches [*erchomai, with pros: cf. 445b as we are near*]: the light his eyes will be dazzled [*mestos: filled*], and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities [*alethos: cf. d*].

Not all in a moment, he said.

He will require to grow accustomed [*sunetheia: acquaintance*] to the sight of the upper world [*horao: cf. 515d as had seen & ano*]. And first he will see [*kathorao: cf. 515e as vision*] the shadows best, next the reflections [*eidolon: cf. 443c as shadow*] of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he **b** will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?

Certainly.

Finally [*teleutaios*] he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections [*phantasma: cf. 510a*] of him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place [*kath' auton*], and not in another; and he will contemplate [*theomai: cf. 513d*] him as he is.

Certainly.

He will then proceed to argue [*sullogizomai: cf. 365a as draw conclusions*] that this is he who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian [*epitropeuo: to be an administrator*] of all that is in the visible **c** world, and in a certain way the cause [*aitios: cf. 508b as author*] of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold [*horao: cf. a as sight*]?

Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.

And when he remembered [*anamimnesko: cf. 507a as remind*] his old habitation [*oikesis: cf. 418c*], and the wisdom [*sophia: cf. 504a*] of the den and his fellow prisoners, do you not suppose [*oiomai: cf. 515d as imagine*] that he would count himself happy [*eudaimonizo: cf. 466a as making unhappy*] on the change and pity them [*metabole: cf. 452b as innovation & eleoo*]?

Certainly, he would.

And if they were in the habit of conferring honors among themselves on those who were quickest to observe [*kathorao: cf. a as see*] the passing [*pariemi: cf. 506e in context of sentence*] shadows and to **d** remark [*mimnesko: cf. 502e as remember*] which of them went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future [*apomanteuomai, cf. 505e as having a presentiment*] do you think that he would care [*epithumetikos, adverb: cf. 442a as concupiscent, adjective*]: for such honors and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer, "Better to be the poor servant of a poor master and to endure anything" [*Odyssey, xi.489-90*], rather than think [*doxazo: cf. 413a as higher value*] as they do and live after their manner?

**e** Yes, he said, I think [*oiomai: cf. c as suppose*] that he would rather suffer [*poneo: to labor*] anything than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.

Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?

To be sure, he said.

And if there were a contest [*diamillaomai: to contend hotly*], and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak [*ambluno: cf. 490b as blunted*], and before his eyes had become steady [*gnomateuo: to form a*

**517 judgment**] (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit [*sunetheia: cf. a as grow accustomed*] of sight might be very considerable) would he not be ridiculous [*gelao: cf. 506d as will bring ridicule*]? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think [*peirazo: cf. 489d as laid to the charge*] of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.

No question, he said.

This entire allegory [*eikon: cf. 510e as reflections*], I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the **b** previous argument; the prison house [*desmoterion: cf. 515b*] is [*aphomoioo: cf. 500c in context of sentence*] the world of sight [*hedra: seat & phaino: cf. 508d as radiant & opsis: cf. 507, sight*], the light of the fire is the

sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards [*anabasis, with ana: cf. 515e as ascent & thea: cf. 467e as see*] to be the ascent of the soul [*anodos: a way up & psuche: cf. 513d*] into the intellectual world [*noetos: cf. 513d as reason & topos: cf. 509*] according to my poor belief [*elpis: cf. 496e as hopes*], which, at your desire [*epithumeo: cf. 494a as please*], I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly God knows [*theos: cf. 492a as divine & eido: cf. 514a as imagine*]. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good [*idea & agathos: cf. 508e*] appears [*phaino: cf. b as sight*] last of all, and is seen [*horao: cf. 516c as behold*] only

ε with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred [*sullogizomai: cf. 516b as draw conclusions*] to be the universal author [*aitia: cf. 491e in context of sentence*] of all things beautiful and right [*kalos: cf. 508e as beautiful & orthos: cf. 515d in context of sentence*], parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source [*parecho: cf. 508e as imparts & kurios: cf. 508a as lord*] of reason and truth in the intellectual [*nous: cf. 513d & aletheia: cf. 513e & noetos: cf. b*]; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally [*emphronos, adverb: sensibly*], either in public or private life must have his eye fixed [*eido: cf. b as knows*].

I agree [*sunoiomai: to give assent*], he said, as far as I am able to understand you [*tropos: cf. 501a as plan*]. Moreover, I said, you must not wonder [*thaumazo: cf. 491b in context of sentence & sunoiomai: cf. c*] that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling [*thelo: cf. 475c in context of sentence*] to descend to human affairs [*prasso: cf. 505e as actions*]; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world [*psuche: cf. b & epeigo: to press down, hurry & ano: cf. 516a*] where they desire to dwell [*diatribo: d cf. 472b in context of sentence*]; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory [*eikon: cf. a*] may be trusted.

Yes, very natural.

And is there anything surprising [*thaumastos: cf. 502b as no miracle*] in one who passes from divine contemplations [*theios: cf. 500e as heavenly & theoria: cf. 486a as spectator*] to the evil state [*kakos: cf. 501e*] of man, misbehaving [*aschemoneo: to behave unseemly*] himself in a ridiculous manner [*geloios: cf. 505b*]; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed [*sunethes: habituated*] to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of justice [*agalma: glory, honor & skia: cf. 515c & dikaios: cf. 506c as right*], and is endeavoring to meet [*diamillaomai: cf. 516e as contest*] the conceptions of those who have never yet seen ε [*hupolambano: cf. 466d as suggest*] absolute justice [*dikaiousune: cf. 506d*]?

Anything but surprising, he replied.

**518** Any one who has common sense [*nous: cf. 517c as intellectual*] will remember [*mimnesko: cf. 516d as remark*] that the bewilderments [*epitaraxis: confusion*] of the eyes are of two kinds and arise from two causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true [*nomizo: cf. 515e as will conceive*] of the mind's [*psuche: cf. 517c as soul*] eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees any one whose vision is perplexed and weak [*thorubeo: cf. 438a as confusion & adunateo: to lack strength*], will not be too ready to laugh [*alogistos, adverb: not to be reckoned & gelao: cf. 517a as ridiculous*]; he will first ask [*episkopeo: cf. 490d as enquire*] whether that soul [*bios: life*] of man has come out of the brighter light, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light [*marmaruge: cf. 515c as b glare*]. And he will count the one happy [*eudaimonizo: cf. 516c*] in his condition and state of being [*pathos: cf. 488a as manner & bios: cf. a*], and he will pity [*eleeo: cf. 516c*] the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh [*gelao: cf. a*] at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh [*katagelastos: cf. 493d as ludicrous*] which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den.

That, he said, is a very just distinction [*metrios, adverb: cf. 504b as fair measure*].

But then, if I am right [*nomizo: cf. a*], certain professors of education [*paideia: cf. 514a in context of sentence*] must be wrong when they say [*epaggello: to proclaim*] that they can put a knowledge into the ε soul [*entithemi & episteme: cf. 513c as science & psuche: cf. a*] which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes. They undoubtedly say this, he replied.

Whereas, our argument shows [*logos: cf. 510c as account & semaino: cf. 440a s meaning*] that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul [*dunamis: cf. 509b & organon: cf. 374d as tools & katamanthano: cf. 493b as attending & eniemi: cf. 508c*] already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn [*strepho: cf. 497b as warped*] from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned [*periakteon: verbal adjective as one must bring round*] from the world of becoming into that of being [*eis to on kai tou ontos*], and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being

[*anecho*: cf. 483a as tolerate & *theo*: cf. 413c as contemplates & *tou ontos*], and of the brightest and best of being [*to phanototon tou ontos*], or in other words, of the good [*agathos*: cf. 517b].

Very true.

And must there not be some art [*techne*: cf. 513c] which will effect conversion [*periagoge*: a going around, revolution] in the easiest and quickest manner [*rhadios*: cf. 489c: as not likely & *anusimos*: efficacious & *tropos*: cf. 517c in context of sentence]; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already, but has been turned [*metastrepho*: cf. 367a as perverting] in the wrong direction [*orthos*, adverb (with *ouk*): cf. 495a as quite right], and is looking [*blepo*: 515d as turned towards & *diamechanaomai*: to bring about] away from the truth?

Yes, he said, such an art may be presumed.

And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul [*arete*: cf. 500d & *psuche*: cf. c] seem to be akin [*kinduneuo*: cf. 454b as danger & *eggus*: cf. 515d as approaching nearer] to bodily qualities, for even e when they are not originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise [*ethos*: cf. 497b as character & *askesis*: cf. 404a as training], that of wisdom [*phroneo*: cf. 505b as knowledge] more than anything else contains a divine element [*theios*: cf. 517d] which always remains, and by this conversion [*periagoge*: cf. d] is rendered useful and profitable [*chresimos*: cf. 505a & *ophelimos*: cf. 457b]; or, on 519 the other hand, hurtful and useless [*blaberos*: cf. 457b & *achrestos*: cf. 499b]. Did you never observe [*ennoeo*: cf. 507d as see] the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue [*poneros*: cf. 499b as corrupt & *sophos*: cf. 466c as wisely]—how eager he is, how clearly [*drimus*: piercing] his paltry soul [*psucharion*: diminutive of *psuche*] sees the way to his end [*trepo*: cf. 508c as directs]; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen [*phaulos*, with *ou*: cf. 496a as vile] eyesight is forced into the service of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness [*ergazomai*: cf. 406c as must attend & *kakos*: cf. 517d as evil].

Very true, he said.

But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures [*periekope* & *phusis*: cf. 514a] in the days of their youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, such as eating and drinking, which, b like leaden weights, were attached to them at their birth, and which drag them down [*strepho*, with *kata*: cf. 518c] and turn the vision of their souls [*opsis*: cf. 517b as sight & *psuche*: cf. a] upon the things that are below—if, I say, they had been released [*apallasso*: cf. 491d as contrast] from these impediments and turned [*strepho*, with *eis*: cf. b] in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in them would have seen the truth [*alethos*: cf. 516a as realities] as keenly [*oxus*: cf. 403a as keener] as they see what their eyes are turned to [*strepho*: cf. b] now. Very likely.

