

The Republic of Plato

(four of four)

Book Eight

543 And so, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion [*homologeo: cf. 510d as arrive*] that in the perfect [*akros, adverb: cf. 459b as consummate skill, adjective*] state wives and children are to be in common; and that all education and the pursuits of war and peace are also to be common, and the best [*aristos: cf. 536e as good friend*] philosophers and the bravest warriors are to be their kings?

That, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged [*homologeo: cf. a*].

b Yes, I said; and we have further acknowledged [*sugchoreo: cf. 540d as agree*] that the governors, when appointed [*archo: cf. 540b as ruling & kathistemi: cf. 503b as must be*] themselves, will take their soldiers and place them in houses such as we were describing, which are common to all, and contain nothing private or individual; and about their property, you remember [*mimnesko: cf. 537a*] what we agreed [*diomologeo: cf. 527b as admission to be made*]?

Yes, I remember that no one was to have any of the ordinary possessions of mankind; they were to be warrior athletes and guardians, receiving from the other citizens, in lieu of annual payment, only their

c maintenance, and they were to take care of [*epimeleomai: cf. 499d as have charge of*] themselves and of the whole state.

True [*orthos, adverb: cf. 529c as justice*], I said; and now that this division of our task is concluded, let us find [*anamimnesko: cf. 522b as recollection*] the point at which we digressed that we may return into the old path. There is no difficulty [*chalepos: cf. 540d*] in returning, you implied. Then as now, that you had finished the description [*dialuo: cf. 477b as division & logos: cf. 539d, in context of sentence*] of the state. You said that such a state was good [*agathos: cf. 538e*], and that the man was good who answered to it,

d although, as now appears, you had more excellent things [*kalos: cf. 540b as heroic*] to relate both of **544** state and man. And you said further that if this was the true form [*orthos: cf. 540d as right*], then the others were false [*hamartano: cf. 553c as inconsistency*]; and of the false forms, you said, as I remember [*mimnesko: cf. 543b*], that there were four principal ones [*eidos: cf. 513c as ideas*] and that their defects [*hamartema: cf. 535c as mistake*] and the defects of the individuals corresponding to them were worth examining. When we had seen all the individuals and finally agreed [*homologeo: cf. 543a as arrived at the conclusion*] as to who was the best and who was the worst of them [*aristos: cf. 543a & kakos: cf. 519a as mischievous*], we were to consider whether the best was not also the happiest and the worst the most miserable [*eudaimoneo: cf. 541a as happiness & athlios: cf. 392b as miserable*]. I asked

b you what were the four forms of government [*politeia: cf. 541a as constitution*] of which you spoke, and then Polemarchus and Adeimantus put in their word; and you began again and have found your way to the point [*analambano: cf. 467b as recover & logos: cf. c as description*] at which we have now arrived.

Your recollection [*mimnesko: cf. a as remember*], I said, is most exact.

Then, like a wrestler [*palaistes: adversary*], he replied, you must put yourself again in the same position [*parecho: cf. 517c as immediate*]. Let me ask the same questions, and do you give me the same answer which you were about to give me then.

Yes, if I can, I will, I said.

I shall particularly wish to hear what were the four constitutions [*politeia: cf. b as government*] of which you were speaking.

c That question, I said, is easily answered: the four governments of which I spoke, so far as they have distinct names, are first those of Crete and Sparta which are generally applauded [*epaineo: cf. 426d as admired*]; what is termed oligarchy comes next; this is not equally approved and is a form of government which teems with evils [*politeia: cf. b as constitutions & suchnos: much, great & kakos: cf. a as worst*]; thirdly, democracy, which naturally follows oligarchy, although very different [*diaphoros: cf. 470b as difference*]; and lastly comes tyranny, great and famous, which differs from them all and is the fourth and worst disorder [*nosema: cf. 391c as passions*] of a state. I do not know, do you, of any other constitution [*politeia: cf. c as government*] which can be said to have a distinct character [*diaphaino: to d show through & eidos: cf. a as ones*]? There are lordships and principalities which are bought and sold and some other intermediate forms of government. But these are non-descript [*metaxu: cf. 479d as intermediate*] and may be found equally among Hellenes and among

barbarians.

Yes, he replied, we certainly hear of many curious forms [*atopos: cf. 524b as curious*] of government which exist among them.

Do you know, I said, that governments vary as the dispositions of men vary [*tropos: cf. 535c as way*], and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other? For we cannot suppose that states [*politeia: cf. c as constitution*] are made of 'oak and rock' [*cf. Odyssey, xix163*] and not out of the human natures [*ethos: cf. 533d as custom*] which are in them, and which in a figure turn the scale and draw

e [*rhepo: to incline downwards & ephelko: to draw on*] other things after them?

Yes, he said, the states are as the men are; they grow out of human characters.

Then if the constitutions of states are five, the dispositions of individual minds [*kataskeue: cf. 462a as organization & psuche: cf. 540a as soul*] will also be five?

Certainly.

Him who answers to aristocracy and whom we rightly call just and good [*dikaios: cf. 540d as justice & agathos: cf. 543c*], we have already described.

545 We have.

Then let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures, being the contentious and ambitious, who answer to the Spartan polity [*politeia: cf. 544d as states*]; also the oligarchical, democratic and tyrannical. Let us place the most just by the side of the most unjust [*dikaios: cf. 544e & adikaios*], and when we see [*skepsis: cf. 533e as consider*] them we shall be able to compare the relative happiness or unhappiness [*eudaimonia: cf. 472c & athliotes: wretchedness*] of him who leads a life of pure justice or pure injustice [*akratos: cf. 491e & dikaiosune: & adikia, with pros: for both, cf. 472b*]. The enquiry will then be completed. And we shall know whether we ought to pursue [*dioko: cf. 490a as followed*] injustice, as Thrasymachus advises [*peitho: cf. 438d as do (not) influence*], or in accordance with the

b conclusions of the argument [*prophaino: to bring forth to light & logos: cf. 544b as point*] to prefer justice.

Certainly, he replied, we must do as you say.

Shall we follow our old plan [*archo: cf. 543b as appointed*] which we adopted with a view to clearness [*skopeo: cf. 539c as seeking & ethe: cf. 541a as habits & enarges: cf. 533d as clearness*], of taking the state [*politeia: cf. a as polity*] first and then proceeding [*skopeo: cf. a*] to the individual and begin with the government of honor [*philotimos: cf. 485b as man of ambition*]? I know of no name for such a government other than timocracy or perhaps timarchy. We will compare [*skeptomai: cf. 526c as*

c concerns] with this the like character in the individual; and after that consider oligarchical man; and then again we will turn our attention [*apoblepo: cf. 540a as lightens & theaomai: cf. 529b as study*] to democracy and the democratic man; and lastly we will go and view the city of tyranny and once more take a look into [*blepo, with eis: cf. 532b*] the tyrant's soul [*psuche: cf. 544e as minds*] and try to arrive at [*peirazo: cf. 517a as think & protithemi: cf. 460d as scheme*] a satisfactory decision [*hikanos: cf. 524d as adequately & krino: cf. 433c as determine*].

That way of viewing and judging [*thea: cf. 532c as contemplation & krisis: cf. 361e as decision*] of the matter [*logos, with kata: cf. 500c as according to reason*] will be very suitable.

First, then, I said, let us enquire how [*peirao: cf. 523a as try & tropos: cf. 544d in context of sentence*] timocracy (the government of honor) arises out of aristocracy (the government of the best). Clearly, all **d** political changes [*politeia: cf. b as state & metaballo: cf. 473c as reform*] originate in divisions of the actual governing power; a government which is united, however small, cannot be moved.

Very true, he said.

In what way, then, will our city be moved, and in what manner the two classes of auxiliaries and rulers [*epikouros: cf. 466a as protectors & archo: cf. b as plan*] disagree [*stasiazo: cf. 520c as fight*] among themselves or with one another? Shall we, after the manner of Homer, pray the Muses [*euchomai: cf. 432c & 411d*] to tell us 'how discord first arose' [*cf. Illiad xvi.112-13*]? Shall we imagine them in solemn

e mockery, to play and jest with us as if we were children and to address us in a lofty tragic vein, making believe to be in earnest [*hupselologeomai: to speak proudly & spoude: cf. 397a as ready*]?

How would they address us?

546 After this manner:—a city which is thus constituted [*sunistemi: cf. 530a as are framed*] can hardly be shaken, but seeing that everything which has a beginning [*gignomai: cf. 527b as perishing*] has also an end [*phthora: cf. 490e as corruptions*], even a constitution [*sustasis: cf. 457e in context of sentence*] such as yours will not last for ever [*chronos: cf. 409d as time & meno, to remain*], but will in time be dissolved [*luo: cf. 515c*]

as liberated]. And this is the dissolution [*luisis: cf. 532b as release*—in plants that grow in the earth as well as in animals that move on the earth's surface, fertility and sterility of soul and body [*phora: cf. 530c as motion & aphoria & psuche: cf. c & soma: cf. 525d as objects*] occur when the circumferences of the circles of each are completed [*sunapto: cf. 425a as be a principle of growth*], which in short-lived existences pass over a short space and in long-lived ones over a long space. But to the knowledge of human fecundity and sterility all the wisdom and education [*sophos: cf. 530d as wiser b & paideuo: cf. 540b as have brought up*] of your rulers will not attain; the laws which regulate them will not be discovered by an intelligence [*logismos: cf. 525d in context of sentence*] which is alloyed with sense [*teucho: to make ready & aisthesis: cf. 537d*] but will escape [*pariem: cf. 516c as passing*] them, and they will bring children into the world when they ought not. Now that which is of divine birth has a period which is contained in a perfect [*perilambano: to embrace & teleios: cf. 361a*] number, but the period of human birth [*auxeseis: growth*] is comprehended in a number in which first increments by involution and evolution (or squared and cubed) obtaining three intervals and four terms of like and unlike, waxing and waning numbers, make all the terms commensurable and agreeable [*apophero: to c carry, return*] to one another. The base of these (3) with a third added (4) when combined with five (20) and raised to the third power furnishes two harmonies [*parecho: cf. 544b as same position & harmonia: cf. 531c*]; the first a square which is a hundred times as great ($400 = 4 \times 100$), and the other a figure having one side equal to the former, but oblong, consisting of a hundred numbers squared upon rational diameters of a square (i. e. omitting fractions), the side of which is five ($7 \times 7 = 49 \times 100 = 4900$), each of them being less by one (than the perfect square which includes the fractions, sc. 50) or less by two perfect squares of irrational diameters (of a square the side of which is five = $50 + 50 = 100$); and a hundred cubes of three ($27 \times 100 = 2700 + 4900 + 400 = 8000$). Now this number represents a geometrical figure which has control [*kurios: cf. 534d as set in authority*] over the good and evil of

d births. For when your guardians are ignorant [*phulax: cf. 540b as governors & agnoeo: cf. 506a as does not know*] of the law of births and unite bride and bridegroom out of season [*kairos, with para: cf. 421a as order*], the children will not be goodly or fortunate [*euphuos: cf. 401c as gifted & eutuches: prosperous*]. And though only the best [*aristos: cf. 544a*] of them will be appointed by their predecessors, still they will be unworthy [*anaxios: cf. 491a*] to hold their fathers' places, and when they come into power as guardians [*phulax: cf. d*], they will soon be found to fall in taking care of [*ameleo: to neglect*] us, the Muses [*cf. 545d*], first by undervaluing music; which neglect will soon extend to gymnastic; and hence the young men of your state will be less cultivated [*amousos: cf. 486d as unharmonious*]. In the succeeding generation rulers will be appointed who have lost the guardian power [*phulakikos*] of testing [*kathistemi: cf. 543b as appointed*] the metal of your different races, which, like

e Hesiod's, are of gold and silver and brass and iron [*cf. Works and Days 109-202*]. And so iron will be **547** mingled with silver, and brass with gold, and hence there will arise dissimilarity and inequality and irregularity [*anomoioites & anomalia & unevenness & anarmostos: unsuitable*] which always and in all places are causes of hatred and war. This the Muses [*cf. d*] affirm to be the stock [*genea: race*] from which discord [*stasis: cf. 471a*] has sprung, wherever arising; and this is their answer to us.

Yes, and we may assume that they answer truly [*orthos, adverb: cf. 543c*].

Why, yes, I said, of course they answer truly; how can the Muses speak falsely?

b And what do the Muses say next?

When discord [*stasis: cf. a*] arose, then the two races were drawn [*helko: cf. 540a as temptation*] different ways: the iron and brass fell to acquiring money and land and houses and gold and silver; but the gold and silver races, not wanting money but having the true riches in their own nature [*plousios: cf. 423a & phusis: cf. 540c*], inclined towards virtue [*ago: cf. 529a as leads & arete: cf. 536a*] and the ancient order of things [*archaios & katastasis: cf. 542a in context of sentence*]. There was a battle

c between them, and at last they agreed [*homologeo: cf. 544a*] to distribute their land and houses among individual owners. They enslaved their friends and maintainers whom they had formerly protected in the condition of freemen and made of them subjects and servants; and they themselves were engaged in war and in keeping a watch against them [*epimelomai: cf. 520 as have care & phulake: cf. 537d in context of sentence*]. I believe [*dokeo: cf. 542b as thinking*] that you have rightly conceived the origin of the change [*gignomai: cf. 546a as beginning & metabasis: a passing over*].

And the new government [*politeia: cf. 545d as political*] which thus arises will be of a form intermediate [*en meso*] between oligarchy and aristocracy?

Very true.

Such will be the change [*metabaino: cf. 449b as succeed*], and after the change has been made, how will they proceed [*oikeo: cf. 521b as administered*]? Clearly the new state [*proteros: first & politeia: cf. c*], **d** being in a mean between [*mimeomai: cf. 539c as imitate & en meso: cf. c*] oligarchy and the perfect state, will partly follow one and partly the other and will also have some peculiarities [*idios: cf. 479a in context of sentence*].

True, he said.

In the honor [*time: cf. 538e*] given to rulers, in the abstinence [*apecho: cf. 407a in context of sentence*] of the warrior class from agriculture, handicrafts, and trade in general, in the institution of common meals, and in the attention paid [*epimelomai: cf. c as keeping a watch*] to gymnastics and military training—in all these respects this state will resemble [*mimeomai: cf. d*] the former.

True.

e But in the fear [*phobeo*] of admitting philosophers to power [*sophos: cf. 546a as wisdom & arche, with epi: cf. 533c as ground*], because they are no longer simple and earnest [*haploos: cf. 383e & atenes: strained tight*] but are made up of mixed elements [*meiktos*]; and in turning from [*apoklino*] them to passionate and less complex characters [*thumoeides: cf. 556a as spirit & haploos: cf. e*] who are by **548** nature fitted [*phuo: cf. 537a as natural bent*] for war rather than peace; and in the value set by them upon military stratagems and contrivances and in the waging of everlasting wars—this state will be for the most part peculiar [*idios: cf. d*].

Yes.

Yes, I said; and men of this stamp will be covetous [*epithumeo: cf. 517b as desire*] of money like those who live in oligarchies; they will have a fierce secret longing [*timao: cf. 5238c as honoring & agrios, adverb: cf. 416b as savage, adjective*] after gold and silver which they will hoard in dark places, having magazines and treasuries of their own for the deposit and concealment of them; also castles which are **b** just nests for their eggs in which they will spend large sums on their wives or on any others whom they please [*dapanao: to spend upon*].

That is most true, he said.

And they are miserly [*pheidolos: thrifty*] because they have no means of openly acquiring the money which they prize; they will spend that which is another man's on the gratification of their desires [*epithumia: cf. 533b*], stealing their pleasures and running away [*apodidrasko*] like children from the law [*nomos: cf. 541a*], their father: they have been schooled [*paideuo: cf. 546a as education*] not by gentle influences but by force [*peitho: cf. 545a as advises & bia: cf. 411e as violence*], for they have neglected her who is the true Muse [*ameleo: cf. 546d as fall in taking care of & alethinos: cf. 347d & 499d*], the **c** companion of reason [*logos, with meta: cf. 545c as matter*] and philosophy, and have honored [*timao: cf. a*] gymnastic more than music.

Undoubtedly, he said, the form of government [*politeia: cf. 547c as state*] which you describe is a mixture of good and evil [*meignumi: cf. 548d in context of sentence & agathos: cf. 544e & kakos: cf. 544c*].

Why, there is a mixture, I said; but one thing, and one thing only, is predominantly seen [*diaphanestaton: verbal adjective*],—the spirit of contention and ambition [*philoneikos: loving strife & philotimos: cf. 545b as honor*], and these are due to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element [*krateo: cf. 492d as overcome & thumoeides: cf. 467e*].

Assuredly, he said.

Such is the origin and such the character of this state [*gignomai: cf. 547c & politeia: cf. c*] which has been described in outline only [*hupographo: cf. 501a & schema: cf. 536d as system*]; the more perfect **d** execution was not required [*akribos, adverb: cf. 435d as adequate & apergazomai: cf. 501b as work*], for a sketch [*hupographie: cf. 504d as outline*] is enough to show the type of the most perfectly just and most perfectly unjust [*dikaios & adikaios: for both, cf. 545a*]; and to go through all the states and all the characters [*politeia: cf. c & ethe: cf. 545b in context of sentence*] of men, omitting none of them, would be an interminable labor [*paraleipo: cf. 486c as should be remarked & dierchomai: cf. 540c as share*].

Very true [*orthos, adverb: cf. 547a*], he replied.

Now what man answers to this form of government [*politeia: cf. d*]-how did he come into being, and what is he like?

I think [*dokeo: cf. 547c as I believe*], said Adeimantus, that in the spirit of contention which characterizes him [*philonikia: strife & teino: cf. 526e as tends*], he is not unlike our friend Glaucon.

e Perhaps, I said, he may be like him in that one point; but there are other respects in which he is very

different.

In what respects?

He should have more of self-assertion and be less cultivated [*authades: wilful & hupoamousos: somewhat estranged from the Muses*] and yet a friend of culture [*philomousos: loving the Muses*]; and he should **549** be a good listener but no speaker [*rhetorikos*]. Such a person is apt to be rough [*agrios: cf. 416b as savage & kataphroneo: cf. 540d as despising the honors*] with slaves, unlike the educated man [*paideuo: cf. b as schooled*] who is too proud for that; and he will also be courteous [*hemeros: cf. 494d as gently*] to freemen and remarkably obedient [*hupekoos: cf. 441e as ally*] to authority; he is a lover of power and a lover of honor [*philoarchos & philotimos: cf. c as ambition*]; claiming to be a ruler, not because he is eloquent [*axios: cf. 540d as worthless (with ou)*] or on any ground of that sort, but because he is a soldier and has performed feats of arms; he is also a lover of gymnastic exercises and of the chase.

Yes, that is the type of character [*ethos: cf. 544d as natures*] which answers to this constitution [*politeia: cf. d as government*].

Such an one will despise [*kataphroneo: cf. a*] riches only when he is young; but as he gets older he will **b** be more and more attracted to [*aspazomai: cf. 480a as love*] them because he has a piece of the avaricious nature [*metecho: cf. 539c in context of sentence & philochrematos & phusis: cf. 547b*] in him and is not single-minded towards virtue [*eilikrines: cf. 478e as simple & arete, with pros: cf. 547b*], having lost his best guardian [*aristos & phulax: for both, cf. 546d*].

Who was that?, said Adeimantus.

Philosophy, I said, tempered [*kerannumi: cf. 501b as temper*] with music, which comes and takes her abode [*enoikeo*] in a man and is the only savior of his virtue [*soter: cf. 502d & arete: cf. b*] throughout life.

Good [*kalos, adverb: cf. 529b as right*], he said.

Such,

I said, is the timocratical youth, and he is like [*eoikos, adverb*] the timocratical state.

c Exactly.

His origin [*gignomai: cf. 548c*] is as follows:—He is often the young son of a grave [*agathos: cf. 548c as good*] father who dwells in an ill-governed city [*politeuo (with ouk & eu): cf. 462d, in context of sentence*] of which he declines the honors and offices and will not go to law or exert himself in any way [*philopragmosune: a busy disposition*] but is ready to waive his rights in order that he may escape trouble [*pragma: cf. 505a as troublesome*].

And how does the son come into being [*gignomai: cf. c*]?

The character of the son begins to develop when he hears his mother complaining that her husband has no place in the government [*archo: cf. 545d as rulers*] of which the consequence is that she has no **d** precedence among other women. Further, when she sees her husband not very eager about money, and instead of battling and railing in the law courts or assembly, taking whatever happens to him quietly [*rhathumos: lightly*]; and when she observes that his thoughts always center in himself [*nous: cf. 531b as understanding & prosecho: cf. 521b, in context of sentence*] while he treats her with very considerable indifference [*atimazo: cf. 505d as despised*], she is annoyed and says to her son that his father is only half a man and far too easy-going; adding all the other complaints about her own ill-treatment which **e** women are so fond of rehearsing [*humneo: cf. 463d as strains*].

Yes, said Adeimantus, they give us plenty of them and their complaints are so like themselves.

And you know, I said, that the old servants also who are supposed to be attached to the family from time to time talk privately in the same strain to the son; and if they see any one who owes money to his father or is wronging him in any way and he falls to prosecute them, they tell the youth that when he grows up he must retaliate [*timoreo: to lend aid*] upon people of this sort and be more of a **550** man than his father. He has only to walk abroad and he hears and sees the same sort of thing: those who do their own business in the city are called simpletons and held in no esteem [*en smikro logo: literally, in small word*] while the busy-bodies are honored and applauded. The result is that the young man, hearing and seeing all these thing—hearing too, the words of his father and having a nearer view of his way of life [*epitedeuma: cf. 539d as pursuit*] and making comparisons of him and others—is drawn [*helko: cf. 547b*] opposite ways: while his father is watering and nourishing the rational principle in his

b soul [*to logistikon; for logistikos, cf. 536b as calculation & psuche: cf. 546a*] the others are encouraging the passionate and appetitive [*epithumetikos: cf. 516d as would care & thumoeides: cf. 547e as passionate*]; and he being not originally of a bad nature [*kakos: cf. 548c as evil & phusis: cf. 549b*] but having kept bad company,

is at last brought [*helko: cf. a*] by their joint influence to a middle point and gives up the kingdom which is within him to the middle principle of contentiousness and passion [*philonikos & thumoeides: cf. b*] and becomes arrogant and ambitious [*hupselophros & philotimos: cf. 549a as lover of honor*]. You seem [*dokeo: cf. 548d as think*] to me to have described his origin [*genesis: cf. 534a as becoming*] perfectly.

c Then we have now, I said, the second form of government [*politeia: cf. 549a as constitution*] and the second type of character?

We have.

Next, let us look at another man who, as Aeschylus says, "is set over against another state" [*perhaps Seven Against Thebes, 451*] or rather, as our plan requires, begin with the state.

By all means.

I believe that oligarchy follows next in order [*politeia: cf. c*].

And what manner of government [*katastasis: cf. 547b as order*] do you term oligarchy?

A government resting on a valuation of property in which the rich have power [*archo: cf. 549c as d government*] and the poor man is deprived of it [*arche: cf. 547e as power*].

I understand [*manthano: cf. 536e as knowledge*], he replied.

Ought I not to begin by describing how the change from timocracy to oligarchy arises [*metabaino: cf. 547c as change*]?

Yes.

Well, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the one passes into [*metabaino: cf. d*] the other.

How?

The accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individuals is ruin [*apollumi: cf. 527b as perishing*] the of timocracy [*politeia: cf. c*]; they invent illegal modes of expenditure; for what do they or their wives care about the law [*nomos: cf. 548b*]?

Yes, indeed.

e And then one, seeing another grow rich, seeks to rival him, and thus the great mass of the citizens become lovers of money.

Likely enough.

And so they grow richer and richer, and the more they think [*hegeomai: cf. 540d as deem*] of making a fortune the less they think of virtue [*atimos: cf. 508a as ignoble thing & arete: cf. 549b*]; for when riches and virtue are placed together in the scales of the balance, the one always rises as the other falls.

True.

551 And in proportion as riches and rich men are honored in the state, virtue and the virtuous are dishonored [*arete: cf. 550e & agathos: cf. 549c as grave & atimos: cf. 550e*].

Clearly.

And what is honored is cultivated [*timao: cf. 548c & askeo: cf. 468e as training*], and that which has no honor is neglected [*atimazo: cf. 549d as indifference & ameleo: cf. 548b as neglected*].

That is obvious.

And so at last, instead of loving contention and glory [*philonikos: cf. 550b & philotimos: cf. 550b as ambitious*], men become lovers of trade and money; they honor and look up [*epaineo: cf. 544c as applauded & thaumazo: cf. 517c as wonder*] to the rich man and make a ruler of him and dishonor [*atimazo: cf. a*] the poor man.

They do so.

They next proceed to make a law [*nomos: cf. 550d*] which fixes a sum of money as the qualification of **b** citizenship [*horos: cf. 423b as limit & politeia: cf. 550d as timocracy*]; the sum is higher in one place and lower in another, as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive; and they allow no one whose property [*ousia: cf. 534c, in context of sentence*] falls below the amount fixed to have any share in the government. These changes in the constitution [*politeia: cf. b*] they effect by force of arms, if intimidation has not already done their work. Very true.

And this, speaking generally, is the way in which oligarchy is established [*katastasis: cf. 550c as government*].

Yes, he said; but what are the characteristics of this form [*tropos: cf. 545c, in context of sentence*] of **c** government and what are the defects [*hamartema: cf. 544a*] of which we were speaking?

First of all, I said, consider the nature of the qualification [*horos: cf. b*] just think what would happen if pilots were to be chosen according to their property and a poor man were refused permission to steer, even though he were a better pilot?

You mean that they would shipwreck?

Yes; and is not this true of the government [*arche: cf. 550d as it or power*] of anything?

I should imagine so.

Except a city, or would you include a city?

No, he said, the case of a city is the strongest of all, inasmuch as the rule of a city is the greatest and most difficult [*chalepos: cf. 543c*] of all.

d This, then, will be the first great defect of oligarchy?

Clearly [*phaino: cf. 537b, in context of sentence*].

And here is another defect which is quite as bad.

What defect?

The inevitable division: such a state is not one but two states, the one of poor, the other of rich men; and they are living on the same spot and always conspiring against [*epibouleuo: cf. 494e as end*] one another.

That, surely, is at least as bad.

Another discreditable feature [*kalos, with ou: cf. 549b as good*] is that for a like reason they are **e** incapable of carrying on any war. Either they arm the multitude, and then they are more afraid of them than of the enemy; or, if they do not call them out in the hour of battle, they are [*phaino: cf. d as clearly*] oligarches indeed, few to fight as they are few to rule. And at the same time their fondness for money [*philochrematos: cf. 549b as avaricious*] makes them unwilling to pay taxes.

How discreditable [*kalos, with ou: cf. d*]!

And, as we said before, under such a constitution [*politeia: cf. b*] the same persons have too many

552 callings [*polupragmoneo: cf. 443d as interfere with*]—they are husbandmen, tradesmen, warriors, all in one. Does that look well [*dokeo: cf. 550b as seem & orthos, adverb: cf. 548d as very true*]?

Anything but well.

There is another evil [*kakos: cf. 550b as bad*] which is, perhaps, the greatest of all, and to which this state first begins to be liable [*paradechomai: cf. 397d as receive*].

What evil?

A man may sell all that he has and another may acquire his property; yet after the sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a part, being neither trader, nor artisan, nor horseman, nor hoplite, but only a poor, helpless creature [*penes: day laborer & aporos: trackless, without means*].

b Yes, that is an evil which also first begins in this state.

The evil is certainly not prevented there [*diakoluo: cf. 497e as hindered*]; for oligarchies have both the extremes of great wealth and utter poverty.

True [*orthos, adverb: cf. a as well*].

But think [*athreo: cf. 420d as consider*] again: In his wealthy days while he was spending his money, was a man of this sort more good [*ophelos: cf. 505e as principle*] to the state for the purposes of citizenship? Or did he only seem [*dokeo: cf. a as look*] to be a member of the ruling body, although in truth [*aletheia: cf. 537d*] he was neither ruler nor subject but just a spendthrift [*analotes: one who wastes*]?

c As you say, he seemed [*dokeo: cf. b*] to be a ruler but was only a spendthrift.

May we not say that this is the drone in the house who is like the drone in the honeycomb, and that the one is the plague [*nosema: cf. 544c as disorder*] of the city as the other is of the hive?

Just so, Socrates.

And as God [*theos: cf. 521b as gods*] has made the flying drones, Adeimantus, all without stings, whereas of the walking drones he has made some without stings but others have dreadful stings; of the stingless class are those who in their old age end as paupers; of the stingers come all the criminal class

d [*kakourgos: cf. 421b as destroyers*], as they are termed.

Most true, he said.

Clearly then, whenever you see paupers [*ptochos: poor*] in a state, somewhere in that neighborhood there are hidden away thieves and pick-pockets and robbers of temples, and all sorts of malefactors [*kakos: cf. a as evil*].

Clearly.

Well, I said, and in oligarchical states do you not find [*horao: cf. 529a as look*] paupers?

Yes, he said; nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler [*archo: cf. 550c as have power*].

e And may we be so bold as to affirm [*oiomai: cf. 521a as thinking*] that there are also many criminals [*kakourgos: cf. d*] to be found in them, rogues who have stings and whom the authorities are careful to restrain by force [*katecho: to hold fast & bia: cf. 548b*]?

