

## Book Six of the Republic

### Introduction

Before deviling into the text at hand, allow me to ramble on about something not directly tied in with it but which played a significant part in getting me started. More specifically, I'm thinking of a young man and his sister both now in their mid-twenties who recently have nailed down successful careers. Some of their success has to do with their upbringing. Their parents are quite outstanding...religious in the best sense of the word...and over time have inculcated their values into their son and daughter. By no means did they force them to accept religious practices. By reason of having taken a stance more suggestive than didactic, such a personal witness was bound to have a positive effective.

As for the two children who are now adults, I can testify from personal experience that they in turn live exemplary lives. However, they differ in a major way from their parents. In essence, they have nothing to do with the practice of religion. It's an unusual situation because they have no axe to grind nor have ever showed hostility towards religion. Instead, they've simply moved on, that being the best way I can put it. If the subject of religion comes up as I recall it did on one occasion, they breeze right by it without the slightest interest.

This reminds me of an experience I had in Iceland some years ago. I and some friends were driving through the countryside and came across a road intersection in the middle of nowhere. We stopped briefly to check the map while I had noticed several cows in a nearby field. For a few brief moments they deigned to look up at us from their perpetual chewing grass and returned chewing on the grass as well as pooping. In other words, we were in their cow consciousness for approximately twenty seconds, no more. A perfect example of being completely disinterested. I never forgot this experience and found it fits quite well as to how young people view religion today. When hearing talk about it they look up momentarily and return to what's of interest to them. I could be misinformed, but such a way of looking at things is rather new. They're neither afraid, interested nor show hostility. Religions isn't low on their list of priorities as one might think at first glance. Rather, it simply isn't there. That's something proponents of religious practices find downright unnerving.

Like many of their peers these two young adults are well educated. However, for the most part they were ignorant of documents seminal to our Western heritage and have thier focus more on business, science and technology. As Willie Sutton had famously

remarked, “That’s where the money is.”<sup>11</sup> With this in mind I decided to look at one particular text central to this heritage. Taking into consideration its profound impact throughout the ages I could better appreciate where the current generation is coming from. Besides, it would be fun to consider something really ancient. It turned out that yes, the text is ancient but what it describes is as fresh as today. While there’s plenty of current material out there that appeals to this young generation, chances are most of it lacks the profundity of this ancient foundation.

The text I have in mind? Plato’s **Republic**<sup>2</sup> and more specifically Book Six. Why Book Six? Because it deals with something of interest to us all...right across the board...the nature of knowledge. Not just that but it does so in an attractive up-front dialogical fashion, not in the least bit abstract. That’s why such a portrayal is as valid now as the day it had been composed. As for the knowledge at hand, it’s incarnated in a person described as a *philosophos* or philosopher. Plato’s portrayal of a *philosophos* is very different from our conventional ivory tower image. In fact, some people today would project that image onto him which isn’t fair. More, of course, on that later within the notations themselves.

Due to the almost mesmerizing presentation of a *philosophos* by Socrates, I was curious to see how a person could acquire its character and live it out in his or her daily life. I use the word “character” because being *philosophos* is a way of life not taken up here for a given amount of time and left for something else presumably better. For me it ties in with another key Greek concept, *paideia*. That’s generally considered as education. However, education is a kind of misnomer. It’s a process that begins in childhood and continues right through one’s entire life. *Paideia* presupposes (and I may be reading into it here) that from Day One onwards you’re always learning to be friendly...learning to be *philos*...with *sophia* or wisdom. However, *sophia* has a broader definition which will become clearer as we move through Book Six. We’ll let Socrates present it to us.

A number of factors stand in the way which contribute toward making us not appreciate this *paideia* as being *philosophos*, at least commonly perceived as such. For example, many people in numerous cultures...chiefly Western but not exclusively...have put their own spin on the **Dialogues**. That, of course, is to be expected. In this way some of them have exerted a profound influence on our culture and society which reflected more their own point of view compared with what the text has to say. This is especially true

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<sup>1</sup> “Why did I rob banks? Because I enjoyed it. I loved it. I was more alive when I was inside a bank, robbing it, than at any other time in my life.”

<sup>2</sup> The Greek text is from **Platonis Opera**, vol iv, Oxford. 1992 reprint. The English translation here is from **Plato: Complete Works**, edited by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, 1997).

concerning one of the most fundamental human activities, how we make sense not only of the world but ourselves. For Socrates this is of tantamount importance. With the exception of the Bible, Plato's works have had the most profound and lasting impact on the West than anyone else. As for the Bible, that was written by many authors whereas the **Dialogues** were written by one individual. Standing before this corpus can be overwhelming and induce a certain paralysis. How can I, the merest of all mortals, can come off with something based on these most central of all texts? The mere thought of it is enough to laugh you right out of town.

The other problem is that we have here an ur-text relative to Western civilization which elevates it to a status that's beyond-beyond. Like high priests, only scholars are endowed with a God-given ability to comment on the text. In other words, we have a double whammy comprised of the text itself and authorities who comment upon it. We as mere mortals can only look on in awe and accept what scholars have said as though it was coming down from on high. Indeed, to some folks Plato is right up there on Mount Sinai with Moses. So when we read the **Republic** or a part of it such as Book Six we must...actually it's *de rigueur*...have a commentary by one of these giants at our side. This is to be expected. We're not up to their standards to think for ourselves.

This dependency is not the by all and end all. Let's substitute for these sources Socrates himself. It's not as far out as we may think, for in the **Symposium** he goes into some detail about his *daimon* or spirit which is ever present and guiding him. As for that *daimon*, it's just alive and well today as it had been way back then <sup>3</sup>. Socrates would be the first to say that his *daimon* is to be shared, so we can take him at his word and help ourselves. He's simply the guardian and would be the first to admit that. You'd think hitting upon this would be something everyone would be drawn to. No so. They prefer keeping the text at a safe distance and automatically resort to their supposed inferiority as a cover-up. This may sound a bit far out but is very much with us.

And so the *daimon* of Socrates would take great delight in us reading the text on our own, regardless of our limitations. More specifically, he'd tell us to ignore the fear of not being competent enough. However, some kind of tool (for lack of a better word) is essential to direct us accordingly. I believe that without hesitation Socrates would encourage us to cultivate a spirit of *parresia*. That involves freedom to speak one's mind without recrimination. It has nothing to do with being careless or mouthing off at will, let alone talking down to other people. Instead, it involves taking careful assessment of a

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<sup>3</sup> For more on this *daimon*, refer to the **Symposium** or more specifically the speech of Diotima beginning around 201d.

situation and the ability to address it regardless of what others think. By no means is *parresia* something we fabricate. It's pure gift. In the case at hand, *parresia* offers a marvelous stimulus to put down one's impressions as we find here in Book Six.

So in light of all this I decided to take the plunge and see what benefit Book Six of the **Republic** may offer <sup>4</sup>. Since my primary interest is in biblical texts and church fathers who have commented on them, the approach I'm most familiar with is *lectio divina*, the slow meditative reading of scripture. I figure that if it works well with the Christian tradition *per se*, why not extend it to the classical one? After all, the Church Fathers, East and West, relied heavily upon Plato. I found it one way of overcoming that Great Fear just described and still persists when coming up with the revered giants of earlier centuries.

However, the *lectio divina* slant just might be a tad different. I got the idea of applying it to Book Six indirectly, that is, from a book written about one hundred and twenty years ago entitled **From Religion to Philosophy** by Francis Conford. Although I'm just about one third through it and as the title intimates, I could see early on that Conford lays out the switch from religion to philosophy in ancient Greece going way back in history, not just with Plato and Aristotle. However, Conford pulls a fast one. Once the transition is made, he points out how the philosophic stance is indebted to the religious one, not the other way around. You could see what impact this approach would have on someone like Carl Jung. From what I gather, the next stage is to take the third step of this sequence not so much to psychology...an absolutely vital step...but to the very source which concerned the earliest practitioners of religion and then on to philosophy. You can't get more basic than that.

So in light of this, why not take a look at the "character" of *philosophos* through the lens of *lectio divina*? Obviously I'm aware that what's presented here may be presented in a sloppy fashion. However, scholarship is not the issue at hand, vital as that discipline may be. It's the *lectio* approach which addresses the psychological realities of which we're comprised. That means the text at hand can impact our lives like none other. And so Book Six is an invitation to read the text and apply it. Hopefully as we move through it we'll see is this works out.

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<sup>4</sup> The 1965 movie **Ship of Fools** is an allegory which has its origins in Book Six, that is, it deals with a ship having a dysfunctional crew and passengers. It represents the problems of governance prevailing in a political system not based on expert knowledge. While I advise seeing it, there's a danger that by watching a movie which lasts less than two hours one will fully understand Book Six. Still, I have the greatest admiration for whoever decided to make the movie. You don't run into such folks nowadays.

It may be helpful to note that some years ago I had made a series of brief in-text notations with regard to the **Republic** as a whole. That document is posted on this homepage in four sections. It was essentially an extended get-to-know-you project, going through the text in order to understand it. A lot of work went into it despite it retaining a certain superficiality. Still, it was helpful to undertake this document on Book Six not only because we have here *philosophos* spelled out but it comes before the all-important Book Seven which deals with the famous cave analogy. I figure if you can get a handle on Book Six, it follows both logically and naturally that you can get even a better handle on what the cave means.

As for the text itself, a number of key words keep repeating themselves such as *phusis* and *dianoia*, nature and mind. Because the meaning may vary every so slightly, on most occasions the full definition will be presented.

Also an interesting phenomenon has been emerging. When I started making notations on Book Six I felt obliged to cover every bit of the text. It reflected a desire to be too close to the text, if you will. It was hard to describe but nevertheless real. Then as time went on, I found that was like jumping down some dark rabbit hole not having a clue as to what was going on. At the same time I was aware of those giants throughout the past 2,500 years who waxed so eloquently on the **Republic**. Awareness of this was more than a brake but close to inducing genuine paralysis. How could I even begin to make a contribution equal to theirs?

Instead of stopping me dead in my tracks it turned out that the text was conveying a deep meaning I had pretty much stumbled upon. To desert it would in a real way be equivalent to deserting myself. Then towards the very end of taking notes on Book Six I hit upon Plato's famous analogy of the divided line. Frankly, I could barely make sense of it except bits here and bits over there. What a way to wrap up the project. While doing a bit of online research I had hit upon a quote which saved the day which I inserted at that part of the document (509d). I repeat it here as follows: "Of the Divided Line, Smith (1996, p. 25) wrote: 'Scholars seem generally to agree that what Plato is doing here is extremely important; but they cannot seem to agree about exactly what Plato means to be doing.'" I took certain comfort in the word "scholars." They, the experts, are confounded. However, I'm approaching the text clearly as not a scholar but an interested party or amateur, if it could be put as such. Regardless of the label, never could I walk away from the text. So I took refuge in the *lectio divina* approach which in addition to exposing my frequent defective insertions, hopefully allowed for some occasional good stuff to seep through.

For some reason or other I couldn't fathom at the time nor still cannot after having

completed this document I felt as though I was a witness to something deep and profound relative to our common Western heritage. More than anything I wanted to eke out something in the text even if it came out clumsy and unprofessional. That meant expanding what Book Six had to offer. It was equivalent to obtaining the best, most expensive nectar ever made. At no time while moving through the text did I tire of Socrates presenting what it means to be *philosophos*. That is the very heart of us all even if we don't know it. Actually being a *philosophos* is the very heart of Plato's **Dialogues**. Personally, I discovered that what counts is the pure enjoyment of being in the presence obviously of a text but something greater than a text. I dare call it a living presence.

A kind of after-thought that occurred to me about two-thirds into the text which I decided to insert now, actually two of them...

