

Being Like God with Plato

Introduction

Some years ago I had taught myself German for reading knowledge in order to access books on St. Gregory of Nyssa. German never was my “thing,” but a lot of authors who wrote in that language had some pretty good stuff related to Gregory as well as other Greek Fathers. And so I went ahead and maintained my knowledge to a certain although imperfect degree. Fortunately it was enough to get what I wanted. Then I let German ride for several years until I decided to revisit it. The motive was to do a re-read of a book on Gregory of Nyssa entitled **Homoiosis Theo: von der Platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa** by Hubert Merki (1952). It’s an oldie but no doubt a goodie.

Merki goes into some detail as to where Gregory had obtained his sources which are both classical and patristic. Plato is such an important influence and a personal favorite. After having gone through the section dedicated to this author I decided to focus upon those passages which Merki cites as to man being made in the image and likeness of God. Perhaps there are more, but here I give seven which Merki has singled out. Perhaps by going through them and making notations in a free-flowing manner I might obtain some additional light on them. Then they can reflect upon Gregory. ¹

Please note that these reflection are done in an unprofessional manner but are presented from a desire to obtain better insight into Gregory’s use of these citations. Indeed, they were composed with a view for everyone to understand them. More often than not we tend to forget this, especially with Plato who’s considered the philosopher’s philosopher and thus way out of reach except for professional academics. That remarkably strong prejudice has persisted as a stumbling block throughout the ages and needs to be put aside. In that way we can start by offering reflections as you’d do, for example, among two friends holding a conversation. Such friends don’t worry about the flow of their conversation...that would make them go nuts right away...but simply and freely engage in a free exchange of ideas.

It should be noted that closely bound to any talk about image and likeness as found in these excerpts are bound up closely with the notion of a *psuche* or soul and the practice of *philosophia*. We have to take some care to understand this noun, for it means a friend or a

¹ As for the biblical image and likeness, refer to an article on this homepage entitle *On the Idea of Image*. You’d think the Bible would have an abundance of such references, but it boils down to around eight of them.

companion (*philos*) of wisdom (*sophia*). This, of course, fits right in with that ebb and flow of discussions among close friends mentioned above.

Also there comes to mind that when going through these excerpts Greek word by Greek word, the richness is difficult to communicate. Still, there's a desire to produce something...anything...that might express what Socrates is saying. That might take the form of further notations or another essay. Time will tell.

On occasion Socrates speaks of a love for one's boy. Some may find this disconcerting because it smacks of child abuse, something with which we moderns hear about from time to time. There's no way to explain that out of existence which means it'll be left as such. At the same time you can't help but wonder how some of the early Christian authors who borrowed heavily from Plato's writings viewed this. We can assume they did so with horror but swallowed their pride without allowing it to interfere with their appreciation of his authentic insights.

As for the approach taken here, many if not most of the sentences are divided and treated separately, each one followed by a set of (hopefully) free-flowing, conversation-like notations. Admittedly that makes them somewhat choppy in an attempt to stay as close to the original text as possible. Often there are reoccurring words. Each one is designated by the minus sign usually in brackets: [-]. I.e., the minus sign is simply indicative of a word that has gone before. There are three instances where this does apply because they occur so frequently: *kalos*, *psuche* and *eido* or beauty, soul and to see. **Excerpts are from Plato: Complete Works** edited by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, 1997). Postings will be made on occasion until the document is completed.

Theaetetus 176a-177a

Socrates, if your words convinced everyone as they do me, there would be more peace and less evil on earth.

This sounds like a noble as well as inspiring desire centered around the verb *peitho*, to persuade, which refers to what Socrates is in the act of saying (*lego*) compared with static words, a more direct type of persuasion. Although Theodorus expresses a future that never can be achieved, nevertheless it isn't to be dismissed summarily but taken as sincere. *Eirene* and *kakos* or peace and evil are his two basic concerns which happen to be pretty much universal. *Pantas* -> *hosper eme* or everyone -> me, this being indication of this universal desire.

But it is not possible, Theodorus, that evil should be destroyed—for there must always be something opposed to the good; nor is it possible that it should have its seat in heaven.

Right away Socrates takes the initiative to gently refute Theodorus' words, fully realizing his noble intent. He comes off with an observation so current of his times, the violence which seems to be everywhere, that evil to which it gives rise cannot be eliminated. The verb for this is *apollumi* which has a more absolute sense about it. More precisely, evil lacks the *dunatos* or capacity or power for this self-destruction. *Hupenantios* is key here, for it represents a necessity or *anagke* which somehow is

prearranged to be set over against that which is good, *agathos* applicable to quality and/or fortune. Furthermore, such *anagke* is for good, *aei* meaning forever, not just for a specific period of time.

By reason of what Socrates had just said about evil, it's impossible for it to be seated literally "in the gods" (*theos*), the verb being *hidruo* also as to establish and give a footing to.

But it must inevitably haunt human life and prowl about this earth.

Evil has an innate capacity not to be associated with divine beings which must have a profound lasting effect. Because of this, evil is in a kind of perpetual exile or wandering which has its origins at some unimaginably distant time in the past. Being uprooted, if you will, sets evil on the path to cause destruction in the human sphere. *Tonde* can be rendered as something like here on the spot or right now which reflects this restlessness on evil's part which Socrates infers. Note use of the noun *topos*, indicative of a physical place to which evil gravitates. This is put in terms of our mortal human nature or *phusis* which it's fond of literally going, around, *peripoleo* suggestive of prowling which intimates stalking. More technically, if you will, this is a going about or ranging (*poleo*) which goes around in circles which is what the preposition *peri-* intimates.

Although evil doesn't seem to completely put human nature under its control, the threat of doing so remains constant. This means that people have to cultivate an attentiveness which matches the *aei* of evil noted in the section just above.

That is why a man should make all haste to escape from earth to heaven; and escape means becoming as like God as possible; and a man becomes like God when he becomes just and pious, with understanding.

Dio kai or "this is why" refers to *peripoleo* or that going around in the sense of prowling noted in the section above. Instead of engaging in *peri-* or around-ness, one should not just *pheugo* or flee but become attached to it, if you will, or endeavor to flee,

the verb being *peirao*. That is to say, *peirao* suggests a possibility, not necessarily that it will happen, but is better than being passive to events. *Enthende* or “hence” suggests flight from the place in which one finds oneself which can be taken as physical existence but is left unspecified for each person to examine that place. As for the flight, it’s directed *ekeise* or something like “to that place” which similarly is left vague in a deliberate sense. The interesting part about the proposed flight...the one which is *peirao*...is that it’s *tachista* or very fast. I.e., it happens not in stages which means that it’s extended in time but comes upon one all at once.

Such flight suggests leaving behind something undesirable that has taken place in the past. That consists in not being like God but the noun *homoiosis* or likeness (also resemblance) with regard to God. Note that this *homoiosis* is in accord with (*kata*) our capacity or that which is *dunatos* [-]. *Dunatos* can have a wide range of application, depending upon the disposition of each person.

Note the importance of the following three: *dikaios*, *hosios* and *phronesis* just, pious and understanding. The second also means hallowed or forbidden by divine law and the third is more general. It’s a noun which can be taken as purpose, intention as well as prudence and of the three, perhaps is the most important.

But it is not at all an easy matter, my good friend, to persuade men that it is not for the reasons commonly alleged that one should try to escape from wickedness and pursue virtue.

Socrates calls Theodorus *aristos* or good friend, an adjective which means that which is best or noblest when bringing up a matter which isn’t easy, *rhadios* as easy to make or to do as well as to comprehend. Here the adjective has a negative or opposite sense (that is, difficult) as it applies to persuading men (*peitho*, -) with regard to a matter held by many, *pollos* and the verb *phemi*, to say, to affirm. That consists of trying to escape from evil and pursuing virtue, both being effected at the same time. Note the two opposite verbs: *pheugo* [-] and *dioko*, to flee and to cause to run or to set in quick motion. To the former belongs *poneria* and to the latter, *arete*. The first refers to a bad condition as well as wickedness and the latter to anything considered as the best as well as excellence.

The two are so contrary to each other that you’d think no *peitho* is necessary to favor *arete* over *poneria*. However, for some mysterious way Socrates recognizes but does not get into, people prefer *poneria* even when *arete* is self-evident. Nevertheless, difficult is involved with regard to the latter which is why he uses the verb *dioko* involving quick motion that has to be constant. Apparently *poneria* doesn’t require *dioko*. Human nature slides into it which is why a forceful verb such as *pheugo* has to be applied.

It is not in order to avoid a bad reputation and obtain a good one that virtue should be practiced and not vice; that, it seems to me, is only what men call ‘old wives’ talk’.

Epiteuteon or one who practices where the preposition *epi-* or upon gives emphasis to following this pursuit. Such a pursuit consists of favoring that which is considered *agathos* [-] over that which is supposedly *kakos* [-], good over evil. The verb *dokeo* here is important (also as to expect, to suppose) because it suggests a personal opinion why may or may not conform to objective reality. This most people tend to label as *huthlos* or idle talk, nonsense belonging to an old woman or *graus*. The provisional nature of *dokeo* is paralleled by *phaino* or to appear as it applies to Socrates.

Let us try to put the truth in this way.

The verb *lego* [-], to say or to speak with the adjective *alethes*, true or in the literal sense, that which is unconcealed.

In God there is no sort of wrong whatsoever; he is supremely just, and the thing most like him is the man who has become as just as it lies in human nature to be.

God or *theos* [-] sometimes is with lower case “g” and at other times upper case “G,” the latter as here which reflects a certain fluidity as to things considered transcendent. *Adikos* is the adjective for unrighteous or unjust which certain does not apply to God. *Dikaios* is the opposite, in the superlative case. How does Socrates know this? Does he have knowledge to which the rest of us aren’t privy? Actually it’s a result of knowing himself though never could he admit it because people would think either he’s crazy or plain arrogant. Thus Socrates is *dikaios* to the utmost, *homoios* being the adjective meaning like, resembling with regard to *theos*. And so justice (the noun being *dikaiousune*) which sounds abstract but requires constant vigilance both inwardly and outwardly.

And it is here that we see whether a man is truly able, or truly a weakling and a nonentity; for it is the realization of this that is genuine wisdom and goodness, while the failure to realize it is manifest folly and wickedness.

Socrates continues speaking about himself while not letting on to the fact that he’s doing so. Most likely someone like Theodorus knows it more than anyone else listening in or knowing Socrates. Thus “here” or *peri touto* (around or concerning this) refers to the matter of *adikos/dikaios* (unjust/just). It determines whether what kind of man he is, here three nouns being used in the genitive case which gives him a closer identity with them compared to an adjective describing him. The three are *deinotes*, *oudenia* and *anandria*: terribleness or harshness, nothingness and unmanliness. Of the three the second is the most condemning in that it means such a person literally is devoid of everything...completely and absolutely empty.

