

Excerpts from Phaedo

Introduction

On a personal and down-to-earth level this dialogue is the most important of them all. While it's unfair to grade Plato's works like this, I single out the **Phaedo** because it has immediate application to one's own life. By that I mean each and everyone of us is certain of one thing. We're all going to die. Not only that, we can't help but wonder what happens afterwards...if anything. The only certainty is that we don't know.

As for the **Phaedo**, Socrates faces this problem head on which is why the dialogue is so important. He's confident that some kind life better than the current one exists yet at the same time couches some of his observations with uncertainty. That direct yet honest approach elevates his words to a whole different level which I prefer to label as a testimony or witness.

In light of death as a universal absolute which Socrates presents in way we're hard pressed to find elsewhere, we take comfort in him not just leading the way but in accompanying us. He knows full well that by the end of the day he will be dead. Yet before that, he's speaking with friends as if he were attending some social event or even a picnic, very casual and not showing the least suffering dread or distress. It's those in the cell with him who are having problems of separation. While Socrates doesn't seem to be distressed by this, the way he comports himself cannot but set an example though this is secondary to his desire to pass into a more blessed divine realm. Such an attitude may come across as a bit callous or even selfish, a frequent observation being made with the selfless death of Jesus Christ.

While the vast majority of us fall in the category of those with Socrates while in prison, nevertheless we can profit by paying close attention to his words on the last day of his life. We have Phaedo to thank who's largely responsible for what we have here and for whom this dialogue is named. Obviously Socrates' death has been compared with Jesus Christ as noted above. While the two men certainly are different, looking at the details of one shouldn't preclude the value of the other. As noted at the very end of this document, it is not the purpose of this document to compare the two.

What we have here are a series of excerpts from the **Phaedo**, more or less arbitrary as they apply specifically to the impending death of Socrates. And so the presence of death, even if for some of us it may be some time off in the future, is the reason for this little project. To be sure, Socrates doesn't come across as gloomy but shows the way to welcome death as a foretaste of the blessed life to come. Objectively, one can either take it or leave it. Better still, I think it's worth while to consider what Socrates has to say at the very end of his physical existence. Even if you're a dyed-in-the-wool sceptic, chances are you'll find his presentation well worth pondering.

As for those in the prison cell with Socrates, one can't help but wonder if they took his joyful, matter-of-fact words about death seriously. To be sure, they were more focused on losing a beloved friend and master. The same could apply to us today if we found ourselves in that situation.

Admittedly what follows comes across in a clumsy, awkward fashion. I was fully aware of that from the beginning yet at the same time more interested in sticking as close as possible to the text from a practical or applied point of view. While the phrase *lectio divina* or sacred reading pertains more to scripture, I decided upon that approach rather than taking a scholarly and therefore sophistic-like approach. Thus *lectio* and the task of philosophizing as presented by Socrates are of supreme importance. In addition to this, the **Phaedo** excerpts and notations have the added boon of sensitizing us more to our impending death whenever it comes.

Certain Greek words are bound to occur with some frequency. To prevent constantly defining them, many will have the plus sign (+). The two exceptions are *psuche* and *soma* (soul and body) which occur with great frequency.

The text used is **Plato, The Complete Works** edited by Paul M. Cooper, Indianapolis, 1999. Also I found the text edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns helpful (**Bollingen Series LXXI**, 1961).

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60a. Socrates looked at Crito. "Crito," he said, "let someone take her (Xanthippe)

home.” And some of Crito’s people led her away lamenting and beating her breast.

There’s something striking about this image. Right away you get the impression that Socrates is more interested in having a discussion about death and all that involves with his friends instead of being with his wife. We can just picture Xanthippe making a scene as she’s being led away. In other words, fellowship with those of the same mind is more enduring than familial ties. To modify the well-known expression, blood is thicker than water, spirit is thicker than blood. As it turns out towards the end of this dialogue, Xanthippe isn’t the only one who should be led away. Most of those in Socrates’ company fall in that category.

60b-c. What a strange thing that which men call pleasure seems to be, and how astonishing the relation it has with what is thought to be its opposite, namely pain! A man cannot have both at the same time. Yet if he pursues and catches the one, he is almost always bound to catch the other also, like two creatures with one head. I think that if Aesop had noted this he would have composed a fable that a god wished to reconcile their opposition but could not do so, so he joined their two heads together, and therefore when a man has the one, the other follows later. This seems to be happening to me. My bonds caused pain in my leg, and now pleasure seems to be following.

Hedus or that which is sweet is modified by its opposite which though having no physical place (*atopos*), is nevertheless experienced as very strong. With this in mind it’s easier to see the relationship such sweetness has with its opposite, pain. Note the connection, “is thought to be,” *dokeo* also as to suppose. That opposite or *enantios* is *luperos* also as causing sorrow.

Should a person lay hold of (*lambano*, to take, to receive) either one, by necessity (*anagkazo*: to force, compel) he’ll catch the other as well. I.e., he’s dealing with a creature of one head, *koruphe*, highest point.

Socrates uses the example from Aesop with regard to reconciling this opposition, *suntithemi* as to set or put with. However, he was unable to effect this so he joined the two heads together, *sunapto*, another verb prefaced with the preposition *sun-* which reads literally to touch with. This applies to Socrates. His bonds cause pain but pleasure follows upon it, *algeios* vs. *hedus* +.

61a. That the dream was thus bidding me do the very thing I was doing, namely, to

practice the art of philosophy, this being the highest kind of art, and I was doing that.

Here we have art and philosophy or *mousike* and *philosophia*, that is, any art over which the Muses preside along with that which is literally friendly (*philos*) to wisdom, *sophia* also as technique. Socrates' dream or *enupnion*, an adjective meaning anything seen in sleep was bidding him to practice this, *prasso*, to effect or to accomplish.

61c. I am leaving today, it seems, as the Athenians so order it.

Apeimi: to be away or far from and *eioka* or it seems. This short sentence is nevertheless memorable in that Socrates shows a somewhat casual attitude as to his death being a departure for something better.

Note that Socrates uses *eoike* or "it seems" or "it is fitting" as applied to death decreed by the Athenians. Perhaps *eoike* represents more the act of traveling than actually dying.

61d-e. Indeed, I too speak about this from hearsay, but I do not mind telling you what I have heard, for it is perhaps most appropriate for one who is about to depart yonder to tell and examine tales about what we believe that journey to be like. What else could one do in the time we have until sunset?

With regard to "hearsay," a footnote in Cooper's translation makes reference to Philolaus, a Pythagorean philosopher which shows that Socrates was influenced by that school of thought. The literal way of putting this is "from hearing" or *ex akoes*, that is, Socrates speaks somewhat tenuously or from what he had heard (*akouo*; verbal root of *akoe*). Nevertheless, he considers it most appropriate about to depart yonder, *ekeise* or thither, usually with regard to the nether world called Hades. The verb *apodemeo* literally means to be away from the *demos* or land, country.