I better appreciate why people don't read Plato. To me, it's a kind of paradox. On one hand, many of the **Dialogues** are straight-forward and as the title clearly indicates, are in dialogue form. On the other hand, sometimes even the simplest way of expressing ideas, etc., comes off somewhat convoluted. However, just about anyone can unravel this, not that difficult. The problem seems to boil down to our modern inability to read s-l-o-w-l-y. If we did, what's there would pop out plain as day. That's a simple way of putting it but certainly to the point.

Also a further insight into this hesitation to reading not just Book Six but the other **Dialogues**. A little less than halfway through the text I decided to stop, go back and review what I had put down. While obviously a necessary step, it wasn't exactly pleasant. The same applied but more so when it came time to moving forward with notations. I could not and still can not put my fingers on why this is so. The best I can come up with is that the contents of Book Six are alien to the way we think. However, there's absolutely nothing out of sync with what was said way-back-then and today. At the same time there's a redeeming quality that comes through without fail. Once I get into the text...like getting into water at the beach...right away there's a sense that this is where I belong and was made to find a dwelling place here.

Also I'm aware of much current interest in thought and spirituality from the East, namely Buddhism. Wonderful stuff, to be sure. Still, no matter how sincere we are and no matter how hard we try to incorporate what that tradition offers, it remains alien. Off limits, really, a fact difficult to accept. Thus for most people it's best to stick with our own stuff and seek ways to overcome our basic un-attraction for it. I say un-attraction because so much of what ancient texts have to offer are overlaid by centuries of non-

practice. While the insights and scholarship are top notch, it's a different story when it comes to practice. Oddly enough it simply is not there. This is like someone setting before you a wonderful booklet of instructions without knowing how to follow them. Indeed, a strange situation which could be looked into more closely at another time. By comparison, this is where Buddhism steps in and excels. Nevertheless, like a pair of shoes that feel terrific for a while, a bit later we realize they don't fit us.

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### The Text

**484** And so, Glaucon, I said, after a somewhat lengthy and difficult discussion, both the philosophers and the non-philosophers came to light as who they are.

Without miss a beat Socrates distinguishes between those who are called *philosophos* and those who are not, this word mentioned once but applies to two opposites. Such is the theme of Book Six. At first this distinction doesn't seem evident but emerged after a discussion described as both long and difficult, *makros* and *mogis*. Understandably so because so much is at issue. Besides, Book Six is a kind of introduction to Book Seven which begins with the all-important cave analogy. As for *makros* and *mogis*, the latter is an adverb implying something done with pain and toil. As for the effort put into this discussion, the verb *diexerchomai* sums it up quite nicely. It means to go through which says that what had been covered was done thoroughly, hence the significance of the two prepositions *dia* and *ex* prefaced to the verb, through and from.

At the very heart of the discussion at hand is a fundamental question. What in the world is a *philosophos*? Above all else, this word consists of the adjective *philos* or dear and *sophia* or wisdom. However, *sophia* can apply to skill and infers practical wisdom, something that can be put to good use. One's relationship with it is therefore an intimate one. Such is a *philos-sophia* where by no means one can afford to be a bystander. One example of what it means to be *philos* comes to mind. That is to say, the friendly, endearing attitude that tugs at your heart when a cat rubs up against you.

As for those who are non-philosophers, *hoi me* suggests an inclination to being "lovers of opinion" or *philodoxos* or being dear to *doxa*, notion, opinion or judgment. This is partial or incomplete knowledge but often passes for truth and must be adhered to. In the situation at hand, the same *philos* is applied to *doxa* as it is to *sophia* meaning one is inclined to opinion.

One's friendship, if you will, can go either way. For example, cf. 480.6: "We won't be in error, then, if we call such people lovers of opinion rather than philosophers or lovers of wisdom and knowledge?" In light of this, consider a few lines above: "We said

that the latter (lovers of opinion) saw and loved beautiful sounds and colors and the like but wouldn't allow the beautiful itself to be anything, *oudeis*" (480.1-2).

This distinction between a philosopher and non-philosopher is of utmost importance, for it sets the stage to appreciate how a person who's inclined to friendship with wisdom...*philos*->*sophia*...lean spontaneously in that direction in order to make it a part of his own life. On the other hand, those who are not so inclined may resemble them superficially but with time their lack of *philos* or endearment comes to light, that it lies elsewhere, *doxa*, for example. Note the verb *anaphaino* (to come to light) to show forth, to display, where the preposition *ana* or upon is prefaced to the verb *phaino* or to manifest. It makes this distinction jump out at you. Thus *anaphaino* recaps what was said in 480.6 and 480.1-2.

**It probably wouldn't have been easy, he said, to have them do it in a shorter one.**

*Braxeos* vs. *ou rhadios* or short versus not ready or easy. Implied is that the discussion or prolonged *logos* would have dragged on indefinitely. Clearly Socrates wishes to avoid this and continue with amplifying the nature of a *philosophos*.

**Apparently not. But for my part, I think that the matter would have been better illuminated if we had only it to discuss and not all the other things that remain to be treated in order to discover the difference between the just life and the unjust one.**

The verb *dokeo* or to think, to suppose is used by Socrates to express his opinion, that is, he does not force it but brings it forth as one not having any skin in the game, if you will, as to whether or not his view is accepted. At heart is the desire to make clear the difference between philosophers and non-philosophers. The verb is *phaino*, to bring to light, to cause to appear as in the section above.

While there may be many things remaining to discuss (*dierchomai* or to go through), at issue here is discerning the difference between the just and the unjust. The verb *kathorao* literally means to look down as from a higher position. From there differences come into clearer focus. The verb for this is *diaphero*, literally to carry through. So between the *kata* of *horao* and the *dia* of *phero*, the difference at hand is bound to come into clearer light, that is, with regard to *dikaios* and *adikaios* or just and unjust.

**What's our next topic?**

*Meta* or after.

**What else but the one that's next in order? Since those who are able to grasp what is always the same in all respects are philosophers, while those who are not able to do so and who wander among the many things that vary in every sort of way are not**

### **philosophers, which of the two should be the leaders in a city?**

Here we get down to the essence of a *philosophos*, one who is friendly with wisdom and skill which implies know-how with practical applications. Putting *philos* in this way is helpful for it brings home the issue in a more striking fashion. One who is endowed with being *philosophos* has the ability to lay hold of what's always the same, *aei* and *hosautos* or eternal and the latter in like manner with the former. The verb at hand is *ephapto* consisting of the root *hapto* or to fasten, to lay hold of with the preposition *epi* or upon prefaced to it. Such laying hold of is a natural outcome of being a *philos* of *sophia*. It means that a *philosophos* has the ability to grasp insights in a manner which won't let it go.

By way of contrast, a person who isn't a *philosophos* tends to wander, *planao*. This doesn't have so much a detrimental connotation but more indirectly, leading astray. Such *planao* is what happens when we loose contact with the constancy or *aei* and *hosautos* as applied to living or, if you will, to awareness though obviously this isn't mentioned but can be implied by reason of the mention of *planao*.

Tied in with this wandering is the verb *ischuo* or to be strong, here with the negative. The sense at hand is not being able to be strong with regard to the multitude of things among which one can wander continuously. This is expressed by the adjective *polus* and adverb *pantoios*, all sorts and manifold, both from the same root and used for emphasis by way of making a sharp contrast with a person who is a *philosophos*.

Such persons who tend to wander cannot function as being *philosophos* nor as leader of a city or *polis*, *hegemon* suggestive of taking the initiative, of being the first. As for *polis*, it is the very foundation of Greek society.

### **What would be a sensible answer to that?**

*Metrios* or within measure, moderate.

### **We should establish as guardians those who are clearly capable of guarding the laws and the ways of life of the city.**

The issue at hand is shifting from *philosophos* to a *phulax* or one who keeps watch on a city wall. However, *philosophos* isn't as distant from this function as at first glance because *phulax* after all is a *sophia*, a skill and a very necessary one at that. Such a *philosophos/phulax*, if you will, must be strong or *dunatos* which suggests sustainability in carrying out this office. *Phulax* can be taken as inferring awareness along with being a protector of those who are vulnerable.

The primary function of watching is directed toward setting down (*kathistemi*) both the laws and customs of the city, *nomos* and *epitedeuma*. The former involves usages and ordinances whereas the latter often pertains to business pursuits.

**That's right.**

The adverb *orthos* also as truly.

**And isn't it clear that a guardian who is to keep watch over anything should be keen-sighted rather than blind?**

*Delos* or clear also in the sense of being conspicuous, of making sure with regard to the matter at hand. The key issue here is *tereo* with *phulax* or to keep guard but in a constant fashion, not intermittently. Again, this can pertain to the practice of cultivating awareness. It makes the contrast come into sharper focus, that is, when it comes to being clear-sighted and instead of remaining outright blind. The verb is *horao* more as to behold with *oxus* or sharp distinct from *tuphlos* which also means obscure. We could say that being *tuphlos* makes you wander...*planao*...more often than desired. The mere mention of it is sufficient to put you on guard.

**Of course it's clear.**

*Pos* or in what way which begins a question in the Greek text...how it is not clear or *delos*?

**Do you think, then, that there's any difference between the blind and those who are really deprived of the knowledge of each thing that is? The latter have no clear model in their souls, and so they cannot—in the manner of painters—look to what is most true, make constant reference to it, and study it as exactly as possible. Hence they cannot establish here on earth conventions about what is fine or just or good, when they need to be established, or guard and preserve them, once they have been established.**

This section begins with a question where the verb *dokeo* or to think or to suppose is indicative of a expressing a position, not necessarily a certainty. Generally *dokeo* leans toward what is true yet retains the possibility of error. *Diaphero* is a key word, literally to carry through with respect to making a difference concerning those who are blind and those who are deprived. It applies not just to knowledge but knowledge of individual things, that is, *gnosis* in reference to each thing that exists. This is rendered by the phrase *to onti tou ontos* (literally, 'by being of being,' the verb *eimi*, to be). The verb *stereo* as to deprive also means to be bereaved, robbed as related to this.

As for the latter or those who are so deprived, they have a second form of *stereo*, if you will, which consist of not having a clear model in their souls. *Paradeigma* (pattern or model to follow) is key, one which is *enarges* or palpable, visible located in the *psuche* and can be rendered as mind as well as soul or sign of life.

Consider this in light of a painter or *graphe* also as drawing, representation. Such persons are unable to do the following three:

1) Look at what's most true, *apoblepo* or to gaze steadfastly (to look from, *apo*) at that

which is *alethes*, literally as unconcealed.

2) *Anaphero* or to carry back or above (*ana*) .

3) *Theoreo* or to consider, to view what is most true in the most exact way possible, *akribes*.

Due to not being able to do these three, such persons are unable to establish conventions about what's fine, just or good upon the earth. The verb is *tithemi* or to set up, to place with regard to *nomimos*, conformable to custom. *Nomimos* pertains to what is *kalos*, *dikaios* and *agathos* (beautiful, just and good), especially needful where there's a need for all three. Included is guarding and preserving them once they are established, *keimai* also as to set up, to propose. The two verbs are *phulasso*, to guard as on a city wall and *sozo* or to save in the sense of rescue.

**No, by god, there isn't much difference between them.**

*Diaphero* or to sent through, *dia*.

**Should we, then, make these blind people our guardians or rather those who know each thing that is and who are not inferior to the others, either in experience or in any other part of virtue?**

A rhetorical question, if you will, dealing with an essentially absurd question but one to make a point. The intent is to make clear to everyone with regard to an obvious choice. Either we choose someone blind to be a guardian or someone who knows. The adjective "blind" isn't in the text but refers to those mentioned above, the adjective being *tuphlos* also as dark, obscure. With the other two meanings in mind, that can imply blindness not necessarily of the physical order.