Yes, I said; and there is another thing which is likely [*eikos*] or rather a necessary inference [*anagke*: cf. 515c as certain] from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated and uninformed of the truth [*apaideuo* & *apeiros*: cf. 409a as no experience & *aletheia*: cf. 517c], nor yet those who never make an end of their education [*diatribo*: cf. 517c as dwell & *paideia*: cf. 518b], will be able ministers [*epitrepo*: cf. 487a as entrust] of state; not the former, because they have no single aim of duty [*skopos*: cf. 452e as standard & *stoicheo*: cf. 462a in context of sentence] which is the rule of all their actions [*prasso*: cf. 517c as affairs], private as well as public; nor the latter, because they will not act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that they are already dwelling apart [*apoikazo*] in the islands of the blest [*nesos* & *makarios*: cf. 506e as sweet].

Very true, he replied.

Then, I said, the business [*ergos*: cf. 501e in context of sentence] of us who are the founders [*oikistes*: cf. 378e] of the state will be to compel [*anagkazo*: cf. 515e] the best minds [*beltistos*: cf. 506c & *phusis*: cf. a as natures] to attain that knowledge [*aphikneomai*: cf. 435e as come & *mathema*: cf. 505a] which we have already shown to be the greatest of all—they must continue to ascend [*anabaino* & *anabasis*: cf. 517b as journey] until they arrive at the good [*agathos*: cf. 518]; but when they have ascended and seen d enough [*hikanos*, adverb: cf. 513c as perfectly] we must not allow them to do [*epitrepo*: cf. c in context of sentence] as they do now.

What do you mean?

I mean that they remain [*katameno*: to stay behind] in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they must be made to descend [*katabaino*: cf. 327a as went down] again among the prisoners [*desmos*: bonds, fetters] in the den and partake [*metecho*: cf. 513e as have] of their labors and honors, whether they are worth having or not [*phaulos*: cf. a as reverse & *spoudaios*: cf. 425a as virtuous].

But is not this unjust [*adikeo*: cf. 440c as wrong]?, he said. Ought we to give them a worse life, when they

might have a better?

**e** You have again forgotten [*epilanthano: cf. 441d*], my friend, I said, the intention of the legislator [*nomos: cf. 502b as laws*], who did not aim at making [*mechanomai: to construct*] any one class in the state happy [*eu: cf. 496b*] above the rest [*diapherontos, adverb: cf. 491e as pre-eminently*]; the happiness was to be in the whole state, and he held [*sunarmozo: cf. 443d as has bound together*] the citizens together by persuasion and necessity [*peitho: cf. 502b as obedient & anagke: cf. b*], making them

**520** benefactors [*metadidomai: cf. 369c as exchange & ophelia: cf. 459c as good*] of the state, and therefore benefactors of one another [*koinos: cf. 464a as in common*]; to this end he created them, not to please [*trepo: cf. a as sees way to the end*] themselves, but to be his instruments [*katachraomai: to make full use of*] in binding up [*sundesmos: a fastening*] the state.

True, he said, I had forgotten.

Observe [*skeptomai: cf. 466a as consider*], Glaucon, that there will be no injustice [*adikeo: cf. 519d*] in compelling [*prosanagazo: to force*] our philosophers to have a care and providence [*dikaaios, with pros: cf. 517e & epimelomai: cf. 467a as educating & phulasso: cf. 484b as guard*] of others; we shall explain to **b** them that in other states, men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils [*metecho: cf. 519d as partake & ponos: cf. 403e as labors*] of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet will [*automatos: cf. 427a as naturally*], and the government [*politeia: cf. 501c as constitutions*] would rather not have them. Being self-taught [*autophues: cf. 486d as spontaneously*], they cannot be expected to show any gratitude [*prothumeomai: cf. 506d as zeal*] for a culture [*trophe: cf. Cf. 491e as education*] which they have never received. But we have brought you into the world to be rulers [*hegemon*] of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and have educated [*paideuo: cf. 493a as teach*] you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are better able **c** to share [*metecho: cf. b*] in the double duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down [*katabaino: cf. 519d as descend*] to the general underground abode [*sunoiikesis*] and get the habit [*sunethisteon: verbal adjective*] of seeing in the dark [*theomai: cf. 516b as contemplate & skoteinos*]. When you have acquired the habit [*sunethizo: to become habituated*], you will see [*horao: cf. 517b*] ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images [*gignosko: cf. 509b & eidolon: cf. 516a as reflections*] are and what they represent, because you have seen [*horao: cf. c*] the beautiful and just and good in their truth [*kalos: cf. 517c & dikaaios: cf. a & agathos: cf. 519c & alethos: cf. 519b*]. And thus our state which is also yours will be a reality [*oikeo: cf. 473b as mal-administration*], and not a dream only [*onar: cf. 476d*], and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other states, in which men fight [*stasiazo: cf. 470c as disorder*] with one another about

**d** shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power [*archo: cf. 465a*] which in their eyes is a great good [*agathos: cf. c*]. Whereas the truth is that the state in which the rulers are most reluctant [*prothumos: cf. 598c as earnest*] to govern is always the best and most quietly governed [*astasiastos: cf. 459e as breaking out into rebellion & oikeo: cf. d*], and the state in which they are most eager, the worst [*enantios, adverb: cf. 396c as opposite*].

Quite true, he replied.

And will our pupils [*trophimos: nourishing*], when they hear this, refuse [*apeitheo: cf. 408b as disobeying*] to take their turn at the toils [*sunponeo*] of state, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time [*oikeo: cf. d*] with one another in the heavenly light [*katharos: cf. 504e as clearness*]?

**e** Impossible, he answered; for they are just men [*dikaaios: cf. c*], and the commands which we impose upon [*epitasso: cf. 425d*] them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern necessity [*anagkaios: cf. 493d*], and not after the fashion of our present rulers of state.

Yes, my friend, I said; and there lies the point. You must contrive [*exeurisko: cf. 473b as discover*] for **521** your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and then you may have a well-ordered [*oikeo, with eu: cf. d*] state; for only in the state which offers this will they rule [*archo: cf. d as power*] who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom [*agathos: cf. d as good & emphronos: cf. 517c as rationally (adverb)*], which are the true blessings [*eudaimoneo: cf. 500e as can be happy*] of life. Whereas if they go to the administration of public affairs [*demosios: cf. 473e as public*], poor and hungering after their own private advantage, thinking [*oiomai: cf. 516e*] that hence they are to snatch the chief good [*harpazo & agathos: cf. a*], order there can never be; for they will be fighting about office [*perimachomai: to fight on each side & to archein (archo)*], and the civil and domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin [*apollumi: cf. 508d as perishing*] of the rulers themselves and of the whole state.

Most true, he replied.

**b** And the only life which looks down upon [*kataphroneo*] the life of political ambition is that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other?

Indeed, I do not, he said.

And those who govern ought not to be lovers [*erastes: cf. 501d*] of the task? For, if they are, there will be rival lovers, and they will fight [*machomai: cf. 407a as dispute*].

No question.

Who then are those whom we shall compel [*anagkazo: cf. 519c as to be guardians & phulake, with epi: cf. 433d as watchfulness*]? Surely they will be the men who are wisest about affairs of state [*phronimos: cf. 450d*], and by whom the state is best administered [*aristos: cf. 502c & oikeo: cf. a*] and who at the same time have other honors and another and a better life than that of politics?

They are the men, and I will choose them, he replied.

**c** And now shall we consider [*bouleuo: cf. 448b as having & skopeo: cf. 515c as look*] in what way such guardians will be produced and how they are to be brought from darkness to light,—as some are said to have ascended [*anerchomai*] from the world below to the gods [*theos: cf. 517b*]?

By all means, he replied.

The process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell, but the turning round of a soul [*perীগoge: cf. 518e as conversion & psuche: cf. 519b*] passing from a day which is little better than night to the true day of being [*tou ontos ousan*], that is, the ascent [*epanados*] from below, which we affirm to be true philosophy?

Quite so.

And should we not enquire [*skopeo: cf. c*] what sort of knowledge has the power [*mathema: cf. 519c & c dunamis: cf. 518c*] of effecting such a change?

Certainly.

What sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul [*mathema: cf. b & helko: cf. 515e as dragged up & psuche: cf. c*] from becoming to being [*apo tou gignomenou epi to on*]? And another consideration [*ennoeo: cf. 519a as observe*] has just occurred to me: you will remember that our young men are to be [*anagkaios: cf. 520e as necessity*] warrior athletes.

Yes, that was said.

Then this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality [*mathema: cf. c & prosecho: cf. 459a as attended to*]?

What quality?

Usefulness in war.

Yes, if possible.

There were two parts in our former scheme of education, [*paideuo: cf. 520b as has educated*] were there c not?

Just so.

There was gymnastic which presided over the growth and decay of the body, and may therefore be regarded as having to do with [*epistamai: cf. 506a as knowledge*] generation and corruption [*apollumi: cf. a as ruin & phthis: decay*]?

**522** True.

Then that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover [*zeteo: cf. 510e & dierchomai: cf. 506d as give an explanation*]? No.

But what do you say of music, which also entered to a certain extent into our former scheme?

Music, he said, as you will remember, was the counterpart [*antistrophos: correlative*] of gymnastic and trained [*paideuo: cf. 521b as education*] the guardians by the influences of habit [*ethizo: cf. 469b as custom*], by harmony [*harmonia: cf. 442a*] making them harmonious [*euarmonstia*], by rhythm rhythmical, but not giving them science; and the words, whether fabulous [*muthodes: mythic*] or possibly true, had kindred elements of rhythm and harmony in them. But in music there was nothing

**b** which tended to that good which [*mathema: cf. 521c as knowledge*] you are now seeking [*zeteo: cf. a*].

You are most accurate [*akribos: cf. 503b as perfect*], I said, in your recollection [*anamimnesko: cf. 516c as remembered*]; in music there certainly was nothing of the kind. But what branch of knowledge is there, my dear [*daimonios: cf. 509c as amazing*] Glaucon, which is of the desired nature; since all the useful arts were reckoned mean [*doxazo: cf. 516d as think & banausos: base*] by us?

Undoubtedly; and yet if music and gymnastic are excluded, and the arts are also excluded [*techne: cf. 518d & chroeo: to give way*], what remains?

Well, I said, there may be nothing left of our special subjects; and then we shall have to take something which is not special, but of universal application [*teino: cf. 498b as increase*].

What may that be?

c A something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in common [*dianoia: cf. 513e as understanding & koinos: cf. 520a as of one another*], and which every one first has to learn among the elements of education [*manthano: cf. 513b as understand*].