Socrates introduces the important capacity of *gnosis* or knowledge in the sense of comprehension, that which is known being the determining factor for which of the three is operative, if you will. Such *gnosis* has two parts, if you will. The first is *sophia*, obviously wisdom but involves cleverness and skill at practical matters. The second is *arete* [-] or the best characteristic of anything described as *alethinos* (true, genuine).

Their opposite consists of an *agnoia* which is *amathia* along with a *kakia* which is *enarges*. That is to say, ignorance or lack of perception which has no *manthano*, if you will, this being the verbal root of the alpha privative *amathia*, no ability to learn or to perceive by the senses. In a word, Socrates is using this for downright stupidity. As for simple badness or *kakia*, it is *enarges*, visible, palpable or manifest to the mind's eye...i.e., *kakia* is almost blatantly obvious.

Everything else that passes for ability and wisdom has a sort of commonness—in those who wield political power a poor cheap show, in the manual workers a matter of mechanical routine.

Next Socrates speaks of what seems or has the appearance of (*dokeo*) “other terriblenesses,” to put it literally. The noun is *deinotes* [-] also as cleverness, shrewdness noted above along with *oudenia* and *anandria* (nothingness and unmanliness). Here it's applicable to persons who have the appearance of wisdom (*sophiaios*) but in truth are vulgar or coarse (*phortikos*) when it comes to wielding power relative to governance. This word is rendered as the noun *dunasteia* which is more akin to lordship, domination modified by the adjective *politikos*, that which belongs to a city state. In other words, this is carried out by means which are mechanical, *banausos* fundamentally as in bad taste which modifies *techne*, the means for doing anything.

Phaedo 81c-83c

We must believe, my friend, that this bodily element is heavy, ponderous, earthly and visible.

Socrates calls Cebes *philos* or friend, someone considered beloved or dear. Such words come shortly after Socrates—and this is the book centered around his impending death—says that the soul or *psuche* has assumed characteristics of the body by reason of constant association with it. In brief, this word refers to the animating principle of life as distinct from the *soma* or body.

The adjective *sumphutos* is apt here, literally as born with (*sum-*) one, inborn or inbred. Such is the reason why he puts his point of view as something supposed or believed, *oiomai* being the verb. That is, by necessity (*chre*) the body (*soma*) has the

following four characteristics: *embrithes*, *barus*, *geodes* and *horatos* or weighty (also as grave in the sense of being dignified), heavy in the physical sense, of the earth to which the first two adjective may be attributed and visible in the sense as that right before our eyes.

Through it, such a soul has become heavy and is dragged back to the visible region in fear of the unseen and of Hades.

“Through it” referring to the so-called bodily element of the passage above which isn’t specified but inferred. Keeping in mind the soul’s (*psuche*) *sumphutos* also as noted there, it too has assumed the same type of corporeal heaviness, *baruno* being a verb meaning to weigh down in the sense of oppress. This fits in well with the verb *helko* meaning to drag (down or back not necessarily being associated with it). Such dragging applies to (*eis*, into) the place which is visible, *topos* and *horatos*., the noun often associated with local circumstances and conditions. Fear or *phobos* is the agent doing this *helko* because it’s associated with Hades. The adjective for this association is *aidos*, often implying respect or regard.

It wanders, as we are told, around graves and monuments, where shadowy phantoms, images that such souls produce, have been seen, souls that have not been freed and purified but share in the visible, and are therefore seen.

Legetai or “it is said” as used by Socrates is for the sake of presentation. The way he says it implies he may not totally subscribe to the reports as presented here. The verb *kulindo* fits in perfectly with the ghostly image at hand, meaning to roll along in a pace that isn’t rushed but constant.

Socrates speaks of souls (*psuche*), more particularly the one that is *sumphutos* with the physical body who heaviness, ponderous, earthly and visible nature which frequents monuments to the dead. It is as though they cannot leave earthly existence, afraid to to be free and purified. This is rendered by the verb *apoluo* or to loosen from (*apo-*) and the adverb *katharos* which applies to purity in the sense of having been cleansed.

So instead of this, such souls participate in what is visible which makes them seen by all, *horao* and *horatos* [-], the latter derived from the former. *Metecho* is the verb to share, literally translated as to have with (*meta-*).

In sum, this sentence reflects a long-standing insight into the distinction between what is visible and what is invisible or better, how they’re connected. The problem is not with the connection of two opposites but with a soul clinging to the visible out of fear of what is invisible or not known to it.

That is likely, Socrates.

Eikos applies to probability.

It is indeed, Cebes. Moreover, these are not the souls of good but of inferior men, which are forced to wander there, paying the penalty for their previous bad upbringing.

Socrates responds in kind to Cebes' *eikos*, that is with the same rendered as "indeed." He refines this notion of wandering not using the verb *kulindo* noted just above but with *planao* which infers having lost one's way. And so *planao* applies to the souls of those who are inferior, *phaulos* also meaning poor in the sense of being petty or trivial. They are in sharp distinction from souls which are *agathos* [-] or good. So *planao* = *phaulos*. What makes this *planao* all the more unattractive is the verb *anagkazo*, to be necessary or to make as such.

As for the "there" at hand, that consists of the above mentioned graves and monuments. This tendency to hang around such places Socrates attributes to an upbringing which is bad, *trophe* basically as nourishment as well as education or in essence, the means of maintaining one's way of life. It's modified by the adjective *kakos* [-] or bad, wicked. And to be in such places is a form of punishment, *dike* as judgment as well as custom or usage.

They wander until their longing for that which accompanies them, the physical, again imprisons them in a body, and they are then, as is likely, bound to such characters as they have practiced in their life.

Once again Socrates brings up the wandering by such misplaced souls, *planao* [-] not so much a painful experience but one which is wearisome. There's an apparent end to all this which is deceptive by reason of their innate longing, *epithumia* meaning desire or appetite or literally a desire (*thumos*: soul, breath, life) which is upon or *epi*-. This desire-upon accompanies such souls, the verb being *sunepakoloutheo*: to follow closely, to accompany. It consists of the root *akoloutheo* or to follow prefaced with two prepositions, *sun*- and *epi*-, with and upon...a following which is with/upon, if you will.

Things which pertain to the body or *soma* [-] are described aptly as *somatoeides* or corporeal...*soma* + the verbal root *eido*, to see, to behold.

What kind of characters do you say these are, Socrates?

Ta poia or from *poios*, of what sort, of what nature?

Those, for example, who have carelessly practiced gluttony, violence and drunkenness are likely to join a company of donkeys or of similar animals. Do you not think so?

Meletao is the verb meaning to take thought or care for as well as to study, here with regard three vices, *hubris* being recognizable as wanton violence or insolence. All three contribute to being attracted to the company of donkeys or such animals, As the verb *enduo* suggests, there's more at work here than joining such animals. The verb means to put on (*en-* or *in*) as with clothes.

Very likely.

Cebes responds not simply with *eikos* as above but with the adjective *pan*, all.

Those who have esteemed injustice highly, and tyranny and plunder will join the tribes of wolves and hawks and kites, or where else shall we say that they go?

The verb *protimao* means not just to honor but to honor before (*pro-*) all else the three undesirable qualities here. Not only that, they will join (*eis*, into) three types of ravenous beasts. As Socrates concludes, there's no other place for them.

Certainly to those, said Cebes.

Amelei: never mind or along the lines of don't trouble yourself.

And clearly, the destination of the others will conform to the way in which they have behaved?

Cebes adds a quick question after agreeing with Socrates. *Melete*: care or attention suggests habits or ways of behavior which are in accord with (*kata*) a likeness or *homoiototes* of these detestable types of animals.

Clearly, of course.

Cebes responds with *delos* which has to do with that which is evident or conspicuous.

The happiest of these, who will also have the best destination, are those who have practiced popular and social virtue, which they call moderation and justice and which was developed by habit and practice, without philosophy or understanding?

The earlier emphasis on *planao* and *kulindo*, indicative of two types of restlessness, come to an end here. It was necessary to go into some detail about them in order to

appreciate better what Socrates is about to describe from this point onward to the end of this section.

Eudaimon is the adjective for happy or more literally, blessed with a good genius or *daimon*, a guiding spirit. This operates, albeit unconsciously with regard to having in mind the best destination, a *topos*, superlative of *agathos* [-] and has a broader sense of region or geographical position. Essential here is the practice or *epitedeuo* with *epi-* or upon indicative of greater intent. It's object: that which is *demotikos* and *politikos*, two adjectives with the former meaning that which is common and the latter, that which pertains to citizenship.

This practice-upon or *epi-* is called moderation and justice, *sophrosune* and *dikaiosune* [-]. The former is very important not just for Socrates but generally for Greek philosophy yet has a certain vagueness about it. Fundamentally it means soundness of mind, prudence, discretion along with moderation is sensual desires. Socrates claims both are developed by habit and practice, *ethos* and *melete* [-], the former as an adopted way of behavior and the latter, putting this behavior into practice.

Interestingly Socrates says that all this is done without the intervention of *philosophia* and *nous*, philosophy and the latter as mind or perception. In other words, the *epitedeuo* as noted with regard to other persons contains both and not necessarily does without them.

How are they the happiest?

Eudaimon [-].

Because it is likely that they will again join a social and gentle group, either of bees or wasps or ants, and then again the same kind of human group, and so be moderate men.

Socrates again takes up the theme of social intercourse, that *demotikos* and *politikos* noted above, likening both to insects which not just swarm together but produce habitations. And so the result is to be moderate in what they do, *metrios* indicative of that which is within measure.

That is likely.

Eikos [-].

No one may join the company of the gods who has not practiced philosophy and is not completely pure when he departs from life, no one but the lover of learning.

The preposition *eis* or into is with *genos* or race as this pertains to the gods which implies belonging “into” this stock in the fullest sense of the term. The verb *aphikneomai* means to arrive, to reach or to attain with regard to being such a member.

What this *genos* does is *philosopheo*, literally to being a friend or *philos* [-] of *sophia*, wisdom. Compare with Socrates’ remarks above concerning no need for *philosophia* and *nous* with regard to social interaction. Also it requires being completely pure (*pantelos*, *pan* or all and *telos*, end which modifies *katharos*, -) with regard to leaving this life or dying, *apiemi* meaning to be away from. That has a more subtle sense in the sense of getting away from something not especially desirable. Those who are entitled to this divine *genos* must love learning, *philomatheo*, to be a *philos* of *manthano*, alternately to perceive by the senses. And so *philos-ophy* and *philos-manthano* are closely bound together.