There are two choices expressed by the verb *tithemi*. The first is to be a *phulax* or guardian and as noted above, to be so in a constant fashion. The second choice is with regard to *gignosko* or knowing and has two parts, if you will: with regard to "each that is" (*eimi*, the verb to be) and with regard to not being less with regard to the others, *elleipo* implying a lack.

Not to experience falling short or *hustereo* (also as to come late) is divided into the following: *empeiria* or experience (also practice) and any part of virtue. That is to say, a *meros* with regard to *arete* or the best of anything; in a word, excellence. Use of *meros* suggests that when it comes to *arete*, there are no parts because it's a whole unto itself.

**It would be absurd to choose anyone but philosophers, if indeed they're not inferior in these ways, for the respect in which they are superior is pretty well the most important one.**

*Atopos* or literally no place suggests there's no space when it comes to making a

choice, *haireo* also as to take. That choice centers around philosophers (not mentioned) provided they aren't inferior or *elleipo*, to leave out, to fall short. The verb *proecheo* or to hold before is with the adverb *schedon* or close by, a vivid way of speaking of that which is the most important quality for a philosopher.

**485 Then shouldn't we explain how it is possible for people to come to have both these sorts of qualities?**

*Tropos* is a multi-faceted word such as course, habit and custom. In light of this expanded meaning, is it possible for one person to have both qualities rendered as *kakeina kai tauta* or those and these?

**Certainly.**

*Panu*: adverb also as altogether and from the adjective *pan*, all.

**Then, as we said at the beginning of this discussion, it is necessary to understand first the nature of the ones who are going to come to have both sorts, for I think that, if we can reach adequate agreement about that, we'll also agree that the same people can have both qualities and that no one but they should be leaders in cities.**

Above all else, it's necessary (*dei* connotes binding) to understand, the preposition *kata* (in accord with) prefaced to the verbal root *manthano* suggesting closeness when it comes to paying attention. This pertains to the nature (*phusis*) of persons qualified to be as *philosophos*. In a way, *phusis* seems to indicate the innate capacity of awareness in each person, *proton* suggestive of having this right from birth.

Note two uses of the verb *homologeō*, literally to speak as the same or as one and the same. The first is with the adverb *hikanos* (adequately, enough) and the second is with regard to the combination of qualities which means only they are qualified as leaders of the city or *polis*, *hegemon* or one who guides.

**How so?**

**Let's agree that philosophic natures always love the sort of learning that makes clear to them some feature of the being that always is and does not wander around between coming to be and decaying.**

*Homologeō* or to be in agreement is important here insofar as it signifies holding a common view with regard to a *phusis* or nature endowed as being *philosophos*. Always (*aei*, also as forever) it is in love or *erao* which connotes passion and is directed towards learning in the ongoing sense, *mathema*. This could be taken as a definition of *paideia* which isn't mentioned here.

Such a *philos-sophia*—being friendly with regard to wisdom/skill—makes evident

(*delos*, conspicuous) a particular feature of that *ousia* or being, substance which is eternal (*aei*). This it does instead of wandering between coming into existence and decay. Wandering or *planao* connotes a going astray and losing one's direction. However, it does not wander around between *genesis* and *phthora*, the act of coming into existence and corruption.

**And further, let's agree that, like the honor-lovers and erotically inclined men we described before, they love all such learning and are not willing to give up any part of it, whether large or small, more valuable or less so.**

*Philotimos* and *erotikos*: two types of love, if you will, are indicated by these words. The first is with regard to *philosophos*, that is, *philos* or friendly. The second pertains to *eros* or passionate love. **Plato** edited by John M. Cooper has a footnote here with regard to 474c-475c from which we get a sense from the question opening that section: "Do you need to be reminded or do you remember that if it's rightly said that someone loves something, then he mustn't love one part of it and not another, but he must love all of it?" The verb here is *phileo* or to love with affection, not *erao* or to love passionately though the latter along with *epithumeo* appear a number of times in that section. *Epithumeo* is along the lines of setting one's heart upon (*epi*) something.

**That's right.**

*Orthos* also as truly.

**Consider next whether the people we're describing must also have this in their nature.**

*Skopeo* or to look out, to fix one's eyes upon with regard to what is present in the nature or *phusis* of people.

**What?**

**They must be without falsehood—they must refuse to accept what is false, hate it, and have a love for the truth.**

*Apseudeia*: truthfulness rendered by a word pertaining to lying with alpha privative which involves refusing not just to accept what's false but to hate it. That is with regard to the *pros* or direction towards-which of *pros-dechomai* as pertaining to what is false, *pseudos*. This adjective is part of the noun *apseudeia*. Opposite to *miseo* or to hate is *stergo* or to show a liking for.

**That's a reasonable addition, at any rate.**

*Eikos*: also as probable.

**It's not only reasonable, it's entirely necessary, for it's necessary for a man who is erotically inclined by nature to love everything akin to or belonging to the boy he loves.**

Such language may be offensive to some. The translation by Hamilton and Cairns has "Consider, then, next whether the men who are to meet our requirements must not have this further quality in their natures." The translation of Jowett runs as "And if they are to be what we were describing, is there not another quality which they should also possess?"

Here at issue is a nature or phusis which is described by the adverb *erotikos*, that this nature functions passionately. It's congenital or *suggenes* to have this love belonging (*oikeios*, literally of the house or proper) to the boy one loves. The verb at hand is *agapao* which means to be regarded with affection.

**That's right.**

*Orthos* also as truly.

**And could you find anything that belongs more to wisdom than truth does? Of course not.**

The connecting word between wisdom and truth (*sophia* and *aletheia*) is *oikeios* which means literally of the household. This makes it all the more personal or intimate. As for *aletheia*, it's an alpha privative word used to describe something in a negative fashion, that is, not concealed, the verbal root being *lanthano* or to be unnoticed, unseen.

**Then is it possible for the same nature to be a philosopher—a lover of wisdom—and a lover of falsehood?**

Two opposite words (*sophos* and *pseudos*) with the same adjective prefaced to them, *philos* as friendly.

**Not at all.**

*Oudamos*: an adverb expressive negativity in a strong manner.

**Then someone who loves learning must above all strive for every kind of truth from childhood on.**

The verb *orego* or to stretch out has an almost erotic air about it, the connecting word between *philomathes* or friendly (*philos*) toward knowledge or learning. It is done by inquiry (the verbal root being *manthano*) and not just by truth or *aletheia* but all truth. Such stretch-forth begins with childhood, *neos* being an adjective.

Absolutely.

*Pantelos*: an adverb consisting of *pan* and *telos* or all and end.

**Now, we surely know that, when someone's desires incline strongly for one thing, they are thereby weakened for others, just like a stream that has been partly diverted into another channel.**

*Eidon* or to know is used with certainty with regard to *epithumia*, desire or yearning consisting of *thumos* or all one's heart prefaced with the preposition *epi*, upon. Here it's described as being *sphodra*, exceedingly. This *epi-ness* indicative of intense desire literally into (*eis*) one thing becomes weakened or *asthenao*, also to become feeble with regard to other objects of desire. The example offered is a stream diverted into another channel, the verb being *apocheteuo*. Actually *rheuma* or stream derives from *rheo*.

**Of course.**

*Pantelos*: an adverb consisting of *pan* and *telos* or all and end.

**Then, when someone's desires flow towards learning and everything of that sort, they'd be concerned, I suppose, with the pleasures of the soul itself by itself, and they'd abandon those pleasures that come through the body— if indeed he is a true philosopher and not merely a counterfeit one.**

The verb *rheo* or to flow with the preposition *pros*, indicative of direction towards-which. That consists of *mathema* or the noun for learning as well as everything related to it. As a result a person becomes disposed to pleasures which are related to the soul or *psyche*. *Hedone* is the noun and connotes more than the sensuous kind, for example, taking delight in what belongs to someone who is *philosophos*. Note the addition of *oimai* or I think, which indicates that Socrates is presenting an opinion in this matter.

Such an inclination leads to abandoning bodily pleasures, the preposition *ek* or from prefaced to *eikleipo* making the verb stronger. All this is contingent upon being a *philosophos*, not one who acts *peplasmenos* or in a contrived fashion.

**That's completely necessary.**

The adjective *megalos* is used, great.

**Then surely such a person is moderate and not at all a money-lover. It's appropriate for others to take seriously the things for which money and large expenditures are needed, but not for him.**

*Sophros* vs. *philochrema* or of sound mind, discreet vs. one who is inclined to or

friendly (*philos*) with respect to *chrema* also as property, goods. *Sophros* is an important adjective because it's synonymous with someone who's a *philosophos*. The verb *spoudazo* or to be busy, eager, doesn't apply to a person who is *philosophos*. Instead, it's applicable to someone who's interested in material things, *chrema* again with *dapane* or much expenditure.

**That's right.**

*Houto*: in this way, in this manner.

**486 And of course there's also this to consider when you are judging whether a nature is philosophic or not.**

The conjunctive *kai* or and begins this sentence which infers that it carries over from what had just been said, that is, the difference between a true and false philosopher.

At issue is what it means to be *philosophos*, *phusis* or nature is being the noun it modifies as noted a number of times thus far in this document. Such frequent mention clearly shows how important it is as a foundation on which *philosophos* rests. Also tied up with *phusis* is one's temperament as well as outward form, of how a person comports himself accordingly.

*Skopeo* or to be on the look-out is the verb when it comes to judging. *Krino* involves picking out as well as distinguishing when it comes to whether or not this *phusis* is *philosophos*. Actually the verb *mello* conveys the overall sense of about to do something. In other words, it adds a certain pause before taking action.

**What's that?**

**If it is at all slavish, you should not overlook that fact, for pettiness is altogether incompatible with a soul that is always reaching out to grasp everything both divine and human as a whole.**

A note of caution. One must not allow to go unnoticed any participation in servility, *lanthano* fundamentally to forget. Such forgetfulness never should apply when it comes to *aneleutheria* or servility, lack of freedom.

*Smikrologia* or pettiness (the root *lego* or to say prefaced with the adjective *mikros* or small) or in a word, preference for small talk. This *mikros* or smallness prevents a soul or *psuche* as life and spirit from stretching forward. *Mello* and *aei* suggests intending in constant fashion. Here it concerns *eporecho* connoting strain but not necessarily in the negative sense by the preposition *epi* or upon prefaced to the verbal root. That imparts a certain rest. The object of the stretching-upon? That which is great, *megas* being contrary to *mikros* when it comes to anything divine and human,

*theios* and *anthropinos*.

**That's completely true.**

The superlative *alethes*, literally as not concealed.

**And will a thinker high-minded enough to study all time and all being consider human life to be something important?**

A rhetorical question with regard to a person endowed with two qualities, the verb *huparcho* implying that one has both of the following from the beginning. The first consists of *dianoia* which literally means a mind or *nous* having the capacity to see through (*dia*) in the sense of understanding. The adjective describing *dianoia* is *megaloprepeios* which consists of the two words *meGas* or great and *prepo*, to be distinguished. The second is *theoria* or beholding and can be associated with the activity of *dianoia*.

With these two in mind, can a person think that human life (*bios* or manner of living) is of great concern?

**He couldn't possibly.**

*Adunatos* or without any possibility.

**Then will he consider death to be a terrible thing?**

*Deinos* or fearful with the negative concerning death along with the verb *hegeomai*, to deem necessary as well as to take the lead.

**He least of all.**

*Hekistos* or not at all.