Certainly [*oiomai: cf. e*], we may be so bold.

The existence [*gignomai: cf. 549c as coming into being*] of such persons is to be attributed to want of education [*apaideusia: cf. 514a as unenlightened*], ill-training [*trophe: cf. 520b as culture & kakos: cf. d as malefactors*] and an evil constitution of the state [*katastasis: cf. 551b as is established & politeia: cf. 551e as constitution*]?

True.

Such, then, is the form and such are the evils [*kakos: cf. e*] of oligarchy; and there may be many other evils. Very likely.

553 Then oligarchy or the form of government in which the rulers are elected for their wealth may now be dismissed [*apeirgo: cf. 396b as forbidden*]. Let us next proceed to consider [*skopeo: cf. 545b as proceeding*] the nature and origin of the individual who answers to this state.

By all means.

Does not the timocratical man change into [*metaballo: cf. 545d*] the oligarchical on this wise?

How?

A time arrives when the representative of timocracy has a son: at first he begins by emulating [*zelos: eager*] his father and walking in his footsteps but presently he sees him of a sudden foundering against

b the state [*polis: cf. 536b*] as upon a sunken reef, and he and all that he has is lost. He may have been a general or some other high officer who is brought to trial under a prejudice raised by informers and either put to death or exiled or deprived of the privileges of a citizen [*atimoo: to dishonor*], and all his property [*ousia: cf. 551b*] taken from him.

Nothing more likely.

And the son has seen and known [*pascho: cf. 537e, in context of sentence*] all this—he is a ruined man, **c** and his fear has taught him to knock ambition and passion [*philotimia: love of honor & thumoeides: cf. 550b*] head-foremost from his bosom's [*psuche: cf. 550b as soul*] throne; humbled by poverty he takes to money-making and by mean and miserly savings and hard work gets a fortune together. Is not such an one likely to seat the concupiscent and covetous element [*epithumetikos: cf. 550b as passionate & philochrematos: cf. 551e as fondness for money*] on the vacant throne and to suffer it to play the great king within him, girt with tiara and chain and scimitar?

Most true, he replied.

d And when he has made reason and spirit [*logistikos: cf. 550b & thumoeides: cf. c*] sit down on the ground obediently on either side of their sovereign, and taught them to know their place, he compels the one to think [*logizomai: cf. 439d as reasons & skopeo: cf. a as consider*] only of how lesser sums may be turned into larger ones, and will not allow the other to worship and admire [*thaumazo: cf. 551a as look up & timao: cf. 551a*] anything but riches and rich men, or to be ambitious of anything so much as the acquisition of wealth and the means of acquiring it.

Of all changes, he said, there is none so speedy or so sure as the conversion [*metabole: cf. 516c as change*] of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one [*ischuros: cf. 388e as excess & philochrematos: cf. c*].

e And the avaricious, I said, is the oligarchical youth?

Yes, he said; at any rate the individual out of whom he came [*metabole: cf. d*] is like the state [*politeia: cf. 552e*] out of which oligarchy came.

Let us then consider [*skopeo: cf. d*] whether there is any likeness between them.

554 Very good [*skopeo: cf. e*].

First, then, they resemble one another in the value which they set upon wealth [*chrema: cf. 442a as gain*]? Certainly.

Also in their penurious, laborious character [*pheidolos: cf. 548b as miserly & ergatis: industrious*]; the individual only satisfies his necessary appetites [*epithumia: cf. 548b as desires*] and confines his expenditure [*apopimplemi: to fill up*] to them; his other desires he subdues [*analoma: expenditure & parecho, with me (not): cf. 546c as furnishes*] under the idea that they are unprofitable [*mataios: empty, vain*].

True.

He is a shabby fellow [*auchmeros: dry, rough, squalid*] who saves something out of everything and makes a purse for himself; and this is the sort of man whom the vulgar applaud [*epaino: cf. 431a as*

b praise]. Is he not a true image of the state [*homoios: cf. 542b as image & politeia: cf. 553e*] which he represents?

He appears [*dokeo: cf. 552c as seemed*] to me to be so; at any rate money is highly valued by him as well as by

the state [*polis: cf. 553b*].

You see that he is not a man of cultivation [*prosecho: cf. 549d as center & paideia: cf. 537c as education*], I said.

I imagine [*dokeo: cf. b*] not, he said; had he been educated he would never have made a blind god director of his chorus or given him chief honor.

Excellent, I said. Yet consider [*skopeo: cf. a as very good*]: Must we not further admit that owing to this want of cultivation [*apaideusia: cf. 552e as want of education*] there will be found in him drone-like **c** desires as of pauper and rogue which are forcibly kept down [*katecho & bia: for both, cf. 552e*] by his general habit of life [*epimeleia: cf. 474d as regards*]?

True.

Do you know where you will have to look if you want to discover [*kathorao: cf. 523b as invite*] his rogueries [*katourgia: evil deed*]?

Where must I look?

You should see him where he has [*sumbaino: cf. 515c as follow*] some great opportunity of acting dishonestly [*adikeo: cf. 520a*] as in the guardianship of an orphan.

True.

It will be clear enough then that in his ordinary dealings which give him a reputation for honesty [*dokeo: cf. b as imagine & eudokimeo: cf. 468e, in context of sentence*] he coerces his bad passions **d** [*biazo: cf. 536e as use compulsion & kakos: cf. 552e as evils & epithumia: cf. a as appetites*] by an enforced virtue [*katecho: cf. c as kept down*]; not making them see [*peitho: cf. 548b as by force*] that they are wrong or taming them by reason but by necessity and fear constraining them, and because he trembles for his possessions.

To be sure.

Yes, indeed, my dear friend, but you will find that the natural desires [*suggenes: cf. 494d & epithumia: cf. d*] of the drone commonly exist in him all the same whenever he has to spend [*analisko: to use up*] what is not his own.

Yes, and they will be strong [*sphodros: cf. 485d*] in him too.

The man, then, will be at war with [*astasiastos, with ouk: not torn by faction*] himself; he will be two men and not one; but in general, his better desires [*beltion: cf. 457b & epithumia: cf. d*] will be found to **e** prevail over his inferior ones [*cheiron: cf. 441c as worse*].

True.

For these reasons such a one will be more respectable [*euschemon: cf. 413e as noble bearing*] than most people; yet the true virtue [*alethes: cf. 539c as truth & arete: cf. 551a as virtuous*] of a unanimous and harmonious soul [*homonoetikos: of one mind & harmozo: cf. 462a, in context of sentence*] will flee far away and never come near him.

I should expect [*dokeo: cf. c*] so.

And surely, the miser [*pheidolos: cf. a as penurious*] individually will be an ignoble competitor in a state **555** for any prize of victory, or other object of honorable ambition [*kalos: cf. 551e as discreditable (with ouk) & philotimia: cf. 553c*]; he will not spend [*analisko: cf. d*] his money in the contest for glory; so afraid is he of awakening [*egeiro: cf. 440c as excited*] his expensive appetites [*epithumia: cf. d*] and inviting them to help and join in the struggle [*sumparakaleo & summachia: cf. 474b as assistance*]; in true oligarchical fashion he fights with a small part only of his resources, and the result commonly is that he loses the prize and saves his money.

Very true.

Can we any longer doubt [*apisteo: cf. 522d as was ignorant*], then, that the miser and money-maker **b** answers to [*homoiotas: cf. 509c as similitude*] the oligarchical state?

There can be no doubt.

Next comes democracy; of this the origin and nature have still to be considered [*skepteton: verbal adjective*] by us; and then we will enquire into the ways [*tropos: cf. 551b as form*] of the democratic man and bring him up for judgement [*paristemi: cf. 498e, in context of sentence & krisis, with eis: cf. 545c as judging*].

That, he said, is our method [*poreuo: cf. 473d as pursue*].

Well, I said, and how does the change [*tropos: cf. b as way & metaballo: cf. 553a*] from oligarchy into democracy arise? Is it not this way? The good [*agathos: cf. 551a as virtuous*] at which such a state aims [*prokeimai: cf. 407a as appointed*] is to become as rich as possible, a desire which is insatiable?

What then?

c The rulers, being aware that their power rests upon their wealth, refuse to curtail by law [*nomos: cf. 551a*] the extravagance of the spendthrift youth because they gain by their ruin; they take interest from them and buy up their estates and thus increase their own wealth and importance.

To be sure.

There can be no doubt that the love [*time: cf. 447d as honor*] of wealth and the spirit of moderation [*sophrosune: cf. 536a as temperance*] cannot exist together in citizens of the same state to any d considerable extent; one or the other will be disregarded [*ameleo: cf. 551a as neglected*].

That is tolerably clear.

And in oligarchical states, from the general spread of carelessness and extravagance [*parameleo: to disregard & akolastaino: to be licentious*], men of good family have often been reduced to beggary [*penes: cf. 552a as poor*]?

Yes, often.

And still they remain in the city. There they are, ready to sting and fully armed, and some of them owe money, some have forfeited their citizenship [*atimos: cf. 551a as dishonored*]; a third class are in both predicaments; and they hate and conspire against those who have got their property and against e everybody else and are eager for revolution [*erao: cf. 465b as love & neoterismos: cf. 422a as discontent*].

That is true.

On the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they walk and pretending [*dokeo: cf. 554e as expect*] not even to see those whom they have already ruined, insert their sting—that is, their money—into some one else who is not on his guard against them and recover the parent sum many 556 times over multiplied into a family of children: and so they make drone and pauper [*ptochos: cf. 552d*] to abound in the state [*polis: cf. 554b*].

Yes, he said, there are plenty of them, that is certain.

The evil [*kakos: cf. 554c as bad*] blazes up like a fire; and they will not extinguish [*apobennumi*] it either by restricting a man's use of his own property or by another remedy [*luo: cf. 546a as dissolved & nomos: cf. 555c as law*].

What other?

One which is the next best and has the advantage of compelling the citizens to look to their characters [*anagkazo: cf. 529a & polites: cf. 464a as they & epimelomai: cf. 547d as attention paid & arete: cf. 554e b as virtue*]. Let there be a general rule that every one shall enter into voluntary contracts [*sumballo: cf. 398c, in context of sentence*] at his own risk, and there will be less of this scandalous [*anaidos, adverb: shamelessly*] money-making, and the evils [*kakos: cf. a*] of which we were speaking will be greatly lessened in the state.

Yes, they will be greatly lessened.

At present the governors [*archo: cf. 552d as ruler*], induced by the motives which I have named, treat [*diatithemi: cf. 494d, in context of sentence*] their subjects badly; while they and their adherents, especially the young men of the governing class, are habituated to lead a life of luxury and idleness both of body and mind [*soma: cf. 546a & psuche: cf. 554c as bosom*]; they do nothing and are incapable of c resisting either pleasure or pain [*kartereo: to be steadfast & hedone: cf. 538d & argos: cf. 458a as never good for much*].

Very true.

They themselves care only for making money and are as indifferent as the pauper to the cultivation of virtue [*epimeleia: cf. 554c as habit of life & penes: cf. 555d as beggary & arete: cf. b, in context of sentence*].

Yes, quite as indifferent.

Such is the state of affairs which prevails among them. And often rulers and their subjects [*archo (used twice): cf. b as governors*] may come in one another's way, whether on a pilgrimage or a march, as fellow-soldiers or fellow-sailors; yes, and they may observe the behavior of each other in the very d moment of danger [*theomai: cf. 545c, in context of sentence & kindunos: cf. 467b as risk*]^d—for where danger is, there is no fear that the poor will be despised by the rich—and very likely the wiry sunburnt poor man may be placed in battle at the side of a wealthy one who has never spoilt his complexion and has plenty of superfluous flesh—when he sees such an one puffing and at his wit's end [*aporia: cf. 496c, in context of sentence*], how can he avoid drawing the conclusion [*hegeomai: cf. 550d as think*] that men like him are only rich because no one has the courage to despoil them? And when

e they meet in private will not people be saying to one another 'Our warriors are not good for much?'

Yes, he said, I am quite aware [*eido: cf. 538a as know*] that this is their way of talking.

And, as in a body which is diseased [*nosodes*] the addition of a touch [*rhope: inclination*] from without may bring on illness [*kamno: to work, suffer*], and sometimes even when there is no external provocation a commotion may arise [*stasiazo: cf. 545d as disagree*] within, in the same way wherever there is weakness in the state there is also likely to be illness, of which the occasions [*prophasis: cf. 475a as pretext*] may be very slight, the one party introducing from without their oligarchical, the other their democratic allies, and then the state [*polis: cf. a*] falls sick and is at war with herself [*summachia: cf. 555a as struggle*] and may be at times distracted [*noseo: to ail*], even when there is no external cause [*stasiazo: cf. e*].

557 Yes, surely.

And then democracy comes into being after the poor [*penes: cf. 556c as pauper*] have conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of freedom and power [*metadidomai: cf. 520a as benefactors & politeia: cf. 554b as state & archo: 556c as rulers*]; and this is the form of government in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot [*kleros: cf. 461e*].

Yes, he said, that is the nature [*katastasis: cf. 552e as constitution*] of democracy, whether the revolution has been effected by arms or whether fear [*phobos: cf. 503e as dangers*] has caused the opposite party to withdraw.

And now what is their manner of life [*oikeo: cf. 547c as proceed*], and what sort of a government **b** [*politeia: cf. a*] have they? For as the government is, such will be [*anaphaino: cf. 487b as appear*] the man. Clearly, he said.

In the first place, are they not free [*eleutheros: cf. 395b*]; and is not the city full of freedom and frankness [*eleutheria: cf. 395c & parresia: freedom of speech*]—a man may say and do what he likes?

It is said so, he replied.

And where freedom [*exousia: cf. 460b as facilities*] is, the individual is clearly able to order [*kataskeuazo: cf. 422e as use*] for himself his own life as he pleases [*areskos: pleasing*]?

Clearly.

c Then in this kind of state [*politeia: cf. b*] there will be the greatest variety of human natures?

There will.

This, then, seems likely to be [*kinduneuo: cf. 518d as seems to be*] the fairest [*kalos: cf. 555a as honorable*] of states, being an embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower. And just as women and children think a variety of colors to be of all things most charming, so there are many men to whom this state, which is spangled with the manners and characters of mankind, will appear [*theaomai: cf. 556d as observe*] to be the fairest of states.

Yes.

d Yes, my good Sir [*makarios: cf. 540b as blest*], and there will be no better in which to look for [*zeteo: cf. 535c as search*] a government [*epitedeios: cf. 430a as fixed & politeia: cf. c*].

Why?

Because of the liberty [*exousia: cf. b as freedom*] which reigns there—they have a complete assortment of constitutions [*kinduneuo: cf. c as seems likely & kataskeuazo: cf. b as order*]; and he who has a mind to establish a state [*polis: cf. 556e*] as we have been doing, must go to a democracy as he would to a bazaar at which they sell them and pick out the one [*tropos: cf. 555b as change*] that suits him; then when he has made his choice, he may found [*katoikizo: cf. 433a*] his state.

e He will be sure to have patterns enough [*paradeigma: cf. 540a & aporos: cf. 552a as helpless*].

And there being no necessity [*anagke: cf. 519e*], I said, for you to govern in this state even if you have the capacity or to be governed [*hikanos: cf. 545c as satisfactory & archo: cf. a as power*], unless you like or go to war when the rest go to war or to be at peace [*eirene: cf. 465b*] when others are at peace unless you are so disposed [*epithumeo: cf. 548a as covetous*]—there being no necessity also because some law forbids [*nomos: cf. 556a as remedy & diakoluo: cf. 552b as prevented*] you to hold office or be **558** a juror, that you should not hold office [*archo: cf. e*] or be a juror if you have a fancy—is not this a way of life which for the moment is supremely delightful [*diagoge: cf. 344e & hedus: cf. 527d as amused*].

For the moment, yes.

And is not their humanity [*praotes: gentleness*] to the condemned in some cases quite charming [*kompsos: cf. 525d*]? Have you not observed how, in a democracy many persons, although they have been sentenced to death or exile, just stay where they are and walk about the world—the gentleman parades like a hero [*heros: cf. 392a*] and nobody sees or cares [*phrontizo: cf. 344e as knows*]?

Yes, he replied, many and many a one.

b See too, I said, the forgiving spirit [*suggnome: cf. 539a as most excusable*] of democracy and is so completely lacking in small-mindedness [*smikrologia: cf. 486a as meanness*], and the disregard which she shows of all the fine principles [*huperblepo: to neglect*] which we solemnly laid down at the foundation [*sebomai: to feel awe & oikizo: cf. 470e as founding*] of the city—as when we said that, except in the case of some rarely gifted nature [*phusis: cf. 550b*], there never will be a good [*agathos: cf. 555b*] man who has not from his childhood been used to play amid things of beauty [*paizo: cf. 537a as amusement & kalos: cf. 557c as fairest*] and make of them a joy and a study—how grandly does she trample all these fine notions of ours under her feet, never giving a thought [*phrontizo: cf. a*] to the pursuits [*epitedeuma: cf. 550a as way of life*] which make a statesman and promoting to honor any one who

c professes to be the people's friend.

Yes, she is of a noble spirit [*gennaïos: cf. 535b as generous*].

These and other kindred characteristics are proper [*adelphos: cf. 436a as natural*] to democracy which is a charming form of government [*hedus: cf. a & politeia: cf. 557d*], full of variety and disorder [*poikilos: many-colored & anarchos*], and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike.

We know her well.

Consider [*athreo: cf. 552b as think*] now, I said, what manner of man the individual is or rather consider [*skeptomai: cf. 545b as compare*], as in the case of the state, how [*tropos: cf. 557d, in context of sentence*] he comes into being.

Very good, he said.

Is not this the way—he is the son of the miserly and oligarchical father who has trained him in his own **d** habits [*ethe: cf. 548d as characters*]?

Exactly.

And, like his father, he keeps under by force the pleasures [*hedone: cf. 556c*] which are of the spending and not of the getting sort, being those which are called unnecessary?

Obviously.

Would you like [*boulomai: cf. 531d as pursuit*], for the sake of clearness [*skoteinos, adverb (with me or not): cf. 520c for adjective, as in the dark*], to distinguish [*dialogo: cf. 539c as dialectician*] which are the necessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures [*epithumia: cf. 555a as appetites*]?

I should.

Are not necessary pleasures those of which we cannot get rid [*apotrepo: to turn away*], and of which the **e** satisfaction is a benefit [*opheleo: cf. 459a*] to us? And they are rightly so, because we are framed by nature [*phusis: cf. b*] to desire both what is beneficial and what is necessary and cannot help it.

True.

559 We are not wrong [*dikaïos, adverb: cf. 497a as injustice*] therefore in calling them necessary?

We are not.

And the desires of which a man may get rid [*apallasso: cf. 519b as released*], if he takes pains [*melete: cf. 535c as discipline*] from his youth upwards—of which the presence, moreover, does no good, and in some cases the reverse of good—shall we not be right [*kalos, adverb: cf. 549b*] in saying that all these are unnecessary [*anagkaïos, with me (not): cf. 521b, in context of sentence*]?

Yes, certainly.

Suppose we select an example [*paradeigma: cf. 557e as patterns*] of either kind, in order that we may have a general notion [*lambano: cf. 534b as attains & tupos: cf. 443b as form*] of them?

Very good.

Will not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments, in so far as they are required for **b** health [*hugieia: cf. 444d as well-being*] and strength, be of the necessary class [*anagkaïos: cf. a*]?

That is what I should suppose [*oiomai: cf. 552e as certainly*].

The pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and it is essential to the continuance [*ophelimos: cf. 518e as profitable & pauo, with me (not): cf. 416c as impair*] of life?

Yes.

But the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for health [*euexia: cf. 444d as well-being*]?

Certainly.

And the desire [*epithumia: cf. 558e as pleasures*] which goes beyond this, or more delicate food or other luxuries which might generally be got rid of, if controlled and trained [*kolazo: cf. 465a as chastising & paideuo: cf. 549a as educated man*] in youth and is hurtful to the body and hurtful to the soul [*blaberos: cf. 519a &*

soma & psuche: for last two, cf. 556b] in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue [*phronesis, with pros: cf. 505c as knowledge & sophroneo: cf. 501c as sense*], may be rightly called unnecessary [*orthos, c adverb: cf. 552b as true & anagkaios, with ouk: cf. b*]?

Very true.

May we not say that these desires spend, and that the others make money because they conduce to production [*ergos: cf. 540a as action*]?

Certainly.

And of the pleasures of love [*aphrodisios: belonging to Aphrodite*] and all other pleasures, the same holds good?

True.

And the drone of whom we spoke was he who was surfeited in pleasures and desires [*hedone: cf. 558d d & epithumia: cf. b*] of this sort, and was the slave of the unnecessary desires, whereas he who was subject to the necessary only was miserly [*pheidolos: cf. 554e*] and oligarchical?

Very true.

Again, let us see how the democratic man grows out of the oligarchical: the following, as I suspect [*phaino: cf. 551e, in context of sentence*], is commonly the process.

What is the process?

When a young man who has been brought up as we were just now describing, in a vulgar and miserly way [*apaideutos & pheidolos (cf. d for adjective): two adverbs*], has tasted drones' honey and has come to associate [*suggignomai: cf. 459d as united with*] with fierce and crafty natures [*ther: a wild beast & deinos: cf. 426c, in context of sentence*] who are able to provide [*skeuazo: to prepare*] for him all sorts of refinements and varieties of pleasure [*hedone: cf. c*]—then, as you may imagine, the change [*metabole: cf. 553e, in context of sentence*] will begin of the oligarchical principle within him into the democratic?

Inevitably [*anagke: cf. 557e as necessity*].

And as in the city like was helping like, and the change was effected [*metaballo: cf. 555b*] by an alliance from without assisting [*summachia: cf. 556e as at war*] one division of the citizens, so too the young man is changed by a class of desires [*metaballo: cf. e & epithumia: cf. c*] coming from without to assist the desires within him, that which is and alike again helping [*boetheo: cf. 492a, in context of sentence*] that which is akin and alike [*suggenos & homoios: for latter, cf. 554b, in context of sentence*]?

Certainly.

And if there be any ally [*summachia: cf. e*] which aids the oligarchical principle within him, whether the influence of a father or of kindred, advising or rebuking him [*noutheteo: cf. 399b as admonition & 560 kakizo: cf. 420b as ill-ordered*], then there arises in his soul a faction and an opposite faction [*antistasis & mache: cf. 534c as gauntlet*], and he goes to war with [*pros, toward*] himself.

It must be so.

And there are times when the democratic principle gives way [*hupochoreo: to withdraw*] to the oligarchical, and some of his desires [*epithumia: cf. 559e*] die [*diaphtheiro: cf. 502a as destroyed*] and others are banished, a spirit of reverence [*aidos: cf. 465a as shame*] enters into the young man's soul [*psuche: cf. 559b*] and order is restored [*katakosmeo: to arrange, adorn*].

Yes, he said, that sometimes happens.

And then, again, after the old desires [*epithumia: cf. a*] have been driven out, fresh ones spring up [*hupotrepho: to bring up secretly*] which are akin to them, and because he, their father, does not know how to educate them [*trophe: cf. 552e as ill-training*], wax fierce and numerous.

Yes, he said, that is apt to be the way.

They draw him to his old associates [*helko: cf. 550b as brought & homilia: cf. 431a, in context of sentence*] and holding secret intercourse [*lathra, adverb: in secret & suggignomai: cf. 559d as associate*] with them, breed and multiply in him.

Very true.

At length they seize upon [*katalambano: cf. 387e as befall*] the citadel of the young man's soul [*akropolis & psuche: cf. a*] which they perceive [*aisthanomai: cf. 527e as unmeaning*] to be void of all accomplishments [*mathema: cf. 537d as learning*] and fair pursuits [*epitedeuma: cf. 558b & kalos: cf. 559a as right*] and true words [*logos: cf. 548c as reason & alethos: cf. 540d*] which make their abode in the minds [*dianoia: cf. 533e as intellect*] of men who are dear to the gods [*theophilos: cf. 501c as agreeable to the ways of God*] and are their

best guardians and sentinels [*aristos: cf. 549b, with phulax & phrouros: watchman*].

c None better.

False and boastful conceits and phrases [*alazon: cf. 490a as imposter & logos: cf. b*] mount upwards and take their place [*katecho: cf. 554d as enforced*].

They are certain to do so.

And so the young man returns into the country of the lotus-eaters and takes up his dwelling there in the face of all men; and if any help [*boetheia*] be sent by his friends to the thrifty part of him [*phaidolos: cf. 559d as miserly & psuche: cf. b*], the aforesaid vain conceits [*alazon & logos: for both, cf. c*] shut the gate of the king's fastness; and they will neither allow the embassy itself to enter, private if private

d advisers offer the fatherly counsel [*logos: cf. c*] of the aged will they listen to them or receive them. There is a battle [*summachia: cf. 559e as ally*] and they gain the day, and then modesty which they call silliness [*aidos: cf. a as reverence & elithiotes*], is ignominiously thrust into exile by them and temperance [*sophrosune: cf. 555c as moderation*], which they nickname unmanliness [*anandria*], is trampled in the mire and cast forth; they persuade [*peitho: cf. 554d as making them see*] men that moderation and orderly expenditure [*kosmios: cf. 539d as orderly & metriotes: cf. 539c dapane: cost*] are vulgarity and meanness, and so, by the help of a rabble of evil appetites [*anopheles: unprofitable & epithumia: cf. a as desires*], they drive them beyond the border. Yes, with a will.

And when they have emptied and swept clean the soul [*psuche: cf. c*] of him who is now in their power **e** and who is being initiated by them in great mysteries [*teleioo: cf. 487a as perfected & telete: cf. 366a*], the next thing is to bring back to their house insolence and anarchy and waste and impudence in bright array having garlands on their heads and a great company with them, hymning their praises and calling them by sweet names; insolence [*hubris: cf. 403a as wantonness*] they term breeding and anarchy liberty **561** and waste magnificence and impudence courage [*anaideia: shamelessness & andreia: cf. 536a*]. And so the young man passes out of his original nature [*metaballo: cf. 559e as changed*] which was trained [*trepho: cf. 542a*] in the school of necessity into the freedom and libertinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures [*hedone: cf. 559d*]. Yes, he said, the change in him is visible enough [*enargos, adverb: clearly*].

After this he lives on, spending [*analisko: cf. 555a*] his money and labor and time on unnecessary pleasures [*hedone: cf. a*] quite as much as on necessary ones; but if he be fortunate [*eutuches: cf. 546d*] and is not too much disordered in his wits [*ekbakcheuo: to excite to Bacchic frenzy*], when years have

b elapsed and the heyday of passion [*thorubos: uproar*] is over—supposing that he then re-admits [*katadechomai: cf. 401e as receives*] into the city some part of the exiled virtues, and does not wholly give himself up to their successors—in that case he balances his pleasures [*kathistemi: cf. 546d as testing & hedone: cf. a*] and lives in a sort of equilibrium [*eis ison*], putting the government [*paradidomai: cf. 501c as committed & arche: cf. 551c*] of himself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the lot [*lagchano*] and when he has had enough of that, then into the hands of another; he despises [*atimazo: cf. 551a as dishonor*] none of them but encourages [*trepho: cf. a as trained*] them all equally.

Very true, he said.

Neither does he receive or let pass [*paradechomai: cf. 552a as begins to be liable*] into the fortress [*phourion: a watch post, citadel*] any true word of advice; if any one says to him that some pleasures are **c** the satisfactions of good and noble desires [*hedone: cf. b & kalos: cf. 560b as fair & agathos: cf. 558b & epithumia: cf. 560d as appetites*], and others of evil desires [*poneros: cf. 519a as rogue*], and that he ought to use and honor [*epitedeuo: cf. 527b as science & timao: cf. 553d as admire*] some and chastise and master the others [*kolazo: cf. 559b as controlled & douleuo: to be a slave*]
—whenever this is repeated to him he shakes his head and says that they are all alike, and that one is as good as another.

Yes, he said; that is the way with [*diakeimai: cf. 499b as entertain*] him.

Yes, I said, he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour [*charizomai: to favor, do something agreeable & epithumia: cf. c*]; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute;

d then he becomes a water-drinker and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn at gymnastics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once more living the life [*diatribo: cf. 540b as pursuit*] of a philosopher; often he is busy with politics and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head; and if he is emulous of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that direction or of men of business, once more in that. His life has neither law nor order; and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom [*hedus: cf. 558c as charming & makarios: cf. 557d as my good Sir & eleutherios: adjective*]; and so he goes on.

e Yes, he replied, he is all liberty and equality [*isonomikos*].

Yes, I said; his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the lives of many [*ethos: cf. 459a as character*];— he answers to the state which we described as fair and spangled [*kalos: cf. c as good & poikilos: cf. 558c as full of variety*]. And many a man and many a woman will take him for their pattern [*paradeigma: cf. 559a as example*], and many a constitution [*politeia: cf. 558c as government*] and many an example of manners is contained in him.

Just so.

562 Let him then be set over against democracy; he may truly be called [*orthos, adverb: cf. 552c as true & prosagoreuo: cf. 507b*] the democratic man.

Let that be his place, he said.