It is for this reason, my friends Simmias and Cebes, that those who practice philosophy in the right way keep away from all bodily passions, master them and do not surrender themselves to them; it is not at all for fear of wasting their substance and of poverty, which the majority and the money-lovers fear, nor for fear of dishonor and ill repute, like the ambitious and lovers of honors, that they keep away from them.

Etairos or friend in the sense of someone close. They are such by being philosophically minded in the proper way, the adjective *phiosophos* along with the adverb *orthos* or rightly. This enables them to do the following three things:

-To keep away (*apecho* or .to have from, *apo-*) from intense longings which are in accord with (*kata*) the body or *soma* [-], *epithumia* being a desire upon, *epi-* [-]. *Kata* here is important in that it intimates following closely as one would do so with a plan or even a recipe.

-To master them, *kartereo* also as to be steadfast, patient; *tereo* or to keep with the preposition *kata-* (in accord with) not unlike the *kata* just above.

-They don’t allow themselves to be handed over to them, *paradidomai*, the preposition *para-* suggestive of being beside, of having these *epithumia* beside them.

Fear (*phobeo*, the verb) of squandering one’s substance or poverty has nothing to do with them, that is, *oikoththoria* and *penia*: the former literally corruption as it pertains to one’s household and neediness. Next note the three occurrences of *philos* meaning a friend. Such is what lovers of money fear, *philochrematos* (*philos* [-] and *chrema*, a thing that one uses or needs), *philarchos* and *philotimos*: *chrema* or a thing that one uses or needs, those who are ambitious and those who crave for honors. In other words, those of a philosophical bent have nothing to do with such things, keeping far away (*apecho*, -) from them.

That would not be natural for them, Socrates, said Cebes.

Prepos or fitting.

By Zeus, no, he said.

Di or the proper name for Zeus.

Those who care for their own soul and do not live for the service of their body dismiss all these things.

A contrast between persons who have care for their souls and disregard for service of the body (*psuche* vs. *soma*, -), the verb *melo* being an object of care used with respect to both. *Plasso* as service means to do something as well as to form, mold or shape. These showing *melo* for their *psuche* tend to disregard the latter, the verb *chairo* fundamentally as to rejoice but also to dismiss or take leave of.

They do not travel the same road as those who do not know where they are going but, believing that nothing should be done contrary to philosophy and their deliverance and purification, they turn to this and follow wherever philosophy leads.

Because those who favor the soul over the body as just noted, they do not travel (*poreuo*, to go, carry) the same path as those who don't know (*eido*, also to see) where they're going. However, they believe their actions must not oppose (*enantios*: opposite, opposing with *hegeomai*, to lead, command) philosophy (*philosphia*, -) as well as the loosening and purification (*luo* and *katharmos*, to loosen and cleansing) it brings. Thus they turn to (*trepo*, also as to direct) philosophy and follow it in the direction where it guides them (*epomai* and *huphegeomai*: to come or be in the company with and to guide, lead).

How so, Socrates?

Pos or how.

I will tell you, he said.

Ero or to tell in the sense of to proclaim.

The lovers of learning know that when philosophy gets hold of their soul, it is imprisoned in and clinging to the body, and that it is forced to examine other things through it as through a cage and not by itself, and that it wallows in every kind of ignorance.

In a way, this is the most important sentence in all the excerpts. It speaks of our human condition and in a way is reminiscent of the cave-like prison in Book Seven of the **Republic**. Socrates begins with speaking of persons who know about *philomatheo* [-] from which *philomathes* is derived, friends of learning (*philos* and *manthano*, -). More precisely, this love or friendship with regard to learning takes hold of a soul (*psuche*) and obviously has consequences. That is reflected in the verb *paralambano* which suggests receiving alongside of or in the company of, *para-* as beside).

And so the soul first is imprisoned by the body, *diadeo* being a vivid verb meaning to bind on either side or more literally, to be bound through (*dia-*). The result? It can't help but cling to the body or *proskallao* where the preposition *pros-* is indicative of direction towards-which. This twofold situation compels (*anagkazo*, to force) the soul to scrutinize things as through a cage, the verb being *skopeo*, to behold or contemplate with the noun *heirgmos*, also a prison. This it does instead of literally through itself (*di' hautes*). The result? The soul wallows in every conceivable type of ignorance, *kulindo* [-] more as a rolling along within *amathia* [-].

Philosophy sees that the worst feature of this imprisonment is that it is due to desires, so that the prisoner himself is contributing to his own incarceration most of all.

The operative word here is *kaeidon* (*kata-* and *eido*), literally as to look down in the sense of getting an overall view of things, that is, from being imprisoned (*heirgmos*, -) because of one's desires, *epithumia* [-]. What's worse (*malista* or exceedingly) is that the person so imprisoned is contributing to his own incarceration, *sulleptor* being an accomplice or assistant.

As I say, the lovers of learning know that philosophy gets hold of their soul when it is in that state, then gently encourages it and tries to free it by showing them that investigation through the eyes is full of deceit, as is that through the ears and the other senses.

Note two uses of *philos* [-], fundamentally as friend: *philomathano* and *philosophia*, *manthano* and *sophia* (both -), to learn and wisdom. Those who are friends of learning realize (*gignosko*, the common verb to know) that being a friend of wisdom grabs hold of a soul when in that state, *paralambano* literally as to receive beside or take to one's side, *para-*. Once there, *philosophia* does the following:

-Gently (*herema*, softly) encourages the soul, *paramutheomai* also as to exhort so as to be beside, *para-*.

-Tries to free the soul which is rendered as such by the verb *epicheireo*, to put one's hand upon (*epi-*) and *luo* [-] or to loosen.

Both attempt to show (*endeiknumi*: to mark, to point out, *en-* or *in*) that any observation done through the senses (*skepsis*, also as speculation with regard to *aisthesis*, sense) is prone to being full of deceit (*apate*). In this instance Socrates having singled out the eyes.

Philosophy then persuades the soul to withdraw from the senses in so far as it is not compelled to use them and bids the soul to gather itself together by itself, to trust only itself and whatever reality, existing by itself, the soul by itself understands, and not to consider as true whatever it examines by other means, for this is different in different circumstances and is sensible and visible, whereas what the soul itself sees is intelligible and invisible.

Philosophy attempts (*peitho*, -) to persuade the soul to draw back from (*anachoreo*: *choreo*, to make room) the senses (*ek touton* or from these) to the degree that it isn't forced to use them (*anagke* or necessity and *chraomai*, to desire, yearn after). Similarly, it asks (*parakeleuomai*: to order, prescribe, encourage) the following of the soul:

-To gather itself to itself (*sullego*: to bring together, to collect with *sull-* equivalent to *sun-*, with) along with the phrase *eis hauten*, "into itself."

-To collect itself (*athroizo* with emphasis upon mustering or crowding together).

-To trust only oneself (*pisteuo*, to believe) and any reality which exists by itself.

The soul in and by itself has the power to comprehend (*noeo*, to perceive, notice) which here has two instances of *kata* or in accord with meaning the soul in and by itself, not informed by anything else (*ton onton*, 'of beings'). That is, the soul doesn't consider (*skopeo*, -) as true (*alethes*, -) anything it examines (*hegeomai*,-) otherwise. In sum, note three verbs relative to perception: *noeo* with *kata*, *skopeo* and *hegeomai*.

The reason for this? On one hand we have things that are visible and sensible and on the other, what the soul sees is intelligible and invisible: *aisthetos* and *horatos* vs. *noetos* and *aides* (also as secret).

The soul of the true philosopher thinks that this deliverance must not be opposed and so keeps away from pleasures and desires and pains as far as he can; he reflects that violent pleasure or pain or passion does not cause merely such evils as one might expect, such as one suffers when one has been sick or extravagant through desire, but the greatest and most extreme evil, though one does not reflect on this.

The soul of the philosopher who is true (*philosophos* and *alethes*, both -) thinks (*oiomai*, -) that the loosening (*luisis*) presented here must not be opposed (*enantioomai*: *en-* and *anti-* or in and against). Therefore he refrains as much as possible (*apecho* [-]) and

dunomai, to be able) from pleasures, desire, pains (*hedone*, *epithumia* [-] and *lupe*), all of which contribute to that end.

This philosopher (i.e., his soul) reflects (*logizomai*, to reckon, calculate) that pleasure, pain or passion in their extremes (*sphodra* with regard to *heomai* or to take pleasure in, *phobeo* or to fear and *epithumeo*; cf. *epithumia*, -) do not cause such evils as expected, *pascho* with regard to *kakos* [-]. The verb fundamentally means to suffer but also more generally as to have something happen to oneself or to come to be in a given state. Such pertain to what one undergoes when ill or suffers from excessive desire (*noseo* or to be sick and *epithumia*, -). However, through strong passions a person incurs (*pascho*, -) the greatest and most extreme evil (*eschatos*, last and *kakos*, -) yet fails to take it into account (*logizomai*, -).

Phaedrus 248a-252b

Now that is the life of the gods.

Bios, also a course or manner of life compared with *zoe*, a means of life or substance.

As for the other souls, one that follows a god most closely, making itself most like that god, raises the head of its charioteer up to the place outside and is carried around in the circular motion with the others.

Socrates is drawing a parallel between the gods ('life of the gods') and other (*allos*) souls or *psuche*. One of them stays on the heels of a god, *epomai* or literally to come upon (*epi*-) and does so in the best *aristos* [-] possible way. The verb also means to attend as well as to escort. In this way it becomes most like that god, *eikazo* also to represent by a likeness (*eikon*) or a figure, the soul doing this on its own which seems to be effected by close observation. Also *eikazo* means to make a conjuncture. Applying that can suggest that the soul tries as best it can from its own self-knowledge to project itself (*epomai*) upon a god. As for the nature of that god, it isn't singled out.

There follows from this *epomai* or being in attendance the imitation which takes the form of raising the head of its charioteer (*heniochos*; *henia* means bridle). The verb for this is *huperairo* (*huper*- or above prefaced to *airo*, to take up) and applies to *kephale*, head also as that which is foremost. Following right away is the preposition *eis* or into with regard to the place (*topos*, -) outside, *exo* representative of the world because *topos* is a spacial term.

As for this image, refer to 246a: “Let us then liken the soul to the natural union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer (etc.).” Thus Socrates is referring to the one who controls the horses where there seems to be a distinction between *psuche* and *heniochos*, the former acting upon the latter.