**Then it seems a cowardly and slavish nature will take no part in true philosophy.**

Here a *phusis* or nature is described as being both cowardly and slavish, *deilos* and *aneleutheros*. The former also means worthless, miserable and the latter, not fit for a free person *an-*; cf. *aneleutheria* above nor not free. *Philosophia* which is *alethes* or true can be taken in the sense of not being concealed has nothing to do with such a person, *meteimi* or to be with (*meta*).

**Not in my opinion.**

It doesn't seem (*dokeo*) to me.

**And is there any way that an orderly person, who isn't money-loving, slavish, a boaster or a coward, could become unreliable or unjust?**

A contrast between the following two, *kosmios* and *philochrematos*: moderate, discreet and friendly towards *chrema* or money, property. Contrast this *philos* with the *philos* of *sophia*. (The latter in the negative) on one hand and on the other hand, *aneleutheros*, *alazon* and *deilos* or slavish, false pretender and cowardly (all in the negative). How could such a person become *dussumbolos* and *adikos*, literally hard to deal with and lacking justice?

**There isn't.**

**Moreover, when you are looking to see whether a soul is philosophic or not, you'll look to see whether it is just and gentle, from youth on, or savage and hard to associate with.**

Note the two same verbs with regard to looking, one as *skopeo* to look in the sense of to consider, to examine and the other with the preposition *epi* or upon prefaced to it. The latter is a more intense, concerted type of looking. As for the first, it's concerns whether a soul or *psuche* is *philosophos* or not. This initial consideration leads naturally to the second, the one with *epi*. That consists in seeing whether or not this *psuche* is from one's youth (*euthus* being an adjective meaning straight) just and gentle, *dikaios* and *hemeros*, the latter also tame or civilized.

On the other hand the *epi* of *skopeo* is to apply in a case whether a *psuche* is savage or not social, *duskoinontes* and *agrios*. The former is literally hard with regard to that which is common and the latter, living or associated with the fields, out in the open.

**Certainly.**

**And here's something I think you won't leave out.**

*Paraleipo* or to leave beside or nearby (*para*).

**What?**

**Whether he's a slow learner or a fast one. Or do you ever expect anyone to love something when it pains him to do it and when much effort brings only small return?**

A contrast between *eumathes* and *dusmathes*: the root *manthano* or to learn by inquiry prefaced with the adverbial form *eu* for *agathos* (good) and *dus* or hard, difficult.

A rhetorical question beginning with the verb *prosdokao* or to expect where the preposition *pros* is indicative of direction towards-which or that which is straight-on. It pertains to love, *stergo*, more along the lines of feeling affection as well as being content. Manifesting it is difficult in a painful situation and despite much effort, it brings little profit. The noun *algos* means pain as well as grief; the verb *anuo* means to finish or

to effect with the adjective *smikros* or small and the adverb *mogis*, hardly which makes it even smaller.

**No, it couldn't happen.**

The negative of *gignomai*: not to come into being.

**And what if he could retain nothing of what he learned because he was full of forgetfulness? Could he fail to be empty of knowledge?**

The two questions convey a certain urgency. *Pleos*: full or complete with regard to *lethe* or forgetfulness. It leads to the inability to retain what had been learned, the verb *sozo* also as to rescue with *mathos*, from *manthano* or to learn from inquiry.

The second question concerns failing to be empty of knowledge, *kenos* in the sense of being bereft with regard to *episteme*, acquaintance and professional skill. The preposition *epi* or upon suggests this professional character.

**How could he?**

**Then don't you think that, if he's laboring in vain, he'd inevitably come to hate both himself and that activity in the end?**

*Anonetos* or unprofitable is a way to describe one's labor, *poneo* also as to suffer. If that applies to a person, then won't he be compelled (*anagkazo* also to restrain) to bring to pass (*teleuto*: to fulfill, to accomplish) despising himself as well as his work? The verb is *miseo* or to hate, the object being *hauton* (accusative case) or oneself and *praxis* also as occupation.

**Of course.**

**Then let's never include a forgetful soul among those who are sufficiently philosophical for our purposes but look for one with a good memory.**

*Epilethomai* is the verb to forget, the preposition *epi* or upon intensifying the sense of forgetfulness as applied to a *psuche* or soul. The warning at hand comes with a certain severity, that such a soul not be (*egkrino*: to reckon) among those who are sufficiently *philosophos*, the adverb *hikanos*, also adequately or enough. Instead of this implied partiality it behooves us to be on the lookout (*zeteo*, to seek) for a *psuche* endowed with a good memory, *mnemonikos* (adjective). At hand is our innate faculty of *anamnesis*, of recollection. Technically it means to bring into the present that which we've learned from a previous existence or perhaps better, that which uniquely has been ours from all eternity.

**Absolutely.**

*Pantapasi*: consists of the adjective *pan* or all used twice, that is, for emphasis.

**Now, we'd certainly say that the unmusical and graceless element in a person's nature draws him to lack of due measure.**

Two words with alpha privative, *amousoi* and *aschemonos* or without music and misshapen, ugly. The former implies without the inspiration goddesses of the Muses and the latter without *schema* or form, shape. If both are within a person's very nature or *phusis*, he's drawn into (*eis*) that which is without measure, *ametria* also as disproportion, another word with alpha privative. The verb is *helko* intimating that the situation is pretty hopeless.

**Of course.**

**And do you think that truth is akin to what lacks due measure or to what is measured?**

The question is with regard to truth or *aletheia* which as noted before has the alpha privative used to describe something in a negative fashion, that is, not concealed. The verbal root is *lanthano* or to be unnoticed, unseen. Here it's a matter of kinship or *suggenes*, literally as born with concerning that which lacks proper or measure as well as proportion, *ametrios* and *emmetrios*.

**To what is measured.**

*Emmetrios*.

**Then, in addition to those other things, let's look for someone whose thought is by nature measured and graceful and is easily led to the form of each thing that is.**

At issue is a mind or *dianoia* or *nous* which has the capacity to see through (*dia*) in the sense of having understanding. *Zeteo* is the verb at hand, to seek with regard to such a mind. It's characterized by a *phusis* which is *emmetros*, *autophues* literally as self-grown or natural and *euagogos* or capable of being easily guided with the verb *parexeimi* or to pass alongside. The idea seems to be to gradually move up, aligning oneself to the form at hand, that is to say, with respect to (*epi*, upon) the form of each thing in and by itself. *Idea* is the noun for form, with emphasis upon outward appearance.

**Of course.**

**Well, then, don't you think the properties we've enumerated are compatible with one**

**another and that each is necessary to a soul that is to have an adequate and complete grasp of that which is?**

A question asked to obtain a confirmation with regard to those qualities deemed necessary (*anagkaios*) and compatible with each other. This is rendered by *dierchomai* or to go through, the preposition *dia* prefaced to the verb along with *mello* or to be destined to, to be likely to (this infers a certain probability).

What's of importance is that a soul must have an adequate and sufficient grasp of reality (i.e., of being or *tou ontos*). The two adverbs are *hikanos* and *teleos* (adequately and completely in the sense of being thorough) along with the verb *metalambano* or to participate, the preposition *meta* suggestive of being with.

**487 They're all completely necessary.**

*Anagkaios.*

**Is there any objection you can find, then, to a pursuit that no one can adequately follow unless he's by nature good at remembering, quick to learn, high-minded, graceful, and a friend and relative of truth, justice, courage, and moderation?**

A rhetorical question with regard to finding an objection, the verb being *memphomai* (to blame, to censure) as it pertains to any pursuit, *epitedeuma*. This noun also applies to business affairs or practices which no one can attend to adequately, the verb *epitedeuo* or root for *epitedeuma* and the adverb *hikanos*, worthily. Key to overcoming this are *ei me* (if not) rendered as unless. This leads to considering the following nine qualities with regard to a person's nature or *phusis*:

-*mnaomai, eumathes*: *eu* or the adverbial form of *agathos*, good, relative to *manthano*)

-*megaloprepes*: *megalos* or great & *prepo* or to be distinguished

-*euchris*: another word with *eu* prefaced to it

-*charis*: also as grace, favor)

-*adreios* (of a man, courageous).

These following are in conjunction with *suggenes* literally as born with, congenital:

-*aletheia* or truth

- *dikaiosune*: justice, righteousness

-*andreia*: bravery, manliness

-*sophrosune*: sobriety. The last is important insofar as it pertains to moderation, discretion, self-control.

**Not even Momus (a personification of blame or censure) could find one.**

A play on the Momus and *memphomai*, to find blame. Momus is the god of criticism, complaint and mockery. For this he was banished from Mount Olympus.

**When such people have reached maturity in age and education, wouldn't you entrust the city to them and to them alone?**

A rhetorical question proposed by Socrates to Adeimantus based on a logical assumption bound to evoke a response. It concerns those who've reached maturity in both age and in education, the verb *teleioo* or to complete or to attain a specific end. The first is *helika* often the prime of one's life and the second is *paideia*, education which begins in childhood and continues through one's entire life. It seems such a person is worthy of having governance of the city entrusted to them, *epitrepo* literally to turn upon.

**And Adeimantus replied: No one would be able to contradict the things you've said, Socrates, but on each occasion that you say them, your hearers are affected in some such way as this. They think that, because they're inexperienced in asking and answering questions, they're led astray a little bit by the argument at every question and that, when these little bits are added together at the end of the discussion, great is their fall, as the opposite of what they said at the outset comes to light. Just as inexperienced checkers players are trapped by the experts in the end and can't make a move, so they too are trapped in the end and have nothing to say in this different kind of checkers, which is played not with disks but with words. Yet the truth isn't affected by this outcome. I say this with a view to the present case, for someone might well say now that he's unable to oppose you as you ask each of your questions, yet he sees that of all those who take up philosophy—not those who merely dabble in it while still young in order to complete their upbringing and then drop it, but those who continue in it for a longer time—the greatest number become cranks, not to say completely vicious, while those who seem completely decent are rendered useless to the city because of the studies you recommend.**

The response? Nobody has the ability to contradict what Socrates has just stated, *anteipon*, also to utter a word of contradiction. However, every time he speaks, his listeners are affected, *pascho* also as to suffer or to bear with. This verb means his words have a profound effect, are not taken lightly.

Because his hearers consider themselves inexperienced—*hegeomai* also as to lead the way and *apeiria* or want of skill, lack of experience—with regard to questions (*ero* and *apokrino* to speak and to reply), they are prone to being led astray. *Parago* is the result, to go beside in the sense of missing the goal and ending up nowhere.

Add this up over a period of time with regard to the completion of words rendered by the noun *teleute* and *logos*, which is how the end of a discussion is rendered, their fall or *sphalma* turning out to be great. It results in being completely opposite to what they said when it had come to light. The operative word here is *anaphaino* meaning bringing to (*ana*, as above) to light.

Adeimantus gives the example of a game of draughts or checkers, the verb *pesseuo*. Those inexperienced (*deinos*, skilled with the negative; also as fearful) in playing the game or those who aren't perfect in it (*teleutao*) end up shut out by those who are experts, *apokleio* also as to exclude. The reason? They're engaged in a game of draughts which is played with words or *logos*. However, the truth isn't affected by this outcome, the adjective *alethes* being used with the verb *echo* or to have.

Adeimantus speaks as such with regard to the case at hand, the verb being *apoblepo* (to pay attention; literally to look from) along with the verb *pareimi* or to be beside with the preposition *eis* or into. That is to say, someone might be unable to contend with Socrates, *enantioomai* also as to be against.

For Adeimantus of special concern (*epi*, upon) are those who take up *philosophia*, the verb being *hormaino* or to ponder over. They differ from persons who dabble in it and drop it later on, *apallasso* meaning to release, to be set free. The verb *paideuo* is used here, to educate with the negative and infers a life-long process of learning. Instead, Adeimantus is concerned with persons who continue with *philosophia* for a lengthy period of time, *endiatribo* or to continue in something, two prepositions *en* and *dia* (in and through) being prefaced to the verbal root *tribo*, to rub down, to pound.