Last of all comes the most beautiful [*kalos: cf. e as fair*] of all, man and state [*politeia: cf. e as constitution*] alike, tyranny and the tyrant; these we have now to consider [*dierchomai: cf. 548d, in context of sentence*].

Quite true, he said.

Say then, my friend, in what manner [*tropos: cf. 558c as how*] does tyranny arise? That it has a democratic origin [*metaballo: cf. 561, in context of sentence*] is evident.

Clearly.

And does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same manner [*tropos: cf. a*] as democracy from

b oligarchy—I mean, after a sort?

How?

The good which oligarchy proposed [*agathos: cf. 561c & protithemi: cf. 545c as arrive at*] to itself and the means by which it was maintained was excess of wealth—am I not right?

Yes.

And the insatiable desire [*aplestia: greediness*] of wealth and the neglect [*ameleia*] of all other things for the sake of money-getting was also the ruin of oligarchy?

True.

And democracy has her own good [*horizo: cf. 533d as previous sketch & agathos: cf. b*] of which the insatiable desire [*aplestia: cf. b*] brings her to dissolution [*kataluo: to destroy*].

What good?

Freedom [*eleutheria: cf. 557b*], I replied; which, as they tell you in a democracy, is the glory [*kalos: cf. a c as most beautiful*] of the state—and that therefore in a democracy alone will the freeman of nature [*phusis: cf. 558e*] deign to dwell.

Yes; the saying [*rhema: cf. 473e as word*] is in everybody's mouth.

I was going to observe that the insatiable desire [*aplestia: cf. b*] of this and the neglect [*ameleia: cf. b*] of other things introduces the change [*paraskeuazo: cf. 496c as conspired & methistesis*] in democracy which occasions a demand for tyranny.

How so?

When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom [*eleutheria: cf. b*] has evil cupbearers presiding over the feast and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine of freedom, then, unless her rulers are very amenable [*archo: cf. 558 as hold office & praos: cf. 501e as gentle*] and give a plentiful drought, she calls them to account [*kolazo: cf. 561c as chastize*] and punishes them and says that they are cursed oligarches.

Yes, he replied, a very common occurrence.

Yes, I said; and loyal citizens are insultingly termed by her slaves who hug their chains and men of naught; she would have subjects who are like rulers [*archo: cf. d*] and rulers who are like subjects: these are men after her own heart [*homoios: cf. 559e as alike*] whom she praises and honors both in private

e and public. Now, in such a state, can liberty [*eleutheria: cf. c as freedom*] have any limit?

Certainly not.

By degrees the anarchy finds a way into [*anarchia & kataduo: cf. 402d*] private houses and ends by getting among the animals and infecting them.

How do you mean?

I mean that the father grows accustomed to [*ethizo: cf. 522a as influences of habit*] descend to the level of his sons and to fear them, and the son is on a level with his father, he having no respect or reverence [*aischuno: cf. 414e as to be ashamed & deoienai*] for either of his parents; and this is his freedom, and a **563** resident alien is equal with the citizen and the citizen with the resident alien and the stranger is quite as good as either.

Yes, he said, that is the way.

And these are not the only evils, I said. There are several lesser ones: in such a state of society the master fears

and flatters his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters and tutors; young and old are all alike [*apeikazo: cf. 514a as show in a figure*]; and the young man is on a level with the old and is ready to compete with him in word or deed; and old men condescend to the young and are full of **b** pleasantry and gaiety; they are loathe to be thought morose and authoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners of the young.

Quite true, he said.

The last extreme of popular liberty [*eleutheria: cf. 562e & plethos: a great number*] is when the slave bought with money, whether male or female, is just as free as his or her purchaser; nor must I forget to tell of the liberty and equality [*isonmia: equality of rights*] of the two sexes in relation to each other.

c Why not, as Aeschylus says, 'utter the word which rises to our lips?'

That is what I am doing, I replied; and I must add that no one who does not know would believe how much greater is the liberty which the animals who are under the dominion of man have in a democracy than in any other state: for truly, the she-dogs, as the proverb says, are as good as their she-mistresses, and the horses and asses have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen; and they will run at anybody who comes in their way if he does not leave the road clear for them: and all

d things are just ready to burst with liberty.

When I take a country walk, he said, I often experience what you describe. You and I have dreamed [*onar: cf. 520c*] the same thing.

And above all, I said, and as the result of all, see how sensitive [*sunethroismenon: ?*] the citizens become; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority and at length, as you know [*ennoeo: cf. 537e as remark*], they cease to care even for the laws [*phrontizo: cf. 558b as giving a thought & nomos: cf.*

e 557e], written or unwritten; they will have no one over [*despotes: cf. 418b as tyrants*] them.

Yes, he said, I know it too well.

Such, my friend, I said [*dokeo: cf. 555e as pretending*], is the fair and glorious beginning [*kalos: cf. 562b as glory & neanikos: cf. 491e, in context of sentence & arche: cf. 461b as government*] out of which springs tyranny.

Glorious indeed, he said. But what is the next step?

The ruin [*nosema: cf. 552c as plague*] of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; the same disease magnified and intensified by liberty [*exousia: cf. 557d*] overmasters democracy—the truth being that the excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction [*metabole: cf. 559d as change*] in the opposite direction; and **564** this is the case not only in the seasons and in vegetable and animal life but above all in forms of government [*politeia: cf. 562a as state*].

True.

The excess of liberty [*agan: adverb & eleutheria: cf. 563b*], whether in states or individuals, seems only to pass into [*metaballo: cf. 562a as origin*] excess of slavery.

Yes, the natural order.

And so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form [*agrios: cf. 549a as rough*] of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty?

As we might expect.

That, however, was not, as I believe, your question—you rather desired to know what is that disorder

b [*nosema: cf. 563e as ruin*] which is generated [*phuo: cf. 548a as fitted*] alike in oligarchy and democracy and is the ruin [*douleuo: cf. 561c as masters*] of both?

Just so, he replied.

Well, I said, I meant to refer to the class of idle spendthrifts [*dapaneros: extravagant*] of whom the more courageous [*andreios: cf. 535a as fairest*] are the leaders and the more timid [*anandreios*] the followers, the same whom we were comparing [*aphomoioo: cf. 517b, in context of sentence*] to drones, some stingless, and others having stings.

A very just [*orthos, adverb: cf. 562a as truly*] comparison.

These two classes are the plagues of every city [*politeia: cf. a as government*] in which they are generated, being what phlegm and bile are to the body. And the good physician and lawgiver [*iatros & c nomothetes: cf. 497d as legislator*] of the state ought, like the wise bee-master, to keep them at a distance and prevent, if possible, their ever coming in; and if they have anyhow found a way in, then he should have them and their cells cut out as speedily as possible.

Yes, by all means, he said.

Then, in order that we may see clearly [*eukrines: in good order*] what we are doing, let us imagine **d** democracy to be divided, as indeed it is, into three classes; for in the first place freedom [*exousia: cf. 563e as liberty*] creates rather more drones in the democratic than there were in the oligarchical state.

That is true.

And in the democracy they are certainly more intensified [*drimus: cf. 519a as clearly*].

How so?

Because in the oligarchical state they are disqualified [*entimos, with me (not): cf. 528b as adverb*] and driven from office [*archo: cf. 562d as rulers*], and therefore they cannot train [*agumnastos: cf. 396d as never practiced*] or gather strength; whereas in a democracy they are almost the entire ruling power, and while the keener sort [*drimus: cf. d as more intensified*] speak and act, the rest keep buzzing about the speaker's platform and do not suffer a word to be said on the other side; hence in democracies **e** almost everything is managed [*dioikeo: cf. 462c as applied*] by the drones.

Very true, he said.

Then there is another class which is always being severed from [*apokrino: cf. 528a as carry on the argument*] the mass.

What is that?

They are the orderly class which in a nation of traders sure [*kosmios: cf. 560d as orderly*] to be the richest. Naturally so.

They are the most squeezable persons [*blitto: to take honey*] and yield the largest amount of honey to the drones.

Why, he said, there is little to be squeezed out of people who have little.

And this is called the wealthy class, and the drones feed upon them.

That is pretty much the case, he said.

565 The people [*demos: cf. 463a as subjects*] are a third class consisting of those who work with their own hands; they are not politicians and have not much to live upon. This, when assembled, is the largest and most powerful class [*kurios: cf. 546c as control*] in a democracy.

True, he said; but then the multitude is seldom willing to congregate unless they get [*metalambano: cf. 486c, in context of sentence*] a little honey.

And do they not share [*metalambano: cf. a*]?, I said. Do not their leaders deprive the rich of their estates and distribute [*dianemo*] them among the people; at the same time taking care to reserve the larger part [*ousia: cf. 553b as property*] for themselves?

b Why, yes, he said, to that extent the people do share [*metalambano: cf. a*].

And the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend [*amuno: cf. 474b as defend*] themselves before the people as they best can?

What else can they do?

And then, although they may have no desire of change [*epithumeo: cf. 557e as disposed & neoterizo: to attempt anything new*], the others charge [*epibouleuo: cf. 551d as conspiring against*] them with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy?

True.

And the end [*teleutao: cf. 513c*] is that when they see the people, not of their own accord [*ekon: willing*], but through ignorance [*agnoeo: cf. 546d*] and because they are deceived [*exapatao: cf. 507a*] by **c** informers seeking to do them wrong [*adikeo: cf. 554c as acting dishonestly*], then at last they are forced to become oligarchs in reality; they do not wish to be, but the [*kakos: cf. 556b as evils*] sting of the drones torments them and breeds revolution in them.

That is exactly the truth.

Then come impeachments and judgments and trials of one another.

True.

The people [*demos: cf. a*] have always [*etho: cf. 337d, in context of sentence*] some champion whom they set over them and nurse [*trepho: cf. 561b as encourages & auxo: cf. 425a as growth*] into greatness.

Yes, that is their way.

d This and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs; when he first appears above ground he is a protector [*prostatikos: for rank or honor*].

Yes, that is quite clear.

How then does a protector begin to change [*metabole: cf. 563e as reaction*] into [*epi, upon*] a tyrant? Clearly

when he does what the man is said to do in the tale [*muthos: cf. 415c*] of the Arcadian temple of Lycaean Zeus. What tale?

The tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim minced up with the entrails of e other victims is destined to become a wolf. Did you never hear it [*logos: cf. 560d as counsel*]?

Oh, yes.

And the protector [*prooistemi: to set before, be a leader*] of the people is like him; having a mob entirely at his disposal [*peitho: cf. 560d as persuade*], he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen; by the favorite method of false accusation he brings them into court and murders them, making the life of man to disappear, and with unholy tongue and lips tasting the blood of his fellow citizen; some he **566** kills and others he banishes, at the same time hinting at the abolition of debts and partition of lands: and after this, what will be his destiny [*meiromai: to receive as one's portion or fate*]? Must he not either perish at the hands of his enemies or from being a man become a wolf, that is, a tyrant?

Inevitably [*anagke: cf. 559e*].

This, I said, is he who begins to stir up civil war against the rich [*stasiazo: cf. 556e, in context of sentence & ousia: cf. 565a as larger part*]?

The same.

After a while he is driven out but comes back in spite of his enemies, a tyrant full grown.

That is clear.

b And if they are unable to expel him or to get him condemned to death by a public accusation, they conspire [*epibouleuo: cf. 565b as charge*] to assassinate him.

Yes, he said, that is their usual way.

Then comes the famous request for a bodyguard which is the device of all those who have got thus far in their tyrannical career—'Let not the people's friend,' as they say, 'be lost to them [*boethos: cf. 474b as auxiliary*].'

Exactly.

The people readily assent; all their fears [*deos: cf. 465a*] are for him—they have none for themselves.

c Very true.

And when a man who is wealthy and is also accused of being an enemy of the people [*misodemmos*] sees this, then, my friend, as the oracle said to Croesus:

By pebbly Hermus' shore he flees and rests not and is not ashamed to be a coward [*kakos: cf. 565c, in context of sentence*].

And quite right too, said he, for if he were, he would never be ashamed [*aideomai*] again.

But if he is caught he dies.

Of course.

And he, the protector of whom we spoke, is to be seen, not 'laying the plain' with his bulk [*Iliad d xvi.776*], but himself the over-thrower of many, standing up in the chariot of state [*polis: cf. 557d*] with the reins in his hand no longer protect but tyrant absolute.

No doubt, he said.

And now let us consider the happiness [*eudaimonia: cf. 545a*] of the man and of the city in which a mortal [*brotos*] like him comes to be.

Yes, he said, let us consider that.

At first, in the early days of his power he is full of smiles, and he salutes every one whom he meets. He **e** to be called a tyrant who is making promises in public and also in private, liberating debtors and distributing land to the people and his followers and wanting to be so kind and good [*prospoieo: to attach oneself & hileos, adverb: cf. 496e as good-will & praos: cf. 562d as amenable*] to every one!

Of course, he said.

But when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty, and there is nothing to fear from them, then he is always stirring up some war or other in order that the people [*demos: cf. 565c*] may require a leader [*hemonos; from hegeomai: cf. 556d as drawing a conclusion*].

To be sure.

567 Has he not also another object which is that they may be impoverished by payment of taxes, and thus compelled to devote themselves to their daily wants and therefore less likely to conspire against [*epibouleuo: cf. 566b*] him?

Clearly.

And if any of them are suspected by him of having notions of freedom [*phronema: cf. 494d, in context of*

sentence & eleutheria: cf. 564a as liberty] and of resistance to his authority, he will have a good pretext [prophasis: cf. 556e as occasions] for destroying them by placing them at the mercy of the enemy; and for all these reasons the tyrant must be always getting up a war [tarasso: cf. 448b as corrupted].

He must.

b Now he begins to grow unpopular [apechthanomai: to be hated & politeia: cf. 564b as city].

A necessary result.

Then some of those who joined in setting [sugkathistemi] him up and who are in power speak their minds [parresiazomai: to speak boldly] to him and to one another, and the more courageous [andrikos: manly]: of them cast in his teeth what is being done.

Yes, that may be expected.

And the tyrant, if he means to rule, must get rid of them; he cannot stop while he has a friend or an enemy who is good [ophelos: cf. 552b] for anything.

He cannot.

And therefore he must look about [oxeos, adverb: cf. 409a as quickly & horao: cf. 552d as find] him and **c** see who is valiant, who is high-minded, who is wise, who is wealthy [megalophron & phronimos: cf. 530b as reason & plousios: cf. 547b as riches]; happy man [eudaimon: cf. 540c as blessed], he is the enemy of them all, and must seek occasion against [epibouleuo: cf. a as conspire against] them whether he will or not until he has made a purgation [kathareuo: to cleanse] of the state.

Yes, he said, and a rare purgation [kalos: cf. 563e as fair & katharmos: a cleansing].

Yes, I said, not the sort of purgation which the physicians [iatros: cf. 564c] make of the body; for they take away the worse and leave the better part [to beltiston: cf. 347b as interest], but he does the reverse.

If he is to rule, I suppose that he cannot help himself.

d What a blessed alternative [makarios: cf. 561d as bliss], I said:—to be compelled to dwell only with the many bad [phaulos: cf. 522c as little] and to be by them hated or not to live at all!

Yes, that is the alternative.

And the more detestable [apechthanomai: cf. b as to grow unpopular] his actions are to the citizens the more satellites and the greater devotion [pistikos: faithful] in them will he require?

Certainly.

And who are the devoted [pistos] band, and where will he procure them?

They will flock to him, he said, of their own accord [automatos: cf. 520b as sweet will], if he pays them.

e By the dog! I said [dokeo: cf. 563c], here are more drones of every sort and from every land.

Yes, he said, there are [alethos: cf. 560c as true & dokeo: cf. d].

But will he not desire to get them on the spot?

How do you mean?

He will rob the citizens of their slaves; he will then set them free and enrol them in his bodyguard.

To be sure, he said; and he will be able to trust [pisteuo: cf. 527d as believing] them best of all.

What a blessed creature [makarios: cf. d], I said, must this tyrant be; he has put to death the others and **568** has these for his trusted friends.

Yes, he said; they are quite of his sort.

Yes, I said, and these are the new citizens whom he has called into existence [suniemi: cf. 505c as understood] who admire him [thaumazo: cf. 553d] and are his companions while the good [epieikes: cf. 538c] hate and avoid him.

Of course.

Verily, then, tragedy is a wise thing [dokeo: cf. e & sophos: cf. 547e as philosophers] and Euripides a great tragedian.

Why so?

Why, because he is the author of the pregnant saying [puknos: close, compact & dianoiia: cf. 560b as **b** minds], 'Tyrants are wise by living with the wise,' and he clearly meant to say that they are the wise whom the tyrant makes [suniemi: cf. a as called into existence] his companions.

Yes, he said, and he also praises [egkomiazo: cf. 367c] tyranny as godlike [isotheos: cf. 360c]; and many other things of the same kind are said by him and by the other poets.

And therefore, I said, the tragic poets being wise men will forgive [suggignosko: cf. 537e as make allowance] us and any others who live after our manner [politeuo: cf. 549c as dwells in an (ill-governed) city] if we do not receive [paradechomai: cf. 561b as let pass] them into our state [politeia: cf. 567b] because they are the

eulogists of tyranny.

c Yes, he said, those who have the wit [*kompsoi: cf. 558a as charming*] will doubtless forgive [*suggignosko: cf. b*] us.

But they will continue to go to other cities and attract mobs and hire voices fair and loud and persuasive [*pithanos*] and draw the cities [*politeia: cf. b as state*] over to tyrannies and democracies.

Very true.

Moreover, they are paid for this and receive honor [*timao: cf. 561c*]—the greatest honor as might be expected from tyrants and the next greatest from democracies; but the higher they ascend our

d constitution hill [*politeios & aniami: cf. 498d as striving*], the more their reputation [*time: cf. 555c as love*] fails and seems unable from shortness of breath to proceed further.

True.

But we are wandering from [*ekbaino: cf. 523c as pass from*] the subject. Let us therefore return and enquire how the tyrant will maintain that fair [*kalos: cf. 567c as rare*] and numerous and various and ever-changing army of his.

If, he said, there are sacred treasures [*hieros: 458e & chrema: cf. 554a as wealth*] in the city, he will confiscate and spend them; and in so far as the fortunes of attainted persons may suffice, he will be able to diminish the taxes which he would otherwise have to impose upon the people.

e And when these fail?

Why, clearly, he said, then he and his companions, whether male or female, will be maintained [*trepho: cf. 565c as nurse*] out of his father's estate.

You mean to say [*manthano: cf. 550d as understand*] that the people, from whom he has derived his being, will maintain [*trepho: cf. e*] him and his companions?

Yes, he said; they cannot help themselves.

But what if the people fly into a passion [*aganakteo: cf. 536c as indignation*] and aver that a grown-up son ought not to be supported [*dikaioi: cf. 548d as just & trepho: cf. e*] by his father, but that the father **569** should be supported by the son? The father did not bring him into being or settle him in life in order that when his son became a man he should himself be the servant of his own servants and should support him and his rabble of slaves and companions; but that his son should protect him and that by his help he might be emancipated from the government of the rich and aristocratic [*plousios: cf. 567c as wealthy & agathos: cf. 562b as good*], as they are termed. And so he bids him and his companions depart just as any other father might drive out of the house a riotous son and his undesirable associates.

By heaven, he said, then the parent will discover what a monster [*thremma: creature, nursling*] he has **b** been fostering [*aspazomai: cf. 549b as attracted to*] in his bosom; and, when he wants to drive him out, he will find that he is weak and his son strong.

Why, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use violence [*biazo: cf. 554c as coerces*]? What! Beat his father if he opposes [*peitho (wth me, not): cf. 565e as at his disposal*] him?

Yes, he will, having first disarmed him.

Then he is a parricide and a cruel guardian [*chalepos: cf. 551c as most difficult*] of an aged parent; and this is real tyranny about which there can be no longer a mistake [*homologeoi: cf. 547c as agreed*]: as the saying is, the people who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen has fallen into the fire **c** which is the tyranny of slaves. Thus liberty [*akairoi: not in season & eleutheria: cf. 567a as freedom*], getting out of all order and reason, passes into the harshest and bitterest form of slavery.

True, he said.

Very well; and may we not rightly say that we have sufficiently [*emmelos, adverb: suitably*] discussed the nature of tyranny and the manner of the transition [*metabaino: cf. 550d as passes into*] from democracy to tyranny?

We certainly [*hikanos, adverb: cf. 523e as adequately*] are, he said.

Book Nine

571 Last of all comes the tyrannical man about whom we have once more to ask [*skopeo: cf. 554b as consider*], how is he formed out [*methistemi: cf. 380e as must be effected*] of the democratic and how does he live, in happiness or in misery [*makarios: cf. 567e as blessed & athlios: cf. 544a as miserable*]?

Yes, he said, he is the only one remaining.

There is, however, I said, a previous question which remains unanswered.

What question?

I do not think [*dokeo*: cf. 568a, in context of sentence] that we have adequately determined [*diaireo*: cf. 454a as define] the nature and number of the appetites [*epithumia*: cf. 561c], and until this is accomplished the enquiry [*zetesis*: cf. 430c] will

b always be confused.

Well, he said, it is not too late to supply the omission.

Very true, I said; and observe [*skopeo*: cf. a] the point which I want to understand [*eido*: cf. 556e as aware] certain of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites [*hedone*: cf. 561c as desires & *epithumia*: cf. a] I conceive to be unlawful [*paranomos*: cf. 539a as breaker]; every one appears to have [*kinduneo*: cf. 536a as called & *gignomai*: cf. 552e as existence] them but in some persons they are controlled by the laws and by reason [*kolazo*: cf. 562d as calls to account & *nomos*: cf. 563d & *logos*: cf. 565e, in context of sentence], and the better desires [*beltion* & *epithumia*: for both, cf. 554d] prevail over them—either they are wholly banished [*apallasso*: cf. 559a as get rid] or they become few and weak [*asthenes*: cf.

c 485d]; while in the case of others they are stronger, and there are more of them.

Which appetites do you mean?

I mean those which are awake [*egeiro*: cf. 555a as awakening] when the reasoning and human and ruling power [*logistikos*: cf. 553 as reason & to archon: cf. 442c & *psuche*: cf. 56d] is asleep; then the wild beast [*theriodes*: savage & *agrios*: cf. 564a as aggravated form] within us, gorged with meat or drink, starts up and having shaken off sleep, goes forth to satisfy his desires [*apopimlemi*: cf. 554a as expenditure & *ethe*: cf. 558d as habits]; and there is no conceivable folly or crime—not excepting incest

d or any other unnatural union or parricide or the eating of forbidden food—which at such a time, when he has parted company with all shame and sense, a man may not be ready to commit [*aischuno*: cf. 562e as (no) respect].

Most true, he said.

But when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate [*hugieinos*, adverb: cf. 373b (adjective) & *sophronos*, adverb: cf. 423a as wise (adjective)], and when before going to sleep he has awakened his rational powers [*to logistikon*: cf. 550a as rational principle] and fed them on noble thoughts and enquiries [*logos*: cf. b as reason & *kalos*: cf. 568d as fair & *skeptomai*: cf. 558c as consider], collecting himself in meditation [*aphikneomai*: cf. 532c as reach & *sunnoia*: anxiety]; after having first indulged his appetites

e [*epithumetikos*: cf. 553c as concupiscent] neither too much nor too little but just enough to lay them to sleep and prevent [*parecho*: cf. 554a as subdues] them and their enjoyments and pains from interfering **572** with the higher principle [*beltistos*: cf. 532c]—which he leaves in the solitude of pure abstraction [*skopeo*: cf. 571b as observe & *kath' hauto monon katharon* (-os): cf. 520d as heavenly], free to contemplate and aspire to the knowledge of the unknown [*aisthanomai*: cf. 560b as perceive & *orego*: cf. 439b as obtain & *eido*, with me (not): cf. 571b as understand], whether in past, present, or future: when again he has allayed the passionate element [*prauno*: cf. 501c as growing a little calmer & *thumoeides*: cf. 553d as spirit], if he has a quarrel against [*orge*, with *eis*: cf. 493d as tempers] any one—I say when after pacifying the two irrational principles [*katheudo*: to lay down, sleep & *thumos*: cf. 465a as resentment], he rouses up [*egeiro*: cf. 571c as awake] the third which is reason [*phroneo*: cf. 518e as wisdom] before he takes his rest then, as you know, he attains truth [*hapto*: cf. 538c as applicable & *aletheia*: cf. 552b] most nearly and is least likely to be the sport of fantastic and lawless visions [*opsis*: f. **b** 519b & *paranomos*: cf. 571b & *phantazomai*: cf. 380d as appear].

I quite agree.

In saying this I have been running into a digression [*epi pleon*]; but the point which I desire to note [*gignosko*: cf. 520c as know] is that in all of us, even in good men, there is a lawless wild-beast nature which [*anomos* & *deinos*: cf. 559d as fierce & *agrios*: cf. 571c & *epithumia*: cf. 571b as desires & *eidosis*: cf. 544d as character] peers out in sleep. Pray, consider whether I am right [*dokeo*: cf. 571a as think] and you agree [*sugchoreo*: cf. 543b as acknowledged] with me.

Yes, I agree.

And now remember [*anamimnesko*: cf. 543c as find] the character which we attributed to the democratic man. He was supposed from his youth upwards to have been trained [*trepho*: cf. 568e as supported]

c under a miserly [*pheidolos*: cf. 560c] parent who encouraged the saving appetites [*timao*: cf. 568c as receive honor & *epithumia*: cf. b] in him but discountenanced [*atimazo*: cf. 561b as despises] the unnecessary which aim only at amusement and ornament?

True.

And then he got into the company of a more refined, licentious sort [*komposos*: cf. 568c as wit] of people and taking to all their wanton ways [*epithumia*: cf. c], rushed into the opposite extreme from an abhorrence of his father's meanness [*eidōs*: cf. b & *pheidolia*: thrift]. At last, being a better man [*beltios*] than his corrupters, he was drawn in both directions until he halted [*kathistemi*: cf. 561b as balances] midway and led a life not of vulgar and slavish passion [*aneleutheros*: cf. 540d as mean & *anomos*: cf. b] **d** but of what he deemed moderate indulgence [*metrios*, adverb: cf. 518b as very just distinction] in various pleasures [*apolausis*: enjoyment]. After this manner the democrat was generated out of the oligarch?

Yes, he said; that was our view [*doxa*: cf. 538d as believing] of him and is so still.

And now, I said, years will have passed away, and you must conceive this man such as he is to have a son who is brought up in his father's principles [*trepho*: cf. b & *ethe*: cf. 571c, in context of sentence].

I can imagine [*tithemi*: cf. 492a as follows] him.

Then you must further imagine the same thing to happen to the son which has already happened to the father:—he is drawn into a perfectly lawless life [*paranomia*: cf. 537] which by his seducers is termed perfect liberty [*eleutheria*: cf. 570c]; and his father and friends [*oikeios*: cf. 538e as natural] take part with his moderate desires [*epithumia*: cf. c & in meso: cf. 547d as a mean], and the opposite party assist the opposite ones. As soon as these dire magicians [*magos*: enchanter, Magi] and tyrant-makers find that they are losing their hold on [*katecho*: cf. 560c as take their place] him, they contrive [*mechanomai*: cf. 519e as making] to implant in him a master passion [*eros*: cf. 499c as love], to be lord over his idle **573** and spendthrift lusts [*epithumia*: cf. e]—a sort of monstrous winged drone—that is the only image which will adequately describe him.

Yes, he said, that is the only adequate image of him.

And when his other lusts [*epithumia*: cf. a], amid clouds of incense and perfumes and garlands and wines and all the pleasures of a dissolute life [*hedone*: cf. 571b & *sunousia*: cf. 493b as attending] now let loose come buzzing around him, nourishing [*trepho*: cf. 572d as brought up] to the utmost the sting of desire [*pothos*: yearning] which they implant in his drone-like nature, then at last this lord of the soul

b [*prostates*: leader & *psuche*: cf. 571c], having madness for the captain of his guard, breaks out into a frenzy [*mania*: cf. 539c as insanity]: and if he finds in himself any good opinions or appetites [*doxa*: cf. 572d as view & *epithumia*: cf. a] in process of formation, and there is in him any sense of shame [*epaischunomai*] remaining, to these better principles he puts an end and casts them forth until he has purged away temperance [*kathairo*: cf. 527e as purified & *sophrosune*: cf. 560d] and brought in madness [*mania*: cf. a] to the full.

Yes, he said, that is the way in which the tyrannical man is generated [*genesis*: cf. 550b as origin].

And is not this the reason why of old love [*eros*: cf. 572e as passion] has been called a tyrant?

I should not wonder.

c Further, I said, has not a drunken man also the spirit [*phronema*: cf. 567a as notions] of a tyrant?

He has.

And you know that a man who is deranged and not right in his mind [*mainomai*: cf. 396b as madness & *hupokekinēkos*, adverb] will fancy that he is able to rule [*epicheireo*: cf. 533b as comprehending] not only over men but also [*elpizo*: cf. 451a as believe & *archo*: cf. 565d as office] over the gods [*theos*: cf. 552c]?

That he will.

And the tyrannical man in the true sense of the word [*akribos*, adverb: cf. 548d, in context of sentence] comes into being when, either under the influence of nature or habit [*phusis*: cf. 562c & *epitedeuma*: cf. 560b as pursuits] or both, he becomes drunken, lustful and passionate? O my friend [*daimonios*: cf. 531c, in context of sentence], is not that so?