What exists *exo* is a much larger world, like stepping outside the sphere of the earth into space. There, if you will, the *psuche/heniochos* is borne around in a circular fashion, *sumperiphero*, the root *phero* (to bear, carry) is prefaced with two prepositions, *sum-* and *peri-*, with and around. Both prepositions impart a personal touch to this *phero*, making it not at all abstract. The verb has as its object *periphora*, a noun meaning bearing-around, *peri-* again with the root *phero*.

Although distracted by the horses, this soul does have a view of Reality, just barely.

Thorobeo is an apt verb for the context at hand, the *psuche* being more than distracted; it'd be more to the point to say have that a clamor is raised against it. Such cacophony comes from the horses (a pair of them in accord with 246a) which means both neighing and the sound of galloping. Despite this noisy distraction, the *psuche* indeed has a view of what's real (*ta onta*, - or literally the beings) but barely so, *mogis* also as scarcely. Implied is some kind of ghostly outline.

Kathorao consists of the root *horao* (to see, -) prefaced with *kata-*, to see in accord with, so it implies having a definite orientation. Again, emphasis here is upon noise or better, a tumult which means the *psuche* is distracted through the faculty of hearing compared to what it sees. However, this *thorobeo* can't help but affect the ability to see or better, to see in accord with a given plan.

Another soul rises at one time and falls at another, and because its horses pull it violently in different directions, it sees some real things and misses others.

Socrates turns attention to another *psuche*, one which is subject to rising as well as to falling, *aeiro* and *duao*, the former to lift up and the latter to plunge into misery. *Tote* or at that time or then is used with both to show their constant alteration.

Why so? This soul too has a pair of horses (again, cf. 246a) which yank it this way and that, *biazo* also as to being hard pressed. This makes it difficult to focus one's attention meaning at one time the *psuche* sees (*eido*) some real things and at other times misses others.

The remaining souls are all eagerly straining to keep up, but are unable to rise; they are carried around below the surface, trampling and striking one another as each tries to get ahead of the others.

Allos [-] is the adjective for remaining and fundamentally means another, here applying to those *psuche* which come after the one just discussed, as following in its path. To them apply the verbs *glixomai* and *epomai* [-], to long after or to strive after and to come after, both being followed by the verb *adunateo*, to be unable or to lack the capacity (*dunamis*) to do something as is the case at hand.

Instead, such souls are borne around just below the surface, *sumperiphero* [-] as noted above with two prepositions prefaced to the root, *sum-* and *peri-*, with and around. This double action, if you will, takes place *hupobruchios*, literally from under (*hupo-*) the water, *bruchios* applicable to the depths of the sea, this adjective adding a bit more drama to the situation.

In this depth, if you will, these remaining souls trample and strike each other while attempting to get ahead of the others. The two verbs are *pateo* and *epiballo*, to tread and literally to cast upon (*epi-*) with respect to *peirao* which applies to these souls in their endeavors (i.e., to try, to attempt).

The result is terribly noisy, very sweaty, and disorderly. Many souls are crippled by the incompetence of the drivers, and many wings break much of their plumage.

Eschatos [-] is an adjective meaning the end or final outcome modifying three nouns: *thorubos*, *amilla* and *idros* (uproar, contest for superiority and sweat).

Unfortunately many souls suffer being crippled (*choleuo*, to become lame) by charioteers (*heniochos*, -) who are incompetent (*kakia*, -; fundamentally as badness) with the result that their wings are broken (*thrauo*) causing damages to their plumage. As for reference to the *psuche* with wings, cf. 246a: “Let us then liken the soul to the natural union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer.”

After so much trouble, they all leave without having seen reality, uninitiated, and when they have gone they will depend on what they think is nourishment—their own opinions.

After this *ponos* or trouble (also as hard work, toil) such souls depart as being uninitiated (*ateles*, not brought to an end, unaccomplished) without having seen reality, *aperchomai* or to go from with *theaomai*, to view or behold, the object being the genitive of *onta* [-], existing things.

Once gone (*aperchomai*, -) they will depend upon (*chraomai*: to desire, yearn for) what they believe is nourishment (*trophe*, -), that is, their personal opinions (*doxastes*: one who forms opinions or conjectures).

The reason there is so much eagerness to see the plain where truth stands is that this pasture has the grass that is the right food for the best part of the soul, and it is the nature of the wings that lift up the soul to be nourished by it.

Spoude or eagerness connotes haste as well as speed and more so here by the adjective *pollos*, much. It's directed to the plain of truth (*pedion* and *aletheia*) where it's located, *pedion* is also a *leimon* or moist, grassy place, an image Socrates prefers because of its pastoral nature. There the right kind of food is provided—i.e., grass—for the best part of the soul, *nome* a third pastoral image, this one referring to feeding. The verb used here is *proseko*, to be near (*pros-*, direction towards-which) at hand and *aristos* [-], the best in every possible way. That is, *aristos* refers to a part of the *psuche*, not the *psuche* in its entirety. Such language infers that there are parts of the *psuche* which are less than desirable, and Socrates focuses upon the one at hand (i.e., the plural isn't used).

Once again Socrates appeals to the image of wings when speaking of this *aristos* with regard to *psuche*. See 246a quoted above: “Let us then liken the soul to the natural union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer.” They have a nature or *phusis* (also as constitution, condition) which can raise it up to be nourished. The two verbs are *kouphizo* and *trepho*, to be light and to become firm.

Besides, the law of Destiny is this: If any soul becomes a companion to a god and catches sight of any true thing, it will be unharmed until the next circuit; and if it is able to do this every time, it will always be safe.

Socrates now lays out the law of destiny or *thesmos* and *Adrasteia*. The first is that which is laid down and established while the second is a proper name, an alternate for Nemesis and connotes that which is inevitable.

Socrates speaks of a *psuche* becoming a companion with a god (dative case) but not specified as to which divinity might be involved, suggesting that one has choice in the matter. The noun representing this companionship is *sunopados*, following along with (*sum-*, with). Being such, the *psuche* is enabled to see that which is true (*ti* or what, singular with *alethos*), *kateidon* fundamentally as to look down upon (*kata-*), regard. In sum, such a looking *kata-* enables the soul to be unharmed (*apemon*, safe; alpha privative with *pema* or suffering) now or until the next time around (*periodos*: journey around, *peri-*) when things might be different.

Being able to do this always (*aei*, -) will keep the *psuche* safe, *ablabe* having alpha privative with *blabe*, harm or damage.

If, on the other hand, it does not see anything true because it could not keep up, and by some accident takes on a burden of forgetfulness and wrongdoing, then it is weighed down, sheds its wings and falls to earth.

Socrates now speaks of the same soul not being able to see (*eido*) anything true, *adunateo* meaning to lack *dunamis* or the capacity to do anything. The reason? It was

unable to keep up (*ephepo*, to apply or direct towards, *epi-* or upon), that is, being a companion to the god. This induced some misfortune which isn't specified but left to our imagination, *suntuchia* being an occurrence or chance event (*sun-* or with prefaced to the verbal root *tugchano*, to happen).

Socrates gives a general example of forgetfulness, *lethe* indicative of something worse, complete oblivion combined with *kakia* or evil [-], the verb being *chrao*, to provide, furnish or proclaim. Combining both is lethal and worse than death. The result is threefold: the soul is weighed down (*baruno*, -), sheds its wings and falls to earth. *Baruno* is used with the second example as well, as strong as *pipto* (to fall down) or more so because it implied being weighted down.

At that point, according to the law, the soul is not born into a wild animal in its first incarnation; but a soul that has seen the most will be planted in the seed of a man who will become a lover of wisdom or of beauty, or who will be cultivated in the arts and prone to erotic love.

Nomos or law also means usage or custom, that which is accepted in a general sort of way and here refers to how nature functions. That is to say, in its first incarnation (*genesis* or birth...others are implied but not made explicit) the soul isn't born into a wild animal, *phusis* [-] being used which means nature vis-a-vis *therios* being an adjective, beast-like. Instead, a soul which has beheld (*eido*) the most will be planted in the seed (*gone*: produce, offspring) of a man. As for this *eido*, it refers to the passage above in reference to being a companion to a god and catching sight (*kateidon*) of what's true.

This *gone* enables the soul to become one or more of the four following:

-a lover of wisdom: *philokalos* or *philos* + *sophia* [- for both]

-A lover of beauty: *philokalos* or *philos* + *kalos*, the latter connoting elegance. NB: sometimes *kalos* is spelled *kallos*. It's a noun which tends to consider that which is seen though can apply to things which are not as such.

-cultivated in the arts: *mousikos*: a votary of the Muses

-prone to erotic love: *erotikos* or *eros*, desire, passion

The second sort of soul will be put into someone who will be a lawful king or warlike commander; the third, a statesman, a manager of a household, or a financier; the fourth will be a trainer who loves exercise or a doctor who cures the body; the fifth will lead the life of a prophet or priest of the mysteries.

Socrates now speaks of four other types of souls, the fifth living a life not unlike a prophet, *mantikos* applicable to divinization which is similar to a priest of the mysteries, the adjective *telestikos* applicable to that which is connected with such rites as well as bringing to fulfillment (i.e., *telos*, -).

To the sixth the life of a poet or some other representational artist is properly assigned; to the seventh the life of a manual laborer or farmer; to the eighth the career of a sophist or demagogue, and to the ninth a tyrant.

The sixth through the ninth covers a wide variety. The phrase *peri mimesin* or “around imitation” (*mimesis*) applies to a representational artist.

Of all these, any who have led their lives with justice will change to a better fate, and any who have led theirs with injustice, to a worse one. In fact, no soul returns to the place from which it came for ten thousand years, since its wings will not grow before then, except for the soul of a man who practices philosophy without guile or who loves boys philosophically.

After having considered nine types of souls, Socrates sets before us two types of fate or *moira* also as part or portion which intimates that which is laid out for someone. *Moirai* is a depressing state of affairs because it implies something dealt out to a person who is unable to alter it. To practice *philosophia* as below is the way Socrates offers to escape this virtual condemnation. The first concerns a person who had lived with justice or justly, *dikaios* and the verb *diagō*, literally as to carry through (*dia-*). He will end up with (*metalambanō* partake; literally as to have with or *meta-*) a better fate.

The second consists of having lived unjustly, *adikos*. Unfortunately this will slide into a fate which is even worse, *cheironos* also as inferior.