What is that?

The little matter of distinguishing [*phaulos: cf. 519d in context of sentence & diagignosko: cf. 461d as know*] one, two, and three—in a word, number and calculation:—do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake [*metochos*] of them?

Yes.

Then the art of war partakes of them?

Certainly.

d Then Palamedes, whenever he appears in tragedy, proves [*apophaino: cf. 473a as discover*] Agamemnon ridiculously unfit to be a general. Did you never remark [*ennoeo: cf. 521c as consideration*] how he declares that he had invented [*heurisko: cf. 479d as have*] number, and had numbered the ships and set in array the ranks of the army at Troy; which implies that they had never been numbered before, and Agamemnon must be supposed literally to have been incapable of counting his own feet—how could he if he was ignorant [*apisteo: cf. 540e as hesitating*] of number? And if that is true, what sort of general must he have been?

I should say a very strange one [*atopos: cf. 515a*], if this was as you say.

e Can we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge [*mathema: cf. b in context of sentence*] of arithmetic? Certainly he should, if he is to have the smallest understanding of military tactics, or indeed, I should rather say, if he is to be a man at all.

I should like to know [*ennoeo: cf. d*] whether you have the same notion which I have of this study [*mathema: cf. e*]?

What is your notion?

523 It appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are seeking [*zeteo: cf. 522b*], and which leads naturally to reflection [*noesis, with pros: cf. 513d*] but never to have been rightly [*orthos, adverb: cf. 518d as wrong direction (ouk)*] used; for the true use of it is simply to draw [*helko: cf. 521c*] the soul towards being [*ousia, with pros: cf. 510b*].

Will you explain your meaning?, he said.

I will try [*peirao: cf. 474b*], I said; and I wish you would share the enquiry with [*deloo: cf. 432b as knew*] me, and say 'yes' or 'no' when I attempt to distinguish [*suntheates: a fellow spectator*] in my own mind what branches of knowledge have this attracting power, in order that we may have clearer proof [*saphos: cf. 515e*] that arithmetic is, as I suspect [*manteuomai: cf. 506a as suspicion*], one of them.

Explain [*deiknumi: cf. 515e as being shown*], he said.

I mean [*deiknumi: cf. b*] to say that objects of sense are of two kinds; some of them do not invite

b [*kathorao: cf. 516c as observe*] thought because the sense [*aisthesis: cf. 513c*] is an adequate judge of them; while in the case of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that further enquiry [*episkopeo: cf. 518a as ask*] is imperatively demanded [*diakeleuomai*].

You are clearly referring, he said, to the manner in which the senses are imposed [*phaino: cf. 517b as appears*] upon by distance and by painting in light and shade.

No, I said, that is not at all my meaning.

Then what is your meaning?

When speaking of uninviting objects [*parakaleo: cf. 425c as attract*], I mean those which do not pass c from one sensation [*ekbaino: & aisthesis: cf. b*] to the opposite; inviting objects are those which do; in this latter case the sense coming upon [*prospipto: cf. 515a as throws*] the object, whether at a distance or near, gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular than of its opposite. An illustration will make my meaning clearer [*saphos: cf. a*]:—here are three fingers—a little finger, a second finger, and a middle finger.

Very good.

You may suppose that they are seen quite close: and here comes the point [*skopeo: cf. 521b as inquire*].

What is it?

Each of them equally appears [*phaino: cf. b as imposed*] a finger, whether seen in the middle or at the

d extremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin—it makes no difference; a finger is a finger all the same.

In these cases a man [*psuche: cf. 521d*] is not compelled [*anagkazo: cf. 521b*] to ask of thought [*noesis: cf. a as reflection*] the question, what is a finger, for the sight never intimates [*semaino: cf. 518c as shows*] to the mind that a finger is other than a finger.

True.

And therefore, I said, as we might expect, there is nothing here which invites or excites [*parakletikon: e verbal adjective, one must summon*] intelligence [*noesis: cf. d*].

There is not, he said.

But is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers? Can sight adequately perceive [*hikanos, adverb: cf. 519d as enough & horao: cf. 520c as have seen*] them, and is no difference [*diaphero: cf. 496a in context of sentence*] made by the circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at the extremity? And in like manner does the touch adequately perceive the qualities of thickness or thinness, or softness or hardness? And so of the other senses [*aisthesis: cf. c*]; do they give perfect intimations [*deloo: cf. a as share inquiry & endeos, adverb (with ouk): deficient*] of **524** such matters? Is not their mode of operation on this wise—the sense which is concerned with the quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also with the quality of softness, and only intimates to the soul [*paraggello: cf. 442c as proclaims & psuche: cf. 523d as man*] that the same thing is felt to be both hard and soft?

You are quite right, he said.

And must not the soul be perplexed [*aporeo: cf. 515d*] at this intimation which the sense gives [*semaino: cf. 523d as intimates*] of a hard which is also soft? What, again, is the meaning [*semaino*] of light and heavy, if that which is light is also heavy, and that which is heavy, light?

**b** Yes, he said, these intimations which the soul receives are very curious [*atopos: cf. 522d as strange*] and require to be explained [*hermeneuo: cf. 453c as draw out the case & episkepsis: inspection*].

Yes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her aid calculation and intelligence [*logismos: cf. 441a as reason & noesis: cf. 523e*], that she may see whether the several objects announced [*eisaggello*] to her are one or two.

True.

And if they turn out [*phaino: cf. 523c as appears*] to be two, is not each of them one and different?

Certainly.

And if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive [*noeo: cf. 508d as perceives*] the two as in a state **c** of division, for if there were undivided they could only be conceived of as one?

True.

The eye certainly did see both small and great, but only in a confused manner [*chorizo: to sever, divide*]; they were not distinguished [*sugcheo: to pour together*].

Yes.

Whereas the thinking mind [*noesis: cf. b*], intending to light up the chaos, was compelled [*anagkazo: cf. 523d*] to reverse the process, and look [*eido: cf. 517c as eye fixed*] at small and great as separate and not confused.

Very true.

Was not this the beginning of the enquiry 'What is great?' and 'What is small?'

Exactly so.

And thus arose the distinction of the visible and the intelligible [*horatos & noetos: cf. 517c as intellectual*].

**d** Most true.

This was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the intellect [*parakletikon: cf. 524d as excites & dianoia: cf. 522c as intelligences*], or the reverse—those which are simultaneous [*horizo: cf. 505c as make*] with opposite impressions, invite [*empipto: to fall in, upon*] thought; those which are not simultaneous do not.

I understand [*manthano: cf. 522c as education*], he said, and agree [*dokeo: cf. 513d as cognizable*] with you.

And to which class do unity and number belong?

I do not know [*sunnoeo*], he replied.

Think a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the answer [*analogizomai: cf. 441c reasons about*]; for if simple unity could be adequately perceived [*hikanos & horao: for both, cf. 423e*] by the sight or by any other sense [*aisthesis: cf. 523e*], then, as we were saying in the case of the finger,

**e** there would be nothing to attract towards being [*helko & ousia: for both, cf. 523e*]; but when there is some contradiction [*enantioma: obstacle, hindrance*] always present, and one is [*phaino: cf. b as turn out*] the reverse of one and involves the conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused within us [*kineo: cf. 503a as*

*stir & ennoia: conception, notion*] and the soul perplexed [*psuche & aporeo: bor both, cf. a*] and wanting to arrive at a decision asks 'What is absolute unity?' This is the way in which the study of the one has a power of drawing and converting [*ago: cf. 439d as attracts &*

**525** *metastreptikos: fit for turning another way*] the mind to the contemplation of true being [*mathesis: cf. 503d as learned & epi ten tou onton thean*].

And surely, he said, this occurs notably in the case of one; for we see the same thing to be both one and infinite [*apeiros: cf. 448c as innumerable*] in multitude?

Yes, I said; and this being true of one must be equally true of all number?

Certainly.

And all arithmetic and calculation [*logistikos: cf. 442c as reason & arithmetikos*] have to do with number?

Yes.

**b** And they appear to lead the mind towards truth [*phaino: cf. 524e & ago: cf. 524e as drawing & aletheia, with pros: cf. 519b*]?

Yes, in a very remarkable manner [*huperphos, adverb: extraordinarily*].

Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking [*mathema: cf. 522e as study & zeteo: cf. 523a*], having a double use, military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn the art [*manthano: cf. 524d as understand & taxis: cf. 424b as form*] of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the philosopher also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change [*exanaduomai: to emrgy & genesis: cf. 485b as generation*] and lay hold of true being [*hapteon (hapto: cf. 513b as clinging) & ousia: cf. 524e*], and therefore he must be an arithmetician [*logistikos: cf. a*].

That is true.

And our guardian [*phulax: cf. 374d*] is both warrior and philosopher?

Certainly.

Then this is a kind of knowledge [*mathema: cf. b*] which legislation may fitly prescribe [*proseko: cf. 504d as reach & nomotheteo: cf. 462a as making laws*]; and we must endeavor to persuade [*peitho: cf. 519e as persuasion*] those who are prescribed [*metecho: cf. 520c as share*] to be the principal men of our state **c** to go and learn arithmetic [*anthaptomai: to lay hold of, engage in*], not as amateurs, but they must carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind only [*thea, with epi: cf. 517b in context of sentence & aphikneomai: cf. 519c as attain & noesis: cf. 524c*]; nor again, like merchants or retail-traders, with a view to buying or selling, but for the sake of their military use, and of the soul [*psuche: cf. 524e*] herself; and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass [*metastrophe: a turning*] from becoming to truth and being [*genesis: cf. b & aletheia, with epi: cf. b & ousia: cf. b*].

That is excellent [*kalos: cf. 520c as beautiful*], he said.

Yes, I said, and now having spoken of it, I must add [*ennoeo: cf. 522e as know*] how charming the **d** science [*kompsos: cf. 505b as sophisticated & mathema: cf. b & logismos: cf. 524b as intelligence*] is and in how many ways it conduces to our desired end [*chresimos: cf. 518e as useful & boulomai: cf. 497e as will*], if pursued in the spirit of a philosopher [*gnorizo: cf. 402c as recognize*] and not of a shopkeeper!

How do you mean?

I mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect [*ago: cf. b as lead*], compelling the soul to reason [*anagkazo: cf. 524c & psuche: cf. c & dialogizomai: cf. 336a as discussion*] about abstract number [*oudemos & apodechomai: cf. 450a in context of sentence*], and rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects [*hapto: cf. b as lay hold of & soma: cf. 476a as things*] into **e** the argument. You know how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule [*apodechomai (with ouk): cf. d & katagelao: cf. 499c*] any one who attempts to divide absolute unity [*hen*] when he is calculating, and if you divide, they multiply, taking care that one shall continue one and not become lost in fractions.

That is very true.

**526** Now suppose a person were to say to them: O my friends, what are these wonderful numbers about which you are reasoning [*dialogizomai: cf. 525d*] in which, as you say, there is a unity [*hen: cf. 525e*] such as you demand, and each unit is equal, invariable, indivisible,—what would they answer?

They would answer, as I should conceive [*dianoemai: cf. 510d as reason about*], that they were speaking of those numbers which can only be realized in thought [*metacheirazo: cf. 498b as learn*].

Then you see that this knowledge may be truly called [*mathema: cf. 525d & kinduneo: cf. 467b in*

**b** *context of sentence*] necessary, necessitating as it clearly [*phaino: cf. 525b, in context of sentence*] does the use of the pure intelligence [*noesis: cf. 525b as mind*] in the attainment of pure truth [*aletheia: cf. 525c*]?

Yes; that is a marked characteristic of it.

And have you further observed [*episkopeo*: cf. 523b as enquiry], that those who have a natural talent for calculation [*phusis*: cf. 519c as minds & *logistikos*: cf. 525b as arithmetician] are generally quick [*oxus*: cf. 519b as keenly] at every other kind of knowledge [*mathema*: cf. a]; and even the dull [*bradus*: slow] if they have had an arithmetical training [*paideuo*: cf. 522a as trained & *gumnazo*: cf. 503e as probation], although they may derive no other advantage from it, always become much quicker than they would otherwise have been.

Very true, he said.

c And indeed, you will not easily [*rhadios*, adverb: cf. 475e, in context of sentence] find a more difficult study, and not many as difficult.

You will not.

And, for all these reasons, arithmetic is a kind of knowledge [*mathema*: cf. b] in which the best [*aristos*: cf. 521b] natures should be trained [*paideuo*: cf. b], and which must not be given up.

I agree.

Let this then be made one of our subjects of education. And next, shall we enquire whether the kindred science also concerns [*skeptomai*: cf. 520a as observe & *proseko*: cf. 525b as prescribe] us?

You mean geometry?

Exactly so.

d Clearly, he said, we are concerned with that part of geometry which relates [*teino*: cf. 522b as application] to war; for in pitching a camp, or taking up a position, or closing or extending the lines of an army, or any other military manoeuvre, whether in actual battle or on a march, it will make all the difference [*diaphero*: cf. 523e as is no difference] whether a general is or is not a geometrician.

Yes, I said, but for that purpose a very little of either geometry or calculation will be enough; the question relates [*skopeo*: cf. 523c as comes the point] rather to the greater and more advanced part of

e geometry—whether that tends [*teino*: cf. d] in any degree to make more easy the vision [*kateidon*: cf. 434d as discerning] of the idea of good [*idea* & *agathos*: for both, cf. 517b]; and to that place, as I was saying, all things tend which compel the soul to turn her gaze [*anagkazo*: cf. 525d & *psuche*: cf. 525d & *metastrepho*: cf. 518d] towards that place [*topos*, with *eis*: cf. 517b as world] where is the full perfection of being [*eudaimonos*: cf. 498c as happily & *ontos*: cf. 521b] which she ought by all means to behold [*eido*: cf. 524c as look].

True, he said.

Then if geometry compels us to view being [*theaomai*: cf. 520c as seeing & *ousia*: cf. 525c], it concerns [*proseko*: cf. c] us; if becoming [*genesis*: cf. 525c as being] only, it does not concern us?

Yes, that is what we assert.

527 Yet anybody who has the least acquaintance with geometry will not deny that such a conception of the science [*episteme*: cf. 518c as knowledge] is in flat contradiction [*amphibeteo*: cf. 505d as difficulties] to the ordinary language [*metacheirizo*: to handle, administer] of geometers.

How so?

They have in view practice only, and are always speaking in a narrow and ridiculous manner [*geloios*, adverb: cf. 517d, adjective], of squaring and extending and applying and the like—they confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life; whereas knowledge [*mathema*: cf. 526c] is the real object b of the whole science [*epitedeuo*: cf. 489d in context of sentence].

Certainly, he said.

Then must not a further admission be made [*diomologeo*: cf. 507a as come to an understanding]?

What admission?

That the knowledge [*gnosis*: cf. 484c] at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal [*to aei*: cf. 485b] and not of what is perishing and transient [*gignomai* & *apollumi*: for both, cf. 508d].

That, he replied, may be readily allowed [*euomolgeton*: verbal adjective] and is true.

Then, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul towards truth [*helko*: cf. 524e as attract & *psuche*: cf. 526e & *aletheia*, with *pros*: cf. 526b] and create the spirit [*apergastikon*: verbal adjective & *dianoia*: cf. 524d as intellect] of philosophy and raise up that which is now unhappily allowed to fall down.

Nothing will be more likely to have such an effect.

c Then nothing should be more sternly laid down than that the inhabitants of your fair city should by all means learn [*aphikneomai*: cf. 525c, in context of sentence] geometry. Moreover the science has indirect effects [*parergon*: cf. 411e as indirectly], which are not small.

Of what kind?, he said.

There are the military advantages of which you spoke, I said; and in all departments of knowledge [*mathesis: cf. 525a as contemplation*], as experience proves [*apodechomai: cf. 525e, in context of sentence*], any one who has studied geometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension [*diaphero: cf. 526d as make all the difference*] than one who has not.

Yes indeed, he said, there is an infinite difference between them.

Then shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge [*mathema: cf. a*] which our youth will study?

Let us do so, he replied.

**d** And suppose we make astronomy the third—what do you say?

I am strongly inclined to it, he said; the observation [*euaisthetotos, adverb*] of the seasons and of months and years is as essential to the general as it is to the farmer or sailor.

I am amused [*hedus: cf. 496c as sweet*], I said, at your fear of the world, which makes you guard against the appearance of insisting upon useless studies [*achrestos: cf. 519a & mathema: cf. c*]; and I quite admit the difficulty of believing [*pisteuo: cf. 505e as losing, with oude*] that in every man there is an eye of the soul [*organon: cf. 518c as capacity & psuche: cf. b*] which, when by other pursuits lost and dimmed, is by **e** these purified and re-illuminated [*kathairo: cf. 399e as purgation & anazopureo: to gain fresh life and courage*]; and is more precious far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by it alone is truth [*aletheia: cf. b*] seen. Now there are two classes of persons: one class of those who will agree [*sundokeo: cf. 460e as is*] with you and will take your words as a revelation; another class to whom they will be utterly unmeaning [*aisthanomai (with medame or not): cf. 507c as perceive*], and who will naturally deem them to be idle tales, for they see no sort of profit [*ophelia: cf. 520a as benefactors*] which is to be obtained from them. And therefore you had better decide [*skopeo: cf. 526d as relates*] at once with which of the two you are **528** proposing to argue [*dialego: cf. 515b as converse with*]. You will very likely say with neither, and that your chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement; at the same time you do not grudge to others any benefit [*oninemi: to help, assist*] which they may receive.

I think that I should prefer to carry on the argument [*apokrino: cf. 515d as will be his reply*] mainly on my own behalf.

Then take a step backward, for we have gone wrong in the order [*hexes: cf. 351a as regularly*] of the sciences. What was the mistake?, he said.

After plane geometry, I said, we proceeded at once to solids in revolution, instead of taking solids in **b** themselves; whereas after the second dimension the third, which is concerned with cubes and dimensions of depth, ought to have followed.

That is true, Socrates; but so little seems to be known [*heurisko: cf. 522d as invented*] as yet about these subjects.

Why, yes, I said, and for two reasons:—in the first place, no government patronizes them; this leads to a want of energy [*entimos, adverb, with oudemios: honored*] in the pursuit [*zeteo: cf. 525b as seeking*] of them, and they are difficult [*chalepos: cf. 502c*]; in the second place, students cannot learn them unless they have a director [*peitho: cf. 525b as persuade*]. But then a director can hardly be found, and even if **c** he could, as matters now stand, the students, who are very conceited [*megalophroneo*], would not attend to him. That, however, would be otherwise if the whole state became the director of these studies and gave honor to them; then disciples would want to come, and there would be continuous and earnest search [*sunechos, adverb & entonos, adverb & zeteo: cf. b*], and discoveries would be made; since even now, disregarded as they are by the world and maimed [*kolouo: to cut short*] of their fair proportions and although none of their votaries can tell the use of them, still these studies force their way by their natural charm [*chresimos: cf. 525d as desired*], and very likely, if they had the help of the state, they would some day emerge into light [*phaino: cf. 526b as clearly*].

**d** Yes, he said, there is a remarkable charm [*diapherontos, adverb: cf. 519e as above the rest & epicharis*] in them. But I do not clearly [*saphos: cf. 523c*] understand the change in the order. First you began with a geometry of plane surfaces?

Yes, I said.

And you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward?

Yes, and I have delayed you by my hurry; the ludicrous state of solid geometry, which, in natural order [*hexis: cf. 513d as habit*], should have followed, made me pass over this branch and go on to astronomy, **e** or motion of solids.

True, he said.

Then assuming that the science [*mathema: cf. 527d as studies*] now omitted would come into existence if encouraged [*methiemi: to let go, relax*] by the state, let us go on to astronomy, which will be fourth. The right order, he replied. And now, Socrates, as you rebuked the vulgar manner [*phortikos, adverb: cf. 442e as commonplace instances*] in which I praised astronomy before, my praise shall be given [*meterchomai: cf. 502e as must be investigated*] in your own spirit. For every one, as I think, must see **529** that astronomy compels the soul [*anagkazo & psuche: cf. 526e*] to look upwards [*horaio: cf. 524dd as perceived & eis to ano*] and leads [*ago: cf. 525d as elevating effect*] us from this world to another. Every one but myself, I said; to every one else this may be clear, but not to [*dokeo: cf. 524d as agree*] me. And what then would you say?

I should rather say that those who elevate [*metacherizo: to administer, manage*] astronomy into philosophy appear to me to make us look [*blepo: cf. 518d*] downwards and not upwards.