Assuredly.

Such is the man and such is his origin. And next, how does he live?

d Suppose, as people facetiously [*paizo*: cf. 558b as play] say, you were to tell me.

I imagine, I said, at the next step in his progress that there will be feasts and carousals and revellings and courtesans, and all that sort of thing; love is the lord [*eros*: cf. b & *turannos*] of the house within him and orders all the concerns of his soul [*diakubernao*: to pilot & *psuche*: cf. b].

That is certain [*anagke*: cf. 566a as inevitably].

Yes, and every day and every night desires [*epithumia*: cf. b as appetites] grow up many and formidable, and their demands are many.

They are indeed, he said.

His revenues, if he has any, are soon spent [*analisko: cf. 561a*].

True.

e Then comes debt and the cutting down of his property [*ousia: cf. 566a as rich*].

Of course.

When he has nothing left, must not his desires [*epithumia: cf. d*], crowding in the nest like young ravens, be crying aloud for food; and he, goaded on [*elauno: to drive*] by them and especially by love [*eros: cf. d*] himself, who is in a manner the captain of them, is in a frenzy [*oistrao: to sting*] and would fain discover whom he can defraud or despoil [*apatao: cf. 451b as deceiver & biazio: cf. 570b as use violence*] **574** of his property in order that [*skoepo: cf. 572a as abstraction*] he may gratify them?

Yes, that is sure to be the case.

He must have money, no matter how, if he is to escape horrid pains and pangs.

He must.

And as in himself there was a succession of pleasures [*epigignomai: to come on & hedone: cf. 573a*], and the new got the better of the old and took away their rights, so he being younger will claim to have more than his father and his mother, and if he has spent [*analisko: cf. 573d as spent*] his own share of the property, he will take a slice of theirs.

No doubt he will.

b And if his parents will not give way, then he will try first of all to cheat and deceive [*klepto & apatao: cf. 573e as defraud*] them.

Very true.

And if he fails, then he will use force and plunder [*harpzo: to seize & biazio: cf. 573e as despoil*] them.

Yes, probably.

And if the old man and woman fight for their own, what then, my friend [*thaumasios: cf. 474a, in context of sentence*]? Will the creature feel any compunction [*eulabeomai: cf. 539a as every care must be taken*] at tyrannizing over them?

No, he said, I should not feel at all comfortable [*tharseo: cf. 451b as take courage*] about his parents.

But, O heavens, Adeimantus, on account of some newfangled love of a harlot who is anything but a necessary connection [*anagkaios: cf. 559c*], can you believe that he would strike the mother who is his

c ancient friend and necessary to his very existence and would place her under the authority of the other when she is brought under the same roof with her; or that under like circumstances, he would do the same to his withered old father, first and most indispensable [*archaios: cf. 547b as ancient*] of friends, for the sake of some newly found blooming youth who is the reverse of indispensable [*oikia & ago (cf. 547b as inclined): to bring into the same house*]?

Yes, indeed, he said; I believe that he would.

Truly, then, I said, a tyrannical son is a blessing [*makarios: cf. 571a as happiness*] to his father and mother.

He is indeed, he replied.

d He first takes their property, and when that falls and pleasures [*hedone: cf. a*] are beginning to swarm in the hive of his soul, then he breaks into a house or steals the garments of some nightly wayfarer; next he proceeds to clear a temple. Meanwhile the old opinions [*doxa: cf. 573b*] which he had when a child and which gave judgment about good and evil [*kalos: cf. 571e as noble & kakos: cf. 566c as coward*] are overthrown by those others which have just been emancipated and are now the bodyguard of love [*eros: cf. 573e*] and share his empire. These in his democratic days, when he was still subject to the laws

e [*nomos: cf. 571b*] and to his father, were only let loose in the dreams [*onar: cf. 563d as dreamed*] of sleep.

But now that he is under the dominion of love [*eros: cf. d*], he becomes always and in waking reality [*hupar: cf. 533b*] what he was then very rarely and in a dream only; he will commit the foulest

575 murder or eat forbidden food or be guilty of any other horrid act. Love [*eros: cf. e*] is his tyrant and lives lordly in him and lawlessly [*anarchia: cf. 562e as anarchy & anomia: cf. 496d as wickedness*] and being himself a king, leads him on as a tyrant leads a state [*polis: cf. 566d*] to the performance of any reckless deed by which he can maintain [*trepho: cf. 573a as nourishing*] himself and the rabble of his associates, whether those whom evil communications [*kakos: cf. d & homilia: cf. 560b as associates*] have brought in from without or those whom he himself has allowed to break loose [*eleutheroo: to set free*] within him by reason [*tropos: cf. 562a as manner*] of a similar evil nature in himself. Have we not here a picture of his way of life?

Yes, indeed, he said.

And if there are only a few of them in the state, the rest of the people are well disposed [*sophrosune: cf. b*]

573b as temperance], they go away and become the bodyguard or mercenary soldiers of some other tyrant who may probably want them for a war; and if there is no war, they stay at home [*eirene*: cf. 557e as peace & *hesuchia*: cf. 503c as peaceful] and do many little pieces of mischief [*kakos*: cf. a as evil] in the city. What sort of mischief?

For example, they are the thieves, burglars, cutpurses, footpads, robbers of temples, man-stealers of the community; or if they are able to speak they turn informers and bear false witness and take bribes.

c A small catalogue of evils [*kakos*: cf. b as mischief], even if the perpetrators of them are few in number.

Yes, I said; but small and great are comparative terms and all these things, in the misery and evil [*poneria*: cf. 491e as evil & *athliotes*: cf. 545a as unhappiness] which they inflict upon a state, do not come within a thousand miles of the tyrant; when this noxious class and their followers grow numerous and become conscious [*aisthanomai*: cf. 572a as contemplate] of their strength, assisted by the infatuation [*anoia*: cf. 492e as folly] of the people, they choose from among themselves the one who has d most of the tyrant in his own soul [*psuche*: cf. 573d] and him they create their tyrant.

Yes, he said, and he will be the most fit to be a tyrant.

If the people yield [*hupeiko*: to withdraw], well and good; but if they resist [*epitrepo*: cf. 519d as to do] him as he began by beating [*kolazo*: cf. 571b as controlled] his own father and mother, so now, if he has the power, he beats them and will keep his dear old fatherland or motherland, as the Cretans say, in subjection to his young retainers whom he has introduced to be their rulers and masters. This is the end of his passions and desires [*telos*: cf. 542b, in context of sentence & *epithumia*: cf. 573e].

e Exactly.

When such men are only private individuals and before they get power [*archo*: cf. 573c, in context of sentence], this is their character; they associate entirely with [*suniami*: cf. 568b as makes] their own flatterers [*kolax*: cf. 538a] or ready tools [*hupereteo*: cf. 540e, in context of sentence]; or if they want anything from anybody, they in their turn are equally ready to bow down before them: they profess every 576 sort of affection [*schema*: cf. 548c as outline] for them; but when they have gained their point they know them no more [*allotrios*: cf. 597b, in context of sentence].

Yes, truly.

They are always either the masters or servants and never the friends of anybody; the tyrant [*phusis*: cf. 573c as nature] never tastes of true freedom or friendship [*eleutheria*: cf. 572e as liberty & *philia*: cf. 401d as sympathy].

Certainly not.

And may we not rightly [*orthos*, adverb: cf. 564b as very] call such men treacherous [*apistos*: cf. 450d as hostile]?

No question.

Also they are utterly unjust, if we were right [*homologeo*: cf. 570b, in context of sentence & *orthos*, b adverb: cf. a] in our notion of justice [*dikaiosune*: cf. 545a]?

Yes, he said, and we were perfectly right.

Let us then sum up in a word [*kephalaioo*], I said, the character of the worst man [*kakos*: cf. 575c as evil]: he is the waking reality of what we dreamed [*hupar & onar*: for both, cf. 574e].

Most true.

And this is he who being by nature [*phusis*: cf. a] most of a tyrant bears rule, and the longer he lives the more of a tyrant he becomes.

That is certain, said Glaucon, taking his turn to answer.

And will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest [*phaino*: cf. 559d as suspect & *poneros*: cf. 561c c as evil], be also the most miserable [*athliotes*: cf. 575c]? He who has tyrannized longest and most, most continually and truly miserable [*aletheia*: cf. 572a as truth], although this may not be the opinion [*dokeo*: cf. 572b as am right] of men in general?

Yes, he said, inevitably [*anagke*: cf. 573d as certain].

And must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical, state, and the democratic man like the democratic state, and the same of the others?

Certainly.

And as state is to state in virtue and happiness [*polis*: cf. 575a & *arete*: cf. 556c & *eudaimonia*: cf. 556d], so is man in relation to [*pros*] man?

d To be sure.

Then comparing our original city which was under a king and the city which is under a tyrant, how do they stand as to virtue [*arete*: cf. c]?

They are the opposite extremes, he said, for one is the very best and the other is the very worst [*aristos*: cf. 560b & *kakos*: cf. b].

There can be no mistake, I said, as to which is which, and therefore I will at once enquire whether you would arrive at a similar decision [*krino*: cf. 545c as decision] about their relative happiness and misery [*eudaimonia*: cf. c as happiness & *athliotes*: c as miserable]. And here we must not allow ourselves to be panic-stricken at the apparition [*ekplesso*: cf. 436e as confuse & *blepo*: cf. 545c as take a look] of the tyrant who is only a unit and may perhaps have a few retainers about him; but let us go as we ought into every corner of the city and look all about [*theaomai*: cf. 557c as appear], and then we will give our opinion [*apophaino*: cf. 522d as proves & *doxa*: cf. 574d].

A fair invitation [*orthos*, adverb: cf. a as rightly], he replied; and I see as every one must that a tyranny is the most wretched form [*athlios*: cf. 571a as misery] of government, and the rule of a king the happiest [*eudaimon*: cf. 567c].

And in estimating [*prokaleo*: to challenge, propose] the men too, may I not fairly [*orthos*, adverb: cf. e] 577 make a like request that I should have a judge [*krino*: cf. d as decision] whose mind [*dianoia*: cf. 568a as saying] can enter into and see through human nature [*diemi*: to thrust through & *dunami*: to be able & *ethos*: cf. 561e, in context of sentence]? He must not be like a child who looks at the outside and is dazzled [*ekplesso*: cf. d as panic-stricken] at the pompous aspect [*prostasis*] which the tyrannical nature assumes to the beholder [*pros tous exo* & *schematizo*: to assume a certain form], but let him be one who has a clear insight [*diorao*: cf. 423e as see through & *hikanos*, adverb: cf. 570c as certainly]. May I suppose [*oiomai*: cf. 559b] that the judgment is given in the hearing of us all by one who is able to judge and has dwelt in the same place with him and been present at his daily life and known him in his

family relations [*oikeios*: cf. 572e as friends] where he may be seen stripped of his tragedy attire and again in the hour of public danger—he shall tell us about the happiness and misery [*eudaimonia* & *athliotes*: for both, cf. d] of the tyrant when compared with [*pros*] other men?

That again, he said, is a very fair proposal.

Shall I assume [*prospoieo*: cf. 566e as wanting to be] that we ourselves are able and experienced judges [*krino*: cf. a] and have before now met [*entugchano*: cf. 531e as was capable] with such a person? We shall then have some one who will answer our enquiries.

By all means.

c Let me ask [*skopeo*: cf. 574a, in context of sentence] you not to forget the parallel [*anamimnesko* (with *ouk*): cf. 572b as remember & *homoiotos*: cf. 555b, in context of sentence] of the individual and the state; bearing this in mind and glancing [*athreo*: cf. 558c as consider] in turn from one to the other of them, will you tell me their respective conditions [*pathema*: cf. 513d as faculties]?

What do you mean?, he asked.

Beginning with the state, I replied, would you say that a city which is governed by a tyrant is free or enslaved [*eleutheros*: cf. 557b & *doulos*]?

No city, he said, can be more completely enslaved.

And yet, as you see, there are freemen as well as masters [*despotes*: 563e, in context of sentence] in such a state?

Yes, he said, I see that there are—a few; but the people, speaking generally, and the best [*epieikes*: cf. 568a as good] of them are miserably degraded and enslaved [*atimos*, adverb: cf. 555d, in context of sentence & *athlios*, adverb: cf. 576e as wretched (adjective)].

d Then if the man is like the state, I said, must not the same rule prevail [*anagke*: cf. 576c as inevitably & *taxis*: cf. 525b as art & *eniemi*: cf. 518c as exists]? His soul is full of meanness and vulgarity [*psuche*: cf. 575d & *douleia*: slavery & *aneleutheria*: cf. 486a as illiberality]—the best elements [*epieikes*: cf. c] in him are enslaved; and there is a small ruling part which is also the worst and maddest [*mochtheros*: miserable & *manikos*: cf. 403a as madness].

Inevitably.

And would you say that the soul of such an one is the soul of a freeman or of a slave [*psuche*: cf. d; & *eleutheros* & *doulos*, for both cf. c]?

He has the soul of a slave, in my opinion.

And the state which is enslaved under a tyrant is utterly incapable of acting voluntarily [*bouleuo*: cf. 521c as

consider]?

Utterly incapable.

e And also the soul which is under a tyrant (I am speaking of the soul [*psuche: cf. d*] taken as a whole) is least capable of doing what she desires [*bouleuo: cf. d*]; there is a gadfly which goads [*helko: cf. 560b as associates & bia: cf. 554c as forcibly*] her, and she is full of trouble and remorse [*tarache: cf. 444b as confusion & metameleia: change of purpose*].

Certainly.

And is the city which is [*anagke: cf. d as prevail*] under a tyrant rich or poor?

Poor.

578 And the tyrannical soul must be always poor and insatiable [*penichros & aplestos: cf. 475c*]?

True.

And must not such a state and such a man be always full of fear?

Yes, indeed.

Is there any state in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow and groaning and pain?

Certainly not.

And is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery than in the tyrannical man who is in a fury of passions and desires [*mainomai: cf. 573c as deranged & epithumia: cf. 575d & eros: cf. 575a as love*]?

Impossible.

b Reflecting [*apoblepo: cf. 545c as turning attention*] upon these and similar evils, you held the tyrannical state to be the most miserable [*athlios: cf. 576c as wretched*] of states?

And I was right, he said.

Certainly, I said. And when you see [*apoblepo: cf. b*] the same evils in the tyrannical man, what do you say of him?

I say that he is by far the most miserable of all men.

There, I said, I think that you are beginning to go wrong [*orthos, adverb (with ouk): cf. 576e as fairly*].

What do you mean?

I do not think that he has as yet reached the utmost extreme of misery.

Then who is more miserable?

One of whom I am about to speak.

Who is that?

c He who is of a tyrannical nature, and instead of leading a private life has been cursed [*dustuches: unfortunate*] with the further misfortune [*sumphora: cf. 399a as crisis*] of being a public tyrant.

From what has been said, I gather [*tekmaiomai: cf. 501b, in context of sentence*] that you are right.

Yes, I replied, but in matters of this sort you should be a little more certain [*skopeo: cf. 577c as ask*] and should not conjecture [*oiomai: cf. 577a as suppose*] only; for of all questions, this respecting good and evil [*agathos: cf. 570a, in context of sentence & kakos: cf. 576d as worst*] is the greatest.

Very true, he said.

Let me then offer [*skopeo: cf. c*] you an illustration which may, I think [*dokeo: cf. 576c as may (not) be*] **d** the opinion & *ennoeo: cf. 563c as know*], throw a light upon this subject.

What is your illustration?

The case of rich individuals in cities who possess many slaves: from them you may form an idea [*prosomoios: much like*] of the tyrant's condition, for they both have slaves; the only difference is that he has more slaves.

Yes, that is the difference.

You know that they live securely and have nothing to apprehend from their servants?

What should they fear?

Nothing. But do you observe [*ennoeo: cf. d*] the reason of this?

Yes; the reason is, that the whole city is leagued together for the protection [*boetheo: cf. 559e as helping*] of each individual.

e Very true [*kalos, adverb: cf. 559a as right*], I said. But imagine one of these owners, the master say of some fifty slaves, together with his family and property [*ousia: cf. 573e*] and slaves, carried off by a god [*theos: cf. 573c*] into the wilderness where there are no freemen to help him—will he not be in an agony of fear [*phobos: cf. 557a*] lest he and his wife and children should be put to death by his slaves [*oiketes: household slave*]?

Yes, he said, he will be in the utmost fear.

579 The time has arrived when he will be compelled to flatter [*anagkazo: cf. 556a & thopeuo: to fawn on*] some of his slaves and make many promises [*hupischneomai: cf. 427d*] to them of freedom and other things, much against his will—he will have to cajole his own servants [*kolax: cf. 575e as flatterers & therapon: an attendant*].

Yes, he said, that will be the only way of saving himself [*anagke: cf. 577e, in context of sentence & apollumi: cf. 550d as ruin*].

And suppose the same god [*theos: cf. 578e*], who carried him away, to surround him with neighbors who will not suffer one man to be the master of another and who, if they could catch the offender, would take his life?

b His case will be still worse, if you suppose him to be everywhere surrounded and watched by enemies.

And is not this the sort of prison in which the tyrant will be bound—he who being by nature [*phusis: cf. 576b*] such as we have described is full of all sorts of fears and lusts [*phobos: cf. 578e & eros: cf. 578a as desires*]? His soul is dainty and greedy [*psuche: cf. 577e & lichnos*] and yet alone of all men in the city, he is never allowed to go on a journey or to see [*theoreo: cf. 537a*] the things which other freemen desire [*epithumeo: cf. 565b*] to see, but he lives in his hole like a woman hidden in the house and is

c jealous of any other citizen who goes into foreign parts and sees [*horao: cf. 567c as look about*] anything of interest.

Very true, he said.

And amid evils such as these will not he who is ill-governed [*kakos, adverb: cf. 495a as ill-educated & paideuo: cf. 559b as trained*] in his own person—the tyrannical man, I mean—whom you just now decided to be the most miserable [*athlios: cf. 578b*] of all—will not he be yet more miserable when, instead of leading a private life, he is constrained by fortune [*anagkazo: cf. a & tuche: cf. 499b as providentially*] to be a public tyrant? He has to be master [*archo: cf. 575e as get power*] of others when he is not master of himself: he is like a diseased or paralytic man who is compelled [*anagkazo: cf. c*] to

d pass his life, not in retirement, but fighting and combating [*agonizomai & machomai: cf. 521be as fight*] with other men.

Yes, he said, the similitude is most exact [*homoites: cf. 472d as resembled & alethos: cf. 567e, in context of sentence*], Socrates.

Is not his case utterly miserable [*pathos: cf. 539a as very natural & athlios: cf. c*], Glaukon? Does not the actual tyrant lead a worse life than he whose life you determined to be the worst [*krino: cf. 577b as judges & chalepos: cf. 570b as cruel*]?

Certainly.

He who is the real [*aletheia: cf. 576c as truly*] tyrant, whatever men may think [*dokeo: cf. 578d*], is the real slave [*doulos: cf. 577d*], and is obliged to practice the greatest adulation and servility [*thopeia & douleia: cf. 577d as meanness*] and to be the flatterer [*kolax: cf. a as cajole*] of the vilest of mankind. He **e** has desires which he is utterly unable to satisfy [*epithumia: cf. 578a & apopimplemi: cf. 571a*], and has more wants [*epidees*] than any one and is truly poor [*penes: cf. 557a*] if you know how to inspect the whole soul [*theomai: cf. 576e as look all about & psuche: cf. b*] of him: all his life long he is beset with fear and is full of convulsions and distractions [*phobos: cf. b as fears & odune: pain*], even as the state which he resembles [*polis: cf. 576c & diathesis: cf. 489a as relation*]; and surely the resemblance holds?

Very true, he said.

580 Moreover, as we were saying before, he grows worse from having power: he becomes and is of necessity more jealous, more faithless, more unjust, more friendless, more impious [*phthonos: cf. 476e, in context of sentence & apistos: cf. 576a as treacherous & adikos: cf. 493c as dishonorable & aphilos: without friends & anosios: cf. 479a as unholy*], than he was at first; he is the purveyor and cherishes [*trepho: cf. 575a as maintain*] every sort of vice [*kakos: cf. c as ill-governed*], and the consequence is that he is supremely miserable [*dustucho: cf. 399c as unfortunate*] and that he makes everybody else as miserable as himself.

No man of any sense [*nous: cf. 549d as in himself*] will dispute your words.

Come then, I said, and as the judge in theatrical contests proclaims [*apophaino: cf. 576e as give our*

b *opinion*] the result, do you also decide who in your opinion [*doxa: cf. 576e*] is first in the scale of happiness [*eudaimonia: cf. 577b*] and who second and in what order the others follow: there are five of them in all—they are the royal, timocratic, oligarchical, democratic, tyrannical.

The decision [*krisis: cf. 555b as judgment*] will be easily given, he replied; they shall be choruses coming on the stage, and I must judge [*krino: cf. 579d as determined*] them in the order in which they enter by the criterion of virtue and vice, happiness and misery [*arete: cf. 576d & kakia: cf. 490c as depraved & eudaimonia: cf. b &*

enantios: cf. 472c as unhappiness].

Need we hire a herald or shall I announce that the son of Ariston (the best) has decided that the best [*aristos: cf. 576d*] and most just is also the happiest [*eudaimos: cf. 450c as simple*], and that this is he who is the most royal man and king over himself; and that the worst and most unjust man [*kakos: cf. a as vice & adikos: cf. a*] is also the most miserable [*athlios: cf. 579d*], and that this is he who being the greatest tyrant of himself is also the greatest tyrant of his state [*polis: cf. 579e*]?

Make the proclamation yourself, he said.

And shall I add, 'whether seen or unseen by gods [*theos: cf. 579a*] and men'?

Let the words be added.

Then this, I said, will be our first proof [*apodeixis: cf. 504b as discussion*]; and there is another which **d** may also have some weight [*dokeo: cf. 579d as think*].

What is that?

The second proof [*eidōs: cf. 572c, in context of sentence*] is derived from the nature of the soul [*psuche: cf. 579e*]: seeing that the individual soul, like the state, has been divided by us into three principles, the division may, I think [*dokeo: cf. d*], furnish a new demonstration [*apodeixis: cf. c as proof*].

Of what nature?

It seems [*phaino: cf. 576b as has been shown*] to me that to these three principles three pleasures [*hedone: cf. 574d*] correspond; also three desires and governing powers [*epithumia: cf. 579e & arche: cf. 563e, in context of sentence*].

How do you mean? he said.

There is one principle with which, as we were saying, a man learns [*manthano: cf. 568e, in context of sentence*], another with which he is angry [*thumoo: cf. 536c as vehement*]; the third, having many forms [*polueidios*], has no special name but is denoted [*eponomazo: to apply a name*] by the general term **e** appetitive [*epithumetikos: cf. 571e as appetites*], from the extraordinary strength and vehemence of the desires [*epithumia: cf. d*] of eating and drinking and the other sensual appetites which are the main elements [*akolouthos: following*] of it; also money-loving because such desires are generally satisfied by **581** the help of money.

That is true [*orthos, adverb: cf. 578b as to go wrong*], he said.

If we were to say that the loves and pleasures [*philia: cf. 576a as friendship & hedone: cf. 580d*] of this third part were concerned with gain [*kerdos*], we should then be able to fall back on a single notion [*kephalaios: head, chief & logos: cf. 571e as thoughts*]; and might truly [*orthos, adverb: cf. a*] and intelligibly describe this part of the soul [*psuche: cf. 580d*] as loving gain or money.

I agree [*dokeo: cf. 580d as I think*] with you.

Again, is not the passionate element [*thumoeides: cf. 572a*] wholly set on [*hormao: pros: cf. 487c, in context of sentence*] ruling and conquering and getting fame [*eudokimeo: cf. 554c as reputation*]?

b True.

Suppose we call it the contentious or ambitious—would the term be suitable [*emmelos, adverb: cf. 570c as sufficiently*]?

Extremely suitable.

On the other hand, every one sees [*manthano: cf. 580d as learns & deloo: cf. 523e, in context of sentence*] that the principle of knowledge [*eido: cf. 572a*] is wholly directed to the truth [*aletheia, with pros: cf. 579d as real*] and cares [*melo: cf. 365d as mind*] less than either of the others for gain or fame [*doxa: cf. 580b as opinion*].

Far less.

'Lover of wisdom,' 'lover of knowledge' [*philosophos: cf. 501d as wise & philomathes: cf. 535d*] are titles which we may fitly apply to that part [*tropos, with kata: cf. 575a as by reason*] of the soul?

Certainly.

One principle prevails in the souls [*archo: cf. 579c as to be master & psuche: cf. a*] of one class of men, **c** another in others, as may happen?

Yes.

Then we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of men—lovers of wisdom, lovers of honor, lovers of gain [*philosophos: cf. a & philnikos: fond of victory & philokerdes*]?

Exactly.

And there are three kinds of pleasure which are [*hupokeimai: cf. 478e as being premised*] their several objects?

Very true.

Now if you examine the three classes of men and ask of them in turn which of their lives is the most pleasant [*hedus: cf. 561d as joy*], each will be found praising his own and depreciating that of others: the **d** money-maker will contrast the vanity [*hedone: cf. a as pleasures*] of honor or of learning [*axia: cf. 536c as disrepute (with ou, not) & manthano: cf. b as sees*] if they bring no money with the solid advantages of gold and silver? True, he said.

And the lover of honor [*philotimos: cf. 551a*]—what will be his opinion? Will he not think that the pleasure [*hedone: cf. d*] of riches is vulgar while the pleasure of learning [*manthano: cf. d*], if it brings no distinction [*time: cf. 568d as reputation*], is all smoke and nonsense to him?

Very true.

And are we to suppose [*oiomai: cf. 578c as conjecture*], I said, that the philosopher sets any value on **e** other pleasures [*nomizo: cf. 530b as imagine*] in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the truth [*eido: cf. b as knowledge & alethes: cf. 554e as true*], and in that pursuit abiding, ever learning, not so far indeed from the heaven of pleasure? Does he not call the other pleasures necessary [*anagkaios: cf. 574b*] under the idea that if there were no necessity [*deo: cf. 388a as entreat*] for them, he would rather not have them?

There can be no doubt of that [*eido: cf. e*], he replied.

Since, then, the pleasures of each class [*hedone: cf. d & eidos: cf. 580d as proof*] and the life of each are in dispute [*amphisbeteo: cf. 533d*], and the question is not which life is more or less honorable or better or worse [*kalos: cf. 574d as good & aischros: cf. 538d as dishonorable; both with pros*], but which is the **582** more pleasant or painless—how shall we know [*eido: cf. e*] who speaks truly?

I cannot myself tell, he said.

[*skopeo: cf. 578c as offer (not in Jowett text)*] Well, but what ought to be the criterion [*krino: cf. 580b as judge & kalos, adverb: cf. 578e as very true*]? Is any better than experience and wisdom and reason [*empeiria: cf. 539e & phronesis: cf. 559b & logos: cf. 581a as notion*]?

There cannot be a better [*beltios: cf. 572c*], he said.

Then, I said, reflect [*skopeo: cf. a*]. Of the three individuals, which has the greatest experience [*empeiros: practiced*] of all the pleasures which we enumerated? Has the lover of gain [*philokertes: cf. 581c*], in learning the nature of essential truth [*manthano: cf. 581d & aletheia (with oios as essential): cf. 581b*], greater experience of the pleasure of knowledge [*hedone: cf. 581e & eido: cf. a as know*] than the **b** philosopher has of the pleasure of gain [*kerdaino: cf. 362b as advantage*]?

The philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage [*diaphero: cf. 527c as apprehension*]; for he has of necessity always known the taste of the other pleasures from his childhood upwards: but the lover of gain [*philoderdes: cf. a*] in all his experience has not of necessity tasted—or, I should rather say, even had he desired, could hardly have tasted—the sweetness of learning and knowing truth [*manthano: cf. a*].

Then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage [*diaphero: cf. b*] over the lover of gain, for he has a double experience [*empeiria: cf. a*]?

c Yes, very great.

Again, has he greater experience of the pleasures of honor, or the lover of honor [*timao: cf. 572c as encouraged*] of the pleasures of wisdom [*phroneo: cf. 572a as reason*]?

No, he said, all three are honored in proportion [*exergazomai: to make completely, accomplish*] as they attain [*hormao: cf. 581a as set on*] their object; for the rich man and the brave man and the wise man [*plousios: cf. 570a & andreios: cf. 564b as courageous & sophos: cf. 568a*] alike have their crowd of admirers, and as they all receive honor they all have experience of the pleasures of honor [*empeiros: cf. a as experienced & hedone: cf. a*]; but the delight [*hedone: cf. c*] which is to be found in the knowledge of true being [*tou ontos: cf. 533b*] is known [*geuo: cf. 475c as taste*] to the philosopher only.

d His experience [*empeiria: cf. b*], then, will enable him to judge better [*krino: cf. a as criterion & kalos: cf. 581e*] than any one?

Far better.

And he is the only one who has wisdom [*phronesis: cf. a*] as well as experience?

Certainly.

Further, the very faculty [*organon: cf. 527d as eye*] which is the instrument of judgment [*krino: cf. d*] is not possessed by the covetous or ambitious man [*philokertes: cf. a & philotimos: cf. 581d as love of honor*] but only by the philosopher?