Socrates makes it clear that no soul returns from where it had come for ten thousand years, *aphikneomai* [-] because it takes that long (*chronos*) for its wings to grow back. However, there is an exception. That consists of a person who puts philosophy into practice, *philosophēo* [-] and does so without guile, *adolos* being an adverb as in a genuine sort of way. Also included is love of boys with *philosophia* [-], *paiderasteo* which consists of the noun *pais* verb *erao* connoting to desire passionately,

If, after the third cycle of one thousand years, the last-mentioned souls have chosen such a life three times in a row, they grow their wings back, and they depart in the three-thousandth year.

Note three instances where the number three plays a role: cycle (*periodos* or around the *hodos*, way), a choice (*haireo*: to take, get into one’s power) of such a life with regard to the souls of the previous sentence and their departure (*aperchomai*) in the three-thousand year.

As for the rest, once their first life is over, they come to judgment; and, once judged, some are condemned to go to places of punishment beneath the earth and pay the full penalty

for their injustice, while the others are lifted up by justice to a place in heaven where they live in the manner the life they led in human form has earned them.

With regard to the remaining souls, they hit upon judgment (*krisis* and *tugchano*, -), the former also as a separating power or one for making distinctions. Such *krisis* results in condemnation in a place of punishment, *krino* and *dikaioterion* being similar (to judge and a place for it). Such a place is physical, out of sight beneath the earth where such souls must pay the penalty in full (*ektino*: to pay off or in full, *ek-* or from) for having done injustice, *dike* or justice being used (to pay justice).

On the other hand, there are souls raised to (*kouphizo* [-], to be light with *eis*, into) heaven by justice, *Dike* as a personal noun. There they live the same type (*eidos* or that which is seen, form) of life as they had done on earth, having earned the former. The adverb *axios* or worthily is that which characterizes both spheres of existence and thus makes them essentially equal for such souls.

In the thousandth year both groups arrive at a choice and allotment of second lives, and each soul chooses the life it wants.

Aphikneomai [-] or to reach or attain with regard to making a choice and allotment with regard to second lives, *klerosis* and *hairesis* (choice and a taking). A soul is able to chose the life it wants, *haireo* [-] and *ethelo*.

From there, a human soul can enter a wild animal, and a soul that was once human can move from an animal to a human being again. But a soul that never saw the truth cannot take a human shape, since a human being must understand speech in terms of general forms, proceeding to bring many perceptions together into a reasoned unity.

Again, the verb *aphikneomai* [-] or to reach or attain with regard to two types of souls:

- A human (*anthropinos*) *psuche* entering a wild animal, *eis* or into that which is *therios* [-].

-a *psuche* which was once human that can move from (*ek*) *therios* to *anthropos*.

There's a third type of *psuche* which never saw the truth (*eido* and *aletheia*, -) meaning never can it assume a human shape, *schema* also as figure or form with *eis tode*, literally "into here." Why so? It boils down to speech (*suneimi* or to co or come together and *lego*, to speak, -) which belongs to humans and is comprehended as general forms (*eidos* with the preposition *kata*, -). These forms proceed to bring many perceptions (*aisthesis* or sense, -) into a unity (*heis*, one) characterized by reason. The verb is *sunaireo* or to take up together (*sun-*) with *logismos*, thought or reckoning.

That process is the recollection of the things our soul saw when it was traveling with god, when it disregarded the things we now call real and lifted up its head to what is truly real instead.

The three types of *aphekneomai* or attaining can be described as a process (*touto*, this) of recalling things which our *psuche* had seen when traveling (*eido* and *sumporeuomai*: to go on a journey with, *sum-*) with god (see above with Law of Destiny). While accompanying this god the *psuche* described as ours paid no attention (*hupereido*: *eido* prefaced with *hyper-* or above, beyond) to what we now call real or *einai* (to be). *Nun* or “now” is crucial. Reason? It refers to things in the present life compared with lifting up the head as it’s put literally (*anakupto*: *ana-* prefaced to *kupto*, to bend) to what is truly real, *eis to on ontos* (into what which is actually).

For just this reason it is fair that only a philosopher’s mind grows wings, since its memory always keeps it as close as possible to those realities by being close to which the gods are divine.

In light of the sentence above, it’s right (*dikaios* as adverb, -) that only the mind of a philosopher grows wings, *dianoia* being comprised of *noos* (mind) prefaced with the preposition *dia-*, through. The reason? Socrates claims that at all times this recollective faculty (*mneme* or remembrance) keeps it as close as possible (*dunamis* [-] with *kata*) to those realities by being close to (*pros*, direction towards-which) what makes the gods divine (*theos* and *theios*).

A man who uses reminders of these things correctly is always at the highest, most perfect level of initiation, and he is the only one who is perfect as perfect can be.

The person who uses reminders (*hupomimnesis*: literally a remembrance from under, *hupo-* with *chraomai*, to use, -) of such things in the right way (*orthos*, -) always is being initiated to the highest and most perfect level. The second part of this sentence contains three uses of a word of the same root: *teleios* (perfect), *telete* (rite, initiation) and *teleos* (perfect). I.e., perfection is to be understood as tending towards an end or completion rather than attaining an idealized state or condition.

He stands outside human concerns and draws close to the divine; ordinary people think he is disturbed and rebuke him for this, unaware that he is possessed by god.

Socrates continues to speak of a person who’s essentially a philosopher. By reason of this he stands outside human affairs, *existemi* (*ex-* from) with regard to what is

anthropinos or human while simultaneously drawing close to what's divine, *spoudazo* meaning to be busy, jealous with *pros* (direction towards-which) what is *theios* [-].

At the same time, people considered (*noutheo*: *noos* or mind and *tithemi* or to set, place) ordinary (*pollos*, much, many) believe this person is disturbed, *parakineo* fundamentally as to move aside, *para-*). And so they're not aware (*lanthano*, to forget) he is possessed by a god (*enthouziazo*: to be wrapped in ecstasy with regard to *theios*, adjective, -).

Now this takes me to the whole point of my discussion of the fourth kind of madness—that which someone shows when he sees the beauty we have down here and is reminded of true beauty; then he takes wing and flutters in his eagerness to rise up, but is unable to do so; and he gazes aloft, like a bird, paying no attention to what is down below—and that is what brings on him the charge that he has gone mad.

The *logos* (word as expression) of Socrates now moves to the fourth kind of madness or *mania*, inspired frenzy. It's revealed when a person sees the beauty (*horao* and *kalos*, -) in our possession here below (*tede*, what is present) as a reminder of true beauty, the adjective *alethes* [-] only with *anamimnesko*. This verb consists of the root to bring to mind prefaced with *ana-* or on, upon and thus a more intense and lasting form of recollection.

The next step is marked by three instances of the verb *pteroo*, to fly and two others prefaced with *ana-*. At the same time he cannot do so, *adunateo* [-]. In the meanwhile he gazes above (*blepo* or to have the power of sight with *ana*) while at the same time does not pay attention to what's below, *ameleo* or to neglect with *kato*. And so he's charged with having become insane, *diakeimai* or to lay outstretched with the preposition *dia-*, through and *manikos* (adverb for *mania* as above).

This is the best and noblest of all the forms that possession by god can take for anyone who has it or is connected to it, and when someone who loves beautiful boys is touched by this madness he is called a lover.

Two instances of *aristos* [-] or the best of anything: what a god has (*echo*) and what's common to anyone associated with it, *koinoo* or to share. Compare with the verb *metecho* [-] or to have with (*meta-*) as it pertains to *mania* [-] or madness when loving beautiful boys (*erao* standing alone, -). And so there's a close connection between *erao* and *mania*.

As I said, nature requires that the soul of every human being has seen reality; otherwise, no soul could have entered this sort of living thing.

Here Socrates associates *psuche* with *anthropos* [-] which has beheld reality, *theaomai* and *ta onta* [both -] or existing things, the former implying to get the lay of the land. Without this no *psuche* could have entered such a living thing, *zao* with *eis* or into.

But not every soul is easily reminded of the reality there by what it finds here—not souls that got only a brief glance at the reality there, not souls who had such bad luck when they fell down here that they were twisted by bad company into lives of injustice so that they forgot the sacred objects they had seen before.

Not every soul is reminded easily of the reality there compared with the one here. That is to say, *anamnesis* through the verb *anamimnesko* [-] isn't easy or *rhadios* [-] when it comes to the correspondence between here and there, *tode* and *tonde* [-].

This includes two types of souls:

-not those which saw briefly there (*eido* and *bracheos* (adverb for short time) with regard to *takei*, there.

-not those who experienced bad luck (*dustugchano: tugchano* or to happen with *dus-* or difficult) upon falling down here, *pipto* and *deuro*.

Such souls had been twisted (*trepo*: to turn and *adikos* with the preposition *epi*, upon, -) by bad company (*homilia*: a being together) into assuming unjust lives with the result that they forgot (*lethe* or forgetfulness, -) the sacred things they had seen earlier (*eido* and *hieros*).

Only a few remain whose memory is good enough; and they are startled when they see an image of what they saw up there.

Leipo or to remain with regard to those whose memory is good, *pareimi* or to be beside with regard to *mneme* [-] modified by the adverb *hikanos* or worthily. Thus they are surprised (*ekplesso*: to strike out, *ek-*) when they see an image (*eido* and *homoioima*) of what they had beheld above (*ekei* or there).

Then they are beside themselves, and their experience is beyond their comprehension because they cannot fully grasp what it is that they are seeing.

The first part reads literally, “no longer in them” aptly describes the astonishment at hand with regard to the region *ekei* or there. Obviously this transcends their ability to perceive, *diaisthanomai* or to feel or have perception through, *dia-* in a way which is worthy, *hikanos* [-]. *Dia-* is indicative of a more thorough type of perceiving. This boils down to not being able to recognize what befalls them, (*agnoeo* and *pathos*). *Pathos* represents anything that comes into one's experience, often indicative of suffering.

Justice and self-control do not shine out through their images down here, and neither do the other objects of the soul's admiration; the senses are so murky that only a few people are able to make out, with difficulty, the original of the likenesses they encounter here.

Dikaiosune and *sophrosune* [both -] remain in obscurity, not shining through their respective images down here, this last phrase not in the Greek which suggests that Socrates knew those persons whom he's addressing realize this. The same applies to other things which are valued by souls, *timios* also as to be held in honor. Thus any likeness or *homoion* lacks the splendor (*phaggos*) belonging to it.

The reason for this state of affairs? The noun for senses is the more generic *organon* which also means instrument which generally are murky or *amudros*, also as indistinct. Because of this, scarcely (*mogis*, -) can a few people discern (*theomai*, -) the *genos* or original of that which is being portrayed (*eikazo*) through other likenesses or *eikon* [-].