What do you mean? he asked.

You, I replied, have in your mind a truly sublime conception [*agennos, adverb (with ouk): low-born*] of our knowledge of the things above [*mathesis: cf. 527c & peri ta ano*]. And I dare say that if a person **b** were to throw his head back and study [*theaomai: cf. 526e as view & katamanthano: cf. 518c as learning*] ornaments on a ceiling, you would still think [*hegeomai: cf. 515d as fancy*] that his mind was the percipient [*noeo: cf. 524b as conceive*], and not his eyes. And you are very likely right [*kalos, adverb: cf. 506a as shrewd*], and I may be a simpleton [*euethikos, adverb: cf. 343d as foolish*]; but, in my opinion, that knowledge [*mathema: cf. 528e as science & nomizo: cf. 518b as if I am right*] only which is of being and of the unseen [*peri to on & to aoraton*] can make the soul look upwards [*psuche & blepo: cf. a*], and whether a man gazes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to learn [*manthano: cf. 525b*] some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn [*manthano*], for nothing of that sort is **c** matter of science [*episteme: cf. 527a*]; his soul is looking [*psuche & blepo: cf. b*] downwards, not upwards, whether his way to knowledge [*manthano: cf. b*] is by water or by land, whether he floats, or only lies on his back.

I acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke [*orthos, adverb: cf. 523a as rightly & epiplesso: cf. 441c*]. Still, I should like to ascertain how astronomy can be learned [*manthano: cf. c*] in any manner more conducive [*ophelimos, adverb: cf. 518e as profitable (adjective)*] to that knowledge [*manthano*] of which we are speaking? I will tell you, I said: The starry heaven which we behold is wrought upon a visible ground, and **d** therefore, although the fairest and most perfect of [*kalos: cf. b as right & akribos: cf. 522b as accurate*] visible things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the true motions of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness, which are relative to each other, and carry with them that which is contained in them, in the true number and in every true figure. Now, these are to be apprehended by reason and intelligence [*lambano: cf. 505e as having the same assurance & logos: cf. 518c as argument & dianoia: cf. 527b as spirit*], but not by sight.

True, he replied.

The spangled heavens should be used as a pattern [*paradeigma: cf. 500e*] and with a view to that higher knowledge [*mathema: cf. b*]; their beauty is like the beauty of figures or pictures excellently wrought [*grapheos, adverb & diapherontos, adverb: cf. 528d as remarkable*] by the hand of Daedalus, or some other great artist, which we may chance to behold; any geometrician who saw them would appreciate the exquisiteness of their workmanship, but he would never dream of thinking [*hegeomai: cf. b*] that in **530** them he could find [*episkopeo: cf. 526b as observed*] the true equal or the true double, or the truth of any other proportion.

No, he replied, such an idea would be ridiculous [*geloios: cf. 527a*].

And will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks [*peitho: cf. 528b as have a director & apoblepo: cf. 484c*] at the movements of the stars? Will he not think [*nomizo: cf. 529b in context of sentence*] that heaven and the things in heaven are framed [*sunistemi: cf. 412a as called*] by the Creator **b** of them in the most perfect manner [*kalos: cf. 529d*]? But he will never imagine [*hegeomai: cf. 529e as thinking & nomizo: cf. a*] that the proportions of night and day, or of both to the month, or of the month to the year, or of the stars to these and to one another, and any other things that are material and visible can also be eternal and subject to no deviation—that would be absurd; and it is equally absurd to take so much pains in investigating [*zeteo: cf. 528cas search*] their exact truth.

I quite agree [*dokeo: cf. 529a in context of sentence*], though I never thought of this before.

Then, I said, in astronomy, as in geometry, we should employ problems, and let the heavens alone if we would

approach the subject in the right way and so make the natural gift of reason [*phusis: cf. 526b & c phronimos: cf. 521b as wisest & psuche: cf. 529c*] to be of any real use [*chresimos: cf. 528c as charm*]. That, he said, is a work infinitely beyond [*pollaplasios: many times as many*] our present astronomers. Yes, I said; and there are many other things which must also have a similar extension [*tropos: cf. 518d as manner & protasso: cf. 491b as required*] given to them, if our legislation [*nomotheteo: cf. 525b*] is to be of any value. But can you tell [*hupomimnesko: cf. 452c as remind*] me of any other suitable study [*proseko: cf. 526e as concerns & mathema: cf. 529e as knowledge*]?

No, he said, not without thinking.

Motion [*phora: a bringing forth*], I said, has many forms, and not one only; two of them are obvious enough even to wits no better than ours; and there are others, as I imagine, which may be left to wiser [*hexis: cf. 528d as order & sophos: cf. 519a as clever*] persons.

But where are the two?

There is a second, I said, which is the counterpart of the one already named.

And what may that be?

The second, I said, would seem relatively to the ears to be [*pegnumui: to make fast, fix*] what the first is to the eyes; for I conceive that as the eyes are designed to look up at the stars, so are the ears to hear harmonious motions; and these are sister sciences [*episteme: cf. 529c*]—as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glaucon, agree [*sugchoreo: cf. 513e as give my assent*] with them?

Yes, he replied.

But this, I said, is a laborious study [*ergos: cf. 519c as business*], and therefore we had better go and learn [*punthanomai: cf. 491c as mean*] of them; and they will tell us whether there are any other applications of these sciences. At the same time, we must not lose sight of [*phulasso: cf. 520 in context of sentence*] our own higher object.

What is that?

There is a perfection which all knowledge [*manthano: cf. 529c as knowledge*] ought to reach [*ateles: cf. 504c as imperfect & epicheireo: cf. 492e as make the attempt*], and which our pupils ought also to attain [*trepho: cf. 442a as nurtured*], and not to fall short of [*exeko: to have reached (with out)*], as I was

531 saying that they did in astronomy. For in the science of harmony [*harmonia: cf. 522a*], as you probably know, the same thing happens. The teachers of harmony compare the sounds and consonances [*sumphonia: cf. 442c as harmony & phthoggos: a clear, distinct sound*] which are heard only and their labor, like that of the astronomers, is in vain [*anenustos: ineffectual*].

Yes, by heaven!, he said; and it is as good as a play [*geloios, adverb: cf. 527a*] to hear them talking about their condensed notes, as they call them; they put their ears close alongside of the strings like persons catching a sound from their neighbor's wall—one set of them declaring that they distinguish an intermediate note and have found the least interval which should be the unit of measurement; the others insisting that the two sounds have passed into the same—either party setting their ears before their understanding [*nous: cf. 518a as common sense*].

You mean, I said, those gentlemen [*chrestos: cf. 424a as more*] who tease and torture the strings and rack them on the pegs of the instrument: might carry on the metaphor and speak after their manner of the blows which the plectrum gives, and make accusations against the strings, both of backwardness and forwardness to sound; but this would be tedious, and therefore I will only say that these are not the men, and that I am referring to the Pythagoreans, of whom I was just now proposing to enquire about

c harmony [*harmonia: cf. a*]. For they too are in error, like the astronomers; they investigate [*zeteo: cf. 530b*] the numbers of the harmonies which are heard, but they never attain to problems—that is to say, they never reach the natural harmonies of number, or reflect [*episkepo: cf. 530a as find*] why some numbers are harmonious and others not.

That, he said, is a thing of more than mortal knowledge [*daimonios: cf. 522b as dear*].

A thing, I replied, which I would rather call useful [*chresimos: cf. 530c*]; that is, if sought after [*zeteo: cf. c as investigate*] with a view to the beautiful and good [*kalos: cf. 530b & agathos: cf. 526e*]; but if pursued in any other spirit, useless [*metadioko: to follow after closely & achrestos: cf. 527d*]. Very true, he said.

Now, when all these studies reach [*aphikneomai: cf. 527c as learn*] the point of inter-communion and d connection [*methodos: cf. 435d as method & koinonia: cf. 466d as community & suggeneia: kin, relationship*] with one another, and come to be considered in their mutual affinities [*sullogizomai: cf. 517c as inferred & oikeios: cf. 501d as akin*], then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit [*boulomai: cf. 525d as conduces*] of

them have a value for our objects; otherwise there is no profit [*anonetos: cf. 486c as in vain*] in them.

I suspect so [*manteuomai: cf. 523a*]; but you are speaking, Socrates, of a vast work.

What do you mean?, I said; the prelude [*prooimion: cf. 432e as exordium*] or what? Do you not know that all this is but the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn [*nomos: cf. 519e as legislator & manthano: cf. 530e as knowledge*]? For you surely would not regard the skilled mathematician as a dialectician?

Assuredly not, he said; I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable [*entugchano: to light upon, meet*] of reasoning.

But do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason [*logos: cf. 529e*] will have the knowledge [*eido: cf. 526e as behold*] which we require of them?

Neither can this be supposed.

**532** And so, Glaucon, I said, we have at last arrived at the hymn of dialectic [*nomos: cf. 531d as strain & dialego: cf. 528a as argue*]. This is that strain which is of the intellect [*noetos: cf. 524c as intelligible*] only, but which the faculty of sight will nevertheless be found to imitate [*mimeomai: cf. 510b as given*]; for sight, as you may remember, was imagined by us after a while to behold [*apoblepo: cf. 530 as looks & epicheireo: cf. 530e as reach*] the real animals and stars, and last of all the sun himself. And so with dialectic; when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute [*ho estin: cf. 507b as essence*] by the light of reason [*logos: cf. 531e*] only, and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres [*aphistemi*

**b** (*with me*): *to remove, keep away from*] until by pure intelligence he arrives [*noesis: cf. 526b & lambano: cf. 529e as apprehended*] at the perception of the absolute good [*agathos: cf. 531c*], he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world [*teleo: cf. 498b as mature & noesis*], as in the case of sight at the end of the visible.

Exactly, he said.

Then this is the progress [*poreia: a going, journey*] which you call dialectic?

True.