Diaskopeo and *muthologeio* or to examine through and to tell a *muthos* or tale, legend. Both verbs center upon leaving home or *apodemia* to going literally there, *ekei*; i.e., what we think (*oionmai* or to suppose) about that or the *apodemia*. Socrates is using the first person plural which is suggestive of holding Pythagorean beliefs in this regard.

He closes with a kind of rhetorical questions as to what better way to handle the remaining time until sunset, *duisme* being symbolic of his fast approaching death.

62b. There is the explanation that is put in the language of the mysteries, that we men are in a kind of prison, and that one must not free oneself or run away. That seems to me an impressive doctrine and one not easy to understand fully. However, Cebes, this seems to me well expressed, that the gods are our guardians and that men are one of their possessions. Or do you not think so?

Lego and *logos* or to speak or to explain and word-as-expression with regard to what's expressed (*lego* again) in the mysteries, *aporretos* that which is not said or forbidden. It says we are in a kind of prison, *phroura* also as guard or look-out. Furthermore, we are not to free ourselves nor run away, *luo* and *apodidrasko* to loosen and to escape by stealth.

This image of a guard or prison appear (*phaino*) as impressive nor a light matter (*rhadios*) to understand, *diorao* or literally to see through. Nevertheless, it seems (*dokeo*) to Socrates that it's expressed well (*lego* + and *eu*). The gods are our guardians (*epimeleomai*: to take care of, *epi-* or upon intensifying the sense of the verb) and that men are one of their possessions, *ktema* also a piece of property. The rhetorical question at the end has *dokeo* + expressing that which seems as such to Cebes.

62e. So, Socrates, the opposite of what was said before is likely to be true; the wise would resent dying, whereas the foolish would rejoice at it.

Eikos or likely with respect to the wise who resent dying, i.e., *phroneo* also as to be minded in a certain way. *Aganakteo* and *charo*: to be vexed and to rejoice.

63c-d. This last I would not altogether insist on, but if I insist on anything at all in these matters, it is that I shall come to gods who are very good masters. That is why I am not so resentful, because I have good hope that some future awaits men after death, as we have been told for years, a much better future for the good than for the wicked.

Diischurizo or to affirm with confidence is something Socrates doesn't

wish to insist upon, but if he does, it's the certainty that he will come to the gods. The preposition *para* suggests that he'll be beside them, they being entirely (*panu* suggestive of all) good masters, *despotes* modified by *agathos*.

Because of this Socrates isn't resentful, *aganakteo* (to feel irritation) because he has hope of good home, *elpis* prefaced with *eu-*, adverbial form of *agathos* +. This rests upon some (*ti*) future, *teleutao* or to come to an end, to accomplish. The small *ti* intimates some doubt or uncertainty. Socrates says this has been promulgated for many years (*palai*, in days of old, namely, that a better (*ameinon*, more stout, stronger) future lays in store for a good man instead of someone who's wicked, *agathos* + vs. *kakos*).

64a. I am afraid that other people do not realize that the one aim of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for dying and death. Now if this is true, it would be strange indeed if they were eager for this all their lives and then resent it when what they have wanted and practiced for a long time comes upon them.

In a very real way the irony of these words capture well Socrates' attitude towards death and the practice for it. It's fine observation (tongue-in-cheek if you will) with regard to those who preach one thing and are afraid to put it into practice when the time times. Involved is being a philosopher though it's not mentioned here. The verb *kinduneuo* expresses this, namely, (the failure) to run a risk. This pertains to rightly (*orthos*, in a proper manner) putting *philosophia* + into practice, *hapto* as to bind or to hold fast. It's aim is for the process of dying and death, *epitedeuo* as to practice, to make one's business.

If this were true, it'd be strange (*atopos*, literally no place) if such persons desired (*prothumeomai*: the verbal root for *thumos* inferring desire prefaced with the preposition *pro-* or before) it all their lives, and once the occasion arises, they resent it, *aganakteo* also as to feel irritation. Such is the case even though that desired and practiced this expectation a long time (*palai* +, in days of old): *prothumeomai* + and *epitedeuo* +, the latter as to take care to do something.

64c. Is it anything else than the separation of the soul from the body? Do we believe that death is this, namely, that the body comes to be separated by itself apart from the soul, and the soul comes to be separated by itself apart from the body? Is death anything else than that?

The question is in response to Socrates saying just before this excerpt, “Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?”

Apallage for separation means deliverance or relief with regard to *psuche* from *soma*, soul from body.

The adverb *choris* meaning separately or asunder is used pertaining to the *soma* from *psuche*. Note the phrase *auto kath’ auto*, awkward to render adequately, but applies to this just mentioned separation by the body. It comes across almost as a withdrawal minus anything that renders. Death is nothing more than this.

Due to the length of the following section, notations are inserted within the text.

64e-65d. What of the other pleasures concerned with the service of the body? Do you think such a man prizes them greatly, the acquisition of distinguished clothes and shoes and the other bodily ornaments? Do you think he values these or despises them except in so far as one cannot do without them?

Socrates asks about the other pleasures (*therapeia* often as service or retinue) concerning the body. Next he poses a rhetorical question whether or not a man values them, *hegeomai* also as to supposed with *entimos*, things worthy of honor. There follows a list of such prized items.

The second rhetorical questions Socrates proposes is with the same person, that is, whether he prizes or despises such objects (*timao* vs. *atimazo*) insofar as there’s no necessity (*anagke*) for him with regard to having them, *metecho* to partake or literally to have with.

I think the true philosopher despises them.

Dokeo or to seem or to appear with *atimazo* or to dishonor.

Do you not think, he said, that in general such a man’s (philosopher) concern is not with the body but that, as far as he can, he turns away from the body towards the soul?

Here we have another rhetorical question with regard to concern not for the body but for the soul, *soma* and *psuche*, *pragmateia* meaning diligent study or the treatment of a subject. The verb *aphiemi* or to turn away from is with regard to *soma* as much as he can *dunamai* also as to be able or capable and *trepo* or to turn.

I do.

So in the first place, such things show clearly that the philosopher more than other men frees the soul from association with the body as much as possible?

A rhetorical question as well as observation concerning that which is

primary, *protos* or first. The discussion thus far clearly shows (*delos*, visible, conspicuous) that compared with other people (*diaphero*, literally to carry through), the *philosophos* frees the soul (*apoluo*, to loosen from and *psuche*) from any fellowship with the body, *koinonia*.

Apparently.

Phaino +: to bring to light.

A man who finds no pleasure in such things and has no part in them is thought by the majority not to deserve to live and to be close to death; the man, that is, who does not care for the pleasures of the body.

Most people think (*dokeo*, to seem) that anyone who finds no pleasure (*hedus*, sweet) and no concern—*metecho* or not having with what's associated with the body—doesn't deserve (*axios*, worthy) to live. I.e., he's close to death, *eggus* and *teino* or near and to extend or to reach. Such is the case for someone who doesn't care for corporeal pleasures, *phrontizo* or to take into consideration and *hedone*, pleasure.