What faculty?

Reason [*logos: cf. a*], with whom, as we were saying, the decision ought to rest.

Yes.

And reasoning is peculiarly his instrument [*organon: cf. d*]?

Certainly.

If wealth and gain [*ploutos: cf. 491c & kerdos: cf. 581a*] were the criterion [*aristos: cf. 580b*], then the e praise or blame of the lover of gain would surely be the most trustworthy [*alethos: cf. 579d as most exact*]?

Assuredly.

Or if honor or victory or courage [*time: cf. 581d as distinction & andreia: cf. 561a*], in that case the judgement of the ambitious or pugnacious [*philotimos: cf. d & philonikos: cf. 551a as loving contention*] would be the truest?

Clearly.

But since experience and wisdom and reason [*empeiria: cf. d & phronesis: cf. d & logos: cf. d*] are the judges... The only inference [*anagke: cf. 579a, in context of sentence*] possible, he replied, is that pleasures which are approved by the lover of wisdom and reason [*philosophos: cf. 581c & philologos*] are the truest [*alethos: cf. e*].

583 And so we arrive at the result [*manthano: cf. 582b as learning*] that the pleasure of the intelligent part of the soul [*hedone: cf. 582c as delight & psuche: cf. 581b*] is the most pleasant of the three, and that he of us in whom this is the ruling principle has the most pleasant life [*archo: cf. 581b as prevails & hedus: cf. 581c*].

Unquestionably, he said, the wise man [*phronimos: cf. 567c*] speaks with authority [*kurios: cf. 565a as powerful class*] when he approves of his own life.

And what does the judge [*krites*] affirm to be the life which is next and the pleasure which is next?

Clearly that of the soldier and lover of honor [*philotimos: cf. 582e as ambitious*]; who is nearer to himself than the money-maker.

Last comes the lover of gain [*philokerdos: cf. 582da as covetous*]?

Very true, he said.

b Twice in succession, then, has the just man overthrown the unjust [*dikaios & adikaioi: for both, cf. 548d*] in this conflict; and now comes the third trial which is dedicated to Olympian Zeus the savior [*soter: cf. 549b*]: a sage whispers in my ear [*athreo: cf. 577c as glancing*] that no pleasure [*hedone: cf. a*] except that of the wise [*phronimos: cf. a*] is quite true and pure [*katharos: cf. 520d as heavenly light*]*—*all others are a shadow [*skiagrapho: to draw with gradations of light and shade*] only; and surely this will prove the greatest and most decisive [*kurios: cf. a as with authority*] of falls?

Yes, the greatest, but will you explain yourself?

c I will work out the subject and you shall answer my questions.

Proceed.

Say, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain [*hedone: cf. b & lupe: cf. 503a*]?

True.

And there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain [*chairo: cf. 475b as joy & lupeo: cf. 562e as sorrow*]?

There is.

A state which is intermediate [*metaxu: cf. 544d as non-descript*] and a sort of repose of the soul [*hesuchia: cf. 575b, in context of sentence & psuche: cf. a*] about either*—*that is what you mean?

Yes.

You remember [*mimnesko: cf. 544b as recollection*] what people say when they are sick [*kamno: cf. 556e as illness*]?

What do they say?

That after all nothing is more pleasant than health [*hedus: cf. a & hugiano: to be healthy*]. But then they **d** never knew this to be the greatest of pleasures until they were ill [*kamno: cf. c*].

Yes, I know [*mimnesko: cf. c as remember*], he said.

And when persons are suffering from acute pain [*periodunia*], you must have heard them say that there is nothing more pleasant than to get rid of [*pauo: cf. 559b, in context of sentence*] their pain?

I have.

And there are [*aisthanomai: cf. 575c as become conscious*] many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and cessation of pain [*lupeo, with me (not): cf. c & hesuchia: cf. c*], and not any positive enjoyment [*chairo: cf. c*], is extolled by them as the greatest pleasure?

Yes, he said; at the time they are pleased [*agapeton: verbal adjective*] and well content to be at rest [*hesuchia: cf. d*].

e Again, when pleasure ceases [*pauo: cf. d as get rid of*], that sort of rest or cessation will be painful [*luperos*]? Doubtless, he said.

Then the intermediate state [*metachu: cf. c*] of rest will be pleasure and will also be pain?

So it would seem.

But can that which is neither become both?

I should say [*dokeo: cf. 581a as I agree*] not.

And both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul [*kinesis & psuche, with en: cf. c*], are they not?

Yes.

584 But that which is neither was just now shown to be [*phaino: cf. 580d as it seems*] rest and not motion, and in a mean between [*en meso: cf. 547d*] them?

Yes [*phaino: cf. a*].

How, then, can we be right [*orthos, adverb: cf. 581a as truly*] in supposing that the absence of pain [*algeo, with me (not): cf. 515e as have a pain*] is pleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain [*chairo: cf. d & aniaros: grievous*]?

Impossible.

This then is an appearance [*phaino: cf. a*] only and not a reality; that is to say, the rest is pleasure [*hedus: cf. 583c*] at the moment and in comparison of what is painful [*algeinos*] and painful in comparison of what is pleasant; but all these representations [*phantasma: cf. 532b as images*], when tried by the test of true pleasure [*aletheia: cf. 582a & hedone, with pros: cf. 583c*], are not real [*hugies: cf. 490c as health*] but a sort of imposition [*goeteia: cf. 513d as enchantments*]?

That is the inference [*semaino: cf. 524a as meaning*].

b Look at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains [*lupe: cf. 583c*] and you will no longer suppose [*oiomai: cf. 581d*], as you perhaps may at present, that pleasure is only the cessation [*paula: cf. 501e as rest*] of pain, or pain of pleasure.

What are they, he said, and where shall I find them?

There are many of them: take as an example [*ennoeo: cf. 578d as observe*] the pleasures of smell which are very great and have no antecedent pains; they come in a moment [*exaiphnes: cf. 515c as suddenly*], and when they depart leave no pain behind them.

Most true, he said.

c Let us not, then, be induced to believe [*peitho: cf. 570b, in context of sentence*] that pure pleasure is the cessation [*apallage*] of pain or pain of pleasure.

No.

Still, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul [*teino: cf. 548d, in context of sentence & psuche: cf. 583e*] through the body are generally of this sort [*eidosis: cf. 581e as class*]—they are reliefs [*apallage: cf. c*] of pain.

That is true.

And the anticipations [*prosdokia: expectation*] of future pleasures and pains are of a like nature?

Yes.

d Shall I give you an illustration [*eika: to be like*] of them?

Let me hear.

You would allow [*nomizo: cf. 581d as sets value on*], I said, that there is in nature [*phusis: cf. 579b*] an upper and lower and middle region?

I should.

And if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region, would he not imagine [*oiomai: cf. b as suppose*] that he is going up; and he who is standing in the middle and sees whence he has come, would imagine that he is already in the upper region if he has never seen [*horao: cf. 579c*] the true upper world?

To be sure, he said; how can he think otherwise?

e But if he were taken back again he would imagine [*oiomai: cf. d*], and truly imagine, that he was descending? No doubt.

All that would arise out of his ignorance [*empeiros: cf. 582c as experience*] of the true upper and middle and lower regions?

Yes.

Then can you wonder [*thaumazo: cf. 568a as admire*] that persons who are inexperienced in the truth [*apeiros: cf. 525a as infinite & aletheia: cf. a*], as they have wrong ideas [*hugies: cf. b as not real & doxa: cf.*

581b as fame] about many other things, should also have wrong ideas about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state [*hedone: cf. a & lupe: cf. b & metachu: cf. 583e; all with pros*]; so that when they are only being drawn towards [*phero, with epi: cf. 503e as endure*] the painful they feel pain and 585 think [*oiomai: cf. e as imagine*] the pain which they experience to be real and in like manner, when drawn away from pain to the neutral or intermediate state, they firmly believe that they have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure [*plerosis, with pros: a filling & hedone: cf. 584e*]; not knowing pleasure, they err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain which is like contrasting black with grey instead of [*apeiria: cf. 487c as led astray*] white—can you wonder, I say, at this?

No, indeed; I should be much more disposed to wonder [*thaumazo: cf. 584e*] at the opposite.

Look at [*ennoeo: cf. 584b as taken an example*] the matter thus:—hunger, thirst, and the like, are empty b stages [*hexis: cf. 533e, in context of sentence*] of the body [*soma, with peri: cf. 559b*]?

Yes.

And ignorance and folly [*agnoia: cf. 578c & aphrosune: cf. 515c as error*] are empty stages of the soul [*psuche, with peri: 584c*]?

True.

And food and wisdom [*trophe: cf. 560b as educate & nous: cf. 580a as sense & ischos: cf. 468d as strengthening*] are the corresponding [*metalambano: cf. 565b as share*] satisfactions of either?

Certainly.

And is the satisfaction [*plerosis: cf. a as satiety*] derived from that which has less or from that which has more existence [*ontos: cf. 582c*] the truer?

Clearly, from that which has more.

What classes [*genos: cf. 477d*] of things have a greater share of pure existence [*katharos: cf. 583b & metecho: cf. 549b as has a piece of & ousia: cf. 578e as property*] in your judgment—those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples or the class which contains true opinion and knowledge and mind [*doxa: cf. 584e as ideas & episteme: cf. 540a as knowledge & nous: cf. c b as wisdom*] and all the different kinds of virtue [*arete: cf. 580b*]? Put the question in this way [*krino: cf. 582d as judgment*]:—which has a more pure being—that which is concerned with the invariable, the immortal, and the true [*to tou aie homoiou & athanatos & aletheia: cf. 584e*]; and is of such a nature and is found in such natures; or that which is concerned [*dokeo: cf. 583e as I should say*] with and found in the variable and mortal [*to to metepote homoiou & thanatos*] and is itself variable and mortal?

Far purer, he replied, is the being of that which is concerned [*diaphero: cf. 582b as has a great advantage*] with the invariable.

And does the essence [*ousia: cf. b as existence*] of the invariable partake of knowledge [*metecho: cf. b as have a share & episteme: cf. b*] in the same degree as of essence?

Yes, of knowledge in the same degree.

And of truth [*aletheia: cf. c*] in the same degree?

Yes.

And, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have less of essence [*ousia: cf. c*]?

Necessarily [*anagke: cf. 582e as inference*].

d Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the body [*therapeia, with peri: cf. 444e as treatment & soma: cf. b*] have less of truth and essence [*aletheia & ousia: for both, cf. c*] than those which are in the service of the soul [*metecho: cf. c & psuche: cf. b*]?

Far less.

And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul?

Yes.

What is filled [*pleroo*] with more real existence and actually has a more real existence [*to ton onton: cf. 532c & onontos: cf. b*] is more really filled than that which is filled with less real existence and is less real?

Of course.

And if there be a pleasure in being filled [*hedus: cf. 584a & pleroo: cf. d*] with that which is according to nature [*proseko: cf. 530c, in context of sentence & phusis: cf. 584d*], that which is more really filled with e more real being [*to to onti*] will more really and truly enjoy true pleasure [*chairo: cf. 584a as pleasure & hedone: cf. a*]; whereas that which participates in less real being [*metalambano: cf. b as corresponding & to ton hetton onton*] will be less truly and surely satisfied and will participate in an illusory and less real [*apistos: cf. 580a, in context of sentence & hetton with alethos: cf. 582e as truest*] pleasure?

Unquestionably.

586 Those then who know not wisdom and virtue [*apeiros: cf. 584e as inexperienced & phronesis: cf. 582e & arete: cf. 585c*] and are always busy [*suniami: cf. 575e as associate with*] with gluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far as the mean [*metecho: cf. 585d, in context of sentence*]; and in this region they move at random [*planao: cf. 484b as wander*] throughout life, but they never pass into the true upper world [*hyperbaino: cf. 509b as exceed & pros to ano*]; thither they neither look nor do they ever find their way [*anablepo & phero: cf. 584e as being drawn towards*], neither are they truly filled with true being [*pleroo: cf. 585d & tou ontos to onti*] nor do they taste of pure and abiding pleasure [*geuo: cf. 582c as is known & katharos: cf. 585b & bebaios: cf. 537a as lasting*]. Like cattle with their eyes always looking down and their heads stooping to the earth, that is, to the dining-table, they fatten

b and feed and breed, and in their excessive love [*pleonexia: cf. 359c as interest*] of these delights, they kick and butt at one another with horns and hoofs which are made of iron; and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust [*aplestia: cf. 562c*]. For they fill [*pimplemi*] themselves with that which is not substantial [*tois ousin*], and the part of themselves which they fill is also unsubstantial and incontinent [*stegos: roof: i.e., 'like a vessel full of holes' or with a covering*].

Verily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life of the many like an oracle [*chresmodos: delivering an oracle in verse*].

Their pleasures are mixed with pains [*hedone: cf. 585e & meignummi: cf. 548c as mixture & suniami: cf. a as are busy & lupe: cf. 584e*]—how can they be otherwise [*anagke: cf. 585c as necessarily*]? For they are mere shadows and pictures of the true [*eidolon: cf. 534c & skiagrapho: cf. 583b as shadow*] and are **c** colored by contrast which exaggerates both light and shade, and so they implant in the minds of fools [*entikto: cf. 410a as inspires & aphron: without sense*] insane desires [*lussao: cf. 329c as mad & eros: cf. 579b as lusts*] of themselves; and they are fought about as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy in ignorance of the truth [*agnoia: cf. 585b & alethos: cf. 585e as truly*].

Something of that sort must inevitably [*anagke: cf. c*] happen.

And must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of the soul [*anagke: cf. c & thumoeides: cf. 581a*]? Will not the passionate man who carries his passion into action [*diaprasso: cf. 497a as will have done a great work*] be in the like case whether he is envious and ambitious or violent and contentious or angry and discontented [*phthonos: cf. 580a & philotimia: cf. 555a as honorable ambition & bia: cf. 577e as goads & philonikia: cf. 548d as spirit of contention & thumos: cf. 572a as irrational principles & duskolia: cf. 411c as impracticable*], if he be seeking to attain [*dioko: cf. 545a*] and **d** pursue honor and victory and the satisfaction of his anger [*pimplemi: cf. b & thumos: cf. d*] anger without reason or sense [*logismos: cf. 546b as intelligence & nous: cf. 585b as mind*]?

Yes, he said, the same will happen [*anagke: cf. c*] with the spirited element also.

Then may we not confidently [*tharseo: cf. 574b as should feel comfortable*] assert that the lovers of money and honor [*philokerdes: cf. 583a as lovers of gain & philonikos: cf. 582e as ambitious*], when they seek their pleasures [*epithumia: cf. 580e*] under the guidance [*epomai: to follow*] and in the company of reason and knowledge [*logos: cf. 582e & episteme: cf. 585c*] and pursue after [*dioko: cf. c as attain*] and win the pleasures which wisdom shows [*phronimos: cf. 583b as wise & exegeomai: cf. 574c as explanation*] them, will also have the truest pleasures [*lambano: cf. 559a & alethos: cf. c*] in the highest degree which is attainable to them inasmuch as they follow truth [*epomai: cf. d & aletheia: cf. 585d*]; and **e** they will have the pleasures which are natural to them if that which is best [*beltistos: cf. 572a as higher principle*] for each one is also most natural [*oikeiotes: cf. 537b*] to him?

Yes, certainly; the best is the most natural [*oikeiotes: cf. 537c*].

And when the whole soul follows [*psuche: cf. 585d & epomai: cf. d*] the philosophical principle and there is no division [*stasiazo: cf. 566a as stir up civil war*], the several parts are [*huparcho: cf. 535b, in context of sentence*] just and do each of them their own business [*prasso: cf. 519c as actions*] and enjoy

587 [*karpoo: to bear fruit*] severally the best [*beltists: cf. e*] and truest pleasures of which they are capable [*dunatos: cf. 540d as (not) impossible*]?

Exactly.

But when either of the two other principles prevails [*krateo: cf. 548c as prevalence*], it fails in attaining [*huparcho, with mete (not): cf. 586e as are & exeurisko: cf. 520e as contrive*] its own pleasure and compels [*anagkazo: cf. 579c*] the rest to pursue after a pleasure [*dioko: cf. 586d & hedone: cf. 586b*] which is a shadow [*allos: cf. 576a as no more*] only and which is not their own?

True.

And the greater the interval which separates [*aphistemi: cf. 532a as preserves (with me, not)*] them from philosophy and reason [*logos: cf. 586d*], the more strange and illusive will be the pleasure?

Yes.

And is not that farthest from reason which is at the greatest distance from law and order [*nomos: cf. 574e & taxis: cf. 577d, in context of sentence*]?

Clearly.

And the lustful [*epotikos*] and tyrannical desires [*epithumia: cf. 586d*] are, as we saw, at the greatest **b** distance [*aphiemi: cf. b*]?

Yes.

And the royal and orderly desires [*kosmios: cf. 564e*] are nearest?

Yes.

Then the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural pleasure [*alethos: cf. 586c & oikeios: 577b as family relations & hedone: cf. a*] and the king at the least?

Certainly [*anagke: cf. 586d, in context of sentence*].

But if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly and the king most pleasantly [*aedes: cf. 398a as severer & basileus: king*]?

Inevitably.

Would you know the measure of the interval which separates them?

Will you tell me?

There appear to be three pleasures [*hedone: cf. b*], one genuine and two spurious [*gnesios: cf. 536a as true & nothos: cf. 496a as bastard*] now the transgression [*hyperbaino: cf. 586a as pass*] of the tyrant **c** reaches a point beyond the spurious; he has run away from the region of law and reason [*nomos & logos: for both, cf. a*] and taken up his abode [*sunoikeyo: cf. 546b as companions*] with certain slave pleasures which are his satellites, and the measure of his inferiority can only be expressed in a figure [*isos, adverb: equally, in like manner*].

How do you mean?

I assume, I said, that the tyrant is in the third place from the oligarch; the democrat was in the middle [*en meso: cf. 584a as in a mean between*]?

Yes.

And if there is truth in what has preceded, he will be wedded to an image of pleasure [*sunoikeyo: 367a, in context of sentence & eidolon: cf. 586b as shadows*] which is thrice removed as to truth [*aletheia, with pros: cf. 586d*] from the pleasure of the oligarch?

He will.

d And the oligarch is third from the royal; since we count [*tithemi: cf. 572d as imagine*] as one royal and aristocratic?

Yes, he is third.

Then the tyrant is removed from true pleasure by the space of a number which is three times three?

Manifestly [*phaino: cf. 584a as appearance*].

The shadow then of tyrannical pleasure determined by the number of length will be a plane figure [*eidolon: cf. c as image*].

Certainly.

And if you raise the power [*dunamis: cf. 535b, in context of sentence*] and make the plane a solid, there is no difficulty in seeing how vast is the interval by which the tyrant is parted from [*apostasis: a standing away from*] the king.

Yes; the arithmetician [*logistakos: endowed with reason*] will easily do the sum.

Or if some person begins at the other end [*metastrepho: cf. 526e as turn*] and measures the interval by **e** which the king is parted from the tyrant in truth of pleasure [*aletheia: cf. c & hedone: cf. b*] he will find him, when the multiplication is complete, living 729 times more pleasantly, and the tyrant more painfully by this same interval.

What a wonderful calculation [*amechanos: cf. 494c as boundless & logismos: cf. 586d as (without) reason*]!

And how enormous is the distance [*diaphoros: cf. 544c as different*] which separates the just **588** from the unjust [*dikaios & adikaioi: for both, cf. 583b*] in regard to pleasure and pain [*pros; hedone: cf. e & lupe: cf. 586b*]!

Yet a true calculation, I said, and a number which nearly concerns [*proseko: that which is according to*] human life if human beings are concerned with days and nights and months and years.

Yes, he said, human life is certainly concerned with them.

Then if the good and just man [*agathos: cf. 578c & dikaios: cf. a*] be thus superior in pleasure to the evil and unjust [*kakos & adikos: for both, cf. 580c*], his superiority will be infinitely greater in propriety [*nikao: to conquer, prevail & euschemosune: cf. 401e as grace*] of life and in beauty and virtue [*kallos: cf. 504b & arete: cf. 586a*]?

Immeasurably greater.

b Well, I said, and now having arrived at this stage of the argument [*logos: cf. 587c as reason*], we may revert [*analambano: cf. 455b as found your way*] to the words which brought us hither: was not some one saying that injustice was a gain [*adikos: cf. a & lusiteleo: cf. 445 as more profitable*] to the perfectly unjust [*teleos, adverb: cf. 534d as forever*] who was reputed [*doxazo: cf. 522b as reckoned*] to be just?

Yes, that was said.

Now then, having determined [*dialego: cf. 558d as distinguish*] the power [*dunamis: cf. 587d*] and quality of justice and injustice, let us have a little conversation with [*diomologeo: cf. 543b as agreed*] him.

What shall we say to him?

Let us make an image of the soul [*plasso: cf. 520c as fashioning & eikon: cf. 533a & psuche: cf. 586e*] that he may have his own words presented [*eido: cf. 582a as knowledge*] before his eyes.

Of what sort?

c An ideal image of the soul, like the composite creations [*phusis: cf. 585d*] of ancient mythology [*muthologeo: cf. 501e as realized*], such as the Chimera or Scylla or Cerberus, and there are many others in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one.

There are said of have been such unions.

Then do you now model the form [*idea: cf. 508e*] of a multitudinous, many-headed monster, having a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild, which he is able to generate and metamorphose [*metaballo: cf. 564a as pass into*] at will.

d You suppose marvelous powers [*deinos: cf. 572b as wild beast*] in the artist; but, as language is more pliable than wax or any similar substance, let there be such a model as you propose [*plasso: cf. b as let us make & logos: cf. b as argument*].

Suppose now that you make a second form [*idea: cf. c*] as of a lion, and a third of a man, the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the second.

That, he said, is an easier task; and I have made them as you say.

And now join [*sunapto: cf. 546a as completed*] them, and let the three grow into one.

That has been accomplished.

Next fashion [*periplasso: to plaster one thing over another*] the outside of them into a single image [*eikon: cf. b*], as of a man, so that he who is not able to look within and sees only the outer hull may

e believe [*phaino: cf. 587d as manifestly*] the beast to be a single human creature.

I have done so, he said.

And now to him who maintains that it is profitable [*lusiteleo: cf. b as was a gain*] for the human creature to be unjust [*adikeo: cf. 565c as do wrong*] and unprofitable [*sumphero (with ou, not): cf. 458b as benefit*] to be just, let us reply that if he be right, it is profitable for this creature to feast the

589 multitudinous monster and strengthen the lion and the lion-like qualities, but to starve and weaken the man who is consequently liable to be dragged about at the mercy of either of the other two; and he is not to attempt to familiarize or harmonize [*sunethizo: cf. 520c as acquired the habit & philos: cf. 450e as love (with poieo)*] them with one another—he ought rather to suffer them to fight and bite and devour one another.

Certainly, he said; that is what someone who praises injustice [*epaino: cf. 554a as applaud & adikeo: cf. 588e*] is saying.

To him the supporter of justice [*lusiteleo: cf. 588e as profitable & dikaios: cf. 588a*] makes answer that he should ever so speak and act as to give the man within him in some way or other the most complete

b mastery over [*egkrateo*] the entire human creature. He should watch over the many-headed monster like a good husbandman, fostering and cultivating the gentle qualities [*epimelomai: cf. 556a, in context of sentence & trepho: cf. 580a as cherishes & hemeros: cf. 549a as courteous & thremma: cf. 570a as monster*] and preventing the wild ones [*agrios: cf. 572b*] from growing; he should be making the lion-heart his ally, and in common care [*trepho: cf. b*] of them all should be uniting [*philos: cf. a (with poieo)*] the several parts with one

another and with himself.

Yes, he said, that is quite what the maintainer of justice say [*epaino*: cf. *a as praises*].

And so from every point of view [*skopeo*: cf. *582a as reflect* & *tropos*: cf. *581b as part*], whether of **c** pleasure, honor or advantage [*hedone*: cf. *588a* & *eudoxia*: *good repute* & *ophelia*: cf. *527e as profit*], the approver [*egkomiazo*: cf. *568b as praises*] of justice is right and speaks the truth, and the disapprover is wrong [*psektes*: *a disparager* & *pseudo*: cf. *487d as are wrong*] and false and ignorant [*hugies*: cf. *584e* & *psego*: cf. *494a as censure* & *eido*: *588b as presented*].

Yes, from every point of view [*dokeo*: cf. *585c as is concerned*].

Come, now, and let us gently reason [*praos*, *adverb*: cf. *566e as good (adjective)* & *peitho*: cf. *584c as believe*] with the unjust who is not intentionally in error [*hekon*: *willing* & *hamartano*: cf. *544a as were false*]. 'Sweet Sir [*makarios*: cf. *574c as blessing*],' we will say to him, what think you of things esteemed noble and ignoble [*nomimos*: cf. *539a as keeper of the law* & *kalos*: cf. *582d as better* & *aischros*: cf.

d *581e as worse*]?' Is not the noble that which subjects the beast [*theriodes*: cf. *571c* & *phusis*: cf. *588c as creations*] to the man or rather to the god [*theios*: cf. *540c as divine*] in man; and the ignoble that which subjects [*agrios*: cf. *b as wild ones* & *douleuo*: cf. *564b as ruin*] the man to the beast?' He can hardly avoid saying yes, can he now?

Not if he has any regard [*peitho*: cf. *c as let us reason*] for my opinion.

But, if he agree so far, we may ask him to answer another question: 'Then how would a man profit [*lusiteleo*: cf. *a*] if he received gold and silver on the condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of **e** him to the worst [*katadouleo* & *beltiston*: cf. *567c* & *mochtheros*: cf. *577d*]?' Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil men [*agrios*: cf. *d* & *kakos*: cf. *588a*] would be the gainer, however large might be the sum which he received? And will any one say that he is not a miserable wretch who remorselessly sells his own divine being [*theios*: cf. *d*] to that which is most godless and detestable [*atheios* & *miaros*: *stained* **590** *with blood*]?' Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of her husband's life [*psuche*: cf. *588b*], but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse ruin' [*cf. Odyssey xi., 326-27*].

Yes, said Glaucon, far worse—I will answer for [*apokrino*: cf. *564e, in context of sentence*] him.

Has not the intemperate been censured [*akolastaino*: cf. *555d as extravagance* & *psego*: cf. *589c, in context of sentence*] of old because in him the huge multiform monster [*thremma*: cf. *589b*] is allowed to be too much at large?

Clearly.

And men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent element in them **b** disproportionately [*anarmostos*, *adverb*: cf. *547a as irregularity (adjective)*] grows and gains strength?

Yes.

And luxury and softness are blamed [*truphe*: cf. *442a* & *malthakia*: *delicacy* & *psego*: cf. *a*] because they relax and weaken this same creature and make a coward [*deilia*: cf. *444b*] of him?

Very true.

And is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness [*kolakeia* & *aneleutheria*: cf. *577d as vulgarity*] who subordinates the spirited animal to the unruly monster [*thumoeides*: cf. *586c as passionate element* & *therion*: cf. *441a as brute animals*] and for the sake of money of which he can never have enough, habituates [*ethizo*: cf. *562e as grows accustomed to*] him in the days of his youth to be trampled in the mire and from being a lion to become a monkey?

c True, he said.

And why are mean employments and manual arts a reproach [*oneidos*: cf. *495c*]?' Only because they imply a natural weakness [*phusis*: cf. *589d, in context of sentence* & *asthenes*: cf. *571b*] of the higher principle [*beltistos*: cf. *586c as highest* & *eidos*: cf. *584c as sort*]; the individual is unable to control [*archo*: cf. *583a as ruling principle*] the creatures [*thremma*: cf. *a*] within him but has to court [*therapeuo*: cf. *469a as reverence*] them, and his great study is how to flatter them [*manthano*: cf. *583a as arrive at the result* & *thopeuo*: cf. *579a*].

Such appears to be the reason.

And therefore, being desirous of placing him under a rule [*archo*: cf. *c*] like that of the best [*beltistos*: cf. *c*], we say that he ought to be the servant [*doulos*: cf. *579d as slave*] of the best in whom the Divine

d rules [*theios*: cf. *589e* & *archos*: *a leader*] not as Thrasymachus supposed, to the injury of the servant, but because every one had better be ruled by divine wisdom [*theios*: cf. *d* & *phronimos*: cf. *586d as wisdom*]

dwelling within him; or if this be impossible, then by an external authority in order that we may be all as far as possible under the same government [*kubernao: cf. 331a as sway*], friends and equals.

True [orthos, adverb: cf. 584a as right], he said.

e And this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law [*bouleuo: cf. 577e as desires & nomos: cf. 587c*] which is the ally [*summachos: cf. 441e*] of the whole city; and is seen also in the authority [*arche: cf. 580d as powers*] which we exercise over children, and the refusal to let them be free [*eleutheros: cf. 577d as freeman*] until we have established [*kathistemi: cf. 572c as halted*] in them a principle analogous to the constitution of a state [*politeia: cf. 568c as cities & polis: cf. 580c as state*], and by cultivation of this

591 higher element [*therapeuo: cf. c as court & beltiston: cf. 589e as noblest part*] have set up in their hearts a guardian [*phulax: cf. 560b*] and ruler like our own, and when this is done they may go their ways [*eleutheros: cf. e*].