But the release [*Iusis: cf. 515c as released*] of the prisoners from chains, and their turning around [*metastrophe: cf. 525c as to pass*] from the shadows to the images and to the light [*skia: cf. 517d & eidolon: cf. 52c & phos*], and the ascent [*epanodos: a rising up*] from the underground den to the sun, while in his presence they are vainly trying to look on [*blepo: cf. 529c*] animals and plants and the light of the sun, but are able to perceive even with their weak eyes the images [*phantasma: cf. 516b as*

**c** *reflections*] in the water (which are divine [*theios: cf. 518e*]), and are the shadows of true existence [*ton ontos: cf. 525a as true being*] (not shadows of images cast by a light of fire [*aposkiazo*], which compared with the sun is only an image)—this power [*dunamis: cf. 521c*] of elevating the highest principle in the soul [*epanagoge & beltistos: cf. 519c & psuche: cf. 530c*] to the contemplation of that which is best in existence [*thea, with pros: cf. 525c as see & aristos: cf. 526c*] with which we may compare the raising of that faculty which is the very light of the body to the sight of that which is brightest [*saphos: cf. 528d as clearly*] in the material [*somatoeides: having the nature of a body*] and visible world [*topos: cf. 526e as place*]**—**this power is given, as I was saying, by all that study and

**d** pursuit of the arts [*pragmateia: hard work & techne: cf. 522b*] which has been described.

I agree [*apodechomai: cf. 527c as proves*] in what you are saying, he replied, which may be hard to believe [*chalepos: cf. 528b as difficult & dokeo: cf. 530b as agree*], yet from another point of view, is harder still to deny. This, however, is not a theme to be treated of in passing only, but will have to be discussed [*epaniteon: verbal adjective, one must return*] again and again. And so, whether our conclusion be true or false, let us assume all this and proceed at once from the prelude or preamble [*prooimion: cf. 531d*] to the chief strain [*nomos: cf. 532a as hymn*] and describe [*dierchomai: cf. 522a as e discover*] that in like manner. Say, then, what is the nature and what are the divisions [*tines au hodoi (hodos: cf. 435d as method)*] of dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither; for these paths will also lead to our final rest [*telos: cf. 506d as reaching the goal & poreia: cf. b as progress & anapaula*]?

**533** Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow [*akoloutheo: cf. 490c as leads*] me here though I would do my best [*prothumia: cf. 497e as zeal*], and you should behold not an image [*eikon: cf. 517d as allegory*] only but the absolute truth [*alethos: cf. 520c*] according to my notion [*phaino: cf. 528c as emerge into light*].

Whether what I told you would or would not have been a reality [*ontos, adverb: cf. 464dc as true*] I cannot venture to say [*diischurizomai: cf. 416b as cannot be so confident*]; but you would have seen [*eidon: cf. 434a as think*] something like reality; of that I am confident.

Doubtless, he replied.

But I must also remind you, that the power of dialectic [*dunamis*: cf. 532c & *dialego*: cf. 532a] alone can reveal [*phaino*: cf. a] this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences.

Of that assertion you may be as confident [*diischurizomai*: cf. a] as of the last.

**b** And assuredly no one will argue [*amphibeteo*: cf. 527c as contradiction] that there is any other method [*methodos*: cf. 531d as connection] of comprehending [*epicheireo*: cf. 532b as behold] by any regular process all true existence or of ascertaining [*lambano*: cf. 532b as arrives] what each thing is in its own nature; for the arts [*techne*: cf. 532d] in general are concerned with the desires or opinions [*epithumia & doxa*: for both, cf. 493c] of men, or are cultivated with a view to production and construction, or for the preservation of such productions and constructions; and as to the mathematical sciences which, as we were saying, have some apprehension of true being [*epilambano*: cf. 490c as objected & *tou ontos*]—geometry and the like—they only dream about being [*oneiros*: cf. 414d as appearance & *peri to on*], but never can they behold the waking reality [*eidon*: cf. a as seen & *hupar*: cf. c 476d as awake] so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined [*hupothesis*: cf. 513a & *akinetos*: unmoved], and are unable to give an account [*logos*: cf. 532a as reason] of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle [*eido*: cf. 531e as knowledge & *arche*: cf. 513d], and when the conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a fabric of convention [*mechane*: cf. 414b as devise] can ever become science [*episteme*: cf. 530d]?

Impossible, he said.

Then dialectic, and dialectic [*dialektikos*, adjective] alone, goes directly to the first principle [*methodos*: cf. b as method] and is the only science which does away with hypotheses [*anaireo*: to abolish, to take up & *hupothesis*: cf. c] in order to make her ground secure [*bebaioo*: cf. 461e as be better & *arche*: cf. c as principle]; the eye of the soul [*omma & psuche*: cf. 432c], which is literally buried in an outlandish

**d** slough [*borboros*: mud], is by her gentle aid lifted upwards [*helko*: cf. 527b as draw & *anago*: to lead up, with *ano*]; and she uses as handmaids and helpers in the work of conversion [*dierchomai*: cf. 532d as describe], the sciences [*techne*: cf. b as arts] which we have been discussing. Custom [*ethos*: cf. 518e as habit] terms them sciences, but they ought to have some other name, implying greater clearness [*enarges*: cf. 513a as greater distinctness] than opinion [*doxa*: cf. b] and less clearness than science [*episteme*: cf. c]: and this, in our previous sketch [*horizo*: cf. 524d in context of sentence], was called understanding [*dianoia*: cf. 529e as intelligence]. But why should we dispute [*dokeo*: cf. 532d as believe e & *amphibeteo*: cf. b as argue] about names when we have realities of such importance to consider [*skepsis*: cf. 434d as investigation]?

Why indeed, he said, when any name will do which expresses the thought of the mind [*hexis*: cf. 530d in context of sentence & *psuche*: cf. c as soul] with clearness?

At any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four divisions; two for intellect and two for opinion [*episteme*: cf. d as science & *dianoia*: cf. d as understanding], and to call the first division science, the **534** second understanding, the third belief [*pistis*: cf. 513e], and the fourth perception of shadows [*eikasia*: cf. 513e], opinion being concerned with becoming [*genesis*: cf. 526e] and intellect with being [*noesis*: cf. 532b & *ousia*: cf. 526e]; and so to make a proportion:—as being is to becoming, so is pure intellect to opinion. And as intellect is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to the perception of shadows. But let us defer the further correlation and subdivision [*analogia*: proportion & *diairesis*: division] of the subjects of opinion and of intellect [*doxastos*: cf. 510a as sphere of opinion & *noetos*: cf. 532a], for it will be a long enquiry, many times longer than this has been.

**b** As far as I understand, he said, I agree [*sundokeo*: cf. 527e].

And do you also agree, I said, in describing the dialectician as one who attains a conception of the essence [*lambano*: cf. 533b as ascertaining & *logos*: cf. 533c as account & *ousia*: cf. a] of each thing? And he who does not possess and is therefore unable to impart this conception, in whatever degree he fails, may in that degree also be said to fail in intelligence? Will you admit so much?

Yes, he said; how can I deny it?

And you would say the same of the conception of the good [*agathos*, with *peri*: cf. 532b]?

Until the person is able to abstract and define rationally [*diorizo*: cf. 507b & *logos*: cf. b] the idea of **c** good [*idea & agathos*: for both, cf. 526e], and unless he can run the gauntlet [*mache*: battle] of all objections and is ready to disprove them not by appeals to opinion but to absolute truth [*doxa*, with *kata*: cf. 533d & *ousia*, with *kata*: cf. b as essence], never faltering at any step of the argument [*prothumeomai*: cf. 520b as to show any gratitude & *elegcho*: cf. 349a as to refute]—unless he can do all this, you would say that he knows

[*eido*: cf. 533c] neither the idea of good nor any other good; he apprehends only a shadow [*ephapto*: cf. 490b in context of sentence & *eidolon*: cf. 532b as images], if anything at all, which is given by opinion and not by science [*ephapto*: cf. c & *doxa*: cf. b & *episteme*: cf. 533e as intellect];—dreaming and slumbering in this life before he is well awake [*exergazo*] here, he

**d** arrives at [*aphikenomai*] the world below and goes to sleep forever [*epikatadarthano*: to set, as a star after sunrise & *teleos*, adverb: cf. 501d as perfectly].

In all that I should most certainly agree with you.

And surely you would not have the children of your ideal state, whom you are nurturing and educating [*trepho*: cf. 530 as attain & *logos*: cf. b & *paideuo*: cf. 526c as should be trained]—if the ideal ever becomes a reality—you would not allow the future rulers to be like posts [*gramma*: cf. 425b as written], having no reason [*alogos*] in them, and yet to be set in authority [*kurios*: cf. 517c in context of sentence] over the highest matters?

Certainly not.

Then you will make a law [*nomotheteo*: cf. 530c as legislation] that they shall have [*antilambano*: cf. 497d as interposing] such an education [*paideia*: cf. 519c] as will enable them to attain the greatest skill [*epistemon*: knowing, wise] in asking and answering questions?

**e** Yes, he said, you and I together will make [*nomotheteo*: cf. d] it.

Dialectic [*dialektikos*: cf. 533c], then, as you will agree, is the coping-stone of the sciences [*thrigkos*: topmost course of stones & *mathema*: cf. 530c as study] and is set over them; no other science [*mathema*] can be placed [*epitithemi*: cf. 545c as should extend] higher—the nature of knowledge can **535** no further go [*mathema* & *telos*: cf. 532e as final rest]?

I agree, he said.

But to whom we are to assign [*diameno*: to remain by, persevere] these studies, and in what way [*tropos*: cf. 530c as extension] they are to be assigned, are questions which remain to be considered [*exelegcho*: cf. 456a as selection]?

Yes, clearly.

You remember, I said, how the rulers were chosen before?

Certainly, he said.

The same natures [*phusis*: cf. 530b as reason] must still be chosen, and the preference again given [*proaireteon*: verbal adjective] to the surest and the bravest [*bebaios*: cf. 503c as steadfast] and, if possible, to the fairest [*andreios*: cf. 459c as more of a man & *eueides*: well-shaped, goodly, with

**b** *dunamis* & *kata*: cf. 533a as power]; and, having noble and generous tempers [*gennaios*: cf. 440d & *blosuros*: grim, valiant & *ethe*: cf. 501b as ways], they should also have the natural gifts [*prosphoros*: useful & *phusis*: cf. a] which will facilitate their education [*paideia*: cf. 534d].

And what are [*diastello*: to distinguish, define] these?

Such gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition [*drimutes*: pungency & *huparcho*: cf. 503d as were deemed & *mathema*, with *pros*: cf. a as knowledge]; for the mind more often faints [*psuche*: cf. 533e & *apodeiliao*: to play the coward] from the severity of study [*ponos*: cf. 520b as toils & *mathema*] than from the severity of gymnastics: the toil is more entirely the mind's own and is not shared [*koinos*: cf. 522c as in common] with the body.