What you say is certainly true.

Alethes or true and *panu*, altogether.

Then what about the actual acquiring of knowledge? Is the body an obstacle when one associates with it in the search for knowledge? I mean, for example, do men find any truth in sight or hearing, or are not even the poets forever telling us that we do not see or hear anything accurately, and surely if those two physical senses are not clear or precise, our other senses can hardly be accurate, as they are all inferior to these. Do you not think so?

Ti de or “then what” signals a shift that arises from this discussion about death to the acquisition of knowledge, *ktesis* and *phronesis* also as possession and purpose, intention. Socrates asks rhetorically whether the body or *soma* is an obstacle with regard to being a partner in the search (*koinonos* or common and *zetesis*) for *phronesis* +. The verbal root is *lambano* (to take, to receive) prefaced with two prepositions, *sum-* and *para-*, with and beside.

The question at hand is whether or not anything true is found by the faculty of sight or hearing, *aletheia* suggestive of disclosure. As for the poets, always (*aei*) they claim that we neither see nor hear anything accurately, *akribes* also as precise. If our faculties of hearing or sight are not accurate, indeed our other senses are pretty much similar by reason of being inferior to these two, *phaulos* also as slight, trivial.

When then, he asked, does the soul grasp the truth? For whenever it attempts to examine anything with the body, it is clearly deceived by it.

Psuche and *aletheia* + are connected by the verb *hapto* +, literally to join. When *psuche* attempts to examine (*epicheireo*: to put one's hand upon and *skopeo*,

to look at) anything with *soma*, indeed it suffers being deceived, *delos* or clear and *exapatao*, the preposition *ex-* or from adding emphasis to the verb.

True.

Alethes +.

Is it not in reasoning if anywhere that any reality becomes clear to the soul?

Reasoning (*logizomai*, to count, to reckon) makes any reality clear to the soul, *katadelos*, the preposition *kata-* or in accord with adding emphasis to *psuche*.

Yes.

Nai, also as verily.

And indeed the soul reasons best when none of these senses troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor pleasure, but when it is most by itself, taking leave of the body and as far as possible having no contact or association with it in its search for reality.

Logizomai + or to reckon with the superlative of *kallos*, beautiful. The soul does this best when not troubled by the senses, the verbal root *lupeo* emphasized by the preposition *kata-*, in accord with.

As for *logizomai* working best, this happens when not disturbed by hearing nor sight nor any of the other senses but when the soul is by itself, *kath' hauten*. Not only that, but when leaving behind the body, the soul is allow to rejoice, *eao* and *chairo*. I.e., no contact nor association (*koinoneo* and *hapto* +, to have in common and to touch) with regard to *orego* also as to reach out with regard to *ontos* or being.

That is so.

Esti tauta or it is such things.

And it is then that the soul of the philosopher most disdains the body, flees from it and seeks to be by itself?

Entautha or here. *Psuche* as belonging to the *philosophos* + not only disdains (*malista* and *atimazo* or to dishonor) the *soma* but also flees from it (*pheugo*, to take flight) and seeks to be by itself, *zeteo* and *kath' auten*.

Due to the length of the following section, notations are inserted within the text.

65d-66a. Or have you ever grasped them with any of your bodily senses? I am speaking of all things such as Bigness, Health, Strength and, in a word, the reality of all other things, that which each of them essentially is. Is what is most true in them contemplated through the body, or is this the position: whoever of us prepares himself best and most accurately to grasp that thing itself which he is investigating will come closest to the knowledge of it?

In this first of two rhetorical questions Socrates asks is it possible literally to lay hold upon (*ephaptomai*) the *ousia* of all things, this word as substance or being.

In the second rhetorical question he asks first whether through the body (*soma*) we get the truest perception of anything, the superlative of *alethes* + and the verb *theoreo*, to behold, to observe.

Next, Socrates asks whether anyone who prepares himself the best and more accurately: *paraskeuazo* (*para-* suggests getting all things organized) *malista* and *akribes*, the superlative as best and precise. Such preparation has in mind both *skopeo* + and *dianoemai*, to look at and to be disposed which is aimed for coming the closest possible to knowledge, *eggus* + (superlative) and *gignokso*. Obviously.

Panu also as altogether.

Then he will do this most perfectly who approaches the object with thought alone, without associating any sight with his thought, or dragging in any sense perception with his reasoning, but who, using pure thought alone, tries to track down each reality pure and by itself, freeing himself as far as possible from eyes and ears and, in a word, from the whole body, because the body confuses the soul and does not allow it to acquire truth and wisdom whenever it is associated with it. Will not that man reach reality, Simmias, if anyone does?

The superlative *katharos* literally means most clear, here with approaching the object with the following three: 1) thought alone (*dianoia*, also as intention, purpose), 2) not associating sight with thought (*paratithemi*, to set alongside and *dianoemai* +) and 3) dragging sense perception with his reasoning (*ephelko*, literally as to draw upon) regarding *aisthesis* or perception and *logismos* also as reckoning, computation.

66b. All these things will necessarily make the true philosophers believe and say to each other something like this: “There is likely to be something such as a path to guide us out of our confusion, because as long as we have a body and our soul is fused with such an evil we shall never adequately attain what we desire, which we affirm to be the truth.

These considerations by necessity (*anagke*) will prompt a genuine (*gnesios*, truly) *philosophos* + to propose a position (*paristemi*, to set beside and *doxa*, opinion) as follows. There seems to be (*kinduneuo*, to be daring, to venture) some kind of path (*atrapos*, short-cut) to lead us from our confusion, *ekphero* or to bear from *skopeo* +. Here the text reads in brackets *meta tou logou en te skepsei* or something like “looking with the right way.”

While we have a body...note the language, “we” as in possession of

soma...and our *psuche* is bound up with (*sumphuro* or to knead together, to mess up) such an evil or *kakos* +...never will we attain what we desire, *ktaomai* and *epithumeo*: to gain or acquire and to desire intensely.

66e-67a. It really has been shown to us that, if we are ever to have pure knowledge, we must escape from the body and observe things in themselves with the soul by itself. It seems likely that we shall, only then, when we are dead, attain that which we desire and of which we claim to be lovers, namely, wisdom, as our argument shows, not while we live; for if it is impossible to attain any pure knowledge with the body, then one of two things is true: either we can never attain knowledge or we can do so after death.¹

Deiknumi as “has been shown” implies a source which informs Socrates as to his current beliefs though they are more inferred than stated in an outright fashion. A (knowledge not in the Greek text) which is pure (*katharos*, adverb) requires (*eiseimi*: to send in) escape from the body, *apallakteon* being an adverb. In this way we can observe things in themselves, that is, with the soul. *Theatos* means to be seen with regard to *pragma* (thing, matter), *psuche* being the instrument which effects this.