Unfortunately for the most part such persons end up as cranks and are vicious, *allokotos* literally as of another nature, monstrous and *pamponeros*. Also a person who seems decent (*epieikes*, fitting, suitable) become useless to the city (*polis*). The two adjectives are *epieikes* or fitting, suitable and *achrestos* or unprofitable. Why so? It comes from the pursuits Socrates is apparently recommending, *epitedeuma* also as business pursuit and the verb *epaineo* or to approve.

**When I'd heard him out, I said: Do you think that what these people say is false?**

Socrates is curious to know if the people Adeimantus mentioned turned out to be false, *pseudo* also as to cheat, to deceive.

**I don't know, but I'd be glad to hear what you think.**

*Hedeos*: adverb conveying a sense of pleasantness.

**You'd hear that they seem to me to speak the truth.**

*Phaino*: to appear, bring to light with regard to the adjective *alethes*, true.

**How, then, can it be true to say that there will be no end to evils in our cities until philosophers—people we agree to be useless—rule in them?**

One on hand, popular opinion holds *philosophoi* as useless or *achrestos* also as not profitable. Unless such persons rule—*archo* as to begin, to lead the way as one possibility that could work—the city will be full of evils, *kakos* also as bad. However,

people must agree to this, *homologeō* literally to speak as the same or one and the same time.

**The question you ask needs to be answered by means of an image or simile.**

Direct language won't work, hence the need for an image or simile, both rendered by *eikon*, semblance or comparison.

**And you, of course, aren't used to speaking in similes!**

*Etho*: to be accustomed, to be want.

**So! Are you making fun of me now that you've landed me with a claim that's so hard to establish? In any case, listen to my simile, and you'll appreciate all the more how 488 greedy for images I am. What the most decent people experience in relation to their city is so hard to bear that there's no other single experience like it. Hence to find an image of it and a defense for them, I must construct it from many sources, just as painters paint goat-stags by combining the features of different things. Imagine, then, that something like the following happens on a ship or on many ships. The shipowner is bigger and stronger than everyone else on board, but he's hard of hearing, a bit short-sighted, and his knowledge of seafaring is equally deficient. The sailors are quarreling with one another about steering the ship, each of them thinking that he should be the captain, even though he's never learned the art of navigation, cannot point to anyone who taught it to him, or to a time when he learned it. Indeed, they claim that it isn't teachable and are ready to cut to pieces anyone who says that it is. They're always crowding around the shipowner, begging him and doing everything possible to get him to turn the rudder over to them. And sometimes, if they don't succeed in persuading him, they execute the ones who do succeed or throw them overboard, and then, having stupefied their noble shipowner with drugs, wine, or in some other way, they rule the ship, using up what's in it and sailing while drinking and feasting, in the way that people like that are prone to do. Moreover, they call the person who is clever at persuading or forcing the shipowner to let them rule a "navigator," a "captain," and "one who knows ships," and dismiss anyone else as useless. They don't understand that a true captain must pay attention to the seasons of the year, the sky, the stars, the winds, and all that pertains to his craft, if he's really to be the ruler of a ship. And they don't believe there is any craft that would enable him to determine how he should steer the ship, whether the others want him to or not, or any possibility of mastering this alleged craft or of practicing it at the same time as the craft of navigation. Don't you think that the true captain will be called a real stargazer, a babler, and a good-for-nothing by those who sail in ships governed in 489 that way, in which such things happen?**

This is where Book Six gets down to the nitty-gritty as to what happens when those not practicing philosophy get control of the city. Adeimantus asks Socrates to listen to the comparison he's about to offer, the noun *eikon* and the verb *eikazo* being used. The former is suggestive of a comparison and the latter the verbal root from which it's derived.

As for the comparison, it's based upon the mismanagement of a ship where sailors lacking in knowledge of seamanship stage a mutiny resulting in chaos on board. Not only that, the sailors are constantly quarreling with each other. Easily we can see how this image provided the basis for the movie **Ship of Fools** noted in footnote number three.

The following lists the negative characteristics of this so-called crew:

- Sailors quarreling with each other: *staziazō* also to rebel.
- Each crew member thinks he's the captain: *oiomai* also to suspect, to forebode.
- Sailors haven't learned the art of navigation: *manthano* also to understand and *technē* or skill.
- Sailors can't come up with anyone who taught the art of navigation: *apodeiknumi*: to set forth.
- Navigation is not able to be taught: *phaskō* or to affirm what can't be taught, *didaktos*.
- Ready to cut in pieces anyone who claims it can be taught: the root *temno* or to cut with the preposition *kata* or in accord with; i.e., a thorough cutting which shows the violence these sailors are ready to show.
- Crowd around the ship owner to hand over control of the ship: *pericheō* or to flow around in the sense of scattering.
- Execute those managing to persuade the ship owner: the root *kteino* or to kill with the preposition *apo* or from which intensifies the situation.
- Have stupefied the ship owner: *methe* or strong drink.
- Use up what is in the ship: *chraomai* also to be lacking.
- Set sail while drinking and feasting: *pino* and *euocheō*, the latter to entertain sumptuously.
- Dismiss anyone as useless who knows how to manage a ship: *psego* or to blame, to censure and *achrestos* as unprofitable.
- Fail to understand that a captain must be attentive to weather, etc.: *epimeleia* or care, attention.
- Don't believe there's any ship enabling the captain how to steer it: *oiomai* or to suspect, to forebode.
- The true captain called stargazer, babler and good-for-nothing by the so-called crew: *meteoroskpon* (raised from the ground and *skopeō* or to look, consider) *adoesches* or a garrulous fellow and *achrestos* or unprofitable.

**I certainly do.**

*Mala*: an adverb meaning very much, exceedingly.

**I don't think that you need to examine the simile in detail to see that the ships resemble cities and their attitude to the true philosophers, but you already understand what I mean.**

There's no need to examine this example, where the preposition *ex* (from) prefaced to the verb *exetazo* suggests a closer examination with regard to *eikon* or image, comparison. Adeimantus acknowledges that Socrates understands what he means, *manthano* here more as to comprehend. The situation at hand uses the image of ships to resemble cities and their attitude with regard to *philosophoi* who are true, *alethinos*. *Diathesis* or attitude also means a placing or arrangement in the sense of a placing-through, *dia*.

**Indeed, I do.**

*Mala*: an adverb meaning very much, exceedingly.

**Then first tell this simile to anyone who wonders why philosophers aren't honored in the cities, and try to persuade him that there would be far more cause for wonder if they were honored.**

At issue is why philosophers aren't honored in the cities, *thaumazo* also as to be astonished being the response with regard to a failure of not holding them in reverence or esteem, *timaos*. This is followed by an attempt to persuade a person that it would more surprising if *philosophoi* indeed were honored. At issue is seeking to win over a person to this position, *peitho* also as to prevail upon.

**I will tell him.**

*Didasko*: to teach, to instruct.

**Next tell him that what he says is true, that the most decent among the philosophers are useless to the majority. Tell him not to blame those decent people for this but the ones who don't make use of them. It isn't natural for the captain to beg the sailors to be ruled by him nor for the wise to knock at the doors of the rich—the man who came up with that wisecrack made a mistake. The natural thing is for the sick person, rich or poor, to knock at the doctor's door, and for anyone who needs to be ruled to knock at the door of the one who can rule him. It isn't for the ruler, if he's truly any use, to beg the others to accept his rule. Tell him that he'll make no mistake in likening those who rule in our cities at present to the sailors we mentioned just now, and those who are called useless stargazers to the true captains.**

It's true (*alethes*) to say that the most noble among *philosophoi* are useless, *achrestos* also as unprofitable for the majority of people. In other words, so many practitioners of *philosophia* are of a wicked condition or *poneria*. *Philosophia* itself isn't to blame for this state of affairs, *aitia* also as cause. Examination of the subject will be done with some hesitancy, hence the words *an dunometha*, "if we can" or if we have the capacity (*dunamai*).

**That's absolutely right.**

Superlative of *orthos*.

**Therefore, it isn't easy for the best ways of life to be highly esteemed by people who, as in these circumstances, follow the opposite ways. By far the greatest and most serious slander on philosophy, however, results from those who profess to follow the philosophic way of life. I mean those of whom the prosecutor of philosophy declared that the greatest number are completely vicious and the most decent useless. And I admitted that what he said was true, didn't I?**

*Eudokimeo*: to be of good repute with *rhadios* or light, easy taken in the negative with regard to those who pursue affairs in ways contrary (to philosophy). The verb *epitedeuo* is with the noun derived from it, *epiteuma* referring to any type of pursuit, often of a business nature.

*Diabole*: false accusation is the issue at hand, this word literally as a casting-through and modified by the superlative of *megas* and *ischuros*, greatest and strongest. It applies to person professing to following *philosophia*. It comes from a person accusing *philosophia*, the verb *egkaleo* or to bring a charge against. He claims the most are completely (*epieikes* fitting, suitable) vicious while the most who are decent turn out to be useless. The two adjectives are *pamponeros* and *achrestos*: entirely (*pan*, all) wicked and not profitable.

**Yes.**

**And haven't we explained why the decent ones are useless?**

The verb *dierchomai* or to go through with regard to a cause or *aitia*. That's with respect to those who are decent are useless, *epieikos* and *achrestos*.

**Yes, indeed.**

*Mala*: conveys that which is very much, exceedingly.

**Then, do you want us to discuss why it's inevitable that the greater number are vicious and try to show, if we can, that philosophy isn't responsible for this either?**

Two words sum this up, *dunamai* and *peirao*: to be able, capable and to attempt. I.e., there's the possibility that those who are vicious or = philosophy or *poneria* = *philosophia*, the former as a state of wickedness.

**Certainly.**

*Panu*: altogether, entirely.

**Then, let's begin our dialogue by reminding ourselves of the point at which we began to discuss the nature that someone must have if he is to become a fine and good 490 person. First of all, if you remember, he had to be guided by the truth and always pursue it in every way, or else he'd really be a boaster, with no share at all in true philosophy.**

The verb *anamimnesko* infers something far greater than just to remember; it implies access to our faculty of *anamnesis* which derives from this verbal root. Essentially it means to bring into the present that which we've learned from a previous existence or perhaps better put, that which uniquely has been ours from all eternity. At issue is to become a fine and good person, the usual adjectives *kalos* and *agathos*; the former implies having an excellent quality and the latter as that which morally good, capable.

What makes a person endowed with these qualities are the following two: to be guided by the truth, *hegeomai* or to go before with regard to *aletheia* and to pursue it, *dioko* (also as to chase, to hunt) it always in every way. Note the two words with *pan* or all...i.e., a double all-ness for emphasis. The option? One would become an imposter which is rendered as such by the verb *alalazo* or to shout aloud. This is completely alien to having a share in true *philosophia*, the verb being *meteimi* or literally to be with.

**That's what was said.**

**And isn't this view completely contrary to the opinions currently held about him?**

Note the word *doxa* or opinion which is contrary to knowledge and here with the verb *doeko* or to suspect, suppose or imagine. I.e., both are pretty much the same

**It certainly is.**

*Panu*: altogether, entirely.