Yes, he said, the purpose of the law is manifest [*delos: cf. 542b as no difficulty*].

From what point of view, then, Glaukon, and on what ground [*logos, with kata: cf. 545c as matter*] can we say that a man is profited by injustice or intemperance [*lusiteleo: cf. 589d & adikeo: cf. 589c & akolastaino: cf. 590a as censured*] or other baseness [*aischros: cf. 589d as ignoble*] which will make him a worse man [*poneros: cf. 576b as wickedest*], even though he acquire money or power [*dunamis: cf. 588b*] by his wickedness?

From no point of view at all.

What shall he profit [*lusiteleo: cf. a*], if his injustice be undetected and unpunished [*lanthano & dike, with me (not): cf. 536b as justice*]? He who is undetected only gets worse [*poneros: cf. a*], whereas he who is **b** detected and punished [*lanthano, with me (not): cf. b & kolazo: cf. 575d as beating*] has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized [*theriodes: cf. 589d as beast & koimizo: to put to sleep & hermizo: to make still*]; the gentler element in him is liberated [*to hemeron & eleutheroo: cf. 575a as break loose*], and his whole soul [*psuche: cf. 590a as life*] is perfected and ennobled [*kathistemi: cf. 590e as established & beltistos: cf. 590c as best & phusis: cf. 590c as natural & hexis: cf. 585b as stages*] by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom [*sophrosune: cf. 575a as well-disposed & dikaiosune: cf. 576b & phronesis: cf. 586a*] more than the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength and health [*kallos: cf. 588a & ischus: cf. 491c & hugieia: cf. 559b*], in proportion as the soul is more honorable than the body [*psuche: cf. b & timios: cf. 539d, in context of sentence & soma: cf. 585d*].

Certainly, he said.

c To this nobler purpose the man of understanding [*nous: cf. 586d as sense*] will devote the energies of his life [*biao: to press hard & sunteino: cf. 504e as elaborated*]. And in the first place, will he not honor studies [*timao: cf. 582c & mathema: cf. 560b as accomplishments*] which impress these qualities on his soul [*apergazomai: cf. 548d as required*] and disregard [*atimazo: 572c as discountenanced*] others?

Clearly, he said.

In the next place he will regulate his bodily habit and training [*epitrepo: cf. 575d as resist & hexis: cf. b & trophe: cf. 585b as food*], and so far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures [*trepo: cf. 520a as please & theriodes: cf. b & alogos: cf. 534d as no reason & hedone: cf. 589c*] that he will regard even health [*blepo: cf. 576d as apparition & hugieia: cf. b*] as quite a secondary matter; his first object will be not that he may be fair or strong or well [*ischuros: cf. 553d as avaricious & hugies: cf. 589c, in*

d context of sentence & kalos: cf. 589c as noble] unless he is likely thereby to gain temperance [*mello: cf. 538c as would trouble & sophrosune: cf. b*], but he will always desire [*phaino: cf. 587e as believe*] so to temper the body [*harmonia: cf. 546c as harmonies & soma: cf. b*] as to preserve the harmony of the soul [*harmozo: cf. 554e as harmonious & psuche: cf. b*]?

Certainly he will, if he has true [*aletheia: cf. 587e as truth*] music in him.

And in the acquisition of wealth [*chrema: cf. 568d as treasures*] there is a principle of order and harmony [*suntaxis: cf. 462c, in context of sentence & sumphonia: cf. 531a as consonances*] which he will also observe; he will not allow himself to be dazzled by the foolish applause of the world and heap up [*auxano: cf. 540e as will be exalted*] riches to his own infinite harm [*apeiros: cf. 525a & kakos: cf. 589e as evil*]?

Certainly not, he said.

e He will look at the city [*apoblepo: cf. 578b as see & politeia: cf. 590e as state*] which is within him and take heed [*phulasso: cf. 536a as distinguish*] that no disorder occur [*parakineo: cf. 540a as flinch*] in it such as might arise either from superfluity or from want [*plethos: cf. 563b, in context of sentence & oligotes & ousia: cf. 585d as essence*]; and upon this principle he will regulate [*kubernao: cf. 590d as government*] his property

and gain or spend according to his means.

Very true.

592 And, for the same reason he will gladly accept and enjoy such honors [*apoblepo: cf. e metecho: cf. 586a, in context of sentence & time: cf. 582e*] as he deems [*hegeomai: cf. 566e as require*] likely to make him a better man; but those, whether private or public, which are likely to disorder his life [*luo: cf. 556a, in context of sentence & hexis: cf. 591c as habit*], he will avoid [*pheugo: cf. 515e as flee*]?

Then if that is his motive, he will not be a statesman [*thelo: cf. 517c as unwilling & politikos: cf. 473d as political*].

By the dog of Egypt, he will! In the city which is his own he certainly will, though in the land of his birth perhaps not unless he have a divine call [*sumbaino: cf. 554c & theios: cf. 590d & tuche: cf. 579c as fortune*].

I understand [*manthano: cf. 590c as study*]; you mean that he will be a ruler in the city of which we are the founders [*oikizo: cf. 558b as laid down*] and which exists in idea [*logos: cf. 591a as ground*] only; for **b** I do not believe that there is such an one anywhere on earth?

In heaven [*ouranos: cf. 508a*], I replied, there is laid up a pattern [*anakeimai: to dedicate & paradeigma: cf. 561e*] of it which he who desires may behold [*bouleuo: cf. 590e as intention & horao: cf. 584d as has seen*], and beholding, may set his own house in order [*katoikizo: cf. 557d as may found*]. But whether such an one exists or ever will exist in fact, is no matter; for he will live after the manner of that city [*prasso: cf. 586e as business*], having nothing to do with any other.

I think so, he said.

Book Ten

595 Of the many excellences which I perceive [*ennoeo: cf. 585a as look at*] in the order [*oikizo: cf. 594a as founders*] of our state, there is none which upon reflection pleases me better [*enthumeomai: cf. 440d as consider & orthos, adverb: cf. 590d as true*] than the rule about poetry.

To what do you refer?

To the rejection [*paradechomai: cf. 568b as if we do not receive*] of imitative [*mimetikos: cf. 395a as imitator*] poetry which certainly ought not to be received; as I see far more clearly [*dokeo: cf. 589c as from every point of view & phaino: cf. 591d as desire*] now that the parts of the soul [*eidōs: cf. 590c as principle & psuche: cf. b 591d*] have been distinguished [*diaireo: cf. 571a as determined*].

What do you mean?

Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my words repeated to the tragedians or any of the imitative ones [*mimetikos: cf. a*]—but I do not mind saying to you that all poetical imitations are ruinous to the understanding [*lobe: despiteful treatment & dianōia: cf. 577a as mind*] of the hearers, and that the knowledge of their true nature [*eido: cf. 589c, in context of sentence*] is the only antidote [*pharmakon: cf. 459c as medicines*] to them.

Explain the purport [*dianoemai: cf. 526a as should conceive*] of your remark.

Well, I will tell you, although I have always from my earliest youth had an awe and love [*philia: cf. 581a & aidos, adverb: cf. 560d as modesty (noun)*] of Homer which even now makes the words falter [*apokoluo: cf. 373a as have no objection*] on my lips, for he is the great captain and teacher [*hegemon:*

c *cf. 520b as rulers & didaskalos*] of the whole of that charming [*kalos: cf. 591c as well*] tragic company; but a man is not to be revered more than the truth [*timeteos: cf. 509a as place of honor & aletheia: cf. 591d as true*], and therefore I will speak out.

Very good, he said.

Listen to me then, or rather, answer me.

Put your question.

Can you tell me what imitation [*mimesis: cf. 397b*] is? I really do not know [*bouleuo: cf. 592b as desires & sunnoeo: cf. 524d*].

A likely thing, then, that I should know.

Why not? For the duller [*amblyos: blunt*] eye may often see a thing [*eidōs: cf. a as parts*] sooner than the **596** keener [*oxus: cf. 526b as quick*].

Very true, he said; but in your presence, even if I had any faint notion [*prothumeomai: cf. 534c as argument*], I could not muster courage to utter it [*kataphaino: cf. 468a as think*]. Will you enquire [*horao: cf. 594b as behold*] yourself?

Well then, shall we begin the enquiry [*episkopeo*: cf. 537c as must consider] in our usual manner: whenever a number of individuals have a common name, we assume [*etho*: cf. 565c as have] them to have [*epiphero*: to bring, confer] also a corresponding idea or form [*eidōs*: cf. 595e as thing]. Do you understand [*manthano*: cf. 594c] me?

I do.

Let us take any common instance; there are beds and tables in the world—plenty of them, are there not? Yes.

But there are [*tithemi*: cf. 587d as count] only two ideas or forms of them—one the idea of a bed, the other of a table.

True.

And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our use in accordance with the idea [*idea*: cf. 588d as form]—that is our way of speaking in this and similar instances—but no artificer makes the ideas themselves.

How could he?

Impossible.

And there is another artist [*demiourgos*: cf. 507c as artificer],—I should like to know what you would say of him.

Who is he?

One who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen.

What an extraordinary man [*thaumastos*: cf. 537e as anything so very unnatural]!

Wait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For this is he who is able to make not only vessels of every kind but plants and animals, himself and all other things—the earth and heaven and the things which are in heaven or under the earth [*Haidēs*: cf. 392a as the world below]; he makes the gods [*theos*: cf. 580c] also.

He must be a wizard [*thaumastos*: cf. c] and no mistake.

Oh! you are incredulous [*apisteo*: cf. 555a as doubt], are you? Do you mean that there is no such maker or creator [*dokeo*: cf. 595a as see & *demiourgos*: cf. b & *poietes*: cf. 380b as author] or that in one sense [*tropos*: cf. 589b, in context of sentence] there might be a maker of all these things but in another not? Do you see [*aisthanomai*: cf. 583d, in context of sentence] that there is a way [*tropos*: cf. d] in which you could make them all yourself?

What way?

An easy way [*chalepos* (with *ou*, not): cf. 579d as worst] enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the feat might be quickly and easily accomplished [*demiourgeo*: cf. 507c as contrived], none quicker than that of turning a mirror round and round—you would soon enough make the sun and the heavens and the earth and yourself and other animals and plants and all the other things of which we were just now speaking in the mirror.

Yes, he said; but they would be appearances only [*phaino*: cf. 595a, in context of sentence & *aletheia*: cf. 595c as truth].

Very good [*kalos*, adverb: cf. 582a, in context of sentence], I said, you are coming to the point [*logos*: cf. 594a as idea] now. And the painter [*zographos*: cf. 501c] too is, as I conceive, just such another—a creator [*demiourgos*: cf. d] of appearances, is he not?

Of course.

But then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue [*poieo*: cf. 589b, in context of sentence & *alethos* (with *ouk*, not)]. And yet there is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed?

Yes, he said, but not a real bed [*phaino*: cf. e].

597 And what of the maker of the bed? Were you not saying that he too makes, not the idea [*eidōs*: cf. 596a] which according to our view, is the essence [*esti*] of the bed but only a particular bed?

Yes, I did.

Then if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true existence [*to on*] but only some semblance of existence; and if any one were to say that the work of the maker of the bed or of any other workman has real existence, he could hardly be supposed [*kinduneo*: 571b as appears to have] to be speaking the truth [*alethos*: cf. 596e].

At any rate, he replied, philosophers would say [*doxazo*: cf. 588b as was reputed] that he was not speaking the truth [*diatribo*: cf. 561d, in context of sentence].

No wonder, then, that his work too is an indistinct expression of truth [*amudros & aletheia, with pros: cf. 596e*].

b No wonder.

Suppose [*bouleuo: cf. 595c as know*] now that by the light of the examples just offered we enquire who this imitator is [*zeteo: cf. 557d as look for & mimetes*]?

If you please.

Well then, here are three beds: one existing in nature [*phusis: cf. 591b, in context of sentence*] which is made by a god [*theos: cf. 596c*], as I think that we may say—for no one else can be the maker?

No.

There is another which is the work of the carpenter?

Yes.

And the work of the painter [*zographos: cf. 596c*] is a third?

Yes.

Beds, then, are of three kinds [*eidōs: cf. a as idea*], and there are three artists who superintend [*epistamai: them: cf. 521e as having to do with*] the god [*theos: cf. b*], the maker of the bed, and the painter?

Yes, there are three of them.

c The god, whether from choice or from necessity [*bouleuo: cf. b as suppose & anagke: cf. 587b as certainly*], made one bed in nature [*apergazomai: cf. 591c as impress & phusis: cf. b*] and one only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been nor ever will be made by the god.

Why is that?

Because even if he had made but two, a third would still appear [*anaphaino: cf. 557b as will be*] behind them which both of them would have for their idea [*eidōs: cf. b as kinds*] and that would be the ideal bed and the two others.

Very true [*orthos, adverb: cf. 595a as better*], he said.

d The god knew [*eidō: cf. 595b as knowledge*] this, and he desired to be the real maker of a real [*ontos: cf. 586a*] bed, not a particular maker of a particular bed, and therefore he created a bed which is essentially and by nature [*phusis: cf. c*] one only.

So we believe.

Shall we, then, speak of [*bouleuo: cf. b as suppose & prosagoreuo: cf. 562a as be called*] him as the natural author or maker of the bed?

Yes, he replied [*dikaios: cf. 589a as justice*]; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation [*phusis: cf. d*] he is the author of this and of all other things.

And what shall we say of the carpenter—is not he also the maker [*demiourgos: cf. 596e*] of the bed?

Yes.

But would you call the painter a creator and maker [*zographos: cf. b & demiourgios: cf. d & poietes: cf. 596d*]?

Certainly not.

Yet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed?

e I think, he said, that we may fairly designate [*dokeo: cf. 596d, in context of sentence & prosagoreuo: cf. d as speak of*] him as the imitator [*mimetes: cf. b*] of that which the others [*demiourgos: cf. d*] make.

Good, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from nature [*phusis: cf. d*] an imitator?

Certainly, he said.

And the tragic poet is an imitator and therefore, like all other imitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth [*aletheia: cf. a & pephukos, adverb: naturally*]?

That appears to be so [*kinduneuo: cf. 557d, in context of sentence*].

Then about the imitator we are agreed [*homologeō: cf. 576a as were right*]. And what about the painter [*zographos: cf. d*]?

I would like to know [*dokeo: cf. e as designate*] whether he may be thought to **598** imitate [*mimeomai: cf. 547d as resemble*] that which originally exists in nature [*phusis: cf. e*] or only the creations of artists [*demiourgos: cf. e*]?

The latter.

As they are or as they appear [*phaino: cf. 596e, in context of sentence*]?

You have still to determine [*diorizo: cf. 534b as define*] this.

What do you mean?

I mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view, obliquely or directly or from any other point of view, and the bed will appear [*phaino: cf. a*] different, but there is no difference [*diaphero: cf. 585c as is*].

concerned] in reality. And the same of all things.

Yes, he said, the difference is only apparent.

b Now let me ask [*skopeo*: cf. 589b as from every point of view] you another question: which is the art of painting [*graphike*] designed to be—an imitation [*mimēomai*: cf. a] of things as they are [pros to on] or as they appear [*pros to phainomenon*—of appearance or of reality [*phantasma*: cf. 584a as representations & *aletheia*: cf. 597e as truth]?

Of appearance.

Then the imitator [*mimetike*], I said, is a long way off the truth [*alethos*: cf. 597a], and can do all things because he lightly touches [*ephapto*: cf. 534c as is given] on a small part of them, and that part an image [*eidolon*: cf. 587d as figure]. For example: a painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any other artist

c [*demiourgos*: cf. a], though he knows nothing of their arts [*techne*: cf. 533d as sciences]; and, if he is a good artist, he may deceive [*exapatao*: cf. 565b] do children or simple persons [*aphroneo*: to be silly] when he shows them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy [*dokeo*: cf. 597e as would like to know] that they are looking at a real [*alethos*, adverb: cf. 540d as true] carpenter.

Certainly.

And whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows [*dianoēomai*: cf. 595b as explain the purport] all the arts [*demiourgia*: 493d as services] and all things else that anybody knows and every single thing with a higher degree of accuracy [*epistamai*: cf. 597b as superintend] than any other

d man—whoever tells us this, I think that we can only imagine [*hupolambano*: cf. 517d, in context of sentence] to be a simple creature who is likely to have been deceived by some wizard [*exapatao*: cf. c & goes: cf. 385a as magicians] or actor whom he met and whom he thought all-knowing [*doxazo*: cf. 597a as would say & *passophos*] because he himself was unable to analyze [*anepiskeptomai*] the nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation [*episteme*: cf. 586d & *mimesis*: cf. 595e].

Most true.

And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians and Homer who is at their head know all the arts [*techne*: cf. c] and all things human, virtue as well as vice [*arete & kakia*, with pros: for both, cf.

e 580b], and divine things [*theios*: cf. 594a] too, for that the good poet cannot compose well unless he knows his subject, and that he who has not this knowledge can never be a poet, we ought to consider [*episkepton*: verbal adjective] whether here also there may not be a similar illusion [*me oion einai*]. Perhaps they may have come across imitators and been deceived by them [*episkopeo*: cf. 596a as begin the inquiry & *mimetes*: cf. 597e & *exapatao*: cf. d]; they may not have remembered [*aisthanomai*: cf.

599 596d as see] when they saw their works that these were but imitations thrice removed from the truth, and could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth [*eido*: cf. 597d & *aletheia*: cf. b as reality]

because they are appearances only and not realities [*phantasma*: cf. b & *ouk onta*]? Or, after all, they may be in the right, and poets do really know the things [*to onti*] about which they seem [*dokeo*: cf. c as will fancy] to the many to speak so well?

The question, he said, should by all means be considered [*exetasteon*: verbal adjective].

Now do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as well as the image [*mimēomai*: cf. 598b as imitation *eidolon*: cf. 598b], he would seriously devote [*aphiemi*: cf. 587a, in context of sentence] himself to the image-making branch [*demiourgia*: cf. 598c & *eidolon*: cf. a]? Would he allow [*spoudazo*: **b** cf. 538b as regard] imitation to be the ruling principle of his life, as if he had nothing higher [*beltiston*: cf. 591a] in him? I should say not.

The real artist who knew what he was imitating [*epistamai*: cf. 598c & *mimēomai*: cf. a] would be interested in realities and not in imitations [*spoudazo*: cf. a & *ergos*: cf. 569c as production & *mimesis*: cf. 598d]; and would desire to leave as memorials [*kataleipo* & *mnemeion*]: of himself works many and fair [*kalos*: cf. 596e as very good]; and instead of being the author of encomiums [*egkomiazō*: cf. 589c as approver], he would prefer to be the theme [*egkomiazō*] of them.

Yes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater honor and profit [*time*: cf. 592a & *ophelia*: cf. 589c as advantage].

Then, I said, we must put a question [*apaiteo*: to demand] to Homer not about medicine or any of the **c** arts to which his poems only incidentally refer: we are not going to ask him or any other poet whether he has cured patients like Asclepius, or left behind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads were or whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at second hand; but we have a right to know **d** respecting military tactics, politics, education, which are the chiefest and noblest subjects of his poems, and

we may fairly ask him about them. 'Friend [*philos*: cf. 589b as uniting] Homer,' then we say to him, 'if you are only in the second remove from truth [*aletheia*: cf. a] in what you say of virtue [*arete*: cf. 598d] and not in the third—not an image maker or imitator [*demiourgos*: cf. 598c as artist & *eidolon*: cf. a]—and if you are able to discern [*gignosko*: cf. 572b as note] what pursuits [*epitedeuma*: cf. 573c as habit] make men better or worse [*beltios*: cf. 582a & *cheiron*: cf. 554e as inferior ones] in private or public life [*demosia*], tell us what state was ever better governed [*beltios*: cf. d & *oikizo*: cf. 595a, in context of sentence] by your help? The good order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and many other

e cities great and small have been similarly benefitted by others; but who says that you have been a good legislator [*nomotheteo*: cf. 534e as will make] to them and have done them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of Charondas, and there is Solon who is renowned among us; but what city has anything [*hexis*: cf. 594a, in context of sentence] to say about you?' Is there any city which he might name?

I think not, said Glaucon; not even the Homerids themselves pretend that he was a legislator.

600 Well, but is there any war on record [*mnemoneuo*: cf. 504a as had forgotten (with me, not)] which was carried on [*archo*: cf. 590c as rule] successfully by him or aided by his counsels [*sumbouleuo*: cf. 469a as advise] when he was alive?

There is not.

Or is there any invention [*ergos*: cf. 599b as realities] of his, applicable to the arts [*techne*, with *eis*: cf. 598d] or to human life such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian and other ingenious men [*sophos*: cf. 582c as wise man] have conceived which is attributed to him?

There is absolutely nothing of the kind.

But, if Homer never did any public service [*demosia*: cf. 599d], was he privately a guide or teacher [*hegemon*: cf. 595b as captain & *paideia*: cf. 554b as man of education] of any? Had he in his lifetime friends who loved to associate with [*agapao*: cf. 596d as content & *sunousia*: cf. 573a, in context of

b sentence] him and who handed down [*paradidomai*: cf. 561b as putting] to posterity an Homeric way of life such as was established by Pythagoras who was so greatly beloved for his wisdom [*agapao*: cf. a] and whose followers are to this day quite celebrated for the order [*tropos*: cf. 596d as way] which was named after him?

Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Socrates, Creophylus, the companion [*hetairos*] of Homer, that child of flesh, whose name always makes us laugh [*geloios*: cf. 536b as ridiculous] might be more justly ridiculed for his stupidity [*paideia*: cf. a as teacher (in Greek text) & *phaino*: cf. 598a as will appear] if, as is said, Homer was greatly neglected [*ameleia*: cf. 562c] by him and others in his own day

c when he was alive?

Yes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glaucon, that if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind [*paideuo*: cf. 579c as ill-governed & *apergazomai*: cf. 597c & *beltios*: cf. 599d as better]—if he had possessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator [*gignosko*: cf. 599d as discern & *mimeomai*: cf. 599b]—can you imagine, I say, that he would not have had many followers and been honored and loved by them [*timaos*: cf. 591c & *agapao*: cf. b]? Protagoras of Abdera and Prodicus of Ceos and a host of others have only to whisper to their contemporaries: 'You will never be able to

d manage either your own house or your own state [*dioikeo*: cf. 564e & *oikia* & *polis*: cf. 590e] until you appoint us to be your ministers of education [*epistateo*: cf. 401c as extended & *paideia*: cf. b, in context of sentence]'—and this ingenious device [*sophia*: cf. 516c as wisdom] of theirs has such an effect in making them love them that their companions all but carry them about on their shoulders. And is it conceivable that the contemporaries of Homer [*hetairos*: cf. b as companion] or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of them to go about as rhapsodists if they had really been able to make mankind virtuous [*arete*, with *pros*: cf. 549b]?

Would they not have been as unwilling to part with them as with gold and have compelled

e [*peitho*: cf. 590a as has any regard] them to stay at home with them? Or, if the master would not stay, then the disciples would have followed him about everywhere until they had got education [*metaballo*: cf. 588c as metamorphose & *paideia*: cf. d] enough?

Yes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true [*alethos*: cf. 598c as real].

Then must we not infer [*tithemi*: cf. 596a, in context of sentence] that all these poetical individuals, beginning with Homer, are only imitators [*mimetes*: cf. 598e]; they copy images of virtue [*eidolon*: cf. 599d & *arete*: cf. d] and the like, but the truth they never reach [*aletheia*: cf. 599d & *hapto*: cf. 572a as attains]? The poet is like a painter [*zographos*: cf. 597e] who, as we have already observed, will make a likeness [*dokeo*: cf. 599a as seem, with *einai*, to be] of a cobbler though he understands nothing of

601 cobbling; and his picture is good enough for those who know no more than he does and judge [*theoreo*: cf.

579b as sees] only by colors and figures [*schema: cf. 576a as sort*].

Quite so.

In like manner the poet with his words and phrases may be said to lay on the colors of the several arts [*techne: cf. 600a*], himself understanding their nature only enough to imitate [*mimeomai: cf. 600c*] them; and other people who are as ignorant as he is and judge only from his words [*theo: cf. a & dokeo: cf. 600e*] imagine that if he speaks of cobbling or of military tactics or of anything else in meter and harmony and rhythm, he speaks very well—such is the sweet influence [*klesis: a calling*] which melody and rhythm b by nature [*phusis: cf. 598a*] have. And I think that you must have observed [*eido: cf. 599a as knowledge & phaino: cf. 600b, in context of sentence*] again and again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped [*gumnazo: cf. 526b, in context of sentence*] of the colors which music puts upon them and recited in simple prose.

Yes, he said.

They are like [*eoika*] faces which were never really beautiful [*kalos: cf. 599b as fair*] but only blooming; and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them?

Exactly.

Here is another point [*athreo: cf. 583b, in context of sentence*]: The imitator or maker of the image [*mimetes: cf. 600e & poietes: cf. 597d & eidolon: cf. 600e*] knows nothing of true existence [*tou ontos: cf. c 586a as true being*]; he knows appearances only [*phaino: cf. b, in context of sentence*]. Am I not right?

Yes.

Then let us have a clear understanding [*kataleipo: cf. 599b & hemiseos, adverb: halfway*] and not be satisfied with half an explanation [*eido: cf. b as observed & hikanos, adverb: cf. 577a as clear*].

Proceed.

Of the painter [*zographos: cf. 600e*] we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bit?

Yes.

And the worker in leather and brass will make them?

Certainly.

But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? No, hardly even the workers in brass and leather who make them; only the horseman who knows [*epistamai: cf. 599b*] how to use them—he knows their right form.

Most true.

And may we not say the same of all things?

What?

d That there are three arts [*techne: cf. a*] which are concerned with all things: one which uses, another which makes, a third which imitates [*mimeomai: cf. a*] them?

Yes.

And the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure [*arete: cf. 600e as virtue & kallos: cf. 591b & orthotes: upright posture & skeuos: implement*], animate or inanimate and of every action of man is relative to the use [*chreia: cf. 494e as advantage*] for which nature or the artist has intended them [*poieo: cf. 596e as creates & phuo: cf. 564b as is generated*].

True.

Then the user of them must have the greatest experience [*anagke: cf. 597c as necessity & empeiros: cf. 584e as ignorance*] of them, and he must indicate [*aggello: to announce*] to the maker the good or bad qualities [*kalos: cf. b as beautiful & kakos: cf. 591d as harm*] which develop themselves in use; for example, the flute-player will tell [*exaggello: to report*] the flute-maker which of his flutes is satisfactory e e [*hupereteo: cf. 575e as ready tools*] to the performer; he will tell [*epitasso: cf. 520e as impose*] him how he ought to make them, and the other will attend to his instructions [*hupereteo: cf. e*]?

Of course.

The one knows [*eido: cf. c as explanation*] and therefore speaks with authority [*exaggello: cf. d as will tell*] about the goodness and badness of flutes while the other, confiding in [*pisteuo: cf. 567e as trust*] him, will do what he is told by him?

True.

The instrument [*skeuos: cf. d as structure*] is the same, but about the excellence or badness [*kallos: cf. d as beauty & poneria: cf. 575c as misery & hexis: cf. 599e, in context of sentence*] of it the maker [*poietes: cf. b*] will only attain to a correct belief [*orthos: cf. 544a as true & pistis: cf. 534a*]; and this he will gain from him

who knows by talking to him and being compelled [*anagkazo: cf. 587a*] to hear what **602** he has to say, whereas the user will have knowledge [*episteme: cf. 598d*]?

True.

But will the imitator [*mimetes: cf. b*] have either? Will he know from use [*episteme: cf. a & hexis: cf. e*] whether or no his drawing is correct or beautiful [*kalos: cf. d as good & orthos: cf. 601e as correct*]? Or will he have right opinion [*orthos: cf. a & doxa: cf. 585b*] from being compelled to associate with [*anagke: cf. d & suneimi: cf. 538b*] another who knows and gives him instructions [*epitasso: cf. 601e as will tell*] about what he should draw [*grapho: cf. 377e as paints a portrait*]?

Neither.

Then he will no more have true opinion [*orthos: cf. a & doxazo: cf. 598d as thought*] than he will have knowledge about the goodness or badness [*kallos & poneria: for both, cf. 601e*] of his imitations [*mimeomai: cf. 601d as imitates*]?

I suppose [*eoiken: cf. 476c, in context of sentence*] not.

The imitative artist [*mimetikos: cf. 595b as imitative ones & poiesis: a making*] will be in a brilliant state of intelligence [*sophia: cf. 600d as ingenious device*] about his own creations?

No, very much the reverse.

b And still he will go on imitating without knowing [*mimeomai: cf. a & eido: cf. 601e*] what makes a thing good or bad [*chrestos: cf. 531b as gentlemen & poneros: cf. 591a as worse*] and may be expected [*eioken: cf. a*] therefore to imitate only that which appears to be good [*phaino: cf. 601c as appearances & kalos: cf. a*] to the ignorant [*eido: cf. b, with mede (not)*] multitude?

Just so.

Thus far then we are pretty well agreed [*phaino: cf. b & diomologeio: cf. 588b as conversation with*] that the imitator has no knowledge worth mentioning [*mimetikos: cf. a & eido: cf. b & axios (with meden, no): cf. 549a as eloquent*] of what he imitates. Imitation is only a kind of play or sport [*paidia: cf. 424e as amusements*], and the tragic poets whether they write in iambic or in Heroic verse, are imitators in the highest degree [*malistos*]?