Eoiken or “likely” is a key word here since it represents that which isn’t exactly certain but infers some probability as to the outcome. When we’re dead, most likely we’ll attain what we desire, *epithumeo* + as to long for (*epi-* or upon for emphasis) and that which we claim to be lovers (*erastes*), that is to say, *phronesis* +, fundamentally as purpose or attention. This will happen not while we live, *teleutao* + basically as to finish, complete. Such is our argument, *logos* + and *semaino* or to point out.

And so one of two things is true. Either we can never attain knowledge or attain it after death, the verb being *ktaomai* + or to obtain.

Then and not before, the soul is by itself apart from the body. While we live, we shall be closest to knowledge if we refrain as much as possible from association with the body and do not join with it more than we must, if we are not infected with its nature but purify ourselves from it until the god himself frees us.

Note the importance of *tote* or “then” which is a definite point of time. Here it refers to the soul apart from the body, *psuche* as *choris* (also without) *soma*.

During our physical lifetime we’re closest to knowledge (*eggus* + with

¹Though the text isn’t divided here, I split it into two parts for the convenience of inserting notations.

respect to *eido*, fundamentally as to see, provided we refrain from association with the body. The two verbs are *homileo*, to be in company with and *koinoneo* +, both in the negative. We're to join with the body not more than we have to, *anagke* meaning necessity if we're not infected with its nature (*anapimplemi* also as to fill up and *phusis*) but instead purify (*kathareuo*) ourselves from it until the god frees us, *apoluo* + also as to loosen from.

Due to the length of the following section, notations are inserted within the text.

67b-d. And if this is true, my friend, said Socrates, there is good hope that on arriving where I am going, if anywhere, I shall acquire what has been our chief preoccupation in our past life, so that the journey that is now ordered for me is full of good hope, as it is also for any other man who believes that his mind has been prepared and, as it were, purified.

The words “if this is true” are significant insofar as they cast perhaps not so much doubt on Socrates’ part but most likely concerning his attitude of some uncertainty. The same applies to the phrase “good hope” or *elpis* + modified by *polus* or much. In sum, they apply to the section just before the one at hand which discusses the relationship between true knowledge and the body, the latter often as interfering.

Socrates has in mind his destination which he puts as *allothi* or elsewhere, that being indeterminate. At the same time he shows assurance that once there (again, wherever that may be), he’ll acquire what had been his chief preoccupation or *pragmateia* (the careful prosecution of an affair) in what he describes as a past life, *parerchomai* (to pass by).

Socrates describes this as a journey or literally a leaving home (*apodemia* +) forced upon him and not of his own accord (*prostasso* or to order where *prostimates* directness). Despite this, it is a journey comprised of good hope (*elpis* modified by *agathos*, both +; compare with the same in the first paragraph) as it is with anyone else who believes (*hegeomai* + also as to suppose) that his mind (*dianoia* + also as intention, purpose) has been prepared and thus purified, *paraskeuazo* + and *kathairo*).

It certainly is, said Simmias.

Panu + also as altogether.

And does purification not turn out to be what we mentioned in our argument some time ago, namely, to separate the soul as far as possible from the body and accustom it to gather itself and collect itself out of every part of the body and to dwell by itself as far as it can both now and in the future, freed, as it were, from the bonds of

the body?

Katharsis or purification (also cleansing) is a separation of the soul from the body as far as humanly possible, *chorizo* also as to distinguish, *psuche* from *soma*. Once accomplished, there's a need to accustom *psuche* to both gather and collect itself (*sunageiro* and *haithroizo*) from every part of the body, *pantachother* also as from all places. Once this is done, the soul can dwell by itself, *oikeo* fundamentally as to be at home with respect to *to dunaton* or as far as possible. This is done both now and in the future, *nun* and *epeita* or afterwards. And so the soul will be freed from the bonds of the body, *desmos* and *ekluo* or to loosen from.

67d. It is only those who practice philosophy in the right way, we say, who always most want to free the soul; and this release and separation of the soul from the body is the preoccupation of the philosophers?

Philosopho orthos + or rightly: this is by persons wanting to free *psuche*, where the preposition *pro-* *prothumeomai* signifies earnestness. The release and separation or *luisis* and *chorismos* of the *psuche* from *soma* is the task of philosophers.

67e. In fact, Simmias, he said, those who practice philosophy in the right way are in training for dying and they fear death least of all men.

Philosopho and *orthos* (both +) as in the section just above is equivalent to *meletao* or to attend to dying. Those so engaged fear death least (*hekistos*) of everyone.

68a. Many men, at the death of their lovers, wives or sons, were willing to go to the underworld, driven by the hope of seeing there those for whose company they longed, and being with them. Will then a true lover of wisdom, who has a similar hope and knows that he will never find it to any extent except in Hades, be resentful of dying and not gladly undertake the journey thither? One must surely think so, my friend, if he is a true philosopher, for he is firmly convinced that he will not find pure knowledge anywhere except there.

In a way, this excerpt speaks in the most eloquent fashion about life and death because of a concrete example affecting us all. Many are willing to go

(*ethelo* and *meterchomai*, to go after) literally into Hades in the hope of seeing (*elpis* + and *horao*) those for whose company they longed and to be with them. Note the two prepositions, *epi-* and *sun-* or upon and with: *epithumeo* + and *sunistemi*.

The verb *erao* or to love is with the noun *phronesis* + (purpose, attention) which represents a person with a similar hope (*elpis* +), the verb being *lambano* + (to take, to receive with *sphodra*, exceedingly. Never will he find it except in Hades, the verb being *entugchano* or to hit upon and not resent dying, gladly (*asmenos*, readily) undertaking the journey there.

One must think so, *oiomai* + or to suppose, provided this type of person is a *philosophos* + who's firmly convinced (*sphodra* and *dokeo*, both +) that only there he'll find pure knowledge, *phronesis* + with the adverb *katharos*; the verb being *entugchano* +.

68c-d. And the quality of moderation which even the majority call by that name, that is, not to get swept off one's feet by one's passions, but to treat them with disdain and orderliness, is this not suited only to those who most of all despise the body and live the life of philosophy?

Sophrosune also as discretion consists in not getting swept off one's feet by passions, *ptoao* also to be scared and *epithumia*, intense longing made the more so by the preposition *epi-*, upon. Instead, one must treat the passions with two opposites, disdain and orderliness, *oligoros* and *kosmios*, little esteem and comeliness. This is suited to those who despise the body (*oligoreo*, to treat lightly) and live the life of *philosophia* + (*zao en*).

69e-70a. When Socrates finished, Cebes intervened: Socrates, he said, everything else you said is excellent, I think, but men find it very hard to believe what you said about the soul. They think that after it has left the body it no longer exists anywhere, but that it is destroyed and dissolved on the day the man dies, as soon as it leaves the body.