**Then, won't it be reasonable for us to plead in his defense that it is the nature of the real lover of learning to struggle toward what is, not to remain with any of the many things that are believed to be, that, as he moves on, he neither loses nor lessens his erotic love until he grasps the being of each nature itself with the part of his soul that**

**is fitted to grasp it, because of its kinship with it, and that, once getting near what really is and having intercourse with it and having begotten understanding and truth, he knows, truly lives, is nourished, and—at that point, but not before—is relieved from the pains of giving birth?**

This excerpt consists of one long, uninterrupted sentence. *Apologeo* or to give a defense. Here it concerns the nature of the real lover of knowledge, this rendered by the verb *phuo* or to bring forth, to produce. *Phuo* represents a constant striving or contending (*hamillaomai*) to know literally that which is, *pros to on*. Here the preposition *pros* intimates direction towards which, that is, the towards which or active attention one manifests for a love of knowledge, *philomathes* also as being fond of (*philos*) acquiring knowledge. I.e., *pros* suggests not arrival but constant movement forward.

This stance is contrary to literally not remaining upon (*epimeno*) opinions about many things considered as real rendered by the verb *einai* or to be. A key word following this is *alla* which can be taken as “but,” signaling the right direction to go. That is, not to set loose nor lessen one’s *eros* or passionate love, the two verbs being *ambluo* and *apolego*, to blunt and to leave off or to desist.

*Prin* or until is another one of those small yet important words signaling another shift, that is, the negative of *ambluo* and *apolego* with regard to *eros*. It remains in effect until there’s a correspondence between grasping the being of each nature and that part of one’s soul fit to grasp it. I.e., *phusis* or the nature proper to one’s *psuche* is connected by the verb *proseko*. This is being at hand or *pros* or to have that direction-towards-which and the adjective *suggenes*, congenital.

Note the three stages which follow: having gotten near what really is, mixing with it, and having given birth to understanding and truth (*plesiazō* or to approach, *mignumi* and *gennao* with *aletheia*). The first two pertain to what truly is or what has being, *to onti ontos*. The effect of all three? One knows, truly lives and is nourished (*gignosko*, *zao* and *trepho*). All relieve one from the pains of giving birth, *lego* as to stop or to cease. As for this *odis* or birth pangs, it gives birth to the cycle of the many particulars (*polus*) that supposed have being.

**That is the most reasonable defense possible.**

*Metrios*: within measure, the superlative of it being used.

**Well, then, will such a person have any part in the love of falsehood, or will he entirely hate it?**

With regard to what is *pseudos* or false the choice is between loving or hating it, *miseo* and *agapao*, the latter as to treat with affection, that being the verbal root for *agape*.

**He'll hate it.**

*Miseo.*

**And if truth led the way, we'd never say, I suppose, that a chorus of evils could ever follow in its train.**

If truth or *aletheia*—again, an alpha privative word used to describe something in a negative fashion, that is, not concealed—leads the way or comes first (*hegeomai*), it's impossible for a chorus of evils (*kakos*) to follow, *akoloutheo* suggestive of going in a sequence. Chorus suggests singing and doing so in unison which because evil is involved, would turn out to be a cacophony.

**How could it?**

**But rather a healthy and just character, with moderation following it.**

The key word here is *alla* or “but” which sets up a contrast with regard to the verb *epomai* or to follow after. Note the distinction between this verb (*epi* or upon) and *akoloutheo* also to go in a sequence. As for moderation, the noun is *sophrosune* also as discretion, self-control.

**That's right.**

*Orthos*: also as truly.

**What need is there, then, to marshal all over again from the beginning the members of the philosophic nature's chorus in their inevitable array? Remember that courage, high-mindedness, ease in learning, and a good memory all belong to it. Then you objected, saying that anyone would be compelled to agree with what we said, but that, if he abandoned the argument and looked at the very people the argument is about, he'd say that some of them were useless, while the majority had every kind of vice. So we examined the reason for this slander and have now arrived at the point of explaining why the majority of them are bad. And it's for this reason that we've again taken up the nature of the true philosophers and defined what it necessarily has to be.**

A rhetorical question with regard to repeating the necessary order of the *phusis* which is *philosophos* presented as a chorus, that image applicable to a group singing a song in unison. Compare with the chorus of evils (*kakos*) in the section just above. However, there's no need to set it in order once again, *anagkazo* also as to compel and *tasso*, to arrange.

Note the necessity of remembering (*mimnesko*) that such a *phusis* as *philosophos* consists of *andreia*, *megaloprepeia* (great and befitting), *eumatheia* (*eu* connotes the adverbial form of *agathos*) and *mneme* or courage (manliness), magnanimous, ease at

learning and a good memory.

Even though anyone can admit this, should he stop speaking of these qualities and instead, look at those persons to whom the words apply, the response? Some were completely useless and most were base. After examining the reason for this slander it's time to explain why most are bad. All this presents the case to take up again the nature of what it means to be a true philosopher and define it.

At issue of this rather convoluted, extended sentence is the need to abandon words and to look at persons, *apoblepo* and *horao*. I.e, two different types of looking: one from (*apo*) and the other straight on, if you will. Such a contrast is the reason for taking up an examination of the nature (*phusis*) of those who are truly (*alethos*, adverb) *philosophos*.

**That's true.**

*Estin*: it is.

**We must now look at the ways in which this nature is corrupted, how it's destroyed in many people, while a small number (the ones that are called useless rather than bad) escape. After that, we must look in turn at the natures of the souls that imitate the philosophic nature and establish themselves in its pursuits, so as to see what the 491 people are like who thereby arrive at pursuits they are unworthy of and that is beyond them and who, because they often strike false notes, bring upon philosophy the reputation that you said it has with everyone everywhere.**

This section begins with the verb *theaomai* or to behold or to gaze up and the following upon which it gazes:

-The corruption of the philosophic nature found in the majority of people: the noun *phthora* is present in *phusis* or nature, also as ruin. It's affiliated with the verb *diollumi* implying utter destruction.

-A small part of this corruption manages to escape being present in many people and is in those who aren't necessarily bad but who are useless: *ekphugo* or to flee with regard to *achrestos* or not profitable and *poneros* or worthless.

-Nature of souls which imitates this philosophic nature and usurps its pursuits: here *mimeomai* as a constitutive part of ourselves alters this precious attribute by substituting pursuits which fit their own needs. The verb for this is *kathistemi* or to establish in accord with (*kata*). The noun to which it's applied is *epitedeuma*, pursuits usually of a business nature. The Latin *studium* is a fairly good equivalent.

-Such souls enter a way of life too high for themselves and exceeds their innate capacity: *psuche* as characterized by the verb *aphikneomi* or to reach, to attain *epitedeuma* of which they are both *anaxios* and *meizon*, not worthy and greater (than themselves). Both adjectives are with the preposition *eis* or into which makes these two

negative characteristics all the more present to them.

-This is manifested by the many discords and lack of harmony in their conduct everywhere and at all times: the verb *plemmeleo* literally means to make a false musical note made all the more striking by the adverb *pantache* and *pan* everywhere.

**In what ways is this nature corrupted?**

*Diaphora*: also as ruin.

**I'll try to enumerate them for you if I can. I suppose that everyone would agree that only a few natures possess all the qualities that we just now said were essential to becoming a complete philosopher and that seldom occur naturally among human beings. Or don't you think so?**

The verb *peirazo* or to make a trial with the verb *dierchomai*, to go through. The common consensus? Only a nature as just set forth (*prostasso*)—*phusis* as belonging to *psuche* as noted above—concerning a *philosophos* is rare. Reason? It is perfect (*teleios* also as unblemished) as well as rare, the adverb *oligakis* connoting smallness. This followed by a question to get an opinion, *oiomai* also as to think in the sense of suppose.

**I certainly do.**

*Sphodra*: adverb also as very much.

**Consider, then, the many important ways in which these few can be corrupted.**

*Skopeo*: to look, to examine with regard to being corrupted, *olethros* also as destructive, deadly.

**What are they?**

**What will surprise you most, when you hear it, is that each of the things we praised in that nature tends to corrupt the soul that has it and to drag it away from philosophy. I mean courage, moderation, and the other things we mentioned.**

*Thaumastotaton*: superlative to express an unexpected surprise. That consists in what was praised in that nature or *phusis* which is *philosophos* corrupts the soul or *psuche*, *apollumi* connotes utterly destruction. It drags the *psuche* away from *philosophia*, the verb being *apospao*, also to tear away. Socrates means by this the following: *andreaia*, *sophrosune* (manliness) and everything else mentioned or gone through, *dierchomai*.

**That does sound strange.**

*Atopos*: literally without a place.

**Furthermore, all the things that are said to be good also corrupt it and drag it away—beauty, wealth, physical strength, relatives who are powerful in the city, and all that goes with these. You understand what I have in mind?**

A sharp contrast between what people generally hold as good or *agathos* vs. what in actuality brings to ruin and tears away the soul from philosophy. That pair consists of the verbs *phtheiro* and *apospao* to ruin, to waste and to tear away.

As for those things that fall under the category of *agathos*, they are *kallos*, *ploutos*, *ischus*, *suggeneia* and *oikeios* or what's good, wealth, physical strength and relatives in the city or those who have connections. The last literally pertains to a household and here is a catch-all for everything else (i.e., belonging to the household).

The second sentence has the verb *echo* or to have with regard to *tupos*, literally the effect of a blow or striking.

**I do, and I'd be glad to learn about it.**

*Akribes*: exact, accurate with regard to *punthanomai*, to learn by inquiry.

**If you correctly grasp the general point I'm after, and it will be clear to you, and what I've said before won't seem so strange.**

*Lambano* or to take, to receive is crucial here with regard to that which is presented correctly, *orthos* or properly, in a right manner. If one's faculty of *lambano*, so to speak, is tuned in, what was said before won't seem so strange or out of place, *atopos*. Note two words here: *phaino* and *dokeo* or to appear and to expect which in themselves suggest a sense of uncertainty, of being less than 100% on target.

**What do you want me to do?**

*Keleuo*: to bid, to command.

**We know that the more vigorous any seed, developing plant, or animal is, the more it is deficient in the things that are appropriate for it to have when it is deprived of suitable food, season, or location. For the bad is more opposed to the good than it is to the merely not good.**

Despite the vigor (*erromenos*: healthy, stoutness) of any seed or animal, it becomes lost when deprived of what's vital such as food, etc. This is expressed by the verb *proseko* or to have with or towards (*pros*) when used with the negative of *tugchano* or to hit upon. *Endeo* as used here is a falling short of.

Another way of rendering this? What's bad is more contrary to the good compared to what's not good, *kakos* vs. *agathos*. "Not good" is rendered as *agathos* with the negative as *me*.

Of course.

**Then it's reasonable to say that the best nature fares worse, when unsuitably nurtured, than an ordinary one.**

Reasonable is rendered by the verb *oiomai* or to thing along with *logos*, word as expression. The nature or *phusis* which is best or *aristos* fares worse (*allos*, also as alien) than the inferior one or *kakos* when conditions for nurturing are not suitable. The verb for this is *apallasso*, fundamentally as to put away, to remove which conveys something more permanent.

It is.

**Then won't we say the same thing about souls too, Adeimantus, that those with the best natures become outstandingly bad when they receive a bad upbringing? Or do you think that great injustices and pure wickedness originate in an ordinary nature rather than in a vigorous one that has been corrupted by its upbringing? Or that a weak nature is ever the cause of either great good or great evil?**

At issue are souls (*psuche*) endowed with the best natures or *euphues* (*eu-* adverbial form of *agathos* or good) prefaced to *phue*, growth or stature. Such natures become especially bad when they receive a poor education, *paidagogia* or attendance with regard to children. The adjective *kakos* or bad is modified by the adverb *diapherontos* or especially (also as differently) from and *tugchano* suggests a hitting upon the evil at hand.

The second question concerns the origin of great injustices and pure evil, *adikema* and *poneria* or wrong which has been done and wickedness, the latter as unmixed. Are they from an ordinary or vigorous nature, a *phusis* as *phaulos* or trivial, common vs. *neanikos* or youthful, fresh. As for the latter, the question at hand is with regard to it having been corrupted by the way it had been raised, *diollumi* implying utter ruin.