Very true.

c And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation [*mimeomai: cf. b*] been shown by us to be concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth [*aletheia, with apo: cf. 600e*]?

Certainly.

And what is the faculty [*dunamis: cf. 591a as power*] in man to which imitation is addressed?

What do you mean?

I will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears [*phaino: cf. b, in context of sentence*] small when seen at a distance?

True.

And the same object appears straight when looked at out of the water and crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to the illusion [*plane: cf. 505c as perplexity*] about colors to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of confusion is revealed [*tarache: cf. 577e as trouble & delos: cf. 591a as*

d *manifest*] within us [*psuche: cf. 595a as soul*]; and this is that weakness of the human mind [*pathema: cf. 577c as conditions & phusis: cf. 601b as nature*] on which the art of conjuring [*goeteia: cf. 584a as imposition*] and of deceiving [*apoleipo: to leave behind*] by light and shadow and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like magic [*mechanomai: cf. 572e as contrive & thaumapoiia*].

True.

And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of the human understanding [*botheo: cf. 578d as protection & charizomai: cf. 561c as indulging in*]-there is the beauty of them—and the apparent [*phaino: cf. c*] greater or less or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery over [*archo, with en: cf. 600a as was carried on*] us but give way before calculation and measure and weight?

Most true.

e And this, surely, must be the work [*ergos: cf. 600a as invention*] of the calculating and rational principle in the soul [*logistikos: cf. 571c as reasoning & psuche: cf. d*].

To be sure.

And when this principle measures and certifies [*metreo: cf. 490b as description & semaino: cf. 584a as inference*] that some things are equal or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent contradiction [*phaino: cf. d & tanantia*]?

True.

But were we not saying that such a contradiction is the same faculty cannot have contrary opinions [*enantia*: cf. 454c as opposition & *doxazo*: cf. a] at the same time about the same thing?

Very true [*orthos*, adverb: cf. 597c].

603 Then that part of the soul [*psuche*: cf. 602e] which has an opinion [*doxazo*: cf. 602e] contrary to measure is not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?

True.

And the better part [*beltiston*: cf. 599b] of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to measure and calculation [*logismos*: cf. 587e]?

Certainly.

And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles [*phaulos*: cf. 567d a bad] of the soul?

No doubt [*anagke*: cf. 602a as compelled].

This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive [*diomologeo*: cf. 602b as agreed] when I said that painting or drawing and imitation [*mimetike*: cf. 598b as imitator] in general when doing their own proper work [*apergazomai*: cf. 600c as improve & *ergos*: cf. 602e], are far removed from truth [*aletheia*: cf. 602c], and the companions and friends and associates [*prosomileo*: verb] of a principle within us which is equally removed from reason [*phronesis*: cf. 591b as wisdom], and that they have no true or

b healthy aim [*hugieia*: cf. 591c & *alethos*: cf. 600e].

Exactly.

The imitative art [*mimetike*: cf. a] is an inferior who marries an inferior [*phaulos*: cf. a] and has inferior offspring.

Very true [*eoiken*: cf. 602a as I suppose].

And is this confined to the sight only or does it extend to the hearing also, relating in fact to what we term poetry?

Probably the same would be true of poetry.

Do not rely, I said, on a probability [*pisteuo*: cf. 601a as confiding in & *eikos*: cf. 519b as likely] derived from the analogy of painting [*graphike*: cf. 598b]; but let us examine further and see whether the faculty [*dianoia*: cf. 595b as understanding] with which poetical imitation is concerned [*prosomileo*: cf. a as c associates] is good or bad [*phaulos*: cf. b & *spoudaios*: cf. 519d, in context of sentence].

By all means.

We may state the question thus:—imitation imitates [*mimeomai*: cf. 602c] the actions of men whether voluntary or involuntary [*biaios*: cf. 464e, in context of sentence & *hekousios*: cf. 414a as willing] on which, as they imagine [*oiomai*: cf. 585a as think], a good or bad [*eu*, adverb: cf. 549c & *kakos*, adverb: cf. 579c as ill-governed] result has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow [*chairo*: cf. 585e as pleasure & *lupeo*: cf. 583d as pain] accordingly. Is there anything more?

No, there is nothing else.

But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity with himself [*diakeimai*: cf. 561c as the way d with]—or rather, as in the instance of sight there was confusion and opposition [*stasizo*: cf. 586e as division & *enantia*: cf. 602e as contrary] in his opinions [*doxa*: cf. 602a] about the same things, so here also is there not strife and inconsistency [*stasiazo*: cf. d & *machomai*: cf. 579d as combating] in his life? Though I need hardly raise the question again, for I remember [*anamimnesko*: cf. 577c as not to forget] that all this has been already admitted [*diomologeo*: cf. a as seeking to arrive]; and the soul has been acknowledged [*psuche*: cf. 603a & *diomologeo*: cf. d] by us to be full of these and ten thousand similar oppositions occurring at the same moment?

And we were right [*orthos*, adverb: cf. 602e as very true], he said.

Yes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an omission [*apoleipo*: cf. 602d as deceiving & *dokeo*: e cf. 601a, in context of sentence] which must now be supplied.

What was the omission?

Were we not saying that a good man [*epieikes*: cf. 577c as best] who has the misfortune [*tuche*: cf. 594a as (divine) call] to lose his son or anything else which is most dear to him will bear the loss with more equanimity than another?

Yes.

But will he have no sorrow [*achthomai*: to be loaded], or shall we say [*episkopeo*: cf. 598e, in context of sentence] that although he cannot help sorrowing, he will moderate [*metriazo*] his sorrow [*lupe*: cf. 588a as

pain]?

The latter, he said, is the truer statement [*alethos*: cf. 603b].

604 Tell me: will he be more likely to struggle [*machomai*: cf. 603d as inconsistency] and hold out against his sorrow [*antiteino* & *lupe*: cf. 603e] when he is seen by his equals or when he is alone?

It will make a great difference whether he is seen or not.

When he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things which he would be ashamed [*aischuno*: cf. 571d as not ready to commit] of any one hearing or seeing him do?

True.

There is a principle of law and reason [*nomos*: cf. 590e & *logos*: cf. 596e as point] in him which bids him resist [*antiteino*: cf. a] as well as a feeling of his misfortune [*lupe*: cf. a] which is forcing him to indulge **b** his sorrow [*pathos*: cf. 579d as miserable]?

True.

But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions [*enantia*: cf. 603d as opposition & *agoge*: a carrying away], to and from the same object, this, as we affirm, necessarily [*anagkaios*: cf. 581e] implies two distinct principles in him?

Certainly.

One of them is ready [*peitho*: cf. 600e as have compelled] to follow the guidance of the law [*nomos*: cf. a]? How do you mean?

The law would say that to be patient under suffering [*hesuchia*: cf. 583d as at rest & *sumphoros*: happening with] is best, and that we should not give way to impatience [*aganakteo*: cf. 568e as fly into a passion], as there is no knowing whether such things are good or evil [*agathos*: cf. 588a & *kakos*: cf. 601d as bad]; and nothing is gained by impatience [*chalepos*, adverb: cf. 535e as indignant]; also, **c** because no human thing is of serious importance [*spoude*: cf. 545e as in earnest], and grief [*lupeo*: cf. 603c as sorrow] stands in the way of that which at the moment is most required.

What is most required?, he asked.

That we should take counsel [*bouleuo*: cf. 597d as speak of] about what has happened, and when the dice have been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best [*beltiston*: cf. 603a as better part]; not like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time in setting up a howl but always accustoming the soul [*ethizo*: cf. 590b as habituates & *psuche*: cf. 603d] forthwith to **d** apply a remedy [*iaomai*: to cure, heal], raising up that which is sickly and fallen, banishing the cry of sorrow [*threnodia*: lamentation] by the healing art.

Yes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune [*prosphero*: cf. 471b as deal & *tuche*: cf. 603e as misfortune].

Yes, I said; and the higher principle [*beltiston*: cf. c as best] is ready to follow this suggestion of reason [*logismos*: cf. 603a as calculation]?

Clearly.

And the other principle which inclines us to recollection of our troubles and to lamentation [*anamnesis* & *pathos*: cf. b as sorrow & *odurmos*] and can never have enough of them, we may call irrational, useless and cowardly [*alogistos*: cf. 439d & *argos*: cf. 556c as pain & *deilos*: cf. 486b]?

Indeed, we may.

e And does not the latter—I mean the rebellious principle [*aganaktetikon*—furnish a great variety of materials for imitation [*mimesis*: cf. 599b]? Whereas the wise and calm temperament [*phronimos*: cf. 590d as wisdom & *hesuchios* & *ethos*: cf. 577a as nature], being always nearly equable [*paraplesios*: cf. 462b as same occasions], is not easy to imitate or to appreciate when imitated [*mimeomai*: cf. 603c], especially at a public festival when a promiscuous crowd is assembled in a theater. For the feeling represented [*pathos*: cf. d as recollection & *mimesis*: cf. e] is one to which they are strangers [*allotrios*: cf. 587a as shadow].

605 Certainly.

Then the imitative poet [*mimetikos*: cf. 602c] who aims at being popular is not by nature made nor is his art intended to please [*eudokimeo*: cf. 581a as getting fame] or to affect the principle in the soul [*psuche*: cf. 604c]; but he will prefer the passionate and fitful temper which [*aganaktetikon*: cf. 604e as rebellious principle & *poikilos*: cf. 561e as spangled & *ethos*: cf. 604e] is easily imitated?

Clearly.

And now we may fairly take him and place him [*epilambano*: cf. 533b, in context of sentence] by the side of the painter [*zographos*: cf. 601c], for he is like him [*antistrophos*: cf. 522a as counterpart] in two ways: first,

inasmuch as his creations have [*eoiken: cf. 603b as very true*] an inferior degree of truth [*phaulos: cf. 603c as bad & aletheia, with pros: cf. 597a*]—in this, I say, he is like [*homoioo: cf. 510a, in context of sentence*] him; and he is also like him in being concerned with an inferior part of the soul

b [*homileo: cf. 50c as order & psuche: cf. a & beltiston, with pros (with me, not): cf. 604d as higher principle*]; and therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit [*paradechomai: cf. 595a as rejection & dike: cf. 591a as injustice (with me, not)*] him into a well-ordered state [*polis: cf. 600d & eunomeomai*] because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens [*psuche: cf. b & egeiro: cf. 572a as rouses up & trepho: cf. 589b as care & ischuros: cf. 591c as strong*] the feelings and impairs the reason [*apollumi: cf. 579a as saving, with me (not)*]. As in a city when the evil [*mochtheros: cf. 589e as worst*] are permitted to have authority [*egkrateo: cf. 589b as mastery over*] and the good are put out of the way [*charies: cf. 426e & phtheiro: cf. 491c as distracting effect*], so in the soul [*psuche: cf. b*] of man, as we maintain, the imitative poet implants an evil constitution [*kakos: cf. 604b & politeia: cf. 591e as city*], for he indulges the irrational nature [*charizomai: cf. 602d as come to the rescue & anoetos: cf. 466b as infatuated*] which **c** has no discernment [*diagignosko: cf. 522c as distinguishing*] of greater and less but thinks [*hegeomai: cf. 594a as deems*] the same thing at one time great and at another small—he is a manufacturer of images [*eidolopoieo*] and is very far removed from the truth [*alethos: cf. 603e as truer*].

Exactly.

But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our accusation [*katagoreuo: to denounce*]:—the power which poetry has of harming [*lobaomai: to outrage*] even the good [*epieikes: cf. 603e*] (and there are very few who are not harmed) is surely an awful thing?

Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say.

Hear and judge [*skopeo: cf. 598b as ask*]: the best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a passage of Homer or one of the tragedians in which he represents [*beltistos: cf. 591b, in context of sentence*] some **d** pitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration or weeping and smiting his breast—the best of us, you know, delight [*chairo: cf. 603c as rejoice*] in giving way to sympathy [*sumpascho*] and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most [*diatithemi: cf. 556b as treat*].

Yes, of course I know.

But when any sorrow [*kedos: care*] of our own happens to us, then you may observe [*ennoeo: cf. 595a as perceive*] that we pride ourselves [*kallopizo: cf. 405b*] on the opposite quality—we would fain be quiet and patient [*hesuchia: cf. 604c as patient & kartereo: cf. 556c as pain*]; this is the manly part [*andros: e man, noun*], and the other which delighted [*epaineo: cf. 551a as look up*] us in the recitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman.

Very true [*ennoeo: cf. d as observe*], he said.

Now can we be right in praising and admiring [*kalos, adverb: cf. 596e as very good & epainos: praise*] another who is doing that which any one of us would consider as unworthy and be ashamed [*axios, with me, not: cf. 602b, in context of sentence & aischuno: cf. 604a*] of in his own person?

No, he said, that is certainly not reasonable.

606 Nay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view.

What point of view?

If you consider [*enthumeomai: cf. 595a as pleases*], I said, that when in misfortune [*sumphoros: cf. 604b as suffering*] we feel a natural hunger and desire to [*epithumeo: cf. 579b*] relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets;—the better nature [*beltiston: cf. 605b, in context of sentence & phusis: cf. 602d as mind*] in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit [*paideuo: cf. 600c as improve & logos: cf. 604a & ethos: cf. 605a as temper*], allows the sympathetic element to break loose because

b the sorrow [*threnodos: cf. threnodia in 604d*] is another's; and the spectator fancies [*theoreo: cf. 601a as judge*] that there can be no disgrace [*aischros: cf. 591a as baseness*] to himself in praising and pitying any one who comes telling him what a good [*agathos: cf. 604b*] man he is and making a fuss about his troubles [*pentheo: to bewail*]; he that the pleasure is a gain [*kerdaino: cf. 582b*], and why should he be supercilious [*kataphroneo: cf. 549a as despise*] and lose this and the poem too? Few persons ever reflect [*logizomai: cf. 553d as think*], as I should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves [*eis ta oikeia*]. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gathered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed [*katecho: cf. 572e as hold on & pathos: cf. 604e as feeling*] in our own.

c How very true!

And does not the same [*logos: cf. a as reason*] hold also of the ridiculous [*geloios: cf. 600b as make us laugh*]? There are jests which you would be ashamed [*gelotopoiios & aischuno: cf. 605e*] to make yourself, and yet on the comic stage or indeed in private when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them and are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness [*miseo, with me or not: cf. 485c as detestation & poneros: cf. 602b as bad*];—the case of pity is repeated;—there is a principle in human nature which is disposed to raise a laugh [*bouleuo: cf. 604c as take counsel & gelotopoieo*], and this which you once restrained by reason [*katecho: cf. b as repressed & logos: cf. c*] because you were afraid of being thought a buffoon is now let out again; and having stimulated the risible faculty at the theater, you are betrayed unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet at home.

Quite true, he said.

d And the same may be said of lust and anger [*aphrodisios: cf. 559c as pleasures of love & thumos: cf. 586d as anger*] and all the other affections [*epithumetikos: cf. 580e as appetitive*], of desire and pain and pleasure [*hedus: cf. 585d & luperos: cf. 583e as painful & psuche: cf. 605b*], which are held to be inseparable from every action [*praxis: cf. 537b as training*]:—in all of them poetry [*poietike mimesis: cf. 604e as represented*] feeds [*trepho: cf. 605b as nourishes*] and waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule [*archo: cf. 602d as mastery over*], although they ought to be controlled if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue [*beltios: cf. 600c as better & eudaimonos: cf. 526e, in context of sentence*].

I cannot deny it.

e Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with [*entugchano: cf. 577b*] any of the eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he is profitable for education and for the ordering of human things [*axios: cf. 605e as unworthy (with me, not) & paideia: cf. 600e & dioikesis: cf. 455b as administration*], and that you should take him up again and again [*analambano: cf. 588b as revert*] and get to know [*manthano: cf. 596a as understand*] him and regulate [*katskeuazo: to equip*] your whole life according to him, we may love and honor [*phileo & aspazomai: for both, cf. 479e*] those 607 who say these things—they are excellent people [*beltistos: cf. 605c, in context of sentence*], as far as their lights extend; and we are ready to acknowledge [*sugchoreo: cf. 572b as acknowledge*] that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm [*eido: cf. 602b as (no) knowledge*] in our conviction that hymns to the gods [*theos: cf. 597b*] and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our state [*paradekteos: received & polis: 605b*]. For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter [*paradechomai: cf. 605b as admit*], either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason [*nomos: cf. 604b & koinos: cf. 535b as (not) shared*] of mankind which by common consent have ever been deemed best [*doxazo cf. 603a as has an opinion & beltiston: cf. 606a as better*], but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our state. That is most true, he said.

b And now since we have reverted to [*anamimnesko: cf. 603d as remember*] the subject of poetry, let this our defense [*apologeomai: cf. 490a*] serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in sending away out of our state [*polis: cf. a*] an art having the tendencies which we have described; for reason [*logos: cf. 606c*] constrained us. But that she may impute to us any harshness or want of politeness [*katagignosko: to discover, be suspect & skelrotes & agroikia: boorishness*], let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel [*diaphora: cf. 471a as difference*] between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many proofs, such as the saying of 'the yelping hound howling at her lord,' or of one 'mighty

c in the vain talk of fools,' and 'the mob of sages circumventing Zeus,' and the 'subtle thinkers who are beggars after all'; and there are innumerable other signs [*semeion: cf. 496c*] of ancient enmity [*enantiotetes: opposition*] between them. Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation [*logos: cf. b & mimesis: cf. 606d, in context of sentence*] that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered state [*eunomeomai & polis: for both, cf. 605b*] we shall be delighted to receive [*asmenos & katadechomai: cf. 561b as re-admits*] her—we are very conscious of her charms [*suniemi: cf. 586b as mixed & keleio: cf. 413c as influence*]; but we may not on that account betray the truth [*prodidomi: to give beforehand & alethos: cf. 605c*]. I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much

d charmed [*keleio: cf. c*] by her as I am, especially when she appears in Homer?

Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed.

Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon this condition only—that she make a defense of herself [*apologeomai: cf. b as defense*] in lyrical or some other meter?

Certainly.

And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf: let them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful [*hedus: cf. 606d & ophelimos: cf. 559b as essential*] to states [*politeia: cf. 605b as constitution*] and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit [*eumenos, adverb*]; for if this can be proved [*phaino: cf. e 602e as apparent*] we shall surely be the gainers [*kerdaino: cf. 606b*]—I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight?

Certainly, he said, we shall the gainers.

If her defense fails, then, my dear friend [*hetairos: cf. 600d as contemporaries*], like other persons who are enamored [*erao: cf. 555e as eager for*] of something but put a restraint upon themselves [*biazo: cf. 574b as plunder*] when they think their desires are opposed to their interests [*hegeomai: cf. 605c & eros: cf. 586c & ophelimos, with me (not): cf. d as useful*], so too must we after the manner of lovers [*eros: cf. e*] give her up, though not without a struggle. We too are inspired by that love of poetry which the 608 education of noble states [*kalos: cf. 602b as good & politeia: cf. d*] has implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest [*phaino: cf. d as proved & beltistos: cf. 607a as excellent & alethos: cf. c as truth*]; but so long as she is unable to make good her defense [*apologeomai: cf. d*], this argument [*logos: cf. c, in context of sentence*] of ours shall be a charm [*epaieido: to sing, as an incantation*] to us which we will repeat to ourselves while we listen to her strains; that we may not fall away into the childish love [*paidikos: cf. 485c as object of affections & eros: cf. 607a*] of her which captivates the many. At all events we are well aware that poetry being such as we have described is not to be regarded seriously [*spoudasteon: verbal adjective, with ou or not*] as attaining to the truth [*hapto: cf. 600e as reach & spoudaios: cf. 603c, in context of sentence & aletheia: cf. 605a*]; and he who listens to her, fearing for the safety of the city [*politeia: cf. 607e*] which is within

b him, should be on his guard against [*nomisteos: to be accounted*] her seductions and make our words his law.

Yes, he said, I quite agree with [*sumphemi*] you.

Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears [*dokeo: cf. 603d, in context of sentence*], whether a man is to be good or bad [*chrestos: cf. 602b & kakos: cf. 605b as evil*]. And what will any one be profited [*timao: cf. 600c as honored*] if under the influence of honor or money or power, yes, or under the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue [*ameleo: cf. 555d as disregard & dikaiosune: cf. 591b & arete: cf. 601d as excellence*]?

Yes, he said; I have been convinced [*sumphemi: cf. b as agree with*] by the argument as I believe that any one else would have been.

c And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards which await virtue [*arete: cf. b*].

What, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an inconceivable greatness.

Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of threescore years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity [*pros panta oligos*]?

Say rather 'nothing,' he replied.

And should an immortal being [*athanatos: cf. 585c*] seriously think of [*spoudazo: cf. 599b as interested d in*] this little space rather than of the whole?

Of the whole, certainly. But why do you ask?

Are you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable [*psuche: cf. 606d & athanatos: cf. c & apollumi: cf. 605b as impairs*]?

He looked at me in astonishment [*thaumazo: cf. 585a as to wonder*], and said: No, by heaven. And are you really prepared to maintain this?

Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too—there is no difficulty [*chalepos: cf. 604b as impatience*] in proving it. I see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this argument of which you make so light.

Listen then.

I am attending.

There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil [*agathos: cf. 606b & kakos: cf. b*]?

Yes, he replied.

e Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying element [*apolluos & diaphtheiros*] is the evil and the saving and improving element [*sozo: cf. 536b as saviors & ophleo: cf. 558e as benefit*] the good?

Yes.

And you admit that every thing has a good and also an evil; as ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and **609** disease of the whole body; as mildew is of corn and rot of timber or rust of copper and iron: in everything or in almost everything there is an inherent [*sumphutos*] evil and disease?

Yes, he said.

And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil [*poneros: cf. 606c as unseemliness*] and at last wholly dissolves and dies?

True.

The vice and evil which is inherent [*kakos: cf. 608d as evil & poneria: cf. 602a as badness & sumphutos: cf. a*] in each is the destruction of each; and if this does not destroy them there is nothing else that will; **b** for good [*agathos: cf. 608d*] certainly will not destroy [*apollumi: cf. 608d as imperishable*] them nor again that which is neither good nor evil.

Certainly not.

If, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot be dissolved or destroyed [*luo: cf. 594a as disorder & apolluos: cf. 608e*], we may be certain that of such a nature there is no destruction [*olethros: cf. 495a as ruin*]?

That may be assumed [*eikos: cf. 603b as probability*].

Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul [*kakos: cf. b & psuche: cf. 608d*]?

Yes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now passing in review: unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance [*adikia: cf. 545a & akolasia: cf. 444b as delusion & deilia: cf. 590b as c coward & amathia: cf. 535e*].

But does any of these dissolve or destroy [*dialuo: cf. 543c, in context of sentence & apollumi: cf. b*] her?—and here do not let us fall into the error of supposing [*exapatao: cf. 598e as illusion & oiomai: cf. 603c as imagine*] that the unjust and foolish man [*adikos: cf. 588b as injustice & anoetos: cf. 605b as irrational nature*], when he is detected, perishes through his own injustice which is an evil of the soul [*poneria: cf. a & psuche: cf. b*]. Take the analogy of the body: the evil of the body [*poneria: cf. c & soma: cf. 591d*] is a disease which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body; and all the things of which we were just now speaking come to annihilation through their own corruption [*oikeios: cf. 587b as d natural & kakos: cf. b as evil*] attaching to them and inhering in [*proskathemai: to be seated near & eniemi: cf. 577d as prevail*] them and so destroying them. Is not this true?

Yes.

Consider the soul in like manner [*skopeo: cf. 605c as judge & tropos: cf. 600b as order*]. Does the injustice or other evil which exists [*eniemi & proskathemai: cf. d*] in the soul waste and consume her [*phtheiro: cf. 605b as put out of the way & maraino*]? Do they by attaching to the soul and inhering in her at last bring her to death and so separate [*chorizo: cf. 524c, in context of sentence*] her from the body?

Certainly not.

And yet, I said, it is unreasonable [*alogos: cf. 591c as irrational*] to suppose that anything can perish from without through affection of external evil [*poneria: cf. c*] which could not be destroyed [*apollumi: cf. c*] from within by a corruption of its own?

It is, he replied [*alogos: cf. d*].

e Consider [*ennoeo: cf. 605e as very true*], I said, Glaucon, that even the badness [*poneria: cf. d*] of food, whether staleness, decomposition or any other bad quality, when confined to the actual food, is not supposed to destroy [*apollumi: cf. d*] the body; although, if the badness of food communicates corruption to the body, then we should say that the body has been destroyed by a corruption [*kakos: cf. d*] of itself which is disease brought on by this; but that the body, being one thing, can be destroyed by the badness **610** food which is another and which does not engender any natural infection—this we shall absolutely deny [*axioo, with oudepote (never): cf. 439d as assume*]?

Very true.

And, on the same principle [*logos: cf. 608a as argument*], unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of the soul [*poneria: cf. 609e & soma: cf. 609c & psuche: cf. 609c*], we must not suppose [*axioo: cf. a*] that the soul which is one thing can be dissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another?

Yes, he said, there is reason in that.

Either then, let us refute this conclusion [*exelegcho: cf. 539b*] or while it remains unrefuted [*ou kalos, b adverb: cf. 605e, in context of sentence*], let us never say that fever or any other disease or the knife put to the throat or even the cutting up of the whole body into the minutest pieces can destroy the soul until she

herself is proved [*apodeiknumi*: cf. 473b as show] to become more unholy or unrighteous [*anosios*: cf. 580a as more impious & *adikos*: cf. 609c as unjust] in consequence of these things being done to the body; but that the soul [*psuche*: cf. a] or anything else, if not destroyed [*apollumi*: cf. 609e] c by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one is not to be affirmed by any man.

And surely, he replied, no one will ever prove [*deiknumi*: cf. 523a as mean] that the souls of men become more unjust in consequence of death.

But if some one who would rather not admit [*tolmao*: cf. 503b as dare & *iemi*: to put in motion, be eager & *logos*: cf. a as principle] the immortality [*athanatos*: cf. 608d] of the soul boldly denies [*homologeō*, with me, not: cf. 597e as agreed] this and says that the dying do really become more evil and unrighteous [*adikia*: cf. 609b], then, if the speaker is right, I suppose that injustice, like disease, must be d assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who take [*lambano*: cf. 586d as have] this disorder die by the natural inherent power of destruction which evil has, and which kills them sooner or later, but in quite another way from that in which at present the wicked [*adikos*: cf. b] receive death at the hands of others as the penalty [*dike*: cf. 605b, in context of sentence] of their deeds?

No, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be so very terrible [*phaino*: cf. 608a as appear & *pandēinos*: all-dreadful] to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I rather suspect [*phaino*: e cf. d] the opposite to be the truth, and that injustice which, if it have the power, will murder others, keeps the murderer alive—yes, and well awake [*agrupnos*: sleepless] too; so far removed is her dwelling-place from being a house of death.

True [*kalos*, adverb: cf. b, in context of sentence], I said; if the inherent natural [*hikanos*, with me or not: cf. 557e as capacity & *oikeios*: cf. 609c as own] vice or evil of the soul [*poneria*: cf. a & *kakos*: cf. 609e & *psuche*: cf. b] is unable to kill or destroy her, hardly will that which is appointed to be the destruction of some other body destroy a soul or anything else except that of which it was appointed to be the destruction.

Yes, that can hardly [*eikos*: cf. 609b as that may be assumed] be.

But the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether inherent or external, must exist for ever [*aei* 611 on *einai*: cf. 527b (*aei*)] and if existing for ever, must be immortal [*athanatos*: cf. c]?

Certainly.

That is the conclusion, I said; and if a true conclusion, then the souls must always be [*ennoeo*: cf. 609e as consider] the same, for if none be destroyed [*apollumi*: cf. 610b] they will not diminish in number. Neither will they increase, for the increase of the immortal natures [*athanatos*: cf. a] must come from something mortal, and all things would thus end [*teleutao*: cf. 565b as end] in immortality.

Very true.

But this we cannot believe [*oiomai*, with *mete* (not): cf. 609c as supposing]—reason [*logos*: cf. 610c, in context of sentence] will not allow us—any more than we can believe the soul in her truest nature

b [*alethos*: cf. 608a & *phusis*: cf. 606a] to be full of variety and difference and dissimilarity [*poikilia*: cf. 404e as complexity & *anomoiotes*: cf. 547a as irregularity].

What do you mean?, he said.

The soul, I said [*rhadios*: cf. 526c as not easily], being as is now proven immortal [*aidios*: everlasting], must be the fairest of compositions [*kalos*: cf. 610e as true & *sunthetos*: cf. 381a as composite things] and cannot be compounded [*suntithemi*: cf. 377d, in context of sentence] of many elements?

Certainly not.