Cebes agrees with what Socrates has just said with arrival in the next world, however, men find it difficult to believe (much disbelief or *polus* + modifying *apistia*) his words about the soul or *psuche*. They believe that having left the *soma* (*apallage* + also as release), it no longer exists, *oudamou eti* or no

longer still. Instead, it's destroyed and dissolved upon death, *diaphtheiro* and *apollumi*. Note the two prepositions, *dia-* and *apo-*, through and from. This happens at once (*euthus* and *apallasso*) with the soul leaves the *soma*.

70c-d. Let us examine it in some such a manner as this: whether the souls of men who have died exist in the underworld or not. We recall an ancient theory that souls arriving there come from here, and then again that they arrive here and are born here from the dead. If that is true, that the living come back from the dead, then surely our souls must exist there, for they could not come back if they did not exist, and this is a sufficient proof that these things are so if it truly appears that the living never come from any other source than from the dead.

Skopeo + is the verb to examine also to look about, to look carefully. The object is whether or not *psuche* exist in Hades or not, *teleutao* + to complete, to finish. Socrates recalls an ancient theory, a *logos* + which is *palaios* where *psuche* which have arrived there come from here, *ekei/enthende* and then reverse the journey, if you will, by being born from the dead. Thus our *psuche* must exist *ekei* +. They couldn't return if they didn't exist. Such is proof (*tekmerion*, a sure sign or token modified by *hikanos* or worthy) that these are as such, that the living have the dead as their source.

72d-73a. I think, Cebes, said he, that this is very definitely the case and that we were not deceived when we agreed on this: coming to life again in truth exists, the living come to be from the dead, and the souls of the dead exist. Furthermore, Socrates, Cebes rejoined, such is also the case if that theory is true that you are accustomed to mention frequently, that for us learning is no other than recollection. According to this, we must at some previous time have learned what we now recollect. This is possible only if our soul existed somewhere before it took on this human shape. So according to this theory too, the soul is likely to be something immortal.

The preposition *ex-* or from prefaced to *exapatao* + emphasizes the fact that we (Cebes and Socrates) weren't deceived with the fact that coming to life again (*anabioskomai*) indeed exists...the living come from the dead...and *psuche* of the dead exist.

Logos + here as a position held by Socrates as true, *hupolambano* (to hold up) and *alethes* +, one he's accustomed to mention frequently (*eiiothas* with

thama), namely, that learning = recollection, *mathesis* = *anamnesis*.

With this in mind, at some previous time (*chronos*, conventional time) we have learned what we now recollect, *manthano* -> *anamimnesko*. This is impossible (*adunatos*, without capacity) unless our *psuche* had existed somewhere (*prin* or before) it assumed human form, *eidos*. According to this, the *psuche* is likely to be deathless, *athanatos*. Note the importance of *eoiken* + or likely which infers some uncertainty, not necessarily doubt.

73d. Well, you know what happens to lovers: whenever they see a lyre, garment or anything else that their beloved is accustomed to use, they know the lyre, and the image of the boy to whom it belongs comes into their mind. This is recollection, just as someone, on seeing Simmias, often recollects Cebes, and there are thousands of other such occurrences.

This is one of those excerpts which get to the point immediately by presenting a concrete example. *Erastes* + or lover, one with *eros*. Whenever such a one sees a personal belonging to their beloved, it acts as an image or *eidos* + of the beloved. Such is a perfect example of recollection or *anamnesis* +.

74e. Whenever someone, on seeing something, realizes that that which he now sees wants to be like some other reality but falls short and cannot be like that other since it is inferior, do we agree that the one who thinks this must have prior knowledge of that to which he says it is like, but deficiently so? Necessarily.

Seeing (*horao* +) something makes one want to be like another reality (*allo ti*) but falls short and cannot be like it since it's inferior, *phaulos* + also as slight, trivial. And don't we agree that the person who thinks (*ennoeo*, to consider) this must have prior knowledge (note the *pro-* or before of *prooida*) of that thing which he says the other resembles albeit inadequately (note the *pros-* or direction toward-which prefaced to *proseoika* and *endeos*, also as lacking)?

79d. But when the soul investigates by itself it passes into the realm of what is pure, ever existing, immortal and unchanging, and being akin to this, it always stays with it whenever it is by itself and can do so; it ceases to stray and remains in the same state as it is in touch with things of the same kind, and its experience then is what is

called wisdom?

Skopeo + or to consider *kath' hauten* (according to itself), it moves (*oichomai*, to go or to come) into that which is *katharos*, *aei*, *athanatos*² and *hosautos echo* (pure, always or eternal, undying and being as such). And so being akin (*suggenes*) to this, it always (*aei* +) staying with it whenever it is by itself (*kath' hauten*) and can do thus. The soul ceases to stray (*pauo* with regard to *planos* or wandering) and is always (*aei* +) by itself, *hosautos echo* + as pertaining to things (*ephapto*, to touch upon) of the same kind. Thus this condition or *pathema* (a passive emotion) is called wisdom *phronesis* +, also purpose, attention.

Because the following section comprises one unit, notations are inserted within the text.

80e-81a. If the soul is pure when it leaves the body and drags nothing bodily with it, as it had no willing association with the body in life, but avoided it and gathered itself together by itself and always practiced this, which is no other than practicing philosophy in the right way, in fact, training to die easily. Or is this not training for death?

If the *psuche* is pure or *katharos* + upon leaving the *soma*³ (*apallasso*) and drags nothing corporeal with it (*sunepheuko*: *sun-* and *epi-* or with and upon prefaced to the verbal root) inasmuch as it had no willing association (*koinoneo* +) with the body in life, but instead avoided (*pheugo* +) it and gathered itself (*sunathroizo*, to gather into one mass, *sun-* or with), having always done (*melatao*, to attend, to pursue) this—it's nothing else than practicing philosophy in the proper manner, *philosopheo orthos* + and in fact is practicing (*meletao* +) to die easily, *rhadios* + or in a light manner.

It surely is.

Pantapasi: the adjective *pan* or all in two forms jammed together.

A soul in this state makes its way to the invisible, which is like itself, the divine and immortal and wise, and arriving there it can be happy, having rid itself of confusion, ignorance, fear, violent desires and the other human ills and, as is said of the initiates, truly spend the rest of time with the gods. Shall we say this, Cebes, or something different?

Therefore a soul literally in a similar condition departs (*aperchomai*, to leave from) for Hades, that is, the divine, immortal and wise (*theios*, *athanatos* + and *phronimos*). Having arrived there (*aphikeomai*, to reach), it is happy,

²The first three words +.

³*Psuche* and *soma* not explicitly mentioned.

eudaimoneo also as blessed, prosperous. The soul has been delivered of (*apallasso* +) wandering, ignorance, fear, irrational desire and other human evils: *plane*, *anoia*, *phobeo*, *erotao* or to lust with respect to *agrios* or what is wild, uncultivated and *kakos*, evils.

Just as it's claimed with regard to initiates (*mueo*, to initiate into mysteries), they spend their time (*chronos* +) with the gods, *diago*, literally to carry through.