The third and final question concerns a *phusis* which is weak or *asthenes* also as feeble being the cause of either a good or an evil both described as great, that is, *aitia* also as cause with the adjectives *agathos* and *kakos*.

No, you're right.

**Now, I think that the philosophic nature as we defined it will inevitably grow to 492 possess every virtue if it happens to receive appropriate instruction, but if it is sown, planted, and grown in an inappropriate environment, it will develop in quite the opposite way, unless some god happens to come to its rescue. Or do you agree with**

**the general opinion that certain young people are actually corrupted by sophists—that there are certain sophists with significant influence on the young who corrupt them through private teaching? Isn't it rather the very people who say this who are the greatest sophists of all, since they educate most completely, turning young and old, men and women, into precisely the kind of people they want them to be?**

At issue is the *phusis* which is *philosophos*. Despite its frequent appearance, always by reason of its importance *phusis* needs to be re-defined or re-presented as one's constitution, nature or character. It's a question of this *phusis* receiving proper teaching, *tugchano* as to hit upon, that is, with respect to a *mathesis* which is *proseko* or near at hand, emphasis upon the *pros* as intimating directness. It needs to grow (*auxano*, also to increase) in order to obtain every virtue or *arete*, that which is the best in anything provided it receives the right instruction, *proseko* again.

On the other hand, if planted in an environment not suited for growth, this *phusis* which is *philosophos* will turn out to be opposite (*ta enantia*, plural) to what it is. The only hope in this instance is that one of the gods will help it, *tugchano* again as to hit upon and *boetheo* also as to assist.

Next we have a question with regard to young people being corrupted by Sophists, *diaphtheiro* where the preposition *dia* as through represents a more intense form of the verb. That is to say, Sophists corrupt by making a profit from their teaching; i.e., knowledge for sale.

The second question deals with those Sophists who give private instruction, *idiotikos* implying being unskilled. They provide teaching or *paideuo* and thus focus upon young and old to be what they wish, *boulomai*. I.e., their *paideuo* turns out to be opposite of true *paideia*. The key word here is *apergazomai* which hints at finishing off what one wishes.

### **When do they do that?**

**When many of them are sitting together in assemblies, courts, theaters, army camps, or in some other public gathering of the crowd, they object very loudly and excessively to some of the things that are said or done and approve others in the same way, shouting and clapping, so that the very rocks and surroundings echo the din of their praise or blame and double it. In circumstances like that, what is the effect, as they say, on a young person's heart? What private training can hold out and not be swept away by that kind of praise or blame and be carried by the food wherever it goes, so that he'll say that the same things are beautiful or ugly as the crowd does, follow the same pursuits as they do, and be the same sort of person as they are?**

Sophists ply their trade by making a lot of noise in public gatherings, the noun *sulloge* implying the act of collecting. Socrates asks rightly about the effect this has on

the heart or *kardia* of a young person, the verb being *ischo* or to restrain or to keep in possession.

The second question has to do with the effect of the loudness just noted on private training or *paideia* which is *idiotikos* as described above. The end result? This person which concur with everything the crowd does, *epitedeuo* inferring making it a practice.

**He will be under great compulsion to do so, Socrates.**

*Anagke* also as necessity.

**And yet we haven't mentioned the greatest compulsion of all.**

*Anagke* with superlative of *meGas* or great, large.

**What's that?**

**It's what these educators and sophists impose by their actions if their words fail to persuade. Or don't you know that they punish anyone who isn't persuaded, with disenfranchisement, fines, or death?**

*Paideutes* is used here in a negative sense which parallels that of the Sophists. If their words fail to persuade or *peitho* (also as to comply), they impose or *prostithemi* the following, again taking notice of *pros* as directness. It assumes the form of punishment, *kolazo* also as to curtail or chastize: *atimia*, *chrema* and *thanatos* (disgrace, thing or matter which is usually negative and death).

**They most certainly do.**

*Sphodra*: adverb also as very much.

**What other sophist, then, or what private conversations do you think will prevail in opposition to these?**

A question with regard to another kind of Sophist, one being *idiotikos* (also as unskilled) and will win out over those being discussed. The two verbs *teino* and *krateo* are similar here, to stretch out and to hold sway.

**I don't suppose that any will.**

*Oiomai*: also as to think, to suspect.

**No, indeed, it would be very foolish even to try to oppose them, for there isn't now, hasn't been in the past, nor ever will be in the future anyone with a character so unusual that he has been educated to virtue in spite of the contrary education he**

received from the mob—I mean, a human character; the divine, as the saying goes, is an exception to the rule. You should realize that if anyone is saved and becomes what **493** he ought to be under our present constitutions, he has been saved—you might rightly say—by a divine dispensation.

*Anoia*: alpha privative with regard to *nous* or mind, lacking understanding along with the verb *epicheiro* or to put one's hand upon, a strong way of opposing the Sophists. At no time—neither past nor future—will there be a person with a character so unusual, an *ethos* which is *alloios* or wholly other than he has received a *paideia* with regard to *arete* with *pros*. By that Socrates means a character which is human, *anthropeios*.

According to a parable or *paroimia* (also a common saying), an exception is the divine or *theios*, *exaireo* being the verb meaning to take out from. Anyone subject to the present constitutions is saved (*sozo*, also to rescue) through a divine dispensation, *moira* also as portion, lot or destiny. The phrase *katastasis* or setting up in accord with and *politeios* or related to the city are used for constitution.

I agree.

*Dokeo*: also as to seem.

Well, then, you should also agree to this.

*Doxazo*: to hold an opinion.

What?

Not one of those paid private teachers, whom the people call sophists and consider to be their rivals in craft, teaches anything other than the convictions that the majority express when they are gathered together. Indeed, these are precisely what the sophists call wisdom. It's as if someone were learning the moods and appetites of a huge, strong beast that he's rearing—how to approach and handle it, when it is most difficult to deal with or most gentle and what makes it so, what sounds it utters in either condition, and what sounds soothe or anger it. Having learned all this through tending the beast over a period of time, he calls this knack wisdom, gathers his information together as if it were a craft, and starts to teach it. In truth, he knows nothing about which of these convictions is fine or shameful, good or bad, just or unjust, but he applies all these names in accordance with how the beast reacts—calling what it enjoys good and what angers it bad. He has no other account to give of these terms. And he calls what he is compelled to do just and fine, for he hasn't seen and cannot show anyone else how much compulsion and goodness really differ. Don't you think, by god, that someone like that is a strange educator?

Sophists are called *mistharneo*, the verb meaning to be for hire and are considered (*hegeomai*, literally to lead) as rivals, *antitechnos* or literally against skill. They only teach (*paideuo*) opinions or *dogma* held by those when gathered together. I.e., *dogma* (*doxa* similar, more along the lines of conjecture) and *athroizo* or gathering together are similar. From this comes what the Sophists consider *sophia*.

An example follows which consists in how to draw near and handle a strong beast or *thremma* also as a nursling, the two verbs being *proserchomai* and *katamanthano*. Note the two prepositions which shed light on this situation, *pros* and *kata* or direction towards-which and in accord with.

Once such knowledge or *katamanthano* is gained, its called *sophia* also as skill. Then this person gathers his information as he would with regard to a craft and then teaches it. The verb *sunistemi* or to put together (with or *sun*) as it pertains to *techne* or skill but more along the lines of a trade compared with *sophia*. The verb *trepo* fits in well here as to turn, that is, to put all this into practice with regard to (*epi*, upon) *didaskalia* or teaching.

Unfortunately this person has no knowledge (*eido*, to see, to behold) as to which of these opinions and desires (*dogma* and *epithumia*) are good or bad (*agathos* and *kakos*), etc. Instead, he applies these to judgments with respect to the beast which is rendered by two adjectives, *tanagkaios* and *dikaios*, necessary and just.

Also this person hasn't a clue as to the difference between what's necessary and what's good, *anagkaios* and *agathos* modifying *phusis* or nature. And so this excerpt ends with the ironic question wondering that such a person is indeed strange, literally lacking a space, *atopos*.

**I do indeed.**

**Then does this person seem any different from the one who believes that it is wisdom to understand the moods and pleasures of a majority gathered from all quarters, whether they concern painting, music, or, for that matter, politics? If anyone approaches the majority to exhibit his poetry or some other piece of craftsmanship or his service to the city and gives them mastery over him to any degree beyond what's unavoidable, he'll be under Diomedean compulsion, as it's called, to do the sort of thing of which they approve. But have you ever heard anyone presenting an argument that such things are truly good and beautiful that wasn't absolutely ridiculous?**

A question with regard to whether the person just described is different from one who holds that wisdom consists in knowing the moods and pleasures of many varied people as well as anything associated with them. A key word here is *diaphero* or to differ, literally as to send through, when it comes to understanding *sophia* consisting of *orge* and *hedone* or urges and pleasures. The verb making this difference is *katanoeo*,

suggestive of knowing well prefaced with the preposition *kata*, in accord with.

Should anyone associate with this hodge-podge collection of persons and share with them anything he had done including his talent, he runs the risk of letting them control him. This is expressed by the noun *kurios* or allowing them to be lord or master. An example from Greek mythology is Diomedes known for his participation in the Trojan War. He gave people what they wanted, *epaineo* or to approve, to praise. This brings up the question whether this is good and honorable (*agathos* and *kalos*, the latter also beautiful) or simply outrageous, *katagelao* (literally to laugh down upon).

**No, and I don't expect ever to hear one.**

*Oimai*: to think, suppose.

**Keeping all this in mind, recall the following question: Can the majority in any way tolerate or accept the reality of the beautiful itself, as opposed to the many beautiful 494 things, or the reality of each thing itself, as opposed to the corresponding many?**

*Anamnesko* or to keep in mind or better, to remember and *ennoeo* or to consider, to reflect with regard to the question to follow. It pertains to *plethos*, a multitude of people almost in the sense of a crowd. At issue is whether it can tolerate or believe in the beautiful itself opposed to many beautiful things or in anything in its essence. That is to say, we have *polus* vs. *einai*, much or many vs. being or that which is, *einai*. The two verbs involved in asking this question are *anecho* and *hegeomai*, literally to hold up, to maintain and to deem necessary as well as to take the lead.

**Not in any way.**

*Hekista*: adverb also for as little as possible.

**Then the majority cannot be philosophic.**

Two unreconcilable opposites: *plethos* and *phiosophos* or the multitude as crowd and one who is friendly or well-disposed toward *sophia*.

**They cannot.**

*Adunatos*: not possible.

**Hence they inevitably disapprove of those who practice philosophy?**

*Psego*: to blame or to censure.

**Inevitably.**

*Anagke*: necessity.

**And so do all those private individuals who associate with the majority and try to please them.**

*Idiototes vs. ochlos: individual vs. crowd. At issue is prosomoleo or to hold intercourse with, pros connoting directness. The approach is an attempt by the former to please the latter, aresko or to make with regard to epithumeo which is suggestive of an intense longing.*

**Clearly.**

*Delos, the adjective.*

**Then, because of all that, do you see any salvation for someone who is by nature a philosopher, to insure that he'll practice philosophy correctly to the end? Think about what we've said before. We agreed that ease in learning, a good memory, courage, and high-mindedness belong to the philosophic nature.**

*A rhetorical question with regard to soteria or salvation, also as deliverance and preservation. It concerns a person endowed with a nature which is philosophic, phusis modified by philosophos. Hopefully this will enable him to practice philosophy to the end. This is rendered by the verb erchomai or to come with meno or to remain with epitedeuma or pursuit. The phrase pros telos literally means in the direction towards completion.*

*Ennoeo or to reflect what was said earlier, emprosthen consisting of em and pros, in and towards-which. That consisted of agreeing that ease in learning, a good memory, courage and high-mindedness belong to this phusis, philosophos not added here. Homologeio as to speak as one and the same regarding eumatheia, mneme, andreia and megaloprepeia. All are noted in 490c.*

**Yes.**

**And won't someone with a nature like that be first among the children in everything, especially if his body has a nature that matches that of his soul?**

*First literally "in children," euthus also as straight, direct. Mention of children suggests the process of education or paideia which as noted here, includes everything. Essential to this is one's physical body matching his soul, soma->prosphero->psuche, the verb literally as to bring toward.*

**How could he not be?**

*Mello: conveys the overall sense of about to do something.*

**Then I suppose that, as he gets older, his family and fellow citizens will want to make**

**use of him in connection with their own affairs.**

Getting older suggests growth in *paideia* which makes this person attractive. The preposition *epi* or upon is used with what people wish him to be, this suggesting he will impose his philosophic nature on them.