But beauty was radiant to see at that time when the souls, along with the glorious chorus (we were with Zeus, while others followed other gods, that is, the philosophers in 252e), saw that blessed and spectacular vision and were ushered into the mystery that we may rightly call the most blessed of all.

Alla or “but” is key here as Socrates shifts from the previous sentence to what he has to offer now. That is to say, beauty or *kalos* had been radiant or *lampros* (also as bright) to see (*eido*) when souls and that chorus described as glorious or *eudaimos* (well blessed or *eu-* with a *daimon*) saw that blessed vision (*opsis* or appearance modified by *makarios*, also as happy). It's also described as being a *thea* or sight.

And so the radiance of beauty allowed souls to be lead into the mystery (the verb *teleo* or to reach an end and the noun *telete*, -) which deserves to be called the most blessed one (*makarios*).

The text has in parentheses word by Socrates in the first person plural as he refers to being with Zeus, *Dios* being the genitive case of *Dis*. And so “we” are compared with philosophers who followed (*epomai*, -) other gods which refers as the reference has it, to 252e.

And we who celebrated it were wholly perfect and free of all the troubles that awaited us in time to come, and we gazed in rapture at sacred revealed objects that were perfect, and simple, and unshakable and blissful.

Socrates continues to speak in the first person plural with regard to celebrating beauty, *orgiazo* often associated with orgies as the root indicates. During such celebrations we were completely perfect and free from all troubles (*kakos*, -) in the future, *holokleros*

and *apathes*, that is, complete in all parts and without *pathos* or passion. This future is described as *chronos* [-] which awaits another time, *hupomeno* (to remain under and *husteros*, later or last).

Also we gazed at sacred objects which had been revealed and were perfect, simple, unshakable and blissful (*holokleros* [-], *haploos* or single, frank, *atremos* or literally not trembling and *eudaimonos* or having a good or *eu-daimon* as in the previous sentence).

That was the ultimate vision, and we saw it in pure light because we were pure ourselves, not buried in this thing we are carrying around now, which we call a body, locked in it like an oyster in its shell.

Phasma is the noun for vision, also an appearance which we beheld (*epopteuo*, to overlook, watch) and into which we were initiated, *mueo* also connoting instruction. The reason? Because we were pure (*katharos*, -) and remained unseen (*katharos*, - and *asemantos* or giving no sign) we saw it in a pure light (*auge*, light of the sun). I.e., it wasn't buried in what we're carrying now in the body (*soma*, - and *periphero* or *phero* prefaced with *peri-*, around) and compared to an oyster in a shell, *tropos* used here meaning after the manner of.

Well, all that was for love of a memory that made me stretch out my speech in longing for the past.

Charizomai mean to favor, make oneself willing and here applies to *mneme* [-] or memory.

Now beauty, as I said, was radiant among the other objects; and now that we have come down here we grasp it sparkling through the clearest of our senses.

Socrates singles out beauty or *kalos* which is distinguished from (*meta* or with) other things by reason of its inherent radiance, *lampo* meaning to shine. *Erchomai* or to come down; *deuro* or hither suggests moving from a superior form of existence to one which is less so. Nevertheless, we retain the ability to grasp (*katalambano*: *lambano* or to take prefaced with *kata-*) it as it sparkles (*stilbo*, to gleam) through the clearest of our senses (*aisthesis*, - modified by *enarges*, visible or palpable). I.e., *kalos* has this inherent character to gleam both in the place from which we had come and where we are right now.

Vision, of course, is the sharpest of our bodily senses, although it does not see wisdom.

A paradox with regard to *opsis* [-] or vision: while the sharpest of our senses (*aisthesis*, - modified by *oxus*, also as keen), it fails to see wisdom (*horao* and *phronesis*, both -). Implied is a different means of viewing.

It would awaken a terribly powerful love if an image of wisdom came through our sight as clearly as beauty does, and the same goes for the other objects of inspired love.

Socrates continues to speak about the vision of beauty (*opsis* and *kalos*) which can awaken a love, *parecho* or literally to have beside (*para-*) with regard to an *eros* [-] which is *deinos* or frightful. This would happen should an image of wisdom come into view (*opsis* and *parecho*, both -), *eidolon* being an image as well as a phantom which is *enarges* or visible [-]. The same applies to other objects which love has inspired.

But now beauty alone has this privilege, to be the most clearly visible and the most loved.

Only beauty or *kalos* has the capacity (*moira* or portion, share) to be visible the most clearly as well as loved, *ekphanes* (shining from, *ek-*) and *erasmios* (lovely, affectionate).

Of course a man who was initiated long ago or who has become defiled is not to be moved abruptly from here to a vision of Beauty itself when he sees what we call beauty here; so instead of gazing at the latter reverently, he surrenders to pleasure and sets out in the manner of a four-footed beast, eager to make babies; and, wallowing in vice, he goes after unnatural pleasure too, without a trace of fear or shame.

Two types of persons: one initiated and one defiled, *neoteles* and *diaphtheiro* or subject to (*dia-* or through) corruption. By reason of their condition both can't be moved abruptly (*oxus*, -) from here (*enthende*, -) to a vision of beauty, *phero* [-] with *pros* with regard to *kalos* as when seeing (*theaomai*) what we call beauty here (*tede*, -), the verb in reference to *eponumia* or name, title.

Instead of gazing at the latter with awe (*prosorao* or *pros-* with regard to *sebomai* or to feel religious awe), he gives in to pleasure (*paradidomai* or to hand over beside, *para-* and *hedone*, -) and behaves as a beast. The verb *baino* or to go is used with *nomos* or law, custom as applicable to this type of behavior to which this person submits, *epicheireo* literally as to put one's hand upon, *epi-*.

Prosomileo: to hold intercourse with (*pros-*) with *hubris* [-] or wanton violence, he pursues pleasures which aren't natural, *hedone* [-] which are *para* or beside *physis* [-]. Furthermore, he lacks fear or shame, *deido* and *aischuno*.

A recent initiate, however, one who has seen much in heaven—when he sees a godlike face or bodily form that has captured Beauty well, first he shudders and a fear comes over him like those he felt at the earlier time; then he gazes at him with the reverence due a god, and if he weren't afraid people would think him completely mad, he'd even sacrifice to his boy as if he were the image of a god.

Socrates says that a newly initiated person (*artileos: telos* [-] or end prefaced with *arti-* or just now) has witnessed much in heaven, *polutheaomai*, the root *theaomai* [-] prefaced with the adjective *polus*. So when this person sees (*eido*) a divine face (*theoeides: theos* and the verbal root for *eido*) or corporeal form (*soma*, -) that has captured beauty (*mimnesko* or to remember with *eu* or well regarding *kalos*), he both shudders and is taken over by fear, *phrisso* and *huperchomai* with *deimaino* or to be bristle and be afraid as *tote* [-] or as then.

He gazes at them with a reverence proper to a god, (*prosorao*, *pros-* and *sebomai* (both -). If he weren't fearful (*deido*, -), people would consider him completely mad (*mania*, - and *sphodros*, excessive). In fact, this person would sacrifice (*thuo*) his boy if he were the image of a god (*agalma*: glory, pleasing gift).

Once he has looked at him, his chill gives way to sweating and a high fever, because the stream of beauty that pours into him through his eyes warms him up and waters the growth of his wings.

Eido or looking at one's boy (*autos*) causes an intense reaction, *metabole* being the word to describe this, an exchange, transition.

Aporroë and *kalos*: stream or gush with regard to beauty.

Meanwhile, the heat warms him and melts the places where the wings once grew, places that were long ago closed off with hard scabs to keep the sprouts from coming back; but as nourishment flows in, the feather shafts swell and rush to grow from their roots beneath every part of the soul (long ago, you see, the entire soul had wings).

Eidos and *psuche*: every part of the soul.

As for this vivid description of one's apparently homosexual reaction, nowadays it can be helpful to see how Socrates was very much aware of it yet was able to put it at the service of transcendent beauty. Indeed, a lesson in favor of resolving a controversial issue which avoids taking a harden position.

Now the whole soul seethes and throbs in this condition.

Two similar verbs: *zeo* and *anakhkio*: to boil or seethe and to sprout up, gush forth.

Like a child whose teeth are just starting to grow in, and its gums are all aching and itching—that is exactly how the soul feels when it begins to grow wings.

Pascho [-] is the verb Socrates uses to describe the soul's reaction when it's aware of growing wings, this verb pertaining to that which is done to oneself.

It swells up and aches and tingles as it grows them.

Three verbs: *zeo* [-], *aganakteo* (to feel irritation) and *phuo* (to put forth).

But when it looks upon the beauty of the boy and takes in the stream of particles flowing into it from his beauty (that is why this is called 'desire' which is *himeros*; the derivation is from *mere* or particles, *ienai* or go and *rhein* or to flow), when it is watered and warmed by this, then all its pain subsides and is replaced by joy.

Blepo [-] intensified by use of *pros* concerning the *kalos* of the boy, *pais* [-]. Such *blepo/pros* is associated with *ephiemi*, literally to set or place upon (*epi-*) the boy's beauty put in terms of particles (*mere*, part) which flow in or *rheo*, also to stream in.

The text in parentheses is a kind of footnote or explanation of this, *himeros* or desire or longing and gives its derivation. I.e., the whole process is put in terms of strong verbs with regard to flowing.

Ardeo and *thermaino*: to irrigate and to grow hot as a result which causes pain to go away, replacing it with joy, *odune* and *getheo*.

When, however, it is separated from the boy and runs dry, then the openings of the passages in which the feathers grow are dried shut and keep the wings from sprouting.

Two similar verbs in this context describing to be without one's boy: the phrase *choris* with *gignomai* or without and to come into being along with *auchmeo*, to be squalid or unwashed.

Then the stump of each feather is blocked in its desire and it throbs like a pulsing artery while the feather pricks at its passageway, with the result that the whole soul is stung all around, and the pain simply drives it wild—but then, when it remembers the boy in his beauty, it recovers its joy.

Note the verbs which border on the expression of pain as well as desire: blocked or to shut off), desire, throbs, pricks stung, drive wild. Even though a person may be so

afflicted, remembering (*mneme* with *echo* or to have, both -) the boy's beauty enables one to recover joy (*kalos* and *getheo*, -).

From the outlandish mix of these two feelings—pain and joy—comes anguish and helpless raving: in its madness the lover's soul cannot sleep at night or stay put by day; it rushes, yearning, wherever it expects to see the person who has that beauty.

Ademoneo: to be sorely troubled is the way Socrates puts this combination (*meignumi*: to mix with *atopia* or being out of the way, extraordinary). In a way, *atopia* is the most compelling way to describe this situation.