81e. It is indeed, Cebes. Moreover, these are not the souls of good but of inferior men, which are forced to wander there, paying the penalty for their previous bad upbringing. They wander until their longing for that which accompanies them, the physical, again imprisons them in a body, and they are then, as is likely, bound to such characters as they have practiced in their life.

Agathos vs. *phaulos* (both +), good vs. inferior souls are compelled to wander (*anagkazo* + and *planao*), paying the penalty (*dike*) for their previous bad conduct, *kakos* + and *trophe*, upbringing.

They wander (*planao* +) until their craving or *epithumia* + (intense, desire, *epi-* as upon) pursues them, *sunepakoloutho* (*sun-* and *epi-* or with and upon prefaced to the verb) or that which is corporeal, *somatoeides* (body-like). Then again this longing imprisons them in a body, *endeo* (to bind in) with *eis* or into *soma*. The result? Such persons are attached (*meletao* +, to attend) to the same character (*ethe*, custom) which they developed (*tugchano*, to hit upon) in life.

82c. No one may join the company of the gods who has not practiced philosophy and is not completely pure when he departs from life, no one but the lover of learning. It is for this reason, my friends Simmias and Cebes, that those who practice philosophy in the right way keep away from all bodily passions, master them and do not surrender themselves to them.

Eis or into with respect to *genos* (stock, family) as connected with persons who engage in *philosopheo* +. Such a person must be completely pure (*pantelos* or wholly and *katharos* +) who departing this life, *aphikneomai*, that is, the lover of learning, *philomathes*.

Those practicing *philosophos* + with the adverb *orthos* + or rightly keep away from bodily passion, *aperchomai* + or to depart with regard to *epithumia* + according to (*kata*) *soma*. Also they must master them and not surrender to them,

kartereo and *paradidomai* to be steadfast and to hand over to be beside.

83a-b. As I say, the lovers of learning know that philosophy gets hold of their soul when it is in that state, then gently encourages it and tries to free it by showing them that investigation through the eyes is full of deceit, as is that through the ears and the other senses. Philosophy then persuades the soul to withdraw from the senses in so far as it is not compelled to use them and bids the soul to gather itself together by itself, to trust only itself and whatever reality, existing by itself, the soul by itself understands, and not to consider as true whatever it examines by other means, for this is different in different circumstances and is sensible and visible, whereas what the soul itself sees is intelligible and invisible. The soul of the true philosopher thinks that this deliverance must not be opposed and so keeps away from pleasures and desires and pains as far as he can.

Philomathes + or lovers of learning know that *philosophia* + lays hold of their soul (*paralambano*, to take beside and *psuche*). Next it gently encourages it and attempts to free it (*paramutheomai* and *luo* +, to exhort while beside and to loosen) by showing (*endeiknumi*) that visual investigation (*skepsis*) is full of deceit (*apate*); the same applies with regard to other senses, *aisthesis* +.

Philosophia + then persuades (*peitho*) the soul to withdraw from the senses (*anachoreo*, to withdraw to up or upon with regard to *aisthesis* +, feeling) as far as it isn't forced (*anagke* +) to use them. It bids (*sullego*) the soul to gather (*athroizo*, also to must) itself to (*eis*, into) itself and trust only itself, *parakaleuo* also to summon beside or near.

Also whatever reality existing by itself the soul understands by itself (*noeo*) and doesn't consider as true (*hegeomai* and *alethes*, both +) whatever it examines by other means, *skopeo* +. This is different in different ways (*allos*, another) and is sensible and visible (*aisthetos* and *horatos*) whereas what the soul sees is intelligible and invisible, *noetos* and *aides*.

The *psuche* of the true (*alethes* and *philosophos*, both +) mustn't think (*oiomai* +) that it has to reject this opportunity for release (*enantioomai* and *luisis*, loosening), so as far as possible (*dunamai* +) it abstains from (*apecho*) giving way to pleasure, desire and pains (*hedone*, *epithumia* ⁴ and *lupe*).

83d. Because every pleasure or pain provides, as it were, another nail to rivet the

⁴The first two words +.

soul to the body and to weld them together. It makes the soul corporeal, so that it believes that truth is what the body says it is. As it shares the beliefs and delights of the body, I think it inevitably comes to share its ways and manner of life and is unable ever to reach Hades in a pure state; it is always full of body when it departs, so that it soon falls back into another body and grows with it as if it had been sewn into it. Because of this, it can have no part in the company of the divine, the pure and uniform.

Hedone and *lupe* (both +) or pleasure and pain act as a nail to rivet the soul to the body, the preposition *pros-* of *proseloo* or to nail indicative of direction action with *pros* as free-standing regarding *soma*. Thus the two are welded together, *prosperanao*, another *pros-* prefaced to the verb, to fasten with a pin. This makes the soul corporeal, *somatoeides* + (like the *soma*) with the result that the soul believes true (*alethes* +) is what the body claims.

Sharing the beliefs and delights of the body, inevitably it comes to share its ways and manner of living, *homodoexo* and *chairo* +: to share the same opinion and to rejoice. Two words prefaced with *homoios*, like or similar, *homotropos* and *homotrophos*: same manner of life and same habits. Thus the soul cannot reach (*eis*, into) Hades in a pure state, *katharos* +. Always it's full of body upon its departure, *aphikneomai* + with the result that it falls back into another body and grows with it as it had been sewn into it: *pipto*, *speiro* and *emphuo* to fall, to sow and to rooted in. Thus the soul cannot partake of (*sunimi*, to be with) the company of the divine which is pure and uniform: *theios*, *katharos*⁵ and *monoeides* (one form).

84a-b. The soul of the philosopher achieves a calm from such emotions; it follows reason and ever stays with it contemplating the true, the divine, which is not the object of opinion. Nurtured by this, it believes that one should live in this manner as long as one is alive and, after death, arrive at what is akin and of the same kind, and escape from human evils. After such nurture there is no danger, Simmias and Cebes, that one should fear that, on parting from the body, the soul would be scattered and dissipated by the winds and no longer be anything anywhere.

Psuche of the *philosophos* + achieves a calm from such emotions, a verb prefaced with *para-* or beside, near: *paraskeuazo* + (to provide, procure) with regard to *galene* or stillness. It follows reason and remains with it while

⁵The first two words +.

contemplating (*epomai* and *logismos* +: to follow and reckoning) the true and the divine (*alethes* and *theios* +) which don't fall under the category of opinion, *adoxastos* (alpha privative).

Nurtured (*trephe*) by this, it maintains (*oiomai* +) that a person should live as such while alive and after death (*teleutao* +: to come to an end), arrive at (*aphikneomai* + with *eis*, into) what is akin and of the same kind (*suggenes* + and to *toiouton* as such), thereby escaping human evils, *apallasso* and *kakos*, both +.

After such nurture or *trophe* + there's no danger to fear (*deinos* and *phobeo* +) that leaving the body (*apallage* + and *soma*), the soul would be scattered and dissipated (two verbs prefaced with *dia-* or through, *diphusao* and *diaptoeo*: to blow every which way and to startle) and no longer be anywhere (*ouden* and *oudamou* +).