Her immortality [*psuche*: cf. 610e & *athanatos*: cf. a] is demonstrated by the previous argument [*logos*: cf. a as reason], and there are many other proofs; but to see her as she really is [*en aletheia*: cf. 608a as c truth], not as we now behold [*theomai*: cf. 579e as inspect] her, marred by communion with the body [*koinonia*: cf. 531d as inter-communion] and other miseries, you must contemplate [*diatheateon*: verbal adjective] her with the eye of reason [*logismos*: cf. 604d] in her original purity [*katharos*: cf. 586a as pure]; and then her beauty will be revealed [*kalos*: cf. b & *heurisko*: cf. 538e as discover], and justice and injustice and all the things which we have described will be manifested [*dikaioisune*: cf. 608b & *adikia*: cf. 610b as unrighteous & *diorao*: cf. 577a as insight] more clearly [*enarges*: cf. 545b as clearness]. Thus far, we have spoken the truth [*alethos*: cf. b] concerning her as she appears [*phaino*: cf. 610d] at present, but we must remember also that we have seen her only in a condition which may be compared

d to that of the sea-god Glaucus whose original image [*archaios*: cf. 574c as first & *phusis*: cf. b as nature] can hardly be discerned because his natural members are broken off and crushed and damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways, and incrustations have grown over them of seaweed and shells and stones, so that he is more

like some monster than he is to his own natural form [*phusis: cf. d as image*]. And the soul which we behold [*psuche: cf. b & theaomai: cf. b*] is in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills [*kakos: cf. 610e as evil*]. But not there, Glaucon, not there must we look.

Where then?

e At her love of wisdom [*philosophia*]. Let us see [*ennoeo: cf. 611a, in context of sentence*] whom she affects [*hapto: cf. 608a as attaining*] and what society and converse [*suggenes: cf. 554d as natural & homileo: cf. 605a as being concerned with*] she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the immortal and eternal and divine [*athanatos: cf. b & aei: cf. a & theios: cf. 598e*]; also how different she would become if wholly following [*horme: cf. 513b as points of departure*] this superior principle and borne by a divine impulse out of the ocean in which she now is and disengaged from the stones and shells and things of **612** earth and rock which in wild variety spring up around her because she feeds upon earth and is overgrown by the good things [*eudaimonos: cf. 606d as happiness*] of this life as they are termed: then you would see her as she is and know whether she has one shape only or many or what her nature is. Of her affections and of the forms [*pathe: cf. 535c as is affected & eidos: cf. 597c as idea*] which she takes in this present life I think that we have now said enough. True, he replied.

And thus, I said, we have fulfilled [*apoluo: cf. 365a as redeem*] the conditions of the argument [*logos: cf. 611b*]; we have not introduced [*epaino: cf. 605e as delighted*] the rewards and glories of justice

b [*misthos: cf. 363d as meed & doxa: cf. 603d as opinions & dikaiosune: cf. 611c*] which, as you were saying, are to be found in Homer and Hesiod; but justice in her own nature has been shown to be best for the soul [*psuche: cf. 611d*] in her own nature. Let a man do what is just whether he have the ring of Gyges or not, and even if in addition to the ring of Gyges he put on the helmet of Hades.

Very true.

And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many and how great are the rewards [*misthos: cf. b*] which justice and the other virtues procure [*dikaiosune: cf. a & arete: cf. 608c & c apodidomi: cf. 456b as assigning & parecho: cf. 571e as prevent*] to the soul from gods [*theos: cf. 607a*] and men both in life and after death.

Certainly not, he said.

Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument [*logos: cf. a*]?

What did I borrow?

The assumption that the just man should appear unjust [*dikaioi: cf. 597d, in context of sentence & dokeo: cf. 608b & adikoi: cf. 610d as wicked*] and the unjust just: for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not possibly escape [*lanthano, with me or not: cf. 591b as detected*] the eyes of gods [*theos: cf. c*] and men, still this admission ought to be made for the sake of the argument in order that pure justice [*dikaiosune: cf. b*] might be weighed against [*krino: cf. 585c as put the question*] **d** pure injustice [*adikia: cf. 611c*]. Do you remember [*mimnesko: cf. 583d as know*]?

I should be much to blame if I had forgotten.

Then, as the cause is decided [*krino: cf. c as weighed against*], I demand on behalf of justice [*dikaiosune: cf. c*] that the estimation [*doxa: cf. b, in context of sentence*] in which she is held by gods [*theos, with para: cf. c*] and men and which we acknowledge [*homologeio: cf. 610c as denies (with me, not)*] to be her due should now be restored to her by us; since she has been shown to confer reality [*komizo: cf. 536a as introduce & niketeria: prizes of victory*] and not to deceive [*exapatao: cf. 609c as supposing*] those who truly possess her [*lambano: cf. 610d as taking & to ontin*], let what has been taken from her be given back that so she may win that palm of appearance [*phaino: cf. 611c*] which is hers also and which she gives to her own.

e The demand, he said, is just.

In the first place, I said—and this is the first thing which you will have to give back [*apodidomi: cf. c as procure*]—the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known to the gods [*lanthano, with ou (not): cf. c as escape & theos: cf. d*].

Granted.

And if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other the enemy of the gods [*theophiles & theomises*] as we admitted [*homologeio: cf. d as acknowledge*] from the beginning?

True.

And the friend of the gods may be supposed [*homologeio: cf. e*] to receive from them all things at their **613** best [*aristos: cf. 582d as criterion*], excepting only such evil as is the necessary consequence [*anagkaios: cf. 604b as necessarily*] of former sins [*hamartia: cf. 379d as folly*]?

Certainly.

Then this must be our notion of the just man [*hupolepton*: verbal adjective & *dikaios*: cf. c], that even when he is in poverty or sickness or any other seeming misfortune [*dokeo*: cf. 612c as appear & *kakos*: cf. 611d as ill], all things will in the end work together for good [*teleutao*: cf. 611a as end & *agathos*: cf. 609b] to him in life and death: for the gods have a care of [*theos*: cf. 612e & *ameleo*: cf. 609b as neglect (with negative)] any one whose desire [*prothumeomai*: cf. 596a as had any faint notion] is to become just [*dikaios*: cf. a] and to be like the god [*homoioo*: cf. 605a] as far as man can attain the divine likeness **b** by the pursuit of virtue [*epitedeuo*: cf. 561c as use & *arete*: cf. 612b]?

Yes, he said; if he is like the god [*homoios*: cf. 562d as after her own heart] he will surely not be neglected [*ameleo*: cf. a] by him.

And of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed [*dianoemomai*: cf. 598c as knows]?

Certainly.

Such, then, are the palms of victory [*niketeria*: cf. 612d] which the gods [*theos*, with *para*: cf. a] give the just? That is my conviction [*doxa*: cf. 612d as estimation].

And what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and you will see that the clever unjust [*deinos*: cf. 588d as marvelous & *adikos*: cf. 612c] are in the case of runners who run well from the starting-place to the goal but not back again from the goal: they go off at a great pace but in the end **c** only look foolish, slinking away with their ears dragging on their shoulders and without a crown; but the true runner comes to the finish and receives the prize and is crowned. And this is the way with the just [*sumbaino*: cf. 594a, in context of sentence & *dikaios*: cf. a]; he who endures to the end of every action [*telos*: cf. 575d & *praxis*: cf. 606d] and occasion of his entire life has a good report [*homilia*: cf. 575a as communications] and carries off the prize which men have to bestow [*eudokimeo*: cf. 605a as please].

True.

And now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you were attributing to the **d** fortunate unjust [*adikaioi*: cf. 588a]. I shall say of them what you were saying of the others, that as they grow older, they become rulers [*archo*: cf. 606d as rule] their own city if they care [*bouleuo*: cf. 606c as disposed to] to be; they marry whom they like and give in marriage to whom they will; all that you said of the others I now say of these. And, on the other hand, of the unjust I say that the greater number, even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last and look foolish at the end [*telos*: cf. c] of their course, and when they come to be old and miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen; they are beaten and then come those things unfit for ears polite as you truly term them; they will **e** be racked and have their eyes burned out, as you were saying. And you may suppose that I have repeated the remainder of your tale of horrors. But will you let me assume, without reciting them, that these things are true?

Certainly, he said, what you say is true [*dikaioi*: cf. c].

These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed upon the just by gods [*theos*, with **614** *para*: cf. b] and men in this present life in addition to the other good things which justice of herself provides [*dikaioisune*: cf. 612d & *parecho*: cf. 612c as procure].

Yes, he said; and they are fair and lasting [*kalos*: cf. 611c as beauty & *bebaioi*: cf. 586c as abiding].

And yet, I said, all these are as nothing either in number or greatness in comparison with those other recompenses [*teleutao*: cf. 613a as work together] which await both just and unjust [*parameno*: cf. 370b as await] after death. And you ought to hear them, and then both just and unjust will have received [*apolambano*] from us a full payment [*teleos*, adverb: cf. 588b as perfectly] of the debt which the argument owes [*opheilo*] to them.

b Speak, he said; there are few things which I would more gladly [*hedus*: cf. 607d as pleasant] hear.

Well, I said, I will tell you a tale [apologos]; not one of the tales which Odysseus tells to the hero Alcinous, yet this too is a tale of a hero, Er the son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle and ten days afterwards when the bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state of corruption [*diaphtheiro*: cf. 560a as die], his body was found unaffected by decay [*hugies*: cf. 591c as well] and carried away home to be buried. And on the twelfth day as he was lying on the funeral pile, he returned to life [*anabios*] and told them what he had seen in the other world [*ekei*: there]. He said that when his soul [*psuche*: cf. 612b] left the body he went on a journey with a great company, and that they **c** came to a mysterious place [*topos*: cf. 532c as world & *daimonios*: cf. 573c as friend] at which there were two openings in the earth; they were near together and over against them were two other openings in the heaven above. In the intermediate space [*metaxu*: cf. 583c] there were judges seated who commanded the just after they had given judgment on them and had bound their

sentences in front of them to ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand; and in like manner the unjust were bidden by them to descend by the lower way on the left hand; these also bore the symbols [*semeion: cf. 607c as*

d signs] of their deeds but fastened on their backs. He drew near, and they told him that he was to be the messenger [*aggelos*] who would carry the report [*diakeluoimai: cf. 523b as commanded*] of the other world [*ekei: cf. b*] to men, and they bade him hear and see [*theaomai: cf. 611d as behold*] all that was to be heard and seen in that place [*topos: cf. c*]. Then he beheld and saw [*horao: cf. 596a as enquire*] on one side the souls [*psuche: cf. b*] departing at either opening of heaven and earth when sentence had been given [*dikazo: cf. 433e as determining suits at law*] on them; and at the two other openings other souls, some ascending out of the earth dusty and worn with travel, some descending out of heaven clean and bright [*katharos: cf. 611c as purity*]. And arriving [*aphikneomai: cf. 571d as collecting himself*] ever and anon they seemed [*phaino: cf. 612d as appearance*] to have come from a long journey, and they went forth with gladness [*asmenos: cf. 607c as charms*] into the meadow where they encamped as at a festival [*paneguris: national assembly*]; and those who knew one another embraced and conversed [*aspazomai: cf. 606e as honor & gnorimos: cf. 343e as acquaintances*], the souls which came from earth curiously enquiring about [*punthanomai: cf. 530e as learn*] the things above [*ekei: cf. d*], and the souls which came from heaven about the things beneath. And they told one another of what had happened by the way, those from below weeping and sorrowing at the **615** remembrance of the things [*anamimnesko: cf. 607b as reverted to*] which they had endured [*pascho: cf. 553b as known*] and seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the journey lasted a thousand years), while those from above were describing heavenly delights [*eupatheia*] and visions of inconceivable beauty [*thea: cf. 545c & amechanos: cf. 587e, in context of sentence & kallos: cf. 602a as goodness*]. The story, Glaucon, would take too long to tell, but the sum was this:—He said that for every wrong which they had done [*adikeo: cf. 591a, in context of sentence*] to any one they suffered tenfold; or **b** once in a hundred years—such being reckoned to be the length of man's life, and the penalty [*dike: cf. 610d*] being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If, for example, there were any who had been the cause of many deaths or had betrayed or enslaved cities or armies or been guilty of any other evil behavior [*kakouchia*], for each and all of their offences they received punishment [*algedon: cf. 464d as pains*] ten times over, and the rewards of beneficence and justice and holiness [*euergesia & dikaios: cf. 613e as true & hosios: cf. 479a as holy*] were in the same proportion [*komizo: cf. 612d as confer & axia: c cf. 581d as honor*]. I need hardly repeat what he said concerning young children dying almost as soon as they were born. Of piety and impiety to gods [*eusebeia: filial respect & asebeia & theos: cf. 614a*] and parents and of murderers, there were retributions [*misthos: cf. 612b as rewards*] other and greater far which he described.

He mentioned that he was present when one of the spirits asked another, 'Where is Ardiaeus the Great?' (Now this Ardiaeus lived a thousand years before the time of Er: he had been the tyrant of some city of **d** Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and his elder brother and was said to have committed many other abominable crimes). The answer of the other spirit was: 'He comes not hither and will never come. And this,' said he, 'was one of the dreadful sights [*deinos: cf. 613b as clever & thea cf. a as visions*]: which we ourselves witnessed [*theaomai: cf. 614d as see*]. We were at the mouth of the cavern and, having completed all our experiences, were about to re-ascend when suddenly Ardiaeus appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants; and there were also besides the tyrants private

e individuals who had been great criminals: they were just, as they fancied [*oiomai: cf. 611a as believe*], about to return into the upper world, but the mouth, instead of admitting them, gave a roar whenever any of these incurable sinners or some one who had not been sufficiently punished [*dike: cf. b as penalty*] tried to ascend; and then wild men of fiery aspect who were standing by and heard the sound, seized and **616** carried them off; and Ardiaeus and others they bound head and foot and hand and threw them down and flayed them with scourges and dragged them along the road at the side, carding them on thorns like wool and declaring to the passers-by what were their crimes and that they were being taken away to be cast into hell [*Tartaros*]. And of all the many terrors [*phobos: cf. 579e as fear*] which they had endured, he said that there was none like the terror which each of them felt at that moment, lest they should hear the voice; and when there was silence [*asmenos: cf. 614e as gladness & sigao: to be silent, still*], one by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These, said Er, were the penalties and

b retributions [*dike: cf. 615e as punished & timoria*], and there were blessings [*euergesia: cf. 615b as beneficence*] as great. Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days, on the eighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey and on the fourth day after, he said that they came to

[*aphikneomai*: cf. 614e as arriving] a place where they could see [*kathorao*: cf. 554c as discover] from above a line of light straight as a column extending right through the whole heaven and through the earth, in color resembling the rainbow only brighter and purer; another day's journey brought them to the **c** place, and there in the midst of the light, they saw the ends of the chains of heaven let down from above: for this light is the belt of heaven and holds together the circle of the universe [*sundesmos*: cf. 520a as binding up & *ouranos*: cf. 594b as heaven] like the under-girders of a trireme. From these ends is extended the spindle of Necessity [*atraktos* & *Anagke*: cf. 603a as no doubt], on which all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of this spindle are made of steel, and the whorl is made partly of steel and also partly of other materials. Now the whorl is in form like the whorl used on earth; and the

d description of it implied [*schema*: cf. 601a as figures & *noeo*: cf. 529b as percipient] that there is one large hollow whorl which is quite scooped out and into this is fitted another lesser one and another and another and four others making eight in all like vessels which fit into one another; the whorls show their edges on the upper side, and on their lower side all together form one continuous whorl. This is pierced by the spindle which is driven home through the center of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has **e** the rim broadest and the seven inner whorls are narrower in the following proportions—the sixth is next to the first in size, the fourth next to the sixth; then comes the eighth; the seventh is fifth, the fifth is sixth, the third is seventh, last and eighth comes the second. The largest (of fixed stars) is spangled and the seventh (or sun) is brightest; the eighth (or moon) colored by the reflected light of the seventh; the second and fifth (Saturn and Mercury) are in color like one another, and yellower than the preceding; the **617** third (Venus) has the whitest light; the fourth (Mars) is reddish; the sixth (Jupiter) is in whiteness second. Now the whole spindle has the same motion; but, as the whole revolves in one direction, the seven inner circles move slowly in the other, and of these the swiftest is the eighth; next in swiftness are the seventh, sixth, and fifth which move together; third in swiftness appeared to move according to the

b law of this reversed motion the fourth; the third appeared fourth and the second fifth. The spindle turns on the knees of Necessity [*Anagke*: cf. 616c]; and on the upper surface of each circle is a siren, who goes round with them, hymning a single tone or note. The eight together form one harmony; and round about at equal intervals there is another band, three in number, each sitting upon her throne: these are the

c Fates, daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white robes and have chaplets upon their heads, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos, who accompany with their voices the harmony of the sirens—Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future; Clotho from time to time assisting with a touch of her right hand the revolution of the outer circle of the whorl or spindle, and Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner ones and Lachesis laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand

d and then with the other. When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis; but first of all there came [*aphikneomai*: cf. 616b as came to] a prophet who arranged them in order [*diistemi*: cf. 458b as will carry out & *taxis*: cf. 587a as order]; then he took from the knees of Lachesis lots and samples [*paradeigma*: cf. 594b as pattern] of lives, and having mounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows: 'Hear the word [*logos*: cf. 612c as argument] of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity [*Anagke*: cf. b]. Mortal souls [*psuche*: cf. 614d], behold a new cycle [*periodos*: cf. 504b as circuitous way] of life and **e** mortality. Your genius [*daimon*: cf. 542b as demi-god] will not be allotted to you, but you choose your genius; and let him who draws the first lot [*lache*] have the first choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his destiny [*sunistemi*: cf. 546 as constituted & *anakge*: cf. d]. Virtue is free [*arete*: cf. 613b & *adespotos*: without master], and as a man honors or dishonors [*timao*: cf. 608b as be profited & *atimazo*: cf. 591c as disregard] her he will have more or less of her; the responsibility [*aitia*: cf. 517c as author] is with the chooser—the god is justified [*theos*: cf. 615c & *anaitios*: guiltless, not being the cause].'

When the Interpreter had thus spoken he scattered lots [*kleros*: cf. 557a] indifferently among them all, and each of them took up the lot which fell near him, all but Er himself (he was not allowed), and each as he took his lot perceived the number which he had obtained. Then the Interpreter placed on the ground **618** before them the samples [*paradeigma*: cf. d as samples] of lives; and there were many more lives than the souls present, and they were of all sorts. There were lives of every animal and of man in every condition. And there were tyrannies among them, some lasting out the tyrant's life, others which broke off in the middle and came to an end [*teleutao*: cf. 614a as recompenses] in poverty and exile and beggary; and there were lives of famous men, some who were famous for their form and beauty as well as for their strength [*eidōs*: cf. 612a & *kallōs*: cf. 615a & *ischus*: cf. 591b] and success in games or again, **b** for their birth and the qualities [*arete*: cf. e] of their ancestors; and some who were the reverse of famous for the opposite qualities. And of women likewise; there

was not, however, any definite character them because the soul [*taxis: cf. 617d as order & psuche: cf. 617d*], when choosing a new life, must of necessity [*anagkaios, adverb*] become different. But there was every other quality, and the all mingled with one another and also with elements of wealth and poverty, and disease and health; and there were mean states also. And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril [*kindunos: cf. 556d as danger*] of our **c** human state; and therefore the utmost care should be taken [*epimeletoon: verbal adjective*]. Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge [*mathema: cf. 591c as studies*] and seek and follow [*zetetes & mathetes*]: one thing only, if peradventure he may be able to learn and may find some one who will make him able to learn and discern [*manthano: cf. 606e & exeurisko: cf. 587a as attaining & diagignosko: cf. 605c as discernment*] between good and evil [*chrestos: cf. 608b & poneros: cf. 609a*], and so to choose always and everywhere the better life [*beltios: cf. 606d as happiness*] as he has opportunity. He should consider [*analogizomai: cf. 524d as supply the answer*] the bearing of all these things which have been mentioned severally and collectively [*suntithemi: cf. 611b as compounded & diaireo: cf. 595b as distinguished*] upon virtue [*arete, with pros: cf. 600c*]; he should know [*eido: cf. 607a as must remain firm*] what the effect of beauty [*kallos: cf. a*] is when combined with poverty or wealth in **d** a particular soul [*hexis: cf. 602a as use & psuche: cf. b*], and what are the good and evil consequences [*agathos: cf. 613a & kakos: cf. 613a as misfortune & ergazomai: cf. 519a, in context of sentence*] of noble and humble birth, of private and public station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and dullness and of all the soul and the operation of them when conjoined [*sugkerannumi: cf. 397d as mixed*]; he will then look at [*apoblepo: cf. 592a, in context of sentence*] the nature of the soul [*phusis: cf. 611d as natural form & psuche: cf. d*], and from the consideration [*sullogizomai: cf. 531d as affinities*] of all these qualities he will be able to determine [*haireo: cf. 374e as select*] which is the better and which is **e** the worse; and so he will choose, giving the name of evil to the life which will make his soul more unjust [*adikaos: cf. 613d*], and good to the life which will make his soul more just [*dikaos: cf. 615b as justice*]; all else he will disregard. For we have seen and know that this is the best choice [*hairesis: cf. 468c*] both in life and after death. A man must take with him into the world below [*Haidēs: cf. 596c as 619 under the earth*] an adamantine faith [*adamantinos, adverb*] in truth [*doxa: cf. 613b as conviction*] and right that there too he may not be dazzled [*anekplektos: undaunted*] by the desire of wealth or the other allurements of evil [*ploutos: cf. 582d & kakos: cf. d*] lest, coming upon tyrannies and similar villainies [*praxis: cf. 613c as action*], he do irremediable wrongs [*anekestos: not to be healed & kakos: cf. e*] to others and suffer [*pascho: cf. 615a as had endured*] yet worse himself; but let him know [*gignosko: cf. 600c, in context of sentence*] how to choose [*haireo: cf. d as determine*] the mean [*mesos*] and avoid [*pheugo: cf. 594a*] the extremes [*huperballo: cf. 358e as greater*] on either side, as far as possible [*kata to dunaton*], not only in this life but in all that which is to come [*epeita: cf. 357b as follows*]. For this is

b the way of happiness [*eudaimonos: cf. 612a as good things*].

And according to the report of the messenger [*aggelos: cf. 614d & aggello: cf. 601d as indicate*] from the other world this was what the prophet said at the time: 'Even for the last comer, if he chooses wisely and will live diligently [*suntonos, adverb: cf. 539d as earnestly*], there is appointed a happy and not undesirable existence [*agapetos: cf. 435d as well satisfied & kakos: cf. a as irremediable*]. Let not him who chooses first be careless [*hairesis: cf. 618e as choice & ameleo: cf. 614b as neglected*], and let not the last despair [*athumeo: to be disheartened*].'

And when he had spoken, he who had the first choice [*lagchano: cf. 561b as wins the lot*] came forward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny; his mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality [*aphrosune: cf. 585b & laimargia: gluttony*], he had not thought out [*ennoeo: cf. 611e as let us see*] the whole matter before he chose, and did not at first sight perceive [*lanthano: cf. 612e as known, with ou*

c (*not*)] that he was fated [*meiromai: cf. 566a as destiny*], among other evils, to devour his own children. But when he had time to reflect [*skeptomai: cf. 571d as collecting himself & schole: cf. 500b as (no) leisure*] and saw what was in the lot, he began to beat his breast and lament over his choice [*hairesis: cf. b*], forgetting [*mimnesko, with ou (not): cf. 612d*] the proclamation of the prophet; instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself, he accused chance and the gods [*tuche: cf. 605d as fortune & daimon: cf. 617e as genius*] and everything rather than himself. Now he was one of those who came from heaven and in a former life had dwelt in a well-ordered state [*tasso: cf. 513e as arrangement &*

d *politeia: cf. 608a as city*], but his virtue was a matter of habit only [*arete: cf. ethos: cf. 619c & 606a as habit*], and he had no philosophy. And it was true of others who were similarly overtaken [*haliskomai: cf. 535e as detected*], that the greater number of them came from heaven and therefore they had never been schooled by trial [*agumastos & ponos: cf. 535b as severity*], whereas the pilgrims who came from earth, having themselves

suffered and seen others suffer, were not in a hurry to choose [*epidrome, with ex: a sudden inroad, attack & hairesis: cf. c as choice*]. And owing to this inexperience of theirs, and also because the lot was a chance [*tuche: cf. c & kleros: cf. 617e*], many of the souls exchanged [*metabole: cf. 565d as change*] a good destiny for an evil [*kalos: cf. 614a as fair & kakos: cf. b as undesirable*] or an evil for a good. For if a man had always on his arrival in this world [*aphikneomai: cf. 617d as came & enthade, here*] dedicated [*pipto: to fall, belong to*] himself from the first to sound [*hugios, adverb*]

e philosophy and had been moderately fortunate [*teleutaios: cf. 516b as finally*] in the number of the lot, he might, as the messenger reported [*aggello: cf. b*], be happy [*eudaimoneo: cf. 544a as happiest*] here and also his journey to another life and return to this, instead of being rough and underground, would be smooth and heavenly [*leios: not embroidered & ouranios*].

Most curious, he said, was the spectacle [*thea: cf. 615d*]—sad and laughable and strange [*eleinos & 620 geloios: cf. 606c as ridiculous & thaumasios: cf. 575b, in context of sentence*]; for the choice [*haireo: cf. a*] of the souls was in most cases based on their experience [*sunetheia: cf. 517a as habit*] of a previous life. There he saw the soul [*psuche: cf. 618d*] which had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of enmity [*miseo: cf. 606c as disgusted*] to the race of women, hating to be born of a woman because they had been his murderers; he beheld also the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale; birds, on the other hand, like the swan and other musicians, wanting [*hairesis: cf. 619d as*

b choose] to be men. The soul which obtained the twentieth lot [*lagchano: cf. 619b a choice*] chose the life of a lion, and this was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon, who would not be a man, remembering the injustice [*mimnesko: cf. 619c as forgetting, with ou (not) & krisis: cf. 580b as decision*] which was done him the judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon who took the life of an eagle because like Ajax, he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings [*pathe: cf. 612a as affections*]. About the middle came the lot of Atalanta; she, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable to resist the temptation [*ou dunasthai & parerchomai: to pass by*], and after her there followed the soul of Epeus **c** the son of Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts; and far away among the last who chose, the soul of the jester Thersites was putting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice, and his lot happened to be [*tuche: cf. 619d as chance & lagchano: cf. b*] the last of them all. Now the recollection [*mneme: cf. 535c as memory*] of former sufferings [*ponos: cf. 619d as trial*] had disenchanting him of ambition, and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares [*apragmatos*]; he had some

d difficulty in finding this which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else; and when he saw it, he said that he would have done the had his lot [*lagchano: cf. c*] been first instead of last, and that he was delighted [*asmenos: cf. 616a, in context of sentence*] to have it. And not only did men pass into animals, but I must also mention that there were animals tame and wild who changed into one another and into corresponding human natures—the good into the gentle [*dikaios: cf. 619e & hemeros: cf. 589b*] and the evil into the savage [*adikos: cf. 613b as unjust & agrios: cf. 589e as fierce*], in all sorts of combinations [*meixis: mixture*].

All the souls had now chosen [*psuche: cf. a & haireo: cf. a as choice*] their lives, and they went in the order of their choice [*lagchano: cf. d & taxis: cf. 618b, in context of sentence*] to Lachesis who sent with them the genius [*daimon: cf. 619c as gods*] whom they had severally chosen, to be the guardian [*phulax: e cf. 591a*] of their lives and the fulfiller of the choice [*haireo: cf. d*]: this genius led the souls first to Clotho and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus ratifying the destiny of each [*kureo: to light upon, prove & lagchano: cf. d & moira: cf. 493a as power*]; and then, when they were fastened to this, carried them to Atropos who spun the threads and made them irreversible, whence **621** without turning round they passed beneath the throne of Necessity [*Anagke: cf. 617d*]; and when they had all passed, they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness [Lethe] which was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure; and then towards evening they encamped by the river of Unmindfulness [*Ameleta*] whose water no vessel can hold; of this they were all obliged to drink a certain quantity and those who were not saved by wisdom [*sozo: cf. 608e & phronesis: cf. 603a as reason*] drank **b** more than was necessary; and each one as he drank forgot [*epilanthano: cf. 536c as remind (with ou, not)*] all things. Now after they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake, and then in an instant they were driven upwards in all manner of ways to their birth like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But in what manner or by what means he returned to the body he could not say; only in the morning, awaking suddenly, he found himself lying on the pyre.

And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will save [*sozo: cf. a*] us if we are c
obedient to the word spoken [*peitho: cf. 604b as ready*]; and we shall pass safely over the river of Forgetfulness
[*Lethe: cf. a*] and our soul will not be defiled [*psuche: cf. 620d & miaino: cf. 416e as pollute*]. Wherefore my
counsel [*peitho: cf. b*] is that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way [*epitedeuo: cf. 613b as pursuit & tropos: cf.
609d as manner*] and follow after justice and virtue always [*dikaiosune: cf. 614a & phronesis: cf. a as wisdom*],
considering that the soul is immortal [*nomizo: cf. 584d as allow & psuche: cf. c & athanatos: cf. 611e*] and able
to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil [*anecho: cf. 518c & agathos & kakos: for both, cf. 618d*].
Thus shall we live dear [*philos: cf. 599d as friend*] to one another and to the gods [*theos: cf. 617e*], both while
remaining here and when, like conquerors in
d the games who go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward [*komizo: cf. 615b as proportion*]. And it shall
be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage [*poreia: cf. 532e as rest*] of a thousand years which we
have been describing.