The *pathos* [-] or feeling it engenders is put in terms of having in view *lussao* and *emmanes*, to be raging mad and frantic. This prevents sleep at night and remaining in one condition (*meneo*) during the day. So instead there's a rushing and yearning, *theo* also as to run and *potheo*, to desire intently, that is, in expectation of seeing (*oiomai* and *horao*, both -) whoever possesses that beauty or *echo* [-] and *kalos*.

When it does see him, it opens the sluice-gates of desire and sets free the parts that were blocked up before.

Seeing (*eido*) the boy is described in opening a sluice gate of desire, *luo* and *himeros* (both -). Then what had been blocked is set free, *sumphrasso* or to pack closely together (*sum-*, with).

And now that the pain and the goading have stopped, it can catch its breath and once more suck in, for the moment, this sweetest of all pleasures.

Anapnoe or catching breath with *lambano* or to take, to receive. This happens upon cessation of both pain and goading, *kentron* and *odis* sharp point and throes of labor. Now one can suck in (*karpoo*: to get fruit for oneself) the sweetest of all pleasures or what is nearby, *pareimi* [-].

This it is not at all willing to give up, and no one is more important to it than the beautiful boy. It forgets mother and brothers and friends entirely and doesn't care at all if it loses its wealth through neglect.

Apoleipo: to give distance (*apo-* from) with regard to what has just been described because the boy's beauty or *kalos* is most important, *poieo* and *pleion* or to do or make with more. And so forgetfulness (*lanthano*, to escape notice) is not a problem even with that which is most important.

And as for proper and decorous behavior, in which it used to take pride, the soul despises the whole business.

Nominos and *euschemon*: normative and elegant as pertaining to how one behaves and in which one used to glory (*kallopizo*: literally, to beautify the face). This described as *etoimos* or at hand is now despised, *kataphroneo*, to think down upon (*kata*-).

Why, it is even willing to sleep like a slave, anywhere, as near to the object of its longing as it is allowed to get!

Etoimos with regard to the verb *douleuo*, prepared to be as a slave in exchange to be close to what it desires, *pothos* also as yearning.

That is because in addition to its reverence for one who has such beauty, the soul has discovered that the boy is the only doctor for all that terrible pain.

Sebomai [-] or to revere as pertaining to a person in possession of such beauty [*kalos*], one has discovered (*heurisko*: to find out) that the boy is the only doctor for such great pain, *ponos* [-].

Republic 4.443c-e

And in truth justice is, it seems, something of this sort.

Eioka or it was opportune with regard to *dikaiosune* [-].

However, it isn't concerned with someone's doing his own externally, but with what is inside him, with what is truly himself and his own.

Dikaiosune: not concerned with one's *praxis* or activity on the outside, *exo* [-] but wholly occupied with *entos* or within. This *entos* is what is *peri* or around a person and of him (genitive case).

One who is just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of another part or allow the various classes within him to meddle with each other.

A person marked by *dikaiosune* doesn't allow (*eao*) the following two:

-Any part of himself to do (*prasso*; verbal root of *praxis* above) the work of another part of himself.

-Various classes (*gene*, also as race, stock or kin) within him (*psuche*) are not to interfere with each other, *polupragmoneo* consisting of the root *prasso* prefaced with the adjective *polus*, much or many, I.e., this verb connotes being a busybody, unnecessary interference.

He regulates well what is really his own and rules himself.

The two verbs are *tithemi* [-] and *archo*, to set or place and to begin or to govern.

He puts himself in order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of himself like three limiting notes in a musical scale—high, low, and middle.

Komizo and *sunarmoza*: two similar verbs. The first means to put in order and implies doing so with a certain decorative intent in mind. Here it's associated with oneself as one's own friend, *philos* [-]. The second is the verbal root *harmoza* or to set in harmony with the preposition *sun-* (with) prefaced to it.

As for this second verb, it concerns three parts of oneself which resemble (*hosper*, as; -) limiting (*atechnos*, without extension) notes in a scale of music. This preposition ties in nicely with the notes of high, low and middle, making them with, if you will.

He binds together those parts and any others there may be in between, and from having been many things he becomes entirely one, moderate and harmonious.

Socrates continues to describe the person characterized by *dikaiosune*. First he binds together (*sundeo*, *sun-* as with) those parts as well as others which are (*tugchano* or happen to be, -) in between (*metaxu*). Next he himself becomes fully one, *pantapasi* or altogether (*pan* or all used twice) as well as *sophranon* and *harmos* (of sound mind and *harmoza* [-])

Only then does he act. And when he does anything, whether acquiring wealth, taking care of his body, engaging in politics, or in private contracts—in all of these, he believes that the action is just and fine that preserves this inner harmony and helps achieve it, and calls it so, and regards as wisdom the knowledge that oversees such actions.

Once what was just described is put in place, the man of *dikaiosune* can act, *prasso* [-]. Regardless of his *prasso* (Socrates lists four of them), he believes his action is just, *beautiful* (*dikaios* [-]) and *kalos*. The reason? It preserves inner harmony and assists in achieving it, *sozo* with *hexis* and (to save with habit and *sunapergazomai*, to help in completing (*sun-* and *apo-*, with and from). He considers knowledge governing all this as

wisdom (*sophia*, -). Note two words with the preposition *epi*- indicative of upon-ness: *episteme* or acquaintance upon and *epistateo*: to set upon, *epi*-

And he believes that the action that destroys this harmony is unjust, and calls it so, and regards the belief that oversees it as ignorance.

Action or *praxis* [-] which is considered unjust or *adikos* [-] because it loosens *luo* [-] harmony or that which is present always, *aei* [-]. He regards (*epistateo*, -) the opinion (*doxa*) maintaining this view as outright ignorance, *amathia* [-].

Republic 6.500b-d

No one whose thoughts are truly directed towards the things that are, Adeimantus, has the leisure to look down at human affairs or to be filled with envy and hatred by competing with people.

Socrates hones in on directing one's thoughts, the verb *echo* with *dianoia* [both -] with regard to things that are, *pros* or direction-towards-which and *tois ousi* (things which are, *eimi*). This precludes any leisure (*schole*, ease; also for higher purposes) to disregard (*blepo* with *kata*, -) human affairs (*pragmateia* or the prosecution of business *eis* or into *anthropos* or man, -) or to have envy and hatred (*phthonos* and *dusmeneia*: envy and ill-will, *dus*- as hard) by competing (*machomai*, to fight) with people.

Instead, as he looks at and studies things that are organized and always the same, that neither do injustice to one another nor suffer it, being all in a rational order, he imitates them and tries to become as like them as he can.

Two verbs relative to sight, *horao* and *theaomai* [both -], to have the power of sight and to gaze with regard to what is organized and constant, *tasso* and literally always (*aei*, -) according to these.”

This twofold seeing doesn't bring injustice, *adikeo* both actively and passively. Everything remains in an order literally according to *kata* with *logos* [-], word-as-expression enabling a person to become as much like them as within his power. Two verbs show this, *mimeomai* and *aphormizo* (to imitate or represent and to look away from, *apo*-, to set apart)..

Or do you think that someone can consort with things he admires without imitating them?

Mimeomai [-] and *homileo*: to imitate and to be in company with as pertaining to *mechane* or a way of providing for.

I do not. It's impossible.

Adunatos or not within range.

Then the philosopher, by consorting with what is ordered and divine and despite all the slanders around that say otherwise, himself becomes d as divine and ordered as a human being can.

Despite the *diabole* or literally the casting-through (*dia-*), the *philosophos* [-] consorts with what's ordered and divine, *homileo* [-] as pertaining to what is *kosmios* and *theios* [-], the former connoting beauty. Thus he becomes as divine and ordered as much as it's possible, *dunatos* [-] with *eis* or into.

Timaeus 89e-90d

There are, as we have said many times now, three distinct types of soul that reside within us, each with its own motions.

Eidos [-] or form, shape with regard to *psuche* which are three residing within us, *katoikeo* also as to settle in or to colonize, *kata-* or down suggestive of greater permanence. Each of these three has its own movement, *kinesis* with *tugchano* [-] or to hit upon.

So now too, we must say in the same vein, as briefly as we can, that any type which is idle and keeps its motions inactive cannot but become very weak, while one that keeps exercising becomes very strong.

Socrates sets up a contrast with regard to two types (*eidos*, -) of souls: one which is idle and remains motionless, *argia* (alpha privative & *ergon* or work) with *diago* or to carry through (*dia-*) or to spend and *kinesis* [-] being *hesuchia* or stillness, rest which results in being *astheneo* or weak, feeble or sickly. The other soul becomes very strong (*erromenos*, in good health, stout) due to its exercise program (*gumnazo*: to train naked).

And so we must keep watch to make sure that their motions remain proportionate to each other.

In order to keep the two types with their motions in balance (*kinesis* [-] with *pros* or toward each other) and *summetros* (literally to be measured with, *sum-*), it's necessary for us to be watchful, *phulakteos*: to be observed, guarded.

Now we ought to think of the most sovereign part of our soul as god's gift to us, given to be our guiding spirit.

Dianoeo or literally to think through (*dia-*) with regard to that which is most sovereign (*kurios*, having power or authority over) with regard to our *psuche*. That is to say, it's a divine gift (*daimon*: god, divine power, -) to us, *daimonio* (*para*, also as beside).

This, of course, is the type of soul that, as we maintain, resides in the top part of our bodies.

Socrates locates the place which the part of the soul under discussion lives (*oikeo*, to dwell) in the top part of our bodies, *epi* or upon with regard to *akros* or furthest point) of *soma* [-].

It raises us up away from the earth and toward what is akin to us in heaven, as though we are plants grown not from the earth but from heaven.

By reason of this *akros*, we're raised up from earth and toward (*pros*, again as indicative of direction towards-which) what is like (*suggeneia*: sameness of descent, *sug-* or with) us in heaven. And so we resemble plants whose roots are in heaven, not earth *ge* and *ouranos*.

In saying this, we speak absolutely correctly.

Orthos: straight, upright.

For it is from heaven, the place from which our souls were originally born, that the divine part suspends our head, i.e., our root, and so keeps our whole body erect.

Hothen or whence (heaven) is the homeland (*genesis*, -) of such souls. That which is divine (*theios*, -) suspends our head, *anakremannuni*, *ana-* or above, upon) and is our root (*rhiza*). Thus both keep our entire body upright or straight (*soma* and *orthos*, both -).

So if a man has become absorbed in his appetites or his ambitions and takes great pains to further them, all his thoughts are bound to become merely mortal.