85b. Nor do the swans, but I believe that as they belong to Apollo, they are prophetic, have knowledge of the future and sing of the blessings of the underworld, sing and rejoice on that day beyond what they did before. As I believe myself to be a fellow servant with the swans and dedicated to the same god, and have received from my master a gift of prophecy not inferior to theirs, I am no more despondent than they on leaving life.

Because swans (*kuknos*, also as a minstrel) belong to Apollo and thus signify music, prophecy and grace. Also this is the origin of the phrase "swan song," the final performance of a poet.

Swans have knowledge of the future, *mantikos* and *proeido*: belonging to a soothsayer and *prooida* +) and sing of the blessings (*agathos* +) of Hades. Socrates believes to be a fellow servant (*hegemai* and *homodoulos*) as well as dedicated to the same god, *hieros* or holy. Also he has received from his master a gift of prophesy (*mantike* as *para* or from beside *despotes* ⁶ or master) not inferior to theirs. Also he was no more sad (*dusthumos*, *dus-* as destroying the good sense of a word) than the swans on leaving life, *apallasso* +.

85e-86a. One might make the same argument about harmony, lyre and strings, that a harmony is something invisible, without body, beautiful and divine in the attuned

⁶Socrates did not have a formal master or teacher but was influenced by Archelaus (natural philosophy) and the female philosopher Aspasia who taught him rhetoric. Socrates also studied the writing of Anaxagoras (introduced the concept of *nous* or mind) and was influenced by the sophist Prodicus.

lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are physical, bodily, composite, earthy and akin to what is mortal. Then if someone breaks the lyre, cuts or breaks the strings and then insists, using the same argument as you, that the harmony must still exist and is not destroyed because it would be impossible for the lyre and the strings, which are mortal, still to exist when the strings are broken, and for the harmony, which is akin and of the same nature as the divine and immortal, to be destroyed before that which is mortal; he would say that the harmony itself still must exist and that the wood and the strings must rot before the harmony can suffer.

Harmonia of an attuned lyre is invisible, without body, beautiful and divine or *aoratos*, *asomatos* and *pagkalos*. On the other hand, the musical instrument itself is the exact opposite, basically akin to what is mortal, *thnetos*. Should someone break the lyre, *harmonia* + continues to exist. On the other hand, *harmonia* being akin to the divine or *theios* + continues to exist.

106e-107a. Then when death comes to man, the mortal part of him dies, it seems, but his deathless part goes away safe and indestructible, yielding the place to death.—So it appears.

Therefore the soul, Cebes, he said, is most certainly deathless and indestructible and our souls will really dwell in the underworld.

Athanatos + and *adiaphthoros* (immortal and incorruptible) as belonging to *psuche*. The words *an eie* rendered “it seems” express a certain improbability.

107c-d. It is right to think then, gentlemen, that if the soul is immortal, it requires our care not only for the time we call our life, but for the sake of all time, and that one is in terrible danger if one does not give it that care. If death were escape from everything, it would be a great boon to the wicked to get rid of the body and of their wickedness together with their soul. But now that the soul appears to be immortal, there is no escape from evil or salvation for it except by becoming as good and wise as possible, for the soul goes to the underworld possessing nothing but its education and upbringing, which are said to bring the greatest benefit or harm to the dead right at the beginning of the journey yonder.

The words “if the soul is immortal” (*psuche* modified by *athanatos* +) again express a certain improbability. Acceptance of this reality demands our solicitude (the preposition *epi-* or upon prefaced to *epimeleia* emphasizes this

care) not just during our lives but for all time or *chronos* +. A person is in dire straits if he doesn't provide this care, *kindunos* also as danger modified by *deinos* + or frightful.

If death was an escape (*apallage* +) from everything, it would be a great benefit (*hermaion* or god-send) for those who are evil (*kakos* +), that is, to get rid of (*apallasso* +) the body and wickedness (*kakia*) along with their soul, *soma* and *psuche*).

Because the *psuche* appear to be immortal (*phaino* and *athanatos*, both +)–again note the element of uncertainty–there is no escape from evil or salvation (*kakos* + in the plural, *apophuge* and *soteria*) except by becoming as good and wise as possible, *beltistos* and *phronimos* +, the former as superlative of *agathos*. The reason? The soul goes to (*eis*) Hades possessing only its education and upbringing, *paideia* and *trophe* +, the former as a lifelong educative process. Both are intended–again, “are said” that element of uncertainty–to bring the greatest boon. This is comprised of the verbs *opheleo* and *blapto*, to be useful and to harm with respect to the newly dead, *teleutao* +. It is to happen at the beginning (*arche* also as first principle) of its journey over there, *poreia* and *ekeise* +.

107d-108a. We are told that when each person dies, the guardian spirit who was allotted to him in life proceeds to lead him to a certain place, whence those who have been gathered together there must, after being judged, proceed to the underworld with the guide who has been appointed to lead them thither from here. Having there undergone what they must and stayed there the appointed time, they are led back here by another guide after long periods of time. The journey is not as Aeschylus' *Telephus* describes it. He says that only one single path leads to Hades, but I think it is neither one nor simple, for then there would be no need of guides; one could not make any mistake if there were but one path. As it is, it is likely to have many forks and crossroads; and I base this judgment on the sacred rites and customs here.

The words “we are told” comprise another element of uncertainty and Socrates' dependence upon others with regard to “when each person dies.” A *daimon* as controlling the destiny of an individual which has been allotted to him or her (*teleutao* +) leads this person to a certain place, *epicheireo* + and *topos*. Once there, he or she will be judged and proceed to (*eis*) Hades, *diadikazo* and *sullego* +, *dia-* as through signifying a more thorough examination. A guide (*hegemoneo*, to lead the way) has been assigned to lead each person, *protasso* and *poreuo*, that is *enthende* to *ekeise* +.

Such souls must undergo what's required of them and remain in Hades for an appointed time, *tugchano* + and *meno* after which they're guided back here, *palin* or again with *hegemoneo* (both +) but only after a long period of time, *chronos* + modified by *polus* + and *makros* with respect to *chronos* +.

Socrates disagrees with Telephus (son of Hercules) who claims that just one path (*poreia* +) leads to Hades. Instead, it's (*phaino* +) neither one nor simple (*aploos*); if so, there's no need for guides, *hegemoneo* +. A soul would not make a mistake if there's just one path, the preposition *dia-* or through emphasizing the possibility to err, *diamartano*. Instead, the path likely will have many divergent ones, *eoike* + again expressing uncertainty as to what's involved. Nevertheless, Socrates bases his judgment upon sacred rites and customs (*susios* and *nomimos*) here, *enthade*. Thus *enthade* is the basis for any reference for what will happen upon death.

108a-b. The well-ordered and wise soul follows the guide and is not without familiarity with its surroundings, but the soul that is passionately attached to the body, as I said before, hovers around it and the visible world for a long time, struggling and suffering much until it is led away by force and with difficulty by its appointed spirit.