Very true, he replied.

**c** Further, he of whom we are in search [*zeteo*: cf. 531c as sought after] should have a good memory [*mneme*: cf. 494b] and be an unwearied solid man who is a lover of labor in any line [*diaponeo*: cf. 503d as toil & *tropos*: cf. a as way]; or he will never be able to endure the great amount of bodily exercise and to go through all the intellectual discipline and study [*epiteleo*: cf. 502b as might bring into existence & *mathesis*: cf. 529a as knowledge & *melete*: cf. 455b as application] which we require of him.

Certainly, he said; he must have natural gifts [*euphues*: cf. 496b as gifted].

The mistake [*hamartema*: cf. 389c as fault] at present is, that those who study philosophy have no vocation [*atimia*: cf. 492d as disenfranchisement], and this, as I was before saying, is the reason why she has fallen into disrepute [*hapto*: cf. 525d in context of sentence & *axia*: cf. 496b as devoted (with *ou* & *kata*)] her true sons should take her by the hand and not bastards.

What do you mean?

**d** In the first place, no student should be lame [*cholos*: an object of anger] in his love of hard work—I mean, that he should not be half industrious and half idle: as, for example, when a man is a lover of gymnastic and

hunting, and all other bodily exercises, but a hater rather than a lover of the labor of learning or listening or enquiring [*philoponos & philomathes & philokoos*]. Or the occupation to which he devotes himself may be of an opposite kind, and he may have the other sort of lameness [*cholos: cf. d*].

Certainly, he said.

And as to truth [*aletheia, with pros: cf. 527b*], I said, is not a soul equally to be deemed halt and lame **e** [*psuche: cf. b as mind & anaperos: much crippled*] which hates voluntary falsehood and is extremely indignant [*chalepos, adverb: cf. 500b as harsh feeling*] at herself and others when they tell lies, but is patient [*eukolos, adverb: cf. 330b as have peace, adjective*] of involuntary falsehood, and does not mind wallowing like a swinish beast in the mire of ignorance [*amathia: cf. 444b*] and has no shame at being detected [*haliskomai: cf. 479d as detained*]?

**536** To be sure.

And, again, in respect of temperance, courage, magnificence [*sophrosune: cf. 506d & andreia: cf. 506d & megaloprepeia: cf. 494b*] and every other virtue [*arete: cf. 518d*], should we not carefully distinguish between [*phulasso: cf. 530e as (not) loose sight of*] the true son and the bastard [*nomos (ton nomon): cf. 532d as chef strain & gnesios: vg. 473f*]? For where there is no discernment [*epistami: to be acquainted with & skopeo: cf. 527d as decide*] of such qualities states and individuals unconsciously err [*lanthano: cf. 459e as must be a secret*] and the state makes a ruler and the individual a friend of one who, being defective in some part of virtue, is in a figure lame or a bastard.

That is very true, he said.

All these things, then, will have to be carefully considered [*dieulabeomai: to beware of*] by us; and if only those whom we introduce [*komizo: cf. 370e as required supply & paideuo: cf. 534d as educating*] to this **b** vast system of education and training [*mathesis: cf. 535c as exercise & askesis: cf. 518e as exercise*] are sound in body and mind [*artimeles & artiprhon*], justice [*dike: cf. 474a as penalty*] herself will have nothing to say against [*memphomai: cf. 487a as find (no) fault*] us, and we shall be the saviors of the constitution and of the state [*sozo: cf. 502a as saved & polis: cf. 455a & politeia: cf. 520b as government*]; but, if our pupils are men of another stamp [*tanantia: opposite*], the reverse will happen, and we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule [*katantleo: to pour water or words over & gelos: laughter*] on philosophy than she has to endure at present. That would not be creditable.

Certainly not, I said; and yet perhaps, in thus turning [*pascho: cf. 487b as strange feeling passes over the minds*] jest into earnest I am equally ridiculous [*geloios: cf. 530a*].

In what respect?

**c** I had forgotten [*lanthano: cf. a as err*], I said, that we were not serious and spoke with too much excitement [*paizo: cf. 422e as they say in the game*]. For when I saw philosophy so undeservedly [*anaxios, adverb: cf. 491a as adjective*] trampled under foot of men I could not help feeling a sort of indignation [*aganakteo: cf. 516a as irritated*] at the authors of her disgrace: and my anger made me too vehement [*thumoo: cf. 441c as anger*]. Indeed! I was listening, and did not think so.

But I, who am the speaker, felt that I was. And now let me remind [*epilanthano, with ou: cf. 519e as forgotten*] you that, although in our former selection we chose old men [*presbutus: elder*], we must not **d** do so [*egchoreo: cf. 478b as cannot be the same*] in this. Solon was under a delusion [*peisteon, with ou: verbal adjective as must not be believed*] when he said that a man when he grows old may learn [*manthano: cf. 531d*] many things—for he can no more learn much than he can run much; youth is the time for any extraordinary toil.

Of course.

And, therefore, calculation and geometry and all the other elements of instruction [*propaideia: preparatory teaching*] which are a preparation [*propaideuo*] for dialectic should be presented [*proballo: to put forward*] to the mind in childhood; not, however, under any notion of forcing our system of education [*epanagkes: necessary & schema: cf. 501a as outline & didache: cf. 399b as instruction*].

Why not?

**e** Because a freeman ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of knowledge [*manthano: cf. d & mathema: cf. 535b as study*] of any kind. Bodily exercise, when compulsory [*biazo: cf. 465a as violence*], does no harm to the body; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on [*emmonos: abiding, with ouden*] the mind [*psuche: cf. 535e as soul*].

Very true.

Then, my good friend [*aristos: cf. 532c as best*], I said, do not use compulsion [*biazo: cf. e*] but let early **537**

education [*paideuo: cf. a & mathema: cf. e*] be a sort of amusement [*paizo: cf. c*]; you will then be better able to find out the natural bent [*phuo: cf. 437e*].

That is a very rational notion [*logos: cf. 534d in context of sentence*], he said.

Do you remember that the children, too, were to be taken to see [*theo: cf. 518c as sight*] the battle on horseback; and that if there were no danger they were to be brought close up and, like young hounds, have a taste of blood given them?

Yes, I remember [*mimnesko: cf. 518a*].

The same practice may be followed, I said, in all these things—labors, lessons, dangers—and he who is most at home [*entrecho: to run in*] in all of them ought [*phaino: cf. 533a as reveal*] to be enrolled in a select number.

**b** At what age?

At the age when the necessary gymnastics are over: the period whether of two or three years which passes in this sort of training [*praxis: cf. 476a as things*] is useless for any other purpose; for sleep and exercise are unpropitious to learning [*polemios: cf. 423a as enemies & mathema: cf. a*]; and the trial of who is first in gymnastic exercises is [*phaino: cf. a*] one of the most important tests to which our youth are subjected.

Certainly, he replied.

After that time those who are selected from the class of twenty years old will be promoted to higher honor [*time: cf. 47b in context of sentence*], and the sciences which they learned without any order

**c** [*mathema: cf. b & chuden, adverb: at random*] in their early education [*paideia: cf. 535b*] will now be brought together [*sunakteon: verbal adjective*], and they will be able to see the natural relationship [*oikeiotes: cf. 402a as friend & sunopsis, with eis: a general view*] of them to one another and to true being [*ontos: cf. 533b*].

Yes, he said, that is the only kind of knowledge which takes lasting root [*mathesis: cf. 536b as education & bebaios: cf. 536a as surest*].

Yes, I said; and the capacity [*peira: trail, attempt*] for such knowledge is the great criterion of dialectical talent [*dialektikos: cf. 534e & phusis: cf. 535b as natural*]: the comprehensive mind [*sunoptikos: seeing the whole together*] is always the dialectical.

I agree with [*sunoiomai: cf. 517c in context of sentence*] you, he said.

These, I said, are the points which you must consider [*episkopeo: cf. 531c as reflect*]; and those who have **d** most of this comprehension and who are more steadfast in their learning [*monimos: stable & mathema: cf. c*] and in their military and other appointed duties, when they have arrived at the age of thirty have to be chosen by you out of the select class, and elevated to higher honor; and you will have to prove [*skopeo: cf. 536a in context of sentence*] them by the help of dialectic, in order to learn which of them is able to give up [*basanizo: cf. 503e as tested*] the use of sight and the other senses [*aisthesis: cf. 524d*], and in company with truth [*aletheia, with meta: cf. 535d*] to attain absolute being [*to on: cf. 533b*]. And here, my friend, great caution is required [*phulake: cf. 521b in context of sentence & ergos: cf. 530e as study*].

Why great caution?

**e** Do you not remark [*ennoeo: cf. 525c as I must add*], I said, how great is the evil which dialectic [*dialego: cf. 533a*] has introduced?

What evil?, he said.

The students of the art are filled with lawlessness [*paranomia: cf. 424d*].

Quite true, he said.

Do you think that there is [*pascho: cf. 536b as turning*] anything so very unnatural or inexcusable [*thaumastos: cf. 517d as surprising*] in their case or will you make allowance [*suggignosko: to know together*] for them?

In what way make allowance?

I want you, I said, by way of parallel, to imagine a supposititious son [*hupobolimaioi: substituted by 538 stealth*] who is brought up in great wealth; he is one of a great and numerous family, and has many flatterers [*kolax*]. When he grows up to manhood, he learns that his alleged are not his real parents; but who the real are he is unable to discover. Can you guess [*manteuomai: cf. 531d as suspect*] how he will be likely to behave towards his flatterers and his supposed parents, first of all during the period when he is ignorant of the false relation and then again when he knows [*eido: cf. 534c*]? Or shall I guess for you?

If you please.

Then I should say, that while he is ignorant of the truth he will be likely to honor [*timaos: cf. 489a*] his

**b** father and his mother and his supposed relations [*dokeo: cf. 533d as dispute & oikeios: cf. 531d as affinities*]

more than the flatterers [*kolakeuo: verb*]; he will be less inclined to neglect them when in need or to do or say anything against them; and he will be less willing to disobey [*apeitho*] them in any important matter. He will.