**Of course.**

**Therefore they'll pay court to him with their requests and honors, trying by their flattery to secure for themselves ahead of time the power that is going to be his.**

Note the two verbs prefaced with the preposition *pro* or before, to put in the forefront: *prokatalambano* and *prokolakeuo* or to anticipate and to flatter beforehand. This is done with the intent of making use of one's *paideia* rendered as *dunamis* or capacity with regards to distorting it for their own end.

**That's what usually happens, at any rate.**

*Phileo*: basically to show affection and also as to wont implying coming to be.

**What do you think someone like that will do in such circumstances, especially if he happens to be from a great city, in which he's rich, well-born, good-looking, and tall? Won't he be filled with impractical expectations and think himself capable of managing the affairs, not only of the Greeks, but of the barbarians as well? And as a result, won't he exalt himself to great heights and be brimming with pretension and pride that is empty and lacks understanding?**

The anticipated response to this question is in a way embodied in the verb *tugchano* which means to hit upon, to meet with. The attractive character of these traits will fill a person with expectations that are basically impractical. This is rendered by *elpis* or hope with the adjective *amechanos* meaning without means or without resources. It applies to managing (*prasso*: to do) affairs concerning both Greeks and barbarians. The result? This persons who started out with a nature that is philosophic ends by exalting himself and brims with pretensions, pride and a lack of understanding.

*Exaireo* is the verb to lift up; *schematismos* is an adjective meaning to have assumed a certain form (*schema*). *Phronema* or high spirit or purpose is modified by *kenos* and *nous* or mind is with the preposition *aneu* or without, the verb *empiplemi* meaning to be quite full.

**He certainly will.**

*Mala*: conveys that which is very much, exceedingly.

**And if someone approaches a young man in that condition and gently tells him the**

**truth, namely, that that there's no understanding in him, that he needs it, and that it can't be acquired unless he works like a slave to attain it, do you think that it will be easy for him to listen when he's in the midst of so many evils?**

*Diatithemi* or literally to set or to arrange through depicts a man in the state of mind described in the section above. At issue is the need to approach this person (*proserchomai*, with emphasis upon the *pros* as often noted) and gently inform him of the truth, *hrema* being an adverb also as quietly. The reason? He lacks understanding and is in great need of it. This is rendered by the *nous* or mind not being in him along with the verb *deo* or to lack.

At issue, of course, is *philosophia*. It can only be acquired by a person who works like a slave, the verb *douleuo* and *ktesis* or possession. Listening with attentive ear or *eisakouo*) will be close to impossible (*eupetes* or favorable with *ara*, interrogative particle) when he's in the midst of evils or *kakos*, the preposition *dia* or through meaning he's really in dire trouble.

**Far from it.**

*Polus* or much with *deo*, to be necessary.

**And even if a young man of that sort somehow sees the point and is guided and drawn to philosophy because of his noble nature and his kinship with reason, what do you think those people will do, if they believe that they're losing their use of him and his companionship? Is there anything they won't do or say to him to prevent him from being persuaded? Or anything they won't do or say about his persuader— whether plotting against him in private or publicly bringing him into court—to prevent him from such persuasion?**

At issue is this person who's disposed and inclined to being attentive. *Phuo* or to engender and *suggenes* or congenital are the words which describe this natural affinity. It's with regard to two other verbs, *eisaisthanomai* or literally to perceive into and *kampto* or to bend or to curve, all this with regard to *philosophia*.

With this in mind, what will be the conduct of people who think they're losing him? *Hegeomai* is the verb, to deem necessary as well as to take the lead with regard to two rather forceful verbs, *drassomai* as to grasp and *apollumi* as to utterly destroy. This is with regard to their own use and companionship, *chreia* and *hetairia*, the latter often ated with brotherhood.

In light of this man's preference for *philosophia* which stands so contrary to popular awareness, these people will do anything both by private intrigue and public persuasion. The verb is *epibouleuo*, literally to contrive upon with regard to that which is *demosios* and *agon* or belonging to the people and assembly, gathering.

**495 There certainly isn't.**

*Polus and anagke: much and necessity.*

**Then, is there any chance that such a person will practice philosophy?**

*Hopos or in some way or other with the verb philosopho.*

**None at all.**

**Do you see, then, that we weren't wrong to say that, when someone with a philosophic nature is badly brought up, the very components of his nature—together with the other so-called goods, such as wealth and other similar advantages—are themselves in a way the cause of his falling away from philosophic pursuits?**

In light of what had just been said in this section it's a question of a person endowed with a *phusis* which is *philosophos* having been brought up in a bad manner. The adverb *kakos* contrasts with *philosophia-as-paideia*. The verb suggestive of *paideia* is *trepho* which connotes raising a child as well as cherishing it. Contributing to this *kakos* or to put it another way, in an evil fashion, are so called material advantages summed up in the noun *paraskeue*. It also means preparation, means or those instruments (*skeue*) which can be considered as beside or *para* in the sense of being of use to a given end.

**I do, and what we said was right.**

*Orthros: adverb.*

**These, then, are the many ways in which the best nature—which is already rare enough, as we said—is destroyed and corrupted, so that it cannot follow the best pursuits. And it is among these men that we find the ones who do the greatest evils to cities and individuals and also—if they happen to be swept that way by the current—the greatest good, for a petty nature will never do anything great, either to an individual or a city.**

*Thaumasios: an adjective meaning wonderful which can refer to friend as in the vocative sense here. Unfortunately a phusis which is most excellent (beltistos, superlative of agathos or good) can be subject to destruction and corruption, olethros and diaphthora, the former suggestive of that which is deadly and the latter, rottenness through and through (dia). Thus this phusis is unable to follow through literally into the best pursuits, epitedeuma modified by aristos, this suggestive of what has practical application.*

When so affected, such people do the greatest of evils (*kakos*) to both cities and individuals. The opposite is true as well, doing the greatest good (*agathos*) when their

energies are channeled in that direction, the verb *rheo* or to flow being key as to the force which can go either way.

**That's very true.**

Superlative of *alethes*.

**When these men, for whom philosophy is most appropriate, fall away from her, they leave her desolate and unwed, and they themselves lead lives that are inappropriate and untrue. Then others, who are unworthy of her, come to her as to an orphan deprived of the protection of kinsmen and disgrace her. These are the ones who are responsible for the reproaches that you say are cast upon philosophy by those who revile her, namely, that some of those who consort with her are useless, while the majority deserve to suffer many bad things.**

This section describes in a poignant way what happens when a person falls away from *philosophia*, the *ek* or from of *ekpipto* making it all the more dramatic. Also we have the verb is *prosecho*...to have towards-which...with *malista* or superlative of *mala*, the adverb for exceedingly. The result of such *ekpipto*? Lives that are not appropriate and not true, *eremos* and *atelos* or desert-like and not perfect.

With this in mind, other persons who approach her are unworthy of *philosophia* or *anaxios* (*axios* also as deserving), the verb *erchomai* prefaced with two prepositions, *epi* and *eis* or upon and into. They do this as they would to an orphan deprived of relatives. By this they bring disgrace upon *philosophia*, *aischuno* and *oneidizo* also as to make ugly and to cast a reproach. Such accusations are said with regard to those who associate with *philosophia*, *suneimi* or to be with are essentially responsible for evil, *axios* and *kakos*.

**Yes, that is indeed what is said.**

**And it's a reasonable thing to say, for other little men—the ones who are most sophisticated at their own little crafts—seeing that this position, which is full of fine names and adornments, is vacated, leap gladly from those little crafts to philosophy, like prisoners escaping from jail who take refuge in a temple. Despite her present poor state, philosophy is still more high-minded than these other crafts, so that many people with defective natures desire to possess her, even though their souls are cramped and spoiled by the mechanical nature of their work, in just the way that their bodies are mutilated by their crafts and labors. Isn't that inevitable?**

The derogatory *anthropiskos* is used, something akin to little men who are preoccupied with a rote way of doing things. *Techne* or skill applicable to carrying out mechanical crafts is involved. However, they're keen enough to see (*kathorao*, literally

means to look down as from a higher position) a place left empty with regard to philosophy and full it with all sorts of fine names and pretensions . They would do this with their *techne*. *Techne*, after all, is the opposite to the *sophia* or skill often associated with *philosophia*. The latter is *proschema*, that which is held before or *pro*. These persons resemble escapees from prison and who've taken refuge in temples, *apodidrasko* also to steal away stealthily.

One way of looking at this section is that it's a kind of foreshadowing of the prisoners in the cave of Book Seven. However, in the instance at hand they're captivated by the images of *philosophia* which makes them escape at once. Instead of leaving the cave, they're simply moving into other caves or temples, if you will. An important word here is *ekpedao* with emphasis upon *ek* or from in contrast to *eis* or into. All this reduces *philosophia* to a low estate but isn't belittled by reason of such *techne* as noted above. The section concludes with a depressing rhetorical question as to the inevitability of such action, *anagke* fundamentally as necessity.

**It certainly is.**

*Mala*: the adverb for exceedingly.

**Don't you think that a man of this sort looks exactly like a little baldheaded tinker who has come into some money and, having been just released from jail, has taken a bath, put on a new cloak, got himself up as a bridegroom, and is about to marry the boss's daughter because she is poor and abandoned?**

Again, vivid imagery which can apply to such persons described above as *anthropiskos* or little men in a derogatory fashion. *Desmos* or bond serves well to describe their state, this word found in Book Seven, 515c.

**496 They're exactly the same.**

*Diaphero* with the negative, literally to carry or to bear through.

**And what kind of children will that marriage produce? Won't they be illegitimate and inferior?**

*Nothos* and *phaulos*: bastard and trivial or common.

**They have to be.**

*Polus* and *anagke* some this up well, literally: much and necessity.

**What about when men who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and consort with her unworthily? What kinds of thoughts and opinions are we to say they beget? Won't they truly be what are properly called sophisms, things that have**

**nothing genuine about them or worthy of being called true wisdom?**

Three rapid fire questions thrown out by Socrates. The first concerns those not worthy of education, *anaxios* with regard to *paideia*. They draw near to *philosophia*, *plesiazo* implying being in motion followed by *homileo* or being in her company while as not worthy. This is expressed by *axios* with the preposition *kata* or in accord with though in a negative (*me*) fashion.

The second question deals with thoughts and opinions, *dianoema* and *doxa* which don't fit in with *philos + sophia*.

The third question deals with sophisms or *sophisma*, a clever device or contrivance. They are opposite to wisdom which here is rendered as *phronesis* (also as purpose, intention) modified by *gnesios* which literally means belonging to the same race. Note that *phronesis* is used here instead of *sophia*, the counter word to *sophisma*, if you will.

**That's absolutely right.**

*Pantelos*: an adverb consisting of *pan* and *telos* or all and end.