A comparison between two types of *psuche*. The first is *kosmios* and *phronimos*, both + which follows the guide (*epomai* +) and knows (*agnoeo* or to be ignorant with the negative) those things which are present in the sense of being beside or in close proximity, the *para-* of *pariemi*.

The other *psuche* which is passionately attached to the body, the adverb *epithumetikos* (strong desire signified by the preposition *epi-*, upon) hovers around it and the visible world, *epomai* + and *topos* which is *horatos* (all three +). It does so for much time or *chronos* +.

108c. On the other hand, the soul that has led a pure and moderate life finds fellow travelers and gods to guide it, and each of them dwells in a place suited to it.

Dierchomai literally as to lead through is in reference to a soul which has led a pure and moderate life, *katharos* and *metrios* (both adverbs, the latter in proper or measured fashion). Such a one finds (*tugchano* + or to hit upon) fellow travelers and gods as guides, *sunemperos* and *theos* with each dwelling in a place

suited for it, *oikeo* + and *proseko*, the latter with *pros-* indicative of directness.

113d. When the dead arrive at the place to which each has been led by his guardian spirit, they are first judged as to whether they have led a good and pious life. Those who have lived an average life make their way to the Acheron and embark upon such vessels as there are for them and proceed to the lake. There they dwell and are purified by penalties for any wrongdoing they may have committed; they are also suitably rewarded for their good deeds as each deserves.

Those who are dead are represented by the verb *teleutao* and arrive (*aphikneomai* with *eis* or into, both +) at their assigned place or *topos* +, that is, having been brought there by respective *daimon* + with *komizo* (to take care of). First they're judged (*diadikazo* +) as to whether or not they had lived a good and pious life, the adverbs *kalos* and *hosios*, the latter also as holy.

Those who had lived an average life (the adverb *mesos* indicative of middle of the road) go to the Acheron depicted as the entrance to the Greek underworld where souls must be ferried across by Charon. There they abide and are purified (*oikeo* and *kathairo*, both +) by penalties for any wrong-doing (*dike* + and *adikema*). Also they are rewarded (*phero* or to carry with time also as honor) for their good deeds, *euergeteo*.

114c. Those who are deemed to have lived an extremely pious life are freed and released from the regions of the earth as from a prison; they make their way up to a pure dwelling place and live on the surface of the earth. Those who have purified themselves sufficiently by philosophy live in the future altogether without a body; they make their way to even more beautiful dwelling places which it is hard to describe clearly, nor do we now have the time to do so.

Diapherontos and *hosios* + are two adverbs, especially and piously, applied to those who are freed and released (*eleutheroo* and *apallasso* +) from earthly places or *topos* + as from a prison, *desmoterion*. They progress up to a pure dwelling place (*aphikneomai* +, *oikesis* modified by *katharos* +) and live (*oikizo*) on the earth's surface.

Those who have purified themselves in a sufficient manner (*kathairo* + and *hikanos*, adverb) by *philosophia* + live in the future (*eis* or into with regard to *epeita* +) minus a body or *soma*. They advance to an even more beautiful dwelling (*aphikneomai*, *eis* or into *oikesis* modified by *kallos*, all three +) which is difficult to

describe clearly (*deloo* and *rhadios* +).

114d-115a. No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places, since the soul is evidently immortal, and a man should repeat this to himself as if it were an incantation, which is why I have been prolonging my tale. That is the reason why a man should be of good cheer about his own soul, if during life he has ignored the pleasures of the body and its ornamentation as of no concern to him and doing him more harm than good, but has seriously concerned himself with the pleasures of learning, and adorned his soul not with alien but with its own ornaments, namely, moderation, righteousness, courage, freedom and truth, and in that state awaits his journey to the underworld.

Diischurizomai or to rely or affirm (*dierchomai* +) here in the negative with regard to agreeing (*prepo*, also to suit) with what Socrates had described, *nous* with *echo* or mind (both +) and to have. However, this or something like it is a true account of our souls and their dwelling places, *psuche* and *oikesis* +. The reason is that the *psuche* appears to be immortal, *athanatos* +. The verb *phaino* + suggests a certain improbability. This, it seems, is a worthy venture, *prepo* and *kinduneuo*, both +. The verb *dokeo* + again shows some improbability. And so Socrates is prolonging his account, *muthos* +.

For this reason one should be courageous (*tharseo*) about his *psuche* provided that he had ignored bodily pleasures and ornamentations (*hedone*, *soma* and *kosmos* ⁷) which are of no concern, *allotrios* as belonging to another. They do more harm than good, *apergazomai*, to finish off.

Instead, such a person has concerned himself with the pleasures of learning, *spoudazo* or to be busy with and *manthano* + and has adorned his soul (*kosmeo* and *psuche*) not with alien ornaments (*kosmos* modified by *allotrios*, both +) but those of his own: moderation, righteousness, courage, freedom and truth (*sophrosune*, *dikaiosune*, *andreia*, *eleutheria* and *aletheia* ⁸). With these he awaits his journey (*perimeno* or to remain around and *poreia* +) to (*eis*) Hades.

116a. So we stayed, talking among ourselves, questioning what had been said, and

⁷The first two words +.

⁸The first two words and the last one +.

then again talking of the great misfortune that had befallen us. We all felt as if we had lost a father and would be orphaned for the rest of our lives.

Perimeno + or here as to stay with regard to Socrates' friends while he went into another room to bathe talking about the current misfortune, *sumphora* also as event, circumstance. One can't help but wonder what he was thinking while in there.

Socrates' friends felt as having lost a father and would be orphaned hereafter, *epeita* +. In other words, such words reveal that the extensive dialogue Socrates had with these people had not registered on them. The two words that stand out are about to be orphaned and *epeita* or for all time afterwards.

117c. And while he was saying this, he was holding the cup, and then drained it calmly and easily. Most of us had been able to hold back our tears reasonably well up till then, but when we saw him drinking it and after he drank it, we could hold them back no longer; my own tears came in floods against my will. So I covered my face. I was weeping for myself, not for him—for my misfortune in being deprived of such a comrade. Even before me, Crito was unable to restrain his tears and got up.

The key words here are from *Phaedo* when he says that he was weeping for himself, not for Socrates. That is to say, he and those with him were being deprived or robbed of such a friend, *stereo* and *hetairos* also as companion.

118a. these were his last words—"Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius; make this offering to him and do not forget."—"It shall be done," said Crito.

It's important to conclude these excerpts with Socrates' final words. A footnote in Cooper's book says that "A cock was sacrificed to Asclepius by sick people who slept in his temples hoping for a cure. Socrates apparently means that death is a cure for the ills of life." And so Socrates was in a process of recovering, not dying. He was entering not into death but into life.

Obviously this example is contrasted with the death of Jesus Christ. The two have similarities or parallels. However, it is not the goal here to compare them. That's beyond the scope of this simple document.