But when he has made the discovery, I should imagine [*manteuomai: cf. a*] that he would diminish his honor and regard [*spoudazo: cf. 485e, in context of sentence*] for them and would become more devoted [*epiteino: cf. 441e as nerving*] to the flatterers; their influence [*peitho: cf. 530a as feeling*] over him would greatly increase; he would now live after their ways and openly associate with [*suneimi: cf. 403b c as familiarity & aparakalutos, adverb: undisguisedly*] them, and unless he were of an unusually good disposition [*epieikes: cf. 489d as best & phusis: cf. 537c as talent*], he would trouble [*mello: cf. 470 as maintain*] himself no more about his supposed parents or other relations.

Well, all that is very probable. But how is the image applicable [*hapto, with pros: cf. 535c as has fallen*] to the disciples of philosophy?

In this way: you know that there are certain principles [*dogma: cf. 506b as opinions*] about justice and honor [*dikaios: cf. 520e as just & kalos: cf. 531c as beautiful*] which were taught us in childhood, and under their parental authority we have been brought up, obeying and honoring [*archo: cf. 521a in context of sentence & timao: cf. b*] them.

That is true.

**d** There are also opposite ways and habits of pleasure [*epitedeuma: cf. 502d as pursuits & hedone: cf. 506b*] which flatter and attract the soul [*kolakeuo: cf. b & helko: cf. 533b as lifted upwards & psuche: cf. 536e as mind*] but do not influence [*peitho: cf. b as influence*] those of us who have any sense of right, and they continue to obey and honor [*peitharcho: to obey one in authority*] the maxims of their fathers.

True.

Now, when a man is in this state, and the questioning spirit asks what is fair or honorable [*to kalon: cf. 493e as absolute beauty*], and he answers as the legislator has taught [*akouo: to hear, listen*] him, and then arguments many and diverse refute his words [*exelegcho: cf. 535a as to be considered & logos: cf. 537a as rational notion*], until he is driven into believing [*kataballo: to cast down & doxa, with eis: cf. 534c as opinion*] that nothing is honorable any more than dishonorable [*kalos: cf. c & aischros: cf. 492c e as evil*], or just and good [*dikaios: cf. c & agathos: cf. 534c*] any more than the reverse, and so of all the notions which he most valued [*time: cf. 537b as honor*], do you think that he will still honor and obey [*time & peitharcho: cf. d*] them as before?

Impossible.

And when he ceases to think [*hegeomai: cf. 530b as imagine*] them honorable and natural [*timaos & oikeios: cf. b as relations*] as heretofore, and he fails to discover the true [*heurisko: cf. 528b as to be known & alethes: cf. 515c*], can he be expected to pursue [*proschoreo: to go to, approach*] any life other **539** than that which flatters [*kolakeuo: cf. d*] his desires?

He cannot.

And from being a keeper of the law he is converted into a breaker of it [*paranomos: cf. 424e as lawless & nomimos: cf. 484d as laws*]?

Unquestionably.

Now all this is very natural [*pathos: cf. 518b as state of being*] in students of philosophy such as I have described and also, as I was just now saying, most excusable [*suggnome: cf. 391e in context of sentence*].

Yes, he said; and, I may add, pitiable [*eleos*].

Therefore, that your feelings may not be moved to pity [*eleos: cf. a*] about our citizens who are now thirty years of age, every care must be taken [*eulabeomai: cf. 507a as have (no) intention*] in introducing them to dialectic [*hapteon: cf. 525b as lay hold of*].

Certainly.

**b** There is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight [*eulabeia: cf. 416b as safeguard*] too early; for youngsters, as you may have observed, when they first get the taste in their mouths, argue for amusement and are always contradicting and refuting others in imitation [*antilogia: cf. 454b as opposition & exelegcho: cf. 538d & mimeomai: cf. 532a*] of those who refute them; like puppy-dogs, they rejoice in pulling and tearing at all who come near them.

Yes, he said, there is nothing which they like better [*huperphos, adverb: cf. 525b as remarkable manner*].

And when they have made many conquests and received defeats at the hands of many, they violently **c** and speedily get into a way of [*empipto: cf. 524d as invite*] not believing [*hegeomai: cf. 538e as think*]

anything which they believed before, and hence, not only they, but philosophy and all that relates to it, is apt to have a bad name [*diaballo: cf. 498c as make a quarrel*] with the rest of the world.

Too true, he said.

But when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be guilty of such insanity [*metecho: cf. 525b as prescribed & mania: cf. 496c as madness*]; he will imitate [*mimeomai: cf. b*] the dialectician [*dialego: cf. 537e as dialectic*] who is seeking for truth [*skopeo: cf. 537d as prove & alethes: cf. 538e as true*] and not the eristic [*antilego: cf. 455a as argument*] who is contradicting for the sake of amusement; and the greater moderation [*metriotes*] of his character will increase instead of diminishing the honor of the

d pursuit [*timios: cf. 415b in context of sentence & epitedeuma: cf. 538d as habits*].

Very true, he said.  
And did we not make special provision [*eulabeia, with epi: cf. b as delight*] for this, when we said that the disciples of philosophy were to be orderly and steadfast [*kosmios: cf. 500c, in context of sentence & stasimos: stable*] not, as now, any chance aspirant or intruder?

Very true.

Suppose [*arkeo: cf. 506d as satisfied & logos, with epi: cf. 538d as words*], I said, the study of philosophy to take the place of gymnastics and to be continued diligently and earnestly and exclusively [*metalepsis: participation & endeuchos: continuously & suntonos: intensely & antistrophos: in a co-ordinating fashion*] for twice the number of years which were passed in bodily exercise—will that be enough?

e Would you say six or four years? he asked.

Say five years, I replied; at the end of the time they must be sent down again into the den [*spelaiion: cave*] and compelled to hold any military or other office which young men are qualified to hold: in this way they will get their experience of life [*empeiria: cf. 484e*], and there will be an opportunity of trying [*basanizo: cf. 537d as able to give up*] whether, when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation 540 [*helko: cf. 538d as attract*], they will stand firm or flinch [*emmeno: cf. 345b as be consistent & parakineo: to disturb*].

And how long is this stage of their lives to last?

Fifteen years, I answered; and when they have reached fifty years of age, then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves [*diasozo: cf. 460a as preserve & aristeuo: cf. 468b*] in every action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge [*ergos: cf. 537d as caution & episteme: cf. 534c as science*] come at last to their consummation [*telos, with pros: cf. 535a as no further*]; the time has now arrived at which they must raise the eye of the soul [*anaklino: to recline & auge & psuche: cf. 538d*] to the universal light which lightens [*phos: cf. 532b & apoblepo: cf. 532a as behold*] all things and behold the absolute good [*eidon: cf. 533b & to agathon; cf. 343b*] for that is the pattern [*paradeigma: cf. 529e*]

b according to which they are to order [*kosmeo: cf. 506b*] the state and the lives of individuals and the remainder of their own lives also; making philosophy their chief pursuit [*diatribo: cf. 519c as education*] but when their turn comes, toiling [*epitalaiporeo: to labor yet more*] also at politics and ruling [*archo: cf. 538c as obeying*] for the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic [*kalos: cf. 538d as honorable*] action but simply as a matter of duty; and when they have brought up [*paideuo: cf. 537a as education*] in each generation others like themselves and left them in their place to be governors [*phulax: cf. 525b as guardian*] of the state, then they will depart to the Islands of the Blest [*nesos & makarios: cf. 519c*] and dwell there; and the city will give them public memorials and sacrifices and

c honor them, if the Pythian oracle consent [*sunanaireo: to destroy together, to give the same answer*] as demi-god [*daimon: cf. 469a as angels*], but if not, as in any case blessed and divine [*eudaimon: cf. 466b as happy & theios: cf. 532c*].

You are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of our governors faultless in beauty [*pagkalos: cf. 338a as excellent*].

Yes, I said, Glaucon, and of our governesses too; for you must not suppose that what I have been saying applies to men only and not to women as far as their natures [*phusis: cf. 538c as disposition*] can go.

There you are right, he said, since we have made them to share [*dierchomai: cf. 533d, in context of sentence & koinoneo: cf. 470e*] in all things like the men.

d Well, I said, and you would agree [*sugchoreo: cf. 530d*] (would you not?) that what has been said about the state and the government [*politeia: cf. 536b as state*] is not a mere dream [*eucho: cf. 499c as dreamers*] and although difficult [*chalepos: cf. 535e as indignant*] not impossible [*dunatos (here as negative): cf. 473e as possibility*], but only possible in the way which has been supposed; that is to say, when the true [*alethos, adverb: cf. 500b*] philosopher kings [*dunastes: lord, master*] are born in a state one or more of them, despising

the honors [*kataphroneo*: cf. 521b as look down upon] of this present world [*ton nun*: literally, of those now] which they deem mean and worthless [*hegeomai*: cf. 539c as believing & *aneleutheros*: cf. 486b & *axios* (with *ou*): cf. 458b as worthy], esteeming above all things right [*orthos*: cf. 529c as justice] and the honor that springs from right, and regarding justice [*dikaiois*:

e cf. 538e as just] as the greatest and most necessary of all things whose ministers they are [*hupereteo*: cf. 427b as propitiate] and whose principles will be exalted [*auxano*: cf. 468d, in context of sentence] by them when they set in order [*diaskeuoreomai*] their own city?

How will they proceed?

They will begin by sending out into the country all the inhabitants of the city who are more than ten **541** years old and will take possession of their children who will be unaffected by the habits [*ethe*: cf. 535b as tempers] of their parents; these they will train in their own habits and laws [*trepho*: cf. 534d as nurturing & *tropoisios*: (?; related to *tropos* as in 535c, way) & *nomos*: cf. 536a as true son], I mean in the laws which we have given them: and in this way the state and constitution [*politeia*: cf. d as government] of which we were speaking will soonest and most easily attain happiness [*katastasis*: cf. 502d as appointment & *eudaimoneo*: cf. 521a as true blessings], and the nation which has such a constitution will gain [*onesis*: use, profit] most.

Yes, that will be the best way. And I think [*dokeo*: cf. 538b as supposed], Socrates, that you have very **b** well described how, if ever, such a constitution might come into being.

Enough then of the perfect state, and of the man who bears its image [*homoios*: cf. 515a as like]—there is no difficulty [*delos*: cf. 432b as obvious] in seeing how we shall describe him.

There is no difficulty, he replied; and I agree with you in thinking [*dokeo*: cf. a] that nothing more need be said [*telos*: cf. 540a as consummation].