Teutazo or to be engaged in or busy with pertains here to both appetites and ambitions, *epithumia* [-] and *philonokia* (desire-upon or *epi-* & love *philos* of strife, -). *Diaponeo* (to work through, *dia-*) with regard to further them, *sphodros* (excessive, -). However, all thoughts (*dogma*, also as opinion) fit for service simply turn out to be (*eggignomai*: to spring up, be born in) mortal or *thnetos*.

And so far as it is at all possible for a man to become thoroughly mortal, he cannot help but fully succeed in this, seeing that he has cultivated his mortality all along.

Pantapasi: altogether or absolutely with regard to a man to become thoroughly mortal, *dunatos* and *thnetos* [both -]. He's bound to succeed here and not fall short, *elleipo*. The reason? All along he has cultivated mortality, *auxano* meaning to increase.

On the other hand, if a man has seriously devoted himself to the love of learning and to true wisdom, if he has exercised these aspects of himself above all, then there is absolutely no way that his thoughts can fail to be immortal and divine, should truth come within his grasp.

Spoudazo [-] or to be busy with as it pertains to *philomathia* (*philos* [-] & *mathesis*) and *phronesis* [-] with regard to *aletheia* [-] or truth. *Gumnazo* [-] or to train nakedly and with diligence (*malista*, -) concerning oneself, then for certain one's thoughts are immortal and divine (*phroneo*: to be wise or prudent with regard to *athanatos* & *theios*, -) provided that truth comes within his grasp (*aletheia* [-] & *ephapto* or to bind upon, *epi-*).

And to the extent that human nature can partake of immortality, he can in no way fail to achieve this: constantly caring for his divine part as he does, keeping well-ordered the guiding spirit that lives within him, he must indeed be supremely happy.

Metecho [-] or literally to have with (*meta-*) and *endechomai* or to take upon oneself with *kath' oson* or according to how great with regard to immortality, *athanasia*, something one can't fail to achieve, *meros* or part & *apoleipo*, to leave behind.

Constantly (*aei*, -) caring for his divine part (*therapeuo* or to be an attendant for service & *theios*, -) which has a lot to do with keeping in good order (*komizo*, -) the guiding spirit living within (*daimon* [-] & *sunoikos*, *sun-* as with). This makes him supremely happy (*diaphero* or to carry through, *dia-* & *eudaimoneo*, to be blessed with a good (*eu-*) *daimon*.

Now there is but one way to care for anything, and that is to provide for it the nourishment and the motions that are proper to it.

One *therapeia* or care: to provide nourishment and the motions (*trophe & kinesis*, both -) belonging to it, *oikeia* (management of a household).

And the motions that have an affinity to the divine part within us are the thoughts and revolutions of the universe.

Kinesis [-] or motions which are similar to (*suggenes*, born with, *sug-*) the divine part (*theios*, -) within us are thoughts and revolutions (*dianoesis*; *dia-* or through and *periphoros*, the process of thinking and literally, carrying around, *peri-*) proper to the universe (*to pan*, the all).

These, surely, are the ones which each of us should follow.

Sunepomai: to follow with or *sun-* with regard to what Socrates had just stated.

We should redirect the revolutions in our heads that were thrown off course at our birth by coming to learn the harmonies and revolutions of the universe, and so bring into conformity with its objects our faculty of understanding, as it was in its original condition. And when this conformity is complete, we shall have achieved our goal: that most excellent life offered to humankind by the gods, both now and forevermore.

Note where Socrates locates revolutions or *periodos* [-], in our heads or *kephale* [-] because they had been thrown off course (*diaphtheiro*: to destroy utterly, *dia-* or through, -) when we were born. Such redirection (*exorthoo*: to set upright, *ex-* or from) comes by learning (*katamanthano*, *kata-* or in accord with) both the harmonies and revolutions (*harmonia* and *periphora* or carried around, *peri-*) of the universe (*to pan*, -).

Thus there comes into conformity our faculty of understanding with its objects, *exomoioo* (to make quite like, *ex-* or from) with regard to two same words with the preposition *kata* prefaced to them, *katanoeo* or to understand in accord with. Such is our original condition, our *physis* or nature *kata* with regard to *archaios* or that which is from the beginning.

Once this conformity is complete (*telos* [-] & *homoioo*: to make like), we've achieved our goal, *protithemi* meaning that which is set before or *pro-*. That consists of the best [*aristos*, -] life which the gods had offered to humans both now (*pros* or direction towards-which & *pareimi* [-] and forever (*epeita* or thereupon & *chronos*, -).

Laws 4.716 a-717e

Athenian: Now then, our address should go like this: ‘Men, according to the ancient story, there is a god who holds in his hands the beginning and end and middle of all things, and straight he marches in the cycle of nature.

The Athenian is referring to a *logos* [-] which is *palaios*, a word-as-expression which is old. A god holds in his hands the following three: beginning, end and middle of everything (*arche*, *teleute* and *mesos*. That is, beginning as first principle, end as completion and middle as in the midst. The three pertain to all beings (*ton onton*). Thus he marches (*periporeuo*: literally, to go around or *peri-*) straight in nature’s cycle, *phusis* prefaced with *kata* or in accord with as with regard to *peraino*, to bring to an end or to finish.

Justice, who takes vengeance on those who abandon the divine law, never leaves his side.

Dike [-] or justice never (*aei* & *sunepomai* to follow with, both -) those who abandon the divine law (*apoleipo* & *nomos*, also as custom, both -)

The man who means to live in happiness latches on to her and follows her with meekness and humility.

Here we have the important value of *eudaimoneo* [-] or to live well (*eu-*) in accord with one’s *daimon*. *Sunepomai* as in the last sentence is used with regard to one pursuing her along with *echo* [-] and *mello*, to have and to intend. They apply to both meekness and humility, *tapeinos* and *kosmeo*, the adjective for humble and the verb to set in order, to arrange.

But he who bursts with pride, elated by wealth or honors or by physical beauty when young and foolish, whose soul is afire with the arrogant belief that so far from needing someone to control and lead him, he can play the leader to others—there’s a man whom God has deserted.

Note the following three verbs which here are similar: *exairo* or to lift from (*ex-*), *epairo* or to lift upon (*epi-*) and *phlego* or to burn. When they are operative, a person doesn’t want anyone to control or to lead him, *archo* and *hegeomai* (both -). Instead, he plays the leader, *hegeomai*. Such is the definition of someone whom God has deserted, *kataleipo* or to leave behind, *kata-* as down.

And in his desolation he collects others like himself, and in his soaring frenzy he causes universal chaos.

In such a case as described this person engages in *proslambano* and *tarasso*, to receive to (*pros-*) himself and to trouble.

Many people think he cuts a fine figure, but before very long he pays to Justice no trifling penalty and brings himself, his home and state to rack and ruin.

Despite presenting a good impression (*dokeo*, to appear, seem, -), he owes Justice (*dike*, -) a small penalty thereby bringing himself, his home and state both rack and ruin, the adverb *arden* or wholly with the adjective *anastatos*, driven from one's home or to be laid waste.

Thus it is ordained.

Pros taut' oun: literally, toward this thus.

What action, then, should a sensible man take, and what should his outlook be?

Diatasso, literally to set or to arrange through or *dia-* along with *drao* and *dianoeo* [-] to do or accomplish and literally to think through, *dia-*.

What must he avoid doing or thinking?

Emphron: in one's mind or senses.

Clinias: This much is obvious: every man must resolve to belong to those who follow in the company of God.

Delos [-] or clear with regard to each person resolving (*dianoeo*, -) to belong to those who go in (*sunakoloutho*: *sun-* or with; to follow with) God's company.

Athenian: 'So what conduct recommends itself to God and reflects his wishes?

Praxis [-] or action as *akolouthos* or with regard to following God and being *philos* [-] with him?

There is only one sort, epitomized in the old saying "like approves of like" (excess apart, which is both its own enemy and that of due proportion).

One sort or one *logos* [-] as in *homoios* with regard to *homoios* [-]. *Amertos* or literally no part and *emmetros* or in measure, proportioned.

In our view it is God who is preeminently the “measure of all things,” (Protagoras, a philosopher of the 5th century, maintained that “man is the measure of all things”) much more so than any “man,” as they say.

God as *metros* or measure of all things, *chrema* [-].

So if you want to recommend yourself to someone of this character, you must do your level best to make your own character reflect his, and on this principle the moderate man is God’s friend, being like him, whereas the immoderate and unjust man is not like him and is his enemy; and the same reasoning applies to the other vices too.

Prospiles or beloved, dear with emphasis upon the *pros-*, direction towards-which. This requires one’s own character to reflect that of a similar person, *anagkaios* & *gignomai* [-], by necessity to come to be as such. Such is the principle for a moderate man to be God’s friend, *sophroneo* & *philos* [-], the verb pertaining to self control and representative of being like (*homoios*, -) God.

On the other hand, someone who is immoderate and unjust (not *sophroneo* & *anomoios*) is an enemy. Two further adjectives: *diaphoros* and *adikos*, different (*dia-* & -; the same reasoning is applicable to other vices as well.

Let’s be clear that the consequence of all this is the following doctrine (which is, I think, of all doctrines the finest and truest):

Logos [-] or word-as-expression as doctrine as *kalos* and *alethes* (both -)

If a good man sacrifices to the gods and keeps them constant company in his prayers and offerings and every kind of worship he can give them, this will be the best and noblest policy he can follow; it is the conduct that fits his character as nothing else can, and it is his most effective way of achieving a happy life.

A person who is good (*agathos*, -) by sacrificing, keeping company with the gods and making all sorts of offerings, this will be the best and noblest practice he can do, *kalos* and *aristos* (both -). This fits his character (*diaphero* & *prepos*, both -) like nothing else and the best way (*anusimos*: efficacious) to obtain a happy (*eudaimoneo*, -) life.

But if the wicked man does it, the results are bound to be just the opposite.

Kakos and *enantios*: evil and opposite, both -.

Whereas the good man's soul is clean, the wicked man's soul is polluted, and it is never right for a good man or for God to receive gifts from unclean hands—which means that even if impious people do lavish a lot of attention on the gods, they are wasting their time, whereas the trouble taken by the pious is very much in season.

The *psuche* or soul of a good man is *katharos* [-] or clean whereas that of a wicked man is polluted, *akatharos*. Never should a good man or God receive gifts from hands which are unclean (*miarmos*, stained). This means that even if someone who is impious pays lavish attention (*maten*, in vain, fruitless) to the gods, it's a waste of time while the effort of someone who is pious (*hosios* or holy modifying *ponos* or labor, both -) is in season, *egkairos*, timely or in *kairos*.

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